Manuel Caleca, Monk of the Order of Preachers

ANNO DOMINI MCCCLV.

MANUEL CALECA MONK OF THE ORDER OF FRIARS PREACHERS. PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

NOTITIA.

(FABRIC. HARLES, *Bibliotheca Græca*, vol. XI.)

Manuel Caleca, a Greek ^A of the family of John Caleca, patriarch of Constantinople from the year 1333 to 1347 ^B, wrote on behalf of the Latins against his own fellow Greeks, and among the monks of the Order of Preachers ^C he professed his name, just as Pantaleo did. He lived not at the time of the Council of Lyons in the year 1274 ^D, but after the errors disseminated by Palamas, whom he refutes at length in a volume, and thus he lived around the year 1360, as H. Wharton correctly notes in the *Appendix to Cave* [E]. His writings are:

1. *Four Books against the errors of the Greeks concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit*, concerning which work Petavius (*Dogma. theol. de Trinitate*, c. 1) says: "Manuel Caleca, a learned and Catholic author, whose excellent volume I possess in favor of the Latins against the Greeks, in which he discourses most abundantly and precisely on the procession of the Holy Spirit, so that nothing more learned or subtle could be written on this subject." Besides Petavius, Allatius produces passages from it in Greek in his *book De purgatorio*, p. 12 seq., and *De consensu*, pp. 1332, 1533, 1360. This work has hitherto seen the light in print only in the Latin version which Ambrosius Camaldulensis composed at the command of Pope Martin V, and which Petrus Stevartius edited from the Bavarian library with notes, Ingolstadt, 1616, 4to; it was reprinted with the same notes in the *Bibl. patrum*, vol. XVI, Cologne edition [col. 1618, vol. XIV, p. 257, in the *Cat. bibl. Leidens.* p. 33] and vol. XXVI, Lyons edition, p. 382 sqq. In the fourth book, Caleca briefly pursues and touches upon many other heads in which the Latin Church is reproached by the Greeks or dissents from them [FABR.]; ms. at Rome in the Vatican library no. 4064, translated by the monk Ambrosius. At Milan, in the Ambrosian library. In the Mazarin library and the library of de Mesme, a manuscript of Man. Caleca is found without the title of the book. See Montfaucon, *Bibl. biblioth. mss.*, p. 114 B, and 157 D, p. 513 E, p. 1308 D, and 1327 C. At Venice, in the Greek codex 159 of the Marcian library, at the end of the book, there is a note in Latin concerning the author and the argument of the book, the author of which [atque]: "Here," he says, "this most illustrious man of great virtues died at Mitylene in the chapel of Saint John in 1410." Ibid., in the Latin codex 138, the same work, translated by Ambrosius Camaldulensis. See *Cat. codd. Gr. Marc.*, p. 90, and Lat. p. 79, add shortly after, § 17, init. [HARL.]

2. *On Essence and Operation*, a work against the tome of Gregory Palamas, approved in the synod of Constantinople, edited in Greek and Latin with notes by François Combefis, vol. II of the *Auctarium novissimum Bibl. Patrum*, p. 1, 67; Paris, 1672 fol. In Latin from Combefis's version, vol. XXVI of the *Bibl. Patrum Lugd.*, p. 321 sqq. The tome itself, promulgated in the year 1351 in the synod under Emperor John Cantacuzenus and Callistus Xanthopulus, patriarch of Constantinople, was published in Greek and Latin by Combefis, p. 135-176 [FABR.]. Paris, in the public library, codex 1279 [HARL.].

3. *On faith and concerning the principles of the catholic faith*, a remarkable book distributed into ten chapters, in which Combefis praises the elegance of the style, the clarity, and the solidity of the doctrine, especially from the tradition of the Fathers; he edited it in Greek and Latin in the same *Auctarium novissimum*.

vol. II, p. 174, 285 [al. p. 182-197] with notes. Thence it was reprinted in Latin, with the notes omitted, in volume XXVI of the *Bibl. Patrum Lugd.*, p. 345. Jacobus Pontanus had given a Latin translation of the same work by Calecas, which was divided into two books; Labbe promised to edit this in the second volume of *De scriptoribus eccles.*, page 45. Allatius testifies that he had read this same work in Greek with the greatest pleasure of mind, from a manuscript in the monastery of St. Ambrose in Milan, of the year 6910, which would be 1402 of Christ, perhaps written not long after Calecas' own time. Arcudius, praising the same man, in chapter 7, calls Calecas a man truly worthy of ancient Greece, and a Catholic. The same man is called a person of great learning and faith by Franciscus Turrianus in his book on the VI and VIII synods. (FABR.) Florence, in the Laurentian Library, codex 13, n. 41, plut. 74, "Mode of Confession" (*τῆς ἐξομολογήσεως*), by Man. Calecas: an interpretation from the Latin, or a form of confession and absolution of sins according to the rite of the Latins, translated into the Greek language by Man. Calecas, beginning: *Ἐξομολογοῦμαι τῷ Κυρίῳ μου, τῷ Θεῷ μου*, etc. There follow the prerogatives of sacramental confession, which are numbered fifteen, and their explanations. See Bandini, *Cat. codd. Gr. Laur.*, vol. III, p. 110. — Munich, in Bavarian codex 127 (see the catalogue of Greek mss. of Bavaria, p. 53; numbered by Hardt as codex 202), on the elements of the Catholic faith according to the tradition of the holy Scripture and the Catholic doctors. (HARL.). [See] p. 855, on the agreement, which as far as I know is unpublished. It begins: *Τῶν παλαιῶν αἱρετικῶν ἦν*. Against Creyghton. Regarding the book on the Simeonites, p. 115. It begins: *Ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος πανταχοῦ*. [See above, vol. X, p. 327.] Regarding the Simeonites p. 112. [See above, vol. X, p. 240.] On the work of Macarius Chrysocephalus on Luke, our Wolf suspects in his *Diss. de catenis Patrum*, p. 32, that this refers to Manuel Calecas. (FABR.) Compare above, vol. VI, p. 325. — A certain grammar by Man. Calecas, Paris, in Mazarin codex 91. See Montfaucon, *Bibl. biblioth. mss.*, p. 1319 E. (HARL.) — [Letters of Calecas to Joannicius, in the Vossian codex. See *Cat. mss. Angliae etc.*, vol. II, n. 2240.] The hymn, *Te Deum laudamus*, translated into Greek by Calecas, as it is read in the margin of the Florentine Laurentian codex n. 2, plut. 4. Others attribute that version of the Ambrosian hymn to the monk Sisebutus, who lived in the eleventh century, others to others. See Bandini, *Cat. codd. Gr. Laur. I*, p. 533. Calecas' monody on Meledon, ibid., in codex Laur. 13 n. 49, plut. 74. See Bandini, *l. c. III*, p. 106. A letter of Demetrius Cydones to Calecas, in Coislin codex 315, at the end. See Montfaucon, *Bibl. Coislin.*, n. 429. (HARL.)

MANUEL CALECAS: AGAINST THE ERRORS OF THE GREEKS, FOUR BOOKS

Olim Latine versi ab Ambrosio Camaldulensi; postea ex bibliotheca Bavarica in lucem prolati et notis illustrati a Petro Stevartio, Leodio, SS. Theologiæ D. professore, et Academiæ Ingolstadiensis procancellario, etc.

PREFACE.

To the most holy and blessed Pope Martin, Ambrosius.

I have obeyed your instructions, most blessed father, and have promptly and obediently translated from the Greek that work of the illustrious and learned man Manuel Calecas against the errors of Greek levity, which the distinguished student of theology, Master Antonius Massanus, fired with zeal for the faith, brought back with him from Constantinople, the royal city, and which I hope I have done fittingly and usefully. In this work, that excellent man performed the office of the task he had undertaken in such a way that (in my own judgment) he allowed no diligence to be found wanting in himself. For, as was appropriate in a matter of such importance, he proceeded cautiously ^A

and proceeds with subtlety according to the dignity of the subject matter, and, like an illustrious warrior, defeats them mainly with their own weapons; and he reveals, uncovers, bares, and pulls up by the very roots, so to speak, the inveterate error—or rather, the inborn love of contention—from its foundations. ^A I, for my part, translated this the more willingly, both because it was enjoined upon me by you, to whom I owe service in all fidelity, and out of respect for an ancient race, long renowned and illustrious in every kind of praise. For who does not know that the Greeks formerly excelled almost all mortals in wisdom and eloquence, as well as in faith, religion, and the other merits of virtue? It was with difficulty—as was fitting—and with distress that I felt that they had been for too long hindered and ensnared by traps and nets of this kind; and for that reason, having been already for a long time so crushed and consumed by supreme calamities that they preserve scarcely any vestige of their former glory and dignity: I desired that, with you as the chief author and guide, it might be restored, if not to its former dignity, at least to its pristine holiness and appearance; for it is surely greater than what we might hope for, that it be at least delivered from internecine destruction.

For it is your role, and you understand it to be so, most blessed Pope, to recall erring men to the right path, and by the imitation of the true and eternal Shepherd, whose place you hold on earth, to seek diligently for the lost sheep, which has been ill-freed from the mazes of devious error and is walking toward its own destruction, and once found and placed upon your holy shoulders, to bring it back to the flock. It is, I say, primarily within your glory to undertake such a divine work, so noble an achievement, with the full intention of your soul, and to omit no diligence until you accomplish it; so that the pastor by whom the Western Church, divided many years ago, has been united, may also, by his authority, cause the Eastern Church, separated by a far greater and worse schism, to be joined under one head to the rest of the body of the Church: lest, being longer scattered from the rest of the structure, it be a prey and food for the Barbarians; or lest the Christian name be utterly removed from where it first sprang up, than which what can be said that is more grievous, or what can be thought that is more unworthy?

I congratulate your holy mind, most blessed Lord; I congratulate your happiness, and I marvel exceedingly that you have been divinely prompted to this work, than which nothing could be more glorious or more illustrious. If you should be able to effect this—and you will be able, by the mercy of Christ, who chose you for this task—anyone who is not ignorant of judgment and reason will deny that a great deal has been added to the heap of your merits, when you apply yourself with every effort not only to repairing sacred edifices that have long been fallen, but, much more worthily, to restoring the universal Church. But it is not my purpose to pursue your praises. I am mindful of myself; more excellent intellects will do this; it will be enough for me, in the limitation of my talent, to have satisfied your command.

Indeed, this work, which the author himself included in one volume as a continuous discourse, we have, for the utility of readers and to consider their weariness, divided into four books with convenient distinctions, so that through these as it were milestones, the reader's mind might rest from the constant exercise of conflict, and arise always more eager to read the remainder and more intent. If however the prudent reader should find anything in this interpretation that is perhaps too obscure or awkwardly phrased, let him attribute it partly to the necessity of translation and partly to my excessive speed. For the subject matter is such, and so constrained by narrow boundaries, that it was not fitting for the translator to depart too far from the author's footsteps, lest I should seem to have compiled my own work rather than translated another's; and the speed was such that I translated the work of months in almost one month. Nor is your holy erudition ignorant that things which are poured out quickly, or more truly precipitously—especially regarding an arduous and most august subject, and one which ought to be handled with nothing but the greatest caution (for almost the entire discourse is about the Trinity)—cannot be stated accurately and elegantly. I will nevertheless maintain steadfastly that I have translated faithfully. May Christ our almighty God deign to preserve your holiness safe, tranquil in long life, and flourishing, most holy and blessed Father.

AUTHOR'S PROLOGUE BEGINS

Since indeed the care of fraternal love must be guarded as of the utmost importance, and all things must be done and undertaken for its sake, as the Lord commands; and yet nothing is more pleasant, nor more useful, than both to hear and to speak of God; from which it happens that both those who give and those who receive attain great rewards; and we obtain thence everlasting life: For this, He says, is eternal life, that they may know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent 1; and since those things which pertain to the divinity, and those which pertain to the human dispensation—and you have required us, according to the measure of our powers, to be taught how the most correct opinion of the holy Fathers concerning the procession of the Spirit stands: concerning which, indeed, since Greeks and Latins differ, does that dissension also, and that of each ^A Church's division, follow necessarily. For you wish to know on what arguments each Church relies, and which of these thinks more reasonably; and besides, with the Lord saying: What I say to you in the darkness, speak in the light, and what you have heard in the ear, preach upon the housetops 2. The Apostle likewise insinuating a terrible judgment of silence, and saying: I testify to you this day, that I am clean from the blood of all; for I have not hidden from declaring to you all the counsel of God 3; and admonishing that this same thing must be done: These things, he says, admonish, and testify before God 4. Although it is more fitting for those to speak of God and divine things who, always meditating on the law of the Lord, are of purer life and intelligence, from whom we are removed by a very great distance, more numerous

^A than those reasons exhorting and impelling me to write, I shall proceed, with such ability as I may have, Christ being my guide, to expound to you—moderately and simply, while maintaining conciseness—what has been written by the holy Fathers on this matter. I will, of course, omit very many things (for it would be a lengthy task to pursue them all) and will set down only a few, such as may satisfy you as to what their opinion on this subject was. Thus, through this moderation of ours, you may obtain what you have requested from a friend, and I, for my part, while I am not terrified by the prolixity of the others, nor perturbed by the shortness of time, will be of better spirit, knowing that I am not to be subjected to the punishment that threatens him who hides his talent.

I will not, therefore, be silent, since my discourse will be preeminently about the truth of the faith; nor do I doubt that through you these writings of ours will flow to others also, whom we cannot address directly, and whom we might entreat regarding the truth of the faith. To them, however, it will be permitted to speak according to the decree; and thus, while the ministry of the word is multiplied, the reward of a faithful servant will be compensated to me. Although I am to provide only a few things from the many, if anyone, however, putting aside squabbling and contention, should proceed to inquire into the truth of the matter itself, by itself, from these things which are firm and established, he will find that this can be illustrated by much shorter and only the very principles of the faith, and that the more easily because it is certain that God aids those who inquire with piety: "Cooperator," he says, "God is to everyone who seeks the good"*. And He who urges us to search the Scriptures*, and has promised that He will give to those who ask and will open to those who knock, will not permit such as these to stray too far from the truth.

For since it is said: "Give an opportunity to the wise, and he will be wiser"*, and I know you to be such a one, and I hold it as certain that you do nothing for contention, nothing for vanity, and that you inquire wisely and prudently only for the truth of things: I shall now proceed more readily to explain what is sought. Nor am I truly unaware that many have already written very many books on this matter, which, although the truth required fewer words, nevertheless required many of them in order to defend it against those who, in a spirit of contention, attempted to attack it.

Furthermore, just as every one of the faithful brings forth a confession of faith: "For with the heart one believes unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation"*: what forbids this truth, also grasped by common faith as we have received it from the holy Fathers, from being brought ^B forward and handed on to others? Now indeed by fulfilling the task; now by teaching; now by counseling those who are studious of it; now by refuting adversaries; and altogether by proposing the doctrine of the saints concerning this truth, which we have received from our Fathers, and which they had received from their predecessors by succession; and by dispensing all things for the sake of honesty and equity and fraternal love, omitting nothing at all of diligence. Therefore, we do not write out of a desire for glory, but fulfilling the wishes of a friend, we have undertaken this labor for the sake of those things which we have mentioned above. And we do not speak our own, but those things which we have read written by the holy Fathers and their successors; these, having preserved the order of the disputation, we have collected from here and there, and have set them down briefly and strictly, glorying in this matter alone—if it is appropriate to be said so—that, by the grace of God, we show that we both know and constantly defend the opinion of the saints on this matter. Nor are we unaware that many, into whose hands these may happen to fall, to whom the truth is odious, will be provoked by this very constancy and confidence of ours to cast counsels and curses at us. On the contrary, we must act thoroughly and walk a path opposite to that which we would take if we were chasing after empty trifles. For if we were indeed courting human favor and glory, we would never expose ourselves to the hatred of our audience, but would speak only what we thought would be pleasing to them.

It is certain, therefore, that had we not preferred the truth to all things, we would never have descended into this field of words, in which there is much labor and difficulty, but very little of human favor.

Therefore, first invoking the Holy Spirit himself, of whom our discourse is now intended, let us proceed to what we have proposed. For documents, we shall use the very beginnings of the faith, and those things which have been assumed and derived from them, as far as it is proper to use proofs in God and divine matters, and also those things which have been said by the Catholic teachers of the Church. And since you inquire first by what arguments the truth of this question can most effectively be shown; then, that those things which are raised against them be set forth, and subsequently that either the objections be refuted, or those things which seem ambiguous be clarified, we shall observe this same order throughout in what follows. From which, if we should by chance be more prolix than the expectation of the brevity undertaken required, indulgence must be granted to necessity. We shall make our beginning from here.

MANUEL CALECA BOOK ONE AGAINST THE GREEKS ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

^A When our Lord Jesus Christ said to his disciples: *Going into the whole world, preach to all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit*, is there some order in the names and realities of the most holy Trinity of the Father himself, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, which is necessarily and always signified by those very names themselves? And as those names relate to one another according to their utterance, are the divine persons also ordered in relation to one another? Maintaining and honoring this order, must we necessarily utter these names fixedly, changing nothing of the handed-down order and position of the names, if we wish to preserve for ourselves the correct rule of the Trinity in our confession? Or is there no order there, and are those names placed haphazardly; and is it in our power to utter them as we wish, so that, with no order maintained, it is permitted at one time to put the Father’s name first, at another to put it after, and at another time to prefer the Spirit to the Son, as if those divine persons, who are signified to us by these names, were disordered in relation to one another, and were now one way, now another?

^B And since we intend to construct and confirm what we propose by the sayings and opinions of the saints, let the great Basil be present now, and let him teach us what is to be thought on this matter. For he says in his Epistle to the Canonicis, the beginning of which is: *How much the rather sadder rumor, which had sounded in our ears, has afflicted us beforehand.* “The Holy Spirit is indeed numbered with the Father and the Son, because He is also above creation; but He is placed third in order, as we are taught by the Gospel, the Lord saying: *Going, baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.* He who prefers Him to the Son, or calls Him senior to the Father, he indeed struggles against ^C the divine ordination and is alien to the sound faith, not preserving the manner of glorification which He received, but devising for himself a novelty of words to please men.” And after a few words, as if concluding, he says: “Therefore it is an abnegation of the faith; for it is equally impious to attempt to lead Him down to the order of creatures, and to prefer Him to the Father or the Son, in time or in order.”

The same author in the first book of the *Questions*, the beginning of which is: *Since all would wish*, when he had presupposed that there is a double order, the one natural, the other invented; and the natural, as is the order of creatures instituted by the reason of the Creator, and the placement of numbers, and the relations of causes to effects; but the invented and artificial, as in the arts and disciplines and the like, he added: “The former being suppressed, Eunomius mentions the order of the second species, and says: that order ought not to be spoken of in God, since the second order is from the orderer. But this he either did not see, or, knowing and deliberate, he passed over: that there is a species of order not consisting of our position, but following from the natural consequence itself: as fire to the light which flows from it. For in these we say the cause is first, the second what proceeds from it, not separating these from one another by an interval, but by thought imagining the cause to us before the caused. How then is it lawful to deny order there, where there is a second and a third: not from our position, but from a naturally inherent consequence? For what reason, therefore, does he refuse the order in God to be accepted? He thinks that if he can effect and demonstrate that the first in God can in no way be understood otherwise, the rest would already be for him the demonstration of an inequality and eminence of the substance itself. We, however, in that order by which causes are preferred to things flowing from themselves, say the Father is put before the Son, but we deny it by difference of nature.”

The same author in the third ^D *Questions*: “For as the Son is indeed second in order from the Father, because He is from Him, and in dignity, because the Father is the beginning and cause of His essence, and because through Him we have access to God and the Father, yet He is not second in nature, because the Deity is one in both—so, clearly, the Holy Spirit, although He is subjected to the Son in order and dignity, is nevertheless not of an alien, but of one and the same nature with the Father and the Son entirely.”

Item in the same work: “Since the Lord Himself has handed down the order of the salutary baptism.” The same author, in his epistle to Eustathius, which begins: “Those indeed who have been pre-empted by another confession of faith,” says thus: “It is necessary, however, to flee those who alter that sequence which the Lord has handed down to us, inasmuch as they openly fight against piety, placing the Son before the Father, and the Holy Spirit before the Son.”

The same author, in his Epistle to his brother Gregory, which begins: “Since many [think of the] common substance,” [says:] “But he who thinks of the Spirit, and has understood Him in Himself, comprehends the Son also in a single act of thought. He who has grasped this in his mind has not separated the Spirit from the Son, but has formed a belief of the three persons in Himself sequentially, yet conjunctively, according to the nature of identity. And he who says the Spirit alone, also comprehends in that confession Him whose Spirit it is. And because it is the Spirit of Christ, and from God, just as the Apostle says, like a chain, he who has grasped one end has drawn the other at the same time; so also he who draws the Spirit, through Him, draws the Son and the Father at the same time. And he who has truly received the Son will have on both sides, from this one the Father, and from this one the Holy Spirit following. For it is not permitted to think of separation or division, so that either the Son is understood without the Spirit, or the Spirit is separated from the Son.” ^A

Saint Epiphanius also, in a certain work of his which he called the *Ancoratus*, calls the Holy Spirit the third light and the third substance from the Father.

But also the Divine Chrysostom in a certain sermon of his on that saying of Abraham: “Put thy hand under my thigh,” says: “Thus the discerning order of the divine persons was known to the saints; but whoever would distinguish the natures in the Holy Trinity is altogether to be rejected.”

The Theologian Gregory also, in his second sermon on the *Lights*, says thus concerning the Holy Trinity: “Just as in three contiguous suns there is one commingling of light.”

Since it has been posited, therefore, that God is both one and three, and it has been granted on the one hand concerning the essence and unity of substance, and on the other concerning the hypostasis of the Trinity, or rather the persons, [let us see] concerning their order toward one another from these things which have been said.

Since, therefore, the great Father Basil accuses Eunomius, who does not piously accept the order in God, inasmuch as he considers it irrational to deny this, and brands him who changes the order of names as an inventor, and asserts that he resists God’s ordination, [citing] the Lord Himself to have handed down this order, he says: “But he who places the Spirit before the Father, or the Son, [is one] whom he declares to be alien from sound doctrine, inasmuch as he introduces a novelty concerning the order of the divine persons; moreover, he teaches that this very novelty and alteration of order carries with it the abolition of the divine persons and the denial of the whole faith, and that it makes no difference whether you reduce the Holy Spirit to the order of a creature, or prefer Him in order to the Father or the Son. For we are taught by the Lord in the Gospel, he says, that the third is placed in the order. It is certain indeed that there is an order in the Holy Trinity, according to which the first person is the Father, the second the Son, the third the Holy Spirit.” ^B

And because not only are the Son and the Holy Spirit joined to the Father, but they are also joined to each other, and this is said of those things in which there is order, and which depend upon each other with no intervening medium, the persons have an order toward each other in every way.

And he who has compared the Trinity to a chain makes it clear that he has rendered an order from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle; which is why he says: “He who thinks of the Spirit, comprehends the Son also in a single act of thought;” and: “He who says the Spirit alone, comprehends in that same confession Him whose Spirit it is,” and: “He who grasps the Son has not separated the Spirit from the Son.” For it is not permitted either for the Son to be understood without the Spirit, or for the Spirit to be separated from the Son. Which would by no means be the case if the Son and the Holy Spirit did not have an order toward each other, according to which the one is referred to the other. For in those things which are loose, and which simply have [no relation] to each other without any relation and order, we are not compelled, while thinking of the one, to also comprehend the other in our thinking. For that belongs only to those things which have an order toward each other, according to which they are necessarily thought of together. ^C

From which it is certain that not only does the Son have an order toward the Father, or the Father toward the Son, but also the Son toward the Holy Spirit. This Blessed Athanasius also posited most clearly in his epistle to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit: “The Spirit,” he says, “has the same order and nature toward the Son, as the Son has toward the Father.”

The great Basil also says thus in his sixteenth epistle to Amphilochius: “Just as the Son has [an order] toward the Father, so also the Spirit toward the Son, according to the connection of terms handed down to us in baptism.”

It is certain, therefore, from these things which have been said, that in the Holy Trinity the divine persons have an order toward one another. ^D

^A For he who refers the order of the Son and of the Spirit to the Father, but the order of the Son and of the Spirit to each other, renders the good of order to God by half. For order is a good thing, and to be ordered is a good thing. Since in those things which have order there is something excellent and best, which contains both heavenly and earthly things at once, and all that is best flows from God; but it must be understood that this good exists much more excellently in God, as in the principal cause. For, as the divine Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*: "It is manifest that those things which are perfections in effects exist far more truly and primarily in the causes themselves."

Who, then, would now presume to contend against such eminent masters of the Church, who openly establish an order of the three persons toward one another in God? Therefore, although we do indeed count the three persons absolutely and simply, and when we wish to insinuate the third alone, we may put one before and another after, as is that of the Apostle: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God and the Father, and the communication of the Holy Spirit" ^B or in whatever other way; yet for those wishing to pronounce the names of the divine persons in the order in which they eternally and ever similarly relate to one another, and in which the perfection of the Trinity is designated, no reason is conceded [to alter it]. Therefore, the great Basil in the fourth book of his *Questions* says: "Yet, because the Apostle mentions the Holy Spirit first here, the Son second, and God and the Father third, it must not immediately be thought that the order is perverse or changed. For he began from our own custom. For when we receive gifts, we first approach the one distributing, then we conceive of the one sending in our mind, and then our thought turns to the very source and cause of the goods."

But if, starting from our own custom, we first remember the Spirit, from whom the bounty of gifts flows to us; then the Son, and thirdly we tend through the Son to the Father—it is clear that, beginning there, we remember first the Father, then the Son, and thirdly the Holy Spirit, according to the proper and everlasting order of the Trinity. Therefore, if a priest were to baptize someone and, while baptizing, were to pronounce: "I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Spirit, and of the Son," the Church would never admit one baptized in such a way, as if consecrated by a ^C baptism, on the grounds that he was not baptized according to the tradition of the Lord; according to which the Trinity of names and things—namely, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit—as it relates to itself, has been handed down to us, which it is not permitted to change. Indeed, the holy Basil warned against those who would change it, as they are openly attacking piety, and are neither baptizing in the Trinity nor confessing it according to the tradition of the Lord. It appears that he [Basilius] also wants to teach the order by which the natures are distinguished, and to embrace and accept the one by which the persons are distinguished—according to which the cause and the caused are introduced with the coeternal and consubstantial—and not to assert and deny the same thing against itself contrary to the way Eunomius wished, in the holy Trinity, to deny the holy ones entirely.

Beyond these things that have been said, God would by no means be a Trinity unless the three were connected to one another and united according to their own order; but the three, simply and rashly (since the unity which order produces in many things would be removed), would be unordered and many, or rather, simply nothing. For neither could they in any way be three or four unless a Trinity or Quaternity were conceived in the mind beforehand. Since, therefore, we confess one connection of the three, just as we confess one essence, and the Father is the cause in the first place, it is necessary that the third exist as well. For if the third is removed, the first will not exist either. For in many things ^D where there is a first, those things which are after the first are necessarily referred to the first by a series of connection. And this is especially true in the Holy Trinity, where we confess one connection of the three.

Again, since the teachers preach the Holy Spirit as the third from the Father, certainly he would not be the third if the first were removed. For we call him the third because he is referred to the first. And this likewise would not be so, unless the first also had an order to the second. For otherwise there would be neither a connection of the three nor a unity; but, as we said, three things simply and rashly having themselves in an unordered way and separated from one another. But this is completely contrary to those things which are said by the masters of the Church and to the common confession of the faith. For we confess the first, and the second, and the third, and one connection of the Holy Trinity, and that they are joined and connected to one another in a series, as was said above. These things, moreover, openly commend an order. It is clear, therefore, from these things that have been said—since order signifies discrete things—that those who say that the consubstantial have an order err in divine matters. For thus they will render unity rather than order. For the three persons, insofar as they are consubstantial with one another, are one according to the nature of the same substance. Furthermore, it is impossible for there to be an order of one toward itself, according to the thing. Moreover, that [they] are from the Father, even if it is common to both, is a cause of union rather than of discretion toward one another, unless something else is added. Indeed, all men, in the very fact that they derive their origin from Adam, are united to one another, but are distinguished from one another by certain reasons and properties. Therefore, to say that both are from the Father is not enough to express the order which they have toward one another. But indeed the hypostasis is used for the principle.

^A or person, in order to avoid equivocation. To say that these relate to one another according to an unmixed and unconfused reason, is altogether irrational. For it is necessary that they be unmixed with one another, maintaining the boundaries of their own properties; for otherwise the order would not be maintained; but yet it does not follow necessarily that those which are unmixed, in so far as they are unmixed, maintain an order toward one another, unless some habit [relationship] toward one another is also seen to be in them. From which certainly from that order toward one another and [that] habit, the boundaries of their proper properties cannot be confused or mixed. And if this [habit] were removed, that which is unmixed in itself would become a cause of disorder rather than of order. We must therefore inquire in the divine persons, what is the cause of their order toward one another, and also what is the cause of their unmixed state according to their properties. For otherwise, besides the fact that nothing is accomplished, it is a clear argument of ignorance to posit a causal as a cause. Therefore, that it is necessary to confess an ^B immobile order in the divine persons, and that it is not in our power to change at will the order that has been handed down, and that those who do change it—inasmuch as they openly oppose piety—are to be shunned, has been sufficiently shown from what was said above.

But since we confess God to be both unity and Trinity, and according to the unity indeed neither order, nor procession, nor the number of persons is looked at: for the essence is one thing, entirely indistinct, and there is no order or distinction toward itself according to the thing: it remains that we must acknowledge the order and the number of persons according to their processions.

There are strictly two processions in God handed down to us: one according to nativity, the other according to procession. For we are taught by the divine Scriptures that God is born from God, and that God also proceeds from God. ^C And indeed the immediate procession of the Son from the Father, the holy Basil, in his book *Against Eunomius*, commends thus: "The Father has no beginning, and none of these [has] a middle." And again in the same: "For as it is a foolish inquiry in Him who is without beginning and unbegotten to seek for something above, so also in Him who is eternally with the Father, and has no medium between Himself and His begetter."

The same person again, in that letter to the Canonical Epistles which we mentioned above: "For if the Spirit is superior to God, He is not now from God; but if He is from God, how is He older than that from which He is? But He is not prior even to the Only-Begotten, for there is no medium between the Father and the Son." ^D Gregory of Nyssa also in his first book *Against Eunomius*, says: "The Father is understood as without beginning and unbegotten. But from Him, according to the reason of contiguity, the Only-Begotten Son is understood to exist at the same time with the Father, inseparably."

Likewise, Saint Cyril says in his *Thesaurus*: "The Father begets the Son without any medium." The same [author] on the Gospel of John, while expounding that word, *In the beginning was the Word with God*, says this: "We understand the Father to be with the Son, on account of the incommutability of the substance: and therefore, because He is entirely contiguous, with no medium, to Him who naturally proceeded from Himself."

The same great Basil, in his epistle to his brother Gregory concerning the difference of essence and substance, says: "The Son, however, who alone as the Only-Begotten shone forth from the unbegotten light, has no communion toward the Father, or toward the Holy Spirit, in respect to the property of the persons." Likewise Gregory of Nyssa on the *Lord's Prayer*, in that treatise which begins, *The law containing a shadow of things to come*: "The Only-Begotten Son," he says, "is named by Holy Scripture from the Father; and thus far His property is carried."

Saint Anastasius, Bishop of Antioch, also says in his book *On Dogmas*, whose beginning is: *Regarding the reason of our healthy faith*: "The Spirit, as I have said, is called God, and holy God. But both these compound names befit Him who is properly called the Holy Spirit, just as the name of 'cause' is accommodated to the Father, and [the name] of 'Son' to Him who proceeds from the cause with no medium."

Thus, therefore, we learn the procession of the Son from the Father, namely, the immediate nativity, according to which He is both called only-begotten, and is called 'only from the Only'; and He receives His personal and substantial property from this, that He is both begotten, and is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit. For the masters have handed down to us this, His proper recognition: that He alone, the Only-Begotten, proceeds from the unbegotten light. For it was said that up to this point His property brings to a stop the term and reason of truth, so that, namely, He is immediately and continuously and begottenly from the Father, but proceeds no further. For whereas the Spirit is indeed from the Father, the property and recognition of His procession does not subsist thus far.

But it was said also that the title 'Son' properly befits Him who is from the Father, with no medium interjected. Although besides these, the name of 'Father' and 'Son' renders a habit and an individual relation toward one another. For one signifies the cause, the other indeed the *causale* [the caused]. And these things, indeed, stand thus regarding the Son.

But we have learned that the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, from which it is evidently clear that He does not proceed from the Father without a medium. For Gregory of Nyssa says in the book which he wrote to Ablavius, whose beginning is: *It would indeed have been just that you, who excel in all virtue, should fight*, he says thus: "Confessing the incommutability of nature, we do not deny the difference between cause and *causale*."

although the difference in the reason of the cause and the causale does not differ at all in a general sense."

At, lest anyone should think that on account of this mediation of the Son, some confusion of personal properties follows, and should imagine that the Son is alien to the Father in his natural state, he ^A does not say—but rather, this mediation of the Son, and the distinction of the persons according to the difference of their procession, preserves the unconfused properties, which could not otherwise be preserved. For once this order is established, the honor of the Only-Begotten also remains undoubtedly in the Son. For he alone is from the alone, and the property of his substance is thus carried forth; and the Spirit is connected to the Father through the Son, just as in all things in which there is a series, the extremes are joined to the firsts through the media; and therefore he subjoins: "Since the mediation of the Son preserves the honor of the Only-Begotten for himself, and does not exclude the Spirit from a natural state toward the Father." And these are indeed the words of Gregory Nyssen.

The holy universal synod which met second at Nicaea says: "I believe in the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son, and that he is acknowledged to be God."

The same thing ^B St. Tarasius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who was a great part of the same synod, also says in the letter which he wrote to the bishops and priests of Antioch, Alexandria, and the Holy City, the beginning of which is: "Our Lord and God, in his many and excellent dispensations, disposing and directing the life of men, and the things that ^C have been received and praised, and that everything is rightly arranged, as proven by their rescripts," after many things, says: "And in the Holy Spirit, who from the Father through the Son proceeds, and he himself is acknowledged to be God."

St. Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, in his Exposition of the Faith says: "I believe in the Holy Spirit, eternally proceeding from the Father and God, who is himself acknowledged to be light, and truly coeternal with the Father and the Son."

Then, when they distinguish these *causalia*, the Son and the Holy Spirit, from the cause, and reasonably separate them from the Father by the method of *causale*—since the *causalia* communicate with one another—he distinguishes them again from each other by the variety of their procession, and just about speaks thus: "For even if both, since they are from the Father, communicate with one another in that they are *causalia*, yet they have their being differently. Therefore, we acknowledge another difference between them." Finally, of these, one, namely the Son, is from the first, that is, from the Father, continuously (or proximately); the other, namely the Spirit, has his being through this very fact, that he is from the first continuously, that is, through the Son, who is from the Father, with no medium interposed. Calling the Father the first, insofar as he is the cause, and designating that which is contiguous or continuous as that which is immediate; but the Spirit from the Father through the medium of the Son. So that the ^D Father, who is from none, is by that very fact distinguished from the Son and the Spirit, in that he is the Father himself and the beginning. The Son, however, being immediately begotten from him, is distinguished by that very fact; from the Father, in that he proceeded from him by generation; from the Spirit, in that he himself is indeed immediately and incontinently from the first; but the Spirit has flowed from the first through himself. But the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father because he is from him; but from the Son, because he is not immediately from the first, as the Son is, but through him who was continuously from the first.

Whence he also rightly said that there is another difference. For that which is immediately from the first, and that which is through a medium from the first, differ by the reason of their procession.

Likewise, the great Athanasius, in that book which is titled *Reprehension of the simulation of Meletius and Eusebius*, the beginning of which is: "Man was made in the likeness of God," says thus: "But it would be impossible for the Spirit to be glorified in the majesty of the Trinity, if he did not proceed from God through the Son, but were made and created from God, as the heretics say."

St. Basil also, in a certain chapter, the inscription of which is: "Why the Spirit of the Son is not the Son," says: "Not because he is not from God through the Son, but lest the Trinity be thought of as an infinite multitude, and, as happens in men, we might imagine it to be sons from sons."

Also in another place, which is inscribed: "Unless anyone says the Spirit is from God, not even the Word": "In what way," he says, "are the inseparable to be separated,

and the one flowing from the other to be divided?"

Gregory, furthermore, the Theologian writing the praises of virginity in heroic verse, sings thus: "Spirit ever flows from the light as light, Through the Offspring, a distinct splendor of the deity for each."

Saint Maximus also, when explaining what he means by the golden lampstand in the prophet Zechariah, and the lamp and lamps that were upon it, says: "The Holy Spirit, just as He is naturally by essence of God and the Father, so too is He of the Son, according to essence, as if proceeding ineffably from the Father essentially through the Son begotten."

John Damascene likewise in the thirteenth chapter of his Theology, whose beginning is: "God is incomprehensible," speaks thus of the Father: "He is indeed the mind of the Word, the abyss, the begetter of the Word, and the producer of the light-making Spirit through the Word." The same, in the same work: "The paternal power of the Holy Spirit, which gives an intimation of the hidden Deity, is from the Father, proceeding through the Son."

Thus, therefore, by the testimonies of many we are taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son; that is to say, from the Father not without a medium.

^B Since, therefore, according to the varied manner of the procession, the variety of the Persons also is designated; for indeed the procession of the Son declares that He subsists immediately from the Father, and has substance from Him by the manner of immediate birth; but the procession of the Spirit declares that He exists through the Son Himself—for it was shown above that He proceeds from the Father through the Son—and since the word "procession" is the property of the Person of the Holy Spirit, just as "birth" is the property of the Son (for both "to be begotten" and "to proceed" intimate the persons of both), it is established that the Holy Spirit has substance from the Father through the Son. And it is established at the same time that the fact that He is from the Father both immediately and mediately, and continuously, and through Him who is continuous, intimates the different processions of the divine persons. And to be begotten, and to proceed through the Son, since they are substantial properties of the Son and of the Spirit, are the properties of the Persons themselves, namely of the Son and of the Spirit, by which they are distinguished from one another and from the Father. Wherefore one is called begotten, and another proceeding; just as each is named from his own substantial term, and by this very thing is distinguished from the others. For surely to proceed uniquely from the Father is, as Basil asserts, the proper knowledge of the Son: and that this is distinguished from the Father and from the Spirit, since by this property of His, He has no communion with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and the things that ^C were said in this sense. But the Spirit is distinguished from the Father, as it were, by a cause as a cause; but from the Son, by the cause which He has from the Father, proceeding through Him: by this difference of procession, namely, that the former is from the First immediately and continuously, but the latter from the First, but through Him who proceeds continuously from the First.

Furthermore, the great Basil in the letter which we mentioned before to his brother Gregory speaks more manifesty about Himself: "The Spirit," he says, "has this mark and sign of His own property, that He is born after the Son, and with the Son, and subsists from the Father."

Whom therefore the holy Fathers transmit in many places as third—that is, third from the Father, and second from the Son, according to personal order—since this One is after the Son; and He whom Gregory of Nyssa said flows from the First, He says more openly: "From the Father," he says. But because that particle, by which we say "through," ^D introduces no interval of time there—since indeed temporary delays have no place in eternal life, and because what is said to be prior by reason of time is entirely eliminated thence, for the reason that it is said to be "through the Son," it can for that reason be said to be one who is at the same time and with the Son—yet on account of the distinction of the persons appearing from the procession itself, which the particle "through" signifies sufficiently, while it neither denies that He is "at the same time," and intimates the order of the persons with the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is difficult to indicate otherwise, that particle has been most conveniently assumed by theology.

And so what Nyssenus himself says, that He is from the First through Him who would flow continuously from the First, this the great Basil likewise confesses; for because He is from the Father, and is after the Son, He could not be such otherwise than by proceeding from the First through a medium. But if He proceeds from the Father through the Son, it is surely clear that, in the personal series, He is third from the Father. And that is what it means to be "after the Son," as the doctor says.

This same Nyssenus expressed this more lucidly in the book *Questions against Eunomius*: "The Spirit," he says, "is joined to the Father by the fact that He is uncreated, and again is distinguished from Him because the Father is not as He is; but by the conjunction which He has with the Son by reason of being uncreated; and by the fact that He has one cause of substance from God of all, He is distinguished again by that property, that He does not subsist solely from the Father, and that He proceeds through the Son Himself. Again also, since the creature subsists through the Only-begotten, so that the Holy Spirit is not thought to have anything in common with this, because He too proceeds through the Son, by that stable and immutable reason the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the creature." If, therefore, that which alone is that the Son is from the unbegotten Light is His own proper knowledge, by which He is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit—and that is to be from the Father without any medium—but the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by that property, that He is and proceeds through the Son Himself, it is surely established that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father without a medium. For that is what it is to be solely from the Father, which is the property of the Person of the Son. For in that He is neither solely from the Father, but through the Son,

^A the proper recognition of the Spirit is said to be the teacher. It is from the primal source, and continuously from the First. And that which is begotten, this is the Only-Begotten. Again, that which proceeds, this is the Spirit, and that which is mediate, this is not continuous; but that which is not continuous, this is not begotten, but is proceeding. Furthermore, that which proceeds through the Son from the Father, this is not the Son. For this is the definition of Nativity: to proceed immediately from the First; whereas the definition of procession is to proceed from the First through a medium.

And since the subsistences of the divine Persons are eternal and immutable—for the Trinity, God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, always existed—the definitions of the personal subsistences [hypostases] are themselves their substantial [hypostatic] properties, entirely eternal and immutable. ^B And the same thing is evident, because if the processions be taken away, the properties also and the persons will cease to be at the same time. For if the account and definition of being born, or of being begotten from the First, is to be without a medium, and that of proceeding, or of the proceeding one, is to be through the Son, it is altogether true that with the removal of the definitions of the things by which they subsist, they also are taken away at the same time. For he who removes rationality from man, has at the same time removed the man.

But because both—namely, the Spirit and the creature—are said to be through the Son, I have defined how this is to be understood by adding the different mode of the processions. For the Holy Spirit is without time, stable, and immutable, because He proceeds from God naturally and essentially, and according to the distinguished Athanasius, He is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and is the creator of the creature equally with the Father and the Son, as being one Creator; whereas the creature is temporal, mutable, and variable; for it was produced through the Son by a mode of fabrication and creation, being most remote from the substance of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. ^C For as Damascenus says, the creature was not made afterward from the substance of the Creator; no one therefore, endowed with mind and reason, will suppose that the Holy Spirit has anything in common with it, from the fact that it is said that He and the creature proceeded through the Son: except in so far as created things are common to the Creator, and things made are common to the Maker. “For by a stable,” he says, “and immutable reason is the Spirit distinguished from the creature.” But now it is to be understood that what is said, that He proceeded or flowed forth, does not signify the eternal substance of the Holy Spirit before all ages. For first, when he set out to teach how the God Trinity was distinguished personally in Itself before the ages, he did not say this in regard to how It related to the creature. And would that, just as here he asserts that what is said to have proceeded into the creature clearly signifies the essence relative to the creature, so also in regard to the Holy Spirit, when it is said that His procession is before all ages, he commends it; and the more so, since it is asserted by the theologians that He also eternally exists, and proceeds, and proceeds through the Son. ^D Then it is right also to listen to the masters, that this which is said to have proceeded commends the eternal processions of the Son and the Spirit, which will be proved in what follows.

Gregory the Theologian, in his sermon *On the Holy Spirit* (14), says thus: "The difference of derivation and of relation to one another also made a difference in their appellation." Here he intended "derivation" to be understood as "procession." But the processions, nativity and procession, are different. Rightly therefore it was said that the different processions of the persons have caused it to be, and to be called, one thing begotten, another proceeding. It is therefore evident from what has been said, that it is the same thing when we say that the Son is and is the Only-Begotten, and from the Father without any medium, and that a person is begotten from a person; and it is the same thing when we say that the Spirit is and proceeds: and is from the First through a medium and proceeds from the Father through the Son: and is not without a medium, nor exists solely, nor continuously from the First. For these things are turned against the same person. For what is the Son in the holy Trinity, this is without...

And from this it is clearly evident that, the accounts of the begotten and the proceeding being removed, by such a removal, [both] the nativity and the procession are taken away, and at the same time also that the Trinity is God. From which it is also concluded that he who confesses that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, necessarily confesses Him to be from the Father without a medium. However, by such a confession, he will take away the property of His substance, and that He is a distinct Person in the holy Trinity. And hence he will not confess a third [Person] from the Father according to the account of sound faith and the tradition of the Holy Fathers. Thus nothing will prohibit confessing that the Holy Spirit is also the Son, proceeding from the Father without a medium. For the appellation of Son, according to the theologians, properly belongs to Him who is from the Father without a medium. And from whence it follows, that what is from thence without a medium is the Son. For we discover the property of the Son to be this: to be from the Father without a medium, which also makes Him begotten; and so there will be a confusion of personal properties, and there will be either two Sons from the Father both without a medium, and therefore neither is the firstborn, or two Holy Spirits. For what necessity and distribution urges, if both are from the Father without a medium, that the Son is one person and the Holy Spirit another, and not rather that there are either two sons in the holy Trinity, or two spirits? Moreover, neither would any relation [habitudo] of the Son and Spirit to each other be spoken of, nor would we have by what property, or confession, we could distinguish the Son from the Spirit. From which it would necessarily follow that we should not indeed confess the Trinity to be God, but three beings simply and separately by themselves. For with the order removed, the first and second...

and third would not be mentioned: but rather each one of them as the first, and it would be more convenient and more proper to speak of God as a duality, namely the Father and the Son, or the Father and the Spirit; and for this reason, the Father would be the cause of them without an intermediary, and by the same logic, he would simply have the character of cause and caused alone.

Furthermore, it would be a matter of indifference to enumerate the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit, or the Father, and the Spirit, and the Son; indeed, just as the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, and his image, and natural and living power, and operation, and whatever else will be said in what follows, so too the Son would be called the Spirit of the Spirit, equally and indifferently, according to all these things, by the Sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers. For if they stood in relation to one another similarly—that is, equally subsisting from the Father without an intermediary, and being consubstantial with one another—then the names would surely be interchangeable from the one to the other by a similar logic. For those things which are consubstantial, and equal to one another, are interchangeable. But this has not been found until now; indeed, it is altogether forbidden. For Gregory of Nyssa, in his homily on the Lord’s Prayer, says thus: ^A “The Son, however, is neither the Spirit of the Holy Spirit, nor is he so called,” nor does this habitual consequence, if I may so speak, turn back upon itself.

Moreover, it is absurd to think that the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone, and for the same to proceed through the Son. For these are most openly contrary to one another, and they destroy one another. For what is said to be "through the Son," is said to occur by mediation of the Son, while that which is "from the sole" signifies the Spirit proceeds from the Father without an intermediary. But we shall see these things later.

It has just been shown from what we have said above that those who, because of the pronunciation of names and the presumption of their own minds, interpret the statement that "the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son" not correctly and substantially, but assert that there is an order of persons to one another merely in the words of divine Scripture, are sinning. For they say: “Since the first person, namely the Father, is called both Father and producer, and the Son is fittingly spoken of in relation to the Father according to the categories of relation—for in saying the Son, we understand the Father at the same time—the Spirit, however, even if he is said to be from the Father, is properly referred to the producer, but improperly to the Father, since the Father is also ^B the producer and is so understood. For he—the Father—is the same as the producer.”

Having posited these things, they infer thus: “Therefore, since we say the Spirit is from the Father—because in saying the Father, we understand the Son at the same time—for that reason it is said that the Spirit proceeds through the medium of the Son, and through the Son from the Father. But when, in turn, we say the first producer, for the same reason—because in saying the producer, we also think at the same time of that which he produces—if at any time the Son is said to be from the producer, then the Son will be properly said to be through the medium of the Spirit, or as the product from the producer, ^C just as the name of the product is understood through the producer, and consequently the Son is born from the producer through the product. Nothing prevents, they say, even this from being said: namely, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, as if from a producer, without an intermediary, but the Son is born from the producer—who is also the Father—through the Spirit.”

But it is truly clear that those who thus pervert the procession of the Spirit through the Son remove the order of the Trinity and introduce a confusion of personal properties, with the persons themselves removed. It is simultaneously clear that they oppose the holy Fathers, the teachers of the Church, while they wish the Spirit to be from the Father without an intermediary, and prefer the Spirit to the Son, and say that nothing prevents even the Son from being born from the producer through the product; from which they confess the Son to be third in order from the Father, thinking that, on account of the pronunciation of names and the subtlety of their understanding of them, they can change the divine, eternal, and immobile order as they please, which is not even possible in creatures. For in these things, if we should prefer the causal to the cause in order, and, while discussing heat, should make mention of fire first, the heat will not immediately become the cause of the fire, or a ray of the sun; nor do things change their own order for the sake of our speech. But let those overly inept and garrulous reasoners think as they may.

But the holy Fathers say that this novelty of order is a deprivation of substance itself and a negation of the entire faith; they accuse Eunomius because he does not accept the order in God; and they define that he who changes the substance opposes the ordination of God, asserting that the Lord himself established the order in the tradition of the saving baptism, according to which one of the persons is first, another second, and another third in personal order. They say it makes no difference whether one leads the Holy Spirit to the status of a creature, or prefers him to the Son or to the Father, not only in terms of time, but of order. Wherefore, the Master (15) rightly says that those who change the order which the Lord handed down to us are to be shunned, as those who manifestly resist the truth and prefer the Son to the Father, or prefer the Spirit to the Son.

Although, according to the aforementioned reasoning, since we believe, induced by the authority of the Holy Scriptures, that all things were made through the Son, and when we say "the Son," we also understand the Father at the same time, nothing would prevent us from saying that creatures flowed from the Son through the Father, so that necessarily the Father would now be the medium between the Son and the Spirit. And since the Paraclete is said to be sent by the Son, and in making mention of the Son we understand the Father at the same time in our mind, for the same reason the Spirit will be said to be sent *through* the Father. And it will be almost the same as if someone were to say that the son of any architect was born from the architect through the house, because the architect is referred to the house. For as soon as you think of the architect, the house also comes to mind at the same time.

^A Indeed, by removing the substantial [hypostatic] processions, one must simultaneously remove the persons as well, so that there remains for us neither any order nor a Trinity. Therefore, it has been rightly said that the novelty of this order is the abolition of the substance itself and the abnegation of the entire faith.

Nor, indeed, do the things we have mentioned commend only the order in the holy Trinity and the procession of the persons—through which the Son is indeed from the First without a medium, while the holy Spirit is from the First through a medium—but from many other things which have been said by the masters, we also learn both the mediation of the Son and the natural and essential procession of the holy Spirit.

And that, in the first place, refutes the absurdity of those who, according to the things we have expounded above, say that the Spirit is sometimes from God through the Word, and sometimes, through the Son, from God. For if they were to judge such reasoning to be true, when they said "through the Word," they would never say "from God," but "through the Word, from the mind." For the Word, according to the reason of the name, is referred not to God, but to the mind. But when they said "through the Son," they would never have added, "From God through the Son," but "through a creature." For of this, God is God; nay, indeed, nothing would prevent it being said that the Son is born from God through creatures. For God is referred to creatures. But the same God is understood to be the Father of the Son. But far be it from us to think that such trifles and ineptitudes ever came into the minds of the holy doctors, lest we show them to be sophists rather than masters of piety, saying one thing after another and beclouding our understanding by that part, who ought to be masters of clarifying obscure things, as indeed they are. And it is certainly not advantageous for us to take perversely what was said by them openly and usefully, from which we bring injuries upon them and acquire a loss of salvation for ourselves.

Certainly, since they were masters of proclaiming the truth more clearly than others, they would have said, if they had thought it to be true in that way, that the Spirit is said to be from the Father through the Son only, but does not exist and proceed [that way]. But since they did not say that, they are proven to have held such an exposition entirely. Indeed, even Damascenus says concerning the Father (16): "He himself is indeed the abyss of the mind of the Word, the begetter of the Word, and the producer of the Spirit through the Word." Therefore, according to these men, he ought to have said "commentator of the Word," with the name of the begetter being silent. For the Word is referred to the mind, not to the begetter. It was necessary, also, for him to say that he is the producer of the Spirit through himself alone, suppressing what he says, "through the Word." For the Spirit is indeed referred to the producer. But now, when he says the producer "through the Word," he says: "The Word, however, is relative neither to the Father nor to the producer, and is referred only to the mind"; he surely cuts off every curiosity of this kind as being most ridiculous and pernicious.

^B Furthermore, what is said "properly" and "not properly," and what "in itself" and "by accident" will have a place in the divine persons. For that which is said "properly" and "in itself" is opposed to "by accident." Moreover, and because they assert that the Spirit is not "properly" from the Father, he certainly would not be distinguished from the Father. But these things, as we have said, are entirely opposed to the intelligence of the theologians who have distinguished the divine persons in their writings. What has therefore just been said is established by those things which we have said before; he who removes the order has also removed that very procession of the persons, and, as a consequence, has removed the persons themselves. For according to the reason of their procession, one indeed proceeds from the Father in the middle, while another proceeds ^C through the medium of the Son from the Father; it is clear, therefore, that the processions being removed, the persons must also be removed simultaneously, and that there remains for us neither any order nor a Trinity.

Indeed, the great Athanasius in *Contra Arianos* III, the book of which the beginning is: "Those who follow the insanity of Arius, as it is given to understand, having decided once to become apostates and transgressors of the truth," says thus: "The Word does not join the Spirit to the Father, but rather the Spirit receives this from the Word." And after a few words: "For because the Word is in the Father, but the Spirit is given from the Word, for this reason he wills us to receive the Spirit, so that, when we have received him, then having the Spirit of the Word, which is in the Father, we also may be seen to be one in the Word on account of the Spirit, and through him in the Father."

The same, in the letter to Serapion concerning the holy Spirit, which begins: "The letters of your holy affection for us were returned to me in the desert," says thus: "They are ignorant that just as those who divide the Son from the Father take away the one God, so also, that they sever the Spirit from the Word, they no longer preserve the one Godhead in the Trinity."

The same, again in another letter to the same concerning the holy Spirit, whose beginning is: "Perhaps you will wonder," says: "For the Spirit is not outside the Word, but because he is in the Word, he is in God through him." And after a few words: "But when the Spirit is in the Word, it is clearly evident that the Spirit is in God through the Word."

But Saint Basil, in a certain chapter, the inscription of which is "The Spirit is to be glorified with God," says: "But that the Trinity is glorified in the same divine works is certain testimony of one divinity, because neither does the Father work without the Son, nor does the Son without the Spirit."

The same in another chapter, which is inscribed: "That the unity of the Trinity is insinuated from the divine nature," says: "Never was the Father without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit."

The same in cap. 16, to Amphilochius: "So, therefore, as the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Spirit to the Son, according to the connection of words delivered to us in baptism. But if the Spirit is connected in a series to the Son, and the Son to the Father, then truly the Spirit [is connected] to the Father."

The same in the place above: "But the one and holy Spirit is connected to the one Father through the one Son." And after.

^A a few things: «It is therefore a path to the knowledge of God from the one Spirit through the one Son, to the one Father, and conversely natural goodness, and natural sanctification, and royal dignity pass from the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit. Thus also the persons agree, and the pious dogma of the unique principality does not fall.»

Damascene in the fourth chapter of his *Theological [Discourses]*: «God, he says, is the holy Spirit, the medium of the unbegotten and the begotten; and he is connected to the Father through the Son.» If, therefore, the mediation of the Son is evident through all these things in the holy Trinity, how is the Spirit from the Father without a medium, or how do those who assert this without a medium not divide the Spirit from the Son? How do they confess that they preserve one Godhead in the Trinity? How, according to them, is the Spirit not outside the Word? How can they preserve what is said: "Neither to make the Son without the Spirit, just as neither the Father without the Son?" How shall the Son not be without the Spirit? How will those who say that the Spirit is from the Father alone confess that sanctification by nature, and natural goodness, reach the holy Spirit from the Father through the Only-Begotten according to the handed-down order? How does the pious dogma of the unique principality not fall for them? What necessity is there that the Son should never have been, or ever be, without the Spirit? For if both are from the Father without a medium, these things will not be said of the Spirit to the Son any more than of the Son to the Spirit. For if these things were said on account of consubstantiality, there would be a total conversion of them to one another, since things of this kind are convertible: but it is certain, indeed, that these things were said on account of the order and the habit toward one another, according to which the divine persons eternally have substance, according to the difference of procession, which is also immovable; because substance too is immovable. For this reason it is also said: "The Son, however, is not the holy Spirit, nor is he so called, nor is this ^B habitual consequence convertible."

Certainly, great Athanasius also, in the tome which he wrote to the Antiochenes: «It behooves us, he says, to anathematize also those who assert that the holy Spirit is separated from the essence of Christ.» In what way, therefore, are both those who think the Spirit is a creature, and those who divide him in any other way, subject to this opinion. But it must be said rather, according to Basil, that it is in no way lawful to think of any section or division: as if either the Son is understood without the Father, or the Spirit is severed from the Son; nor does it become us at all that either the Father should have ever been without the Son, or the Son without the Spirit, according to the theologian Gregory in the sermon on Pentecost. For unless, as was said, the reason of the personal order should compel it, according to which, as it is established that they relate to one another by the distribution of processions, nothing would prevent the Son from being understood even without the Spirit. For according to unity ^C of essence, there is neither habit nor distinction of persons. Either, therefore, the Son and the Spirit would be one person, or they would not relate to each other at all. For things that have nothing to do with each other, it is not necessary, while one is understood, that the other be understood at the same time.

Furthermore, just as when we think of the Father, the Son necessarily follows, since the latter received substance from Him, and the former gave it, and hence he is understood simultaneously as both cause and caused: so also, while the Son is thought of, because we are necessarily compelled to think of the Spirit at the same time, the reason of the order and the habit toward one another is entirely the cause, through which the Spirit has being from the Father through the Son: and according to which he is asserted by the theologians to both be and proceed from the first through the medium, and they are both distinguished and related to one another.

However, the very examples or similitudes handed down to us by the holy Fathers concerning the holy Trinity demonstrate the aforementioned order and consubstantiality of the divine persons. Finally, the eminent Gregory also says in his theological discourses: «We observe the eye, the fountain, and the river; taking the eye, indeed, in the image of the Father; the fountain, however, of the Son; but assigning the river to the holy Spirit.» As, therefore, the order is observed in these three, according to which something has substance from the first through the medium without a medium, and as a river exists from a fountain, not as if proceeding through an instrument, [receiving] substance through it, and yet one thing and the same substance resides in them: for they are water, but they differ from one another in the order of substance: in a like manner, the one essence being presupposed in the holy Trinity, the third person has its substance from the first, through the medium, naturally and essentially: whence it is also said to proceed through it.

This also John Damascene says, confirming [this] concerning the Spirit (16): «For thou art the river of the Godhead proceeding from the Father through the Son.» The same Theologian also [says]: «I observed the sun, the ray, and the light.» Just as therefore light has substance from the sun through the medium, naturally, that is, and essentially. For it is consubstantial with the ray, without which the light surely would not exist: so also it must be said concerning the holy Spirit, who is conceded by the theologians to proceed from the Father through the Son.

Agreeing with these, Damascene also speaks in his theological chapters, saying (17): «The Spirit is as a ray from the sun through the Son: but through the ray the radiance is given to us.» Indeed, the radiance of the Spirit would never be given through the Father’s ray, that is, the Son, unless it had existence naturally through him; otherwise, indeed, it would be through an instrument. Furthermore, the Theologian says: «The Godhead, to speak briefly, is indivisible in things that are divided, and as it were in three contiguous suns, there is one tempering of light.

^A If, therefore, to be contained by one another is this, that the third comes from the first through the middle; for otherwise there would not be a Trinity of God, nor an indivisible Deity; for it is clear that there is one tempering of light; and one [must] also preserve the order with the consubstantiality of the persons, according to which the third is from the first through the middle.

Nyssenus also, in his book *On the Holy Spirit* against the Macedonians, while handing down the immutable order of the divine persons according to their essence and their relation to one another, and rebuking those who dared to introduce a diminution because of the personal order and the mediation of the Son, added: «As if someone looking at a flame divided into three lights; and we assume the first flame to be the cause of the third light; which by distribution through the middle has extended to the highest. Then, he prepares the heat to abound in the first flame; but in the following it decreases, and that change tends toward the lesser; [so that] the third is not even called fire anymore, even if it burns and shines in the same way, and performs all things that fire does.»

From this example, therefore, it is clear that the third has its essential existence from the first through the middle. For from the distribution of the middle, the highest [part] of the flame is said to be kindled; and although the substance of the flame is one, nevertheless, that which is [a part] according to substance is in no way less perceived.

The supreme Chrysostom also [says] in Psalm xcii: «He calls the Father the fountain, the Son the river, but the Holy Spirit the water of the river,» taking up the testimony of the Lord, who says: *He who drinks from the water that I shall give him will not thirst forever.* Expounding upon this, the Evangelist says: *He said this about the Spirit whom those who believed in him were to receive.* As, therefore, the water of the fountain flowing naturally through the river has its substance through it, and together with the order constitutes one and the same substance of water, so far as is possible in human and fragile matters, so it must be said also regarding the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Other holy Fathers also assumed fire, flame, and light in the image of the Trinity, from which the same things can be gathered. The blessed Cyril likewise, in his *Thesauri*, took the root, the branch, and the fruit ^D for a similitude; and he called the Father the rose, the Son the flower, and the Holy Spirit the fragrance of the odor; and he said that the Spirit of the Son is as it were a vapor from the water, and like its quality. As, therefore, the fruit proceeding naturally from the root through the branch receives its substance from the root through the branch, not from the root without a medium; but with the mediation of the branch removed, the fruit cannot exist, and one natural quality and order shines forth; in the same way it must be said of the Holy Spirit, insofar as the infirmity of the example permits.

The same blessed Cyril says in the *Thesauri*: «Addressing the Jews, he says, *But if I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has surely come upon you.* He says that in this place the finger is the Holy Spirit, in a certain way sprung from the divine essence, and naturally hanging from it, just as the finger hangs from the human hand. For [the] Holy Scriptures call the Son the arm of God and the right hand, as is that [word]: *His right hand and his holy arm have saved him.* And again: *Lord, thy arm is high, and they did not know [it]: but those who know it shall be confounded.* As, therefore, the arm is naturally fitted to the whole body, performing everything that the mind has perceived, but usually utilizing the finger for this; so we think [of] the Word of God as adapted to Him and in Him naturally and essentially, if I may so say, and sprung forth: but in the Son, the Holy Spirit [is] likewise naturally and essentially penetrating, through whom He anoints and sanctifies all things. The Holy Spirit, therefore, does not appear alien and removed from the divine essence, but is naturally in It and from It: just as the finger is not separate from the body, being inborn in the hand itself and sprung forth as one. And the hand, in turn, exists in the body [as] not of another, but of its own substance.»

In this place, the teacher of the Church shows through the image of Scripture, and the order of the persons, by which they depend upon one another, such as the hand [depends] on the body, but the finger is joined to the hand or the arm, according to which order the third also is from the first through the middle, just as the finger [is], by natural connection to it, and by substance, and by power reaching through the arm. As also the great Basil says, the natural goodness and royal dignity reach from the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit. And not only this, but theology has taught that all things are produced and consist from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the doctor shows the order of the persons themselves, and from this necessarily insinuated their consubstantiality. For the natural and essential substance of the body, and the arm, and the finger is one: although the hand is not the finger, nor is the finger the hand, because the hand is not fitted to the body through the finger. Therefore, having also shown through this image the order of the persons to one another, he immediately added concerning their consubstantiality: «The Holy Spirit, therefore,» he says, «is neither alien nor removed from the divine essence.»

Certainly also the blessed Augustine, whom the universal synods have proclaimed as the highest and most excellent teacher, as is evident from the synodal acts, takes the human mind for the Father in the image; but the Word, which is called inborn and intimate, for the Son; who is also called the Word of God by John the Evangelist: and [He] has been called by Gregory the Theologian the definition of the Father, and the Word, and the sprout, and the will, and the seal, according to which image the image of God is most of all preserved in man. ^{B C}

^A And the will, which is naturally within all rational and intellectual beings, he assigns to the divine Spirit, taking the occasions for this partly from the divine Scriptures, and partly because God is both called and is intellectual, rational, and willing. For He would never have brought forth beings endowed with reason and will unless He had these things within Himself in a far more excellent way.

But just as the definition of the Father, and the ingrafted Word, is essential and substantial, so too is the will of this kind, according to which God wills Himself, just as He also understands Himself according to His own Word. For there is no accident in God. The Word, therefore, is from the Mind without intermediary; but the will is from the Mind through the Word. For it is impossible for anyone to will anything or in any way, unless he has first thought about what he wills. Therefore, the will proceeds through the Word and from the Word. Hence, also, brute animals, because they lack word and reason, neither will nor are said to will, but are borne by natural motion irrationally. Since, therefore, the word is referred to the mind, and the will necessarily proceeds from the mind through the word, what was proposed is hence also demonstrated.

And the examples which the saints assume are of this kind. But just as a river does not exist without the intermediary of a spring, nor could light exist otherwise than from the sun through a ray, nor could living water flow from a fountain without an intermediary but only through a stream, nor could fruit exist from a root without the intermediary of a branch—for this confuses and destroys the order of things and the process of substance—in these, and in the other examples we have proposed, by surely the same reasoning, the Holy Spirit is not said to be from the Father without intermediary. For the Third is placed after the Father according to personal order, and is asserted by the theologians to exist and proceed through the Son. But to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father without intermediary belongs to those who would divide the one tempering of light; and those things which are said, that the three persons contain one another, and that the Trinity is likened to a chain, and other examples of this kind—which are intended to show that order in the holy Trinity is to be understood with a certain rectitude, for it would not stand otherwise—they deny these altogether, and divide the Spirit from the Son according to the position of a triangle whose sides are separated from one another at the base. But this perverts the aforementioned order, and takes away all that is said about this by the holy Fathers. For thus it will be permissible to think of the section and division of the Son and Spirit, and to think of the Son without the Spirit; and when we speak of the Son, [to think that] they are not contained by one another; and all things completely contrary to those things which were spoken by the saints will follow; but that is truly inept, insipid, and impious.

Lest, however, this disturb anyone, ^B it attributes to God none of the things that occur in matter. For we leave to matter local and temporal intervals, and those things which are subject to flux and mortality. But if there is any perfection, and a likeness to the Creator in them, we ascribe this to God as far more worthy. Hence, indeed, we silently remove the consubstantiality of the divine persons, and their order toward one another, as it exists in the fountain, and the river, and the living water. Hence the immobility of the order [is removed], with the personal properties in no way moved; for the eye of the fountain is not called the fountain; nor is the fountain the river. Nor, again, is the sun called a ray; nor is the ray called the light which flows and is diffused through it, even though it itself certainly is light. Yet for the sake of the order to be preserved, the names are distributed and separated, each to each. Just as the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son.

And from elsewhere, indeed, the union of the persons is intimated. Basil, in fact, used the excellent example of the rainbow. In which, although the union and distinction of colors appears gently and moderately, yet no process is perceived in them in any way. From elsewhere, however, a process with the difference of order is gathered, or that there are many things from one, and others from another, with the imagination gathering a certain unity of truth. For it behooves us, as long as we live in shadows and enigmas, to rely on these things which are better known to us, as if on certain aids toward God: believing primarily and necessarily in those truths which flow from there; but also taking consolation from these things which are seen, as much as is permitted, and as much as creatures in themselves can faintly insinuate the Creator: and visible things ^C exhibit certain vehicles toward the first truth.

Whence also Gregory the Theologian says: "There is nothing that stays my soul as I look at these examples, in that which I proceed to imagine and behold, unless someone takes one thing and rejects the rest out of gratitude." For if, because of those things which follow matter and universally created things, we do not take either the identity of essence, nor the order, from these examples which have been said concerning God in an equitable proportion: ^D no one could say that these examples are of no use to us, as if they were taken by the saints in vain and without a certain reason.

Thus, therefore, by the order of the divine Trinity, and the intermediary of the Son, confirmed in many ways by the masters of the most holy Church, it is clear that if any of the saints at any time spoke of a twin ray, and twin lights of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and a double branch, and secondaries of the Father—that which some refer to as having been said in verses by Gregory the Theologian—they do not contradict those things which have been said, nor are they contrary to themselves, nor to one another. For they did not intend to hand down the order of the divine persons toward one another, and their process, when they said these things, but simply that there are only three persons, and that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father as the cause, and the cause from whence all things have flowed. For through these things they indicate that all things are referred to the Father. For under the definition of the causal...

^A they deduce both, according to the former distinction. This is what Gregory the Nyssen also did, distinguishing the one God into cause and caused, or into cause and that which is from the cause. Then, subjoining that we arrive by intelligence at another difference, again, of that which is from the cause. For the one is that which contains, but the other is through Him who contains, and the one is begotten, and the other proceeds, and whatever of this kind has been said for those who perfectly distinguish. According to this sensible reasoning, he who called the Son the second from the Father, and the Holy Spirit as well, wished to signify only this, that these things are causal from the Father, including both under the definition of the causal. For according to the fact that they are causals, the things that are second may also be commonly called causes according to the order of the persons.

But indeed this same author, distinguishing these things more perfectly in other places, says that the difference of emanation and of the relationship to one another has also made the appellation different. And again, in verses he says: "God is one, from the Father, through the Son, into the Holy Spirit, the perfect Deity remaining in three perfect ones." Not even this—what Damascene (19) says, that the Holy Spirit is the median between the unbegotten and the begotten—clashes with the aforementioned order. For he does not thereby intend to set forth the order of the persons and their substantial procession. But since heretics would scarcely confess the Son to be consubstantial with the Father, and would by no means deem the Holy Spirit worthy of this honor and dignity, the holy Fathers, knowing this to be the true God from the true God, and that He proceeds from God according to the Scriptures, not according to a progress of birth, but according to a ^B procession, said: "There is also another mode of substance, namely, a procession, according to which another person comes forth from God; and this is that by which the Holy Spirit proceeds, being of the same essence with the Father and the Son; who is neither unbegotten, nor without a cause [principle]: for He is not the Father; nor, on the other hand, begotten, because He is not the Son, according to the procession of birth." For this reason, the doctor (20) here called the Holy Spirit the medium of the unbegotten and the begotten. For wherever, with three terms posited, a third is denied by both of the others, according to the custom of dialectics it is seen to be the medium in the negation of the others. For if he had thought the Spirit to be from the Father according to [that mode of] being (21), he would never have said that He is there joined to the Father through the Son. For this proves the malice of certain people, and clearly shows that the master agrees with himself and with others. Nor would he ever have said this, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that the Father is the producer of the Spirit through the Word. For these things are most openly contrary to one another.

If, however, anyone wishes to assert that the procession of the Spirit through the Son signifies consubstantiality, first of all, according to the consubstantial, there is no order of persons in God. For in that respect, by which they are consubstantial, the divine essence is one thing, entirely indivisible and indistinct. But the consubstantial introduces no distinction at all. But according to the reason of the procession, and the order that follows from it, the number of persons is introduced and admitted. And so, he who thinks that it is said by reason of the consubstantial that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, posits that one essence to be the cause of the distinction, which is properly an Arian position; ^C and, having omitted the personal distinction, he will necessarily confess three essences divided from one another, and beyond all reason he will posit the causal as the cause. Since such a procession is natural and essential, it shows that the things which are produced are consubstantial with one another.

Further, although the consubstantial is truly said to be signified by these words, the order of the persons is nevertheless principally commended. For the particle "through," as Basil says, writing to Amphilochius, discerns the persons first. Consequently, however, it also introduces the consubstantial. For just as the Son, because He is from the Father, is therefore also consubstantial with Him: so also with the Holy Spirit, while He is asserted by the theologians to be naturally and essentially from the Father through the Son, first, this procession through the Son and its distinction is insinuated; then, the reason for the consubstantiality also appears. For this natural and essential procession is held as admitted. Whence also the great Basil, in his book *Against Sabellius and the Anomoeans*, the beginning of which is: "Judaism is opposed to gentility," says: "We confess the Father and the Son, but on account of the identity of nature, since the Son is from the Father; therefore, it must be said likewise of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." For he who has come forth by an equal cause, that is, naturally and essentially, it is established that he is also of the same nature with the producer, and with Him through whom he proceeds.

Although also, according to the proposed examples, if anyone thinks that they indicate only the consubstantial along with the subsequent order of the processions, he also introduces the reason for the consubstantiality. For, since to believe the unity in the Trinity, and the Trinity in the unity, is the summit of our faith, these things are simultaneously inferred through all that has been said by the masters, and they hold together, so that those who have confessed the one, also confess the other. ^D And thus the order principally, but the consubstantiality consequently, as has been said, appears lucidly in the persons.

But it is established from these things that have been said, that those who wish the procession through the Son to be understood in this way, using their own examples, such as light through glass, or air, or

^A water through a conduit, or a man through a door, are thinking things contrary to the faith and to the holy Fathers. For the latter affirm that He proceeds substantially through the Son. But the former, by what they bring forward, remove ^B what is said to be essential and natural. For neither does water move through a duct, nor man through a door, nor light through the air or through glass, in a natural or essential way. Indeed, these things do not even intimate the order of the divine Persons, nor their procession. For those who are assumed in these examples are entirely of a different substance, and no natural procession is perceived in them.

Wherefore, one should not say that the light goes through the air, but rather in the air. But the Holy Spirit is both in the Son and proceeds through the Son. Therefore, such examples indicate neither the order of the divine Persons nor their consubstantiality. Moreover, if we were to put faith in them, we would attribute a ministerial office to the Son, so that He would fulfill the task of a minister according to a ratio of proportion. But this is both foolish and impious. Therefore, since there is no rationale of unity in them, nor any order, they are to be rejected as harmful and having nothing to do with what we have proposed: and especially because not one of the saints uses them. And this also appears, that the Holy Spirit is not asserted to proceed through the Son because He is given and sent through the Son. For that which is said to be given is temporal; but to proceed is eternal. Nor is it possible that what is temporal should be the cause of that which is above time. And so the Holy Spirit is asserted to proceed from the Father through the Son according to His substantial procession; for His substance, as well as His procession, is eternal.

But it is intimated by this one thing, that He is given and sent by the Son because, according to His substantial procession, He is also through Him. For as the great Athanasius says, writing against Arius: "From whom ^C should it be necessary for the Spirit to be given, if not from Him whose He is? For otherwise the Son would be a minister, if He were said to give what did not naturally proceed through Him." Simultaneously, we would also be compelled to confess that something happens temporally to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: namely, "to give" for the former, and "to be given" for the latter.

Furthermore, that which, when posited, results in both folly and falsehood, must itself be foolish and false. From which it is clear that there is no double procession of the Spirit—one temporal and another without time. First, because no holy Father said this; second, because if this were conceded, many foolish and unworthy things would emerge. But there is one sole and eternal procession, according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. However, to creatures who become apt and worthy to receive the notion and illustration of such a procession, He is said to proceed, to shine, and to be poured forth, and to be given through the Son; and then, what is eternal in Himself comes to them ^D temporally.

So, according to that which is said: "From whom," He is one; but according to that which is said: "Into whom," such procession is twofold. For He proceeds solely and singularly from the Father through the Son, as if from one principle, according to the unique and simple procession by which He is said to proceed; yet, with the addition of the creature, by whom He is said to proceed for the sake of sanctification, then He who proceeds from the Father through the Son is understood to be sent and given from the Father also through the Son. And that whole procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son toward the creature is called a mission, which occurs in time for the sake of the creature, who enjoys His temporal participation—that temporal interval being applied not to God, but to us. And it is one, but differs in reason. For we ought not say that there is anything temporal in God because we receive Him temporally, applying the weakness of our condition to Him. Nor, if someone who was blind until now begins for the first time to look and to enjoy the rays of the sun, does the ray begin to flow from the sun, or the light from the ray, only then. For it is certain that even before the blind man looked, both the ray and the light were likewise in the sun, and the ray likewise grazed his eyes with its radiance.

Wherefore also the great Gregorius, a performer of miracles, in the book whose beginning is: "Most hostile and alien from the apostolic confession," called this procession an eternal emission. Yet there would never be a temporal eternity for Him. Finally he says: "While the Father is indeed unbegotten, the Son is begotten from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is eternally emitted from the Father's essence through the Son." But also the Theologian Gregorius, in the book he wrote to Hero the philosopher, called the emission of the Holy Spirit a "proper" one; yet the temporal will never be able to be the proper one of the Holy Spirit. For certainly if, because He is given and sent by the Son, He is therefore also said to proceed through Him, then He has His substance for our sake, according to which He is from the Father through the Son. But also, as for the temporal one they introduce, it follows that even He would have His substance for our sake. But if He is given, He certainly was, when He was not; and again, when He was, He would cease to be. But these things are impious. Therefore, what is proposed is not true. Furthermore, the excellent Basil in Book IV of the Questions says: "He does not proceed in time, who proceeds from God, even if His action is rendered efficacious in time," meaning, of course, when he makes mention of the Holy Spirit. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is from the Father through

It is asserted by theologians that the Son proceeds naturally, essentially, and eternally from the Father and the Son, regarding nature and essence. But that which is said ^A to proceed, indicates that it has substance by reason of the process, just as the Son is also said to subsist by reason of birth. And everything that has substance essentially through something, is also from it. It is evident, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and proceeds from Him. For either that which is said "through" denotes nothing in the procession of the Holy Spirit, or it does indeed denote something, but something imperfect, or it fulfills the role of an instrument, or—like "through" a place or time—it certainly denotes that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son naturally and by reason of the process, and essentially according to the proper mode of substance. But since other things have no place in the holy, supersubstantial, and simple ^B Trinity, it is left of necessity that we say the word "through" was not inserted by the holy Fathers in vain, and that it denotes one thing: that the Holy Spirit proceeds substantially from the Father through the Son, according to one and the same procession. For indeed, the "through," in those instances where it is assumed, concurs with the preceding cause toward the same efficiency, which that cause regards. And this is widely apparent to those who examine the particulars.

For when fruit proceeds from a root through a branch, the branch, in accordance with the seminal reason of nature that is in the root, strives toward the efficiency of the procession of the fruits along with the root. And in all the aforementioned examples, whoever wishes to exercise his ingenuity will perceive that the same appears. But even in those things where art works—a saw, for instance, through which a carpenter makes a wooden step—it cooperates with the artisan toward that object, and not toward an effect of a different kind. For it will not cooperate with him in heating or whitening, and that through which a machine is pulled will cooperate with the puller toward the drawing of the load.

And if indeed the saw were a man, as is the carpenter, and the same man—just as in the Father and the Son there is the same God—it would cut just as the carpenter does: and that which is done by the saw would be the same as that which is done from the saw. If, however, in those things where nature is different, those things through which something is made cooperate with those who first move, and in their own way become one cause: either like instruments, or helping and conferring in other ways; much more in the Father and the Son, where there is perfect identity and incommutability of the Son toward the Father, and equal Deity according to the same and unique substantial procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, the Son Himself will share with the Father, not instrumentally or servilely, but essentially and naturally, as being a power natural to Him which is substantially implanted in Him. For if in those things which are lesser, it is believed that through the same and unique [power], the [Spirit] is rendered [as having] the same [nature] with the Father and also with the Son, in which there is certainly an infinite variety of substance, much more so in the Holy Spirit, who is of the same [nature] with Them. ^C Now, let the admirable Cyril confirm what we have proposed with his authority. For in the second book to Hermias, he says thus: "You shall call the Holy Spirit, who is poured forth naturally from the Father through the Son, and who, as in the likeness of the breath of our mouth, indicates to us His substance."

If, therefore, the likeness of the breath of our mouth is taken as an example—that the Spirit proceeds through the Son: for the holy Fathers say that the Son is the mouth of the Father; or also on account of the signification of that breathing when the Lord, by breathing, gave the Holy Spirit to the disciples, as will be shown in what follows—this indicates to us a proper substance. It is evident that, whether we have said He proceeds through the Son, or whether we have accepted the figure of breathing, we are taught the substance of the Spirit from both of these, through such an eminent teacher. But if these things are proven to be true and entirely to the point, with the beginnings of the faith and the sacred doctors and all in agreement, it is clearly evident, unless someone wishes to be entirely shameless, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, since He has His substance through Him and proceeds through Him.

Furthermore, we shall teach more openly, from the holy Fathers, that "through" and "from" are of equal value in divine matters; for those who have thought it pious to accept these things interchangeably in these matters, have taught that to understand them otherwise is of heretical malice. For these men were attempting to introduce different natures into the holy Trinity by the difference of prepositions. For ^D the illustrious Basil says in those things which he wrote to Amphilochius: "Not only is the use of words changed in the divine Scriptures, but often other [words] are put for the signification of others, and they pass from their own [meaning] into an alien one. Finally, in these particles, 'through' and 'from,' one often takes the signification of the other, as is that saying: 'I have gotten a man through God' [Gen. IV, 1], which is the same as if he had said, 'from God.' And elsewhere: 'Whatsoever Moses commanded to Israel through the precept of the Lord' [Exod. XL, 25]. And again: 'Is not the declaration of these things through God?'"

' And the angel says: 'Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife, for that which is born in her is of the Holy Ghost' [Matt. I, 20].

^B Furthermore, Saint Cyril, writing to Palladium, by interrogation and response, almost at the beginning of the book which he entitled *On Spiritual Worship*, says: "The Spirit is certainly not variable. Or, if He is subject to this disease of variation, this stain reflects upon the divine nature itself, since He is of God and the Father, and even of the Son, since the Spirit is poured forth essentially from both, namely from the Father through the Son."

Nor indeed must we treat with many words that which is most manifest. For it is evident from these things which have been said, that 'through' and 'of' amount to the same thing in divine matters. And since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, He proceeds also from the Son. And it is simultaneously evident that those who say that 'through' and 'of' are equivalent only when they are taken in terms of creatures—as in the text: 'All things were made through the Son' [John I, 3], which is the same as if it were said, 'of the Son'—but deny them in the uncreated order, do not judge rightly; for the divine Cyril declared that the Spirit of the Father and the Son is poured forth essentially from both, namely from the Father through the Son. It is likewise clear that he considers it identical to speak of the Spirit as being from both, that is, the Father and the Son, and from the Father through the Son, as has been said. ^C But also the excellent Basil, in the 5th chapter to Amphilochius, showing that the term 'of' is appropriate for the Son, alleges the following: 'He shall receive of mine' [John XVI, 14], and that text: 'I know that virtue hath gone out of me' [Luke VIII, 46]. And they themselves, whom they contradict, while considering grace and uncreated efficiency, confess that it proceeds through the Son and of the Son in a different way. And it is furthermore evident that those who assign 'through' only to the Son, while taking away 'of,' will necessarily call the Son less than the Father. For, Chrysostom says, the heretics take this as a sign of diminution. Therefore, no necessity compels us to attribute 'through' to the Holy Spirit. For the Son is not said to be born of the Father through the Spirit, nor will any reasoning whatsoever compel us to say that the Son is of the Spirit.

Furthermore, in very many places in their works, the holy Fathers commend that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. And first Gregory the Theologian, in his book *On the Holy Spirit*, forming an argument from the contrary: "What therefore is lacking to the Spirit, that He should not be the Son? For if anything were lacking, He would certainly be the Son." But having posed this objection, he immediately adds: "We do not say that anything is lacking to Him. For God is in need of nothing; but the difference of procession, so to speak, and of the habit-relation toward one another, has made their different appellation." This habit-relation, moreover, of the Son to the Holy Spirit, and conversely, Gregory of Nyssa also, upon the Lord's Prayer...

^A affirms, saying: "But the Son of the Holy Spirit neither is, nor is called; nor does this consequence admit a conversion of habit."

Since, therefore, on account of the total exclusion of material and the identity and unchangeability of that supreme essence, neither according to greater or lesser, or first or last, nor according to any other eminence is order and habit in the divine persons admitted by theologians—for it is not right that places of such kinds should be in God—but rather it is received solely according to relation, cause, and what is caused, just as in the Father and the Son, relation and habit is both handed down and believed; yet likewise in the Father and the Spirit, according to the handed-down difference of the processions, it is clear that since the habit handed down by the saints of the Son and Spirit toward one another is necessarily rendered by the same logic, we must confess either that the Spirit is the cause of the Son or the Son the cause of the Spirit, especially since, as has been said, we perceive that the divine persons are distinguished only in cause and the caused. For otherwise the Son and the Spirit would not be habitually referred to one another, nor would the handed-down habit be preserved. And yet the Son neither is nor is called the Holy Spirit; nor does this consequence convert the habit. Nor, according to the exposed process of His substance, is He born from the Father through the Spirit. Therefore, the Spirit is not the cause of the Son.

And since the "being conceived before" ^B in the holy Trinity, which is spoken of, belongs to those things in which thought and habit, namely according to person, exist; but thought and habit are wont to be where there is distinction; and distinction is found and taken solely in the cause and the caused; it is gathered that what is said to be "conceived before" is spoken of by the holy Fathers in the holy and most blessed Trinity solely according to cause and what is from a cause.

Here, if one were again to bring forward the previous points, such as that because the Father is both Father and producer, and the Father is continuously rendered to the Son: the producer is referred to that which is produced, since the Spirit is said to be from the Father; we are compelled to think of the Son before the Father, because the name of Father is rendered to the Son; for indeed our mind is accustomed to think simultaneously of things that are relative to one another. For the Spirit is said to be from the Father not according to that which is Father, but according to that which is producer. For the Spirit, according to St. Maximus, has no father. But when the Spirit is spoken of from a producer, we are necessarily compelled to think of the produced Spirit before the Son, because the name of producer is referred to the product; but through the intermediary producer, to revolve both the Father and the Son at once in the mind.

It remains, therefore, to confess the Son as the cause of the Holy Spirit, because He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son, according, namely, to His substantial procession: ^C according to which both the logic of the process, and being, and the order toward one another, and habit, and consequently the distinction, is preserved. Whence it is deservedly said that this consequence does not convert the habit, since the procession and substance of the persons does not convert. For the Son is not born from the Father through the Spirit. From which it is surely manifest that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son of God.

Furthermore, Gregory of Nyssa in the first book of Questions against Eunomius, near the end, when he had premised that the Father is preferred to the Son solely by the logic of cause, added: "The same must be felt by us concerning the Holy Spirit. For they differ only in order. For as the Son is joined to the Father, and while having His being from Him, is yet not posterior in the logic of substance: so also the Holy Spirit is joined to the Only-Begotten, ^D for the Son is envisioned and preferred to the substance of the Spirit solely by the logic of cause."

Then, lest anyone from these words should arbitrate that "prior" and "posterior," and even certain local and temporal intervals, happen to God—from which the indivisibility of substance, and identity, and singularity would be taken away—he followed by adding: "But temporal delays have no place in eternal life, so that although the logic of cause is said to be preferred, the holy Trinity can in no way be discordant with itself."

If anyone, therefore, asserts these things and things of this kind regarding what is said to be "conceived before," through which he strives to exclude at once the habit and distinction of the Son and Spirit, and the cause, and that which is from a cause: this one will necessarily be compelled to confess at one time that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and at another time that the Son is begotten from the producer through the product. Indeed, they openly both say and write this. For nothing hinders them, according to their own reasoning, from also putting the Son before the Father. And by this logic, they will be both through one another and from one another. But that this is both false and blasphemous, has already been declared above. For by this reasoning: not because the Son is from the Father, is He therefore said to be from the Father, nor because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, according to His substantial and eternal procession, is it therefore asserted by theologians that He proceeds in this way; but because He is said [to exist], therefore He is so; and our speech is not the cause of the thing, but the immovable and eternal order of the persons is one thing, and it would hold itself differently according to the whim of our speech and imagination, and at the same time, not even the distinction of the Son and Spirit would be rendered. But these things are truly both inept and at once pernicious.

Wherefore it is most correctly said that this novelty of order is the abolition of the substance itself, and the abnegation of the whole faith; and that it is of equal impiety to confess the Holy Spirit as a creature, and to prefer Him either to the Father or the Son, not only in time, but in order. For that indeed takes away whence He is; but once that is removed, whence He is and how He is will take itself away at the same time, and the person will cease to be. Then, what are they going to say, when the Father is asserted to be conceived and thought of in the mind according to the logic of cause before the Son? For here this exposition of theirs has no place.

^A For the doctor says: "In the same way that the Father is thought of before the Son, so in the same way is the Son thought of before the Holy Spirit. But the Father is thought of before the Son by the logic of cause and the caused. It has been premised, however, that the Son also is thought of before the Holy Spirit by the logic of cause before the Spirit—that is, naturally, by the cause which He Himself holds in relation to the Spirit, according to which He proceeds from the Father through the Son; though not according to the one the Father holds in relation to the Son. For the human mind does not grasp this, nor is it right to think of the Son as before the Holy Spirit, as the doctor says. Since, therefore, the Father is pre-thought before the Son in the exact same manner, and the Son before the Spirit, it is evident that the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit."

Likewise, Saint Athanasius, in Book I *Against the Arians*, says after many things: "The Lord, while showing His divinity and majesty to the disciples, not signifying Himself to be now lesser, but greater and equal, was indeed giving the Holy Spirit and saying: *I will send Him, and whatsoever He shall hear, He shall speak*." And after a few words, explaining in what manner the Father is greater than the Son, he says: "The Lord called the Father greater than Himself, not because of any magnitude or time, but because He is born from the Father Himself." ^B But also Damascene, in the chapter on the Holy Trinity, the beginning of which is: "We believe, therefore, in one God," says the Father is greater than the Son by the logic of cause. If, therefore, as it has been said, the Father is greater than the Son by the logic of cause, and Saint Athanasius called the Son greater than the Spirit, it is surely evident that, when he calls Him greater, he meant to signify that He is the cause of the Holy Spirit. If, however, the Father is also said by some to be greater than the Son by reason of the humanity assumed, the Holy Spirit is certainly not incarnate, so that He should be called lesser than the Son by the grace of the flesh assumed.

For even though the great Basil in Book IV *Against Eunomius* seems to reject what is called greater according to cause ^C in the Father, he forbids there a cause which precedes as a causal factor according to time, or magnitude, or any other excellence of that kind, and that it should be more honorable than the other; he does not, however, deny that the Father is the beginning of the Son; and it is certain that in the first *Against Eunomius*, he fully accepts and confesses that what is said to be greater in the Father according to cause, is just as cause is understood in the Holy Trinity. But the theologian Gregory also says: "I wish to call the Father greater, from whom both the equals (that they might be equal) are, and that He is." "For all will grant these things, and I fear lest I make the beginning of the lesser [things] *the* beginning, and by this as it were honorable preference, I should do Him injury."

^D Since, therefore, it is held as confessed that what is consubstantial is of the cause from which it is, surely the illustrious doctor will not refuse to call the Father greater than the Son by the logic of cause, especially to those who piously accept what is called greater, and do not hunt for occasions of blasphemy from words. Therefore, even D. Athanasius, when he had called the Son greater than the Spirit, also added "equal," so that he might obstruct every approach of blasphemy. Since, therefore, the Father is greater than the Son, and the Son is said to be greater than the Spirit by the logic of cause, the Son is therefore the cause of the Holy Spirit, even though all things of the Son and of the Holy Spirit flow back to the Father, from whom they have both their being and their being equal.

Furthermore, the great Basil in Book I of the *Questions*, the beginning of which is: "Scarcely satiated at length." There, while Eunomius asserts that the Holy Spirit is third by nature, he himself indeed confesses Him third in order, and strongly. But he presses sharply against that which was called third by nature, and adds: "For what necessity compels us, since the Spirit is third in order and dignity, to confess Him third also by nature? For reason of piety commends Him as second in dignity from the Son, since He has His being from Him, and receives from Him, and announces to us, and entirely depends on that cause. But that He is third by nature, we have neither learned from the Holy Scriptures, nor can it be inferred from what has been said according to the logic of consequence."

Here he most openly proves it pious and most religious that the Holy Spirit depends on the cause of the Son, and is suspended from Him, and receives and has being from Him. But if anyone contends that this is not Basil's, and says it was added to the texts, he is raving completely. Indeed, in the most ancient codices it is found written thus. Which codices, indeed, no one could at all doubt were written for their antiquity before the schism arose: some of which are seen to be obliterated; with some people not wishing to accept this saying of that man as if it were adulterated, and impiously using iron against the mute apexes.

Moreover, the context of the words themselves, and the address itself, corresponds miraculously to itself and the hearer. From these things themselves also, the intention of the Saint is sufficiently apparent. For he says that He is second from the Son, that is, third from the Father by the logic of order, which is also asserted for Him from the preceding. In this place, therefore, he appended the cause why the Spirit is second from the Son, namely, that He has His being from Him. For the species of the statement requires this, just as when, for example, we say: "This one, having a rational nature, learns," for it is the same as if it were said: "Because he has a rational nature, therefore he learns." For "learning" is causal; but "having a rational nature," which is said, is as if [it were the cause]. Caleca, however, explains his mind sufficiently well.

^A For there is nowhere that a form of expression of this kind does not signify a cause and a causal [relation], but rather it is set down as if in passing, or because it is both this and that besides. But in the Holy Trinity, since no other difference is observed except only the relation according to cause, on account of the highest simplicity: that which is said in passing, in both deed and word, would be utterly removed from this kind of expression. Hence, he recommends to us in the second place the cause, and from that the causal [notion] ^B from the cause. For in the second place to be is asserted by the theologians on account of the procession of the divine persons in the Holy Trinity. But theology teaches that the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son: through whom, to be sure, he is called second from the Son, and third from the Father. And the cause of these is the procession from the Father through the Son. Now, in every case, the causal [notion] at least precedes the cause in thought. And where there is a causal [notion], it follows necessarily that there also is a cause; with the cause removed, the causal [notion] is also immediately removed. Therefore, the holy man, who confesses the Spirit to be third from the Father and second from the Son, according to the order of the persons, and who deems the insolent novelty of this order a denial of the faith, and [who considers] whatever other things he has foretold—by what reasoning does he posit the causal [relation] as pious, and then, by adding that he has his being from the Son, deny the things that follow—the cause—as if it were something foreign? For if to be second is a causal [state], and of this, that he has his being from the Son, and that he proceeds absolutely through the Son, a cause is posited, and truly a causal [notion] is never without a cause, how does the cause not necessarily follow along with the causal [notion]? For if he is neither second from the Son, nor third from the Father, then he will not have his being from the Son either. But since here, and in many other places, the holy man posits him as both second and third, and even those who contradict him do not delete the fact that he is called second along with the other things, it is necessary to confess that he also posited the teacher [as the reason], or the cause, why he is second, which is indeed that he has his being from the Son. And just as he himself says in the same places: "Just as the Son is indeed second in order from the Father, because he is from him, and in dignity, because the Father is his beginning and cause so that he might exist; and [just as he] posited the Son to be second to the Father in order and dignity as a causal [being]; but as to the cause, because he was from the Father, he himself had the beginning and cause; nor would he be second in any way unless he had his being from the Father; he posits a comparable method for the Holy Spirit as well. For he would not be second from the Son—that is, third from the Father—unless he had his being from him. Therefore, they must either deny that he is second in order and third in one stroke, or, necessarily agreeing to this, they are compelled to confess at the same time that he has his being from the Son. ^C For indeed, if he had believed the Holy Spirit to be from the Father alone, what was to prevent him from saying: 'Since just as the Son in order [has his being], so too the Holy Spirit is in turn second from the Father in order and dignity.' For this could have contributed much to his purpose, when he was attempting to commend him as being of the same essence as the Father, and true God. For regarding the Father, there was never any one of the heretics who did not think him to be eternal and true God. On the other hand, many have often thought otherwise regarding the Son. But he did not say this, since he was well acquainted with the order of the divine persons and the difference of their processions; nay, he even forbade it, as is clearly shown from the things already said. But certainly, if we have accepted from the other doctors, and from the great Basil, that the Holy Spirit is third from the Father and second from the Son: and this would never be so unless the third were from the first through a medium, that is, that he proceeded from the Father through the Son: how is what we premised not supported with all truth? Specifically, that because of the substantial procession of the persons toward one another, the order appears? How, likewise, is it not the same thing to proceed through the Son, as is said, and to have one's being from the Son, according to St. Basil, which he also posited as the cause so that he might be second from the Son? But how are both 'to be' and 'to proceed' not understood as the same thing, if indeed it is established that it is a cause, so that the Spirit is second from the Son, because he proceeds through the Son, for which reason he preferred to say that he has his being from the Son? ^D How, likewise, by positing him through the Son and from the Son equally, does he not openly signify that 'from' and 'through' have the same weight in divine matters? For no one would burst into such fury and madness as to attempt to distinguish the particles 'from' and 'out of' from one another in this place by a reason of signification. From these things, therefore, it is established that the text 'to have his being from the Son' belongs to the holy man. Nay, more, even from these things, which wicked slanderers add in this clause against the master's faith and truth, the sense of the holy man shines forth clearly indeed, while they themselves are refuted throughout by their own malice, so that it is within their will both to delete and to add. For besides the fact that it is manifestly apparent in the most ancient copies that the malignity—which should be deemed intolerable—was added subsequently in both the position and the form of the letters, the holy man says in the following: 'For as the Son is indeed second in order from the Father, because he is from him, and in dignity, because the Father is his beginning and cause so that he might exist, and because through him there is access and introduction to God and the Father for us, but in nature he is not already second, for the divinity is one in both: so, manifestly, the Holy Spirit, even if he yields to the Son in order, and is in dignity, yet he does not already exist as if of a foreign nature.' Where, therefore, he says: 'And if

we grant he yields to the Son in order or dignity, they have added: “Entirely, and we will grant it.” But where he says: “Does the rationale of piety hand it down?” they read it with an addition and say: “Perhaps the rationale of piety hands it down,” so that by these words they might entirely take away what is called second in order and dignity, and by no means concede that he is second from the Son. How, therefore, when the rationale of piety is that the Spirit is second in existence from the Son, can he grant what is said to be conceded to the Son, yet [say] that he is second from the Son, [and that it is] third from the Father—the order which the Lord handed down in the salutary tradition of baptism, as that excellent man said both here and elsewhere, asserting this to be the rationale of piety, and then, as if hesitant and wavering, perhaps added it? How, I ask, can he who defined this insolent novelty of order to be a denial of the faith, asserting that it makes no difference whether someone somehow changes this, or leads the Holy Spirit to [the status of] a creature, and establishing that those who change that consequence which the Lord handed down to us are to be shunned as those who openly attack piety, calling the Lord’s tradition of order piety; how can he, having suddenly changed his opinion, refute these words as if they were spoken impiously, saying: “If we grant these things at all”? But that is by no means consistent with the wisdom and prudence of great Basil.

But that ^A he did not use this new and unaccustomed term here, but took the occasion from the Holy Scriptures, is evident from what the Lord says about himself: “The things which I speak,” and, “The things which I have heard from my Father, I have announced to you.” But concerning the Holy Spirit: “He,” he says, “will glorify me, because he will receive from what is mine, and will announce it to you.” Furthermore, the teachers of the Church, as they had received these things, so they laid them down. Finally, Saint Athanasius in his Epistle to Serapion says thus: “And the Son indeed: ‘The things which,’ he says, ‘I have heard from my Father, these I speak in the world.’ The Spirit, however, receives from the Son: ‘For from what is mine,’ he says, ‘he will receive and announce it to you.’” The same [author] in the third book against the Arians: “The Spirit does not join the Word to the Father; but the Spirit receives this rather from the Son.” And again: “Whatever the Spirit has, he has received from the Word.”

^B Moreover, in creatures indeed, which are said to receive from God, since they receive whatever they have through participation and temporally, so that they might become better, it signifies that what they have received was previously lacking in them. Although there is nothing to prevent the more imperfect of mortals, when they progress from imperfect to perfect, after they have received coming into being—nay, it is even necessary—from being called both to hear and to receive skill, or art, and to be able to perfect whatever has been received.

Furthermore, in the Holy Trinity, since both matter and every imperfect affection are utterly removed from it by its supreme simplicity and perfection, it is entirely absurd to think either that the Son, having been begotten, was previously ignorant of the Father's will and learned it afterward, the Father handing it down, as if knowledge were later added to his essence; or that the Holy Spirit later stood in need of the Father's and the Son's knowledge, as if he progressed toward perfection gradually and little by little.

But if the Word of God is indeed the wisdom of the Father, nay, is one God with the Father, and since the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of wisdom, he has no need ever to hear anything from another; for these things are completely alien to that substance, and the distinction in the divine persons has a place solely by the rationale of cause and the caused; it is clear that the Father, since he is without cause, is for that reason ^C not able to receive or hear from another: but the Son, since he is not from himself, but has a beginning, the Father, is said both to speak and to hear from the Father, not from himself, since he drew from there both essence and wisdom simultaneously. But when it is said that the Holy Spirit both hears and receives from the Son, it is surely established that from whom he receives, from him he also drew his essence by process.

Whether, therefore, the Spirit does not receive from the Son, and we shall erase the voices of Scripture and the doctors at once: and he will no longer be said to proceed naturally and essentially from him; or if he receives from him, as the Son himself said—for so the holy Fathers accepted that saying—what he receives and has; indeed, according to the opinion of Athanasius, ^D “Whatever he has, he has received from the Son.”

Saint Cyril also, when interpreting that evangelical [passage]: “He will glorify me,” says, “Then that which is said, ‘He will receive from mine,’ will be entirely irrefutable, and will be void of every curse and accusation, that the Spirit is asserted to receive something from the Only-Begotten. For, since he proceeds naturally through him, he is said to receive it as his own property, with all the things that he has perfectly, which are his.” The same person, upon that saying: “All things that the Father has, are mine,” says: “But this Spirit is also of the Only-Begotten; for he is consubstantial with the Father. Since, therefore,” he says, “it is seen that he is in God and the Father, to be revealed in those who are worthy in his own Spirit, and to effect also through him what he wills, for this cause he said, ‘Because he will receive what is mine, and will announce it to you.’”

^A

[He] possesses [all things] as received; but what he has is of his essence, and he who truly proceeds possesses the whole essence itself, just as the Son also, being born, possesses this: necessarily receiving from the Son, he also has his being from him. And just as the divine Chrysostom, explaining the evangelical saying: “The Father has given all judgment to the Son,” says: “Since, he says, he said he gave life, and what he said, judgment he gave, it is the same as if he were to say: He begat him as Judge.” In the same manner, to be sure, that which is said, to hear, and to receive, according to the different processions of the persons, commends that he has his being from him from whom he receives. For if that which is said, "He gave," according to Chrysostom, signifies that he is from a cause, the receiving of what is said will signify the same. For that which the cause gives, that also the causal receives. Whence also the divine Athanasius, to Serapion: “He explained 'will receive' for that which is, 'will take unto himself,' saying: ‘But if he is the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit receives all things from the Son, as the Lord himself says.’” But where does the Lord say this? Truly there where he said: “He shall receive of mine.” Therefore, if what the Son is said to receive from the Father is to be born of him, and what the Spirit is said to receive from the Son, this is to proceed from the Father through the Son, and since the cause of what is said to be announced and suggested is to receive, and he has to receive and to hear from the Son, it is necessary that to hear and to receive are one and the same in divine matters: and as the great Athanasius asserts, whatever the Spirit has, he has received from the Son; by that fact, therefore, which he hears from the Son and receives, he is demonstrated to be entirely from the whole. ^C And because the Father is not one thing and the whole Son another, but the Father and Son are one whole; for the essence of both the Father and the Son is one, the Spirit receives as if from one, while the difference of the begetter and the begotten is always preserved. Wherefore he is also said to have his being from the Son, and to proceed through the Son.

If, therefore, according to the Savior’s sentiment, the Spirit hears and receives from him, furthermore to hear and to receive from him that which is said signifies to have his being from him, according to the common sanctions of the faith and the expositions of the holy Fathers. For what reason would the great Basil deny that he, who has his being from him, and receives from him, and announces it to us, and depends entirely upon that cause, is as it were a foreigner? For he received this from the holy Scriptures; but he placed this as a consequent and equivalent, as if it were a conclusion necessarily following the beginnings. But who would say that he used a new, harsher, and unaccustomed term, when the sacred utterances themselves, and the divine Father himself with the remaining doctors, and the faith, and all things thoroughly protest against it?

From which it is indeed manifest that that saying, as has been explained above, is the great Father Basil's, from which he is in harmony with himself and the other doctors. But in those copies where it is not so found, it is clearly a matter of open malice, namely on the part of those who, for the sake of defending their own opinion, which they had previously taken away by means of injuries and insults, have partly added to, and partly subtracted from, their sayings and opinions.

But if anyone should say that the holy Basil, in the same work against Eunomius, openly denies the order of the Trinity and the third Spirit from the Father; when he said, refuting Eunomius himself: “He cannot even say who the holy men were, and in which books they were the authors of his doctrine,”—Eunomius himself, that is; for he himself was saying concerning the Holy Spirit that, since he had received that he was third, both in order and in dignity, from the holy, he believed that he was also third in nature. If, therefore, anyone brings this forward, it is indeed manifest from the things which have been said that the great Basil confesses an order in the holy Trinity, and that the Holy Spirit is third from the Father. But here he accuses Eunomius, either because this order had not yet been so declared by the holy, and simply, according to his custom, he argues against him who was lying through these things, not having from where he could assert it more clearly. Indeed, it had not yet been so openly set forth, nor had any of the predecessors discoursed in such a way concerning this matter of order. For before those times in which Athanasius and Basil flourished, and whoever were the teachers of the Church through that age, we do not read that there were any such public teachers: or, what is more proper and true, as if he were insulting the holy, and fabricating calumnies against the truth itself, when he asserted that they had handed down that the Holy Spirit was third in order and dignity, by distinguishing certain degrees of essence; and because he had believed, on account of this, that he was also third in nature; for Basil, as is clear from the aforementioned, embraces the confession that he is third in order and dignity, as is pious; but that he is third both in dignity and in order according to nature, he is nowhere seen to accept.

For he delivered a twofold species of order in the preceding sections, proving the one from these, and, as has been declared above, disapproving the other. For he stands with full intent against that [view] by which he is said to be third in order and dignity: according to which order the differences of essences, and the prior and the posterior, and the more honorable seemed to be introduced. But to that [point] namely, that he is said to be third in order and dignity, according to which also cause and causal, beginning, and that which is from the beginning, and at the same time, and co-eternity are perceived, just as it naturally befits the light which flows from him to the fire, as he himself says; or, as the light, and the ray, and the sun have [a relation] to one another; to this order, therefore, he in no way recoils, unless one thinks he is forgetful of himself, and that he is destroying himself.

At the same time, this also appears from the preceding, that those who thus interpret what has been said: “He shall receive of mine,” for that which is, “From my Father,” do not judge rightly. For the highest of the Fathers, as it was shown above, accepted this in the Son, as if it were being said: “From my own,”

that is, all things from my entire plenitude, and so he will receive it. ^A Furthermore, if this were the true interpretation, it would by no means be said without an addition. For possessive pronouns of the masculine or feminine gender are never used in the property of the Greek language without the addition of the article. For we say ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ, and ἡ ἐμὴ οἰκία, ἡ πόλις, that is: “This is my Father,” and “This is my house,” or “city.” For so indeed, as we have said, the custom of the Greek language, in which this Gospel is written, is accustomed to speak: otherwise the pronunciation would be faulty. But when it is said without an addition, it is understood to be neuter and to signify the thing itself. For example: Εἴ τι καὶ τοὐμόν ἐστι παρά σοι, that is: “If anything of mine is with you,” which gives the thing to be understood by itself. But to these words, “He receives from mine,” or “He will receive,” the preceding words give recommendation. For He says: “All things which the Father has, are mine. Therefore I said to you, because He receives from mine.” For if the Spirit receives from the Son, but all the things of the Father are common to the Son, it is manifest from these things that the Son is insinuated to be one God with the Father; and that the Spirit is declared to be true God from the essence of the Father and the Son: which is indeed the power of the heavenly utterance. ^B Furthermore, to say: “All things which the Father has are mine; therefore I said that He will receive from my Father,” signifies nothing, or nothing to the purpose intended, since the cause having been adopted for the structure, it concludes nothing concerning the dignity of the Son, except in so far as it was said: “All things which the Father has are mine,” which could have been said by itself even without that which follows.

However, if anyone objects to the divine Chrysostom, that in a certain sermon of his he explains that which is said: “He will receive from mine,” that is to say, “from my flesh,” and “from my body,” as if he were drawing it from a certain cistern. For that Jesus had been filled according to his humanity with all the graces of the Spirit, rooted in him and stored up in himself, and that he thus distributed them to others—even if we concede that this sermon was of this supreme man; for it is very suspicious, because it is not at all similar to his other sermons, neither in sense nor in the mode of speaking. For it was more proper to say that the Spirit receives these things from Himself, since He is more of a fountain of such gifts than the Lord’s body is as a body; and it would be expressed more expressly and more truly that the Son receives from the Spirit ^C and gives to us, since He himself also gives these things: and all the more so, since He himself gives the Spirit, and not the Spirit the Son.

Positing, however, that this sermon is Chrysostom’s, we will teach these things here: that it is neither contrary to the preceding things, nor, this being posited, does the interpretation handed down by the holy Fathers totter. Nor are these things so contrary to one another that, one being posited, the other remains inconsistent. For, even if the Son is sent as a man, ^D and many of the doctors think it, it is not therefore the case that he who says He is sent by God is immediately a blasphemer: “For He was sent,” says the theologian Gregory, “but as a man; but if He was sent even as God, what then?” And this, of course, he approved as true.

Nor did the great Basil, when he had said that the Son is second to the Father in order and dignity, because the Father was the beginning and cause for Him to be, immediately destroy himself, adding: “And because through Him is the access and bringing to God and the Father for us.” For both are true, if anyone wishes to distinguish these things and receive them according to various interpretations.

Thus also Chrysostom is to be thought to have spoken, when heretics, from that which is said, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son, wished to diminish the substance of the Spirit: wishing to obstruct the mouths of those men, he accepted “to receive” in this place as being said according to his humanity; but where there was no battle for him against them, he confirms the handed-down interpretation with the rest. For saying in the Gospel of John: “He will receive from mine,” that is, from my knowledge, he showed that he understood what is said, “He will receive from mine,” or “He receives,” from the Son. For He himself is the wisdom of God, nor is His essence one thing, and His knowledge another. For otherwise He would be composite, since essence would be viewed in one thing, and knowledge in another. And it would be believed that essence is devoid of knowledge, and that knowledge is without substance. Wherefore, he showed that what is said as “to give and to receive” signifies a cause and a causal relation. This, moreover, confirms the interpretation which we have mentioned before.

Just as, therefore, for those who receive greater things in the Father for the sake of the cause, it is not but pious to speak this also, according to the doctrine of the saints: so also in the Son it must be spoken according to Athanasius, that He is indeed greater regarding the Spirit: so therefore nothing will prohibit thinking even the handed-down interpretation of Chrysostom himself to be true and necessary: especially since today no contradiction of heretics disturbs us.

If, therefore, he is contrary neither to the other doctors, nor to himself, how shall we say that the aforementioned interpretation is contrary to him; if even in that way it can be said by another method, especially when no contradiction presses us? But this also can be gathered from the things said before, because the superiority which Athanasius rendered to the Son according to cause, this the great Basil placed in the Spirit, asserting that He concedes to the Son both in order and in dignity. For if the Spirit concedes to the Son, both in order and in dignity, it is established that the Son is greater in order and in dignity. Moreover, writing this also to Amphilochius, he indicated it, saying: “Just as the Holy Spirit insinuates the greatness of Him from whom He proceeds, namely the Son, for the discourse to him was about Him; thus, therefore, although he said that He yields to the Son, he nevertheless confesses an one nature for both, since the deity is neither greater nor lesser in the mystery of the Trinity.”

^A And just as when the Father is called greater than the Son, it is said because of the cause, yet the Son is not on that account lesser than the Father; so, even when the Son is asserted to be greater than the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is not understood to be lesser than the Son. For the essence of the Three is indeed one. Moreover, when things of this kind are spoken of in accordance with the personal order, the distinction is rendered solely by the cause and the causality of the persons. For to concede anything else, or to signify it according to being, means nothing other than that there is another person prior to it, who is conceived by the mind prior to the person himself.

Moreover, those who interpret the dictum of Basil in such a way as to think that what he says—that the Spirit has His existence from the Son, and is given by Him—signifies the act of being in place of that which is the act of being given, taking them as equivalent—those people think entirely contrary to the intention of the doctor. For he, having shown the Son to be consubstantial with the Father, intends also to conclude that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Son, and through Him, with the Father. Furthermore, to conclude that it is given by the Son means the opposite, unless it is presupposed that it is given through Him, through whom it is assumed to proceed naturally and essentially, when even "to be given," in divine matters, is the same as "to proceed." Since, therefore, Eunomius blasphemed that the Holy Spirit was a creation of the Son, and since what is merely called "given" contributed to this blasphemy of his, the holy and most learned man certainly would never have acted so weakly, and indeed in favor of his enemies; nay, if he had thought at all that an exposition of this kind could be taken from his words, he would never have said it completely without addition and definition, according to the custom of the learned; and entirely, as he was most diligent, he would have taken the utmost care in this matter, lest he achieve the opposite of what he had proposed. From which it also appears that the Holy Spirit is said to be given by the Son because He has His existence from Him. For otherwise He would perform the office of a minister, providing what did not proceed naturally through Him. ^B It is clear also that which is said, that He has His existence from Him, signifies the Spirit through the Son.

Furthermore, the great Basil himself, in Book IV of the *Questions*, says: "For we would not have had anything less for the purpose of knowing that the Spirit is from God, by hearing that the Spirit is the breath of His mouth; but this could suffice by itself to indicate that His substance is from God." If, therefore, for the Spirit to be from God is the same thing as for Him to be called the Spirit of His mouth, and the Son is called the mouth of the Father by the teachers of the Church, then it is the same thing to say that the Spirit is from God and to call Him the Spirit of the Son. But that of the Holy Spirit signifies substance from God. And so, that He is also called the Spirit of the Son designates the same substance of the Spirit both through the Son and from the Son. He says, therefore, that this also suffices to insinuate the substance of the Spirit. Whence it also appears that He would not otherwise be called the Spirit of the Son, unless He had His substance through Him and from Him. Since, therefore, in God, both matter and everything that is from matter have absolutely no place, and it is impossible that this be named according to excellence and defect, nor as a possession, or a work, or a part, or a member, or in any other way whatsoever according to property of this kind; it is certain indeed that when this is called "of this" or "of that" by the theologians, a cause is insinuated; for otherwise it is not possible for it to be. ^C From which it is also insinuated that the Spirit is spoken of relatively to the Son, if we wish to distinguish these things from one another according to the relation of cause and causality: "since according to Gregory of Nyssa: 'In this alone do we find the one distinguished from the other, that the one is the cause, and the other is from the cause.'" Which he again divided in such a way as to say that one exists continuously from the First, and the other flows through Him who continuously exists from the First. But now the length of this book must be curtailed, so that the reader's intent, refreshed meanwhile from labor, may rise up more alert and vigilant for the things that remain.

BOOK TWO

In the Sacred Scriptures the Holy Spirit is called the breath of God: *The breath of the Almighty, he says, teaches me* [Job xxxiii, 4]. For both are denominated from breathing, namely, both "spirit" and "breath" (*spiraculum*). For the great Athanasius also, in the book which is inscribed: *Refutation of the simulation of Meletius and Eusebius*, said: "Not to the birth of the Holy Spirit is the procession assimilated, but to the breath, which breath as if from the mouth proceeds." And the same in the book to Serapion ^D on the Holy Spirit: "This Spirit, he says, is the breath of the Son." If, therefore, the Spirit is indeed of the Son, and is called Spirit, while breath and Spirit are the same thing; and the breath is truly of the breather; it is manifest that the Holy Spirit is referred to the Son, as if to an inspirer. For if He is His breath, it is certain that He is breathed by Him, and He Himself is the inspirer.

^A Since indeed the breath, as we have said, is denominated from breathing.

But because the Holy Spirit is called the breath of God, and yet the Father and the Son are one God—since they are of one essence, saving only the personal difference by which the one begets and the other is begotten, and the Holy Spirit is asserted to be the whole-from-the-whole; and because the whole Father is not one thing and the whole Son another, nor is there any dissonance—it is established that the Father and the Son are the one breather of the Holy Spirit, of whom He is the breath. Whence He is also called producer through the Word.

Holy Epiphanius also, in that book which he inscribed *Ancoratus*, says thus: "The Father was always, and the Son was always, and the Holy Spirit always breathes from the Father and the Son." But in truth, just as the sprout and the Son are the same, so also is the Spirit and what is breathed. And the producer is said to be related to the produced; therefore He is also said to be related to the Spirit. Therefore, of whom the Spirit is and by whom He is inspired, to him He is also said to be related. From which it again follows that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son relatively. Wherefore, ^B the great Basil says, this also suffices for insinuating His substance. For if it were not so, when we say "Spirit," the thought would not recur to one person of the holy Trinity, but to one God. For if God is called "Spirit" absolutely, then one would neither have the Trinity as God, nor would we confess Him by His proper names, nor would we be led into the thought of the three persons.

Holy Augustine also attests to these things in book V *De Trinitate*, saying thus: "The Holy Spirit, however, according to that which is written, that God is Spirit, can indeed be called so universally, because the Father is Spirit and the Son is Spirit. Therefore the Father is holy, and the Son is holy, and the Holy Spirit is holy, since one God is both holy God and God is Spirit, and He can be called both Trinity and Holy Spirit. But yet that Holy Spirit who is not understood as the Trinity, but within the Trinity, in that He is properly called Holy Spirit, is spoken of relatively when He is referred to the Father and to the Son; because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son."

As for the objection brought by some who say: "Since the gate is called the house's, and God is called our God, but neither is the gate from the house, nor is God from us, this is utterly absurd and vile." First, it is said that in divine persons only dignity is preserved, so that what is said to be of someone is understood either to be of Him or to be the cause of Him of whom it is said; since there is no other distinct difference there. For it is not said that this is of that as a limb, or a part, or an instrument, or a possession, or in any other way as occurs in creatures. Then, indeed, God is called the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of all, but of the just as a dwelling and a lot. For God is the inheritance of the saints; but of creatures and others he is simply creator and Lord, providing for His own.

From which it is clear that even in this there is no lack of order according to those things that are Relative (Ad aliquid). This order is observed according to that which perfects and that which is perfected, and that which rules and that which is ruled. And so the Spirit is not called the creature's Spirit according to His personal property, but according to the fact that He is one God with the Father and the Son, sanctifying, and inspiring, or otherwise making those who are worthy better, and visiting them.

Moreover, since the producer is of the number of those things which are spoken of relatively (Ad aliquid), and the "Spirit" is spoken of only toward Him, it is established that the Spirit also is among those things which are spoken of relatively, and is referred only to the producer. For if anything, according to its being such, is said in relation to something else, it is established that even that first thing is said in relation to it as if to a relative. ^C For if a man, according to the fact that he is a master, is spoken of in relation to another, and that person is referred to him as a servant, because servant and master are always relative to one another, this same thing applies to all things which are mutually related as relative. Whose Spirit, therefore, the Spirit is, that one is the producer, and the Spirit is referred to him whose Spirit He is, as to a producer. But the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son; therefore the Son is the producer of the Holy Spirit, and is the one breathing Him. And therefore His procession is likened to a breath, and is denominated from breathing, and is called the breath of the Son. And according to holy Epiphanius, the Spirit breathes from the Father and the Son.

Moreover, Basil in the books against Eunomius and Arius says: "I understand the Spirit's property in relation to the Father, because He proceeds from the Father. But in relation to the Son…"

^D The Theologian Gregory also says: "The habit of emanation toward one another creates a difference; and it also effects the naming of them; so that, for instance, one is called the Son, and another the Holy Spirit." Where he also adds: "But if anyone contends and altogether refuses to place the name of 'Spirit' among those things which are spoken of relatively, let him know first that he is holding an opinion contrary to all reason and to the sentiments of the Fathers. Then, we are not conducting the argument about the name, but most especially about the reality."

But Gregory of Nyssa also says: "The Holy Spirit is not and is not called the Son, nor is this habit of consequence reversed." Where there is a habit, it is certain that a relation exists.

Now, however, this sort of property follows upon "consubstantial." Just as "Son," a name which in itself signifies the process of one from another, in the same species, consequently also signifies "consubstantial." For whatever has processed in this way is necessarily also consubstantial. Therefore, the Holy Spirit ^A would not be called proper to the Son according to nature, unless by proceeding naturally through Him, He also had His substance through Him. For whatever comes forth from something else, or through something else according to an equivocal process, is shown to be one with that from which it originates, in which the property is most evident, and consequently, it is demonstrated that it is consubstantial and of the same species.

Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is no more proper to the Father than to the Son, because He is the same substance of the Father and the Son, and the holy man understands the property of the Spirit in relation to the Father because He proceeds from the Father, the same property must necessarily be understood in relation to the Son. Thus, that which is said to be the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of the Son commends the fact that He exists from Him; especially since the holy man had prefaced his remarks by saying, to show His substance, that He is from God, and that it suffices that it is said: *The Spirit of His mouth* (Ps. XXXII, 6). But he also says in the chapters addressed to Amphilochius: "Nor is the communion of nature shown only from this, but also because He is said to be from God; not as if proceeding from God in all respects, but as the Spirit of His mouth; by this, indeed, the property is insinuated, while the manner of the substance is kept ineffable. And the Spirit," he says, "is called the Son’s, as if proper to Him by nature."

From these ^B things, it is clear that Basil the Great signifies a property in the divine persons, like a union of cause and the caused. For what he says is this: When we hear "Holy Spirit" and "Spirit of the mouth of God," we understand Him to be naturally from God. This, indeed, is the property; but we are ignorant of the manner in which He is from God, that is, His procession. For although we believe that one is begotten and another proceeds, and that one has existence from the First without a medium, and another through Him who is from the First without a medium, we are nevertheless ignorant of the manner. This, therefore, being known, that He is from God naturally, the question follows as to how He is.

Therefore, this property principally signifies the cause and the caused. Then, consequently, it also signifies the consubstantial. And the proof of this is: first, because "consubstantial" indicates no differentiation. But "property" commends difference and distinction. Second, because things that are consubstantial are interchangeable with one another according to the same reasoning of words, without any addition; for indeed the Father is consubstantial with the Son, and the Son is consubstantial with the Father. Which "consubstantial," indeed, here presupposes a differentiation, sufficiently apparent from the names of Father and Son. But "proper things" are not used simply, but with addition; for we cannot say, "The Father is proper to the Son, and the Son to the Father," but we will render it properly thus: "The Son indeed is the Son proper to the Father; but the Father is the Father proper to the Son." For in the former way, it would be rendered indiscriminately and without relation to one another. But in this way, we render the property of the Son to the Father, according to which He is begotten from Him, and [the property] of the Father to the Son, according to which He is Father to Him. ^C It was necessary, therefore, that the property be convertible in the same way that "consubstantial" is: since "property" would principally signify "consubstantial."

But now this sort of property follows upon "consubstantial." Just as "Son," a name which in itself signifies the process of one from another, in the same species, consequently also signifies "consubstantial." Therefore, the Holy Spirit ^D would not be called proper to the Son according to nature, unless by proceeding naturally through Him, He also had His substance through Him. For whatever comes forth from something else, or through something else according to an equivocal process, is shown to be one with that from which it originates, in which the property is most evident, and consequently, it is demonstrated that it is consubstantial and of the same species.

Therefore, Basil the Great also said that property is insinuated from this, because He is said to be from God. But that which is said to be from God shows the cause, by which, when this precedes, "consubstantial" also follows in the divine persons according to this kind of property. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is proper to the Son according to nature, it is certain that He is referred to Him as to a cause. Whence He is also consubstantial with Him.

Likewise, Basil the Great in his *Exposition of Psalm XXXII* says: "Just as, therefore, the Creator confirmed the heavens with His Word, so also the Spirit, who is from God, who proceeds from the Father, that is, who is from His mouth, so that you might not think Him to be among exterior things, nor among creatures; but that you might glorify Him because He has His substance from God. For He summed up all virtues in Him." And after a few words: "This is said in this place as the Spirit of His mouth, so that the Savior may be understood, and His most holy Spirit. But where will this be found? Assuredly, in what the Apostle says about the Son: *Upholding all things by the word of His power* (Heb. I, 3). He posited the Holy Spirit as the power and the Word of the Son." And again: *Whom the Lord Jesus will kill with the Spirit of His mouth, and will destroy with the brightness of His coming* (II Thess. II, 8). From which it is also certain that the malice of some was foolish and irrational, who erased the word *Jesus* from this saying of the Apostle, so that it would not be understood of the Son of God. For from that which is added, *brightness*, they are refuted. For the future apparition of the Lord Jesus is believed, and at the same time the integrity of the apostolic statement is shown in the most ancient manuscripts. However, in this place, the holy man says that the mouth of God is the Son; for he had said earlier that the Spirit is from the mouth of God, which he said signifies the same thing: *Who proceeds from the Father*.

But Athanasius, the holy Bishop of Antioch, in the book which we mentioned before, says: "The Word is not without the Spirit, just as the mind is not without the Word. But we say that the Father of the Word is the Mind. The Mind, in which is the Word, with which is the Spirit," calling the Holy Spirit the mouth of God, for the Son is the mouth of the Father.

If, therefore, the Spirit is from the mouth of God, and this is the same thing as the One who proceeds from the Father; therefore

why should not that also which is called the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of his mouth, signify indifferently his substance, according to which he proceeds from the Father through the Son, and has his being through him and from him? When he had said therefore: "Not for that reason, because he is not from God through the Son," he shows that because he is from God through the Son, using two negations for one affirmation. Whom therefore he said to be through the Son, him he indicated also to flow through the Son, putting being and flowing in substance indifferently. For if, as some think, flowing signifies the manifestation by which he is manifested to the world, since according to this he more manifests the Spirit as the Son, for He, he says, "will glorify me;" then I and the Son would be the Word of the Holy Spirit. But Gregory of Nyssa denied this, saying: "The Holy Spirit is neither the Son, nor is he called this, nor is this consequence accepted." Surely, however, whether or not the Son is the manifestation of the Holy Spirit, ^B nothing can show; unless "to flow" signifies substance simply, just as "to be" also does, according to which substance he is asserted by the theologians to be through the Son.

Likewise, the great Basil in book IV *Against Eunomius*, propounding, as it were, from the contrary: "But you say," he says, "If the Son is the image of God, and the Word is the Spirit of the Son, why has the Son not been called the Son of the Son?" If, therefore, Eunomius had impelled him into these absurdities, Basil would have very easily countered him, if he did not believe the Holy Spirit to be from the Son, by saying: "How could the Spirit be the Son of the Son, who does not in any way proceed from the Son, or through the Son?" For thus he would relieve himself of the burden of this controversy. But he did not indeed say that, but adding what he had proposed, he resolves: "But we, regarding this, answer for ourselves as much as is possible. For it would be enough to do so for you as well, since the same little question also threatens you. We say, therefore, that to say the Son is from the Son would bring the Trinity of the divinity into suspicion of a multitude, in the eyes of bold men. For it was at hand to suspect that if the Son were begotten from the Son, then from him again another would be born, and again another, and thus increase into a multitude. Therefore, for the sake of this matter, the Apostle openly preached that the Spirit is from God, saying: 'For we have received the Spirit of God,' and the Son made it manifest that he flowed through the Son, calling him the Spirit himself, just as he also calls him the mind of God and of Christ, as he does the Spirit of God. But he cautiously declined to call the Son of the Son."

So the great Basil denies that the Spirit is the Son of the Son, but asserts that he proceeds from the Son or through the Son. But that "to flow" signifies to proceed naturally is manifest from the fact that theologians use this verb also in the birth of the Son. For Saint Cyril, in the book which he wrote to Bishop Valerian, says: "The Unique-begotten Son, who is holy by nature, just as the Father is, is he who flowed from him, and he is said to be sanctified according to the fact that he appeared as man." But also Basil himself in the book *On the Holy Spirit* says: "The Spirit has nothing sought for himself, but has all things eternally, as the Spirit of God, and flowing from him." He placed "to flow" for that which is "to be." But it is evident from what precedes: "For he called the Spirit himself of the Son, just as of God, in the same way that he is the Spirit of the Son, in which he also is of God and of the Father." The same man, again, in the same chapter, which is inscribed: *Why is the Spirit not the Son of the Son?* he says: "Not for that reason, because he is not from God through the Son, but lest the Trinity be thought an infinite multitude of sons," as if they were offspring, as occurs in men, credited.

^C And from these things indeed it is concluded, that the Holy Spirit is not the Son, since by the difference of emanation — that is, the differing mode of the process of their substance, according to the theologian Gregory — this one was made to be called Son, and the other Holy Spirit. For the latter is said to be from the Father without medium, but the former through the Son.

But it is also clear that the great Basil, when he could have rightfully refuted the objections by saying: "He, therefore, who has his substance neither from the Son nor through the Son, could not be thought and believed to be the Son of the Son," since his view was rather that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son and from the Son, he acquiesced in it as most certain and most true; especially when he said that the Holy Spirit is the Son's just as he is the Father's. But he is the Father's, according to the fact that he is from him. And therefore he is also the Son's for the same reason, since he has his being from him and proceeds through him.

Furthermore, the same Basil, fighting against Eunomius, who asserted that the Holy Spirit is, as it were, a creature from the Son alone, just as the Son is from the Father alone and is himself, as it were, a creature: he refutes him on the fact that he is not from the Son, as he meanwhile omits the creature, reserving it for the third book: "About this," he says, "when there is more leisure, we shall speak." But towards the end of the second book *against Eunomius*, inveighing against him: "But that," he says, "concerning which it could be obscure to all, that no efficacy of the Son is separated from the Father: and that there is nothing in all things which is in the Son that is alien to the Father? For all things, he says, are mine, and yours; and yours, are mine. How, therefore, ^D does he assign the cause of the Spirit to the Son alone, and take his creation as a predicate of his nature? If, therefore, he introduces two principles mutually contrary to each other, he will be crushed along with Manichæus and Marcion, he says. But if he suspends all things that exist from one, what"

is said to be made by the Son, it relates ^A to the first cause and depends entirely upon that cause; and thus, although we believe that all things have been produced into existence through the Son, we do not deny that God is the cause of all.

In these matters, the holy man censures Eunomius for not saying, in the meantime, that the Holy Spirit is from the Father. But if he believed that He was not from the Son, Basil would have more easily countered his objection by saying: "Since indeed He has his existence from the Son in no way, how, according to you, is He from the Son alone?" However, he did not say this, but, having taken it as conceded that He is from the Son, he argues against Eunomius for denying that He is from the Father. And subsequently, arming himself against him, he says: "How then is it not an obvious danger to divide the Spirit from the Father, that is, to contend that He is not from God and the Father, when the Apostle hands down both to us conjointly, and now calls Him the Spirit of Christ, and now of God, writing thus: 'But if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His.' And again: 'We, however, have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God.' "

Where it is to be noted that, censuring Eunomius because he did not also say the Spirit is from the Father, but separated the Spirit from God, he produces a testimonial from the Apostle ^B, commending the Spirit conjointly to God and Christ, that is, that He is from both. For if to be separated from God, that is, not to be from God, is to be joined to God and Christ, it is certain that it signifies being from them. And the proof of this matter is that, when he had spoken of the Spirit, now as being called Christ’s, now as God’s, wishing to confirm with testimony how He is God’s, he says: "We, however, have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God": as if to say the same thing, the Spirit of God, and the Spirit who is from God.

Since therefore he had set forth the testimony that the Holy Spirit is spoken of conjointly, both as Spirit of God and Spirit of Christ, and had introduced the Apostle as a witness, he wished to take testimony from the Gospel also to assert this; and subsequently says: "But when the Lord calls Him the Spirit of truth, He Himself is indeed the truth, and He proceeds from the Father." Here he thinks again that the Spirit of truth is spoken of and proceeds from the Father; for having promised that he would state a testimony, that the Spirit of God and of Christ was spoken of conjunctively: that He is Christ’s, from the fact that He is called the Spirit of truth; but he shows that He is God’s, because He proceeds from the Father; since therefore, what is said, Spirit of God, and the Spirit who is from God, and who proceeds from the Father, signifies the cause, and that the Spirit of Christ, and the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of truth exists and is spoken of, he shows the cause similarly. For these, as the master (28) taught, have the same force; therefore he also said ^C that the Holy Spirit has His existence from the Son, and the teaching of piety hands down that [conclusion]: and the holy man agrees with himself in this, and in most other places. From which it is evident that the Holy Spirit is relatively called the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of Christ, and the Spirit of truth.

Gregory of Nyssa also, concerning the Lord’s Prayer, says: "The Unique-born is named Son by Sacred Scripture, and thus far His property is handed down. But the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father, and is asserted by true testimony to be from the Son." But if anyone asserts that the preposition "from [ex]" was added in this place by some, first it is found to be held thus in the most ancient copies, or at least the place is noted, from which it is perceived that that particle was deleted by the rashness of certain excessively foolish men. Furthermore, that man said nothing unusual to himself. For what he says elsewhere: "One thing indeed continuously from the first, but another thing through that which is continuously from the first," he says this also here universally; since it is true that what proceeds essentially through something, and exists through Him and through Him possesses the substantial mode of its proper procession, that it is also from Him. Indeed, he spoke in harmony with Basil: for he, as is evident from the foregoing, understood that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son in the substance of the latter. For what is called the Spirit of the Son, and Spirit of His mouth, he says is the same as if it were said to proceed from the Father; and he defined that by the fact that He is called the Spirit of the Son, such a property toward Him is designated, as he commends is from the Father, in that He is said to proceed from the Father; and he says it suffices that He is ^D called the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of His mouth for whispering [insinuating] His substance; and to signify nothing less when He is called the Spirit of the Son, than when we hear that He is from God. He therefore explained this in such a way. And Nyssa also received that saying with equal intelligence. "For because," he says, "the Apostle named Him the Spirit of the Son, just as he named Him of God, according to the same custom is He the Spirit of the Son, according to which He is also of God and the Father. But He is called the Spirit of God and the Father, as existing from Him. Therefore he also accepted the Spirit of the Son, as one who is from Him, and has His existence from Him. Therefore this blessed man has not used a new or unheard-of word and intelligence: but having taken the occasion from the divine Scriptures, he spoke in accordance with the great Father Basil.

Saint Cyril also, concerning that Gospel passage: "He will give you another Paraclete," says: "He calls Him another Paraclete Spirit; for there is one reason of substance in both, not placing it outside Him, but giving the word of otherness in this alone, that the Spirit Himself was a proper substance, and subsisted. For the Son is not the Spirit, but when He is properly, and subsists, this, which is in the faith, we will accept; for the Spirit is of the Father, and truly

^A of the Son. Therefore, when the Spirit is called the Son's, we must understand a certain distinction, not a consubstantiality, as some have said; although, as much as possible, as has been stated, consubstantiality follows from it. Just as the Spirit is indeed distinguished from the Father, because it is His Spirit, as proceeding from Him; but from the fact that it is His Spirit, it proceeds from Him, and is consubstantial with Him, and the Son is distinguished from the Father according to what corresponds to the Son, and a certain distinction is signified by the name; yet by that very fact, that He is the Son, He is also entirely consubstantial.

And since in divine persons distinction signifies a relation according to cause and causality, and what is said of the Son's Spirit indicates a distinction, it is clear that when we say the Spirit of the Son, we signify a relation according to cause and that which is causal. Indeed, we cannot say that the Spirit is referred to the Father and to the Son, which is the same as saying that the Holy Spirit has properties by which it is referred to them differently; or that the Spirit is some different and double thing; or that the Son, not according to essence, is one with the Father, which would remove the identity of the Son to the Father, and would take away the one and simple procession of the Spirit, according to which it is referred to the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father through the Son.

Then, even if the Son is referred to the Father and to the Spirit, and the Father likewise to the Son and the Spirit, it is absolutely heretical to ^C think, even regarding the Holy Spirit, that it itself is also referred to the Father and the Son, namely, by a double relation. For the Spirit is referred to the Father and Son according to one and only its own personal property, and according to what it is as Spirit: but the Father and the Son are indeed referred to each other by their own personal properties. But truly to the Spirit, not by these, but by another relation than that of generation and birth, namely, of production [spiration], according to which the Father and the Son are one; even if they are distinguished by their differences toward one another. For, according to what the one is Father and the other is Son, they are spoken of only in relation to each other.

Therefore, while it is right there to refer the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, namely, according to its one and only personal procession; in the Father, however, to refer it to the Spirit and to the Son: and again, in the Son, to refer it to the Father and ^D the Holy Spirit, is entirely impossible; for indeed, even though the Father's person, being one and simple, is referred to the Son and the Spirit, we can say that because the Father is referred to the different persons, the Spirit and the Son, according to the fact that they are different persons, therefore He is also referred differently; but the Holy Spirit, even if it is referred to different persons, it does not necessarily follow that it is the same, and much more so here, since the discussion is also about the consubstantiality of the Spirit itself to them.

The masters of the Church perceived this as well. For the most blessed Cyril says, when explaining that passage: *I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete*: "For being essentially an associate and partner of the natural goods of God and the Father, just as He holds the Spirit in the same way as the Father is understood to hold Him—that He is not introduced, nor injected from the outside, to think this is the height of madness—but, just as each of us contains his own spirit, and pours it forth from the innermost depths to the exterior. For this very reason, Christ finally breathed [on them] corporeally, showing that just as spirit proceeds corporeally from the human mouth, so also does the Spirit, who is from the divine substance itself, pour forth in a divine and worthy manner."

The same, again, when he explained that evangelical passage: *And the Word was God*, says: "He is not, therefore, minor, who has the same efficacy as the perfect Father, and has the Spirit of the begetter as His own good, living and substantially inherent nature, just as does the Father."

Here, if someone again posits two processions of the Holy Spirit, one timeless [ἀχρόνον] and substantial, the other temporal and not substantial, assigning both to the Father, but to the Son only the secondary and temporal one, according to which it is said to be sent by Him, and given, and poured out, and whatever else of this kind can be more conveniently said about such a great matter. First

of all, this is what points out that the Son is less than the Father. Further, it is not said only: "Because through Him it is sent and given," but "Because it also proceeds," which surely signifies the substantial procession of the Holy Spirit, which is also believed to be eternal and before the ages. But indeed it has been declared above what ineptitudes, what things unworthy of such men, follow. For beyond the fact that ^A ministers assign an order to the Son, they are compelled to assign to the Son and to the Spirit accidents according to time, and at the same time an imperfection.

But lest we fall into these trifles, it must be said, according to the great Basil, that what proceeds from God does not proceed in time, even if its efficacy appears in time; and because, according to that which is said "from whom," there is a single procession, but according to that which is said "to whom," it is recognized as double according to our habit, and whatever other things have been said above. Although it would never be given by the Son unless it were from Him. "For from whom," says the great Athanasius, "ought the Spirit to be given, if not from Him whose It is?" Otherwise the Son would be a minister. And certainly, if the Father were to keep to Himself that prior and substantial procession, according to which It proceeds from Him, while not sharing It with the Son, and were to deign to share with Him only the mission; the Father would therefore give the Spirit to the Son by measure, and not, as the Baptist said, "not by measure."

Moreover, if the mission is common to the Father and the Son, but the procession is from the Father alone, without the Son communicating with Him, then all things will indeed be the Father's and the Son's; but not all things will be the Father's and the Son's. Therefore, it will not be true that which was said by Truth itself: "All things mine are thine, and thine are mine." And that: "All things which the Father hath are mine," which is most absurd and entirely contrary to the sentiments of the saints.

For the most blessed Cyril says concerning that: "All things which the Father hath are mine." Since the Son is the fruit and the expressed image of the paternal substance, He claims for Himself all things that are His by nature; therefore He says: "All things which the Father hath are mine; I have said to you that He shall take of mine, and will declare it unto you," namely the Spirit, who is through Him ^B and in Him. And the same again concerning that: "This was in the beginning with God," "God," he says, "truly begotten of the true God the Father, the Only-Begotten, manifesting Himself, says: All things which the Father hath are mine; and the Son is the heir of all the properties which are in the Father naturally, as existing from Him according to nature, and perfectly having in Himself those things which are the proper and principle things of the substance of the Person." ^C The same concerning that: "As Thou hast sent Me into the world," "Since," he says, "the Son is from the Father and in the Father according to nature, existing as the true fruit of His substance, He claims the Father's own Spirit for Himself by nature."

But also the great Basil in his book *On the Faith*, the beginning of which is: "To remember God continually," "The Son, indeed," he says, "as Son, possesses naturally what is the Father's; but as Only-Begotten, He has all things collected in Himself."

If, therefore, the Son also has all the chief and proper goods that the Father has, and the Spirit is chief and substantially implanted, and He is asserted by the theologians to be a good of the Son’s nature ^D properly, although it is also asserted that the Son has all that is the Father’s, besides the fact of being only from the Father; it is surely clear that the Holy Spirit is also the Son's, just as He is the Father's, and in the same manner. For otherwise we would exclude the Son from that supreme identity and incommutability with the Father.

Truly, even if the Father and the Son have the same substance, as is worthily understood to be held in that divine and most simple nature, nevertheless the Father possesses it in such a way that He is understood to have received it from no one, since He is without cause: but the Son possesses the same in such a way that He received it from the Father, as from a cause, and by virtue of His birth claimed the relation of Son for Himself. Similarly, however, it must also be said concerning the Spirit, that He has the same substance with Them, proceeding indeed from the Father, but receiving it causally from the Son, that is, by way of process, whether from the Father through the Son according to His substantial procession, according to which He is asserted to be from the Father through the Son.

But to say: "If the Son has all the Father’s, then the Son is necessarily already the Father," is of men speaking with little consideration, destroying the voice of the Savior, and being entirely ignorant of the order of the Persons. For the Son would no longer be Son, nor the Father Father, but all things would be mixed and confused, with the properties removed. Moreover, it is clear that, with the properties alone preserved which designate the Persons, all other things are common. For here the Lord, making mention of the Father and of Himself and of all things, "For all things," He says, "which the Father hath are Mine," to those who confess the Trinity and the unity, by saying "Father" and "Son," has given the properties to be understood, and the distinction of Persons; but by saying "all things," He intended to signify all the goods of nature which the Father has, except for being the Father.

Whence also the great Basil in the book *On the Faith*: "All things that the Father is, the Son is. I have said Father and Son, keep these properties for me." Remaining therefore

^A Son, the Son is all things, as are those of the Father, according to the voice of the Lord saying: "All that the Father has, are mine." For of a truth these are all things of the image which are present in the primitive form. The blessed Cyril likewise in his second letter to Hermias says: "We believe the Son to be coeternal with the Father and having all things equally, except the sole act of begetting." The same [author] in his book *On the Trinity*: "In the Son," he says, "the only-begotten, who is in all things equal and similar to the Father, except for this alone, that he is not the Father." The divine Chrysostom likewise in his 39th homily on John, on the passage: "That all should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father." "Shall we therefore call him the Father also?" he says. "Far from it. For he said 'the Son' for this reason, that we might honor the Son as the Son, and the Father as the Father. But he who calls him the Father is no longer honoring the Son as the Son, but is mixing and confounding all things." And a little later: "He gave the expression for this reason, that you should not suspect him to be unbegotten, nor think that there are two Fathers. For all things that the Father is, this also the Son is, begotten and remaining Son." ^B Furthermore, if anyone should also infer that the Holy Spirit, since he is of the same essence with the Father and the Son, is as it were necessarily produced by himself as well, he will hear that there is nothing henceforth that could bring forth itself, and be its own cause; and on the other hand that no other person exists for us besides the three, as handed down in the divine [tradition], for the Spirit to produce. Thus he will be compelled ^C to find another person that is produced, since that which produces and that which is produced cannot be the same, and at the same time the foundation of the discourse will be removed. For it is presupposed, according to the position of the sacred testimony, that the Spirit is produced, or proceeds; and the question alone remains: if both the Father and the Son are one producer, then that which produces and that which is produced cannot be the same. For in this way the cause of that which is said, whence it originates, will necessarily be removed: but by this reasoning, also that which is said, "from the Father through the Son," will be completely taken away. Therefore, an objection that is removed both by those things of which we speak, and by those things which are conceded by the disputations, is not to be thought of. Although, even if another person were granted, someone would question this very thing about her, and thus the infinite would nowhere be checked. For by the same reasoning, either the number of processions proceeds to infinity, or, if it should stop anywhere, why not rather in the Spirit, namely the third person of the Trinity, so that both the confession of the Trinity may be preserved for us, and vanity of this kind may be altogether warded off? For besides the fact that such vain reasoners conclude nothing, even those things which have been handed down to us concerning the Trinity are disturbed. For if it were posited that the Spirit is from the Father alone, the same objection and hesitation will remain against them nonetheless. So that, therefore, such an objection, which contributes nothing to the dispute for them or for us, but rather destroys the things proposed, may be cast aside.

From these things, then, which we have said, it appears that the very name of the Son contributes much to our proposition. For the Father would not be called a true Father unless he completely communicated himself to the Son; nor would the Son be a true Son unless he had all of the Father within himself; nor would he be the immutable image of the Father if he appeared lesser than him; nor would the seal be uniform, which in itself shows the Father, according to the great Basil: "For they are all things of the image, whatsoever are present in the primitive form," as he says; and as Gregory the Theologian said in his sermons on the Son: "For this is the nature of an image, to be an imitation of the first exemplar, and rather to be the same, than an assimilation, lest it be in one way similar and in another way dissimilar." And he added: "But this [is so] all the more, by how much the living is the image of the living." But neither would Christ have truthfully declared concerning himself, saying that he had all things that were the Father's; but the Father has the proper good of his own nature, the Holy Spirit. And since the Son, begotten from the Father, has one and the same nature with the Father, who would dare to assert that the Son, endowed with this, enjoys some of the Father's goods and is deprived of others? And from hence to take away the definition of all things that is said, when the Lord said that he has all things of the Father? Furthermore, it is said: "He that sees me, sees also the Father." ^D But that which is said, "sees," is put for that which is, "understands," as the Fathers explaining it [state]. And from this therefore it is evident, that he who contemplates the Son without the Spirit, will also understand the Father as destitute of the Spirit. For because the Son is the definition and word of the Father; and as a definition is to the defined, or the definable, so is the Son to the Father, according to Gregory the Theologian: "He who knows not the definition of the defined, will neither know the definable and defined itself." Therefore, if the Father is the cause of the Holy Spirit, the Son is also with him. But if not the Son, then neither the Father. For that which is not seen in the immutable image, that will not be seen in the primitive form. And he who does not see the Son as the cause of the Holy Spirit, will not be able to see the Father as the cause of this nature either. For what Christ says is, as it were, a brief definition of the parity and equal honor of the Father and the Son. How great then, and how dangerous an audacity it is, when there is such an identity of immutability in both, to take the Spirit from the Son, against the judgment of the Lord and the Fathers, so that from here the immutability of the image is also taken away, and a difference of essence necessarily follows? Whence surely it is evident that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Holy Spirit, with the property of begetting and proceeding preserved.

John Chrysostom likewise in his 38th homily on John, when the Arians asked how he who sends and he who is sent could be of the same essence, replied saying: "Again you turn the discourse to human things, nor do you understand that these things are said for no other reason, save that we might know both the cause, and [not] fall into the madness of Sabellius."

we avoid falling into any heresy. ^A It is established from these things that the expression "to be sent," while it indeed commends the distinction of the divine persons, also indicates the cause and the caused: for it is said that he is sent for no other reason than that we may know the cause, and not fall into the disease of Sabellius. If, however, "to send" and "to be sent" signify the cause and the caused, and the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son, it is clear according to the divine Chrysostom that the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, and since he is sent by the Father and the Son, the Father and Son are therefore one sender, and the Holy Spirit is one cause. And so, not only by that which is said to "proceed," since the Spirit is asserted by the theologians to proceed from the Father through the Son, but also by that which the Spirit is said to be sent through the Son, the Son is found to be the cause of the Holy Spirit—according to a substantial, simple, and unique procession, according to the theologians of the Church and the principles of the faith. And this one thing appears, that in divine matters—as has been demonstrated above—"to give," "to hear," and "to receive" not only indicate the cause and the caused, and the distinction of the persons, and being from another, and being a cause, but also "to send" and "to be sent" signify the cause and the caused in the same way, and demonstrate being sent from another. Therefore, the Father is not said to be sent, because he is from no one; but the Son and the Holy Spirit, because they are from a cause, are said to be sent according to the difference of their own processions: the Son, indeed, from the Father alone, because he is also from him alone; the Holy Spirit, however, from the Father and the Son, because he is through him and from him. For otherwise, if these things were accepted, they would have no place in the Holy Trinity, where the immutability and identity of substance are held as a given. ^B

It is clear, however, from these things that in the Son, to be born is to be sent, but in the Spirit, to proceed is to be sent. And not only "to be sent," but any words whatsoever that signify procession simply and are fitting to the Son and the Spirit, commend in the one case (the Son) birth, and in the other (the Spirit) procession, according to their own substantial processions, respectively. For this is what the holy Fathers also say.

Finally, St. Cyril, upon that evangelical text: "He that hath received his testimony hath set to his seal that God is true" (John iii, 33), says: "The Father brought forth the Son from his own nature, as radiance from light, according to the ineffable and inexpressible manner of divine birth, which he himself also shows to us, saying: 'I came forth from the Father and am come' (John xvi, 28)." For the Son came forth from the Father into his own substance, even if he is always in him according to nature, and that which he signifies to us as "having come forth" in him, this he indicates here again as "to be sent."

The same, upon that text: "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me" (John vii, 16): "One must know, indeed," he says, "that by the fact that he says he was sent again, he does not show himself to be from the dignity of the Father; nor is that servile mission to be understood, even if, clothed in the most servile form, he speaks these things about himself without blame. He is sent, however, just as the word is from the mind, as the radiance of the sun is from it."

The same, upon that text: "He knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands" (John xiii, 3): "And certainly," he says, "not as one ignorant that he has power over all, and that he went forth from God, that is, was born from the Father's essence."

The same, upon that text: "You have believed that I came out from God" (John xvi, 27): "From the fact that he says, 'I came out from God,' we shall again think it said, either because I was born and flowed forth from his substance according to procession, that I might be and be known—perhaps properly and substantially, though not entirely dividedly. For the Father is in the Son, and again, according to nature, the Son is in the Father. Or, 'I came out' in place of 'I have been made man,' taking up your form and nature. For the proper nature of any thing is as it were the place from which it goes forth, when it passes over to any other thing, and comes to be what it was not."

St. Maximus also, writing the controversy of the Anomoean or Arian with the orthodox in the manner of a dialogue, makes the Anomoean question what it is to beget, and to be born, and to send forth, and to produce? And he introduces the orthodox person responding thus: "The Father indeed begets, that is, has begotten; the Son however is begotten, that is, he has been begotten; and the Father himself sends forth the Spirit, that is, he has sent forth; and the Spirit proceeds, that is, has proceeded."

Consonant with these is blessed Gregory, the Roman pontiff, in his homily upon that evangelical text: "When it was late that same day, the first of the week" (John xx, 21), he speaks, saying: "'As the Father hath sent me, I also send you.' That is, I love you with that charity, while I send you among the scandals of persecutors, with which charity the Father loves me, whom he made to come to endure sufferings, although to be sent can also be understood differently according to the nature of divinity. For the Son is said to be sent by the Father by the very fact that he is begotten by the Father. For the Holy Spirit also, who, although he is coequal to the Father and the Son, yet is not incarnate, the Son himself also bears witness that he sends, saying: 'When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father' (John xv, 26). For if to be sent ought only to be understood as being incarnate, the Holy Spirit, beyond doubt, would in no way be said to be sent, since he is by no means incarnate; but his mission is his very procession, by which he proceeds from the Father and the Son. As, therefore, the Spirit is said to be sent because he proceeds, so also the Son is not incongruously said to be sent, who is begotten."

^D That which, therefore, is gathered from the words of the divine Father Chrysostom, this also is given to be gathered from the sentiments of the other saints. For "to be sent" in the Father and the Son signifies what it is also "to be born" and "to have being from the Father"; even if these things can be understood according to the humanity of the Son. Furthermore...

since he does not have this in the Holy Spirit, because he did not assume a body as the Son did, it remains to be understood concerning the natural procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, that he is said to be sent, to go out, and to proceed.

From these it is also most manifest, as we have said, that there are not two processions of the Holy Spirit, which is assumed by some; for this is refuted by many points, even if, on account of his temporal manifestation and our progress, that which is eternal appears temporal, as was said above. But if divine Chrysostom said in another place: "When you hear that he is sent, do not take it as said of his divinity; God is not sent," we must say that because many heretics, from the fact that he is said to be sent, introduced degrees of divinity, and divided one and most unified essence and deity, teaching that one sends while another is sent, for this reason the teacher of piety denies that, lest a multitude of deities be introduced, and of subsequent gods, part superior, part inferior, according to the differences of substances; and he says that the deity is not sent, nor is God, when it is spoken of absolutely according to the name of Deity, and without relation. By the fact, however, that it is said to send and be sent, he acknowledges the substance of the persons, and the cause and the causal. And he says that it is said thus, that he is sent, in order that we might know the cause, and not fall into the disease of Sabellius, taking notice that to be sent, according to which a person has substance from a person, proceeding from him, while they have one essence.

Therefore, according to ^A that he is a divine person, he is set forth as being sent, because even in divine matters, as has been said, to be sent signifies to be from another. For otherwise, he would be most clearly contradicting both himself and the teachings of the Savior who says concerning himself that he would send the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth: calling himself the Truth, that is, the Spirit whom the Father sends, and who proceeds from the Father. From which it also appears that those who say that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son through a gift without substance, and not as a person according to what he is as a person, do not think correctly. For he who proceeds from the Father is the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, whom, he says, the Father will send in my name, that is, through me. He himself also promises that he will send him, who would teach the disciples and suggest all things to them. Who, then, would dare to call this Spirit "without substance," unless he wishes to blaspheme?

Great Basil also in the book *On the Holy Spirit* says: "The Holy Spirit has nothing acquired for himself, but has everything eternally, as the Spirit of God and flowing from him, having him as the cause, as the fountain of himself." Where it is to be noted that he admonishes that God is the cause of the Holy Spirit from the fact that he is his fountain. For he says: "He has him as the cause, as the fountain of himself." It is clear, however, that he wishes the name of fountain to signify cause.

Great Athanasius likewise in the work against the Anomoeans that he wrote, from the person of the orthodox ^B says: "I say, however, that the Spirit is unbegotten; for he does not have an author of his generation, but has a fountain of himself; for just as a fountain does not beget the water which it pours out from external sources, but has it from itself, overflowing, so too God is the fountain of the Spirit, as has been said, the bestower of him, not taking him from outside, but pouring him forth from himself; for it is written: *My people have committed two evils; they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have hewed them out broken cisterns, which cannot hold water* (Jerem. ii, 13). And the Apostle says: *He who bestows the Spirit on us, and works virtues within us* (Galat. iii, 5). That the Spirit is the living water, Christ taught, saying: *He who drinks from the water that I shall give, as the Scripture says, rivers of living water shall flow from his belly* (Joan. vii, 37, 38)." And in this place great Athanasius called the Father the fountain, and the Spirit the water.

But where he enumerates the testimonies of Scripture concerning natural communion, from the fact that the Father is similarly so, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, there he calls Christ the fountain of the Spirit, and names the Holy Spirit the water. Finally he says: "The Savior says again: *He who believes in me, as the Scripture says, rivers of living water shall flow from his belly.* But the evangelist, explaining what the living water is, says: *But this he said about the Spirit, whom they were to receive who believed in him. For the prophet says: They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have hewed them out broken cisterns, which will not be able to hold water.*"

The same again in the book *On the Dispensation of the Incarnation of the Lord*, the beginning of which is: "Those who wish to understand the divine Scriptures maliciously—For the prophet knows," he says, "that the Son is with God the Father, the fountain of the Holy Spirit." But also Chrysostom in the homily *On the Sacrament of Baptism*: "For this reason," he says, "the Savior shows himself to be the fountain of living water, and the Holy Spirit to be the living water." In the hymns also we chant: *They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and they sought Barabbas, and cast me out.* It is certain, therefore, that what was said, "they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water," sometimes pertains to the person of the Father, and sometimes also ^C to the Son. The Holy Spirit is called the living water.

Therefore the Father and the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit. Thus, indeed, it is explained by the holy Fathers. And since the Father is the fountain of the Spirit, as his cause, and the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, it is gathered that the Father and the Son are one cause and one fountain of the Holy Spirit. For all things that the Father has, are the Son's, and what are the Son's are referred to the Father. And it is certain at the same time that just as by nature the water is one, both that which is in the fountain and that which flows from the fountain, so the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one by nature. But if water flows, pours out, and streams from the fountain, it is manifest that the Spirit also flows, streams, and pours out ^D from the Son.

^A These things signify that He is from Him: for the holy Fathers, saying that the substance of the Son flows, pours out, and streams from the Father, wish to signify this, that His substance is from the Father. For the holy Cyril indeed says, in a certain chapter concerning the eternity of the Son, which begins: "God is called the fountain of wisdom," and which is: "Therefore the Son was co-eternal with the Father, flowing as if from a certain fountain from the paternal substance." Nevertheless, the same Fathers also say that the Holy Spirit flows, pours out, and proceeds also from the Son. For in the records of the first synod at Nicaea, in those things which the holy Fathers said to the philosopher through Bishop Leontius, the beginning of whose words is: "But that is to be understood, O friend, seeker of truth, as follows," it is held: "The Spirit is found to be proceeding from the Father indeed, but belonging to the Son, and flowing from Him." If, however, anyone wishes that the Son be understood as the fountain of the Spirit only according to the process of Him as it is introduced by some; once that is granted, all the aforesaid things will be inept and absurd. The same [author] in the sermon *Against Sabellius and the Anomoeans*: "But there, when you hear 'image,' understand the 'splendor of the glory'." John Damascene also, in the Canon for Saint Basil the Great, says: "The Son is the image of the Father, and the Spirit [is the image] of the Son." To this, Saint Cyril indeed in the *Sixth [Book] against Hermias* says: "Finally, even the holy David, recognizing the Son as the living and substantially indwelling efficiency and virtue of the Father, will pray saying: 'Command, O God, Thy power; confirm this, O God, which Thou hast wrought in us.'" Paul likewise openly proclaimed the most wise Christ to be the power of God and the wisdom of God. The same in a certain chapter of the *Thesaurus* says: "It is most clearly shown that the Holy Spirit is not alien to the Son, but is in Him and from Him, and as it were a certain natural efficiency capable of filling all things, whatsoever He wills." And again in another chapter of the *Thesaurus*: "The Son, he says, is the living and essential efficiency, and the power and wisdom of the Father." But also the great Athanasius, in his *Epistle to Serapion*, calls the Spirit the operation of the Son, and in many places the holy doctors assert that the Spirit is the natural and essential power and operation of the Son. ^B Furthermore, even if we have granted that there is a double process, it is necessary that each be common to the Son with the Father, lest a variation of essence of the Son toward the Father follow. For of those whose power is different, the essence is also different; just as those whose power is equal, the essence is also equal. But if the process is one, much more so is that which was sought in our hands. And this is indeed most true, especially since it is shown; on the one hand, that many absurdities necessarily follow those who posit two processes, and on the other, because it commends the distinction of the divine persons as being sent, and proceeding, and flowing. Furthermore, the Son is called the image of the Father, but the Spirit [is called the image] of the Son. For the Apostle said: "Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son." Cyril also, concerning that Gospel passage: "As Thou hast sent Me into the world," says: "For because the Spirit of the Only-Begotten is the perfect image of His substance, according to that which Paul wrote: 'Those whom He foreknew, and predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son,' He makes everyone in whom He shall be conformed to the image, that is, to the Son." The same concerning that passage: "I do not pray for these only," says: "The Son is the sincere image of the Father, but the Spirit is the natural likeness of the Son." The same again in the *Thesauri*: "Therefore, as the Son is the most diligent image of the Father, who receives Him and has the Father, so the analogy recurring to an equal figure: he who receives the image of the Son, which is the Spirit, through Him possesses the Son entirely, and the Father, who is in Him." But the great Basil in *Book 1 Against Eunomius*, "The image, he says, is begotten, and is called the Son, and is the wisdom and power, and righteousness of God, not as a habit, nor as an aptitude, but a living ^C substance, and efficient, and the splendor of the glory of God, and displays the Father in His whole self, shining forth from the whole of His glory." Adhering to this, they assert that the Son is the face of the Father, but the Holy Spirit is [the face] of the Son. For the divine Cyril says in *Book 5 against Hermias*: "For that the Son is as it were the face of God and of the Father, the Psalmist will be able to teach us easily, sometimes indeed saying: 'Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit, and whither shall I flee from Thy face?' sometimes again, as if in the person of those who had believed in Him: 'The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.' For we are signed by the Holy Spirit to the likeness of the face of the Father, that is, of the Son." The same concerning that passage: "Work for the food which perishes," "For, he says, there is no doubt that the Son is the face of God and of the Father. He is Himself the very character in which God signs." The same concerning that passage: "But if not, believe on account of the works themselves," "For if the Son has indeed filled the heavens, and the ends of the earth, ^D that is, hell, how is it not most foolish and altogether contrary to all reason to apply the term of 'circumscription' to Him? Nor does even that fact come to mind, that if He is His face—that is, the Spirit; for the Spirit is called the face of the Son—He fills all things, [and therefore] by no reason can He be included by circumscription." To these things the great Basil in *Book 1 Against Eunomius* called the Father the begetter and the first form of the Son. But that great Gregory, the wonder-worker, bishop of Neocaesarea, in the book whose beginning is: "Most hostile and alien to the apostolic confession," says: "The Father is the principle of the Lord."

He begat him eternally; and the Lord is the first form of the Spirit. Moreover, the Son is indeed the discourse of the Father, but the Spirit is the word of the Son in Holy Scripture. Thus, too, the great Basil has expounded it. And the Son is indeed asserted by the theologians to be proper to the Father, but the Holy Spirit to the Son. Finally, the holy Cyril in the book *To the Monks*, the beginning of which is: "They have come indeed, according to custom, to Alexandria," says: "For just as it is proper to man, and indeed to every other animal, that which is generated from it according to nature, so it must be understood and said that it is proper to God, which is from his essence." Likewise the great Athanasius, in the first book *Against the Arians*, says: "For because the Word is naturally proper to the substance of God, He is also from Him and in Him." Again, the most blessed Cyril, expounding that evangelical text, "He shall take of mine," says concerning the Holy Spirit: "Proceeding indeed through Him naturally, as proper to Him with all things that He has, He is said to receive perfectly the things that are His."

If, therefore, almost all the holy Fathers have thus expounded that apostolic text, "Conformed to the image of His Son," so that they say "conformed" to the Spirit, who is the image of the Son of God—for "image" signifies that from which it is—since the Son would not be called the image of the Father unless He were from Him: "For when we hear 'image', ^B as the great Basil says, we ought to understand 'splendor';" but "splendor" most clearly designates the emanation of substance: it is certain that the Spirit, since He is called the image of the Son, is for this reason called His image, because He emanates from Him as the likeness of splendor. From which it appears that if the Spirit were not also from the Son, the Son would in no way shine from the Father according to this. Thus neither would He be an immutable image. But He is immutable, though with personal distinction preserved. Moreover, He is said to be the brightness of His glory. If He is image from the whole of the whole, it is necessary that He be the image of the whole, and according to this, in no way variable. And because the Son shows the Father entirely in Himself; this, however, is because He is the whole from the whole. But Basil himself, writing to Amphilochius, says: "Because the Holy Spirit shows the Son entirely in Himself, and His majesty, from whence He proceeded, it is evident that the Holy Spirit is also the whole from the whole Son. And because the Father and the Son are one whole, and the Father is not one whole and the Son another whole; it is clear that the Holy Spirit is from one whole, the Father and the Son, with the distinction of the Father and the Son, of course, preserved."

Since, indeed, the Son is also the living power and natural and essential efficacy of the Father, and this entirely, because He is from the Father (for power is in the powerful and is from the powerful, and efficiency proceeds from the efficient), it is certain that the Spirit is also the natural and essential efficacy of the Son, ^C and ^D living power, when he is called such, according to the same manner of speaking, though with the difference of the process of the Son and the Spirit preserved; for the latter proceeds immediately and continuously from the first, the former through Him who proceeds continuously from the first. And according to the same reasoning, the Spirit is also called the face of the Son, and the Lord the first form of the Spirit, just as the Father is also called such for the reason of being the cause of the Son. For He is the image of the living, and the figure of His substance. And certainly, if the Spirit were from the Father without a medium, that is, from Him alone, the Son would never have been called the image of the Father; nor the Spirit the image of the Son: and the Son would have been the operation and power of the Father; but the Son's operation and power would not be the Spirit. And the Son would indeed be the face of the Father; but the Spirit would not be the face of the Son. And the one thing appears from these, that the Spirit is neither nor is said to be the Son of the Father; nor His image, and the other things which are said to be the Son's. For the process is different, and the difference of emanation caused this to be called Son, and that to be called Spirit. If, however, anyone asserts that things of this kind signify consubstantiality, let him listen: things that are consubstantial are indeed converted; but this consequence—that the Holy Spirit is, is called, or is converted to the Son—is not. But not even that has been read anywhere, that the Son is the power, and the natural and essential operation, and the image, nor His word—and the things which are said to be the Son's—that the Holy Spirit is these. From which it is surely clear, because of the order of the divine persons in relation one to another, according to which process, and according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, these things cannot be converted, because neither is the Son begotten from the Father through the Spirit. For just as the Father is not called the power, nor the operation, nor the splendor of the Son, and if there is anything of this kind (for this would be to destroy the order of substance), for the same reason neither is the Son said to be these things to the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, if anyone, wishing to take the image of men toward God, according to the ratio of proportion in the image of the Father, that is, the Son, and in the image of the Son, namely the Spirit, will show, he will not blaspheme more than he wishes, by alienating the Son from the essence of the Father, and the Spirit from the Son, nor as if naturally innate to himself. For he will be forced to confess that the Son has the same relation to the Father, which individuals of men have to God.

But from the aforementioned order of the persons according to their process, the ratio of consubstantiality also appears; for it is certain that what proceeds from anyone, or through anyone, according to an equivocal process, takes the same nature from it. And the holy Fathers assert that the Son is proper to the Father, as being from His substance. For the great Athanasius says: "Since the Word is by nature proper to the essence of God, He is from Him and in Him."

^A Since there are many things said concerning this, we omit them on account of their multitude, for through them it is established by the holy Fathers that He is from Him, so that He may be proper to His essence. And from this it can be recognized that the Spirit is said to be proper to the Son because He is from His essence, and conversely it is asserted that He is from the essence of the Son because He is the proper good of His substance: for the blessed Cyril said that the Spirit proceeds naturally through the Son as His proper one, and therefore He is said to receive from Him, because the Holy Spirit has received His being through such a procession.

Likewise, the great Athanasius, concerning the same, in his first *Contra Arianos*: "For unless," he says, "the Word were the proper sprout of the Father's substance, just as the radiance of light, and if the Son were different by nature from the Father, it would have sufficed for the Father to give Him alone." Here he calls the Word the proper one of the Father, as the radiance of light. But radiance is from the cause of light. Therefore, he shows that the proper one is also from the cause. ^B

Saint Cyril, on that passage: "When the Paraclete comes": "If, therefore," he says, "you think that the Son performs the office of a minister, this is alien; since the Spirit who proceeds from God and the Father, and who is holy by nature, grants Him to us; the Son is not holy by nature, but by participation, just as we are." Explaining this, he says that "alien," proceeding from God and the Father; not therefore calling Him alien because He is from God and the Father, but because He is not from the Son. If, therefore, just as that which is born from man according to nature is proper to him, so also that which is from the essence of God is proper to God; and the Spirit is said to be proper to the Son, how is He not therefore said to be proper, because He is from Him? For if He is not from Him, He will be alien to Him, even if He is not alien to the Father.

And throughout all this, if one observes Saint Cyril more diligently, he will always find him saying that the Holy Spirit is proper to the Son, as one who is from Him, and because He is the same, saying that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and is His proper one; that the Spirit of the Son is said relatively, was shown above; but the great Basil also says that this suffices to insinuate His substance, just as it is said that He is from God; and he understands the property of the Spirit toward the Son from the fact that He is called the Spirit of the Son, just as also toward the Father, since He proceeds from the Father. For he wishes the property in the divine persons to be taken as it were the communion of cause and the caused: who, also writing to Amphilochius concerning the Holy Spirit, said that not only is the communion of nature demonstrated from this, but also since He is said to be from God, it is manifest that because He is also called the Spirit proper to the Son, he intends all these things; for because in the divine persons that which is called this of this, and that this is proper to this, excluding matter and all things that follow it instantly, He is not called so as a member, nor as a possession, nor according to any excellence, and such property, but solely according to cause and the caused; by which alone we discern that the one is distinguished and separated from the other, it is established that the fact that the Spirit is said to be proper to the Son can only be accepted according to this reason of cause, especially since the saints assert most clearly that the Son is indeed proper to the Father, because He is from Him; but the Spirit is proper to the Son, as one who proceeds naturally in Him and through Him, and is from Him; which signifies the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Son. For not because He is consubstantial is He therefore from Him; for by reason of consubstantiality, they are one, and no order, or habit, or process is seen, because there is one essence, and that one is individual according to itself, but because He is from Him, for that reason He is also consubstantial; for the property of this kind of cause and the caused follows consubstantiality, just as the name of the Son, according to the process, indicates one from another primarily in the same species, but consequently that there is consubstantiality. For that which proceeds in this way is necessarily also consubstantial. And so that which is said to be "this from that" is accepted as the cause, while that which is such because of such a process is called equivocal, and they are consubstantial, as it is the caused; for it is not necessary to place the cause as the caused, which some do irrationally, saying that the Son is proper to the Father, and the Spirit proper to the Son, because of consubstantiality.

^A And the Son is indeed the image, the living power, and the operation substantially inherent in the Father; and the Spirit is the image of the Son, and the power, and the natural operation, and that which is substantially inherent in Him; for it has been shown by the holy Fathers that all these things signify the cause and the caused; for they say it is proper, because it is from Him, and other things which we have posited above.

The great Basil testifies to these things in his discourse *Against Sabellius and the Anomoeans*, saying: "We confess the Father, and the Son; but [we confess] the identity of nature, because the Son is from the Father." And again in the same: "As the image does not have variety, so the begotten preserves consubstantiality." Saint Cyril, moreover, regarding the text: *When the Paraclete shall come*, says: "When he said this, he says, 'We have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is from God,' he shows that the Holy Spirit is not of a worldly kind, but of the divine essence." The same, regarding the text: *For I came down from heaven, not to do my own will*, says: "For that the Son is said to be born from the Father, this absolutely compels even the unwilling to confess Him to be consubstantial with Him." And again in [the treatise] *To Hermias*: "Since the Son has sprung from the very essence of God and the Father, He should be understood as being no otherwise than He [is], as far as natural identity is concerned."

Saint Maximus, when explaining what the prophet Zechariah meant by the ^B "golden lampstand, and the lamp upon it," says: "The Holy Spirit, just as He is naturally according to the essence of God and the Father, so also is He according to the essence of the Son, as if proceeding ineffably from the Father essentially through the begotten Son."

It is clear, therefore, from these things that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, because He is from Him; and again, by the same reasoning, that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Son, because He proceeds through Him, and is in Him and from Him. These things are indeed handed down by the holy masters of the Church. If, however, anyone says that the Spirit is the property of the Son because He is given through Him to those who are worthy, he does not sufficiently consider that what is said to be given is temporal; but that the Spirit is the property of the Son is eternal. For certainly that which is temporal could never be the cause of that which is above time. For, if a man’s own property, insofar as he lives, is always with him, much more will this be so in the Word of God; and he would be a minister, one who would not naturally proceed through Him and from Him as the giver. Although, if the Spirit were the property of the Son according to some notion of consubstantiality—such as that which exists between two consubstantial things, in which one is not through the other—then the Son would indeed be the property of the Holy Spirit, and, because of such a conversion, consubstantial from the substance of the Spirit. But this is neither said by any of the saints, ^C nor will it ever be said by those who piously and catholically believe concerning their God.

Although such consubstantiality is not properly consubstantiality, but that which connects one to the other, inasmuch as it exists naturally and essentially through Him from Him. Basil bears witness to this assertion when he says that not everything that is "brotherly" (genuine) to one another is called consubstantial. For he says in the epistle *To the Canonicas*: "Since, therefore, the Father is the light from the beginning, and the Son is the begotten light, and both are light, they would deservedly call this consubstantial, so that they might commend the equal honor of their nature. For not those things which are brotherly are called consubstantial, as some have supposed; but when [the one is] the cause and what is from the cause has substance, they are called consubstantial of the same nature."

The same person, in the discourse *Against Sabellius and the Anomoeans* concerning the Father and the Son, says: "But when I say one essence, do not understand two divided from one, but that the Son subsists from the Father as the principle, not that the Father and the Son [subsist] from some superior essence. For we do not say [they are] brotherly; but we confess the Father and the Son; but [we assert] the identity of essence, because the Son is from the Father."

This, therefore, in the place [where he speaks] against certain heretics standing against the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, and constructing calumny therefrom—as if, indeed, if the Father is consubstantial with the Son, and of the same essence, both [might] be induced as two brothers from one essence instead of Father and Son: and having devolved into these absurdities, the great Basil grants meanwhile that those things which are brotherly are called consubstantial with one another: but then, indeed, when both the cause, and that which has substance from the cause, are of the same nature. And he adds: "For we do not say [they are] brotherly, but we confess the Father and the Son, because the Father ^D is indeed the unbegotten light, and the Son is the begotten light." As if even in those things which, while being simply consubstantial, and having substance from one [source], there is indeed a property: just as the multitude of men are consubstantial with one another, since they have their generation from one father, Adam, yet there is not for them such a property as occurs with those of the same nature where one is the cause and one is the caused; for then they are properly called consubstantial.

Just as, therefore, the Son, having His existence from the Father, is consubstantial with Him, and these are consubstantial with each other; for that the Son is from the Spirit, that process according to which the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, does not in the least permit: for thus we shall avoid confessing two sons in the Holy Trinity, and we restore consubstantiality most especially. And it is shown at the same time that, unless the Spirit is from the Son, the Son and the Spirit will be "brotherly" toward one another. For by saying, "Do not understand two divided from one, for we do not say brotherly," he taught: because if they were [so], from the same solely, according to which they would be from the same,

they would deservedly be called brothers. Therefore, those who say that both the Son and the Spirit are from the Father alone and immediately—confessing two brothers in the Trinity, and understanding two divided from one—thereby neither provide a rational basis for consubstantiality nor is that personal order to one another preserved at all; and at the same time, the Trinity will not be God. But these things are most absurd, and that which necessarily follows from them is likewise absurd.

Nor are they only absurd, but also impossible, standing as they do against the foundations of the faith and the sentences of the doctors. Furthermore, while the saint adds an identity of essence, since the Son is from the Father, he shows that consubstantiality exists with the Father and the Son, because the Son is from the Father. Whence it is evident that in the divine persons, the consubstantial is observed in the cause and the caused: but not conversely, even if they are joined to one another, just as the cause is thought of before the caused. Therefore, the Son and the Spirit would not be consubstantial to one another unless the one were from the other, especially since, even according to the consubstantial, when they are one, no distinction is beheld unless a relation precedes it, which exists according to cause.

From these things that have been written, it is evident that even those who strive to support their own opinion concerning the writings of Theodoret against the most blessed Cyril do not attain to the intention and understanding of the holy Fathers. For he said concerning Saint Cyril: "But if he says that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, as if having substance from the Son or through the Son, we shall reject it as blasphemous and impious." But Cyril said, as is evident from what is above, that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son and is in him and from him, just as he is understood to be in God himself and in the Father; and he said that as his own, he proceeds through him naturally. Therefore, he is also said to receive what is his, not as one introducing an alien Spirit in a servile manner, but [receiving] him who is from him and is his own. ^B And in another place, he taught that the Holy Spirit, flowing naturally from God the Father through the Son, as in the likeness of the breath of our mouth, indicates to us his own substance. But these things are openly contrary; and they do not blush to produce as a witness in support of their own cause against the holy man, Theodoret, a heretical man and an adversary to Saint Cyril in his dogmas. For that that man was a heretic, and often repelled by the Church, public records bear witness. For the holy Fifth Universal Synod defined thus in chapter 13: "If any man favors the writings of the impious Theodoret, which [were written] against the right faith and Cyril, and his twelve chapters, for which he is discovered to have held the same things as the aforementioned Theodore and Nestorius, and fostering their impiety, does not anathematize the aforementioned impious writings, and together with them those who have thought and do think such things, and all who have written against the right faith and Cyril and his most blessed [chapters], and died in such impiety, let him be anathema."

The holy and universal Sixth Synod in the ninth chapter of its acts defined thus: "If any man does not anathematize the writings of Theodoret against the right faith and Saint Cyril, and the Epistle which is called that of Ibas, and Theodore of Mopsuestia the bishop, and his writings; and if any man does not accept the booklets of Saint Cyril himself, and especially those against Theodore, and Andrew, and Nestorius, and those who have thought or do think like them or any one of them, let him be anathema."

The Fourth and Seventh Universal Synods contain almost the same things. And it is truly wondrous that these people procure such patronage for themselves precisely from those twelve chapters of Theodoret which were openly and by name subjected to anathema by the holy synods. For the things which the divine Cyril wrote against Nestorius in twelve chapters, Theodoret presumed to contradict with as many chapters. And in the ninth, when Cyril asserted that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, he in his ninth [chapter] vomits up that saying. But, so that the intention of the holy man may be known more openly, let us set down his very words.

From the twelve chapters written by S. Cyril against the heretic Nestorius, the ninth chapter.

"If any man," he says, "says that one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Holy Spirit, as using a power of his own, as if it were alien, and that he received it from him so that he could work against unclean spirits and perform divine signs among men; and does not rather say that the Spirit is his own, through whom he displayed divine signs to mortals, let him be anathema."

Declaration of the same chapter held at Ephesus, by the same Blessed Cyril, when the sacred synod had asked him that he might explain to them more openly what these things meant.

"The Only-begotten Son of God, having become man," he says, "thus also remained God, existing as all things that the Father is, except only that he is the Father, and having his own Holy Spirit proceeding from himself and essentially unbegotten to him, he performed divine signs. And therefore, having become man, he also remained God. By his own power, therefore, through the Spirit, he performed miracles. But those who say that he, as one of us, a holy man, by the efficacy of the Spirit, used [this power] not as his own but as alien and not divine, and as one receiving a participation of grace from the Spirit, shall be subjected to the deserved sentence of anathema." But indeed, refuting that dictum of Theodoret himself, he says: "But because Nestorius said that Christ used an alien power, just as each of the saints did, for this reason I said 'the Spirit of the Son.' For he was, and is, the Spirit of him, just as indeed of the Father. And this the Apostle Paul insinuates to us, saying: 'Those who are in the flesh cannot please God. You, however, are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit: since indeed

the Spirit of God dwells in you. But if any one has not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his.' For the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, according to the voice of the Savior. But he is not alien to the Son; for he has all things with the Father. From these things, therefore, the mind of the holy man must be carefully considered, and how he understood the Holy Spirit to be the property of the Son; for who could be a more convenient and apt interpreter of his own words than he himself, who wrote them? For he called the Holy Spirit the property of the Son, as if [he were] the power of the Son, and [said] that He operated through Him: and for this reason He was essentially innate to Him, and from Him He is, and the Son has all things which the Father has, except only being the Father. But also, while rendering a reason for his statement, when he said that the Holy Spirit is of the Son, just as He is of the Father, and that He is not alien from Him, because, namely, He has all things of the Father with the Father: for since the Son is the heir of the natural goods of God and the Father, He also has the Spirit, just as He is understood to be in God and the Father Himself, except that He is not the Father, as he says in another place. ^A He shows that he is asserting more strongly what he had said in the new chapter than denying it, nor does he accept Theodoret's opinion at all, as it was most pernicious.

It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that Theodoret was a heretic, and especially in those things which he wrote against blessed Cyril. But it is not at all appropriate to use writings of this kind to establish a rule of truth. Furthermore, if anyone later says that he was accepted by the Church [32] having repented, it is nothing to the point. For those things from which Theodoret's statements are brought forward were condemned by universal synods.

It is clear, however, that even the opinion that the Holy Spirit does not have its substance from the Son, nor through the Son, is the opinion of Nestorius; of which Theodoret was a partaker, as the facts themselves testify. And Nestorius himself also pronounced thus in his confession of faith. But if he is not openly accused of this cause, it was not that which was proposed to the synod at that time, nor were many scandalized by it then, since it was not even recognized by many, nor on that account was the synod called. For even if it were a worse and greater sin and lie to loosen the reins of blasphemy regarding the divinity than regarding the dispensation of humanity, yet the reason [of the situation] pressed more on the Incarnation at that time. ^B For the faith was in danger at that time, since many were asserting that the Word had not taken flesh, and that God had not become man, and the sacrament of the dispensation, in which the salvation of Christians consists, seemed to be a name rather than a reality; and it was not at all opportune, omitting that for which they had gathered and for which the Church was in danger, to stir up words about things that were not pressing, when the principal question stood in need of much time and many sermons in order to be resolved: lest if they had fallen back from their intended purpose with the matter unfinished, they might seem to confound and mix everything, and while they ought to have corrected what was at hand, they might neither do this worthily, nor that which they were attempting out of season. Therefore, having omitted the necessary things, the rest, they persisted in caring for this one thing which was pressing.

It is therefore truly unworthy and most iniquitous to bring forward the chapters of Theodoret, which the whole synod decreed must be consigned to perpetual oblivion and rejection, and to indicate the mind of blessed Cyril through them. Rather, his mind must be gathered from those things which he says while explaining himself, and which he wrote elsewhere in many places. ^C From which it surely becomes manifest to those reading [them] that he always understood [the Spirit] to be his own, which he said, or not alien from the Son, because He is from the Son; just as is also manifestly detected from the things above. And what is more marvelous, when Theodoret was accusing holy Cyril in some letters, saying that the holy man, having omitted what he had said and written against Nestorius, had become in agreement with Theodoret himself, and had sent those letters to many; and when they were marveling at and astonished by this change of his; when the calumny was discovered, blessed Cyril wrote back saying: "Lord, deliver my soul from lying lips, and from a deceitful tongue." For I find myself exposed to false calumny.

Those who rely on Theodoret's patronage bring these things forward as if they were said to confirm Theodoret's opinion; ^D which denies that the Holy Spirit is through the Son and from the Son, the holy man having changed his opinion. But this is the work of men lying most wickedly against the truth of things and against the mind of the saints. For these men, as was declared above, assert with holy Cyril that the Holy Spirit has substance through the Son, and is from the Son, as the proceeding argument will teach more openly.

For even the wisest physicians, when they have noticed that the infirm are laboring under a double disease, arm themselves first against the one that disturbs more and requires surgery, even if in its own kind it seems to be lesser. And judges, having many times found some defendant guilty of many crimes, omit the rest for the time being, and press most upon that one in which he has been caught.

Nor indeed is it to be wondered at, if that opinion of Nestorius was not then thought of or refuted by the holy Fathers, since before him Arius, and all who blasphemed against the Son, were even more wickedly blasphemous against the Holy Spirit. For indeed Arius asserted that the soul assumed by Christ with the flesh existed before the Incarnation of the Word, and that it came from heaven. For he himself also believed in the pre-existence of souls, and yet this crime was not objected to him; he was banished and cast out of the Church only because he called the Son a creature, and the rest of his blasphemies are not in memory, nor is he publicly discussed regarding them.

^A And for this reason, he was certainly the enemy of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless.

But if anyone imagines that the synod ought to have at least refuted such blasphemies at that time, he will hear that it was generally rebuked when they said: "It is permitted to no one to produce, write, or compose any other faith besides that which the holy Fathers delivered," setting down concerning it that one must think as the symbol contains, namely according to the exposition of the blessed Cyril, and according to the letters which the same man wrote to Nestorius: in which he openly confesses that the Holy Spirit has being from the Son, and through the Son. If, however, it is the opinion of the holy Fathers that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally and essentially and eternally through the Son—and "to proceed," as it is called by procession, signifies to have being, just as being born signifies by nativity—and since the blessed Cyril also asserts, through almost the entire text of his writings, that the Spirit proceeds naturally through the Son, as his own Spirit and his own power, and is from him, by divine reasoning, and all other things which have been said: how then does the synod not argue against that man who denied that the Spirit has being through the Son, even if, because of the things we mentioned, they said nothing further about such an opinion? How absurd, therefore, it is to think, on account of such silence, that the holy synod acquiesced to the heretical man's blasphemies—namely, that the Spirit did not have being through the Son—when that is ^B manifestly contrary both to the preceding holy Fathers, and to the writings of the blessed Cyril, which the synod followed and determined must be followed by the rest. For this is to construct a calumny against the holy Church.

Nor would the ecclesiastical cause be Weaker, nor would anyone argue it. Although it might be said that the holy synod was intent on other things, and perhaps had not arrived sufficiently instructed and prepared for such a calumny, or even that it had thought that, with the error that had emerged concerning the incarnation of the Lord eliminated, this also would at once be cast out.

That this was the opinion of Nestorius, however, is clear from the ancients, whose concern it was to deliver these things in writing. For it is barely certain from the symbol of his faith, if anyone, content with piety, would wish to accept what he said piously. For he says, "We think the Holy Spirit is from God, not by way of creation, but from the divine essence; and we do not think that he received existence from the Son, or through the Son." By saying, therefore, that he is from the essence of God, and "we do not think" the Son, he gives it to be understood that he believes this Spirit is both from God and from His essence; but what he says, "not by way of creation," and adds, "nor did he receive existence through the Son," he gave it to be understood again that, just as creatures are not from God through the Son, so too the Holy Spirit does not have existence from God through the Son; but this is true. And at the same time, it is evident that as to the fact that the Spirit is not from the Son, he said nothing here; but indeed, how would he not be thought to be the Son, if he did not have existence through the Son, that is, if he did not proceed through the Son? Therefore, if indeed he denies here an eternal existence and procession through the Son, how does he not openly gainsay the holy Fathers? Is he not now necessarily compelled to confess the Son, while also believing that the Holy Spirit himself is from the Father without a medium, according to the aforementioned assertions of the Fathers? ^C Furthermore, it is altogether most stupid not to acquiesce to these things which the holy Fathers have written in countless places, but, neglecting them, to conjecture that they said what they never said, and to wish to draw arguments from these things which they kept silent about, as if, once the debate was removed, silence alone were sufficient to explain what is in question—when surely Scripture says: *By your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned* (Matt. xii, 37); and thus to wish to conclude so easily about difficult matters. And yet by that facility—lest I call it a pernicious levity—we would call the Holy Spirit the true God of true God, and would not confess him consubstantial with the Father and the Son, because in the Symbol of faith that is not noted concerning the Holy Spirit as it is concerning the Son: for here, from things suppressed by silence, an entrance is opened to those wishing to act maliciously. But the things written about the Spirit in the Symbol are found to be common to the Father and the Son.

But if the holy Fathers did not announce those things for whose sake they had come together, in the second synod, that is, wise as they were and most intelligent, what wonder if they omitted that for which they had not in the least come together, ^D nor was the ecclesiastical cause any weaker, nor did anyone argue it?

Since, therefore, that which was said can be accepted simply and with pious understanding, even if we do not confess it was said with that mind; and since this opinion was not yet public, nor vulgar, and for that reason the Christian religion would be in no way harmed by it, and almost no one was accusing it, and no one was examining the words themselves more subtly while other matters, specifically most necessary and urgent ones, were at hand—namely, lest the mystery of the incarnation appear to be mere words and empty preaching—they passed over the circumlocutions and betook themselves to that for which they had come together. It is evident, however, that he who also says that the Spirit is not from the Son will confess that Christ used him not as his own power, but as another's. Moreover, that has been visited with anathema.

Whether, therefore, because the Son is the immutable image of the Father, and has all that the Father has, except for the only thing that he is not the Father; or because Christ uses the Holy Spirit by his own power, not the power of another, so that it may be believed, which is said: *The Word was made flesh* (John i, 14); it is necessary to confess that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son. For Nestorius denied this for this reason, so that he might show himself more openly against the dispensation of the incarnation. It is also written in the Gospel: *And Jesus knowing that power had gone out of him* (Luc. vi, 19). And again in

the Gospel: *The weakness of the demoniacs also was among these, whom Jesus healed.* For he himself says: *But if I by the Spirit of God cast out demons* (Matth. xii, 28). It is clear, therefore, that the power flowing from him was the holy Spirit.

This is also evident from the fact that it indeed belongs to God to love all things, but that power healed all things. It is necessary, therefore, that God be the holy Spirit, whom holy Cyril also says is the Spirit proper to the Son, as his power, naturally proceeding through him, and therefore not even alien to him.

It is found, therefore, in the Gospel that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, which they ventilate with so many questions. Furthermore, that it is said to proceed through the Son restrains us from all such curious inquiry. For the authority of the learned has taught that *by* and *from* carry the same weight, and the reason of truth opens itself on every side. But, in truth, it is helpful to append what was more clearly written by the holy Fathers on this matter. For holy Cyril inscribed a certain chapter of the book of *Thesauri* thus: *That the holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son.* But if this holy man had proposed this, who might doubt that he wished to accomplish his purpose? In that very chapter so inscribed, he says: ^A *For since the holy Spirit, when he is in us, shows us to be conformed to God; however, he proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is certain that he is of the divine substance, existing essentially in it, and proceeding from it.* Again in the same: *The Spirit is altogether proper to the Son, and does not subsist externally.*

In another place, again: *The Law, therefore, while Christ is bringing it forth, bears the Spirit who is his own, as being in him and from him, naturally existing.* And again in another: *Paul, therefore, knows no difference of nature between the Son and the Spirit; but, as existing naturally from him, he calls him by the name of lordship.* And in another again: *It is necessary to confess that the Spirit is the substance from the very essence of the Son.* And in another again: *Therefore, the Spirit is from the essence of the Son.*

The same, in the fifth book *to Hermias*, says: *And if, by receiving the Spirit, we are made partakers of the divine nature, how will the Spirit be second to the Son, or how will the Spirit be more excellent than he, and not rather, as he himself also is, from him, having his Spirit as possessing his whole operation, and bestowing participation in him?*

The same, in the first book *on Spiritual Worship*, when he was explaining the three signs performed by Moses, at the end, discussing the circumcision of the son of Moses, he says: *Which son, indeed, the intellectual Zipporah, that is the Church, who is from Midian and from the Gentiles, circumcised with a stone. That is a figure of the holy Spirit, on account of his greatest and unbroken power; because he is also from the rock; for Christ is the Spirit, and the rock is Christ, as also Paul most wisely said.*

The same, writing to Palladius in the first book, namely, *on Spiritual Worship*: *The Spirit, he says, is certainly not changeable; or if he is subject to the disease of variation, the stain recurs to the divine nature itself. Since he is the Spirit of God, and of the Father, but also of the Son, essentially from both, namely from the Father through the Son.* ^B

The same in the third epistle *to Nestorius*, the beginning of which is: *He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me* (Matth. x, 37): *Although, he says, the holy Spirit is in a special substance, and is understood according to himself, according to the fact that he is Spirit, and not the Son, yet he is not alien to him. For he is named the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the Truth, and he flows from him, just as he does from the Father, indeed.*

The same *concerning John*, on the passage: *And the Word was God*: *He is not, therefore, inferior, who has operation with the perfect Father, and has the Spirit of the begetter as good, living, and substantially implanted in his own nature, just as indeed the Father also has.*

The same on the passage: *And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete* (Joan. xiv, 16): *For the Son, he says, existing essentially as a partaker of the natural goods of God and the Father, has the Spirit according to the same manner, according to which the Father is understood to have him; neither introduced, nor coming from the outside. For it is foolish and insane to think so. But just as each one of us contains his own spirit in himself, and pours it out from his inmost bowels to the outside. Therefore, Christ also breathed him out corporally, to show that just as from the human mouth the spirit proceeds corporally: so ^C from the divine essence through the divine reason he flows, who is from him.*

The same *concerning Joel*, when he was explaining that passage: *I will pour out of my Spirit* (Joel ii, 28): *For according as he is God and according to nature the Son from God: for he is born from God and from the Father, the Spirit is proper to him, and in him, and from him,* just as indeed he is understood from God himself and the Father.

The same in *Praises of the Emperor Theodosius* says: *Baptizing, he says, therefore in fire and the holy Spirit; he does not grant the Spirit to the baptized as someone alien, in the manner of a servant or a minister: but, as God according to nature, with supreme power, as his own and who is from himself. And after a little: Absolving him of sin, he anoints him with his own Spirit, which he himself sends forth, as the Word from God the Father, and pours it out upon us from his own nature. Truly, however, as something common, he attaches it to the dispensation of the flesh, and as a man, he breathed corporally. For he breathed, and said: Receive the holy Spirit (Joan. xx, 22). And: God does not give the Spirit by measure (Joan. iii, 31), according to the voice of John; but he himself sends him forth from himself, just as indeed the Father also.*

In the acts also of the first synod at Nicaea, in those things which the Fathers said through Bishop Leontius, it is held thus: *The Spirit has been found, proceeding indeed ^D

from the Father, but proper to the Son, and flowing from Him.

Great Athanasius also, in his book *On the Dispensation of the Incarnation*, whose beginning is: "Those who wish to understand the divine Scriptures perversely," says: "God sent Him from above, and He Himself, when He was below, received Him as man. From Him, therefore, it descends upon Him, from His deity into His humanity." ^A Saint Chrysostom also, in his sermon on the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose beginning is: "The grace of God has truly appeared to us," says: "Christ came to us, gave us the Spirit flowing from Himself, and took on our body." The same author, in the sermon which is inscribed *Prophylacticon*—in which he strives to forearm the faithful against heresies—whose beginning is: "Since we tend toward the good God," says: "We must observe and guard ourselves against the adversary of the good, the devil, and thus the Spirit flowing from Christ will guard us against the day of future redemption."

Simeon Metaphrastes also, writing the passion of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, began thus: "Formerly, indeed, the mysteries of the faith were wrapped in figures and enigmas, and the light of truth was covered by a cloud of shadows. But after that great sacrament of salvation was procured for us, and He who fashioned our hearts uniquely was made like us without sin, by a kindness and mercy proper toward us; and submitted to all things which are of human infirmity, so that I might receive the first nobility, and was finally affected by the punishment of the cross and sustained death. And—not to recount individual things, for there were many sacraments of His dispensation in between—His bodily inhabitation received its end: and the Spirit begins His grace, and my Christ is carried into the heavens, and returns to the paternal throne, and sends the Spirit proceeding from Himself for the informing of the unbelieving Gentiles ^B as disciples."

Saint Anastasius, Patriarch of Antioch, in his book *On the Right Doctrines of the Church*, says: "Taking the propriety of the body as an example of the divine persons toward one another, we intend to commend the state through the proportion of members and their likeness. For this Spirit is called the Spirit of His mouth, namely the Holy Spirit, since the mouth is the Only-Begotten; and the Spirit, again, proceeding from Him, and sent not only by the Father, but also by the Son." And after a few words: "For the Apostles, praying and supplicating to the Lord, brought in from the outside, so to speak, the Holy Spirit to those who were worthy by His advent. But our Savior, as if from a treasure house within Himself, offered Him to those who were suitable and worthy through the purity of their life." The same author in the same book says: "The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God's mouth, for the mouth of the Father is the Son." Again in the same: "The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth: He proceeds from the Father, but receives from the Son."

Great Athanasius likewise, in his letter to Serapion: "For the Son, being the living Word, says there must be one perfect and full life, sanctifying and illuminating, which is His operation and function, which is said to proceed from the Father; since by the Son, who is conceded to be from the Father, it is sent forth, and is sent, and is given."

Item, in his profession of faith, whose beginning is: "Whoever wishes to be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith," he says: "The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, not created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

Saint Epiphanius, in his book which he inscribed *Ancoratus*: "The Spirit," he says, "is incomprehensible, not alien to the Father and the Son, nor is He a confluence of the Father and the Son." And after a few words: "The Holy Spirit is not the brother of the Father, but is of the same essence as the Father and the Son. For the Only-Begotten Himself called Him the Spirit of the Father, and proceeding from the Father: 'And He shall receive of mine,' He says; so that you might think Him not alien to the Father or the Son." And after a few words: "From the Father and the Son, third in appellation." And after many things: "Both dwell in the just man, Christ and His Spirit. But if Christ is believed to be God from God from the Father, and the Spirit from Christ, or from both, as Christ says, who 'proceeds from the Father,' and 'He shall receive of mine'—" And after a few words: "But someone will say: Therefore do we say there are two sons? And how will He be the Only-Begotten? 'Who are you that answerest God?' For if He calls the Son begotten of Himself, but the Holy Spirit, who is from both: which are understood by the saints alone, they have clear, light-giving, and luminous efficiency." And after a few words: "The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, the third light from the Father and the Son." And after a few words: "For just as no one knows the Father except the Son, and no one the Son except the Father; so I dare say, no one knows the Holy Spirit except the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds and from whom He receives. And no one knows the Son and the Father except the Holy Spirit, who truthfully glorifies, who teaches all things, who is from the Father and the Son."

And with some things interposed: "Therefore both the Father was always, and the Son was always, and the Holy Spirit breathes from the Father and the Son." And again in the same: "Send forth, says David, thy light and thy truth." It is the Lord Himself who said: "In the last days I will pour out of My Spirit upon all flesh, and their sons and their daughters will prophesy, and their young men will see visions."

And indeed, those things which are said by the saints of this kind are collected here, being few out of many, as they are manifest. Since therefore great Basil, in his epistle to Terentius the Count, says: "Whatever relationship the common has to the proper, that has essence to substance." And the same author again in his epistle to his brother Gregory concerning the difference of essence and substance, says: "The ratio of community is indeed referred to essence. But substance is the proper sign of each thing." Damascene also, in his theological works—

^A regarding chapters: "Substance is the common [element] along with the proper," it is established that when we say "the essence of the Son" conjunctively—since "Son" is a name derived from the proper [property]—we signify [it] as the common along with the proper. But substance is the common along with the proper. Thus indeed Damascene defines it. And so, because the Spirit is said to be from the essence of the Son, [He] is said to be from His substance: and thus, we have found that which was sought.

Moreover, that in the divine Scriptures property and substance, or even person, are the same as regards the thing itself, is manifest. For Gregory the Theologian in his sermon on the Lights said: "But when I have said God, you are illuminated by one light and three: by three, indeed, according to properties." And explaining what he meant by properties, he adds, whether it pleases [one] to call them substances or persons. Likewise, in his praises of Saint Athanasius, after having said: "For there is one essence, and three substances; when they are indeed spoken of by us," he immediately and piously added: "For the one indicates the nature; the other, the properties of the three." There, therefore, when he had posited properties, he set forth substances; here, however, substances [and] properties. From which it is surely manifest that he wishes property and substance to be understood as the same, and at the same time esteems nature and essence in God; for he set forth one essence [as] nature. Since, therefore, there are three substances of the essence that is common in God, and this [the essence] is the common [thing] which is also the proper essence for each; for indeed one of the three is some person; and that which is to each, this is wondrously also common; for the one is three, and the three are one; in which is [the] deity, or, if I may speak more diligently, the deity which is according to the theologian Gregory, it is manifest that, as the essence of the three is substance, so the essence and substance of each of the substances is [the same]. But the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three substances; for according to these they are properly accepted as relative to one another.

Thus, it is indeed true what is said, that when we speak of the essence of the Son conjunctively, we signify His substance or person; since by saying essence, the common is indeed signified, but by the relative name of Son, the proper substance is insinuated: for substance is said to be the common with the proper. And when it is said that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son, [it is said] from His substance. For essence and substance are the same insofar as the thing is concerned.

Damascene furthermore in his theological chapters says: "Deity indicates the nature; but what is called substance, just as humanity commends the nature, but Peter [commends] the substance." Since therefore, just as the Father, so also the Son similarly indicates substance; but substance is the common with the proper, as he himself defined; and Deity or nature or essence is the common. Moreover, it is said that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son; it is manifest that [He] is from His substance. But since the same [author] says in the same places: "When I know one ^B and perfect essence. But it is said that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son: it is manifest, because it is said to be from His substance." And since he says in those same [works]: "Because the Son alone is begotten; for He is born from the essence of the Father without beginning and without time; and the Holy Spirit alone is not begotten from the essence of the Father, but is proceeding: but from the essence of the Father, for the reason that He is from the substance of the Father," this both he hands down and all agree, because when the Holy Spirit is asserted by the theologians to be from the essence of the Son, [He] is also of His substance: for essence and substance in God are the same according to the thing.

Furthermore, if anyone wishing to take these things otherwise, should want to signify one thing by essence in God and another by substance, he will necessarily be compelled to confess an essence without substance and a substance without essence. To which absurdity the great Basil also necessarily led his discourse in the aforementioned letter to the count Terentius. And since theologians, discoursing indiscriminately about the divine generation of the Son, assert Him to be born sometimes from the essence of the Father, and sometimes ^C from His substance; [either] one will confess that two sons were born, one from the essence, but the other from the substance, or he will say that the Son's generation is not unique and simple. The same thing will also be said about the Holy Spirit. And certainly if there are three differences, and one thing is the property of the Father, another the person of the Father, another the paternal substance, and one thing is the Father, and another again His essence; and if the same is to be said about the other substances: partially the Trinity will be taken from us, and all the things we have received which were piously handed down about It will perish: partially God will be composite, consisting of things so different from one another according to the thing. But these things are indeed absurd and impious. And therefore that [notion] is also utterly absurd and impious, once [the] placing [of which] these things follow.

^D Since, therefore, substance and person are the same, and substance and property are equally the same, and substance is essence, as is manifest from these things which we said above, it is manifest that all these are the same in God according to the thing. And that also is manifest, that if essence is said by the saints to be one thing, substance another; yet according to the thing, they said not that essence is one thing and substance another, but according to that which one and the same matter is signified otherwise indeed from the name of essence or nature, otherwise from the name of substance or person. For the former is said commonly and absolutely, but this latter more properly, with that which certainly has a relation to something: for because the absolute differs from those things which are spoken in relation to something; but of those things which are spoken in God, some are absolute names which signify the one God indiscriminately, while others have a relative [character] which commend the Trinity to us, and according to those things which are absolute and common, the Theology is established [as] united, but according to those things which are relative to one another, and according to those things which have [a relation] to something, the theology is woven together [as] distinct;

^A unitio vero atque discretio non idem est; and neither is the relative and the absolute the same according to this statement: it follows that essence and substance are not the same. For the name of essence signifies something absolute, but substance ^A denotes each thing’s own particular mark, according to which it is referred to another person.

For example, a right-handed man differs from him who is simply a man according to what is simple and in some way, or according to what is common and proper, although in reality they are the same right-handed man; just as Peter is both a man and the son of Jonah; and he who calls the same Peter a man does not signify the other thing; but he does so when he has called him the same son of Jonah. But the second, which is spoken simply and in a certain way, indicates only a difference; for by saying that Peter is a man subject to an absolute and common name, and by also saying he is the son of Jonah, with a proper, relative, and definite name, he indicates that the same person is also a son from the man Jonah who was his father. Through each name, therefore, the same thing is signified in one way and another, that is to say relatively and absolutely: but it differs only simply and in a certain way. For one thing signifies essence without a habit; another signifies the same thing having in some way a relation to something.

And this ^B is attested by, first, the great Athanasius, and later also by Saint Maximus, and both in their dialogues against the Anomoeans. For when the Anomoean says that essence is one thing and substance is another, Saint Maximus replies: "One thing and another, not as if they were different realities"; and when the former suggests: "Is it then a composition?" the Saint adds: "I said one thing and another, not as if they were different realities, but as essence signifies one thing and substance another. Just as a grain of wheat is called both seed and fruit; but 'seed' signifies one thing, and 'fruit' another."

Therefore, although the Saint concedes there that essence is one thing and substance another, he does not permit the Godhead to be understood as double: for the reason, namely, that 'Godhead' and 'substance', or 'essence' and 'substance', do not signify the same thing in the same way. It is permitted, therefore, to say that essence and substance are the same in reality, and that essence and substance are different according to the signifying names of things. And yet both are true. For they do not signify the same thing in the same way; inasmuch as essence [signifies] the common, and the same as what 'to be' is. But substance [signifies] the same thing, along with ^C what has a relation to something, whether by way of the begetter, or the begotten, or the proceeding, or the produced.

And it was said by the saints that essence and substance are not the same, especially on account of Sabellius. For he, confessing God to be one person, was willing to confess that substance and essence are the same in God according to reality. For this contributed most to what he was striving for. But he did not want for substances, or persons, to be relative. For if anyone says the paternal substance is relative, it is necessary to confess at the same time that to which it is referred. For such is the nature of those things which are said in relation to something. But the same thing must be said regarding the generated substance and the proceeding one. And if this is posited in God, it is necessary to confess three substances, or three persons in God, according to the position of the faith, appearing from the processions or relations, which was contrary to the intention of Sabellius.

Regarding this which is proposed, the great Basil also, in the example of the faith dictated by him—the beginning of which is: "To those who have been forestalled by another confession of faith"—says: "Some, however, coming from the impiety of the African Sabellius, having suspected that substance {hypostasis} and essence are the same, draw from thence the occasions for weaving together their own blasphemy, from the fact that it is written in the faith: 'If anyone says that the Son is from another essence or substance, the catholic and apostolic Church anathemitizes him.' For they did not say there that essence and substance are the same. For if the words insinuated one and the same understanding, what need was there to posit both? It is certain, indeed, that because some were denying that He is from the essence of the Father, while others were saying that he was neither from essence nor from substance, they thus prohibited both as alien to the ecclesiastical understanding. For where they expressed their own meaning, they said the Son is from the essence of the Father; no longer adding, 'and from the substance.' Thus that was posited for the abolition of the worst understanding, but this manifests the saving dogma."

In this place, the great Basil, to the Fathers who say: "If anyone shall say, from another essence or substance is the Son, him the catholic and apostolic Church anathemitizes," faults those who concluded from here that substance and essence are the same, and says: "For not because they said there, 'from another essence or substance,' is it therefore collected that essence and substance are the same; but, eliminating the fallacious opinions of certain people from the Church, they used both these words. For if both signified the same thing, it was certainly not necessary to posit both. But because some were denying that the Son is from the essence of the Father, while some were admitting that He is not from the essence or the substance of the Father, on that account they prohibited both, subjecting to anathema, for the deletion of the worst understanding, the person who says the Son is from another essence or substance."

From which it is permitted to conclude that it is not the same thing to be essence and substance. Which some, perverting beyond the intention of the holy man, fall into many absurdities. For he does not fault them for saying that, according to reality, essence and substance are the same; for truth itself speaks this truth along with the holy Fathers, and he himself attests to this in his epistle to his brother Gregory; but

^A because, according to reason, or the signification of the names, they thought essence and substance to be the same, and not as he himself says—that they define essence as pertaining to the common, as they simply put it, but substance as a proper mark in that which in some way relates to another; and from both of these names they derived one and the same understanding, through which they took away the processes, the relations, and the three persons altogether, being God.

Therefore, the masters of the Church indeed confess that essence and substance are the same; and yet the same men again deny that substance and essence are the same, saying that they are not so according to the same respect, as has been said; for a contradiction can never be true at the same time in the same respect. For one thing is accepted according to the reality, and another according to the name.

Next, he adds that where the Fathers wished to indicate their own meaning, they said the Son is from the essence of the Father, and they thought this sufficient to insinuate that the Son’s substance is from the Father; and very closely, as if it were said that he is from the Father’s substance. For they assert that this possesses a manifestation of the saving dogma. Now, the saving dogma is to confess that the Son has his substance from the Father, by reason of his birth—that is, consubstantial with Him from whom He is—which dogma he said was indicated by that which was said, that the Son is from the essence of the Father. It is therefore the same to say "from the essence of the Father" and "from the substance of the Father." It is the same regarding essence and substance in reality. And the essence of the Father is the substance of the Father.

Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is also asserted to be from the essence of the Son, it is also clear that He is from His substance; for there is neither essence without substance, nor substance without essence. Although the first synod also handed it down in the Creed of faith: "We believe in the Son of God born from the Father, that is, from the essence of the Father."

It is established, therefore, through everything, that whether the Spirit is said to be from the essence of the Son, or from the Son, or from the substance of the Son, it makes no difference for insinuating His substance. For just as from that which was said, that the Son is from the essence of the Father, His substance is understood to be from thence: so also the Holy Spirit, since He is handed down by the theologians as being from the essence of the Son, is insinuated to have His substance also from Him, according to which He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and according to which He is said to have His being from Him. And just as the Son is said indifferently by the theologians to be from the Father’s essence or from His substance, to insinuate His substance from Him: so also we can indifferently say that the Spirit is from the Son, whether from His essence or from His substance, to show that He has His being from the Son; unless one wishes to be impudent toward everything.

But if anyone should say that consubstantiality is indicated by this, the Son is certainly not said to be of the essence of the Spirit, nor is that consequence of habit convertible. ^B Furthermore, if the holy Isaac 34 brings forward one saying: "He is your father, and is of your nature—but that is lawful to be said in those things in which no order is perceived, being divided indeed according to matter, but united only by the term of mortal nature, through which they are called consubstantial toward one another according to conversion, and according to which each one of another’s nature is said abusively, as if from a certain subject, in his own substance, and as if a part from the whole. But in the holy Trinity, since it is one and a most simple essence, and the difference is perceived only by the order of the persons toward one another—according, namely, to their substantial processes—just as it is impossible for the Father to be said to be from the Son and from the Son’s essence, and certainly when it is one and the same essence of the Father and the Son, so it is not possible for the Son to be said to be from the Spirit or of the Spirit’s substance, because of the term of order according to which He proceeds from the Father through the Son. ^C In like manner, for the same reason, we cannot assert that the Son is begotten from the Father through the Spirit. Therefore, it was rightly said: The Son of the Holy Spirit neither is, nor is He called, nor is that consequence converted.

But it is established from the things which have been said, and indeed that the great Athanasius says: "He is said to proceed from the Father, because He flashes forth from the Word, and is sent, and is given." Therefore, unless the Father sent Him forth through the Word, He would in no way be proceeding from the Father. For the property of the Spirit, as we have said, is to proceed from the Father through the Son, or to be from the first through the middle, and he is one who proceeds through a process of this kind. For the Son would be [the Spirit], if He proceeded from the Father without a medium. For to be from the Father without a medium is the property of the Son, as we also taught above. How, therefore, could He not be said to be from the Son, who is said to proceed from the Father for this reason, because He is from the Son and through the Son? And it is likewise established that Athanasius considers "to proceed" and "to flash forth" to be the same. For that reason he says: "He is said to proceed from the Father, because He flashes forth from the Word," as if he were saying, "He is a proceeding one, because He proceeds from the Father through the Son; for unless He were through the Son, He would never be said to proceed from the Father, but to be born."

If, however, as some wish, he intended "to flash forth"—which he says—to be understood concerning the temporal process which they introduce, what connection would he have had at the same time with that reason? ^D For even if we concede that this also exists, what does that temporal process contribute to that which is without time? By what reason, indeed, would he posit this as the cause of His eternal procession? For we all know that the causal connection is accepted for the cause. For not because He flashes forth from the Son temporally, does He therefore proceed from the Father also in time. He used that word, however, to say "to flash forth" in place of what is "to proceed," because he called the illuminating Spirit "life," naturally using an alternation in the conversion of the expression: although also many of the masters [understand] "to flash forth" which

in the substantial procession of the Persons they preferred before their own substance; just as it is that which is sung: "The Only-begotten Son, who shone forth from the Father without time"; but he also called the Spirit proceeding from the Father the life of the living Word. If, however, there is life from the living One, the Son will certainly never be without the Spirit: "For just as the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself." But the Holy Spirit is life, which he draws as it is born from the Father, together with the Father's essence. For he who is born is not without life. For that, beyond impiety, is also most foolish, as Chrysostom says when explaining that: "He gave life."

Indeed, because the Holy Spirit has been called the operation of the Son, subsisting and substantially inborn, it is clear that He operates through the Spirit. But this is also the common opinion of the Church, ^B especially since the Lord also said: "If, however, I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." Which another evangelist, explaining, says: "If, however, I cast out demons in the Spirit of God." Therefore, the Son operates through the Spirit of God, which is also His own Spirit. Now, that through which anyone operates is either as a moving agent, as a king through whom a steward of a city administers and performs everything; or as something special and coming from art, as an artisan operates through art; or through the cause of his own natural power. Therefore, the power of the one operating is not the cause, just as the mind operating through the word, as if through its own natural force and efficiency, is the cause of the word, but not conversely: for every power and action naturally proceeding through someone is also from him. But the Son operates through the Word, as if through His own natural power. The Son, however, operates through the Spirit, as if through His own natural and substantially inborn power. Therefore, the great Basil also in the Fourth [Book] of Questions says: "Neither does the Father do anything without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit." But the Word of the Son is the Spirit: "Upholding," he says, "all things by the word of his power."

From all of which, indeed, the order of the divine Persons toward one another, and that they hold together, and are thought of and understood as one, is established. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is the gift of the Son, and is His operation; and truly an operation [shines] from the one operating, and a gift [shines/proceeds] from the one sending, and is sent, and is given: it is clear that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For just as the Son, through whom the Father operates, is from the Father; so also it is to be said of the Holy Spirit, through whom the Son operates. For this "through whom," as it is said, does not have a place here as that which moves, or as an artificial and exemplary cause. But he called it "gift," either because conversely, and in this place, he has used a conversion of the expression. For "gift" is proper to that which is said to be given and sent. Or because it signifies that it is to be given and sent. Through whom, nevertheless, he wished the cause, and that which is from the cause, to be understood. For indeed it would never be given by him unless it were also from him: for otherwise it would perform the role of a minister. But by whom was it fitting for Him to be given, as Athanasius himself says, if not by Him whose [Spirit] it is? But this would not be so unless it were also referred back to Him. But relation commends a cause and that which is causal. The Son, therefore, is the cause of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit does not operate through the Son; and the cause of that is because the Son is not begotten from the Father through the Spirit, but the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. According to which reason, indeed, the Son is not called the operation and power of the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, if anyone thinks the saying of the same most blessed man, stated beforehand in his confession of faith (35), where he says: "The Holy Spirit, from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding," is ambiguous, and slanders it as if it were adulterated: first, that this is true is manifest from the fact that the theologian Gregory in his praises of Athanasius remembers it, saying: "He alone, or with very few, dared to confess the truth in writings"; and what he adds there: "which then at that time he sent, written, to Julius the Roman pontiff, when he was accused of not being of the right faith." Then, it is also established from the fact that it is his, because it is always sung by all the churches of the West on Sundays, and the author is so famous that he is not ignored even by children; from those times it is diffused everywhere, and against the heresy of the Arians, and against all adversaries of the right faith, it is commanded to be sung publicly in all churches.

Therefore, let them either produce some other confession of so great a man, which the Theologian also mentions, and to which the tradition of the Church attests: or if they cannot do this, let them accept the one with the statement explained above. But those who wrote long before against the Latins-which as an adversary to themselves, they strive in vain to overthrow-testify that this very confession of faith is of that holy man, and that the saying is so. And, as it is given to be understood, then it was indeed still preserved, but afterwards, those who became more obstinate in contradicting it wished to remove it entirely. And if now, nevertheless, it is rarely found to be so in very old codices for those who inquire carefully, if one, however, looks into it more diligently, he will find that the holy man said nothing new here. For in very many places he says that He is through the Son, and receives from the Son, and clearly receives from Him what He receives. That, however, is His being, and what he was saying a little before, to shine forth from the Son; wherefore, the power which he said proceeds from the Father, he intended for the Holy Spirit to be understood as proceeding from the Father.

^A Furthermore, these statements are highly consonant with what he set forth in his exposition of the faith. It appears at the same time from what has been said above that "to proceed," "to be poured forth," "to flow forth," "to inundate," "to stream," "to shine forth," and whatever similar terms are used, signify the same substance of the Holy Spirit, which is the very same thing that "to proceed" signifies. This is not only because, as has been said, there are not two processions of the Holy Spirit, as some would have it—and therefore all these terms must be reduced to his substantial procession, since many very absurd consequences follow for those who posit these twin processions—but also because the theologians unanimously assert that the Holy Spirit "proceeds," "is poured forth," "flows forth," and "is sent" from the Father when they wish to say that he proceeds from the Father. For the great Basil says: "Because that which proceeds from God does not proceed in time, even if his operation occurs in time, and he eternally possesses all things as the Spirit of God, and as streaming from him." And he adds: "For we were not going to have anything less for knowing that the Spirit is from God when hearing him called the Spirit of his mouth; rather, this name was sufficient to intimate his substance from God." He used "to be" in place of "to proceed." St. Maximus also says: "The Father sends the Spirit," that is, he has sent. And discussing his procession, as was established above when we demonstrated this by the authority of the holy Fathers, he shows that "to be sent" and "to be dispatched" among them are usually taken to mean "to be born" and "to proceed."

St. Cyril likewise says: "He proceeds from the Father and the Son; and it is certain that the divine essence is in itself, and proceeds from itself; and he is poured forth by the Son, just as also from God and the Father." Again, in his discourse to the monks, and in the Exposition of the Divine Symbol, he says thus: "The Spirit is poured forth, that is, proceeds, as from a fountain, from God and the Father." And again to Hermias: "Have you noticed, he says, that the Lord has called the Paraclete the Spirit of truth?" Finally he says: "Because he proceeds from the Father, showing properly all that belongs to the Father." And again in the same work: "Do you understand how he promises that he will send us the Spirit as his own, who proceeds from the Father?" And he calls him the Spirit of truth, yet he defines his being poured forth from the Father himself.

But also the great Athanasius, in the disputation he wrote against the Orthodox and the Macedonians, says: "The Holy Spirit is a nature incorruptible, as the Spirit of God, and from him streaming or proceeding." ^B Indeed, they have used the aforementioned words to signify the substance of the Son from the Father. For the great Basil in the third question says: "The Father is the source, and the Son is the best, but from the unbegotten light the eternal light shone forth, and from the true life the life-giving fountain proceeded, and from the very power of God the power shone forth." But he also used it in a word in a certain mystical prayer of sacrifice, speaking concerning the Son: "From whom the Holy Spirit has shone forth." And the same person again says in the same: "A common presumption for all Christians alike is that the begotten light is the Son, shining forth from the unbegotten light."

St. Cyril also, in one of his chapters on the eternity of the Son, speaks thus: "The Son was therefore coeternal to the Father, flowing as it were from a fountain of paternal substance." And in another: "For he who has proceeded from the paternal essence immediately shows the Father who had begotten him." And in another: "That which has proceeded from the Father's essence is the Word." And in another: "The Father produced the Son from himself inseparably and unconfusedly." And in another: "The whole being of the Son proceeds from the Father's essence." In another also: "For what passion is seen to occur in the sun when it begets light? What separation happens to fire, how does it emit brightness from itself? But if they beget these things inseparably, and emit them impassibly, which are from them; is it not much more worthy and excellent that the nature of their Creator should emit his own splendor?" We also sing in the hymns of the Confessor of the Spirit, that he likewise shone forth from the Father. And again: "You, O Mother of God, have been made unconfusedly his, who is from the immortal Father."

^C If, therefore, many absurdities follow those who posit two processions of the Holy Spirit, yet they have used the same words—by which they wished to signify the substance of the Son from the Father, and again the substantial procession of the Spirit from the Father—indiscriminately and without any determination in the Son and in the Spirit: how is it not necessary to understand, by that which is said, "to be poured forth," and "to inundate," and "to flow forth," that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed through the Son and from the Son, as intimating his substance from the Son, according to which he proceeds from the Father through the Son; especially since the blessed Cyril has most openly taught that "to be poured forth" means the same as "to proceed"?

For since the faith has handed down that two persons proceed from God, according, that is, to a twofold procession: one, indeed, according to birth; the other, however, according to procession: and the one is appropriate to the Son, the other to the Spirit, it is certain, since the Son is asserted by the theologians to proceed, inundate, and flow from the Father, that these things are to be understood as meaning "to be born" or "to be begotten." But when the Holy Spirit is said, whether from the Father or from the Son, to be poured forth, to proceed, and to flow forth: these are to be taken as meaning "to proceed"; while all these words intimate the procession of each from another, and are able to be adapted more peculiarly everywhere in this place to return fully the proper substance to each person: to the one, indeed, by the manner of being born; to the other, however, of proceeding; ^D since the one is continuously from the first, and the other is through that which is continuously from the first: obviously these are the boundaries of the substances for both.

But since the Holy Spirit is asserted by all doctors to proceed from the Son, it is indeed clear that this is either according to nature or according to accident. For it is the lot of creatures not to proceed from God naturally. If, therefore, the Spirit proceeds from the Son according to nature, this happens in two ways: either according to birth, or according to pro-

procession; for besides these, there is no other ^A significance in the divine persons according to their natural process; but according to birth, there can be no process in the Spirit, for thus the Spirit would be the Son of the Son: it is manifest, therefore, that the Spirit’s process from the Son, as existing from one who proceeds, and at the same time it is evident from these facts, that the Spirit is said to shed forth, to be poured forth, and to flow from the Son: that He Himself is the One Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father, not signifying some gift without substance, as some wish; for just as when the Son, or the Spirit, is said to shed forth and flow from the Father, the divine persons themselves are indicated as proceeding: so also when the Spirit is said to be poured forth from the Son and to shed forth, and especially when He is thus said to proceed from the Father through the Son, to be poured forth, and to proceed, the divine person of the Spirit Himself is signified. ^C For no one presumes to say the Spirit who proceeds from the Father is without substance, unless one wishes to blaspheme.

However, that which some say, that the saints declare the Holy Spirit indeed to proceed from the Father, but to be poured forth from the Son; and again, that He proceeds from the Father, but sheds forth from Him, or is His own, or is not alien, and such like things: by these connective conjunctions, as they remove the substantial process of the Spirit from the Son and attribute it solely to the Father, it is altogether weak. For their meaning is this: that while the Spirit is indeed said to proceed from the Father, whence according to essence He is peculiar to Him, nevertheless He is not alien to the Son, for He is called the Spirit of the Son, just as He is also peculiar to Him. Hence He is also poured forth by Him, just as from God and the Father, for He is the heir of the paternal goods, and is His own, inasmuch as He proceeds naturally through Him and exists from Him. Therefore, although He proceeds from the Father, one ought not to consider Him alien from the Son according to the manner we have mentioned above. For He proceeds through the Son. Moreover, that He is said to proceed is also attained through the Son. Otherwise, He would not be said to proceed from the Father.

The great Basil testifies to these things when he says: "I understand His property toward the Father, in that He proceeds from the Father; but toward the Son, in that he hears: ‘If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His.’" And that: "For we would not have had any less to understand by the Spirit being from God, than by hearing Him ‘the Spirit of His mouth’; but this name was sufficient to signify that His substance is from God." Furthermore, the Son is the mouth of the Father, as the Fathers will. But absolutely, that which pertains to the Holy Spirit toward the Father—to proceed from the Father, and to be called the Spirit of the Father—this is also held toward the Son, to receive from Him, and to hear, and the other things which commend that He is the Spirit of the Son. For indeed, that which is said to proceed from the Father, to receive from the Father ^D signifies this. Therefore, He is indeed said to proceed from the Father, but He proceeds through the Son. For that which is said to be from the Father, according to the opinion of the Fathers, follows also through the Son; for otherwise He would not be proceeding. Therefore, those conjunctions of this kind connect the Son more to the Father according to the process, or procession of the Holy Spirit, which they divide.

But for those who hasten to construct a difference of essence between the Father and the Son, it is to render these things separately and differently; for, by dividing them thus, a difference of essence will necessarily follow as well. Indeed, the theologian Gregory also, in his discourses on the divinity, in the liturgical part, invoking the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and subjoining that one is well-pleased, that another cooperates, and another inspires: he surely did not divide these to the persons by such conjunctions, whether it be good pleasure, or inspiration, or cooperation; for neither are each of these accommodated to each of the persons more properly than to the others: but rather, all belong to each, nay, to the whole Trinity, as one God inspires, and is well-pleased in what is good, and is the helper in whatever is initiated. And everywhere, such things are assigned to the persons as proper, and they agree without any variety; where the objection of relation is not opposed, just as the procession of the Spirit offers no obstacle to the relation of the Son to the Father, as will be shown more clearly in what follows.

But if they search for the term itself in the Son, which in Greek is called *ekporeuesthai*: first, it has been shown by many arguments above that other words also signify this same thing. Secondly, because such a term has also been used by the saints. But even the fact that He is said to proceed through the Son is, by the evidence of the Fathers, sufficient to commend that He also proceeds from the Son. Although to whom is it not sufficient that the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Son? Since the saints have said this in many places when they discussed the personal substances: and that the word, being substantial, can even better express the substance from someone, according, of course, to the term of the proper process.

Furthermore, it is established from the above that we say the Spirit remains in the Son, a point which some object to, though it in no way deters those who bring it forward from the Son. For those who say the Spirit is also from the Son, and confess that he remains in the Son, do so far sooner; for the saints also say he is in the Son, and add that he is through him and from him. And not only this, but that the Holy Spirit also remains in the Father and in the Son. Just as he remains in the Father and is also from him, so too, remaining in the Son, he is also from him. For surely no one will dare to blaspheme that the Spirit remains in the Son as he does in any of the saints, in whom he indeed rests and remains, but by grace, not by nature.

Moreover, it is necessary that what proceeds must have preexisted in the one from whom it proceeds. Nor indeed would it proceed otherwise from him. But in the divine persons, it exists simultaneously in him, through him, and from him, on account of eternity, and because there is no place for time there. Therefore, just as the Son, existing in the Father, is from him, and the Holy Spirit likewise, so by equal reasoning must one speak of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Son.

And it is indeed true what the divine Dionysius says, that the divine substances circulate into one another, but there is no confusion on that account, nor is the fixed order perverted; nor is it necessary, when we say the Son is in the Spirit, to confess that he is also from the Spirit, as Gregory of Nyssa says: "But the Son is indeed in the Father, just as the beauty of an image is in the primitive form in its own image." The same is to be said of the Son and the Spirit.

Since, therefore, it is established that the Holy Spirit is handed down from the Oriental Church teachers as being from the Son and proceeding from him, although many things have been omitted which could be brought forward to assert this very thing; now we are advised to attempt to establish the same also from the Doctors of the Western Church, so that there may be no excuse remaining for those who attempt to contradict. And first, indeed, it must be insinuated how great a reverence and authority universal synods have granted them and with what faith their words ought to be accepted.

The holy and universal fifth synod therefore says in its acts almost word for word: "We follow in all things the holy Fathers and doctors of the holy Church of God, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, Cyril, John of Constantinople, Leo, Proclus, and all that has been written by them concerning the right faith and for the condemnation of heretics, we receive." Indeed, those who do not receive the aforementioned doctors, nor confess all that has been written by them, are condemned by anathema in what is called the synodical letter. But especially Augustine, the holy universal synods, as is evident in their acts—namely the third, the sixth, and the seventh—have declared [him] a most eminent teacher of the Church and a holy man.

But also concerning the aforementioned holy Anastasius, patriarch of Antioch, the sixth synod says: "We receive the holy Anastasius, who answered with the right faith on behalf of the tome of the holy and venerable Pope Leo." And again: "The whole Orient calls this man of holy memory Anastasius, who was archbishop of Antioch, holy, and whoever does not receive him, let God anathematize him."

Therefore the holy Hilary, an ancient and venerable Father, and most famous for the power of his speech, his studies in philosophy, the sublimity of his theology, the purity of his life, and the manifestation of miracles, is such that the blessed Augustine says of him: "It is indeed a wonder if anyone, reading Hilary, does not marvel along with those who gathered at Nicaea." Fighting against Arius for the glory of the Only-Begotten, he says in the second book *De Trinitate*, which he wrote against Arius and Sabellius: "We believe the holy Trinity, that is, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, one omnipotent God, of one essence, of one substance, of one power, creator of all creatures; from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things. The Father is not from another; the Son [is] begotten from the Father, true God from true God, true light from true light, yet not two lights, but one light; the Holy Spirit proceeding equally from the Father and the Son, consubstantial and coeternal with the Father and the Son, the Father [is] full God in himself, the Son [is] full God begotten from the Father, the Holy Spirit [is] full, proceeding from the Father and the Son. We do not, however, say three gods, but one God."

The same [writer] in his *Commentary on the Apostle*, discussing the Father and the Son, says: "Nothing double is to be understood in the Holy Spirit, since the Father and the Son provided [it] for him. Whence both are called the one principle of the Holy Spirit."

The holy Jerome also, in a certain place in his works, says: "The Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is in all things coequal and coeternal with the Father and the Son."

The holy Ambrose, bishop of Milan, also says in his book *De Trinitate*: "The Spirit is not sent as if from a place, nor does he proceed from the Son as if from a place." The same [writer] in his second book *On the Holy Spirit* says: "That which is from something is either from essence, as when the Son is from the Father, or the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. But from power, as all things are from God."

The holy Augustine, however, in book IV *de Trinitate* says: "Nor can we say that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For it is not in vain that the same Spirit is called the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. Nor do I see what else he could have wished to signify when, breathing into the face of his disciples, he said: 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' For that corporeal breath, proceeding from a body with the sense of bodily touch, is not a substance."

It was, however, a demonstration, by a suitable sign, not only that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but also from the Son. For who would be so demented as to say that the Holy Spirit whom He gave by breathing was one, and another the one whom He sent after His ascension? For there is one Spirit—the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the Father, and the Spirit of the Son, the Holy Spirit, who works all things in all.

The same author in Book XV *De Trinitate*: And yet it is not without reason that in this Trinity the Word of God is called only the Son, nor is the gift of God called anything other than the Holy Spirit; nor is He from whom the Word is begotten, and from whom the Spirit principally proceeds, any other than God the Father. I have added "principally," however, because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But the Father gave this to Him too, not when He was already existing and not yet possessing it, but whatever He gave to the only-begotten Word, He gave by begetting Him. Thus, therefore, when He begat Him, it was so that from Him also the common gift would proceed, and the Holy Spirit would be the Spirit of both.

^B The same author in Book V *De Trinitate*: Just as the birth from the Father provides being to the Son without beginning of time and without mutability of nature, so too the procession from both provides being to the Holy Spirit without beginning of time and without mutability of nature.

The same author concerning John: That corporeal breathing was not the substance of the Holy Spirit, but a demonstration by a suitable sign that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son; for who would be so demented as to say that the Holy Spirit whom He gave by breathing was one, and another the one whom He sent after He was taken up?

The same author in the same book: I confess this faith through You, and from You, and in You, O blessed, and praised, and glorious Trinity, O true, and supreme, and eternal Unity, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, God and Lord, Paraclete, charity, grace, union, true light, true lumen from true lumen, true illumination, living life, life from the Living One, the vivification of the living, fountain, river, stream, the one from none, the one from the One, the one from both. From the One all things, all things through the One in the One. The Father from none, the Son from another, namely the Father; the Holy Spirit from both, that is, from the Father and the Son. True begetter, truth, begotten, the charity of both, the Holy Spirit. One Unity, equal majesty, equal glory, one and the same essence.

Also, Saint Leo the Pope, under whom the Council of Chalcedon was assembled, whose letters regarding the faith the universal synod calls a column of the right faith, says in the canonical sanctions against those who for the sake of money would impose a gift: "Grace, which is not given freely and is received, is not grace." But the Simonians do not receive it freely; therefore, they do not receive grace, which operates most of all in ecclesiastical orders. If, however, they do not receive it, they do not possess it, nor can they give it freely or for money to anyone. What, therefore, do they give? The spirit of deceit, naturally. How? We shall show this. For if the Spirit of truth, Truth Itself bearing witness, from whom He proceeds, is given freely; without doubt the spirit of deceit is discovered to be that which is not given freely.

Likewise, Saint Gregory, the Roman pontiff, in his homily on that passage of John: *When it was evening on that day, the first day of the week*, he says: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you: that is, I love you with that charity with which I send you among the scandals of persecutors," etc., which we noted above. The same author, when expounding that passage of the Song of Songs, namely: *The odor of your ointments, above all aromatics*, says: The ointment of the Lord was the Holy Spirit, of whom the Prophet said to Him: ^D *God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your companions.* With this oil, when He was incarnate, He was anointed: for He was not first made man and afterwards received the Holy Spirit, but when He was incarnate from the Holy Spirit, He was at once incarnate and anointed. For the odor of the ointments is the fragrance of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Him and remains in Him. The same author in II *Moralia*: The Holy Spirit never deserted the humanity of Christ, from whose Deity He proceeds.

The same author to a certain Peter, who was asking for a rule of right faith to be written out, divided it into forty chapters; of which each one contains wholesome dogma, and that which is necessary for the faith. He says, therefore, in chapter 8: "Hold most firmly, and doubt in no way, that the Holy Spirit Himself, who is the one Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeds from the Father and the Son." For the Son says: *When the Paraclete comes, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father*; in which place He showed that the Holy Spirit is His own. For He Himself is the Truth. And that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, both prophetic and apostolic doctrine commends to us. For Isaiah says concerning the Son: *He shall strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the Spirit of his lips he shall slay the wicked.* Concerning whom the Apostle also says: *Whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the Spirit of his mouth.* Whom also the only-begotten Son of God Himself, showing significantly that the Spirit of His mouth is [the Spirit], breathing upon His disciples after His resurrection, said: *Receive the Holy Spirit*, and John in the Apocalypse said that a twice-sharpened sword proceeds from the mouth of the Lord Jesus Himself. He Himself, therefore, is His Spirit, and He Himself is the sword proceeding from His mouth.

The same author in the book *De fide catholica*: Grant, he says, to me, in this way in which I walk with You as my guide, wisdom, and breathe into me, and teach me through Your grace, how it behooves me to believe in You immaculately, so that I may perceive You as God, one, eternal, and incomprehensibly three in persons, the Father unbegotten, the Son only-begotten from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from both and remaining.

These things, then, taken from Latin doctors, we have set down—a few out of numberless ones—through which to the Greeks

^A indeed we shall have honor; but those who disobey them, we shall deem heretics. But these things are plainly inept and most absurd. For that the blessed Augustine, in his pronouncements on the Holy Spirit, did not show even a trace of ambiguity, is evident from his own words: "For we cannot say," he says, "that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son." And those who think otherwise he calls most demented; and he says that this faith—in which it is contained that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son—is to be openly confessed before God, and he asserts that this is shown even by the very words of the Savior; and he adds that it is the prophetic and apostolic doctrine itself to commend that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

These things, however, are certainly not the words of one who is in doubt; and he admonishes Peter to hold most firmly, and in no way to doubt, concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. And at the end of the forty chapters which he wrote to him, as if concluding, he says: "Individual things that were said therein have such power for the faith, that he who would attempt to abolish even one of them, as if he were a manifest impious man and a common pestilence, should be execrated and avoided; and he says he is to be communicated with neither at meals nor in any other way, nor to be greeted, nor to be called under one’s roof." ^B It is certain, therefore, that what he had believed and written about the faith, he both exhorted all to believe and obey, and prayed that those things which were most healthful and true [should be maintained]. For Augustine would certainly have been delirious if, for uncertain matters, he had sought such great retribution.

Furthermore, if there are some who think that the blessed Augustine did not put forth that opinion concerning the Holy Spirit as an immovable dogma, and that he did not intend to persuade others of it as such, because he said in some place in his writings (36): "That one should believe and assent to the canonical Scriptures alone, that is, the divine utterances, instantly and without any hesitation; but to his own writings, to give not so much honor, but, if indeed they accord with the canonical Scriptures, to receive them; but if ever he should have strayed from the truth, not only not to refuse but even willingly to embrace correction and emendation"—whoever, therefore, bring forward such things, are compelled to cast even the Apostle Paul from the apostolic choir; nor will they admit that he knew the preaching of the truth.

Likewise, they are going to say that the blessed Dionysius fell away from the truth, having taken occasion from his words. For he says: "Since I am not worthy to be called an apostle, and I do not yet think I have attained [it]." And this man, at the end of his book *On the Divine Names*, sought pardon if in any way, even in part, he strayed from the truth. But if those things which were said by the highest men out of modesty and humility ought not to be taken against them as if they were testimony—much less is it right to bring forward against the blessed Augustine, as testimony, those things which were said by him most modestly, nay, even against the truth. For otherwise we shall overturn the greatest virtues of the saints, and we shall judge the Catholic doctors to have suffered shipwreck concerning the faith, and to have caused shipwreck for others; and we shall call them at once both saints and harmful, and ^C masters of heretics, as they always have in their mouths against the authority of the Fathers.

What, then, are they going to say about the remaining doctors? For they will not say that they are all ambiguous. But some assert that it is no wonder if he, and many other doctors with him, erred concerning the Holy Spirit: for they were men, and it is human to err. But these things are indeed the words of too wicked men, and of those who strive to destroy the doctors together. For what prevents them, by the same reasoning, from exploding them all equally? For they, too, were men, and as it were dwelling in the darkness of profound night. For if this were granted, we shall think that all men remain hesitant and dubious concerning the faith, and we shall use the judgment of none of these for the understanding of the holy Scriptures. Not even these who say such things will have wherewith to confirm their own positions, when all things are wavering. By which arguments they attempt to rebuke the masters they choose, by the same they themselves shall be rebuked. For they will not sit as judges of all; ^D while they are common masters of the Church, they themselves, however, possessing as though the treasures of wisdom and knowledge stored up within them, and boasting that they had been above human nature, will dare to say that the things they put forth alone obtain validity, are ratified, and are most firm. And, as it is given to understand, those who by the consensus of all, by wisdom, and by holiness

^A have been able to fall into error through the frailty of human condition, but that they alone could not be deceived by error, will this be thought peculiar?

But let these things, as being most full of pride and folly, be left to those whom it pleases to follow such fatuous and useless vanities; especially since it is not possible that the same men, in agreement with the whole world, should have deviated from the faith, without which it is impossible to please God, as the Apostle says. We, however, preserving the honor due to them from the universal councils, and regarding them as teachers and leaders, following Greeks and Latins alike: For in Christ Jesus there is neither Jew nor Greek, and whatever is said by anyone, if it truly holds the same force, weighing these things for ourselves and for each other, we see that they are greatly in accord regarding the Holy Spirit.

For some say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; others that He is from the Son, and has His being from Him, and naturally comes forth, deepens, shines forth, and flows from Him, and proceeds through the Son and from the Son; and if any such thing nearly approaching this understanding is said by them, although whatever might have been said by the masters more obscurely in this matter, it would have been of prudence not to interpret them away from manifest statements, lest by our action the holy doctors appear to be at odds with themselves and with each other: for we hold it for certain that the masters of the Church, having been taught by God, could never dissent among themselves by diverse doctrines: through whose mouth that one and divine Spirit, of whom the discourse is, has spoken.

Having posited these things, it is clear from those which we have noted that were said commonly and individually by the holy Fathers: that those same holy men who said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and proceeds from the Son, and is from Him, and has His being from Him, and naturally comes forth and flows from Him; and if there is anything of this kind, beyond what is necessarily concluded from the principles of the faith itself, they received the occasion from the very voices of the Savior; asserting that it is from the Father because the Savior said in the Gospels, Who proceeds from the Father. But that He is through the Son, and from the Son, because the Lord Himself now indeed calls Him the Spirit of truth, and now shows Him corporeally to the disciples. And now, indeed, He says to the disciples, Because He will receive of mine and will declare it to you. Now, however, to the Father: All mine are yours, and yours are mine. ^B

And from this, that the Spirit is indeed sent and given by the Father—and if there is anything of this kind—yet He is also said to be sent and given by the Son in the same place, and the Father does not send the Holy Spirit separately, and the Son separately; but because He is given and sent by the Father through the Son and from the Father and the Son, by one bestowing, one granting, one mission: just as, namely, by one procession He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and from the fact that the Son is a sharer in all the natural goods of the Father, and possesses the Father's goods as His own and particular; and from this, that He is not sent slavishly and by the office of a minister by the Son, inasmuch as He is the immutable image of the Father. These things, then, even if they are many, are indicated from what has been said. And one thing is apparent, that when the Lord breathed upon the disciples and said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit, He gave to them Him who naturally proceeds from the Father through the Son, and proceeds through Himself.

This, therefore, as it has been said by the masters of the Church, has been sufficiently declared above; but especially the great Basil, indicating his opinion on this matter, confirms the aforesaid. For in the fourth book against Eunomius, in one chapter which is entitled That the Spirit is of divine nature: The Spirit, he says, being joined to the living Word for creating, is a living virtue, and a divine, ineffable nature coming forth from an ineffable mouth, ineffably sent into man through the insufflation, and according to the form shown corporeally by Christ, again restored by Him through the insufflation. For it was fitting that the present renovation should concur with the ancient novelty, and He who breathed, being no other than He who had breathed from the beginning, expressed such a concurrence; but He Himself, through whom God gave the insufflation, then indeed with the soul, but now into the soul.

Great Athanasius also, in his epistle to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit, whose beginning is: I have read also now the letter written by your reverence, says: Finally, the Father sending the Spirit, He gave that Spirit to the disciples, breathing upon them. For all things that the Father has, are the Son's. ^C

Likewise the holy Cyril in the fourth book to Hermias, says: For at once, even the nature of man was advanced by the ineffable favors of the supreme Creator to substance, and was also composed in habit toward the Spirit. For He breathed into his face the breath of life, not otherwise, as I think, would the animal be adorned with this light of sanctification and the propriety of being able to possess God, if it had not been adorned by the participation of the Holy Spirit. And so, when man had become ruined, deserted and destitute of the ancient good, and of that which he had received from the beginning, finding the nature of man, He took care to transform it again into that, namely, sending it into him from the fountain, that is to say, in its own fullness, and saying: Receive the Holy Spirit, well signifying by the more evident insufflation through the flesh the nature of the Spirit.

Beyond these things, however, which have been said by the holy men, by which it is openly indicated that the Holy Spirit was given to the disciples through the insufflation: inasmuch as this great Basil said that the Spirit was joined to the Word for creating, whom he also called a living virtue and a divine nature having been restored to man by Christ through the insufflation; which he also called a corporeal form shown by Him; it is certainly manifest that when the One breathing said: Receive the Holy Spirit, He insinuated by this very thing Him who would proceed from the Father. For this is

^A what they have sensed, and may he who persists in that impiety until the end be anathema.

From these things it is shown at the same time that one ought not to confess many Holy Spirits in God, as some feign; since indeed the Apostle has said, "One Holy Spirit, in whom are all things"[Ephes. IV, 6]; and the great Basil to Amphilochius: "One God and Father, one only-begotten Son, and one Holy Spirit," and He Himself is enunciated in the singular, and is joined to the Father through the one Son, and through Him fills the venerable and most blessed Trinity. And again: "The way of divine knowledge is from one Spirit, through one Son, to one Father." Likewise Gregory the Theologian in his book to Heron the philosopher says: "You define our religion, teaching that one should know one God, the unbegotten Father; and one begotten Son; and one Spirit, truly proceeding or coming forth from the Father." ^B The aforementioned blessed Athanasius in the aforementioned book also teaches thus: "You will not find another to be called the Holy Spirit; for the Spirit, as I said, is called God, and holy God. Both names taken together are appropriate to Him who is properly called Holy Spirit: just as the title of Father is appropriate to the Cause, and of Son to Him who is from the Cause without any intermediary."

Therefore, although it is permissible to name many spirits—one indeed the spirit of adoption, another the spirit of love, another of wisdom, another of faith, another of the fear of God, another of counsel, and of fortitude, and of patience, and of continence; for Isaiah was accustomed to call the operations of the Spirit 'spirits', according to the theologian Gregory. For the Apostle says that one and the same Spirit works all things, which he also calls operations, saying: "And there are divisions of operations, but it is the same God who works all things in us"[I Cor. XII, 6].

Divine Chrysostom also, in his sermon on the Holy Spirit, the beginning of which is: "Yesterday, O lovers of Christ, the advent of the holy and venerable Spirit ^C was praised by us," says: "Because what is given is the Holy Spirit. He is also called the gift of the Spirit, having his name from the Giver; but when He is called Spirit, it is not permissible to understand anyone other than Him who properly and substantially proceeds from the Father." Just as the name of the Son and of the Father is appropriate to His substance, so the title of Holy Spirit corresponds to one person of the Trinity. For as it has been said, Spirit and holy, put together, are appropriate to Him who is properly called the Holy Spirit.

The great Athanasius also witnesses to these things in his Epistle to Serapion, the beginning of which is: "The letters of your holy love"; for he says: "Say, if you have read anywhere in the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is called simply 'Spirit' without the addition of 'of God', or 'of the Father', or 'my', or 'of Christ Himself' and 'of the Son', or 'from me', which is 'from God', or without the article after the manner of Greek speech: lest ^D 'spirit' be understood simply. For if it be said πνεῦμα, without a preceding article, it can be understood of any spirit. If, however, the article is added,…

^A such as τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, it signifies the Holy Spirit, or the Paraclete, or the Spirit of truth, that is, of the Son, He Himself saying: "I am the Truth," lest those who hear the word 'Spirit' spoken simply, or without a preceding article, or without a following addition, might think that the Holy Spirit is being spoken of. Therefore, when we have heard 'Holy Spirit,' or 'Spirit' with an article, it is not to be understood of just any spirit; but of Him who proceeds from the Father, the Spirit of truth, or however it may be uttered with some one of the aforementioned additions. Indeed, if anyone were to call the Holy Spirit a spiritual gift because it is given by the Spirit, then the gifts of the Son and of the Father would also be gifts of the Son and of the Father, and so nothing would prevent the multiplication of the Trinity. Nay, since the gift is common, and the gifts are common, nothing would prevent one from calling the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit by the same names. But these things are utterly absurd.

Since, therefore, the Savior said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," which signifies only the Paraclete, Chrysostom by no means contradicts Him, nor does he say that the Holy Spirit was not given at that time. From the fact that he agrees with the heavenly teacher and the saints, ^B honor is rendered to Chrysostom. For some think that he said a certain gift without substance was given to the apostles, because, expounding that saying, he says: "Some indeed say that He did not give the Spirit, but that by that insufflation He made them fit to receive the Spirit. Yet it would not be wrong for anyone to say that they then received a certain spiritual power and grace, so that they might forgive sins." Therefore he added: "Whose sins ye forgive, they are forgiven them," showing what species of operation he gives. But the saint does not contradict through this. For he does not set this forth as his own opinion, but as one cast in by others. For he says that "some" say that Christ did not give the Spirit. And then, correcting their opinion: "Yet it would not be wrong for anyone," he says, "to say that they then received some spiritual power and grace," as if he were to say: "To them, indeed, it does not seem that the apostles then received the Holy Spirit, and therefore did not receive His grace either, and that they were made capable only through that insufflation to receive the Holy Spirit." For it was consequential that those who denied that they then received the Holy Spirit would also take away the perception of grace, which it was impossible for anyone to obtain without the Spirit.

Then he brings in his own sentiment: "Yet it would not be wrong for anyone to say that they then received grace," as if correcting the judgment of those who denied that the Holy Spirit was given at that time; he shows more openly that it is his opinion that they then received the Holy Spirit. For when the grace of the Spirit is present, He Himself is understood to be present at the same time: and this is evident from the fact that the power ^C to absolve sins belongs to God alone, as the great Basil also shows in his fourth book *Against Eunomius*, saying: "If, therefore, it belongs to no one to forgive sins except to God alone; but the Holy Spirit forgives sins through the Apostles, therefore the Holy Spirit is God." At the same time it is also established that, if the Holy Spirit had not then been given, the Apostles would not have been able to forgive sins; because, however, they did forgive them, it is clear that they received the power of forgiving sins together with the Holy Spirit. For they would not have this, if He were not present. Therefore Chrysostom also used to say: "Nor would he be wrong who said that they then received spiritual grace, so that through it the Holy Spirit might dwell in them, whom some denied had been given to them then by Christ."

The same Saint, *On the Gospel of John*: "Why then," he says, "do I ask the Father?" Because, if He had said: "I will send," they would surely not have believed in the same way. For now He was chiefly acting so that He might be believed. The Apostles therefore then received Him whom Christ gives; but He gives whom He sends; whom, therefore, Christ sends, him the Apostles received. He sends, however, not a gift without substance, but the Spirit Himself. "For the Paraclete," He says, "whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father."

But to recommend also that Christ sends the Spirit, Chrysost. added: "For afterwards He says that He sends Himself, saying: Receive the Holy Spirit." Therefore, He who was then given by Christ, he says was sent both by Him and by the Father. Therefore, he is not contrary to himself or to other teachers of the Church in these things which he said.

Furthermore, to those who say: "If the Apostles received the Holy Spirit then, what need was there for Him to be sent at Pentecost?" it must be said that He was indeed given, but not in all His fullness, nor according to all His operation; not because He is Himself divided and split, but because of the weakness of those receiving Him, who could not then indeed grasp all His operation and efficiency. But afterwards, when they had progressed to more perfect things, then they became capable of all graces and celestial gifts. ^D

Wherefore also Chrysostom: "Nor will he be wrong," he says, "who said that they then received some spiritual grace, since the Spirit then judged them worthy only of that." For then He gave the apostles only the grace of the priesthood, which is proper for absolving and binding sins—not yet, however, the grace of doctrine and the word, for this He gave on the day of Pentecost through fiery tongues. But not even then was the whole abundance given to them. For they would not have arrived daily at greater and more perfect virtues and powers. But even after Pentecost, when Peter and John told the other apostles how many things they had suffered from the Jews because they had acted with confidence in the name of Christ: "A motion," he says, "being made, they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, so that..."

they spoke the word of God with confidence." For if they had possessed it fully at Pentecost, why were they filled with the Spirit at that time? It is clear, indeed, that they did possess him, but because they did not possess him perfectly, they were filled by him again. For the Spirit is given to us constantly and continuously, and he enters into us individually through his various gifts. ^B And it is written in the Acts of the Apostles: "The apostles laid their hands upon him who was being baptized, and the Holy Spirit descended upon them." For he is given in adoption to those who are baptized, and to those who take up spiritual leadership in the governance of the people, and he confers these things differently, according to the gifts, for the perfection of the Church. Therefore, that breathing is an indication of the true effusion of the Holy Spirit; and all the more so, because the grace in which he is given belongs to God alone. But the Holy Spirit is God, and that breathing is also a proof, through its express signification, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and exists from him.

From these things it is also clear that those who say it is nothing strange if the Spirit is given by the Son, seeing that he is given by any man whatever, provided he be a priest—and as he does not proceed from men when he is given by them, so neither does he proceed from the Son of God, even though he is given by him—are blaspheming irrationally and most dementedly. ^C First, indeed, because they imagine that the Holy Spirit has the same relationship to the Son as he has to men; second, because he cannot be given by just any men, as he is not given by the apostles: "For they laid their hands," he says, "upon the baptized people, and the Holy Spirit descended upon them."

In these matters, which have been said by the masters of the Church, the harmony between them is also to be noted. For just as the great Athanasius said in his Epistle to Serapion that the Holy Spirit is the gift of the Son, so also Augustine in the book *De Trinitate* called him the gift of the Son. Furthermore, because he is given by the Father and the Son, and because he proceeds from the Father through the Son, he added that he is the gift of both. And just as the former called the Holy Spirit the one life of the one living Word, so also Augustine in the book *De Fide* called him the living life and the life from the Living One. And just as Cyril said to Palladius that he is essentially from both, that is, from the Father through the Son, so also the latter said that he proceeds from both and endures in both; and that he exists from both, that is, from the Father and the Son. And just as Augustine called the Holy Spirit charity, so also Athanasius, writing to Serapion, says: "Finally, he was praying to the Trinity on behalf of the Corinthians, saying: 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God and the Father, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all.'" ^D For we have the grace of the Word as participants in the Spirit, and in the Father himself we have charity. It is clear, therefore, that he called the Holy Spirit [charity] in this place: for in this way the Trinity is suggested, in which he says the Apostle prayed to the Corinthians. Certainly, the blessed Theodore the Studite also speaks of the Holy Spirit as "Life, love, light. Charity also means the same thing."

But Augustine again called the Holy Spirit grace. Moreover, Saint Basil concurs with this in the mystical prayers of the holy sacrifice, speaking to the Father about the Son: "Who is the image of thy goodness, the seal, the form, showing the Father in himself, the living Word, the true God, from whom the Holy Spirit has shone forth, the gift of adoption, the pledge of future inheritance." The same man again, in his epistle to his brother Gregory concerning the difference of essence and substance, says: "Every good thing that reaches us from the divine power; we call the operation of the grace that works all things in all, as the Apostle says: 'But all these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to every one as he wills.'"

Furthermore, if we proceed to inquire whether the bestowal of good things, beginning from the Holy Spirit alone, comes to the worthy in such a way that we are again admonished by Scripture to believe that the cause and author of all good things, which are bestowed upon us through the Spirit, is the Only-begotten Jesus. For we have learned from the holy scriptures that all things were made through him and exist in him. In these texts, however, where he says that he works all things in all, he means the Holy Spirit. For one and the same Spirit works all things. And he adds: "All things are accomplished for us through the same Spirit." ^A It is to be noted, indeed, that by the meaning of that statement—that all things are made through the Son—he shows the Son to be the author and cause of the good things which are wrought in us through the Spirit; at the same time, those things which we said before concerning the order of the persons are, by the present statement also, strengthened, since—preceding—he says that all things, when they were not, were brought into being through the Son. For indeed, not even from this power is it without a beginning, but it is a certain power, existing without birth, without beginning; which is the cause of those things that are the cause of all, and which are wrought in us through the Spirit. For this reason that discourse had been instituted: but Augustine also in another place called the Holy Spirit the will. But truly, charity, and love, and will are worth the same. For what a person loves, that he also cherishes, and wills.

Those ancient masters of the Church among us concur with this. For these men—and the great Athanasius in particular, in those things which he wrote against Arius—by reasoning brought that absurdity upon those who were saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit were posterior to the Father: as if they were saying that God is without reason and will. And rightly so; for since God is intelligible and willing, according to common understandings about him and the sentiments of Scripture, and the perfection of rational beings is to have reason and will, and all perfection resides more principally and more perfectly in God: just as God, understanding himself, is himself intelligible to himself; for this is even to move himself by the contemplation of himself; and understanding himself, he also understands other things, as he says.

Dionysius the Eximious; and hence the person of the Word and of the Son arises. For what is definable is spoken of relatively to a definition: and he is himself the definition of the Father, and the Word; and as a definition is related to the defined, so the Son is related to the Father, according to the Theologian Gregory. But he is also consubstantial with Him. For there is no accident in God; thus he is also himself loving, willing, and beloved, as regards himself. For he is his own desirable object, and the highest good, and from himself he produces his own will, or charity, or love, which the masters of the Church assign relatively to the Holy Spirit. For they would not otherwise have been able to object to those who deny the Son and the Holy Spirit that they are compelled to confess God without reason and will, if they had not wished to call the Father the Mind, and the Son the Word, but the Holy Spirit the Will, relatively.

And since the love, or will, is as great as that which is loved, it is also equal to God, and commensurate. It is also consubstantial, since there is no accident in God. Thus, therefore, the Holy Spirit is also held, by confession, to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and coeternal. For God was never without the Word and without will. From which, and from the things aforesaid, it appears as one truth, namely, that the Son is from the Father without intermediary, as the word from the mind; but the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, as the will, and charity, and love, proceeds from the mind through the word, and from the Word. For it is impossible to will or to love except through the word, and with the word preceding. Wherefore it is also deservedly said to proceed from the Word.

Since, therefore, Augustine understands that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Word according to the process of the will or charity; for this reason, having said that he, at the dictation of Scripture, is the charity of the Father and the Son, he concludes that he proceeds also from the Father and the Son. With which conclusion he is also most consistent with the Greek doctors, as we have shown above. For they assert that he proceeds from the Father through the Son, and is from the Father and the Son: which, whoever denies, will confess either the Father without Word and will, or two Sons in the Holy Trinity, and that both can be from the Father without any intermediary.

But if anyone should inquire of Augustine whence he took the cause for calling the Holy Spirit the gift and love of the Father and the Son, his writings, fortified by the testimonies of the divine Scriptures (for without these he said nothing), will answer for him in his books *De Trinitate*, and at the same time for the great Athanasius, who said the same things. It is not, therefore, expedient, while they wish to deny the conclusions unreasonably, to deny also what has been said by the Holy Fathers—that they confess [the Spirit] as charity, or will, or something of this kind, for the Holy Spirit both commonly and individually; [for they thereby] impudently exalt themselves against the saints, and set them in opposition to one another. And this ^A profession of injury is something than which nothing could be more unworthy or more grave, whether toward them or toward God; and what is greater, by lying against them, they make themselves exiles from the truth of these [Fathers]: and then they think they are rendering them due honor. Nor indeed is it agreeable that they should not also necessarily confess the Holy Spirit to be from the Son, according to the very truthful theology of the Fathers: while they wish to deny that he is given or sent by the Son, presuming to call the Holy Spirit a grace without substance. For as it is written: *God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son for it* (John iii. 16); so also it must be confessed that the Holy Spirit is given and sent, as Scripture with the doctors proclaims, because he has loved us; recalling this, moreover, to mind, which we say praying daily: "Come, O benevolent Paraclete, and dwell in us"; and: "O Lord, who sent your Holy Spirit at the third hour to your apostles, do not take him away from us, O merciful one." But in truth he would never have been given by him at all, had he not also been from him. For otherwise the Son would be a minister. Therefore it is also said: *But from whom was he to be given, if not from him whose he is?* And that also consistently stands, that the Word would not have been given unless charity had preceded, according to which he loved us. And because the Holy Spirit is called charity, he gave him principally to us when he had loved us, especially because the Holy Spirit has been called will, because he both loves and wills himself. For whoever is made a friend to some one, gives his own good will to him first.

^C However, it is fitting to know that those things which are often said of God commonly and indiscriminately, are also said of him relatively and properly. And thus, therefore, God is called charity, as he is also called mind and word, commonly and absolutely; but in this place it is rendered relatively to the Spirit. For wisdom is also indeed called God commonly; according to which respect it is necessary to understand that this name is common to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as to one thing without distinction. For the essence of the three is one, as is one wisdom, and one goodness, and if anything else is both and is understood commonly and absolutely. Yet, nevertheless, wisdom is properly rendered to the Son, although it is one out of the number of three, and the same is the wisdom both that which is begotten and that which ^D begets; yet in another respect it is not the same, according to the opposition of begetting and being born, because neither is the Father the Son, nor is the Son the Father. Thus, indeed, the Spirit is also called Wisdom and Mind, but this is never said strictly relatively and according to the proper definition of process; similarly also God is called will commonly, because the very commandment and power of God is willing. And the Son of God himself is also called the will and counsel of the Father, according to a different respect, just as is wisdom; lest the Father be seen to be Father unwillingly—which some have objected to the faithful and pious. Truly, the Holy Spirit, according to

^A another mode, is called a will in a relative sense, according to the definition and property of His substantial process.

Furthermore, if one, according to the aforementioned reason, wishes to call the Father "charity," and the Son likewise, he will introduce from this an absurd multitude of persons, and will assert that they proceed in a manifold way. But Augustine indeed, who discourses most subtly about this, and especially in the books *De Trinitate*, to those who wish to read it, is clear that he calls the Holy Spirit one and the same charity of the Father and the Son, by which God loves Himself, and by which the Father and the Son love one another; which he also names the connection and union of the Father and the Son, and which he says there: "just as there is one Word, according to which God understands Himself." But we, with the holy Fathers, answering for these things, say that the order of the Holy Trinity must remain immovable, according to which neither the names, which appear from the substantial processes and modes, are commuted: nor are the persons either set before, or set after, or commuted at all; for just as there is one Father, and one Son, and neither is the Son the Father, nor is the Father the Son: so also one will, or charity, will be said to agree relatively with the Holy Spirit. And the same for the Father, nor the Son, nor the Mind, nor the Word, according to the personal order, will there ever be. And if there is one essence, and one charity, and one God, with the Father and the Son, according indeed to common and absolute names: just as the Paraclete is also called, and the Son, but it is properly rendered to the Holy Spirit, although I do not see why it is called so more because of the fact that He is called Spirit, or charity, or will, or something of this sort. Some think that such absurdities follow. But from the fact that the Spirit is called the same, it is not the same in the same way. By the same reasoning, indeed, could someone say that the Spirit also breathes another Spirit, and that one again another, and that this tends to infinity; likewise, that the Son indeed begets, and that he who is born from Him also begets another person, and that this, too, tends to infinity: but it is necessary ^B to preserve the order, and not to transgress its bounds, but to remain within the Trinity, according to the rule of faith handed down to us, lest we introduce a mob of gods. Therefore, it is the task of those who presume such things, who remove, confuse, and mix up everything, the order of persons and what is handed down and confessed about the Holy Trinity. But let the end of this second volume finally be here.

THIRD BOOK

And these things, indeed, are so. But in order that, repeating what was said in the previous books, we may give everything in one view: we have taught, in the first place, that the Holy Spirit is from the Father according to the personal order. Then, because of the substantial processes of the divine substances, namely of being born and of proceeding, that the Son is indeed from the Father without any medium; but that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Then, according to the aforementioned order, that the mediation of the Son is handed down in very many places by the holy doctors of the Church as a confessed fact: next, that all the examples which the holy Fathers used in the Holy Trinity insinuate the order handed down in the divine persons, according to the substantiality of their processes, together with the consubstantiality, according to the intention of those using them; then, that the Holy Spirit, since He proceeds from the Father through the Son, has substance through Him. That "per" and "ex," among the holy ones in divine matters, signify the same thing. Then, that the Son has a relation and habit toward the Spirit, and the Spirit likewise toward the Son, as is handed down by the holy ones. Then, just as the Father is understood before the Son by reason of cause; so also the Son is understood before the Spirit by the same reason of cause: that the Son is greater than the Spirit, according indeed to the personal order handed down by the theologians. Then, that the Holy Spirit has His being from the Son, as one who hears and receives from Him.

^C Then, in the eleventh place, to suffice for indicating that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, because He is, and is called, the Spirit of the Son. Then, that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Christ, for the same reason by which He is asserted to be the Spirit of the Son: that the Holy Spirit is handed down by theologians as the spirit of the mouth of the Son, and that both signify that He is from the Father and the Son, that is, He proceeds from the Father through the Son. That the Son is indeed called the Word of the Father, but the Holy Spirit is likewise called the Word of the Son, by reason of cause; that the Holy Spirit, moreover, is also insinuated by the supreme theologians to be from the Son; that the Son, because He is the immutable image of the Father, and essentially has all the Father’s goods, for the same reason as He is the true Son of the Father, has the Holy Spirit; by which the Father has Him: for otherwise that immutable would be taken away. That "to send" and "to be sent" signify cause and causality in the divine persons. That the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit; that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son, and His natural and living virtue, and essential operation: just as the Son is all these things of the Father. And that the Son is indeed the face of the Father by reason of cause; item, that the Son is the primitive form of the Spirit; and that the Son is the property of the Father, because He is from Him; but the Spirit is the property of the Son, as ^D proceeding from Him naturally and essentially, and receiving His being from Him, and existing from Him. The Latins and the Greeks

^A doctors commonly, and most openly, hand down by divine reasons that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and exists [from Him], and proceeds. Furthermore, all these things have been shown by many reasons; and since they are true and fortified by the firmest arguments on all sides, it is established truly that what is called "to produce" cannot be the substantial property of the Father. For the same Spirit cannot be, at the same time, third and second from the Father, nor can He proceed continuously and without a medium from the First, and through Him, who is continuously from the First: nor can He proceed from the Father alone, and [yet] proceed through the Son: nor can the producer be through the Word, and [yet] be the sole producer, and other things of this kind which have been stated earlier. For these are most evidently contradictory to themselves; and it is the same as if we were not to confess that He proceeds from the Father at all; especially since it has been declared by the saints that He would never be said to proceed from the Father, unless He proceeded also from the Son. For "proceeding from the Father also through the Son" is comprised as one, since the definition of proceeding is to proceed from the Father through the Son, according to which He is also distinguished from the Son, by a proper and differing process of His own.

Moreover, once what is asserted concerning the process through the Son is removed, that which is said about the process from the Father is also taken away; for with the definition of any substance and its substantial property removed, the very name of the ^B definition is taken away, and the substance which the name of the definition signifies is taken away along with it. But since the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Father, it will be asserted that He also proceeds through the Son. For so the holy Fathers explained the complex definition of the process of the Holy Spirit, and showed that the things said are true. And at the same time, it is as stated: that to produce cannot be the substantial property of the Father, and this, as it is established by what was said above, is also clear from these things which we now append; for since the true faith commends the unity and Trinity of the Lord, that certainly [pertains] to the essence, but this [pertains] to the persons, and beyond the properties by which the persons are distinguished according to the order of their processes: there is no other difference among the divine persons, and the divine substance alone remains: we must consider, according to the accepted principles of the faith, what is the property of the Father, and that specific property which primarily commends the person of the Father, and makes Him the Father, and according to which He is distinguished toward the persons coequal to Himself, the Son and the Spirit.

Since, therefore, three things are commonly said of the Father: that He is unbegotten; that He is Father; that He breathes or produces; "unbegotten," indeed, is that which signifies the cause; and although according to this the Father is separated from the Son and the Spirit, yet it does not commend ^C the person of the Father, and is merely a designation and notion of Him, already following [upon] the subsisting being, as a simple property. For property is twofold. For one kind is the property which commends the substantial species of each, and separates it from others: as, for example, for Paul to be an animal; but the other is [like] having been a teacher of the gentiles, or from the tribe of Benjamin, or a disciple of Gamaliel, or something of this sort; truly a property, yet not as an existing substantial thing; but, as a notion simply. Furthermore, this having something as a property has nothing according to negation. For the negation of a thing, which is the removal, and that of which it is not, is a positing. But negation is what is called "unbegotten," and follows upon the already subsisting being, for it signifies that it is not begotten, through which it is signified as being without a cause. Therefore, either the Father’s paternity is a substantial thing, and to beget is [substantial]; or else production and inspiration; and to produce, and to inspire; or both together, or else, beyond these, a third thing. And that third thing, indeed, no one has said heretofore; for if anyone should call [it] the cause, first of all its name would simply be "cause": just as for the Son, the name is "Son"; and for the Holy Spirit, "Holy Spirit": and it would have been necessary to name the cause for the Father, which is foreign to the custom of Holy Scripture, which, whenever it speaks of God, calls Him Father. ^D Furthermore, since "cause" is universal, and is a predicate of the Father, and of the producer, and of the creator: if, indeed, it were to be accepted only as a predicate, just as genera and species, and all things which are predicated universally in opposition to particulars, there is no thing outside the thinking mind, but it is purely in the mind alone: so there would be no substance of the Father, but only a mental notion; and [the Father] would be a subsistent from a non-subsistent, which is absurd. For the supersubstantial name of the Father signifies the thing [itself], says the divine Dionysius. But if "cause" signifies some substantial thing in the Father, if indeed it signifies something else besides paternity and production; and it is clear that these other things, namely, paternity and cause, are in the Father. Therefore, "cause" will signify some other thing besides the Father and the producer: and thus, there will be a composition in God of differing intelligible things, and at the same time, in God there will be something more perfect and something less perfect, and one will not be the other.

But if "cause" is the same as paternity and production, it is better to say, for the cause, that which is common, [namely] those things which are more properly substantial, paternity, to wit, or production, because the discourse is also about the more proper substantial things, and the doctors call paternity the property, since they also confess Him to be the first Father. That, therefore, this third thing is a substantial cause, is established from these things, but yet it is not right to speak of both together as the paternity. For either thus both would be substantial, as if they were separately two; and so the Father would, according to this reasoning, be two substances. For it is not possible to say that two substantial things are in anyone. Furthermore, this same thing, that there are not two substances, is almost the same as if some man were to have two souls. For they would not be called two men. For each substantial thing infused, which its own

^A properties, and likewise the substantial properties, be confessed to be of the divine persons. For this reason, our Lord, when handing down the mystery of the Trinity, commanded to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. By that which He said, "in the name," signifying one essence; but by that which He added following it, "of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," indicating the properties according to which the divine persons subsist, according to their substances, in their own proper modes of being, admitting no communion whatever. And since the rationale of paternity is generation according to essence, and producing the Son first and without any medium—for nature truly operates in the Father according to the property of the person in which it is—but the rationale of the begotten is to be from the Father without any medium; but the Spirit, or the one proceeding from the Father, is to be through the begotten; for this reason, placing the Father first in order, He added the Son, as one who is from the Father without any medium; but He added the Holy Spirit as the third, as one proceeding from the Father through the Son.

For in each being, its own, substantial, and constant and substantive species, according to which it first subsists, is its operation without medium, through which it operates other things also that have been ^B previously conceived. As for example, in man, since the rational substantial is his species, according to which this very thing—to be a man—is had, it is his primary immediate operation, through which he also operates other things which follow his constant species; for instance, the visible. The species of the sun also, being one, according to which the sun subsists, is the principle of the primary and immediate operation in the sun of shining, which has no other operation conceived before it in the sun. And by this operation of shining, which is conceived before all others and is in the sun without medium, it is able to illuminate, to warm, and to heat. And again, the human mind, since through intelligence it is the primary and immediate act for itself, through this previously conceived one, it also performs the following operation, namely, to will. For these are called operations, since even to understand, and to think, and to reflect, and to will, just as also to beget, is to operate something.

Therefore, because the person of the Father subsists according to the rationale of begetting, through this very "begetting" which is spoken of, the Father will also be the producer. Therefore, ^C indeed, it is congruously said that the producer is through the Word; and that the Spirit proceeds from the Father. We have received that not only this, but also that all things were made through the Son.

All these things aforementioned strengthen this; for they also commend the handed-down order—the Son being necessarily conceived in the mind before the Spirit—and that the Spirit is the third in personal order from the Father. And with the order of the persons toward one another, which is simultaneously declared by the processions, the identity of the essence is also strengthened, since the third is joined to the first through a medium, according to Gregory of Nyssa, by nature.

^A From which it is also permitted to wonder how they who wish the Holy Spirit to be from the Father alone, while indulging themselves too much, posit that the Father’s substantial production is a thing that could, with much labor, be demonstrated, and they take it as a granted premise; whereas the common understandings concerning the Trinity allow no such thing, nor do the Holy Scriptures have it, nor has any one of the holy Fathers said it, but rather they have turned away from such an understanding. Yet, since it is not conceded by those debating, they themselves, nevertheless, as if for a granted premise, posit that which is sought beyond all reason, and think that they are concluding something; and they aggregate many inept things against those who confess that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and through the Son. But if it is necessary that there be only three substantial properties of the three persons, lest many absurd and unworthy things follow, and if we understand the mode of subsistence and the difference of the substances only through the properties of paternity, and of nativity, and of procession, according to the tradition of the holy Fathers, it is clear that, besides the aforesaid properties, there is no other substantial ^B property belonging to any of the three persons in the holy Trinity; and it is false, what they posit as granted, and all things are false which they think they conclude or prove once this is posited: these are external and rotten things, which they write in very long treatises against the Latins, or rather against the holy Fathers, through which they conclude nothing at all, but always revolve around their own beginning principles.

It is also concluded from these things that have been said, that among those things which are spoken of in God, some signify no distinction at all; but are spoken of the whole divinity indistinctly: whether they are absolute, as if someone should say in themselves, such as wise, good, life, truth, essence: or whether they are spoken of by way of the excess of negation, as invisible, incomprehensible, supersubstantial: or whether they indicate a relation to the creature, as creator, king, omnipotent. Others, however, are proper in the Trinity.

And some of the proper things are common to two, ^C but are proper to the other. For there is also a certain such property, directed to some other thing, and which is called a property directed to something, yet it is not a property in a way that signifies that thing itself, as if to denote this specific thing; as for example, to be a biped is a property of man ^D relative to a horse, and to be a dog is a property. Therefore, those things which are properties common to two divine persons, are nonetheless properties relative to the remainder: as "causal," which is a property of the Son and of the Holy Spirit relative to the Father: but "to send," or "to give," or "to cause to emanate" the Holy Spirit, is common to the Father and the Son relative to the Spirit: and similarly, the fact that they are, and are called, the Holy Spirit. For that Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; but those [the Father and Son] are not called of him, neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Spirit of himself. Concerning these, "causal" is common in name only, but not in reality. For it is a predicate stated only of both; therefore, they are not called one, but two causes; for if

even it were causal, both would be one causal. ^A Yet it is evident that no person is indicated through those [terms]; for only the substantial ones have this power, and those things which communicate in one substantial [property], if indeed it were possible, it would be necessary that there be also one person; but other things, by no means: therefore, by those three properties alone are the divine persons both distinguished and commended; by others, they are known only. For this reason, Damascene defined the difference of the substances as being understood in these three properties alone, as if they were commending the persons, not merely signifying [them]—as that [term] is of the Unbegotten, which is the acknowledgment of the Father, but it does not commend Him personally; for besides the three aforementioned substantial differences, by other [terms] as mere notions the divine persons are distinguished, yet not as causes of distinction, but only as signs of distinction.

To send and to emanate, and others of this kind, are one thing in the Father and in the Son—as both are senders and emanators, there is one who sends, and one font. For it has been shown that the Father and the Son are the font of the Holy Spirit, and that the Son has all things of the Father in the same manner, except that He is the Father. And the Father sending the Spirit, the Son also sends Him by one giving and one bestowing, as the great Basil says. These things, therefore, are proper to the two persons toward the relative [other]. But others belong to one only. And of these, one thing is of the substantial [nature] of the person, such as paternity, nativity, and procession. Another thing, however, follows the person who is already subsistent, but does not establish it; such as "unbegotten" in the Father, or also "producing" in Him alone, according to those who say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Neither, therefore, are the things which are predicated commonly the substantials of the whole deity; for no substance is insinuated through them; nor [are those which] are proper to two toward one; for there is no person who is properly "causal," nor is there one who sends the Holy Spirit. For the Father and the Son together are one, who sends the Holy Spirit. For common terms, which indicate a thing, are indeed said individually in divine matters, yet one person is not understood according to that [term]. ^B Nor [does] that which is of one person only, yet follows the person, such as "unbegotten" in the Father: for this in no way constitutes [it], since it is a negation, and follows the substance which the affirmation insinuates. And otherwise, if "not to be begotten" is said to be "unbegotten," this will be common also to the Holy Spirit. For He too is unbegotten; for He is not begotten; for the substantials of the persons do not admit any fellowship of the others at all; but neither has it been demonstrated that "to produce" is a substantial [property]: but that it follows paternity, and is merely significant of the paternal substance.

^C So therefore must these three properties—and only these—be declared to be substantial to the divine persons. The paternity of the Father, and the begetting itself, that is, the giving of Himself to another person according to the process of nativity. The nativity of the Son, and being born itself, that is, to receive the Father in Himself according to the procession of being born. And the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the proceeding itself, that is, to receive the Father and the Son in Himself, according to the natural and essential procession from the Father through the Son. And these are to be called not only substantial, but also properly, and mostly, and most peculiarly personal, insofar as they commend the persons.

From which it is evident that if any of the holy Fathers rendered "unbegotten" to the Father, he attributed it not as a substantial [property], but as an acknowledgment and simply as a proper [sign]. If, however, anyone called the Father "genitor" and "producer," as Gregory the Theologian in the first sermon on the Son, he separated the name of "genitor" as substantial to the Father. For it is equal to say the Father and the genitor: since paternity and nativity are worth the same amount. But the name of "producer," as following the paternal substance already subsistent, he added to the substantial property of paternity. ^D And again, if anyone called the Father "principle," he certainly did not signify His substantial proper [property], but wished to indicate His substance. For He is from none; but the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all things of the Son and Holy Spirit are referred back to Him. For even those who said that the Father is greater than the Son by reason of cause, did not render that as a greater substantial [property], but as a notion of the Father toward the Son; similarly, one must philosophize concerning that which is said to be "without principle."

That, therefore, the habits of the divine persons toward each other appear with the difference of their substance, according to the divine and hidden processes, and that at once with that very habit of relation, cause and causal are introduced simultaneously, it has been established previously by many reasons. But now it must be said how, according to cause and causal alone, and according to these first, the divine persons are distinguished, and are themselves the causes of distinction; which cause and causal commend the substantial properties, the very supersubstantial name of the Father, and the reality of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Having presupposed, therefore, that the unity in Trinity and the Trinity in unity is to be worshiped, according to the position of the faith, and not departing from those things which have been said by the saints, [we follow] Damascene indeed, understanding the difference in the divine persons according to cause and causal; but [we follow] Gregory of Nyssa saying: Considering the immutable [nature] of His nature, the diffe-

difference regarding cause and causal, we do not deny; only in this do we perceive that one is distinguished from the other. What we have proposed, we shall hold; for since those three are one in essence, it is not possible that they should all be without a cause; and it is far more impossible that they should have a cause more ancient than themselves; it remains that one of these three is the cause of the others. Therefore, it is not possible that the processings from it should be the same in respect of the person producing; for it is not possible for anything to produce itself, or to be the cause of itself. ^A Thus, the processings must be distinguished personally; united indeed according to essence, for no discretion is admitted therein; but distinct, according to substances, or persons; and neither on account of union are the persons confused, nor on account of discretion is the essence divided. For there is perfect, yea, supreme union and discretion there. And union, as has been said, makes the unity of essence; but the faith confesses discretion according to cause and causal. And this is that which, in itself and not for the sake of something else, most greatly both unites and distinguishes. Discretion, namely, according to cause and causal. For we can think of discretion as being neither more free from confusion, nor can we think of a greater communion of two things, than when one has its existence from the other. For according to cause and causal, something is found according to an equivocal cause, producing what is like itself in the same species: and according to that in which cause and causal are ^B opposite, they will have relationship to one another. Therefore they will also necessarily be distinguished: but according to that in which the causal, being from the cause, receives its essence, they will communicate with one another, especially since they have a property by nature toward one another. Therefore the faith and religion deliver for us that the Son is born of the Father. And since, according to that which is called begetting and being born, the opposition of cause and causal is seen according to those things which are said relative to something, in respect of the fact that the one gives, and the other, proceeding thence, receives its essence, two persons are necessarily understood of the same nature. Again, since Scripture says that God proceeds from God; according to the same reason, the opposition according to cause and causal is also understood here, according to which opposition it is permitted for them both to be distinguished from one another and to be united. Thus, therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they are from the Father, are both united and distinct. Furthermore, because on account of the order and confession of the Trinity, it does not befit these to be both distinct and united in relation to the Father more than the Son and the Holy Spirit are in relation to one another; for otherwise there would be inequality in the Trinity, nor would they be distinguished from one another. But if they were not distinguished, there would be one person only; for the relation according to cause and causal being removed, only the essence remains. It is evident that the Son and the Holy Spirit are both united and distinct in relation to one another, just as ^C the Son and the Spirit are united to the Father, and are distinguished according to the species of opposition of cause and causal.

It is necessary, therefore, if they are to be distinguished, that either the Son should be the cause of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of the Son. But that the Spirit should be the cause of the Son cannot be maintained; because He is delivered as the third from the Father, according to personal order, because the Spirit is the natural and essential operation and virtue of the Son; because He is said to be His image; because the Spirit of the Son is delivered by theology: who is certainly not said to be the Son of the Holy Spirit. For they are not converted, on account of the personal order, and especially because the Spirit is delivered as being from the Father through the Son, but not conversely. Moreover, that which has been granted, namely, that the Son is from the Father without a medium, would be taken away: for thus the Son would be from the Father through the Spirit, and consequently the Spirit would be the Father, communicating to Him according to the ratio of fatherhood.

It remains, therefore, that the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, and that the Spirit is through Him, and from Him. By this reasoning, therefore, they are both united to each other and distinguished, which even Nyssen indicated, saying that the divine persons are distinguished from one another only in the difference according to cause and causal. For he did not say these things of the Father alone toward the Son and the Holy Spirit; for thus he would have delivered the discretion of the Father alone relative to those things which are from Him, nor would he have added: We understand another difference, again, of that which is from a cause. But these things are consonant with what we have said above. For it is necessary that the Son should be understood before the Holy Spirit; and that the Son and the Spirit have a habit toward one another, and that the Son be called greater than the Spirit by reason of cause; and to have existence from the Son, as one who receives from Him, and what other things have been said. ^D Si quis autem objiciat, Nyssenum aliam profitentem differentiam aperte videri velle non ejusmodi et hic in Filio, et Spiritu, qualem secundum causam, et causale reddidit: scire convenit, illam aliam secundum numerum, non secundum discretionis speciem causæ et causalis dicere; ut discerneantur quidem scilicet, non tamen secundum causam, et causale: secundum modum vero alterum cum discernantur, puta, sicut contraria discernuntur ad invicem, vel quæ secundum negationem et affirmationem sunt, vel quæ secundum privationem et habitum; vel secundum aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Constat autem et quia aliam, non alteram dixit. Alius enim quod dicitur, in his quæ sub eadem specie sunt et adducuntur, Græcæ locutionis usus proferre consuevit; altera vero et alteritas, in his quæ vel specie, vel genere differunt, dicitur; nisi forte abusive dicatur; quod profecto abusive nunquam Ecclesia magister in divinis posuisset; verum, etsi specie eamdem, in quantum sub eandem speciem adducitur, causæ et causalis scilicet; quia tamen etiam, quod sine medio ex aliquo, vel quod per aliquod prodit, causale causæ est, per

^A aequivocal process, since the Son's nativity is immediate, while the Spirit's procession through the Son is mediate, and since he [the Author] has rendered the [relation of] cause and caused to both, and the Word, by implying that it is from a cause, while also subdividing them from one another according to cause and caused, has distinguished that which is continuously from the first, and another thing by that which is continuously from the first. For we perceive that the divine persons are distinguished solely in cause and caused. And since "Father," as it is called, indicates the begetter, the Son indicates the begotten, and the Holy Spirit the proceeding or inspired one, therefore the names of the cause and the caused—or of the principle and of those things which are from the principle—are the names of the holy and supersubstantial Trinity: namely of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And because paternity, nativity, and procession are the only substantial properties of the persons—and properties are the same thing as the substances, as has been shown according to the theologian Gregory—substance or person signifies the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For the Damascene thus defined it, saying: "Deity indicates nature; but 'Father,' as it is called, indicates substance, because even substance is common with [the] proper." ^B It is evident that these names introduce a personal distinction and necessarily signify things that are distinct. Wherefore these alone are properly personal and substantial, which signify the habit of the cause and the caused, and each is rendered properly to each, with no notion of community introduced; and they suffice of themselves to commend the reason for the distinction. For the name and thing of the Father, being above substance, indicates the cause of the Son, and likewise those of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Of these, the Son is indeed said to have a habit toward the Father, but the Holy Spirit is handed down as having the reason of the caused toward the producer or spirator, especially since He has been called the breath of the Almighty; and the Holy Spirit is the breath of the Son, and the breath is of the spirator; and the Spirit is named from spirating. And as the great Athanasius says, the procession of the Spirit is likened to a breath. But the procession of the Spirit is a process: ^C consequently, so is an inspiration. For the Spirit is also called proceeding precisely because of the process according to which He proceeds from the Father through the Son. Therefore, it is clear that the substantial properties—paternity, nativity, and procession—signify the divine persons according to cause and caused; and that is why they are called substantial and proper in themselves, and why the difference of the divine persons is understood solely by these properties. And it is also evident that properties subsisting according to cause and caused impress the thought of process upon the mind, and again the process of the cause and the caused, and at the same time imply their distinction. For these things are gathered together through one another.

^D Gregory of Nyssa indeed says, discerning this: "For it is one thing effectively from the first; another through that which is effectively from the first; for, as we have also said before, cause and caused commend a process of this kind; for if there were no process in the divine, there would certainly be neither distinction nor a number of persons; but the number of persons is distinguished according to cause and caused in the divine persons." At the same time, it is evident that it is not possible for the divine persons to be distinguished even according to opposites; for opposites commend differing species, as white and black, and rational and irrational, and body and incorporeal. But God is one species, whatever it may be—if one may say so—and the essence and unity of the three is one. Nor indeed according to privation and habit; for those that have [these] imperfectly are distinguished according to this opposition, as blindness [is distinguished] from sight, and the seeing from the blind. But there is no privation of the supreme good in God; for He is most perfect, and each of the substances is perfect; and God is wholly true from the whole, and perfect according to the positions of the faith, but neither [are they distinguished] as affirmation and negation. For, according to this opposition, those things which are are distinguished from those which are not, as truth from falsehood. Furthermore, there is no place for non-being in God. For God is a supersubstantial essence, and a virtue higher and more excellent than every virtue, and an immutable truth. For God cannot deny Himself, as Paul says. Moreover, it is not a negation that is simply an affirmation. But one person is simply what the other is; they are indeed two according to relations, but simply one. For according to essence and being, they are a unity: "For I and the Father," He says, "are one": and negation indeed follows those things which are other than the indivisible; for it is a sign of distinction, but it does not make the distinction. For man and any other animal whatsoever are distinguished by reason and the privation of reason; since the irrational is taken as a species in divisions. But it is not because he is a man, and is not a man. For it is not the same to be a man as [it is] not to be a man. Since, however, in those things which are relative, which are considered in essence ^D according to cause and caused, there is found something producing a likeness to itself, in the same species, according to a univocal cause—but God is one in essence; three in substantial properties according to cause and caused—the opposition according to cause and caused, in those things which are called relative, has a place in the holy Trinity. Therefore, it has been handed down that the divine persons are distinguished solely according to cause and caused, both by Holy Scripture and by the holy Fathers. For the distinction handed down of the Father to the Son is that of cause and caused; likewise of the produced and the producer. But it is evident from the premises, because [there are those that are] unbegotten, [those that are] begotten...

nor is it properly distinguished from the Son by the reason of birth and non-birth. ^A For these are, as it were, a contradiction opposed to one another. It has been said, however, that affirmation and negation cannot distinguish anything by themselves, but follow things that are already distinguished by other means, since they are signs of distinction; just as what is called "unbegotten" follows the already subsistent Father by an affirmative, that is, a substantial property, namely paternity. Therefore, "unbegotten" and "begotten" do not create the distinction between the Father and the Son, but signify that they, already subsistent and distinguished by their substantial properties according to cause and what is caused, are distinguished by paternity and sonship. Similarly, the same must be said of birth and non-birth.

It is clear from these things that those who say it is necessary for there to be a Father and a Son first, and then another who begets, are far from a proper confession of the holy Trinity. For there is no other difference of distinction there, beyond that which appears from the processions according to cause and that which is caused. For this very fact, that one is the cause and another is that which is caused—that is, one is the Father and another is the Son—signifies both the persons and their distinction at the same time. Therefore, if there were no procession, as has been said, there would surely be no number of persons, and consequently no Trinity either.

^B Others also, without the processions which are according to cause and that which is caused, posit that there are three in God: and thus nothing will prevent them, since they are three, from confessing in God—according to themselves, without relation to one another—that which, because it removes the unity of essence, is an Arian proposition.

Therefore, not only is it not proper for there to be a Father first and then a begetter, but it is not even fitting to think of it that way. For if the act of begetting itself signifies the person of the Father, how will he be the Father once that very begetting is removed? For either he will not be the Father, if it is permissible to say so, or there will certainly be confusion, or there will be some third thing, absolute and in itself, divided from the essence of the Son and the Spirit. The same must also be said concerning the Holy Spirit. But these are truly the phantasies of men who posit that the Holy Trinity has within itself, as it were, three men, and who indignantly apply to it things that happen in matter, and feel that it contributes nothing to things that are incorporeal. ^D Furthermore, this opinion is held about our God in a most unworthy and insane manner.

Moreover, the great Dionysius called the name and reality of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit "supersubstantial," while no conversion or communion of any kind is introduced among them. Basil likewise, in his letter to his brother Gregory concerning the difference of essence and substance, says: "Wherefore, in the communion of essence, we say that the notions which are observed in the holy Trinity admit of no accident or consortium, through which the property of the persons, which are handed down in the faith, is commended, since each is understood distinctly by its own proper notions."

142 Quoniam igitur Since he said that those things by which the property of each of the persons is commended, and by which each of them is accepted distinctly, do not admit of accident or consortium, he is properly discussing their own, substantial notions, taken in themselves. Therefore it is impossible for the property of another to be contemplated in the same person. For no communion or conversion is introduced among them. This also happens according to a certain opposition, by which that which is one thing is not what another is, according to the reason of opposition, according to which they are not convertible with one another.

Since, therefore, the divine persons are distinguished only in the cause and that which is caused, and this has been stated universally and clearly, and, moreover, by the dictates of nature itself—for the Trinity could not exist without order, especially since it is held as confessed that the third proceeds naturally from the first through the middle—it is nonetheless possible for there to be three without procession and order. And since faith in the persons also points to distinction, it is clear ^A that if the Son and the Spirit are to be distinguished from one another, they must necessarily be distinguished by no other distinction than that of cause and that which is caused, the kind that we detect in the same genus, and also in the Father in relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit: the former by the reason of generation, the latter by that of procession, according to which neither is the Son the Spirit, nor is the Spirit the Son; just as the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, nor is the Father the Holy Spirit; nor is the Spirit the Father, on account of the necessary opposition of cause and that which is caused, with no conversion or communion slipping into them. For if it is not appropriate to understand any communion by converting [them] according to distinction, it is necessary to accept the two substances simultaneously by word alone, and to preserve their dignity by conversion; for "to be converted" is spoken of in two things; nor is it fitting to look at the Father and the Son in the way they relate to each other, but not [look] at the Son and the Spirit. For thus the dignity of conversion would not be rendered commonly to the persons.

Since, however, it is necessary to render it commonly, but distinction is also necessary, unless someone says that the Spirit is distinguished from the Son according to cause and that which is caused, he will render neither conversion nor distinction to them, and the supersubstantial name and reality of the Son will perish for him, since he is distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit; for no conversion, but only communion, would enter in; and thus the Son and the Spirit would be one person, not distinguished from one another, but this is absurd. For the Trinity would not be God, and confusion of the persons would follow; and whatever else is of this kind. Therefore the Son is distinguished from the Spirit by the reason of cause and that which is caused. But if this is so, he is also from the Son. For the fact that the Son is from the Spirit is prohibited by the fact that he is through the Son. Truly, however, the Spirit would not be the Spirit if his property, which is according to the reason of procession, were moved: for how would he be substance, if his substantial property were moved?

^A And it likewise appears, according to the reason of conversion, that the intention of the great Dionysius—who, some assert, seems to distinguish the Father from the Son and the Holy Spirit by the principal deity—is otherwise. For if conversion is considered in two terms, and it has been said that divine persons are thus distinguished from one another so that no conversion may creep in, then the reason of conversion is preserved no otherwise than if the two persons are considered together. Therefore, by comparing the Father to the Son alone through the principal deity, he distinguishes him from the Son. For if the Father and the Son are regarded so as to have relation to one another: the Father is indeed the fountain of the Son, whereas the Son is not the fountain of the Father, just as the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father. For the Son is from the Father, yet the Father is not from the Son: especially since divine generation likewise has a habit by begetting toward that which is begotten, but not toward that which proceeds. And this is also indicated by what follows, when he says the Son is not the Father, and the Father is not the Son; which indeed indicates that that supersubstantial divine generation is not converted, namely, Father and Son. And because the dignity of conversion, as the cause of distinction, must necessarily be rendered commonly to the persons; by that same reason of conversion we can say that the Father is not the Spirit, nor the Spirit the Father: since the former is the fountain and root of the Son, and the Spirit. For the things of the Son and of the Spirit are referred to him. But the Spirit is not the cause of the Father. Similar things must be said of the Son and of the Spirit. For neither the Son is the Spirit, nor is the Spirit the Son. For, says Nyssenus, these consequences of relation do convert. But this happens according to some opposition, and that is what is rendered by the reason of cause and causal, according to which it has been said that one thing is continuously from the first, and another is through that which is continuously from the first.

Furthermore, the Son has been called the fountain of the Holy Spirit by the holy Fathers: and not only this, but it is even asserted that the Son alone is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, as will be shown in what follows; which is even more than is required for what we have proposed. And certainly it is not possible, according to the one whom some introduce, for the Son to be the fountain of the Holy Spirit, according to the ^B process of the Holy Spirit. For it was shown above that many absurdities necessarily follow those who posit such things. Therefore, the intention of the holy man is not made clear from the reason of conversion alone; but also from the fact that he calls the Father the supersubstantial divine generation. For divine generation, just as it is suited to the Father as begetter, is referred to the Son who is being born. Moreover, if anyone should try to refer that to the Spirit as well; first of all, he would be compelled to say that the Spirit is also the Son. For divine generation, as we have said, suits the begetter, and the begetter is referred to the Son. Then, even if the Spirit is distinguished from the Father by the reason of divine generation; he is indeed distinguished according to his own substantial property, but only as he is from the Father; and thus he shall be distinguished from the Father as a result of a cause, yet not according to his own property. But he will have the same relation to the Father, which the Son also has. And thus, there will not be that proper distinction of persons which we seek, according to which no community is introduced, and which the great Basil wished to say does not admit of any accident or partnership.

But neither did he hand down to us the distinction of the Son and the Spirit, as some explain that statement. And surely, when he had promised that he would hand down the all-encompassing distinction of the divine persons, he also added: Thus we strive both to unite the divine to the Word, and to distinguish it, just as the divine itself is both united and distinct. Therefore, according to the reason of conversion, and by that which he added—the perfect mode of distinction, when joined, as has been said—he handed down the mode; namely, the cause and the causal, according to which it is shown by other divine doctors in their reasonings that he proceeds from the Father through the Son.

Furthermore, because all things that are said in God are rendered to the persons commonly and incommutably, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, but it is said that God is from God: one must consider whether this does not suit all persons, through some opposition. Since therefore "God from God," which is said, designates a process from something: but the Father does not proceed from anything; for he is not a causal agent; yet he is God, but not "from God," otherwise indeed he would not be without beginning: having a principle preceded in thought, just as the Son—nor would he be called the root and fountain of the Son, and of the Spirit. But the Son, while being God, is said to be from God the Father; and the Holy Spirit, while being God, is preached as being from the same God the Father; and the profession of faith and the opinion of the Church also attest to this: thus, since "God from God," which is said, befits the Son and the Holy Spirit; and hence they are distinguished from the Father by the reason of cause and causal, with the different processes of substance being understood, whereas the Son is God, and item, the Holy Spirit is God: it is necessary, if we wish to keep the principles of the faith inviolate, that either the Son be God from God the Spirit, or the Spirit be God from God the Son; for it does not befit saying "God from God" any more to the Father than to one another.

For the opposition of relation does not forbid this. For indeed paternity is opposed to nativity, just as "to beget," which is said, is opposed to that which is "to be born," and "to produce" to that which is "to be produced." But to be born and to proceed are not opposed to one another. For if they are opposed and distinguished, then also "to beget" and "to produce" will be opposed to one another. And thus the Father will be two persons, and a composite substance—especially according to those who, as has been said, posit that to produce is substantial. Therefore, either two substances

^A of like kind must be acknowledged, which results in two Deities, and the simplicity of the essence is destroyed; or, if there is one essence, the Father and Son, or the Son and Spirit, will be one person, and thus the names and the differences of the persons will be rendered void. For if the essence is one, and there is no distinction of relationship, how can there be Father and Son, or Source and Procession? But if one denies that the Son ^B is God from God, or the Spirit God from God, he must then be forced to acknowledge that the Son and Spirit are either different gods, or that the Trinity is one person. But the Church knows that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct in number and substance, but one in essence and divinity, because the Godhead is not divided. Nor is that which is said to be from another thereby rendered separate from the one of whom it is; nor is it ^C an effect, for the Godhead is not composed of parts. Therefore, the Spirit is correctly said to be from the Father and from the Son, not as from two sources, but from one, because the Father and the Son are one. And since the Spirit is of the same essence, he is entirely of the essence of the Father and of the Son, yet he is distinguished by his own proper mode of procession, just as the Son is by His generation. Thus, the distinction remains, and the unity is preserved. ^D Therefore, the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, as the masters of the Church have declared, in order that the order of the persons may be kept, and the unique causal relationship—which does not imply a difference of essence—may be maintained. For since God is entirely in the Father, entirely in the Son, and entirely in the Holy Spirit, they are one God, not three gods. And because God is by nature unchanging, the properties by which they are distinguished are likewise unchanging, ensuring that the order of the blessed Trinity remains forever fixed. Furthermore, of all the titles assigned to God, those that imply a relationship of person toward person signify the distinct persons, while those that do not, commend the one Godhead in an undifferentiated manner. Indeed, where the opposition of relation does not hinder it, to refuse to apply to God a name that is otherwise appropriate is to diminish the essence to which that name most fittingly pertains. For example, the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as well as paternity, nativity, procession, cause, causal effect, to beget, and to be begotten, can be predicated of one another,

^A indicative of the persons of the Trinity, are properly returned to the persons. For either they are the substance of the persons, or they are significant of them. But "wise," "good," "just," "creator," and all such terms signify one thing indifferently, God. For we are compelled by none of these to understand any personal distinction in God toward Himself, except according to certain names directed only toward the creature or, rather, of the creature toward God; for He is called "just" in relation to the creature, and "creator," and "omnipotent."

But of terms that are substantial and significant of substances, some are rendered properly to each individual of the persons; and these are the things substantial to them, such as paternity and nativity and procession, Father and Son and the one proceeding. Others, however, are rendered to two, such as "causal" and "to be sent," and "God from God," and the Spirit being called both the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. Likewise, "to send" and "to emanate," and the Father "pouring forth," and the Son the Spirit. Others, however, are rendered without change to the three; and they signify one God without any difference, as has been said. But to produce is certainly not of the Holy Spirit; for the opposition of relation forbids this, because that which produces is opposed to that which is produced; but that which is produced is the Holy Spirit; and it has been said to be impossible for that which produces and that which is produced to be the same; for nothing is the cause of itself; and no person produces itself, just as we see happens in the case of humans as an example, for even among us the son of someone is not himself by himself, nor is he called of himself, but of his father: and neither is the son the father of his father, nor the father the son of his son, on account of the reason of opposition according to cause and causal effect, which does not convert. And certainly it is possible for the same to be both father and son, but not according to the same, nor toward the same. But toward another and another, both apply. But this has no place in God. For the faith teaches that only the three persons are God: to whom their properties remain immovable and fixed. Therefore, to produce is not of the produced Spirit, but the Father is asserted to produce the Spirit. For according to this [the Father] is distinguished from the Spirit, as cause from causal effect.

But it is asked whether "to produce" is also common to the Son with the Father. And since the opposition of the Father to the Son according to paternity and nativity, and [the opposition of] cause and causal effect, does not prohibit this, nor does any confusion follow from it; for "to be born" is relatively opposed to "to beget," not to "to produce," and the Son is related to the Father, but not to the producer, in that He is the Son; therefore, nothing compels us to take away "to produce" from the Son, just as we are compelled to take away "to beget" entirely from the Son; for the opposition of Himself to the Father—namely, of paternity and nativity—does not permit it; lest the Father and Son be one person, or the same at the same time, Father and Son, and neither properly. Since, therefore, the opposition of the relation of the Son to the Father does not compel us to take away from the Son that which is called "to produce," "to produce" is entirely common to the Father and to the Son. ^B Furthermore, just as those things which are common to the Father and the Son, for example, "good," "wise," "creator," etc., when we do not return them equally and immutably to the Son, we make the essence of the Son lesser than the essence of the Father: for in that way the Father will not be "wise" and "creator" in the same sense as the Son. In the same way, whoever takes away "to produce" from the Son, while having no necessity of opposition to return this to Him, will be compelled to confess the essence of the Son to be lesser than the essence of the Father.

Moreover, if someone, alleging Dionysius, asserts that he speaks thus, [saying] that divine reason assigns what is common and united to the Father and to the Son, and also common to the Holy Spirit: let him know that he spoke of those things which are returned indifferently to the three, and of those things which are called natural, in which neither any distinction nor relation is seen. For this reason he also said "common and united"; but to produce is relatively opposed to that which is produced. And that which is produced is the Holy Spirit. But it is not possible for it to be the same as that which produces. Nor does the Spirit produce itself; for nothing can be the cause of itself; nor can another, because of the Trinity handed down to us. ^C Therefore, to produce is common to the Father and to the Son; and the Father and the Son are the one producer of the Holy Spirit. Just as [they are] also one all-powerful and one sender, having preserved, of course, the distinction of generation and nativity. And thus the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by the reason of cause and causal effect; for it is also said that [the Spirit] proceeds through the Son; and it is asserted by the Theologians that the Father is the producer through the Word and has [the Spirit] from the Son, as He receives the Spirit from Him.

From which it also is established that "to produce," as it is called, is not of the Father's substance; but this also was demonstrated above. And the sentences uttered by the holy Fathers attest to these things, by which they assert that the Son is the heir of all the Father's goods, and has all the Father's goods, [both] proper and special, and has all that belongs to the Father, except that alone which is not the Father; and that the Son has the Spirit of the generator as a good of His own nature, living and substantially implanted; just as the Father does. Yet it is pleasing to add these also. ^D Therefore, Saint Cyril says in the *Thesaurus*: "Just as [the tree] gives to the fruit coming forth from it [the power] to bear its own natural quality; so the Son is understood to have received from the Father all things that are His, while He Himself is all that the Father is except for being the Father alone."

And again in the same: "The Son is not said to have received from the Father as one in need; for He possesses naturally, as He is His proper Word and splendor, all things that are His, except for being and being called the Father. But He says that He received from the Father, as God anticipating and cutting down the opinions of heretics. For lest anyone, observing the Son having all things of the Father, out of great similarity and unchangeable identity, might think the same to be Father and Son, and might fall into the error of Sabellius; He necessarily says that He received from the Father, as discourse introducing, on the one hand, one giving, and on the other, one receiving, [to show] duality in properties.

^A and that He does not distinguish [them] with names alone.

The same [author], in *Ad Hermiam*: "The Son, consubstantial and coeternal with the Father, possesses all things in absolutely equal measure, except for the mere act of begetting. For this alone properly pertains to God and the Father." The same, in *Thesauri*: "Therefore, whatever you may say of the Father, this is also true of the Son, except for that alone which is that He is the Father; and whatever you attribute to the Son, this is also in the Father, except for that alone, that He is the Son."

Chrysostom, in his thirty-ninth homily on John: "It was said, however, for this reason: lest you suspect Him to be unbegotten, or think that there are two Fathers. For all that the Father is, this the Son is also." And after a few words: "You see the immutable, and that he indicates the difference by one thing alone, namely, that this one is the Father and that one is the Son. For that which is said, 'He gave,' necessarily introduces this distinction alone; as to the rest, all things indicate equality and, from that, incommutability."

Magnus Athanasius, in *Contra Arianos*, says: "Thus, therefore, because they are one, namely the Father and the Son, and the Deity is one, the same things are said of the Son as are said of the Father, unless it be that He is not called the Father."

The same, in the sermon in which he explains the faith composed by the Arians in their various synods, at the end of a very long sermon says: "For this reason the Son has equality with the Father, through uniform terms, indeed, and the Scriptures say of the Son what they say of the Father, except that He is not called the Father."

Magnus Basilius, in his book *De fide*: "To receive that which is called common corresponds also [to the nature of] the creature; but to possess by nature is proper to the Begotten. Therefore, as the Son naturally possesses the things that are the Father's, and as He is the Only-Begotten, He has all things comprehended within Himself." And again in the same: "I have spoken of the Father and the Son; preserve these properties for me. Therefore, the Son, remaining in that which He is, the Son, is all things that the Father is, in accordance with the very word of the Lord, who says: 'All things that the Father has are mine' (John xvi, 15). For in truth all things that belong to the primitive form are of the image."

If, therefore, all that the Father is, this the Son also is, being begotten and remaining the Son, and all that the Father has, this the Son also has comprehended, except for paternity alone, and except for that alone, that this one is the Father and that one the Son, all things are common. For they differ in one thing only. All other things indicate equality and immutability. How is it that paternity and nativity are not the only substantial properties of the Father and the Son which are not shared between them; but to produce [the Spirit] is common to the Father and the Son, because the Holy Spirit also is common, and is called the Spirit of both, and the breath of both? For the Father is not without a medium by reason of paternity, nor is the Son the Holy Spirit, nor is [this] opposed to the reason of nativity; for only the reason of paternity is opposed to this. Therefore, according to that which is called the principle of the Holy Spirit, there is no distinction of the Father and the Son, and consequently it is proper for the Father toward the Son, for the Unbegotten is congruent with both; but if He is also Unbegotten, for there is no privation of the Unbegotten there, it is therefore common to the Father and the Son.

Since, therefore, to produce [the Spirit] is not of the substance of the Father, but is common to the Father and the Son, consequently the Son is also distinguished from the Holy Spirit according to cause and what is caused. For it is in cause and what is caused alone that the divine persons are distinguished, as the faith teaches and as the saints confess, as is clear from the above.

^B But some, not accepting the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit according to cause and what is caused, while nevertheless being compelled to provide a distinction for them, claim that they are distinguished by differing processions from the Father, and they bring forward as a witness Justin, the philosopher and martyr, saying: "Because just as the Son is from the Father, so the Spirit is from the Father, except for the mode of substance." ^C Also Gregory the Theologian, saying in his sermon on the Nativity of Christ: "The Holy Spirit proceeds indeed from the Father, but not like the Son; for it is not by the way of nativity, but by the way of procession." And against Heron: "The property of the Son is indeed nativity: but that of the Holy Spirit is procession."

Furthermore, those who say these things are entirely ignorant of their own voice and that of their masters. For whosoever among the saints said that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by differing processions—that is, by rendering an order with nativity and procession or personal properties, and to the processions, and relations, and properties—said this as if it were not possible for there to be a distinction of the persons otherwise than by their being also relatively opposed to one another. Nativity, therefore, is an immediate procession from the Father, and this is its definition; but procession is understood through nativity: therefore, the Son is indeed without a medium from the Father, but the Spirit is through the Son.

^D Moreover, besides that relationship which exists according to cause, it is not permitted to think of any distinction in the divine persons. For it has been said that the divine persons are distinguished only in cause and what is caused; for otherwise, with every opposition and order of processions to one another removed, nothing will prevent their properties from coinciding in the same subject. Therefore, when they distinguish the Son from the Spirit by nativity, they say nothing other than that the Spirit is through the Son: for to proceed through nativity is what is said. Similarly, when they distinguish the Spirit from the Son by procession, they confess that He is distinguished from the Son by that procession, the definition of which is "to be through nativity."

Since, therefore, according to substantial processes, the substance of the persons is signified, and at the same time cause and causative are brought in with order, and the Son indeed is begotten from the Father without medium according to his own process; but the Spirit proceedeth from the Father according to his own process: therefore, the one is asserted to have being by nativity, the other by procession; they rightly say that both are from the Father, but differ in the mode of substance. ^A

Furthermore, when distinction and [the relation of] cause and causative are brought in simultaneously with the modes of substance, it is indeed to say that one thing is to be continuously from the First, and another to be through that which is continuously from the First. But also to say that nativity is proper to the Son, and procession to the Spirit, means nothing else than that the Son is from the Father without medium, but the Spirit proceedeth through the Son: and to confess that He proceedeth, but not like the Son. For it is not by reason of nativity, but of ^B procession, that He who distinguishes what is said to be immediately, and what mediately [discerningly] acts; and what the same theologian says, "that all things which the Son has are the Spirit's, except for the reason of nativity and of the Son," signifies the same thing, as if he were to say, "except that He is without medium." For He Himself proceedeth through the Son; but the Son is born through the Father, and, besides, the one is indeed the Son, but the other is the Holy Spirit. For He Himself is the one who says that the difference in the habits of emanation and the relation to each other has also made the difference in appellation for them; and therefore it is the same as if he had said, "except that one is the cause, and the other the causative." If, however, Nyssenus also made a distinction when he said one thing is "continually" [principally] and another "through that which is continually," and if anyone said that procession is another mode of substance, he intends to insinuate, besides the nativity immediately from the First, that which is from the First through a medium. ^C

And that which is said, that it is sufficient for distinction to say "begotten" and "proceeding," contributes to that understanding; for the reason of the proceeding is to be through the begotten. Therefore, it is true indeed that the processes distinguish the divine persons, yet not without order and without understanding in relation to each other, and that nativity must be thought of before the process, and the procession through the nativity, because the Spirit is also through the Son, and therefore cause and causative are necessarily brought in; yet it is impossible that, according to their opinion, to be born and to proceed should [by themselves] distinguish the persons. For, if those persons who contain no opposition in themselves were sufficient to distinguish, as they say, then by the same reasoning, to beget and to produce, which are in the Father, would be sufficient to split the Father Himself into different persons. For it is impossible, and has an open contradiction, that principles which are proper and suitable for distinguishing should exist anywhere, and yet distinction should not be there. Just as if someone were to say that skill exists in someone, but that he himself is not skilled. It is therefore the same also to say, that those things by which ^D the causes are distinguished, are indeed in the cause, but the cause itself cannot be distinguished by them in any way.

It will therefore distinguish or not distinguish, both in the producer and in the products: for if, for example, the same man begets a son and teaches him his art of painting, so to speak—since nature and art are thoroughly present in the son and disciple, just as they are in the father and master—it will not divide the one more than the other into many, for the reason that the cause of distinction is the same in both. And again, if someone should be both a father and a carpenter of beds, and by nature begets a son, but by art makes a bed, yet in the bed and the son, because there is a diversity of natures, which is distinguished by the very reason of the subject—for one is a man and the other is wood: which wood, if it were present in the father and maker, just as the man is, would necessarily distinguish him into several substances of causes. Or if the nature that produces the wood knew how to craft, then even then, he would be as it were the cause, the wood and the maker being the same according to the subject, and so the bed would be the product, the same art and the bed, nor would that which produces be distinguished more than that which is produced. Therefore, when the causes of distinction are equally present in both, namely the cause and the causative, it will distinguish them equally. To beget and to produce is in one and the same nature, in which it is also to be begotten and to proceed.

It is also established that "to beget" is the same as "paternal property," and that "properties" are the same as "substances according to reality," as has already been shown above. Now there are three substances [hypostases], the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is the true God, one Trinity and supersubstantial essence. Similarly, the same must be said of that which is to be born and that which is to proceed. These, therefore, will either distinguish the producer and the products equally, or they will not distinguish: if therefore they do distinguish, the Father will be two substances [hypostases], by reason of begetting and producing; but if these are not the cause of distinction in the Father, then neither will the Son and the Spirit be distinguished from each other by reason of being born and proceeding for the same causes; but in that case, the Son and the Holy Spirit will be one person. For we cannot say that in this place there is a cause of distinction, as in the bed and the son, where a differing nature distinguishes, which is not in the Father. For the essence and nature of the three is one, and the saints understand no other distinction besides that which is according to cause and causative.

For, since to beget and to produce are in the Father's nature, they do not distinguish the Father into two persons; therefore, neither will to be born and to proceed, since they are in the nature of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, distinguish them, unless something else is added; that is, unless they have opposition to each other. Whence those who have said that they are distinguished by various processes, namely, of being born and proceeding, understand them to be relatively opposed to each other by personal properties, as has been said.

If, however, they were substantial properties—since they indicate their own substance, subsisting in relation to the one who breathes—unless the Holy Spirit is breathed by the Son, He would not differ from Him personally, but would be one person with Him, having different modes, such as to be born and to be inspired, because they would have no opposition or habit toward each other: or, as would be the case if there were two simply different beings, they would have a difference of essence, not merely a personal one, which is utterly absurd.

Moreover, if one proceeds to argue that the Son is distinguished not only by the Father, but also by the Spirit, he will not escape in this way, nor say that the Holy Spirit is breathed by the Son; for the destination of the Son is to be a partaker and heir of all the Father’s goods. And so, if the Spirit is also a cause to Him from the Father, and for this reason becomes a cause distinct from the Holy Spirit, which is included in the destination of birth. Indeed, the definition of the one proceeding is to be from the begetter, through the begotten. Therefore, even if the Spirit were to be distinguished by His property—that is, the procession from the Son—by that very property, namely, that He is from the Son, and thus referred to Him, He would have a distinction relative to the Son. Indeed, if anyone claiming that to be born and to proceed are incongruous in relation to each other, thinks that they suffice by themselves for distinction without another understood relation, he trusts in a completely feeble argument. For these things happen to be incongruous on account of the order of cause and causal. For they are not said to be relative to themselves and to each other alone, as some suppose, but rather, to be born is relative to the Father, while to proceed is opposed to the producer. Thus, when they say these are opposed, they are consequently compelled to say they are distinguished as cause and causal relative to each other. Since that which proceeds from the begetter is through the begotten; ^A but that which is born without a medium from the generator is a partaker, according to its own property, of all the Father's goods.

Furthermore, because it has also been said that the divine persons are distinguished only in the cause and the causal. And some object to this: that if the Son were the cause of the Holy Spirit, and He has this from the Father, the cause of the Holy Spirit would be understood as being in the Father, at least in thought.

Therefore, the Father will be thought of before the Son breathing the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit subsists concurring with the procession of the Spirit from the Father; and consequently, He is distinguished from Him. But before the Son breathed, the Son was only Son, and not a producer. Therefore, even if the Son were not a cause, He would be distinguished from the Holy Spirit. But to say that each person subsists in Her own personal property and is abundantly separated from all others, so that the birth and procession of the Son and Spirit suffice for distinction, and that thus the cause of the distinction need not be sought, is of no avail for the purpose. For things which subsist according to themselves, and suggest themselves as such, suffice for the distinction of the rest. For Peter, subsisting by his own soul and body, is distinguished from Paul and others: but they whose subsistence consists in the fact that they are referred to something else, have this also as their mark of distinction, namely, to be referred to those to which they are referred. For a servant, for example, exists in the fact that he is referred to a master, and is called a servant. Otherwise, if the relation were removed, he would not be a servant, in so far as he is a servant; since therefore paternity and birth and procession subsist according to cause and causal: the Son indeed, in so far as He is Son, is distinguished from the Father alone; but from the Spirit by no account, unless some other difference of His relative to the Spirit is understood. For without the relation to the Father, being understood solely according to the birth, the Son and the Spirit would be one person. Again, the Holy Spirit ^B in relation to the one breathing, subsisting, ^C if He were not inspired by the Son... ^D Truly, this too is feeble, for the reason that the birth of the Son from the Father is first and immediate, according to the paternal property of the process, and is thought of before the procession of the Holy Spirit. For through the birth resides the procession; because, also, the Spirit is through the Son, and the destination of the one proceeding has been shown as being through the begotten. But since the Son, in so far as He is the Son, is the heir of all the Father's goods, and everything which is the Father's, by being born

^A he truly receives; the Father, in begetting, is indeed an origin for the Son, as well as the cause of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is the Son through His birth, as an origin and cause, the Father will communicate with the Son, and together with the Son will have this, and He will not be understood to breathe forth the Holy Spirit without the Son. For either it is not from the Father—if it be permitted to say so—or it is also through the Son and from the Son: for this is the standard of the one proceeding. And before the Spirit is thought of as being from the Son, the Son already has the power to produce Him with the Father, having been begotten by the Father, especially since the Father is also called a producer through the Word. For if the Father, in producing, gave the cause of the Spirit to the Son, the Son would surely be thought of before the cause, according to which the Spirit proceeds from the Son. But now the Father is the origin for the Son in begetting, just as He is the cause of the Holy Spirit, and through the Son He is the cause of the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him through the Son as well. Therefore, the Father and the Son are conceived of as one origin before the Holy Spirit.

Just as, therefore, we cannot think of the sun warming without its ray, nor of heat without its brilliance, so it is impossible for the procession to be conceived without the Son; for the principle of what is proceeding is to be from the begetter through the begotten. And just as the sun and the ray are one origin of warming, so the Father and the Son are one origin of the Holy Spirit, according to this, His unique and simple procession, with the difference ^B between paternity and birth being preserved, of course. Therefore, the breathing Father cannot be understood either in reality or in thought without the Son: nay, if the Son were removed from the mind and from thought, it would no longer be possible for there to be a procession either. Whence it is also said: He is said to proceed from the Father for this reason, because He is from the Son. But if He is said to be contemplated beforehand, nevertheless there is no before and after. For both the cause and the caused, and the mediation of the Son, and the being through the Son, are handed down by divine sacred doctrines. But they are nonetheless asserted to be at once, and conjoined, and inseparable for those who confess. For temporal delays have no place in eternal life, as Gregory of Nyssa says, for the reason that there is nowhere any place for time there.

Through all these things, therefore, it is concluded that which was proposed from the beginning, that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit according to cause and causality, and that the Father and the Son are the one origin of the Holy Spirit, with their mutual difference preserved, according to the theology of the holy Fathers; through which they assert in divine doctrines that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Since, however, truth does not struggle against truth, and especially in these discourses where the faith is treated, in which there must be the highest concord, both with themselves and with the other doctors. For otherwise God would have allowed men to be deceived and to err through them; either wishing for contrary things to be true; or clashing truth with truth; but a lie is set against the truth. Moreover, it has been demonstrated from many places that through the Son, and from the Son, ^C the Holy Spirit is said to have substance, which things, having posited what was said before, let us now proceed to those things which seem to be utterly opposed to this truth.

Let the holy John of Damascus therefore come first: He says, "We say the Spirit is the Son's, but we do not say He is from the Son." If, indeed, they think that by this he wishes to insinuate that the Spirit is not from the Son, and does not have substance through the Son, the illustrious doctor considered the Holy Spirit to have substance from the Father alone. If this is so, then He is also from the Father without a medium. But if He produces even the substantial [property] of the Father without a medium, and it is His own, and not common to the Son—for the substantial properties of persons are proper, and certainly not common to others—how then does He call the Father the producer of the Spirit through the splendor-giving Word? How has He taught us in very many places that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son? How, if the Spirit has much of an order or habit toward the Son, did He say: "But it behooves one to have the Word and the Spirit"? For these things are most manifestly contrary to one another; for if the producer through the Word is [the one], it will surely never be to produce that which is the Father's proper substantial property. But if [He is] from the Father without a medium, He would never proceed through the Son; for what is said to be "proceeding through the Son" designates the mediation of the Son, which Nyssa also hands down, and all the theologians together with him, and it commends the Holy Spirit after the Father according to personal order. Furthermore, to say "without a medium," that is, "from the Father alone," destroys all these things at once.

And yet, this doctor is not only contrary to himself, as some interpret that saying, but also to those who were before him, the teachers of the Church. For they say that He is from the Son, and from His essence, and that He proceeds from Him, and has His being from the Son, and proceeds from Him: but he says that He is not from the Son, not from His essence, and does not proceed from Him. But this is a manifest contradiction. From which it follows that either this teacher alone is asserted to be of the Church, and he alone is seen to be holy, with so many holy Fathers neglected (it is a shame even to say it, ^D rejected), or, for the sake of reverence for the multitude and ancient authority of those others, one does not admit this one. But this is inept and foolish. For one must reverence all the holy ones, and receive what is said by them with a pious intention: and strive to explain them in such a way, if anywhere they might seem to dissent, that they may be as concordant as possible both with themselves and with other masters of the Church. And, if indeed this happens, and nothing is taken away from the granted and established doctrines of the faith, to state a concordant and true exposition; but if not, [to state] the contrary. For once this is posited, absurdity follows, and it is of such a kind. Although, not to say it for the purpose of the thing being so, is not contrary. For there are many things that are indeed true.

^A They are not, however, spoken of; and this, as it is evident from other considerations, is clear also from the very dogmas of the Church. For that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and that the ever-Virgin is heralded in the Church as the Mother of God, and that the Son of God is united to human nature according to substance, are indeed true things; yet there was a time when they were not spoken of; nevertheless, they were not on that account false. For afterwards, by urgent necessity on account of those saying contrary things, it was even established and formulated that they should be spoken of publicly in the Church. What wonder, then, if this holy man also says that what was not pronounced—as was the case with many other things both then and before—is not said? For he does not surely indicate by this that it does not exist, but only this: that it was not brought forward in customary speech.

But that he is not contrary to himself, this surely is evident hence. For it was shown before that "through" is the preposition in which that which is assumed co-operates with the preceding cause, and towards that efficiency which it [the cause] itself regards, whether one wishes to exercise discourse in natural things or in works of art. For the branch through which the fruit arises has the same intention as the nature of the root. And a saw, for example, through which a craftsman makes a step, co-operates towards that, not towards the effect of another kind of craft. For it will not co-operate with him for heating or whitening. And in general, those things through which something is done co-operate with those who first move them, according to their inclination, together with them as causes, or as instruments, or in any other way ^B assisting them.

If, therefore, there were not a different nature for them compared to those who use them, they would indeed themselves be a cause simply, just as that first one; but in the Father this is the case even more. Since the operation would also be the same for those using them. But in the Father and the Son, since one nature is regarded in number, and there is also one action or procession for them, being one and the same God, the significance of "through" for the Son and "from" for the Father will not differ; but the latter will indeed pass over to "of" or "from," while the former will indeed, in turn, be transferred to "through," and the Holy Spirit will be a common and one and the same principle with the Father, on account of the equal Divinity of the Son to the Father, and the same essence, and every other identity and immutability: with the concession once given that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and all teachers shouting that there is no difference in any way in understanding these prepositions, and teaching that in the Father and Son, "of" or "from," "by/at," "through" differ in nothing, except in so far as they distinguish substances. For the great Basil, writing to Amphilochius, ch. 5, says: "One God and Father, from whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things." These are not the words of one positing a law, but rather of one distinguishing sub- ^C stantially. For this reason, therefore, the particle "through" was assumed, so that it might designate at once both the consubstantiality and the order and distinction of the persons apparent from the very processions. In which order and distinction, the person of the Son indeed occupies the middle place—which "through" always signifies even in common usage—and so that the Father and Son may not be thought to be one person because of the similarity of the prepositions, or two, and both divided against themselves, and the Spirit to appear as if he had two principles. And such is the person of the Son, as is also that of the Father, having nothing thought of before it, just as the Father. For "from" posits the mind, and does not compel it to go further and seek a principal cause to which "from" is distributed principally; but "through" includes another person also besides "from"; and it carries the mind to that one, and designates that principal cause in which this is placed as a medium of both the first and the one to whom the procession or operation is directed. And thus it commends the Trinity to us integrally through, and at the same time indicates the order of the persons to one another. But it also connects the unity of essence by itself in the third place, according to Gregory of Nyssa, by the mediation of the Son, both preserving the honor to the Only-begotten and not excluding the Father from the natural Spirit. For thus, as the great Basil says, both [substances] are granted and the pious dogma of the unique principality does not decline.

^D Since, therefore, we ought to confess also the distinction along with the unity of persons, according to the faith handed down to us, and this [faith] commends both, that one is said to proceed from the Father, through the Son, as the Holy Spirit, but the other is not said to be from the Son—therefore the Damascene confesses that it proceeds through the Son. But we do not say "from the Son," he added, thinking that "from" does not fit the person before that person is thought of, but before it none, such as is the person of the Father. Truly, very many of the holy Fathers, and the same ones often, both receive and do not receive the same expressions in theology according to different understandings, and sometimes so, and sometimes otherwise; as the great Basil in the *Questions against Eunomius* does not accept calling the Son "offspring," thinking that this expression fits imperfections; wherefore Eunomius used it most. But the theologian Gregory, in the first book *On the Son*, speaking of him and the Holy Spirit, says: "Of these, however, one is indeed offspring, the other is truly product." And indeed in divine persons the naming of "cause" and "causale" is forbidden by the blessed Cyril, saying: "To name 'cause' and 'causale' is not even permitted, if one understands it of course according to the custom of crea-

- ^A tures. But the common faith, and all theologians, say that the divine persons are distinguished only in cause and causally, and most doctors have assigned the greater, in the matter of cause, to the Father. But according to the opinion of the Arians, this is repelled from the fold of the Church.

It is no wonder, therefore, if some of the doctors, indeed, judging that it is proper only to the principal cause, and before which nothing is conceived, assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that the Father is the producer through the Word, because all things of the Son are referred to the Father, and they say not "from the Son." But others, positing that it is also proper to him who is from the cause, as to the Son, of whom the Father is thought of as the principal cause, in that the Father and the Son are one principle and one cause, just as there is one essence: they say now that [He] exists and proceeds through the Son, now that [He] exists and goes forth and proceeds from the Son, delivering the divine themes according to the saints, as has been said, wishing the same thing by both, even if they differ in syllables.

Damascene therefore saw fit in a theology of this kind to use "through," from which both consubstantiality and unity, and the order and discretion of the persons, appear, rather than by assuming "out of" to signify only a cause: most especially lest the Father and the Son might be thought to be one person because of the similarity of the prepositions; or lest the Son might seem to have nothing conceived before Himself, as the Father does; for so it seemed to him, and other things that have been said previously.

But these things indeed are sufficient, even if the master had said that the Spirit is not from the Son. But in fact, he did not say so; he only said, "But we do not say 'from the Son';" yet this in no way contradicts what is said as being "from the Son." For he transmits only common usage through this. Therefore, if by accepting that interpretation which many desire, many things that are established are torn down, and he concordant neither with himself nor with others before him, while with our explanation admitted, no such thing happens, and of those things which are established, nothing at all falls away: it is agreed, surely, that this is the true interpretation, and theirs is false and to be rejected. From which also the solution of that word of the blessed Dionysius is derived, where he says: "The Father is the sole supersubstantial fountain of the Godhead," for such a fountain—before which nothing is conceived—as this great father renders to God and the Father, Damascene denies in the Son. For before this one, the Father is thought of. And again John removes such a cause from the Son, such as Augustine called the Father, calling Him the principal cause: "Principally," he says, "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father"; and he added: "He said 'principally' because the Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son to God."

It has been shown above that the Son is called a fountain of the Holy Spirit by the doctors. But since the Father is conceived before the Son, and before the Father ^B nothing; and He Himself is said to be from the Father, and to Him is referred ^C every thing that is said to be from the Son, having a relation to the first cause, according to the opinion of Basil in the book of *Questions*, according to which manner the Father can be called root, and fountain, and sole cause, that it might be shown; from which it is said that "neither three, nor two principles of gods are accepted separated by plurality," as Gregory the Theologian says in his book *On the Holy Spirit*. Therefore it is also said: "I live on account of the Father." And "Of that hour no one knows, neither the Son, except the Father"; and: "I do nothing of myself"; and: "As I hear I judge"; and: "My doctrine is not mine"; and: "My Father is greater than I"; and if anything of this kind has been said by Him, who refers all things to the Father, just as he also says concerning the Spirit, in one place: "Because I will send you the Paraclete"; but in another: "Whom the Father will send in my name," that is, through me. For he does not signify by this the person of the Holy Spirit to be the future Son. That, indeed, is to show His own dignity. For He is second in dignity and order from the Son, according to the great Basil, and the great Athanasius says the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit. But honoring this principle without time, and that He might not seem to be adverse to God, as the Theologian Gregory says.

Indeed, it has also been shown by the reasoning of conversion, because the holy man, conferring the Father to the Son alone, says this; for when he had said: "For the supersubstantial things of the divine generation do not convert," he added: "When the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, and divine generation signals this, and what other things were said before." We hold, therefore, the intention of the doctor, concordant from another place to himself, and to the other doctors, who are of the same merit, and nothing inferior in the company of saints. But as some will have it, the contrary would entirely happen. For to call the Son the fountain of the Holy Spirit according to the invective brought in by them concerning the process, as vain and subject to many absurdities, has been refuted above.

And certainly not only did the great Athanasius call the Son the fountain of the Holy Spirit, but he also called Him the sole fountain of the Holy Spirit. For Theodoret in the second book of his *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 23, introduces the letter of the great Athanasius to the Africans concerning the Council of Rimini, in which it is written thus: "But who would wish to engage with these men, who do not even accept their own? For in their ten and more synods, as we have said before, writing now one thing and now another, they show quite evidently that they disapprove of their own individual ones. Yet they suffer this, which the Jews also suffered at that time. For as they, leaving the sole ^D fountain of living water, dug for themselves cisterns which could not hold water—it is written, moreover, in the prophet Jeremiah; so also these, fighting against the universal synod, have dug for themselves many synods." But even in the book *Against the Arians*, the same great

Athanasius says that the Savior alone is the dispenser of the Holy Spirit, saying: "And on the contrary, since the Savior is God, and always commanding the kingdom of the Father, He alone is the dispenser of the Holy Spirit." These things, therefore, were said in abundance to show that the Son also is called the source of the Holy Spirit.

If, then, it must be confessed that the teachers are consistent with themselves and with each other—which is now most especially the case, and there is nothing in the dogmas granted that is inconsistent, with these things having been set forth as stated—while the contrary is entirely the case for the others; then it is surely a manifest proof that this interpretation alone is true, and all those besides it are false.

The solution to that saying which Gregory the Theologian set forth is also evident: namely, that all things which the Father has are the Son's, except the cause. For just as the divine Dionysius, comparing the Father to the Son alone according to the notion of origin, said the Father alone is the ^A source (for the Son is not the source of the Father, nor is there a reversal): so also this most eminent man said that the Son has all things of the Father except the cause—namely, the cause which the Father has in relation to the Son. For if they think that by this the holy man grants no cause at all to the Son, they are mistaken. For he himself is the one who says, "From the Principle a Principle." Moreover, in the prayer which he makes to Christ, he began thus, saying: "You now also we bless, my Christ, Word, the source-less dispenser of the Holy Spirit." He wished to indicate what cause the Father has in relation to the Son; otherwise, it would not be consistent with himself, and the opinion would seem fallacious. For to say "except the cause" is to wish to remove *every* cause; but this is false. Or they will certainly say that he is the cause of creatures. He himself also attests to this, saying: "All things which the Father has are the Son's except the cause; and all things which the Son has are the Holy Spirit's, except the birth."

It is clear, therefore, that in comparing the Father to the Son, he spoke of "except the cause"—which, in fact, the Father has in relation to the Son—just as the following part is that of one comparing the Spirit to the Son, looking at their mutual relation according to their own proper processions. For to say that the Spirit has all things except the birth signifies nothing other than this: except for the fact that he is immediately from the Father; since, indeed, the Son is from the Father without an intermediary, according to his own property, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and therefore he does not reverse, because neither does his procession reverse, and consequently, neither do his substantial properties. And so, from this, they conclude nothing in their favor.

By the same reasoning, even that does not help them, which the holy Maximus says in his Epistle to Marinus, writing thus: "The holy synod of the present most holy Pope did not repudiate as many chapters as you wrote, those who gathered in the royal city. They contained only two, one of which is about theology." He says, "that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, and the other truly about the divine incarnation: because it was written, not without the sin of the first father, ^B to be the Lord, insofar as he was a man." And first, indeed, they brought forward the consistent opinions of the Roman Fathers. Cyril of Alexandria also, in his exposition upon the Gospel of John, from which they showed themselves not to make the Son the cause of the Spirit. For they knew there is one cause of the Son and the Spirit: of the one, indeed, according to procession; but that they might insinuate it to proceed through him; and thus they commended the conjunction of essence and immutability.

So, because the holy Cyril says in many places that the Holy Spirit is from the Son even as he is from the Father, and that he is from the Son and through him, and naturally proceeds from him, and because he pours forth ^C what is naturally our own substance through him, and other such things, has been sufficiently declared above. But they also produced the sayings of the Roman doctors—namely, Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine—consistent with this opinion, who also teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But it is a marvel if this does not also insinuate a cause. For by that reasoning, as it is given to be understood, neither when it is asserted that he is from God and proceeds from the Father, will it designate a cause. But these things are beside the intention of the Scripture; namely, because according to the holy Cyril and the Western doctors, they confess that he is of this opinion, who evidently confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds and comes forth from the Father and the Son, as from one principle, as was said. Therefore, they introduce nothing new from themselves, who also confess that the Spirit proceeds from the Son: and at the same time, the present letter of the Roman Fathers truthfully endorses the aforementioned allegations of theirs. For either they are all theirs, or some of those which they then brought forward. For surely holy Maximus was not deceived, nor was he speaking these things falsely.

What then do they mean, when they say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but add that the Son is not the cause of the Holy Spirit? Because, forsooth, the Son is indeed from the Father; but all things of the Son are referred back to the Father, and yet it has been said also by the saints that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, as from one thing and one principle, and is and proceeds from them: on account of this, through such opinions they have revealed that they do not understand the Son as a proper and peculiar ^D cause of the Spirit, besides the Father. And rightly so. For there are not two principles of the Holy Spirit divided against themselves and separated from one another; nor, as there are two persons, are there also two principles of the Holy Spirit; for just as the Father indeed sends the Holy Spirit, and the Son likewise sends him; yet the Son is not another cause of the mission besides the Father; for the Father does not send without the Son, just as he does not act without the Son; wherefore it was also said: he sends the Holy Spirit by one giving and one dispensing, so also must it be said concerning what we have proposed, and all the more [strongly] since the mission is the same as the procession, as was declared above. Or if some contentious person [thinks] this…

^A indication of the substantial procession of the Holy Spirit, in truth, he would never be sent by the Son, unless he were also from Him; otherwise the Son would be a minister.

Therefore, the Father is not the sole cause of the Holy Spirit without the Son, nor is the Son [the cause] without the Father; for He is said to proceed through the Son, and the Father is asserted to be the producer of the Holy Spirit through the Word. This is also evident from His own subsequent words. For He says: "They recognize the Father as the one cause of the Son and of the Spirit; of the one, indeed, according to birth; of the other, however, according to procession." These things, moreover, best agree with what has been said before. For the Son, indeed, is from the Father according to the definition of birth, or of the begotten, being from the Father without any intermediary. The Holy Spirit, however, according to the term of procession, or of the one proceeding, is from the Father through the Son; since these things are so, the Son and the Spirit are congruously referred to one principle, the Father, so that the Son is not a cause apart: for neither the Son nor any cause exists without the Father; but the Father and the Son are one cause, and the Holy Spirit one principle.

For although, as was declared above, He has existence from the Son, receiving it specifically from Him, and the logic of piety teaches that He depends entirely on that cause, together with the other things previously mentioned: yet because the Son is from the Father without an intermediary, while the Spirit proceeds through the Son ^B and is joined to the Father through Him: and because all things of the Son are referred to the Father, the Father shall be called the one principle of the Holy Spirit; for which reason He is also called solely the fount of divinity; and the fount and root of the Son and of the Spirit, and He alone can be called the cause, because He has nothing thought of before Himself, and all things are referred to Him. Whence also the great Basil said: "Natural goodness, and royal dignity extends from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Son: thus we profess both substances, and the pious dogma of the unique principate does not collapse."

These things harmonize with what preceded; but neither does what follows dissent from it. For to say: "They said He proceeds also from the Son, so that by this they might signify that He proceeds through Him," is nothing other than to say: "He proceeds from the Son for this reason, because He proceeds through the Son": for because He proceeds through the Son, He proceeds naturally, of course, and essentially. Thus, indeed, the conjunction ^C and the incommutability of the essence shall be declared: for that which proceeds through something naturally, and essentially, has its substance from it also. Therefore, to come forth through the Son is the same as to proceed through the Son; for this indicates that He has substance through the Son; what, therefore, He called "procession" above, this He said in the subsequent parts "to come forth" and "to proceed" through the Son. It is evident, therefore, from these things as well, that what is said, "to proceed from the Son," is the same as "to proceed through the Son." Moreover, these things were also said before. But that was also demonstrated, that the identity of the Son's essence to the Father makes the Son ^D have all things of the Father, except being the Father alone. And in the same way, the identity of essence is by no means destroyed, especially when it has been said that they differ by one thing only: that this is Father, and that is Son, while all other things are common. Therefore, the Father is the cause of the Spirit, just as is the Son. It has been said, however, that they do not assert the Son as a cause of the Holy Spirit, because of those things which were previously stated; for what he wishes for himself from Damascene—that we do not say "from the Son"—[is] so that two divided principles might not be seen, nor that the persona of the Son, as if it were the persona of the Father, has nothing before it; for he wishes this meaning for himself here also in these things. For the Holy Spirit has one principle, the Father and the Son; and neither the Son [exists] without the Father, nor the Father without the Son. For the Holy Spirit would not be proceeding; because, however, the Father is without cause, the separate name of "cause" is assigned to Him, which cause, when related to the Holy Spirit, comprehends the Son also, because it proceeds through the Son. For the doctors accepted that "to proceed from the Father" signifies the same as "to proceed from the Father through the Son."

So it is, and those things which are set forth in the aforementioned epistle harmonize with the truth and with themselves; and those things which were said by St. Cyril and by the Latin doctors concerning the Holy Spirit, the Romans alleged to the inquiring St. Maximus. For it is impossible for the teachers of the Church to say that the Spirit is and proceeds from the Son, and again to say that He is and proceeds through the Son, and then to take away the cause from the Son; for this is an open contradiction, and it is evident that even those who contradict [this] do not accept what is said, "to proceed from the Son," as if a cause were signified by it. For the preposition "from," and especially in divine persons, commends the procession with the cause; and "through" has so much power, not only because, as has been said, it is equivalent to "from" in divine matters, but also because, through itself in the things in which it is assumed, it everywhere indicates a cause; for whether we speak through an instrument, as through a cause, or a consortium of cause, or through a place; because the cause of motion is a place, and all motion is in magnitude, and distance; similarly we speak as through a cause, or through time likewise (for time contributes most to motion); or whether in syllogisms we say that the extremes are connected through a middle term; it is evident that it happens through a middle cause, according to the whole of the mind, or [by way of] transgression.

Truly, it is not possible at all that when we say "through," we do not also think of some cause; since, therefore, the Holy Spirit is said to come forth and to proceed "through the Son," the Son is necessarily understood to be a cause. And at the same time it is established how He is a substantial cause; for, removed by the consummate and most full perfection, and by the highest equality—or unity—to the Father, [it is forbidden] to posit the Son as an instrument, or a place, or a time, or an imperfect cause of another essence; for if in creatures, the word "through" commends one cause, one creator, one Father, and the Son, much more surely [is this the case] in the consubstantial.

^A This distribution—in the Father, indeed, through these [factors] a cause ^B is signaled to be signified, but in the Son is it not so?

But if they say that to proceed from the Son signifies here consubstantiality—namely, just as the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father because He proceeds from the Father, so also is He consubstantial with the Son because He proceeds from the Son; for the Son is also consubstantial with the Father, since He is from Him, if indeed the great Basil pursues the truth, saying: "Furthermore, the identity of essence, because the Son is from the Father."

The most blessed Cyril attests to these things also: "To be born," he says, "from the Father through the Son will force even those of us who are unwilling and reluctant to attribute consubstantiality to Him." But also, the fact that He is said to proceed through Him would by no means commend a conjunction ^C of essence and unchangeability, unless it were presupposed that what proceeds has its substance through the Son; for that which proceeds in such a way is necessarily also consubstantial, if indeed in this place the holy Maximus is truthful, saying: "The Holy Spirit, just as He is naturally according to essence of God and the Father, so also is He of the Son according to essence, as One who proceeds ineffably from the Father essentially through the Begotten Son; for this reason, therefore, He is consubstantial with the Son, because through Him He proceeds from the Father." That this is the same thing as proceeding from the Son has been demonstrated in very many places.

Indeed, that statement of Basil, which they set before them in their disputations as an impregnable wall, confers much less upon them. Finally, the holy man says: "God begets, not as a man; but He begets truly; and that which is born of Him, the word does not express as human. But He emits the true Word from Himself; He sends forth the Spirit through His mouth, not as a human, because God’s mouth is not corporal. But from Him the Spirit is, and not from elsewhere."

In these things, it is first fitting to note that the holy man accepted "to emit" in relation to the substance of the Son. For his discourse in this place is about substantial processions; just as the theologian Gregory also called eternal emanation "substance." And since there are two substances of the persons, and they are mutually different, he immediately added: "The difference of emanation ^D made the names of them also different, so that, namely, one would be the Son, the other the Holy Spirit." Therefore, since the Son is said to emit the Holy Spirit, and since the Spirit has shone forth from Him, as the great Basil says in his prayers, the substance of the Holy Spirit from the Son is most evidently signified.

Secondly, it is to be noted that he accepted "to send" also in relation to the substance of the Holy Spirit; but this agrees with the above points, in which it has been shown by the holy Fathers that "to send" and "to be sent" designate the intemporal substances of the Son and of the Spirit, and that "to send" denotes a cause; but "to be sent" denotes the causal.

"But He emits," he says, "the Spirit, through His mouth." Now, the mouth of the Father is expounded by the teachers of the Church as the Son; therefore, it is the same thing to say "to emit the Spirit through the mouth" and "the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son." But this insinuates [that He] has His substance through the Son. For the Word to proceed signifies the substance of that [Being]...

from which [He proceeds], and ^A that while the Son is indeed said to send and emit the Spirit, the substance of the Holy Spirit is signified from the Son and through the Son, and that being sent from Him signifies that He is from Him. But He says that the Holy Spirit is also from Him, that is to say from the Father, and not from elsewhere. Indeed, that the Holy Spirit is from the Father is conceded by all, but He said "not from elsewhere"; because many of the heretics, desiring to exclude the Son from the essence of the Father, claimed that He was neither from the essence of the Father nor from His substance, but from some other essence and substance (which was the proposition of the Arians). This is certainly established by those things which the great Father Basil had previously stated in the writing of the faith dictated by him. He indicates this, moreover, in the *Exposition of the XXX Psalm*, saying: "The Spirit, who is from God, who proceeds from the Father, do not think that He is some external creature; but glorify Him as having His substance from God." Although this which he says, "from elsewhere," is sufficient to commend what we have said; for "whence" and "from elsewhere" are taken in things that are said to differ most in nature. But the Father and the Son are one by nature: "For I," he says, "and the Father are one." Therefore, the Saint did not say "from elsewhere" looking to the Son, but to the creatures, from whom certain heretics said He had His substance. And so this judgment is against them ^B rather than for them; but if it is against them, it is clear that it is for the truth, and in all things it agrees with the above.

Yet as to what they say: "If it were true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the ancient Fathers, when they were fighting against Arius for the glory of the Only-Begotten, ought to have said this for the commendation of His equality and unity with the Father; for if they were laboring at this against lesser [opponents], they ought to have done it far more against the greater; since, however, they did not say it, it is clear that they were not of that opinion," this brings no necessity [to our position].

For from these things, the solution to that saying which they bring forward in the First Nicene Council to the hesitating philosopher is also clear; for thus the Fathers said there to him: "Accept one divinity of the Father, who begat the Son ineffably, and of the Son who was begotten from Him, and of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the same Father, and is the proper [Spirit] of the Son." For they said "from the Father Himself," as if pointing with a finger, taking away the wicked contradiction of those who blasphemed that the Son was not from the Father Himself, nor from His substance, but ^C from another essence and substance. But if it is said "from the Father," but according to the term of the one proceeding, "from the Father through the Son," for they accepted that to proceed "from the Father through the Son" [means] because He proceeds "from the Father through the Son," explaining the complex definition of what it is to "proceed." Therefore, "and is the proper [Spirit] of the Son" was also added; but the Spirit has been called "proper to the Son" by the holy Fathers, as He who naturally comes forth in Him and through Him, and is from Him, since He receives His being from Him.

Finally, the synod itself testifies through Bishop Leontius to the philosopher, saying: "That the Spirit is proper to the Son, and flows from Him." But that which the great Basil says: "Since the things that are common to the Father and the Son are also common to the Spirit," has indeed been excellently said; but they do not prove by this what they desire. For this compels nothing regarding the Spirit, whether He is the producer of Himself or of another person, since all things that a person has are common, though the properties of each person are preserved. For the things that are present to the Son are also present to the Father, though it is preserved that to the one it is to be Father, to the other to be Son. Whence, also, he himself, the Saint, says in the book *De Fide*: "While the Son is everything that the Father is, preserve for me these properties." Remaining, therefore, the Son is everything that the Father is, according to the very voice of the Lord saying: "All things that the Father has, are mine." But in truth, all things that are present to the primitive form are of the image. Also, John Chrysostom in the 61st homily on John: "I in the Father and the Father in me. For I am nothing else than what the Father is, remaining the Son; nor is He anything else than what I am, remaining the Father. And if anyone has known Me, he has known the Father; and if he has known the Father, he has learned the Son." Thus, therefore, even those things which are the Father's and the Son's are common to the Holy Spirit, while the personal property is preserved for Him—that is to say, for the remaining Spirit. Furthermore, in the reason of this property is to be from the Father through the Son. And so it will no longer be the Spirit producing the Spirit from Himself, but the Father and the Son. For it was theirs to inspire the following proper Spirit.

^D First, because the Arians, blaspheming that the Son was a creature, felt much worse about the Holy Spirit. For they were foolish enough to think that the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Son, and they said He was from the Son, just as all things are; and not only this, but also from the Son alone, which the great Basil insinuates while fighting against Eunomius, saying: "How then does he apply the cause of the Spirit to the Only-Begotten alone, and makes the predicament of His nature a creation of this one?" If, therefore, it had been His object that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, it would have been in no way effective for commending the honor of the Son to the Father. For they, too, confessed that the Son was from Him, as has been said, but as creatures; for as far as the wording goes, it was not compelled to confess the identity of essence. If, therefore, from the fact that the Son does all things just as the Father does, and thus also the Son raises the dead and gives life just as the Father does, they were not induced to place the Son as equal to the Father: how, from the fact that the Spirit was said to be from Him, whom they foolishly thought was His creature and much inferior to Him, would they have been persuaded to honor the Son with the Father's dignity? For in debates, they bring forward that which urges and persuades more. But more...

^A than this, regarding Him as whom they heard to proceed from the Father, they were not persuaded thereby that the Holy Spirit is God, just as the Father is; for regarding the Father, no one doubted that He was the true God: how then, if hearing this one proceed from the Son, whom they posited as a creature of the Father and the first created thing, would they have been induced to say that He is consubstantial with the Father?

Next, we find that the holy Fathers also said this. It is the property of the Son, indeed, that they said He proceeds from Him; but that the Spirit is the Son’s own, signifies that He is through Him and from Him. Furthermore, that the term "proceed" in substantial processions was adopted by the saints has been shown ^B above on many occasions. But in the writings of those who flourished during the same time, Athanasius, Basil, Nyssenus, and Gregory the Theologian accepted that He exists and proceeds from the Father through the Son, in that He proceeds from the Father through the Son.

When, therefore, that which we seek has been found, it is not expedient to suffer annoyances by inquiring more inquisitively. At the same time, it is clearly proven by these things that to be "from the Son" signifies a cause, not only a property, as some think, but a cause, with the property preceding it, as has often been said. For Eunomius, calling the Spirit "from the Son," wished himself to commend the Son as the conditional cause of the Spirit, and the divine Basil undertook the case, saying: "How then does he apply the cause of the Spirit ^C to the Only-Begotten alone?" And certainly it was fated to speak of the holy man. What then, regarding that which is in no way either from the Son or through Him, how can it have a cause from the Son? But he did not say this, since he had often affirmed that He exists from the Father through the Son; and by asserting that it is naturally and essentially through the Son, and that it has its existence from Him, he resisted that which was being said on the ground of the creature. Therefore, when it is asserted that [He is] from the Son in essence, the natural and essential substance of the Holy Spirit is commended.

Furthermore, according to the aforementioned reasoning, the Fathers would not use the Spirit’s proceeding from the Son to commend the divine persons in the Trinity to Sabellius. And some add this, too. For if, hearing the Son and the Father, the Lord saying: *I went out from the Father* (John XVI, 28); *and the Spirit proceeds from the Father* (John XV, 26), he was not led to confess the Trinity as God; surely, if he had also heard that He proceeds from the Son, he would not by this have been more inclined to confess the Trinity as God: nay, it can be believed that he and those like him heard these things about the Son quite often, when they posited the difference of the persons, and that which would imply the cause, the caused, and the order to one another; for those who were the doctors of that time asserted about the Holy Spirit that He proceeds through the Son, and receives from Him, and goes forth, and other things of this kind. Moreover, if those who were perceiving this from the most evident testimonies of Scripture did not think it to be true, how would they believe—even if they heard it from men—when the Scriptures were in harmony? ^D rent? They accomplish nothing necessary from these things.

But they do not only bring these things forward from the saints, having no agreement with their purpose, as has been shown, nay, even entirely opposing themselves; but they also strive to turn them into inanities and trifles, though it be conceded that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. And first, they say that those who assert the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son in this way are compelled to admit two principles of the Holy Spirit. But this should have been imputed first to the holy Fathers, who prove by divine reasons that the Holy Spirit exists and proceeds through the Son and from the Son, and exists from the Father, just as He does from the Son. But if it did not follow for them as they asserted these things (for they would not have said such things, if these absurdities followed them; nay, in saying these things, they even confess one principle), it is clear that, neither alleging the words of others, do they follow these absurdities.

Furthermore, since all things of the Son are referred to the Father, and Father and Son are one God, and the Holy Spirit is asserted to proceed by a unique process, whether from the Father through the Son, or from the Father and the Son, where will two principles have a place? For if indeed it were the substantial [act] of the Father to produce, this perhaps might have a rationale: since, however, this is not so, as we have taught above, it is therefore common to the Father and the Son to produce. For if it were substantial, it would never be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Indeed, both that which proceeds and that which is produced are entirely the same. And so, the Father indeed produces the Holy Spirit through the Son, but He Himself is the one who is produced. Therefore, He is also called the producer through the Word. And yet it has been shown that it is not a substantial cause, for it does not signify a thing, but is only a predicament. For if it signifies a thing as cause, it is also substantial, and consequently the causal will designate a thing and will be substantial. And so, when the Son and the Holy Spirit are causals, there will be one person, since it has been shown that all things are common to the Father and the Son, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way; for to produce neither corresponds to paternity according to its rationale, nor is it opposed to nativity. For these have to one another only a relation and substance. Therefore, nothing compels one to remove the production from the Son; otherwise, as wise and good, which are nowhere opposed to nativitiy, if we take them from the Son, we will necessarily confess the Son to be of an essence less than the Father, not rendering to Him the unbegotten and the proper, just as we do to the Father: so also, to produce, since it is not opposed to nativity, unless it be common to the Son with the Father; the seal will by no means be uniform, and the immutable image of the Father, and one God with the Father.

Therefore, according to proper substantial relations, namely paternity and nativity, although the Father and the Son are distinct according to persons, the common undivided [nature] will be piously observed in all other things. For not because they are two in persons, is it therefore [so] in all things.

For then there would be two wise ones, two good ones, two creators, two gods, and two senders, since the Father sends the Holy Spirit; but the Son also sends Him; and he who sends is, in some way, the beginning of him who is sent.

Therefore it was said by the theologian Gregory, "a principle from a principle," although I do not see why, from the fact that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son, two principles of the Holy Spirit should be born: yet from the fact that He is sent by the Father and the Son, two beginnings do not arise in the same way, nor are two or three creatures called makers, and three gods, and consequently three principles; but it is established that since neither "wise" nor "creator" is opposed to paternity or nativity, this is also common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since it is not opposed to His substantial property, namely, procession: [there is] one creator and one principle of the creature, the Trinity. And to send the Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son, since this does not interfere with their substantial properties. Therefore, the one who sends is also both Father and Son. Similarly, the one who produces is, for the same reason, one. But for the Holy Spirit, to send and to produce, as a thing opposed to His substantial property, is not present; for that which produces is referred to that which is produced; and that which is produced is, in the same way, referred to that which produces or inspires. But it is not possible for the same thing to be that which produces and that which is produced. For nothing is the cause of itself. ^C Furthermore, if the Spirit were the producer, He would cease to be the proceeding one, and the Spirit, which is His property. And [the Son] would be either from the Father by begetting, and how from the Father? Or [He would be] a producer, and how then a Spirit? But neither will there be a third from the Father, according to the theology of the Fathers, according to which the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son: and thus He will neither be proceeding nor Spirit. Therefore, as an object to His property, to produce will be something alien from Him, even if it is of the same substance with the Father and the Son, as existing essentially from them and as if from one thing. Therefore, even those who confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son do not say that it is from the Father according to the property of the Father (for this is said in relation to the Son), nor from the Son, according to the definition of the Son, for His account indeed has a relation to paternity and substance, but in as much as the Father and Son are one, namely according to the mode of producing. For just as when all things are said to be through the Son, the unification of will is shown, as the great Basil says, so also when the Spirit is said to proceed from the Father through the Son, the unification of the Father and the Son is commended, according to the substantial procession of the Holy Spirit; wherefore they also confess one principle, and one procession of Him, as from one: with the distinction of begetting and being born being preserved.

Although also according to the examples placed by the holy Fathers concerning the holy Trinity, what we say fits externally. For light is from the sun through a ray, and from the ray as if from one principle it is, ^D and a river from a fountain through a stream, or water from a fountain through a river, and fruit from a root through a branch, they proceed according to one process and one principle. But if this happens in matter, much more so in divine things, and those removed from all matter, which are contemplated without time and interval.

But so far are the Romans and Latins from confessing two principles or two processions of the Spirit, that they also anathematize those who presume to say such things. Finally, in the Council of Lyons, with Greeks and Latins gathered, this sentence was promulgated: which in very many places, written in Greek and Latin letters and books, he who seeks easily finds.

Gregory X, in the universal Council of Lyons: We pronounce with a religious and faithful voice that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as if from two principles, but as from one, not by two inspirations or processions, but by one and the same. This the holy Roman Church, mother and teacher of all the faithful, has confessed, preached, and taught from the beginning; this it holds validly and most constantly, [and it is] the true and immovable sentence of the orthodox Fathers and doctors, Latins and Greeks. However, because some through ignorance of this irrefragable truth have fallen into various heresies: we, wishing to block every approach to such heresies, with the holy council decreeing at the same time, condemn and reprobate all who dare to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, or who with temerarious audacity affirm that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as if from two principles, and not from one.

These things were held firm and ratified by all who met there, and written in Greek and Latin, and they endure among them, and were sent to Constantinople at that time with the legates. But if now these writings are not seen everywhere, there is another reason. For how were the writings preserved, whose work was overturned shortly after? Yet that such and so famous a synod was convened on account of these things is still in the memory of many.

But from these things it becomes more evident also that which the blessed Maximus said: that the Romans, confessing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, do not confess the Son as the cause of the Holy Spirit. For they did not say this to drag the Son down as a cause; but that they might not show two causes, the Father and the Son, but that the Holy Spirit proceeds from one cause and principle, from the Father and the Son. These men, therefore, as Maximus says, have been accused irrationally, and are now irrationally harassed by calumnies.

But those who exaggerate the crime of two principles add also by saying: Because a begetter is not the same thing as one producer. For if it were the same, it would also be convertible. For one is a begetter and a producer; but not every producer is a begetter. For a producer...

and the Son, according to those who say that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, who is certainly not the begetter; but since the term is not convertible, it is different. Therefore, there will be two producers; and if this is granted, there will also be two principles.

Those who say such things are indeed worthy of being asked in return: is the same Person who sends also the Father, and is He one sender? For the Father is indeed a sender, but a sender is not necessarily the Father. For the Son is also a sender, who is not the Father; for this term is not convertible, nor will those two escape being [called] principles; for whoever sends is in some way a cause of that which is sent; but if [the Spirit comes] from the Father and the sender, no two origins are gathered, for the Father would not be called the sender, and the Son would not be called the sender of the Holy Spirit; ^B nor will this be the case regarding the begetter and the producer. But we must say what we said before: that things which are spoken of in God, where no opposition of relation stands in the way, nothing prevents them from being present to the persons, or to a person: for example, God is both good and creator; because these are not opposed to fatherhood or birth. The Father and the Son are one God and creator and good; but the Son, since He is opposed to the Father, will not be the same as the begetter, nor the Father the same as the Son. But the "producible," as has been said, is not opposed to fatherhood, nor to birth. It is therefore common to both, and therefore, there is one producer, for the term "produce" does not make a real distinction between the Father and the Son; for generation and birth have made these things as they are, in and of themselves. Just as, therefore, the same is God and Father, and the same is God and Son, so also the same is begetter and producer, and one and the same Son and producer. And just as God, who is the Father, and the Son with the Father alone do not make a distinction of reality, so neither does the producer, who is the Father and the Son, indicate two distinct things with the Father alone. For when we say Father and producer, according to that which we call Father, we understand the distinction of the Father from the Son: but according to that which we call producer, we understand the Son together with the Father, as if it were one thing. The same is true of the Father and the sender. ^C Since, therefore, things that are common to the Father and the Son behave in the same way toward the Father alone as they do toward both, just as Father and producer do not make two principles, since they are understood in the Father alone: so neither do they when they are in two; and if "begetter" and "producer" are not convertible, they are not two on that account. For "Father" and "God" are not convertible, nor are "Father" and "sender," yet there are not two senders, nor two gods, nor two existences; for the whole Trinity is one, and they are not two persons: for "God" does not designate a person, just as "producer" or "sender" do not. But because the name "God" is present to the three, and is not applied to their substantial properties, while "producer" is applied to two, "God" is understood by us more universally than "producer": not that there is anything more universal or more particular in God (for God is not a genus, nor is He contained in a genus, or species), but according to the signification of the names, and as it is possible for us to understand these divine things, according to the custom of our habits.

Just as, therefore, Father and God are one thing understood in two ways, one more universal, the other more particular: so also producer and Father are both one thing, and likewise Son and producer. But they are recognized by us in two ways, one more particular, the other more universal, as has been said. For human poverty does not prevail either to speak otherwise of divine things, or to insinuate the whole by one name, whatever we grasp through many names and intelligences.

Wherefore, the Father and the producer are understood by two intelligences and reasons, as has been said; yet this does not cause a difference of *things*: for if this were the case, infinite names for the one God, according to different reasons, would distinguish Him in reality, as much as possible, into infinite things and persons. But those things that are differences among us, but in God are one and the same substance, introduce only a difference of *reasons*: an admirable name, and a thing corresponding to all these through supreme perfection, simplicity, and union. For the whole has that which is comprehended in itself, as a sort of immense sea of essence, according to the theologian Gregory. But the difference of relative things is only in substantial things. Indeed, they think that the Father and the Son are also glued together into one person, if the Son communicates with the Father in the production, or procession, of the Holy Spirit, which they say is left to be *personal*, since it is neither natural nor common to the three: and they add that the communion of natural things indicates identity of nature in the persons; therefore, as the communion is for the persons, it will be significative of personal identity, so that hence it necessarily follows that the Father and the Son are both two according to their personal opposition, and one again because of the identity and communion of production. But if to "produce" were substantial [hypostatic], they would have [some] reason; but since it has been shown above by many reasons that it is not substantial, the reason is empty, and posits what it should have proved. For, so that what has been said may again become clear, we have shown that only three things are substantial [hypostatic] of the three: the generation of the Father, the birth of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Spirit, which also denote persons and are properly *substantial*: but "to produce," like "to send," belongs properly and simply to the Son, having a contrary division, just as the cause belongs properly and simply to the [Father], and is significative of the Son and the Spirit: but things that are so proper that they follow the persons, and which are not substantial, do not denote a person, nor do they make two persons one. For the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one person because of the communion of cause; nor are the Father and the Son one person because of the mission of the Holy Spirit, because a mission is not a personal [property].

^A Similarly, therefore, with respect to the act of producing, the Father and the Son are not one person; for to produce is not something substantial. Therefore, there is no necessity for them to be one person; otherwise, they would also be one person by reason of being sent. It is common, therefore, to the Father and the Son to produce; and each one of them, whether as the producer or the spirating one in relation to the product and the one spirated, that is, the Spirit, has a relation: that is to say, with the distinction of begetting and birth preserved. For the Spirit does not come from the Father and the Son in so far as they are two distinct things, according to their relations, but in so far as they are one. Furthermore, if anyone, since they are one in respect of that which is one, while attributing that one thing to the Spirit—who is of the same essence—also wishes the Spirit to be from himself; yet, just as the Son is one with the Father according to essence, and the Father indeed begets the Son, while the Son does not beget himself, yet he is not on that account of a different essence than the Father: so also the Holy Spirit, existing of the same essence with the Father and the Son, is nevertheless not from himself. For there is a common nature in each of the persons, according to its own property. In the Father, indeed, as having it from no one, yet giving it to others by begetting; in the Son, however, by receiving it in being born from the Father; in the Holy Spirit, however, by receiving it in proceeding, that is, from the Father through the Son. If anyone, therefore, wishes him also to produce, he will either be the Father; and how then from the Father? Or he will be a producer, and how then the Spirit? For the procession being removed, regarding the substance which he has, the order and relation according to cause and causality, and his very being a person, will all be taken away. Therefore, for him to produce will not have the character of being, as it were, contrary to the substantial nature of his property.

Furthermore, they think that another absurdity follows from this, and they say: "If the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, the Son will be greater than the Spirit according to a cause, and he [the Spirit] will be third from the Father." And whereas the Son is indeed more similar to the Father, inasmuch as he exists from him without an intermediary, the Spirit is truly more unlike the Father, nor is he so much the same as the Son. He will also be minor to the Son, inasmuch as he is connected to the Father through the Son, who is greater. And the Son will have a smaller distance to the Father; but the Spirit, a greater [distance], especially since he is the cause of no one. ^B Similarly, he will be equal to both, and in nothing distant or dissimilar. But just as the Father is not more perfect than the Son, because the former is the cause and the latter is the caused, nor does he on that account differ from him, even if he is called second to him by reason of cause (for the divinity in both is one): so also the Holy Spirit, even if according to his single and simple procession from the Father through the Son he is referred both to the Father and the Son as to one producer and spirator, whose Spirit he is, and is called their breath; yet he will not be less than the Son, nor less than the Father, even if he is joined to the Father through the Son, otherwise the Son also would be unlike the Father in that he is caused; and if not so as the Spirit, yet according to the rationale of proportion.

And just as the Father is asserted by most of the Fathers to be greater than the Son by reason of cause, and yet the Son is not on that account lesser than the Father: so also the Son, even if he is called greater than the Spirit, not for that reason will the Spirit be lesser than him. Wherefore the great Basil also said: "Even if he succeeds the Son in order and dignity, he is not of an alien nature." For these things are said on account of the order and relation of the cause and the caused toward one another. But order, and having properties in relation to something else, does not cause a difference of natures. For, by way of example, because one is a friend, or a neighbor, or a teacher, nothing is added to him in himself, so that on account of such a condition he might be more perfect in himself according to essence. Nor, if someone has a son and a grandson, will he be for that reason the third, or more or less similar to his grandfather according to essence than his son is: if this happens in human affairs, much more so in the divine persons, where one nature is asserted, and besides the sole difference regarding cause and causality, there is no other distinction.

To these things, they also add another argument, and say: "If the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is perfect, then the procession from the Son must of necessity be superfluous." And here, if it were said that there are two processions of the Holy Spirit, perhaps this argument would have weight. ^C But since even they who affirm that he proceeds from the Son deny that there are two, and confess that they are one in number, it is ridiculous to infer a conclusion against those who deny the premise. For the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is one and the same, and he proceeds perfectly from both, according to those who have said that he proceeds from the Father through the Son. And since the rationale of the one proceeding is that he is from the Father through the Son: and neither will the Father produce the Holy Spirit alone (for he would not be proceeding if he were without an intermediary from the First), nor the Son alone, for he would not be said to proceed from the Father through the Son, but he is from the Father through the Son and from the Son, as if from one reality, as has been said often already: therefore, the great Athanasius also said: "For this reason, he is also said to proceed from the Father, because he is from the Son; otherwise he would not be proceeding, but would either not be a person, if it be lawful to say this, or he would be the Son": ^D although this absurdity follows them nonetheless.

For if the Holy Spirit is sent perfectly by the Father, it will be superfluous for him to be sent also by the Son; but if he is sent imperfectly, then the Father is not perfect. And if all things were created perfectly by the Father, what necessity was there to say: "All things were made through him"? But if imperfectly, they will nevertheless loosen their tongues in blasphemy against the Father. But those who posit two processions necessarily fall into absurdities.

Furthermore, those who confess only one production of all things from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, and one mission, and gift, and giving of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (for it is asserted by the theologians that he is sent by a single giving and gift); furthermore, they confess one who inspires, ^A while preserving the difference between them: no harsh or difficult conclusion follows them. The same must be said regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit; for just as what is said, that all things were made through the Son, commends the unity of will: so also, that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son demonstrates the unity of his substantial procession and production.

Moreover, they think it necessary to confess that the Holy Spirit is composite, for those who admit that he proceeds also from the Son: and this, because he must receive from both; and if there are two from whom he receives, he will be entirely composed of two.

But this objection should first of all have been leveled against the holy Fathers. For they are the ones who explained the statement: "He shall receive of mine," as meaning "from the Son," and who said that he receives and hears from the Father and the Son, as we taught above.

Next, the Holy Spirit does not exist as one thing and receive another from the Father and the Son; or receive one thing from the Father and another from the Son; or if anyone desires a composition *per se*, he receives nothing other than essence and being and what is; but the being and essence of the Holy Spirit, and what he is, is something one and simple: or because of those who give or produce, the Father and Son are one. For the Holy Spirit is not asserted to be so in as much as they are two, but in as much as he is one from the Father and the Son; but just as the Son is whole from the whole, so also the Spirit is asserted to be whole from the whole. Nor is the Father one whole and the Son another whole, but according to the position of the faith, it is one whole, while the distinction in begetting and being begotten is preserved. In no way, therefore, is it permitted to conceive of composition, even if God were more than three persons, there would be no necessity for composition, and that he should receive the order of procession from each individually. For composition is judged not by the multitude of those who give, but from the difference of those who give and of the things that are within; but if what is given is difference, and what is within must differ: then that which consists of such things will be composite, which has no place in the Holy Spirit.

And they also proceed to ask this, as if it were inevitable: ^B Is the Holy Spirit from the essence or from the substance? For if from the essence, because the Holy Spirit is of the same essence with the Father and the Son, then the Holy Spirit is that very being, as is clear from what was stated above. Furthermore, the Father's essence is the Father's person, just as the Son's essence is also the Son's person, with the substances [hypostases] being intimated through the name of the Father and of the Son; for Father and Son are names of the substances; but through the name of the essence, the essence itself appears. For essence is not without substance, nor is substance without essence; for substance is said to be common with what is proper; yet it does not follow that because the Holy Spirit is of one essence with the Father and the Son, that he therefore necessarily produces himself, or the Son, or another Spirit. For it has been said that nature operates according to the property of the person in which it is.

Therefore, since the Father and the Son, or the Mind and the Word, are said relatively according to their own property, it follows that they also have the Spirit; for the property that follows the Mind is to bring forth from itself the Word without an intermediary, according to the process of intelligence. For otherwise a mind would be without a Word, and a Word without a mind that is intelligible and rational, such as God is primarily and supremely; it follows also that He has the Spirit, which is called by the theologians will, or charity, or whatever one chooses to call it, it has been shown above: because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Mind through the Word, according to the process of charity; for whom the Mind understands through the Word, Him it also loves and wills; and it is not possible for it to be otherwise. Thus, therefore, the will, or love, and affection proceeds from the Mind through the Word; with the process from the Mind through the Word indeed being ^C thought of beforehand, just as we say the cause is thought of before the caused, even if it is asserted to exist simultaneously: because one thing is what is continuously from the first, and another is what is through that which is continuously from the first.

Although, even if we call the Father the first cause, and the Word consequently, and say that the Son is born from the Father without an intermediary, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Therefore, according to the substantial properties of the persons, it follows that the Father and the Son—however one may wish to call the divine persons—also have the Spirit. Therefore, the Spirit is also called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, and the Spi-

- ^A rit is likened to their breath, according to Athanasius, and is spoken of relatively toward the Father and the Son, as has been demonstrated; just as proceeding and inspired in relation to the one producing and inspiring: and it indicates also what is begotten from the Father, so that the relation toward the Father and the Son is also reduced, as it were, to one producing and breathing; for which cause they are thought of simultaneously with one another, according to the habit of their relation: for he who says the Spirit, simultaneously comprehends in thought the one whose Spirit it is. Thus, therefore, it is a necessary consequence, according to their substantial properties, that the Father and the Son have and send and are the source of the Holy Spirit; and the teachers of the Church attest to these things. Gregory the Theologian indeed says: "For it was not fitting that either the Son should ever be lacking to the Father, or the Spirit to the Son."

Saint Anastasius of Antioch, in his own dogmatic book, says: "The Holy Spirit appears simultaneously with the Father and the Son, just as with the mind and the word." Damascene also says: "But it is necessary that the Word also have the Spirit." We likewise show the great Basil, in a certain chapter against Eunomius, saying: "If anyone says the Spirit is from God, he must not even deny the Word."

Since, therefore, it is a necessary consequence of the property of the Word that it should have the Spirit—yet all things that the Father has, the Son also has; but if the Father did not have it, the Son would not have it either; and if He did not have it, there would be neither Word, nor would it be from the Father; for the Word must also have the Spirit, as the master (38) most rightly said: If anyone says the Spirit is from God and the Father, he must not deny the Word; since, however, the Father has it, the Son also has it. For the Holy Spirit appears simultaneously with the Father and the Son, just as with the mind and word, and according to the same manner—for thus the saints say. Then, concluding, he infers: "How, therefore, can those things which are inseparable be separated, namely, the Word from God, and the Spirit from God through the Son?"

Likewise the great Athanasius says: "Because the Spirit is not outside the Word." And again: "It would also be impossible for the Spirit to be glorified in the glory of the Trinity, if the reason for His procession were not from God through the Word." The saint was here speaking of His natural and substantial procession, according to which the Holy Spirit exists and subsists. For He is not outside the Word; as if to say: He does not subsist without the Word; for through it He proceeds from the Father. These things, therefore, are so, and whatever other things have been said about this: but to the Holy Spirit, according to His own substantial property, it follows that He exists from the Mind through the Word. For this is the terminus of the one proceeding, or the Spirit, according to which He also has, in Himself, the person as subsisting. In short, there is one and the same essence of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: in the Father, indeed, it is paternal, that is, without cause, with the property of begetting added, according to the terminus of paternity; ^B in the Son, however, it is in the manner of a son, that is, causally, with the property of birth added, according to the terminus of nativity; but in the Holy Spirit it is processively, that is, causally, with the property of procession preserved for Him.

As, therefore, the Father would not be the Father if He were also the Son to the Son—for so the Son would also be the Father, and a confusion of persons would result—and certainly, since there is one essence to the Father and to the Son: and just as the Son would not be the Son if He were not from the Father without a medium, that is, by being begotten; so also the Holy Spirit would not be the Spirit if He were not from the Father through the Word. For if He were from the Father without the medium of the Word, He would be by being begotten, and consequently, the Son. And just as the Son, by the communion of nature with the Father, begets neither the Father nor Himself, for that would indeed be beyond the terminus of the Son, through whom He is personal, so also the Holy Spirit, through identity of nature with the Father and the Son, and their communion, will not have production; for otherwise the proceeding Spirit would cease to be; and whether He were the Father by begetting, and how from the Father? or a producer, and how the Spirit? and finally, if He were indeed the cause of the Son, consequently there would be a Son from the Father through the Spirit, and He would be third from the Father, according to the personal order; which is certainly beyond the terminus of the Son and of the Spirit.

But neither can He be the cause of Himself. For nothing is the cause of itself. For thus it would contain a contradiction, according to the same thing. Nor can He be the cause of another Spirit. For by this reasoning, the Trinity would not be God: and at the same time, neither has our faith handed down to us the Spirit, or the Spirit of Himself, or the Spirit of the Spirit. For indeed, if we have exceeded the Trinity, nothing will prevent us from looking for a fifth and a sixth person in the divine. To will these things, therefore, is the act of men who strive to take away what has been handed down concerning the Holy Trinity, and who, from the opposite side, blaspheme it. For it is not a multitude of persons, but the number has progressed only to the Trinity.

Wherefore, the Holy Spirit is indeed from the essence of the Father and of the Son, or from the substance of the Father and of the Son, according to the handed-down reason, not in so far as they are two substances, but for the reason that the Father and the Son are one, namely, in producing, which is common to both, as we have often already said; and hence, there will be no gluing together of the Father and the Son; for it is not substantial to produce; nor are the Father and the Son one substance; nor are they two ^D principles, for there is one producer. For he who is produced is produced from the Father through the Son, and proceeds in one procession. Nor is He the cause of the Son; for this is beyond the terminus of His own procession. For He Himself is through the Son. Nor of Himself, for nothing is the cause of itself. Nor of another person; for the Trinity of persons is God. And yet He is not minor to the Son. For even the Son, existing as causal, and second from the Father according to the personal order; yet not on that account is the Fa-

Father minor, nor even the Son more advanced, ^A nor is the Father prior, since He is from nothing. For these things are according to substantial relations, which do not induce a difference of natures.

These things being thus elucidated, and while the Father indeed exists "from nothing," the Son from the one and only Father, and the Holy Spirit from the First through the mediator, the Third is joined to the First through the mediator. For indeed the mediation of the Son preserves the honor for the Only-Begotten himself, and does not in the least exclude the Spirit from the natural habit towards the Father, as Gregory of Nyssa says; and thus according to the sentiment of the great Basil, both the substances [hypostases] are granted, and the pious dogma of the unique princedom does not fall. And so the discourse has returned to us to the beginning; since we began with the order of the holy Trinity, we have arrived at that same order again.

If, therefore, these things being granted, nothing is taken away from the established things, and those things which are comprised by the common confession of faith, and all things harmonize with the principles of faith and the sentiments of the saints; and the truth for those who confess the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son opens itself on both sides, namely from the proper reasons and those produced according to themselves: for us indeed that which we had initially established will receive its end. It is evident, however, that those who confess the Holy Spirit from the Father alone are frustrated in the truth; for they take away the order of the Trinity itself, through which He is indeed another, from the First, and hence they mix and confuse the discrete and supersubstantial name, and the thing of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, ^B and by saying that the Holy Spirit is from the Father without a mediator, they take away that He is even properly and substantially the Spirit; for with His substantial procession removed, according to the reason of the one proceeding, either the Spirit will not be proceeding, or according to the process of birth, He will be the Son, according to which the Son is born from the Father without a mediator.

Furthermore, the only-begotten Word of God, and the uniform seal of the Father, and the immobile and immutable figure, and He who out of the whole perfectly shines out from the whole from the Father, and the immutable image, and the definition of the Father, and the Word, those who deprive Him most of all of paternal goods, exclude the identity which He has to the Father, and the perpetual constancy; which is the Arian impiety. And since he who does not honor the Son, does not honor the Father either, as the Lord Himself says: *He who sees me, sees the Father: for all things which the Father has, are mine*; they will be forced to confess neither the Father by nature, nor the true and perfect Father, unless the Son be similar to the Father, and in Himself perfectly indicate the Father, from whom He proceeded: besides being the Father alone, according to the sentiment of the saints. For he who does not behold the Holy Spirit in the Son, will not behold Him in the Father either. For he who sees the Son, sees the Father. Indeed, according to the great Athanasius, since He is said to proceed from the Father, for the reason that He is from the Son, he who denies Him to be from the Son, will not confess Him to be from the Father either. If it will be thus, He will be in no way proceeding ^C nor will He be the Son, as it has been said: and there will be two sons in the Trinity, being in no way different from each other, and thus the habit towards each other, and the discretion will be taken away; for we have received from the saints that the divine persons are discerned only by the reason of the cause and the caused, and the Word being subdivided from the cause, the holy Trinity has nothing in itself unless it be concordantly. Thus, therefore, they take away the series of the most blessed Trinity and the indissoluble bond of order, and by the things which they say, they depose individual divine persons, both in congruent dignity and in proper substance: or they cast them down entirely. Obliquely, however, a blasphemy of this kind looks to the Son, which drags many other absurdities with it. For one thing conceded, he says, many ineptitudes follow. And if indeed they do not confess these things with their mouth, nor assert that they think so, even if they do not wish to, they are dragged into it. And if they confess the Son as consubstantial, yet they say those things from which this is taken away. For it does not suffice to deny absurdities, or not to say these things with the mouth, and to deny that they think so, unless they also beware of saying those things, which, being posited, necessarily follow with absurdities. For, by way of example, Sabellius indeed denied that he was Judaizing, but because he did not admit the Trinity of divine persons, he was impelled into it, even against his will. And the Jews indeed think that they honor God, asserting that they follow His law, as it was given to them, but they so expound the Scriptures, that the law neither even slightly benefits them. For it cannot save, and they dishonor God through the things which they say. For he who does not honor the Son, does not honor the Father; and: *He who does not believe on the Son, will not see life, but the wrath of God remains upon him*, as the Lord Himself says.

It is evident from these things that there is not some small difference between those who think the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and those who think He proceeds from the Father alone. For in the very beginnings of the faith, and those looking at the doctrine of the saints, there will be nothing differing. For as God joins them, everyone agrees about this. They indeed use the same words; these, however, contend for the same end of truth through other equivalent ones. As, for instance, if one should say *patriam*, the *solum patrium*, or a *rectam lineam*, *æquam*, or *parilem*, or *novem*, *ter tria*; and no contention is found among the holy Scripture, and the holy Fathers, if one should look to the truth of the thing alone: so much so that we are necessarily compelled to confess that the things which have been said piously and faithfully by all the saints, and by both sides, are consonant with each other, and congruent with the sacred letters.

Truly, for the exposition, or presumption, or will, or any other intention of those who use it, in total, and entirely, what is said differs, and has a manifest fight of contradiction. But it is clear that they indeed confess the Spirit as third from the Father according to the personal order; and they think that those who think otherwise resist the divine order, not observing that which they have received (continued on next page/column).

Lord has indeed handed down to us in the tradition of the saving baptism. These men, however, say that nothing hinders one from saying that the Son is born from the Begetter through the produced; and while the former confess the mediation of the Son with the teachers of the Church, the latter manifestly deny it. And the former believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son and continuously exists from the First through Him who is; but the latter affirm that He proceeds from the Father alone, that is, without mediation. And the former confess the one, timeless, and eternal procession of the Spirit, according to which He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and is recognized by those who are able to understand it in terms of temporal sequence; for that which proceeds from God does not proceed in time, even if it is seen to operate in time. The latter, however, say that what is called "proceeding through the Son" designates a certain temporal procession: and they contradict the Word Himself—the procession of whom all have accepted as distinctive of the substance of the Holy Spirit—while they are compelled to call that procession temporal; nay, from this, they are also compelled to say that certain temporal things accrue to the Son and the Spirit: to the former, that He gives; to the latter, that He is given and sent by the former.

And the former assert that the Son possesses all things that are proper and principal to the Father, except for the Father’s being the Father alone; that the Son exists in all ways except for paternity alone, and differs in that alone; and that all other things belong to Him in common and without any variation. The latter manifestly deny these things. And the former confess that the Son also has the Spirit of the Begetter, as a good of His own nature, just as the Father does. The latter, however, contend that while He does have Him, He does not have Him in the same way. And while the former affirm that the Spirit exists from the essence of the Son, for the reason that He is from the substance [hypostasis]: just as they also posit substance from the essence of the Father, and are compelled to speak of substance without essence and essence without substance. The latter, however, say that the expression "from the essence of the Son" signifies a cause, just as it is also said "from the essence of the Father," and likewise that the Spirit proceeds from the Son just as He does ^B from the Father; though the latter resist this very strongly. The former say that the divine persons are distinguished from one another solely by the reason of cause and the causal; the latter do not say it is solely by this. The former posit only generation as the substantial property of the Father; the latter wish there to be four such properties of His, from which come the being unbegotten and the being without beginning. The former say that to produce is in no way a substantial property; the latter, however, asserting that it is substantial, most obstinately wage war. The former confess that He does not proceed from the Father alone; the latter both feel and write that He does so from the Father alone.

I omit what clearly presents itself in the foregoing: the varied conflict and disagreement of both parties, and what follows from these things; all of which are ^C of the most open contradiction. And they themselves openly indicate that the difference is not small, while they abstain from one another and accuse one another of impiety: and they warn each to avoid and shun the communion of the others as though it were a ruin and a plague. Which, however, of the two parties is in harmony with the common accounts of the faith and the theology of the Fathers, has become clear from what is above, and is left to the conscience of those who are to read these things, with God as their witness, who sees all things: provided that anyone, having cast aside from his mind all prejudice and unreasonable hatred, and having not read merely some one small part and that negligently, but having traversed all things prudently and cautiously, should sit as a judge in the middle of both sides, and thus deliver judgment on all things. For the open account of the faith and the doctrine of the holy Fathers has been set forth. And thus, that they might become clearer, the same things have been repeated twice and thrice and often: and nothing curious, or redolent of ambition and vanity, appears in an exposition of this kind: nor is any web of syllogisms attached, unless something clearly follows which had been granted by all. But all the things aforementioned consist in the very words of the Savior and their expositions, as they have been compiled by the holy Fathers: so that no one may say that we make the cross of Christ of no effect in the persuasion of human wisdom, and that we make our preaching vain, by pursuing these subtleties, which are known even to young boys, and by hunting for glory and empty rumors from them.

For who is ignorant ^D that God is neither genus nor species, nor contained in these very things, but since He is the beginning of all things, and excels all things most superlatively, He is above all proofs? For although we know that God is, yet we are ignorant of what He is; yet not because we are ignorant of what He is do we therefore go blind in the deepest night of ignorance, so as to know nothing at all about our God: nor do we confess ourselves to be ignorant, as if He were something we knew, nor yet that we are entirely ignorant; for if we knew absolutely nothing, our faith would be empty; and if we confess those divine and arcane processions, how, however, that may be, we can neither say nor understand, as God Himself knows Himself.

However, we believe, having received it from the faith itself and the holy Fathers, that the one is a birth, the other a procession; that the one is the Begotten, the other the Proceeding; that the one is the Son, the other the Spirit; and that the one is from the First without medium, but that the other is from the First continuously through Him who is. With these things posited, we confess the Trinity, neither dividing the unity on account of the persons, nor confusing the persons on account of the unity.

For when the doctors discuss these things, they do not make the cross of Christ of no effect, nor do they announce the faith in the persuasion of human wisdom: although he who speaks in such a way, if he entirely removes syllogisms and reasoning, first of all takes away that which is proper to human nature, and the wonted speech and communion of men with one another; he shall be blamed—

and theologians also, whether they are discoursing about substantial matters or divine processes; nevertheless, he shall destroy the sentence of the Savior, who commands us to search the ^A Scriptures. For it is not obscure that he who searches the Scriptures, by gathering and reasoning, will read; nay, he will even observe that the Lord Himself, who looks diligently, reasons, when He introduces arguments, saying: "If I by the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you"; and: "If Satan casts out Satan, then he is divided; and every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation"; and again: "Therefore God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." And: "If you were Abraham's children, you would do the works of Abraham; but now you seek to kill Me; this Abraham did not do"; and: "If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give good things to those who ask Him?" and such like.

^B Then, he also destroys himself. For the things he said against reasoning, he says by reasoning: unless one were to pronounce that he is not reasoning, but rather wandering from reason when he says these things. For if he prohibits such reasoning only in God, he will destroy the entire theology of the saints, and especially that which they wrote more diligently and subtly while fighting against the errors of heretics, and which permits the examination of divine things to the senses alone, as is given to be understood. Otherwise, he admits a proof that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father alone, for which they strive with all zeal and ingenuity to prove that it is so; but to assert that He is also from the Son, he does not admit such a proof. For if that which is from the Scriptures, as he thinks, effects nothing, and he strives to show it, much more will he who also says that He is from the Son teach this more copiously and manifestly from the Scriptures, from the doctors, and from all who contend with ^C him. It is not, therefore, entirely evil to prove, but to use one's own principles for a proposition and to think that faith is proved by natural principles, that is evil and pernicious.

Therefore, he who uses the common principles of faith regarding that which is daily sought, when it is proposed concerning God, and the admitted sentences of the saints, to which subjects, with nothing of those that are asked being removed, he neatly concludes; as happens when the ancient Fathers discourse about the consubstantial and many other questions of faith: nonetheless, it must be confessed that that conclusion is also the sense of Scripture, hanging from those manifest principles, and from the causes whence it was drawn, and that it must be called theological, and that it is from those things which are by revelation: just as geometric conclusions do not deviate from the principles of geometry; otherwise, very much of these things that are conceded from faith, and which were not openly ^D written, will perish.

But if someone should say: "If it be possible to find a syllogism concluding from the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son, and having both premises, I would most gladly accept this as most congruent with the truth." This person will surely find it clearly in what has been said: for the Son, receiving and hearing from the Father, has His being from Him. But the Holy Spirit hears and receives from the Son. The Holy Spirit, therefore, has His being from the Son. This major premise is indeed a sentence of faith; the minor, however, is that the Holy Spirit receives and hears from the Son: and this is from the principles of faith and the sentences of the Savior. Thus, therefore, the saints, as it has been shown, set forth this sentence. For this reason they also say that He has His being from Him, as one who receives and hears and announces from Him; and that He is from the Son, and proceeds from Him, and through Him, and proceeds from Him, and whatever else of this kind has been predicted. Therefore, since there is a sought-for syllogism, let him desist from contention, for I omit adding similar ones to this for the rest.

Indeed, if he thinks that every syllogism which does not have both premises from the Scriptures concludes falsely, he is both falsely suspicious himself, and he slanders the teachers of the Church who used such syllogisms for the truth in God; but this is certain, that which is born from something according to the essence is of the same essence as that which begat it: the Son is born from the Father, therefore the Son is of the same essence as He who begat Him. And this minor premise of ours, therefore, is true; for that which is begotten is of the same essence as He who begets; nor yet does the syllogism conclude something false in God, even if the Son of God is seen to be of the same essence with the Father more perfectly and excellently; for matter and all things that follow are very far removed from that. For unless the premises which are taken from our affairs cannot show whatever is sought in God, because the Creator excels the creatures by a vast distance, the conclusion is already false and contrary: for thus truth would conflict with truth, and God, who is truth, would collide with truth, so that neither would the invisible things of Him be seen from visible things, nor would we behold the Creator from the beauty of the creature. For these things would rather keep one away from the truth, to which he wanted to lead men through these things. And we say these things, not because we used the art of syllogisms in the foregoing, as if we were now wishing to purge ourselves; for we have said before that we have simply set forth the dicta of the saints; but because many, as if it had been conceded by those discoursing that God is subject to natural principles, are thought to say something through these, and they deceive the simpler folk. But the length of this volume also must be restrained. The rest, God willing, let us discourse upon in the following, fourth and final, book.

BOOK FOURTH

Since, therefore, with the help of Christ, and with piety itself as our guide, it has been truthfully proven that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, it ought not, in truth, to be surprising if that phrase has been added to the symbol of the common faith; but rather, this must be diligently inquired into: whether that addition be true or false. For those who forbade an addition also prohibited the writing of an addition to the faith or of corrupted dogmas. For in the Synod of Ephesus it says: Having read the Symbol of the Nicene Council, they decree in common that no one is henceforth permitted to write, or to propose, or to deliver any other faith to those who come to the Church from the Jews, or from the Gentiles, or from any other heresy; and whoever shall have presumed to do this, let him suffer these and those penalties. They said "another faith." But to pronounce others for the sake of any necessity, and more clearly and manifestly, when some hold positions contradictory to the Catholic faith, does not at all violate the one faith itself. Therefore, it is not forbidden to explain the common faith; but to introduce another, or a contrary one, is forbidden, as the very letters themselves testify; nor is it forbidden to any men that anyone of them—writing a proper Symbol for himself here and there, and separating some from the common confession, and baptizing them with this—should form conventicles, such as were taking place in great numbers at that time.

^A Furthermore, the Church has not taken away from itself the license and power of teaching, and of dictating to others what is true and salutary. For if, later on, as new blasphemies arose day by day, it had not added to the terms of the faith those things which would discern the pious from the impious; then it would either be necessary to confess everything, and then for that to be added most fully to the confession of the faith, and to suffice for warding off future novelties of words; and henceforth for it to be not at all permitted for future councils to make decrees about the faith: or else [one must hold] that the Church was indeed able to determine dogmas at the beginning, and to add some things and remove others, but later on lost this power. But that this first point is not true, the councils that took place subsequently testify: which, in fact, would never have gathered if those first ones had satisfied the needs of future scandals; for it is God's [alone] to foresee the future. Individual councils, however, intent upon the present danger, fight against heretics, they do not repel the future. For this is uncertain. That, however, is present and pressing. From which it becomes evident that councils were afterwards usefully and necessarily brought together, as often as the necessity of the Church urged it. For to think that the same power does not always, and in the same way, belong to the Church, is the act of those who take away the mysteries of the faith, especially when the Savior said that He would be with it even until the consummation ^B of the age. If, therefore, there had been sufficient provision for all future dangers for those at the beginning, there would have been no need afterwards for convening councils: it must be thought that the Church has this same power also for all times, and that, otherwise, if this liberty were taken away, it would not mean small losses, but that ultimate ruin would necessarily follow, if it were not permitted to the Church to decide, write, and define concerning the faith.

From what has been known in the past, it is clear that it was not the addition of a word, but the writing of another faith that was forbidden, and that the Church has taken away the power of deciding about the faith not from itself, but from individual men. For it would not have added anything at all to the terms of the faith in subsequent councils if it had deprived itself of that power. For otherwise, those who say these things would also subject to anathema those who gathered at the Nicene Council, who added not a few things to the Apostles' symbol, and those who later gathered at Constantinople, who themselves are likewise proven to have added some things to the Nicene Symbol; and indeed some to have taken things away, with no one accusing them, because it seemed good to do so. For who is ignorant that the remaining councils thereafter added or changed some things otherwise, whenever these or those necessities and cases required it?

^C Furthermore, we accept the sanctions of the councils concerning the faith just as we do the Symbol, which are comprised within it. But even though the blessed Paul says: "Even if an angel should preach a gospel to you besides that which I have preached, let him be anathema," the Fathers nevertheless added "consubstantial," even though no one before them had handed down this term. For which reason they were also argued against by those who contradicted, that it was not to be found in the Sacred Scriptures. They added it, however, comparing the sense of the letter, and constantly fighting against the adversaries according to the theologian Gregory, who says: "We are not fighting about words and names, provided the syllables lead to the same understanding." And certainly, they are not subjected to the anathema of Paul on account of an addition of this kind. For every synod, gathered for the refutation of blasphemers, sets forth a definition of the faith, lopping off new dogmas by that which is added to the old words. For thus the matter stands. If, indeed, it were possible for the Church to remain unmoved in its ancient principles without any contradiction from those ^D who wish to attack the common faith, there would have been no necessity to add anything at all; but it would have sufficed for the confession of faith, that the Symbol composed by the holy apostles from the beginning remain brief, and at the same time simple.

^A Since, however, the first Arius presumed to drag the Son of God from the essence of the Father—a thing which had not been written openly in the apostolic symbol—to the effect that the Son is of the same essence as the Father, and since a pestilence of this kind was creeping through the body of the Church and this plague was being poured out upon many, the Fathers who gathered at Nicaea, having care of the truth and of the faithful, composed another Symbol, and added the *consubstantial* to it; and that the Son is begotten of the Father before all ages, not made, and is true God from true God, and those things which they then added, when the apostles had said only that he was born of the Father.

And those who first gathered at Ephesus expounded a term of faith by which the blessed Virgin is proclaimed to be the Mother of God. For the Virgin had been called only "blessed" in the symbol. For even if that was not added to the Symbol, nevertheless we venerate that term of the Symbol, accepting this kind of word and its meaning as having been most rightly placed, and confessing it, and cursing those who deny it; to whom we show no greater rigor concerning the Symbol than the entire synod, gathered for the refuting of blasphemies, showed—expounding a term of faith, and by the words which it adds to the ancient ones, eliminating new dogmas.

Furthermore, the great Basil in his *Rule to the Monks* concerning the faith of the holy Fathers, which, as he himself says, could not be falsified or adulterated, when he promised that he would deliver it, omitted many things that are set down in the Symbol of faith, and said nothing about the Holy Spirit, neither that he proceeds from the Father nor that he proceeds through the Son; but holding only that he believes in the Holy Spirit, with certain testimonies of Scripture added concerning the Holy Spirit, he was entirely silent on him proceeding from the Father: since he had proposed to add nothing, nor to take anything away, thinking that in those things which he had said, those things which he left silent were also comprehended.

From these things it clearly stands that those who forbade taking anything away or adding anything, forbade not the addition of a word, but the edition of another faith; otherwise no council would be immune from charge. ^B And it stands [evident] as one thing, that while it is indeed proper for the faithful to reach for, and to recur to, that which is not written and to prior things for the sake of inventions of novelty—covering up iniquity at the same time under the pretext of religion, and striving to introduce it—indeed individual heretics, who have introduced one corruption of the faith after another, have deservedly forbidden addition, so that their craftiness might not be argued by it: which, of course, the holy Fathers devised against their ruin as a most potent medicine, and by which they might distinguish the infidels and the impious from the pious and faithful, and by which the pure and immaculate faith of the Church might be preserved.

These things were so; and the faith seemed then to be abundantly fortified, when a little time later an impiety raised itself against the divinity of the Holy Spirit. For there were those who said that the holy Fathers in Nicaea had established things best concerning ^B the faith, and had proclaimed the Father as God; and likewise had honored the Son with equal praise; but had not called the Holy Spirit God. The Fathers gathered at Constantinople, and composed the symbol which is read now. And when the Fathers of the Nicene council had said only that they believed in the Holy Spirit, and had added nothing more, these men appended those things which are added concerning the authority and deity of the Holy Spirit. Nor did they only add, but they also subtracted. For when those men had said, "Begotten of the Father," that is to say, of the essence of the Father, these men retained only "begotten of the Father"; and you will find a great difference altogether in these three Symbols, if you attend to the words and names. Yet, on account of that difference, neither are those who gathered at Nicaea thought to have composed a different faith than that which they received from the Apostles, nor did those who were later at Constantinople think otherwise than the faith of the Fathers who were at Nicaea. Gregory the Theologian, who took part in this synod, testifies to this, writing thus in his epistle to Cledonius: "We have never preferred, nor can we prefer, in honor or anything else, any faith to that which was composed by the holy Fathers who gathered at Nicaea for the destruction of the Arian heresy; but we are, and shall be, of that faith, by the mercy of God. We have elucidated only this, that little had been said concerning the Holy Spirit, because at that time a question of this kind had not been stirred up, although it behooves one to know the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, of one divinity, by confessing the Spirit also to be God."

In the council at Chalcedon also, those who were gathered, as if giving an account for these things, say that they neither added these things to the faith of the Nicene Fathers, as if saying something new and various; nor that they completed what had been left by them, but that they made the understanding of the Fathers concerning the Holy Spirit clearer by testimonies of Scripture against those who were striving to take away his dominion. ^C But we see that they themselves, who gathered there, added to the Nicene Symbol. For while those men said only that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, these men added: "Consubstantial with the Father according to deity, consubstantial with us according to humanity," correcting the opinion of Eutyches in this.

^D And against those who say that they who first set down and defined concerning the faith were holier and more honest than those who are always adding something, they give an account for themselves and for the truth of their silence, bringing forward the cause of the former Fathers, namely that those men said nothing because the tares of wickedness had not yet arisen to such a degree: but if these men were now present, or if scandals of this kind had sprouted up then, they themselves would have added these things too, just as we do now, and would not have abstained at all from a name by which they could have restrained your tongues. And so, finally, the Nicene Fathers stood against Arius and his accomplices with the added *consubstantial*: with him indeed having recourse to the unwritten, and objecting the sanctity of the apostles, who had written nothing of this in their Symbol; but to those men who were bringing it against them, [it was] that the addition of a word is nothing alien to their intention. Moreover,

^A if, while they were still present, this question had been stirred up, or if they were present with us now, they would never have spoken or written anything differently than we do now, as we most firmly assert.

So also at Constantinople, against those who denied that the Holy Spirit is God, and who objected that nothing of his deity was written in the Nicene Symbol—which they asserted was the only thing to be followed—they answered concerning the addition. And to the heretics, who were promising that they would be quiet if they removed the additions to the Symbol, the teachers of the truth replied: It would indeed be best if, as before, the pure simplicity of the faith were preserved without anyone struggling against it, for there would be no need for any addition; but because some have arisen teaching the corruption and novelty of the faith, it is necessary that an addition be made; and that it must remain as it is written, so that by it those who have chosen to deal maliciously may be detected, and by the sign of this addition may be distinguished from the entire [faith]. And at the same time, this is so that we may not seem by silence to have acquiesced in the errors of those who blaspheme against the addition. If therefore you understand it piously, you will also confess the wording; but otherwise, we indeed receive it as pious and most congruent with the sentiment of the holy Fathers; but you will be cut off from the integrity of the Church.

Thus Nestorius, denying the term Θεοτόκος, that is, Dei Genitrix, asserted that it was not fitting to transgress the statutes of the Nicene council and the Symbol; to whom it would have been sufficient to say, "Christ born of the Virgin Mary." But Cyril meets him, arguing and saying that it is in vain that he flees to the Fathers and the Symbol, as if it were not lawful to add what they had been silent about, asserting the cause why they had not spoken openly of Mary as Dei Genitrix was the ignorance of the future; and [asserting] that those who had spawned this absurdity had not yet arisen: For the Fathers, he says, would have added it, if they had known that some were about to rush into such madness. And he compels Nestorius even to accept the chapters written by him, and to confess that he would hold to what they contained: as if the confession of the Symbol did not suffice for him, he threatened that unless he remained in those things which were written there, he would cast him out of the priesthood and from the Church.

And henceforth ^B we shall find that all councils up to the seventh have responded in this way. But if every addition to the Symbol is to be deemed a heresy, then Arius, Macedonius, Nestorius, and the others who barked rabidly against the truth will have to be praised, because they did not accept the additions, on account of a feigned and painted reverence for antiquity. On the contrary, the whole Church is culpable (to these men).

But many other things also must necessarily be confessed according to the faith which are not contained in the Symbol. For the blessed Virgin Mary is not there called Dei Genitrix, but only Virgin. Nor is it there [stated] that the Word of God united to himself the man he assumed according to one substance; nor that Christ descended into the regions below, which had been written in the Apostles' Symbol. Nor is the Holy Spirit asserted to be God.

^A What then? Shall we on this account not believe these things? Are they to be derived necessarily from those things which have been written, or shall we stand by simple words, as they have been handed down by the councils? But that is indeed the argument of those who contend about names; and they think everything that is accepted beyond the letter is a scandal: according, namely, to the baseness of the Jews, who always sit close to the letter of the law. Which even the divine Dionysius says is irrational and perverse, to attend not to the virtue of the intention, but to the vocabulary.

Furthermore, it is for those who wish to make the councils void to minimize, and not to accept, the definitions set forth by the synods as if they were a common Symbol. And therefore, whatever they have established, just as the Symbol, must be received. For surely, shall we honor what is contained in the Symbol, and not honor that which depends upon its end, or which is said after its reading, or which is set forth in their definitions? For this is at once stupid and irrational.

But if we venerate the holy councils, it is fitting to venerate their sentiments as well, and in such a way that we are most certain of these things, that we confess them with complete confidence, and that we execrate those who deny them. For he who denies the sentiments set forth in the synods will be liable to the penalties of those who deny the Symbol. Absolutely, we shall honor those things which are not inscribed in the Symbol just as if they were written. And hence, if the rationale of truth requires it, if a case has necessarily impelled it, it makes no difference if ^B even those things which are not written are confessed, when in the Symbol they are encompassed and comprised.

Wherefore, neither is the addition to be objected against those who also confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But, as it has been said, it must be examined whether this is true. For, besides the fact that it is necessary—if we wish to observe those things handed down commonly by the theologians concerning the Trinity—for the established principles of the faith, to profess also that he proceeds from the Son; we have some holy men who say he is from the Son, and has his being from him, and proceeds from him naturally and essentially, as his own natural and essential operation. And that, just as He is from the Father, so also He is from the Son, in the same manner. Others truly say that he proceeds naturally through the Son, and receives through him and from him, and proceeds from the Father through the Son, and furthermore even proceeds from the Son: and whatever other things have been predicted. For thus they themselves interpreted that evangelical saying: "Who proceeds from the Father," and adding the complex term of proceeding, they declared that he proceeds from the Father through the Son. Whom, surely, no one will be so insane as to dare to accuse of deceit. For they themselves are the ones who instituted the councils: through whom those things received strength and protection, and by them, whenever any question concerning the faith was to be solved, we are sent to their doctrine and magisterium, that we might suffer these and those things to be added to us, unless we accept them. Why do we not also blame the addition here, and deny that he proceeds through the Son, since that is written in the Gospel?

^A nor is it? But great Athanasius says, it is not possible to be in the glory of the Trinity, to have the Holy Spirit glorified, unless he proceeds from the Father through the Son; but also the seventh synod, and most holy patriarch Tarasius, and very many of the saints, in the confession of their faith, have insinuated that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Furthermore, if anyone should object to those who say that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son with that evangelical saying: *Who proceeds from the Father*, he does not oppose to them a contrary voice. For neither, if He is from the Son, does He cease to be from the Father; nor do these things objected in turn, subvert one another. Nay, as we have taught in many places, that which is said, "to be from the Father," also implies "to be from the Son." Nor, indeed, would it be said by the saints to proceed from the Father through the Son, if these things were mutually contrary. For if it had been said "from the Father alone," such an objection would have a rationale. But because it has been said only "from the Father," and this is held as confessed by both sides, it is superfluous and most vain to omit what they ought to have cared to show first—namely, that He proceeds from the Father alone—which is contrary to that which is "from the Son": to lead those who in no way deny this to take what is said, "from the Father," as though it were repugnant.

Therefore, once it is granted by both sides that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, we must now examine the remaining passages to see with which they more agree: with these, who say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or indeed with those who confess Him to be from the Father and the Son? For these indeed have many things consonant with their own confession, such as that which is said: *He shall receive of mine*; and: *Whom I will send*; and: *The Spirit of truth*; and: *The Father will send in my name*; and: *I and the Father are one*; and: *All things that the Father hath are mine*; and: *If I by the finger of God or by the Spirit of God cast out devils*. He breathed and said, ^B *Receive the Holy Spirit*, and six hundred such things. For the masters of the Church, induced by these, as was said above, held the aforementioned views concerning the Holy Spirit, and said He proceeds both through the Son and from the Son; but those who wish to say "from the Father alone" have no testimony at all for themselves; nay, even all the aforementioned things oppose them, and they have as enemies the holy Fathers, who interpreted them thus.

But if they object that it is not written "from the Son," first of all, *He shall receive of mine*, and all the things that have been said, tend to that; unless their ears have become utterly deafened to the great voices shouting out from the saints; then, neither is it written "from the Father alone." Therefore, they do not object that it is not written any more for themselves than against themselves.

But if, since the Son is said to be from the Father, and ^C He is believed to be alone from the alone, for that reason they also add to the Holy Spirit, since it is said He proceeds from the Father, [that He proceeds] from the alone, they themselves are proven to be adding [to the text], and they are not worthy to be heard when they accuse those who say [He proceeds] also from the Son as the cause of this addition. For the same are they themselves held liable. Then they will be compelled, if they confess the only-begotten Son as alone from the alone, according to the term of nativity, so also to confess the Holy Spirit—the procession from the Father through the Son being removed—to confess the only-begotten Son as alone from the alone, just as the Son is alone from the alone; for we do not say only "from the alone," but also "the only-begotten Son." For, certainly, just as in the Holy Scriptures He is called the only true Father, and because *no one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son*; and: *He that believeth in me, believeth not in me, but in him that sent me*; and: *My doctrine is not mine*; we are not compelled to distribute these things only to the persons in whom such things are definitely said; but "only true God" is congruently applied to both the Father and the Son; as if an objection is not being made to their substantial properties; but to know the Father and the Son and to be known by them is also distributed to the Holy Spirit; for the reason that to know is not an object pertaining to His substantial property, and similarly of other things. For where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, nothing prevents what is said from being congruent. Thus, neither if the Holy Spirit were said to proceed from the Father and "from the alone" were added, could this be validly denied to the Son. Now, however, when it is said simply "from the Father" and "from the alone" is not added, since to proceed does not conflict with the nativity and also befits the Son, and therefore is seen to be common to the Father and to the Son, it is most foolish in every way to snatch at the word, and by this to exclude the Son from the communion of the Father.

But either fulfilling the sacraments of the dispensation, or sparing the disciples, he does not mention His own, because perhaps they could not bear greater things about Him: *I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now*; or referring all things to His principle, from whom He Himself is, and all His things, as the theologian Gregory says; or even because it was necessary that this be believed on account of the supreme equality with the Father, He omitted to say this. For the Son is of the Father, and is the definition and Word of the Father.

Although from the superior sentiments, which are of equal value, it is not found that He has entirely kept silent about this truth which these men insistently deny, He declares. For there is a twofold way of saying what Scripture wills. Either by pure and proper names, as when He names the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; or when from things openly said, these are also—

^A inferred, just as the name "consubstantial" is believed to be in accordance with the understanding of Scripture, because it seemed to correspond necessarily, according to the understanding, with many things openly stated. It was said, indeed: "I and the Father are one" (John x, 30); and: "All things that the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner" (John v, 19); and things which are written in this form. And certainly, to those who look only at the letter, things contrary to that which was openly said would seem to appear: "The Father is greater than I" (John xiv, 28). But nevertheless, because from those things which were openly said, the consubstantial necessarily followed, it was indicated that it is true and in harmony with Scripture.

By a similar reasoning, that which is said, that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son, is not indeed written to the letter and openly set down in Scripture, but follows from those things which are openly said. But those things which follow by necessity from what is conceded must also be true. Just as in the sciences, the conclusions which follow the principles. For it is written: "The Spirit of truth" (John xv, 26). But the Son is the truth; and it is said that He hears from Him, and receives, and is sent, and is breathed forth; all of which ^B truly, while the teachers of the Church were explaining, they said that He proceeds through the Son, and to have His being from Him, as receiving from Him, and to be from Him, and to proceed, and the things which have been said before.

For if, because they are not said in words, we also reject their meaning, we shall surely cast away many things that are necessary and conceded, as has been said: but we will also cast away the very name of the Trinity, and substance, and persons, and the unbegotten, which is said of the Father, and consubstantial, because it is not written openly. And yet, if anyone should sit closely to the sounds of the letters, he will not even confess that the common faith of the Savior regarding the Holy Spirit is held in agreement in the Symbol. For there it is said to proceed from the Father; here, however, to proceed from the Father. But if, regarding the understanding, "from" and "by" do not differ at all, why do we not say that "from" and "by" do not differ from one another, when we hear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by the Son? Especially since the holy Fathers define that "by" and "from" do not differ in divine matters.

Truly, what need is there to dwell long on prepositions that have the same value, when we hear the saints most openly saying that He has His being from the Son, and is from Him, and proceeds? Therefore, those things which are openly set down in Scriptures must be believed with pious devotion. But those things which they did not say are not to be cast away hastily, unless a manifest absurdity is detected in them which would destroy the confession of the common faith. But if that is absent, these things are also to be accepted piously, especially when necessity compels it on account of those who strive to violate the truth of the faith, imitating in this matter the ancient doctors who, in difficult and urgent matters, necessary additions and those most ^C congruent with the sense of the Scriptures, dispelled those who were striving to scatter the flock of Christ.

And now also, even if it is not written in the Symbol concerning the Holy Spirit that He is true God from true God, if the Church, striving to repel that error when it came into doubt, had added this to the Symbol, it should not be thought to be blaspheming. For if everything had been written openly, no heresy would dare to lift its head. But now it is necessary that heresies also be among us, on account of the wickedness of some, that those who are approved may be made manifest. And "Search the Scriptures" (John v, 39) would not be said if all things were written lucidly and openly.

Therefore, and for the principles of the faith, and for the testimonies of Scripture not only not hindering, but truly for the most part helping, and openly showing this, and with the teachers of the Church openly asserting this in many places; and for those who deny it, necessarily falling into great absurdities: and for those who shake the reasons entirely handed down concerning the holy Trinity, all of which have been demonstrated by more things: that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son was added to the Symbol at a pressing time. For they say that after the first synod, a certain heresy pulled to the surface which applied the name of the Father to the Son, called in Greek *hyopatria* ([Υἱοπατορία]), saying: that the Son is the Father of the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit Himself is the grandson of the Father. On account of which, Damasus, who was then Roman bishop, having gathered a council, added to the Symbol that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; resisting, of course, those who said that He is born from the Son. For He who proceeds from the Father through the Son, and is said to proceed from the Father and the Son, certainly cannot be begotten from the Son. For in the holy Trinity, He who is from the First without a medium is the Son, according to the procession of birth. The Holy Spirit, however, existing from both, that is to say from the Father through the Son, according to St. Cyril, comes forth beyond the boundary of birth; for He is proceeding from the First through the medium. Therefore, by this addition, He repelled those who contradicted.

The ancient teachers of the Church attest to these things, sometimes refuting those who said that the Spirit was either a creature or the son of the Son, as the great Basil does when he says: "Not because He is not from God through the Son," and such things, by which they deny that the Son is the son of the Son, and say that He proceeds through the Son; and in part a certain historian by the name of Scylix (45), in that which he explained, wrote the cause and the time of the addition. ^D There are also those who say that some from the madness of Arius, when they wished to diminish the majesty of the Son, said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. These, when they wished to defend their blasphemous opinion, used the arms of piety against piety, shouting that it is not right that anything be added to the sanctions of the Nicene Council, and that the Son was not added to the Father in the procession of the Holy Spirit there. And saying these things, they were rending the Church, and from the ignorant and foolish, they were seizing the opinion of religion, so that they might seem to revere antiquity.

For proof of this is blessed Maximus in his letter to

Marinus, that this addition ^A was not made when the schism of the churches occurred, but long before, and perhaps even before his own time. It was, moreover, at the time when the Sixth Synod was brought together. Therefore, with urgent matters at hand, when this pestilence was gradually and slowly infecting certain parts of the Western Church, a fitting synod added to the Creed that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, to which the authority of the Roman Pontiff, which also strengthens other synods, would have sufficed.

Nor, indeed, is it to be wondered at that the Roman Bishop, the prince of the Church, having himself summoned a council of Western bishops, should have decreed this. For if provinces have often celebrated individual councils, and their authority is not thereby diminished, much more was he able to do this, with all the bishops around him, he who is proven to be the first pastor, the father of the whole Church, and the universal judge of all Christians, as apostolic antiquity calls this supreme prince, and as royal decrees establish him, and as the facts themselves proclaim—without whom it is strictly impossible for ecclesiastical matters to be handled and directed. Just as blessed Stephanus the Younger ^B stood against those who, because they maintained that all images should be destroyed, were called *iconomachoi*, when they had held a council at Constantinople, he asserted that it was not lawful for them to hold a council unless the Roman Bishop were presiding, either in person, or [if] others were sent by him. Indeed, from that Church, no opinion regarding the faith has ever flowed which the whole Church now condemns or anathematizes as blasphemous and harmful, when there have been great waves and many shipwrecks against the Church. For unless we accept these things, I do not know what valid and recognized things we shall accept, or what things, however most manifest and conspicuous, we shall not most impudently reject.

If, therefore, these things are true concerning him, without whom it is not possible for ecclesiastical matters to be decided, it matters little to decide upon them [whether one] convenes with few or with many; and at the same time, concerning a matter that is open and one that has been worn smooth by all the teachers of the Church—namely, the procession of the Holy Spirit—there was no need to summon the world, as if that question were highly ambiguous and, therefore, [needed to be] communicated to everyone. For those who had once perceived that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and that He is His immutable image, and has all things of the Father except only being the Father, and now heard that the Spirit of Truth is also of the Son and receives from Him, and now that He proceeds through the Son and is from the Son, just as He is also from the Father and has His being from Him, and other such things as were proclaimed—they could not doubt that He also proceeds from the Son, especially when they knew that those who concede such principles necessarily admit also that which follows from them. And the teachers of the Eastern Church, Athanasius ^A and Basil, say that the Spirit has [His being] from the Son, and by a rationale of cause they assert the Son to be greater than the Spirit; and Cyril, upon the Gospel of John, and in very many places in his works, proclaims this very thing, besides the teachers of the West, who in countless places say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one principle. There did not seem to be any need for the Eastern Fathers to suffer distress over things that had been granted.

Furthermore, if anyone asks why, since that addition is ancient, it was not also inserted into the Creed by the Easterners? First, indeed, because out of due subjection and reverence rendered to the Roman Pontiff and his Church according to ecclesiastical regulations, they were thought to neither differ in anything regarding the faith, nor to think to the contrary—which, indeed, was truly the case. Secondly, it was not necessary, as they had a right and fitting understanding of the Son and Holy Spirit, to read the Creed with the addition; [nor were they thought] to be of a contrary opinion, nor to consider those who read it with that [addition] to have fallen from the truth of the faith, and [they were considered] united with them. For even after the ancient schism, when unity had again been made for both Churches, the Latins did not compel the Greeks to read the Creed with the addition, or to use other ecclesiastical rites in their own manner, but only three things were required of them after the union was made. First, that they should make mention of the Roman Bishop in the diptychs, that is, in the canon of the Mass; second, that they should consider him the universal judge of all Christians, and fill his place according to custom. ^C Truly [they held] them to be rendering reverence to the ancient custom of the Church; third, that they should believe the Roman Church, in ecclesiastical dogmas, to be the mother of the faithful and a teacher of sound faith at all times. Other things were permitted to remain in their own places. But even now in Sicily, and in what was long ago called Great Greece, although very many Greeks dwell [there] and use the habits and rites of the Eastern Church, because they are subject solely to the Roman Church, they are not compelled to read the Creed with the addition; but only, as has been said, obedience is rendered to the Church, and since they are not of a contrary opinion, nothing more is required of them, the Latins judging that all other things are contained in this one thing; for our religion consists not in words, but in senses, according to Gregory the Theologian. ^D

If anyone objects to these things, that the Greeks ought also to have been called and to have communicated in the synod regarding the decision: first, indeed, since the matter was entirely known, it was not necessary to impose this trouble of gathering upon everyone, nor is it necessary for all to be present at all councils, but primarily the Father and Pastor of the Church. For if these things have been separated from the beginning by ecclesiastical laws, it is highly fitting that he be present and preside at council, either in person or through nuncios. For if he does not help, all things are empty and of yesterday; for without him, ecclesiastical matters cannot be handled and established; and it is agreed whether with many, or with few, that it pertains to him to fulfill it.

Others, however, need not all be called, especially those who are more remote, and whom either the length of the journey or other events of circumstances that frequently emerge might hinder. And these things, when there is no great urgency and when the question is clear, need not be debated before the whole world; since he himself can very easily summon a great part with them and, together with them, resolve and decide. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to scrutinize whether a person summoned was invited or uninvited; but rather to weigh whether what has been decreed is true; lest anyone seem to have no care for the truth, but only to take it ill that he was not invited; which is what these men do now, while they seek honors and the primacy, so that they might not be under the care and obedience of the Roman pastor, according to ancient custom, holding up the addition to the Creed as a ^A reasonable pretext.

But this is an open proof not of religion and faith, but rather of pride. For if they consider the addition impious, why, in the times of Saint Maximus and even before him, when the whole Western Church read the Creed in this way, did the entire East not refute this impiety, nor was it cut off from the Roman Church? But they did not do this; nay, rather, having gathered the sixth and seventh synods, they clearly approved this addition as pious; nor did they resent that they were not invited, as these men do now.

Why, then, are they not, like those men, content with what was decreed at that time? For either it is necessary to execrate those synods as having been formed by impious men; and thus, we together reject those who were in them, as holy: or else approve those, and those who gathered them, as pious and religious men. ^B But this signifies that our people at that time were in harmony with the Westerners. Wherefore, it was not necessary, as has been said, for them to be gathered; since either from the principles of the faith and the sentiments of the saints they had become convinced that the addition was most correct, or they had heard from those who added it the cause, the necessity, and the harmony throughout.

And our people, as can be understood, inquired in a more religious manner concerning the faith than they do now, which those at that time did not seek. For it is certain that they, as promoters of the truth and observers of legitimate subjection, yielded and inquired into nothing further. But we, seeking our own, under the pretext of church dogmas, contrive a schism, taking up the addition as an aid. And yet, our people, as long as they obeyed while observing the prescribed duty, believed there was no need to hold separate councils; since they knew the addition to be supremely useful and necessary. But afterwards, when they wished to be separate, having found that addition as a suitable cause for departure, as it seemed to them, they were unwilling to obey when called. For if they had come, they did not doubt that a judgment would be rendered against them, and that they would be compelled to render obedience to the Roman pontiff, whom they themselves shunned. Therefore, they were often called to the union of the Church; they demanded that the addition first be removed: to whom it was answered that if there had been no cause for the addition, it would not have been added from the beginning. For it was the case that when both Churches read the Creed without that addition, and the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son was kept silent among all in the Church, since there was no question about this.

But afterwards, when some were contradicting and, having posited definitions of the faith, were blaspheming the Son as lesser than the Father, because it was not written in the Creed that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son; and therefore were taking away the identity and immutability of the Son with the Father, that phrase was added for the declaration of the symbol: with the common consent of the Church ^C teachers, that it would be a sin to remove it, lest the contrary opinion of those contradicting have a place, and through such an abolition it appear to be true.

If, therefore, you agree with the truth, standing with us for this, then either recite it with the addition, which blocks the mouths of the blasphemous; or, reading without it, do not be of a contrary opinion, nor consider us blasphemers. For thus you will stand with the truth. For our religion does not consist in words, but in senses. And, if you wish, we grant you this much, that coming to an agreement with us, we may discuss this matter in common; and discuss together the sentences of the Fathers on this, by which this addition is proven to be true. But if you are of a different opinion, and utterly reject this addition: it is certain, indeed, that you err concerning the truth of the faith with the adversaries; and that this addition declares war on you and them together, since it was added precisely because of the contradictors.

Truly, just as for those who denied the Creed of the Nicene Council, or that which was subsequently published at Constantinople—for both were one, even if they seem to differ in words—it profited nothing to recur to the Apostles' Creed, as if it were safer and more religious; for those denying what had been edited with the addition, were denying that as well; for even the things that seem to have been added later are contained and comprised in the Creed of the holy apostles. Thus it will profit you nothing to boast of holding the Nicene Creed—even if you reject this addition which they handed down as connected and comprised in the Creed, and which they themselves would have added in its entirety, if that question had been stirred while they were living, or if such controversies ^D were present now, or if they had known those to be inclined to such madness.

But you do not recite it as it was posited by them, but with the addition. For once "from the Son," as it is said, is removed, it is clear that the addition is posited as being from the Father alone. For even if you do not say this in word, yet when speaking with God, while you say "from the Father," you also add "from the Father alone," and you offer such a faith, or rather such a faithlessness, to God, to whom our minds and hearts are open. For it is more valid to think than to speak.

^A but rather asserts that he might command a soldier in matters of war more than he commands the emperor. But these things are manifest proofs of pride, and they proceed from those who divide things irrationally.

These, then, were the answers given by our people to the Westerners when they demanded that the addition be abolished. And then, they say the same things, and call them in every way to union. But, neither now, nor before, have they chosen to assent to these things which are said. How, therefore, since they are of a contrary opinion, even when called, would they have wished to agree with those whom they deem to be blaspheming concerning the faith? But yet, even this was done, and that which they call an invitation, and a common synod, ^B whether with our people returning to their former obedience, or with those desiring to be taught concerning such an addition, or with those recognizing the truth by themselves, was gathered at Lyons, and openly concluded many years ago. There was present the Roman pontiff himself, the author of that convocation, and with him almost four hundred bishops. There were also present legates of the Constantinopolitan Church, who might fill their place. Then, therefore, as is evident from the written commentaries from there, in which both the names, and words, and dignities of those who had convened, and everything at all, have been committed to memory: it was commonly declared by all that this is the most ancient tradition of the Church, and is most highly necessary for the most salutary and true faith of the holy Trinity, reinforced equally by the dogma and doctrine of Greek and Latin teachers, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son alike, as from one principle. Moreover, all those ^C who then convened condemn and anathematize those who might subsequently attempt to introduce two principles, and to force this absurdity into the ears of the Church. That opinion, indeed, pronounced by the common votes of all, was digested in the same writings.

Nowhere, indeed, did anyone there feel indignation at the addition; but all things, both the voices and the actions which were performed at Lyons then, were true; and those of our people who were present at the council, and the legates, and the bishops, returned having confessed, having been allied, giving thanks to God with everyone for the common concord of the faith, in which they consented together upon the aforesaid three chapters.

And since they were joined in spirit, they were not forced to read the Symbol with the addition; but, just as in the times of the blessed Maximus, so then were things situated. For truly, since the common ^D opinion of both Churches, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, was promulgated to be true, and those feeling otherwise were condemned to a curse: it is certain, surely, that those who confess that same thing now are worthy to be asserted to love our Churches, and their opinion, as if of one

confession to embrace and contain; but those who deny that opinion, it is clear that they honor neither [the one nor the other]; and they have I know not what third Church, separate from both, and declaring war against both. ^A

It is clearly proven, therefore, that the synod they inquire after has already taken place, and that, since they were not among those who decreed it, the addition they seek is other than it is. Yet, if we concede that they were neglected, is it not an act of extreme contention and madness not to discuss whether the addition is true, and merely to be indignant and vexed because they were not summoned? And because they were not honored by that convocation, to dishonor God; and because they consider it to have been the case for those who were called that they were neglected, to deem it false, and to judge the truth of divine matters by their own maladies and passions? ^B For the Westerners ought rather to have been accused of disdain and contumely, or whatever human passion, if they deserved to be accused; not of blasphemy, and impiety, and those crimes than which nothing worse can be conceived. Yet, on account of their contempt, they ought not to have driven the sword into themselves, cutting themselves off from the unity of Christians, and wounding themselves perniciously and lethally; and, from these things which they blame against the doctrine of the holy fathers, [adding] what they themselves add against those of a different sentiment.

Since, therefore, it is not permitted to define and decide matters of faith by the Westerners alone apart, and to decree concerning all things otherwise than was thought, the reason stands. For that opinion was the cause for those fleeing obedience—due to pride and arrogance, and on account of the scale of the city, the dignity of the empire, the seeking of excuses, and the aspiring to primacy—because though called, they did not come, as has been said; it behooved them indeed to preserve the union until the end, with contentions set aside.

Now, however, they remained for no small time in the very union of the Church: but afterwards, those who considered the just subjection to be a yoke of slavery, having found a new emperor, ^C and having persuaded him—who was by nature prone to new things—to urge on freely and with whatever force he might, so that the perversion of the union might be given to them as a reward for the empire which, with their cooperation and by neglecting his brother, he had obtained. And thus, with all things perverted, they returned to their former contumacy.

Furthermore, by what logic would this man preserve the present union, or seek and recall the absent one, he who during the time of his empire deposed ^D four patriarchs, installing one and casting out another; which was not permitted to him, had he been returning to the Roman pontiff his due right, as the covenants of the union would have compelled? From this one thing, one may conjecture regarding the rest.

Moreover, if one should assert that this synod was violent, by the same reasoning we shall be compelled to overthrow the other synods also, rendering all things regarding what was conceded in them ambiguous, for the reason that in each one there were some who dissented, and after the pronouncement of the truth regarding the sentence, there were always some contradicting the truth.

Then, there has never been any synod gathered in the presence and with the approval of the Roman Pontiff, or another who fulfilled his position, of which all the sentences were not ratified. Conversely, regarding those which were convened without him and against his will, we know that most of the sentences passed were rejected and deservedly exploded, and we can easily show this. Hence, therefore, with him present and presiding, I do not see how they wish the sentences pronounced there to be invalid.

Unless by chance we say that the Council of Nicaea was also violent, partly because Constantine the Great was present, restraining those who contradicted with all his might: and partly because many who contradicted remained so even after the sentence was brought forth, and nevertheless continued to contradict: as we see to have happened in every one of the universal councils, yet we do not therefore dare to say that those sentences were either violently passed or invalid. Why so? Because the head of the Church was present, without whom ecclesiastical affairs cannot be directed and established, and who, if he is present at a synod with anyone, we believe that any sentence concerning faith flowing from there cannot be false, and is most true. For otherwise all ecclesiastical matters will be ambiguous; nor shall we be able to know more certainly what things are true, although why should we not rather say that the most violent thing is the destruction of that peace, which even overturns the decrees of the universal council, which the Roman bishop present approved? ^C

And certainly, in the universal synods, no sentence passed while he was present was ever reproved or rejected by any local synod or the audacity of anyone. Yet many of the venerable bishops complained about what was being done; to whom, on account of their honesty, and wisdom, and the dignity of their thrones, it was easily conceded: of whom also some left behind their contradiction against those things in their commentaries, while others endured publications, and prisons, and exiles for the sake of the true opinion and faith: through which, the peace of the Churches was made subject to the theology of the Fathers.

Truly, moreover, there have never been wanting from among us, even of those who appeared to be something, those who favored the Roman ^D Church, judging their own separation to be irrational, and contrary to ecclesiastical laws and the theology of the Fathers; but those who betook themselves to them were indeed affected by ignominies, or even put to flight for the sake of the confession of the truth and bold confidence: to whom he who wrote these things has also been joined, and gives thanks to God that he was deemed worthy of these things. Yet bearing all things bravely, beyond the reward laid up in store for such things, as also happened to many in previous times, when they acted freely for the truth of the faith and refuted those who contradicted. For which, indeed, to the admiration and veneration of posterity.

were. Why then should we not say that the overturning of unity was most violent: since those who were the authors of its overturning thereby secured for themselves gains, honors, and glory? On the contrary, those who are studious of unity are treated with every sort of injury, reproach, and insult, and are afflicted with all manner of hardships.

Furthermore, as has been said, it would be permissible to overturn all councils if a path were opened for doubting the faith, and if credit were to be withdrawn from the synods. Yet Photius himself quite openly demonstrated that the cause was something other than the addition: he, being the first to be enticed by the desire for the patriarchal throne, was considered wiser than those who had been before him. And therefore, I have deemed it sufficient to omit all that he did, how he disturbed the most holy Ignatius in various ways from his see ^B, what he plotted, and what historians relate about him. Yet, because he wickedly trampled upon all laws and tore apart the patriarchal throne—which he could not obtain except by the permission of the Roman pontiff; for it was necessary, according to custom, to receive authority and confirmation from him. This, however, he would have shamefully missed out on because of his own ambition; relying on his familiarity with the Emperor, who himself also wished to add to his own power, and because he despaired that he could otherwise attain that throne, he resorted to the addition to the Creed. And although he and the others had for a very long time before revered it as it was, he induced certain more seditious men of the ecclesiastical order to consider this impious, and by means of an epistle, which he called circular, he incited the hatred of the multitude against the Roman Church, so that he might not appear to transgress the limits of subjection if he were to raise himself up and be the author of that dignity for himself. Thus, now sitting on the throne, he administered ecclesiastical affairs.

The Roman pontiff took this ill, and being angry, he proclaimed him by letter an invader, calling him a new Judas, a schismatic, and a seditious man, and subjecting him to the anathema of excommunication, affirming that he was not even a Christian: not only because he had wickedly invaded the see, but because he was liable for many other crimes. For Ignatius was still alive, who had explained to him what violence he was suffering; just as the great Athanasius, and Paul the Confessor, and Chrysostom had done before, writing to the Roman pontiff when they were unjustly driven from the Church; all, in short, who were afflicted with injuries and driven from their sees by force, would have recourse to the Roman Church. From that time ^A a maximum part of the Oriental bishops withdrew themselves from Photius, calling him a schismatic; nor did they wish to offer sacrifices with him; and there was a huge tumult, suggesting that very many things had proceeded under him against the canonical sanctions, so that from these things it is openly given to be understood what was then sent in letters regarding this matter.

After the Roman pontiff had died, his successor was equally angry at Photius, and likewise harassed him with letters. But after Ignatius died, another also presided over the Roman see. He, having laid aside indignation and strife against Photius, called him patriarch, by which title his predecessors had never deemed him worthy: and he sent all things which were accustomed to be sent by the Roman bishop to those who were recently instituted, namely the pallium, the staff, and the sandals. Then he also, having obtained his wish, put aside his struggle against the Roman pontiff, and called him Father and holy. "Just as," he said, "the Lord of all, bowing the heavens, visited us; not content with the glory which He had in heaven among the angels, unless He also drew to Himself the assumed human nature: so, too, our common Father, the most holy Pope, visited us, who were far away, with paternal affection."

At that time, no mention was made of the addition to the Creed. Nevertheless, the maximum part of the Oriental bishops were not reconciled to him; but, observing themselves apart from him, they were unwilling to call him patriarch. Therefore, he besought the Roman pontiff, to whom the care of the Churches mostly fell, to send, according to the custom of the Roman see, legates to the royal city, who might both visit him and decide on all things together; and might unite the dissenting bishops both to one another and to the patriarch. Two were sent, and a synod was then held ^C inside the walls of the most famous temple distinguished by the name of divine Wisdom for the sake of settling the contention among the Orientals. This synod some also call the eighth. Declaring Photius patriarch at that time, those who held the place of the Roman pontiff, peace having been restored, warned them from then on to abstain from scandals, and that all should attend to this man as patriarch, joined together in an indissoluble charity. No mention was made of the addition at that time. For if anyone thinks that in the extreme order of the acts of that synod there is a statement about the addition, namely that it is not right to take away or to add; which also some put forward to seduce the simpler folk; one must know ^D

that either this matter ought to have been handled primarily, or it should not have been handled so incidentally and untimely, and apart from the proper place. For even if we concede that it was stated by the synod, it declares nothing regarding such a question; nor does it oppose the things which have been said. For either, as has been said, it forbids that another addition be made to the faith, and [forbids] the removal of a correct one, or in other ways the Church does not deprive itself of this power. Although we can say that by this pronouncement, if it is of the council, by which it was declared that nothing ought to be taken away, that command had been issued so that the addition of the Westerners, which they were accusing, might not be removed.

If therefore, as has been declared above, and many years before Photius, the Symbol was read by them with the addition, and he himself the first, when he did not obtain his desire, discovered the addition to be the cause of dissension, so that it might be permitted to him everywhere to enjoy his wishes: but having become obtained his desire, he moved not another word about that matter, and rendered to the supreme pontiff the due subjection in all things, is it not clear from all this that not the addition, but pride rather, and the desire to be judged by no one, was the cause of the schism? Photius died, however, when the unity of the Churches existed, which endured after him through seventeen patriarchs.

From which it surely is evident that the synod celebrated under Photius deemed the addition to the Symbol to be true and reasonable, and that he himself chose communion with the Roman Church, having cast aside the previous controversy, which had ensnared him as a man.

Then, to concede that Photius did not admit the addition: it certainly was not reasonable, after he had been confirmed as patriarch by the Roman pontiff, to move a word about the addition: lest, having barely at last obtained his desire, he might lose everything, being again removed by him. But it was enough for the legates and especially for the Roman pontiff himself, with subjection rendered to him, to judge that they thought rightly regarding other matters. And so, inquiring nothing further, they permitted the rest to remain in their places.

And that also indicates the addition made by some, which we have said, that after many years of the emperors, the subscriptions of the bishops are noted, and glory is rendered to God for the union of the Church. Which things are all written at the end of the synodal acts. Moreover, that regarding not adding or taking away which is placed separately, and is openly disjointed and separated from others. Therefore, it is not to be accepted that after those things which were investigated, after matters were composed, finally after the end of the council, after those things which were accustomed to be appended at the end of synods, they were again thinking of dealing with these things; for they ought not to have been handled primarily, or not so incidentally and untimely, and apart from the proper place. For even if we concede that it was stated by the synod, it declares nothing regarding such a question; nor does it oppose the things which have been said. For either, as has been said, it forbids that another addition be made to the faith, and [forbids] the removal of a correct one, or in other ways the Church does not deprive itself of this power. Although we can say that by this pronouncement, if it is of the council, by which it was declared that ^B nothing ought to be taken away, that command had been issued so that the addition of the Westerners, which they were accusing, might not be removed.

If therefore, as has been declared above, and many years before Photius, the Symbol was read by them with the addition, and he himself the first, when he did not obtain his desire, discovered the addition to be the cause of dissension, so that it might be permitted to him everywhere to enjoy his wishes: ^C but having become obtained his desire, he moved not another word about that matter, and rendered to the supreme pontiff the due subjection in all things, is it not clear from all this that not the addition, but pride rather, and the desire to be judged by no one, was the cause of the schism? Photius died, however, when the unity of the Churches existed, which endured after him through seventeen patriarchs.

From which it surely is evident that the synod celebrated under Photius deemed the addition to the Symbol to be true and reasonable, and that he himself chose communion with the Roman Church, having cast aside the previous controversy.

Then, as the aforementioned historian Scylax says, Michael the patriarch, by surname Cerularius, with other cases again emerging, such as often happen to men, and at the same time the adversary of peace envying, cast the Roman pontiff out of the diptychs because of unleavened bread. He had, however, two patrician supporters, and the more corrupt and seditious part of the Church: and he adds another distinction of the man, because of which they seem deservedly to have chosen to live apart. Although, if he cast the Roman bishop out of the diptychs because of the addition, why not even sooner? But if because of unleavened bread, from the beginning the Roman Church was accustomed to sacrifice with these. But ^D even if one might inquire more diligently, he will uncover another to be the cause of the separation. For already long since accustomed to cast off the yoke of obedience, those who were in charge opened a place for themselves of dignities and the excellence of names from the beginning of the schism, striving to adorn their priesthood with the honor of names. For one calls himself universal patriarch, [the whole of which synod was a fiction of Photius, never celebrated except in his brain. Caleca, however, thinks otherwise, as you see.]

^A For we were taught to pursue the way of virtue leading to God; and once we were enemies of the Father, having been reconciled to Him through the good and well-pleasing will of God, we were taught to pursue the way of virtue leading to God. And finally, He wishes that which follows to be understood: "If anyone enters by me, he will be saved, and will go in and out, and find pasture" [John x, 9], the contemplation of God and the kingdom of heaven, into which we cannot otherwise enter except through the Gospel and the mysteries of Christ.

They began to claim for themselves that which, before the times of the schism, was not customary. One constituted himself judge of the world. Another desired to be called the thirteenth apostle. And certainly it was sufficient for the ancients that the bishops should call themselves merely bishops; those who were under them, imitating them, did not persist in the names handed down from antiquity by the Church, but each one, devising for himself a certain proud dignity, added it to their subscriptions: while some inscribed themselves as professors, others as leaders, others as preceptors, others as primates, truly displaying proof of the innate and deeply rooted vanity within themselves: through which they wished not only to deny the honor owed to the Roman see, but also to prefer themselves to it, and to preside over absolutely everyone. For as if indulging themselves, so that they might now seem to rightfully rebuke the others, they found not only additions, but many other causes as well.

^B For when they had once decided to contend against the Western Church regarding the primacy, and that contention gradually produced hatred in their hearts, and as they wished to gratify their own followers, so that they might receive gratification in return from those they gratified, they were prone and ready for insults and crimes; and he seemed to be the wise one, he the best, he superior to all, who could cast some form of abuse against the Western Church. For since there was no one to correct them, one had a zeal, but not according to knowledge; another was led by the presumption of custom; another, desiring to be called master by others and blinded by the vice of pride; another, so as to compensate for the rewards of his present dignity or to seek a new one for himself; another, having a truly correct opinion but indulging the times, and setting forth the opposite of what he felt, since at other times it was not permitted for him to live safely, and lest he be disgraced by many and afflicted with insults and injuries, and forbidden to enjoy his own goods and cast outside the Synagogue, through much license and facility, they each write and say things that are irrational or iniquitous.

And Eustratius of Nicaea, explaining what is said about proceeding through the Son, said: "As a man proceeds through a door," and cited the Lord as a witness, saying, "I am the door," ignoring that the door is spoken of according to His humanity, and the Lord is also spoken of according to us: "For there is one mediator between God and men," as the Apostle says [1 Tim. ii, 5]; and: "Through him we have access" [Ephes. ii, 18]; because through His divinity and humanity, having acknowledged one God, we were freed from the error of idols.

^D But the Metropolitan of Methone, arguing, says: "If the Holy Spirit," he says, "were from the Son, He would not have descended upon Him from heaven at His baptism": the man himself being ignorant of what the great Athanasius says, that He Himself, as God, sends Him from above, and He [the Son] Himself descends below as man. Therefore, from Himself into Himself He descends, that is, from His Deity into His humanity.

But others, who wished to be more subtle, say: that the Holy Spirit did not descend upon Jesus at His baptism in the form of a dove, but that that bird itself, the form of a dove, was seen by sensible eyes in a sensible form, which was an indication of the Holy Spirit to insinuate the truth of the dispensation; they assert that the Holy Spirit was not signified by the Spirit Himself. For because the Holy Spirit appeared in a sensible form, Chrysostom also attests to this regarding John.

Another patriarch says: He says there is nothing wonderful if in the sacred Scriptures and the holy doctors it is said that the Son has the Holy Spirit, because the Mother of God had Him, and each of the saints: he wants to suggest that, just as the saints had Him, so the Son of God has the Holy Spirit. Thus he blasphemes, saying that He has the Spirit according to participation.

In the disputations, however, some, blaspheming this too, say: "Because it is impossible that the Holy Spirit be from the Son, because the Son is posterior. For there was when He was not born from the blessed Virgin." Or, as is openly conjectured, they deny the eternal nativity of the Son, attributing to Him only a temporal one: or they think that the assumed condition of humanity was translated into the Deity: or they think that those who confess the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son are asserting that He proceeds from the humanity of Christ.

Some, however, who is held to be great in the name of wisdom, even asserted that, if even the apostle Peter were to say that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son, he would not believe it.

Another, blaming the Westerners because they confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, says that he relies upon certain ^A wretched Augustines, and profane Hieronymuses, and gloomy Ambroses. The wretch is ignorant, while he speaks these things, that he is subjecting the masters of our own Eastern Church to the same charges.

But those who are juniors, even from the dead, attempt to assert this; and besides the lie by which they claim that the Council of Lyons was tyrannical, they also imagine that the corpse of the king ^B himself, who brought it together, remaining intact, as they say, announces the iniquity of his soul, because he convened such a council. For they judge concerning the faith by their senses. What they consider a sign of holiness in others, this they take as an indication of damnation in those whom they choose, as if God were deciding according to their will. Yet if they judge that the non-dissolution of the corpses of the deceased is an indication of holiness, what are they going to say about the bodies of Peter and Paul, and of very many saints, which have been dissolved into fragments and into dust? But if they see that the very many bodies of the saints have been dissolved, from where will they be able to prove that those which have not suffered this are holy? And what are they going to say about infidels, whom they themselves subject to public curses, whose corpses endure in an incorrupt state? Furthermore, if they judge these to be signs of damnation, how do they honor the bodies of the saints?

But these things certainly belong to those men who, as is given to be understood, live by sense, and judge the faith by touch and colors. But if we are to judge them by their fruits, says the Lord, and the first fruit for each is the true opinion he has concerning God, and the works which are built upon faith: let them at last cease to tempt the Lord God, and from these things which are material, and which elsewhere and otherwise come to pass according to the times, the dispositions of bodies and places, and of things, to take proofs of those things which are remote from matter.

Then, not everyone who is of sound faith is also already holy and blessed: For not everyone, he says, who says to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter the kingdom of heaven. And: Many will say to me in that day, Lord, have we not prophesied in your name, and cast out demons, and done many mighty works? And I will answer them, I know you not: depart from me, you workers of iniquity. What wonder is it, then, if someone having the right faith, and even having been a leader of it for others, is nevertheless corrupt, ruined, damned, and afflicted with eternal punishment in other respects? Not for that reason, however, is his faith to be reprobated and deemed false: otherwise we would have to say that faith alone suffices for salvation. But we have heard that faith without works is dead. ^C But, in truth, neither was that king, under whom the synod was gathered, its author at all. For it was collected under him who had reigned before him, which he completed once he had become master of affairs. Nicephorus Blemmydes, a monk and priest whose name is famous among all for every virtue and wisdom, is an indication to us, as are the two books written for King Theodore Lascaris concerning the Holy Spirit, by which it is indicated that having substance from the Son, and through the Son, was handed down by the holy Fathers.

They add, furthermore, those who think in this way, that there has been no sign among the Latins after the schism; but they do not think that what is not seen even exists. For they wish to look from Thrace to what is in Italy, and Germany, Spain, and in the Gauls, and the British Isles, where after the schism many, illustrious for virtues and miracles, illuminated the whole West, not with certain ambiguous and obscure things, but such as we read were done by the apostles and their successors. Although these things, indeed, were not to be investigated in this way, nor to be taken as an indication of sanctity: Signs are not for the faithful, but for the unbelievers; and: Do not rejoice, because the demons are subject to you: but rejoice, because your names are written in heaven; and the sentences which were spoken by the Savior to this effect.

Of the Eucharist.

Certain ones also take away the mystery of the Lord's body and blood from these things which they say: not even saying that the blessed water among the Westerners remains uncorrupt, and they assert that this is an indication of their heresy. They are ignorant, for that mystery is indeed more wondrous and holier than all mysteries in the Church of Christ, in which, while the accidents remain ^D in the underlying substance of the bread, because they are handed down to us as venerable mysteries under, as it were, sensible veils, the subject of bread is changed into the body of the Lord. But this, unless one applies appropriate diligence, it is necessary that the accidents which underlie it do what is their own. Shall we not therefore judge that this is the body of the Lord, which he himself handed down to his Church? But if we confess this, as we receive it: and if the accidents, which are what is their own, can show themselves in them, why shall we not confess the same in other matters, if this happens on account of the material subjects in which the mysteries are handed down?

^A

On sacred images, and relics, and the memory of the departed.

From this they also fabricate a calumny against the Westerners, asserting that they do not venerate images, even though they certainly have churches full of sacred images; and that they treat the relics of the Saints with contempt, which they venerate in such a way that no one else does, adorning them with precious stones and covering them with gold and silver.

Likewise, they say that they make no memory of the departed, for whom among them so many prayers and alms are offered that it is difficult to describe, to such an extent that they suffice for nearly infinite hosts of monks and the poor. Nor do they only provide what is necessary for the body, but they even build monasteries whose structure surpasses royal opulence.

^B Others, indeed, even attribute the defects of certain individuals to the Western Church; naturally, because they received injuries from some of them, they have taken vengeance for those who harmed them by attacking their faith. For even here, everyone who causes offense is immediately judged to have a base opinion. If, however, any Christians transgress the laws, they judge not only them, but their Church also, to be heretical and infidel. For, associating with sailors and certain base and vulgar men, they form a judgment about everyone as if they were like themselves. And since presumed hatred holds them with hostile intent, they think that to be the truth which they desire. Truly, what they do not see, or even if they see it, they do not understand on account of the diversity of language, they do not consider to exist at all. ^C Thus they attend to things that are evil; but those things which are good and honorable, though knowing and prudent, they pass by, as if they themselves had surpassed human infirmity, or as if most among them were not also from the number of more honorable men who transgress the laws. For it is not enough for this to have been touched upon. Indeed, since in this life the good are mixed with the evil, and it is a duty to lead back the erring to the faith and the Church, they want the Westerners to be perfect in all things; and if anything reprehensible is found in them, they will immediately be heretics; and if anyone has sinned, the whole Church will be at fault. ^D By this reasoning, finally, if anyone has admitted anything beyond the Gospel, the Gospel itself will likewise be accused. For it prescribes the things that should rightly be done; yet this one, with that thing being prohibited, has preferred pleasure to justice. For indeed, the wicked have never been absent from the Church; yet she has not been lesser or worse, nor has the perversity of the wicked been able to harm the good; nor does the malice of some dull the faith.

For if, as they say, the condition of the water remaining uncorrupted in no small way makes the matter ambiguous, let them see what follows from that. For whence will they be able to believe firmly in the Lord’s body, on account of the accidents that subsist there? Therefore, they do not accomplish what they desire, but make the sacrament of the Eucharist ambiguous. They are ignorant, however, that the water which is blessed in the Churches of the West does not promise anything great; it is simply blessed water, poured out each week by the priest for the devotion and faith of those passing by, so that they may sprinkle themselves with it. But that which they bless and consecrate on the day of the great Sabbath, as water that is more precious, placed in a sacred and safe place, which no one touches indiscriminately, provides great benefit to the Churches; and not only does it last uncorrupted throughout the circle of the year, but it could even last longer, which we have learned by experience. They are ignorant, moreover, that the whole, and every part of the water taken separately, and changing without any stain in any way whatsoever, first in itself, and then, as if purified and filtered, becomes, as long as each one might wish, preserved, and lasts uncorrupted, and always becomes clearer; which experience itself has taught. And for us it is an argument that in wine, even though it is of a thicker substance, the same thing happens.

On the tonsure of hair.

Some, however, also refer the tonsure of hair not to custom; and they judge what is ornamental and what is base, not by custom. For what is honorable to some, because it is customary, is judged base by others because it is unusual. But they include this also among the heresies, and say that those who do this violate the form of God, although certainly not all use this custom, and that they change the image and likeness of God: as if the dignity of man, namely, to be rational and to be in the image and likeness of God, were present to him on account of his hair; or as if God had some human form or thickness, to whose image man, since he is such, ought also to be similar regarding his hair. But even among us an instruction for the tonsure of the beard is found to be spoken by priests: namely, lest hair be dipped or stained by the blood of the Savior when approaching for the communion of the holy mysteries, and the same should again necessarily absorb whatever liquid when consuming food, or should drip down in some other way, and thus a not insignificant error occur. At the same time, just as we cut our nails, lest they be an impediment to us, nothing prevents us, by the same reasoning, if anything should obstruct, from cutting the hair, more ornamentally and humanely.

^A For it is without crime; but the wicked shall pay the debt of their punishments. Thus, neither will he who walks under the guidance of the faith of the Church be liable for the faults of his neighbor, but each shall render an account for himself, according to the merits of his works.

It is, therefore, the wickedness of certain individuals that is indeed a scandal to the gathering of the Church; yet its faith is not violated thereby, nor are those who are united to it harmed by it. Moreover, if anyone, because of the wicked, rejects the Church as dishonored, casting off the whole Church together because there has always been a place for the wicked within it, he will, in the same way, also eventually cast off his own church, and will not even call himself a Christian, having no church without crime; for he attributes to the faith the corrupt morals of certain men, who must necessarily be mingled among the multitude. But these are the ways of cruel judges, standing entirely alienated from the love of their neighbor, neither feeling their own nor the common infirmity, nor willing to gather what is useful from all things, but rather, taking scandal from the evils which perhaps they delight more to hear—all of which are signs of a weak and vitiated conscience.

On Fasting

There are also very many who accuse the Westerners because they do not fast as they themselves do; but this is most similar to the crimes of the Pharisees. And certainly, one will find that the Armenians surpass our people in fasts and observances of this kind without any comparison. For they abstain from foods when they fast (and they fast more than the rest), such that if any of our own people were to contend with them in fasting, he would be ridiculous; yet they are not therefore going to call themselves better. But generally, regarding foods and drinks and garments, and all the things they do: they mark the Latins as heretics, because they do not do them, while using the customs which they have received from the beginning. For they wish, if it were lawful, to bring all the nations of the whole world under one custom, and for everyone to use similarly what they themselves use: not knowing that they themselves could also be reprehended by many in such matters, and that it is not possible for the same norm of morals to obtain among all.

Nevertheless, nothing prevents either our people or them—whether by difference of languages, or of morals, or the like—that is not common to all, from being brought under one faith. For even the Apostles, when they had traversed the whole world, did not force all to change their customs in every matter. But neither, had they so wished, could they have changed those nations; rather, they exhorted them to hold and confess certain principal chapters of the Evangelical preaching, about ten or twelve, saying nothing of the rest, unless they openly opposed the delivered chapters.

It is indeed noble for all to abstain always by fasting, and by casting off the burden of the flesh ^B: for who would not praise what has been apprehended by the holy Fathers with the greatest diligence and care, as a no small species of active virtue? And perhaps someone might say that the Westerners fast more than our own people, if all are compared together with all. However the matter may be, fasting, if it is performed with love for one’s neighbor, and without disputation and condemnation of those who do not fast, has its reward. For otherwise, compared to Pharisaic pride, it harms, and, if it has any other fruit, it loses it: "For if I distribute," he says, "all my substance to the food of the poor, and if I deliver my body so that I may burn, but I do not have charity, it profits me nothing." The Apostle also adds: "Food does not commend us to God." And: "He who does not eat, let him not despise him who eats."

But if anyone who eats scandalizes one who does not eat: this, indeed, does nothing to harm the latter, especially if some necessity, or the arrangement of places or bodies, should compel it. For the Apostle says that there is no law for the infirm; and: "He who is infirm, let him eat herbs." And: "To the clean, all things are clean, even the unclean. But to the unclean, all things are unclean. For their mind and conscience are defiled." But he argues that his infirm conscience limps because his sense is childish, and that of one who has not yet apprehended evangelical perfection: in which, in mutual love, and in the spiritual letter, legal observances are prohibited. And: "Not that which enters through the mouth defiles a man, but that which comes out from the heart"; namely, hatred, enmities, and things like these; lest we appear as whitened sepulchres full of rottenness, and cleansing the dish on the outside, we neglect the interior uncleanness, and incur the crime of blindness, if we, not seeing the beam in our own eyes, studiously search for the splinter in our brother’s eye; how, therefore, is he not most harmed who, having lost the goods of charity, hunts for such splinters?

There are, likewise, very many who accuse the Westerners because they do not fast as they themselves do; but this is most similar to the sins of the Pharisees. And certainly, one will find the Armenians, in fasts and observances of this kind, to surpass ours without any comparison. For they abstain so much from foods when they fast (and they fast more than the rest), that if any of our own, when they fast, were to contend with them, he would be ridiculous; yet they are not therefore to say that they are better. But altogether concerning foods, and drinks, and garments, and whatever they themselves do: they mark the Latins as heretics, because they do not do them, as they use the customs which they received from the beginning. For they wish, if it were lawful, to bring all the nations of the whole ^C world under one custom, and for all to use similarly what they themselves use: not knowing that they themselves could also be reproached by many in such matters: nor is it possible for the same norm of morals to obtain among all.

Nevertheless, nothing prevents either ours, or them, whether by difference of languages, or of morals, or anything of the sort, which is not common to all, from being brought under one faith. For even the Apostles, when they had traversed the whole world, did not force all to change their customs in everything. But neither, if they had wished, could they have changed those nations; but exhorting them to hold and to confess certain principal chapters of the Evangelical preaching, nearly ten or twelve, they said not a word about the rest, unless they openly opposed the delivered chapters.

Furthermore, in the doctrine of Christ, some are precepts or mandates, some are admonitions or counsels. Therefore, it is required of every one of the faithful to keep the precepts, by necessity. For otherwise, he will pierce himself with mortal sins. But if anyone chooses to follow the counsels, he apprehends perfection: "If you wish," he says, "to be perfect, go, sell all that you have, and give to the poor, and come, follow me"; yet this, if anyone is unwilling to do, he is by no means excluded by the hope of faith, provided he keeps what is necessary for salvation. But such fasting as this is not, except on certain appointed days, or on Fridays for all, and the fasting of Lent, which, having been instituted by the holy Fathers, whoever violates through contempt, he sins indeed, but he has not on that account suffered the shipwreck of faith. He falls, however, into that sin for which, through penance and confession, with the cooperating virtue of Christ, he will obtain remission.

Concerning the Fast of the Sabbath (81)

^A They also blame the Church of the West for Judaizing, because many of them abstain from meats every Sabbath, either on account of the burial and death of the Lord, or because of the sadness and tribulation which His holy mother had throughout that day, during which the Lord rested in the sepulcher, dead according to His humanity. In doing this, we act just as we do every Sunday in the commemoration of His Resurrection, and every Friday in the commemoration of His cross and death. Indeed, it is by the intention of any given act that a person is either blamed or praised. But the aforementioned intention, being one of faith and religion, cannot deservedly be blamed. Nor does he do this for the sake of Judaizing; indeed, the thing itself has no resemblance to Jewish observance. For the Jews, ^B prepared as far as they are able, and refraining from every work, eat and drink throughout the entire day of the Sabbath; but these, by abstaining from meats, spend it more chastely, and are clearly doing the opposite of them. Therefore, it is not the one who fasts, but the one who imitates their idleness and gluttony, who is to be said to be "sabbatizing" and Judaizing. For "sabbatizing" is taken to mean indulgence, idleness, and rest; if, indeed, he speaks truly who said: "On the first Sabbath of the fasts, let us sabbatize, brothers, resting from yesterday’s labors."

Furthermore, we may consider that the Church also used this, of necessity, due to the character of the times and the singular care for souls. Otherwise, the virtue of Christ would in no way be preserved by the apostles for the Church, nor would it be able to dispose of new things according to emerging cases. Therefore, if someone, desiring to honor the passion of the Lord and to embrace His death within himself as much as possible, and on that account abstaining from meats and all food, had been blamed by the apostles, he would rather, by advancing toward the intended prize of the evangelical preaching, be accounted worthy of reward and praise. They themselves are the ones who say: "The letter kills, but the spirit gives life."

Truly, if anything in these matters appears to be done otherwise by the Churches of the West, they received this from the beginning, from the successors of the apostles; and they produce the decrees of Linus, Anacletus, and Xystus concerning this, which define that it is at once reasonable and just to observe the Sabbath day for this or that reason, yet without commanding it out of necessity.

Accordingly, if anyone also thinks that the precept concerning not fasting on the Sabbath emanated from the Jews, we might believe it was deservedly promulgated in the regions of the East, where the Jewish nation and homeland were, and whom the apostles, desiring to call to the doctrine of the Gospel, because the Jewish nation especially gloried in the Sabbath, allowed things to be so as they were before—for fear that they might suffer a scandal in the faith—and forbade them to fast, in that they were, like caretakers of souls, achieving all things so that they might win over all or at least the many. This did not harm them in terms of religion, provided that they observed it. For the apostles would not have recalled some from the Law and others from the worship of idols if they had wished to recall them to all their customs that did not stand in the way of the preaching of the Gospel. For if they sometimes permitted circumcision, which is opposed to the power of the preaching—"For if you be circumcised," he says, "Christ will profit you nothing"—and they did this so that they might acquire more from the Jews, whom they thought to especially excel others, what is to be said about the Sabbath, in which neither fasting nor not fasting is opposed to the spirit of the doctrine?

Yet this was not to be preached throughout the whole world, once the cause of the Jews was removed. For the apostles did not have the same rationale concerning eating or not eating as they had in doing all things for the increase of the Gospel in the very beginnings of their preaching; many things were allowed then that were later not allowed, once the cause for which they had been permitted earlier was removed: just as with physicians, who prescribe other things that are expedient for the apparent causes.

Augustine also, an ancient and venerable Father, says in a certain epistle (82) concerning the Sabbath: "That when he resides in the West, he fasts according to the custom of the Westerners, but if he were in the East, he would follow them in not fasting on that day, according to ancient custom." From which it is clear that it was an ancient custom of the Churches that some should act in one way, and others in another; and that this was not out of necessity, but from ancient custom, and as the individual will moved them and as usage prevailed. But also Gregory, the Roman pontiff, whose name is illustrious among all, handed down to the Churches of the West the offices and fasts as they are kept today: for all follow him in every tradition.

Concerning antiquity

Those among us who are sturdier schismatics also object to the Westerners regarding antiquity, through which they think they can conclude in their favor, as if they themselves did not have the same antiquity, and as if it were permitted to introduce that in their own behalf. Nor do they realize, while they say these things, that they are showing their own idol worship to be firmer, by virtue of antiquity, than the Christian religion. For if all the most ancient things are also more true, what would follow is manifest. But also, with the union of the Churches or even the addition to the symbol already presupposed, as has been said, why are not these things kept with greater honor? Although, who does not know that such hatred has grown among them against the Western Church that no one thinks of union even in a dream, and insanity is so widely diffused that they appear to have lost their reason? A very bad disposition has altogether prevailed, for them to do all things by their own will and nothing by the examination of reason. For if they proceeded with judgment, the rationale would have been different; now, however, "there is no one who understands or seeks after God." For when there were those who had a care for union,

^A truth in seeking it, not in order to seem to say something different, they spoke neither in vain nor irrationally.

It is certain, then, that contention was absent, and that there was distance and a separation of what had been disjointed. Yet it is a mark of the ignorant to think that very many who have been numbered among us for a long time strengthen the schism; for the Westerners could bring forward very many of these same people, not indeed presenting ridiculous and unworthy things, but producing most valid and most proven arguments, and people whose wisdom has permeated the world. Though indeed this is a firm argument for their truth: that never has anyone been found among them who could anticipate the opinion of our people, or who would struggle against them in that controversy over which the Churches of the East and West contend with each other.

But if anyone supposes that any one of them favored his own people—as being his own and dearer to him—or was terrified by punishment and affliction, and thus spoke nothing to the contrary, he will, in the first place, have said that also those of our own side were most tenacious of their opinion; yet it was never the case that there were none who joined the Church of the Latins. Furthermore, it is not possible that, in such a lapse of time, there should not have been some who preferred the truth to their love for their kin, and to faith, and to future rewards: and for this reason they acted with steadfastness, just as in the beginning many showed the greatest confidence against tyrants for various causes, whose names and writings exist, just as we know other heresies have been rebuked and profligate among the Latins. For even among us, many things written by them are preserved. It is therefore a mark of the fullest stupidity, as we have perceived, to speak thus and to inquire nothing further; as if we were ashamed to become sane after an illness, or rather, not to imitate the ancients, who, having often been forestalled by false opinions, later repented when the truth had shone upon them, not at all ashamed, but giving thanks to God. For according to the theologian Gregory: "It is not the change from bad things, but the persistence in bad things that causes shame."

It is even more foolish, as if by setting forward a common dignity, to wish to imitate one's ancestors individually regarding the faith. For it is of the ignorant; because if all Christians, if they had known the wisdom of dignity, would never have been that very thing—a great and most honorable name and reality. For it is clear that those who follow this, never, for the sake of the faith of their ancestors, would have exchanged truth for idolatry, or other heresies that have risen up in any way, which the Fathers whom they follow avoided. But indeed, bidding them farewell, they were joined to Christ. Surely they even blamed the blessed Paul, because, not remaining in the shadow of the law, he persisted in being a persecutor of the Gospel. And they assert at the same time that the Westerners ought not, having omitted what they say about the Holy Spirit, to assent to those things which are said by them. For how could they persuade those who hold the same [beliefs] before them; or how will they speak about the faith of Christ to infidels, who have received their infidelity from their ancestors? If, therefore, those who have been converted to one another can do such things, what strength will their reasoning have? Is it not then more proper and useful, having left aside all preconceptions, to investigate the truth itself, by itself, with every effort and care? That is indeed the mark of men seeking ^B the truth with diligence, so that they might not seem to be speaking in vain and irrationally.

Since, therefore, not a few of our people have always been joined to the Roman Church, if any of them, illuminated by him who illuminates the blind, and with the doctrine of the saints as a guide and predecessor, cannot by philosophy and rhetoric defeat and restrain the calumniators, they call this man foolish and simple, and rebuke him as if he were seduced and deceived: just as if, when it is required of all the faithful to be fit to give a reason for their faith, and to be ready to satisfy all who ask, then Plato, and Aristotle, and Cicero must also be in their tongue. But they say that the wisdom of some is supreme, because they rest upon them alone: and they admonish and send the inexperienced to go to them, to learn those tumid and inflated things.

Furthermore, if any of those who are blamed by them gives a reason, and admonishes them of the doctrine of the saints, and shows that the things objected to have no strength, or insinuates the slipperiness of their absurdities; they think him curious, verbose, and a lover of conflict, and useless, and they praise the simplicity of faith, and bring up the fishermen, as if they themselves had arrived at the rank of fishermen, and had attained their wisdom and the signs that followed them. For they do not know that those fishermen, before they were called by the Lord, were indeed fishermen; but afterwards, when they had been made his disciples, those same fishermen were declared by him to be most wise: for "Blessed be God," he says, "who has shown the fishermen to be most wise."

And they say these things, not [to object] if anyone uses syllogisms in divine matters, and mixes in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; for it would be an excellent thing if, for the reverence of the faith, these things were taught based on the authority of the Scriptures. But now, they even show themselves impudent against the very boundaries of the faith, and the magisterium of the Scriptures and the saints, when they are urged by them: and they do not understand in principle what they want, but use such cavils as a refuge and a diversion, like cuttlefish which, in order to escape and hide from fishermen, vomit ink before them. Yet even as they wish to seem to say something, speaking to their own [kind] in a corner, they forget the very rules which they themselves set for others, as though boastful of wisdom ^C stating things both open and secret, and which we have said above, they both write and say.

And yet, if they indeed think that every reason is to be rejected, and they accept what is beyond reason, why at length do they prefer these "Seven Sages" of theirs, when they compare the others to them, and say that it is child’s play, and to whom they wish everyone to yield? For if they rely on their wisdom, they will find that there have been more and wiser people who oppose them. For the wisdom of the Westerners certainly excels: but if what is wise and endowed with reason they themselves also accept, and for that reason they attempt to persuade regarding the Scriptures: they ought by no means to cast away those who converse with them, whom [they should treat] as those who...

^A argue for the faith, bringing against the opponents that which is valid, just as the ancient teachers of the Church did in former times; indeed, according to the great Basil in his exposition on Isaiah: "The force of external wisdom is a wall for our dogmas, not permitting them, for those who wish it, to become easy to seize and despoil."

He who is such as this, never using the norms of the wisdom of the saints in divine matters on account of [mere] wisdom, as that which lies, can be blamed; otherwise, we shall also cast these out together as corruptors. For the Church expelled Arius himself for this very reason, that many things, which are conceded by the authority of Scripture and by faith, were being taken away by the proposition of his own making. ^B Here, however, as has been shown, nothing of this kind occurs. For those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, follow everything except Scripture and the reasoning of the saints. But those who confess [that He proceeds] from both—that is to say, from the Father through the Son—it is proven that they follow everything according to reason; since neither is anything removed from what has been supposed, nor is any absurdity introduced. But that man, indeed, neither believed the catholic and universal council, nor wished to heed the common Church. Therefore, wishing to go a certain path of his own, apart from the common one, he was a heretic. But this man, who adheres to the Western Church, besides that which is in agreement with all the teachers of the Catholic Church, also obeys the universal synod, in which, with Orientals and Westerners coming together, ^C it was defined by common consent that it is the common opinion of all the saints that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that the Church confesses this, from which no fallacious opinion concerning the faith has ever flowed.

But assuredly, wisdom in itself is not an evil. For if someone has used it against reason, he himself will not be immediately at fault. But neither is he to be called wise who fabricates lies. For knowledge and wisdom are not [the cause of these things]; but on the contrary, ignorance and folly are what those use who lie and deceive others; just as a pilot is not deservedly called a pilot who has lost his ship, nor a physician one who kills an invalid. For it does not happen because of the extent to which he is a pilot or a physician, but in that each has fallen away from the norm of his own skill. Yet, the art of steering or of medicine is not in itself an evil on account of their incompetence or malice. For no one would be saved through these things. Therefore, wisdom is not an evil on account of those ^D who abuse it; for if someone were wise, no one would speak the truth; thus, we would say that all the theologians lie. But we would not even believe Basil, and Gregory, and others like them, on account of their wisdom, unless they themselves, while other heretics were saying other things, had been united to such a Church, and had been approved by the catholic synods gathered by it, and the Church directed [us] to them as masters of the truth. But we would not even consider them holy if they struggled against it with others.

For we curse those who at that time did not obey it or contradicted it. Therefore, it is not only necessary to be wise. Unless the rest are present, and principally the dogmas of the Church are confessed, however wise anyone may be, he raves. For it is necessary that the Church always abide in the truth, and this is proven from those things which happened before it; and it is worth the effort to obey it. For otherwise it would be uncertain which of the wise men one should follow, unless it were submitted that the Church necessarily always follows the truth, and that it discerns all ambiguous things, and defines them.

Of unleavened bread. Many, indeed, [call] the Church to judgment concerning unleavened bread also.

^A [they] draw, concerning whom it is not even worthy to speak, especially to those who are ignorant that the Churches from the beginning always remained such that the Church of the East sacrificed with leavened [bread], but the West with unleavened [bread]; and that for the power of the mystery, both have the same value. For it is certain from the substance of wheat, from which alone it is necessary that this subject matter be taken; and our Savior, doing all things according to the Law: "I came not," He says, "to dissolve the Law, but to fulfill it; and: It becomes us to fulfill all righteousness"; it was fitting that He use unleavened bread in the same legal Passover, namely, according to the tradition of the Law, which, with leavened items removed, then offered unleavened [bread]. From which, indeed, it is recognized that in the same banquet, He also delivered the mystery of His own body.

Which Chrysostom also attests, saying: In that supper, He performed everything according to the Law. For unless He had used unleavened bread according to the Law at that supper, He would have been accused by the Jews altogether as a transgressor of the Law: "For when many false witnesses," he says, "had risen up, they did not find a cause," especially since the betrayer of that supper was present, who, if any such thing had been admitted, would have reported it secretly to the Jews. Although the Lord also says: "With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you," in which, indeed, the mystery of His body was also to be delivered, and He foretold where it was necessary for Him to eat the Passover with the disciples.

If, however, the Passover was legitimate, He used entirely legitimate foods in it. For, having fulfilled all things of the Law, He ought not to have transgressed it at the Passover. The evangelist also praises this when he says: "Now on the first day of the Unleavened Bread." But the first [day] of the Unleavened Bread was the solemn and legitimate Passover. But if divine Chrysostom, explaining the "first [day] of the Unleavened Bread," said it was that which precedes the unleavened bread, he says this because it was the custom for the Jews, who always calculate the beginning of the day from the evening, ^B to begin the solemnity of the Unleavened Bread also from the evening; for that night which we calculate as part of the previous day, making the beginning of the day from the sunrise, they calculate as the beginning of the following day; and so what we call "before the Unleavened Bread," they call the "first of the Unleavened Bread." For which reason the evangelist also, according to custom, called it the "first of the Unleavened Bread," which Chrysostom said was before the unleavened bread, wishing to signify the evening, in which the Lord, as the first of the Unleavened Bread was beginning, ate the Passover with the disciples.

But if it is said: "And they themselves did not enter into the praetorium, so that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Passover," it is not therefore to be thought that the Passover had not yet arrived; but because it was permitted for the Jews to defer it in certain cases. For just as it was forbidden for the Jews to celebrate the Passover outside their own city, if any had been absent for the solemnity, they celebrated it in the city after it: so also it was permitted for those who were in the city to defer [it] in certain cases, just as some then also did: wickedly, indeed, because while unjustly handing over a just man to death, they thought themselves pure by eating the Passover according to the Law. They deferred it, however, even if they had not the slightest reasonable cause.

It is ridiculous, too, that some, thinking that the name of bread, which in Greek is called *artos*, is [derived] *apo tou airesthai*, that is, from that which is lifted because it swells on account of the leaven, do not wish even unleavened bread to be called bread because it lacks leaven. As if it were necessary for all languages to derive the name of bread in that way too. For the Latin, perhaps, or the Persian derives the name of bread from confirming, because it confirms the heart of man, or in any other way, from the properties following the thing itself. If, however, unleavened [breads] also confirm the heart of man, they also must be called by the name of bread entirely; and Scripture, when it speaks of them, calls both [leavened and unleavened] loaves.

Which the blessed evangelist Luke indicates, who, following the Savior's discourse after the resurrection to Luke and Cleopas setting out to Emmaus, after certain things says: "But with all these things, today is the third day since these things were done," speaking, of course, of the passion. For this was the discourse; and it is certain that this was the third [day] between the seven days after the Passover, in which according to the Law it was forbidden for them to use leavened [items], or even to carry them about. And there he adds that He was known in the "breaking of bread."

In that same apparition of the Lord also, in which He appeared to those fishing, it is written: "Because they found coals set, and a fish laid thereon, and bread." It is certain therefore that the evangelists called unleavened bread "bread," for it was not permitted for them during those seven days to have leavened bread, or to carry it about.

Furthermore, leaven is taken in Scripture for deceit and malice: "Beware," he says, "of the leaven of the Pharisees." And: "Let us feast not in the old leaven, nor in the leaven of malice and wickedness, but in the unleavened ^D bread of sincerity and truth"; because also the body of the Lord, taken from the holy Virgin, was sincere, intact, and inaccessible to any stain of sin, therefore also the unleavened bread, since it is more sincere and simpler, can deservedly be said to be assumed in the oblation of the sacrifice, in which that subject is changed into the Lord’s body. For it is full of reason that for mysteries, which are delivered through sensible species, those [things] which are more precious, and which

are more adapted to them, should be chosen.

Concerning the departed.

And this, too, is a charge brought by the Westerns ^A against us, that they say that those who depart from this life—unless some sins hinder them—immediately enjoy the debt of blessedness, and consequently that those who are bound by mortal sins, and are therefore unworthy of blessedness, are dragged off to eternal torments, until at that general resurrection of the dead, the individual bodies joined to the souls of each shall either enjoy the joys together or be afflicted with punishments. But those who bring this charge, whether one ought to believe the sacred Scriptures or whether reason is to be observed, deserve to be blamed rather than that they themselves should blame. For the Lord—as is clear from the parable proposed of the poor Lazarus and the rich glutton, since He would not propose words without realities—concluding, added: that Lazarus indeed, having died, was carried by the angels into Abraham’s bosom; but the rich man also died and was buried, and went into the fire. Through which, after death, the rest and blessedness of the one is signifyed, and the torment of the other, having no end.

Although that which was said to the thief on the cross: "Today you will be with me in paradise," already commends the future blessedness. And divine Paul desires to depart and to be with Christ. For the sake of what thing did he desire this? "For we groan," he says, "knowing that while we are in this tabernacle, we are away from the Lord: for we walk by faith, not by sight"—calling "sight" the substance and truth of things believed. Surely he would not say these things, unless he knew openly that after a pilgrimage of this kind, having laid aside the burden of the flesh, he would enjoy by sight the things he desired. Otherwise, indeed, it would have been preferable to live than to die. For the connection of body to soul is as that of matter to the natural form. But in all there is a desire for those things which are according to nature and are one's own: nor would anyone choose to be separated from natural bonds, unless he believed that after the dissolution he would enjoy better things, and sorrow would be present to the deceased, were he not to obtain the things he hoped for.

^B Furthermore, since a firm hope of this kind is deposited for the saints, and cannot exist in the substance of things unless the soul is separated from the body, the saints, fleeing natural conjunction, desire dissolution, so that with matter destroyed for them, it may be permitted to receive the substance of those things they believed in: until through the supreme kindness of God natural conjunction also returns more divinely and excellently. Those things are also attested by what was said in the testaments by the patriarch Joseph: "Sinners die and descend into hell." They are also attested by what is sung daily in the Church, as that: "For in the heavenly chambers the glorious martyrs entreat Thee, O Lord." And that: "The renowned martyrs, the earth did not hide you, but heaven received you. The gates of paradise are opened to you, and reclining within, you taste the tree of life." And that: "The choir of the saints has found the fountain of life, and the harbor of paradise." And that: "Because now you stand happy before the Trinity, intercede for us who with faith and affection venerate your memory."

And we confess that everywhere the saints are present with the angels, and rejoice with them, and join in the dances, venerating them and praying that they intercede for us; which surely would not happen if it were not the common opinion of the Church that even before the future resurrection of the dead all the saints enjoy blessedness. Otherwise, they would be utterly miserable if, while gazing from afar at the goods reserved for them, they had departed promptly from this life and with pleasure. Hence, how is it fitting that souls preserved in some place of theirs be defrauded for so long a time of the debt due them, for whom the Lord promised eternal joy, and whom He says are to be taken up: "That where He is, they also may be"? ^C But also that it might be lived after this life with faith and hope, which the blessed Paul said would be evacuated, and that only charity would remain in the blessedness which consists in divine contemplation. And yet the Lord would not have willed this, lest, if even those who are to receive the debt of blessedness had compared themselves less worthily to receive it—with His supreme kindness always overflowing beyond merits, and with nothing here hindering—He should guard the promised goods recondite to Himself, having become a cause of sorrow to His own, and depriving them of merit-honors.

For if it is better everywhere to be frustrated of the end of sorrow, how will this not be a cause of sorrow to the saints, and all the more so, the more they will not obtain the greatest and most worthy end? For they will always be seeking, desiring, and, not obtaining, they will mourn. For if they groan here, where they are pilgrims away from the Lord, how will they not suffer this also after the present life, if they must live there with faith also and hope? All of which is beyond the norm of Scripture and beyond reason.

^D Furthermore, if anyone objects with divine Paul saying: "And all these, the saints obviously of whom he was speaking, did not receive the promise, God providing something better for them, that without us they should not be perfected": it must be known that here, by "perfection," he meant the union of soul and body, which will be universally at the future resurrection of the dead. For according to the part of the body, the saints are not yet blessed, because they do not yet have it glorified, according to the reason of the soul's blessedness. But when such a union will be, then both parts of man will be perfect; which therefore is said

already to have attained perfection even according to the body, as we have said, and which as announced to the Fathers in the Spirit, He has not yet restored before the future restitution, or to other saints, until that heavenly Jerusalem, from those who are before the Law, and under the Law, and in the New Testament, is filled, according to the great counsel of God, and foreknowledge, and ineffable disposition.

Wherefore, it is not to be thought, if indeed they who are worthy of blessedness enjoy the due rewards, that there will be no necessity for the illustrious coming of the Savior to judge the world. For then when the resurrection of the dead shall be, individual bodies also, according to the splendor or obscurity of each soul, will participate in rewards in equal proportion. Moreover, since He will come in glory with bodily lineaments, not as in the former coming in humility, necessarily all who rise will see Him in the kingdom with glory, when the holy ^B will be satisfied when His glory shall have appeared, having already attained the perfect blessedness even according to the body. And on the other hand, the impious and infidels will be conquered in a most brilliant triumph, when all fall before the Triumpher: For every tongue shall confess, and every knee shall bow, of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.

But those who crucified the Lord of glory will be permitted to see Him for this reason alone, that they may be judged: For they shall look on him whom they pierced: and they who in this world did not receive what was preached, but remained in their error, shall be confounded. Yet they could never see the bodily lineaments of the Lord, unless they themselves were permitted to have their bodies and their effects after the resurrection, according to the proportion of each soul, as was said above; which being done: These indeed shall go away into eternal punishment, but the others into life eternal.

Of the fire of purgatory.

But of sins, some are called mortal, which is to say, those that cause the soul to die, whose death is separation from God; others, however, are venial, which indeed impose some wrinkle or stain upon the soul, yet not so as that it should be excluded from eternal blessedness on account of them. For only the Lord, having assumed our human nature, lived without sin; but each of men is held bound to some sins or others. For we were born ^C in sins, and it is impossible to pass through life without sin, however much we may strive for virtue. For if one abstains from mortal sins—for it is impossible not to be entangled in lesser ones, for which anyone praying is also held to say: Forgive us our debts—nevertheless, in so far as anyone commits sin in any way, he is subject to the liability of debt, and he is bound to pay the satisfaction for this in some way. If, then, anyone being subject to mortal sins should depart from this life without repentance, such a one shall be judged eternally. For such, says the Apostle, shall not inherit the kingdom of God; for whom there is no longer any hope of salvation, and having attained the resurrection unto condemnation, they will return again to the same place.

But if anyone, having confessed, before he makes satisfaction for his sins, or even, at the same time as he has confessed, being penitent, departs from life in those things in which he has sinned mortally, he is liberated from eternal damnation through the sacrament of repentance, for in this the remedy of repentance has been granted; for otherwise there would have been no hope of salvation for those who repent at the end; yet he will pay the debt of satisfaction for his sins. For that which here, whether by alms ^D and other acts of beneficence, or by fasting

^A and tears, and afflictions of this kind, he was bound to pay according to the canons laid down by the holy Fathers for satisfaction for sins, this, if he was not permitted to live, he shall pay after departing in accordance with that disposition, until, having washed away through the grace and justice of God the filth impressed upon him by sin, and having now become pure and worthy to be united to God, no longer having spot or wrinkle, he enjoys that blessedness for which he was indeed being prepared by the remedy of repentance and the other sacraments, having been liberated from eternal damnation by the grace of Christ, yet was prohibited from approaching it, because the satisfaction due for him had not yet, according to the divine justice, been fulfilled.

"For if the Lord is merciful, He is also just, and not so merciful as to render His own justice null. For all things are in a balance and measure, according to Isaiah. ^B Otherwise it would be vain for the Church to impose canons of affliction upon those who confess, or for the penitent to surrender themselves to such hardship, if, by once confessing their iniquity, they were to be free from all guilt thereafter. But it is evident that by weighing the affliction of repentance against sins, and judging the purification here to be more succinct and lighter than that which is owed hereafter, she imposes such things upon sins. ^C And indeed, even those who have lived their whole lives in luxury and licentiousness, but repent only at the very end of life, would in no way be inferior to those who have persisted in sackcloth and ashes and tears until the very end for similar sins. Furthermore, the alms and prayers ordained by the Church for the dead would contribute nothing. For as regards those who have already attained blessedness, there is no need to offer sacrifices while praying. For those offices which we offer for the saints, we do not offer so that they may obtain mercy, but honoring them, we set them before God as mediators for us, as the first-fruits of our nature. But for those who are damned in hell, the Church makes no prayer. ^D And it is manifest that prayers and such things are offered for those who are established neither in blessedness nor condemned to hell. Whence it is necessarily gathered that there is a certain third place, where, such purification having been made and the remaining satisfaction having been paid, those who have come through it, having been cleansed of remaining slight filth, pass over to blessedness. In a similar way also, if anyone, having kept all the commandments of God's precepts, and having thus been freed from mortal sins, is yet liable to these small and daily ones—without which it is impossible for a man to live—and he departs without having completed the satisfaction for these, if any of it was neglected, or if, the end having arrived, he did not reach [the time] to fulfill it, having been cleansed in the

^A place of purification, he will fully render payment. For that one who has abstained from mortal sins throughout his life should, on account of these small things, be condemned in Hades just the same as those who have lived dissolutely, would certainly not be permitted by the just Judge. For otherwise, how would the life lived according to the commandments of God differ from the ruined one, if, when it is impossible for a person—being human—not to be tangled in forgivable sins, he is to be condemned for these just the same as those who are utterly ruined? And how will the Lord render to each according to his works, if the many labors for the sake of His commandments are spent in vain by the one who has accomplished them? Or rather, what hope of salvation is there, if even the small sins, which follow all men like a shadow, condemn them just as the mortal ones do? For to depart even without these is only for those who have been perfected through martyrdom and who have lived the angelic life, and indeed also for those who have shown great repentance, like the thief, and those whom the grace of God has justified in a special way, which belongs to very few.

The fact, however, that one who has even a small stain cannot be united to God and enjoy beatitude is impossible. For nothing profane approaches the divine nature; but to believe that one who has been entirely cleansed is not permitted to enjoy beatitude, when nothing else stands in the way, is both irrational and unjust, and contrary to the decisions of Scripture. Thus, therefore, between beatitude and eternal punishment, a third place is left, in which such sins are purged. This place, they say, is fire—not that fire which precedes before the face of Christ at His revelation, as Daniel says, and which Scripture calls the fire of Gehenna, for for those submerged in that there is no hope of emerging—but another fire, which they call Purgatory, because in it faults are purged, and those who are sent into it are cleansed as if in a furnace. And this is before the final judgment. For after that, since the things done on behalf of souls can be beneficial only toward that [judgment]; after that, there will be no one being cleansed, as each will eternally occupy his own proper place. But even if some, at the moment when the Lord is present to judge the world, remain, as long as they are of those who can be healed—"We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed,” and "we who are living, who are left behind, shall be caught up together with them”—just as God is powerful enough to effect all things of death and their regeneration in a moment, so too He will render the pain of being cleansed, which would have lasted for a long time, gathered into a short span for those needing purification, according to the proportion of time and pain, so that all may stand before Him, with all motion and all course halted, and all mysteries and every dispensation completed. It is not forbidden to think the same thing also regarding bodies, if anyone wishes to attribute some pain to them because of their association with the soul in this life.

^A If anyone rejects such a purgation of which we have spoken, he must of necessity admit either that some evil is left unpunished, or that the Church of the faithful is to be joined to Christ with a stain, or that what is done on behalf of the deceased is of no value. But the first point, even if it is a bold thing to say, shows God to be unjust, if He subjects those who have sinned differently to the same punishments, and deems those who have lived differently worthy of the same things, not distributing to each what is just by balance and weight. For not even if He is merciful and compassionate is the highest justice in God set aside. For this is to destroy Himself. Indeed, Scripture everywhere joins mercy with judgment, nor does it, by being indulgent, rescue those who confess from eternal condemnation, and at the same time do away with the affliction of repentance and satisfaction for sins. For thus it would have been possible to attain the kingdom through the mysteries alone. And yet, even the ability to make satisfaction at all is a grace. For to those who sin against the divine height, what could suffice for propitiation or satisfaction? Nevertheless, condescending to the infirmity of men, and exchanging great things for small, He forgives according to His great mercy, nor does the Church, by imposing contrition and affliction upon those who repent, and by not admitting them in any other way to communion of the sacraments with the faithful, appear less precise than He Who searches hearts and reins, ^B and reaches even unto the division of soul and spirit, provided that satisfaction for sins is granted as much and in whatever way one might wish. It would not, however, be just to bar anyone from the kingdom because of a slight stain present. But the second point is altogether impossible. For it is necessary, says the blessed Paul, for the Church to be united to Christ, not having spot or wrinkle, and as has been said by divine wisdom, nothing profane shall come near to it, and also as Gregory the Theologian says, after the restoration, the blessedness for the saints is the contemplation of the holy Trinity, which is blended with the whole intellect in its entirety; which, he says, I alone call the kingdom of heaven. How could this be, if any impurity remained in the soul? ^C The third point is altogether contrary to what is performed by the Church on behalf of souls, and to the hope of the faithful; and furthermore, it is opposed to what is said by the saints in histories, revelations, or contemplations. Since these are many, we shall recall only what the divine Damascene said in his discourse *On the Dead* before the Lenten fast, in which he recounts that it was revealed to many of the living how much alms and prayers that are performed on behalf of the deceased profit them, and how they are released from tribulations and bonds while these things are being done. ^D And indeed, the great Basil also, in the prayers which are read at Pentecost, hopes for and prays for rest for the sleeping, and for the relief of the sorrows that possess them. And the whole Church offers such prayers on their behalf; and it is clear that not only...

^A do they not pray while asking for a release and ease for those held in the eternal torments, for those who have once entered into that place have no return; nor is one compelled to think that those condemned therein are released, and thus to think that there is an end to the unending torment — for that is contrary to the common position of the faith.

And since the Church offers no such prayers on behalf of those who are established in blessedness (for these enjoy their end without fear), nor on behalf of those who have been judged to eternal condemnation, it follows from the stated reasoning that there is a third place of purgation, where those who are detained — in accordance with the supreme justice of God and His great mercy — are released from the sorrows that hold them; and through works of love the all-good God is propitiated, and by this means He transfers those who have neither spot nor wrinkle ^B to blessedness after a shorter interval of painful purgation. For it is on behalf of these that the prayers for the dead have been accepted.

This purgation also receives the testimony of the blessed Paul, who says: *Each one’s work will be tested by fire; if anyone’s work burns, he will suffer loss, but he himself will be saved, yet so as through fire.* By calling them burning works, he indicates the material that easily catches fire: those who have built upon it will burn utterly. For indeed all their pursuits have suffered loss and will be scorched without limit. But the works that are built upon, namely, those of faith and those which remain, he calls the works of virtue, such as in their proportion are gold, silver, and precious stones, which he who has accomplished them will receive a reward, namely, salvation. For it follows: *But he himself shall be saved.* Indeed, even he himself with pain, namely, passing through the fire, and purged of the stain that has been lightly burned into him. For it belongs to God alone to be without sin. But regarding men, however much they may be pure, it is said: *For in many things we offend all,* and, *No one is pure from sin, not even an infant of one day.* And it is said also in Malachi: ^C *For like the fire of a furnace, and like the fuller’s herb, he shall refine and cleanse some.*

And certainly, if he wished to speak of the fire of Gehenna here, how is it possible that one who has been sent into it should attain salvation? For in it, indeed, there is no hope of salvation. It is clear, therefore, that it concerns a fire that purges and tests, like gold in a furnace, those who are cast into it; for the fire of Gehenna will neither cleanse anyone nor test them.

Furthermore, if some of the saints have explained what is said, *he shall be saved, yet so as through fire,* as remaining in the fire, there is nothing contradictory in this; for he who is purged and tested, however much he must remain in that by which he is tested and purged, must do so in order to lay aside his filth. At the same time, what is said, *through fire,* is what we say confirms ^D this. For he signifies a certain passage and movement. But he who has once been cast into the fire of Gehenna must remain in it forever.

St. Chrysostom also bears witness to these things in his fourth homily on Matthew: The saints indeed, he says, moving through the river of fire, will suffer nothing sad, but on the contrary, they will even be rendered brighter thereby. He calls the holy faithful those who have lived in a holy and just manner without mortal sins; for Scripture calls those who live in such a way, saints. And what is also said: *If the righteous one is scarcely saved, where will the sinner appear?* is led to this understanding through the mention of him who is scarcely saved, commending him who enjoys salvation through purgation.

Some also among us, expounding that apostolic saying, say: In his exposition of Isaiah, St. Basil, making mention of this saying a second time, accepted it as being for purgation. Gregory of Nyssa also explained the saying in this understanding. Some, not understanding the force of these words, thought that the end of eternal torment after the final judgment was being spoken of in this very understanding, and they blamed the Western Church, as if it preached a purgation before the final coming of the Savior, and by removing it, many absurdities must necessarily follow. But it is false, truly, for her to think that way; so much so that if any are proven to think this openly, she casts them from herself and does not admit them to the communion of the sacraments. And this is evident both from the ancient and the more recent doctors of that Church, as one who wishes to read them will observe from those things which have been translated into our Greek language, as it happens. But enough of this.

On the office of the deacon performing the duty of the priest.

by crime, is yet blamed by our people. But the fact is that in offering the sacrifice, the priest frequently fulfills the ministry of a deacon. This is indeed a wicked criticism. For they are ignorant that he who possesses what is greater, necessarily possesses also what is lesser of the same kind. But the converse is not true. And this will be evident to all who examine the matter. For man, having a rational soul, has also a sensible and a vegetative soul beneath it. Yet those things which use a vegetative soul do not possess a sensible and rational one as well. And the same [principle] applies if one wishes to examine other things, whether human or divine. Indeed, our Lord Himself, existing as the first and greatest priest according to humanity, did not for that reason—because He demonstrated the habit and ministry of a servant by washing the feet—confuse the order of the priesthood. And ^A therefore this priest, since he contains within himself the degrees of an inferior priesthood, it is evident that he makes use of all things that are beneath him in a legitimate manner.

But a deacon cannot fulfill the order of such a man. For unless the priest contained the degrees that are beneath him, he would certainly never fulfill the ministry of all the degrees at once before himself; but since he does fulfill them, it is clear that, having them, he is also able to minister according to them. For it is irrational to permit all things to be done at once, but not [to permit them to be done] separately, when there is nothing that forbids it. And yet the sacerdotal dignity is not excluded by the deacon’s stole. For these things are not contrary to one another, so that when one exists, the other cannot. Nor does the deacon’s stole exist as the cause of the sacerdotal degrees; ^C but on account of these, the difference of the stoles has been distributed among those who hold them. But if the priest contains within himself the degrees that are beneath him, it is clear that when he fulfills the ministry of a deacon separately, it is permitted for him to wear even his stole. Otherwise, it would be inconvenient for some pontiff, affected by either exile or some other circumstance, when the ministers who should assist him in the oblation of the salutary host are absent, not to fulfill all things by himself, but to persist for a very long time without participation in the sacraments, or even to depart without them, when there is nothing present that reasonably and necessarily hinders him.

For what is said—that it is not proper for a priest to enter into the order of a deacon—is of this kind, as if one were to say: "It is not expedient that anyone, deserting the rank of the priesthood, should cross over to the order of a deacon."

^B For since the priesthood contains all degrees beneath it, it is clear that in one person who contains the others, when the greater is removed, the other is removed at the same time. Just as when a rational soul is separated from the body, the remaining parts become idle and useless, and when the priesthood of certain men is removed, it is not permitted for them to hold the degree of even a deacon or subdeacon, and to fulfill that ministry. But the Church also forbids in another way those who abandon the rank of the priesthood to retain a lesser one among them. For there would not be wanting those who, either on account of the facility of the canon or by acquiring for themselves an honor which it is permitted only to deacons to have, or in certain other cases, might entirely desert the priesthood, as if they had not been consecrated as priests from the beginning, and might not wish to use the dignity of deacons. From which it would happen that ecclesiastical ministries would be confused and lack order, with individuals choosing what they found more pleasing to themselves. But the Church has restrained such license.

Concerning the two Roman pontiffs (83)

Concerning the Images of the Lord

Concerning the sign of the cross (84)

And as it seems, they will demand to inquire first how the cross that is seen was composed or drawn; if indeed it was as they wish, then they will worship it; but if that composition was begun in another way, they will omit it. And at the same time, just as someone, when signing another with the figure of the cross, begins crosswise from the right: what transgression is it if he signs himself in this way also? For this reason, many of the Latins wonder ^A that some could have fallen into such rusticity as to suppose that, even regarding the formation of the holy cross, when it is formed in the same way in any manner, there is a contemplation and virtue involved; or that they should think there is a difference of faith if it happens one way or another, since they themselves do not think that it makes any difference, and they do not doubt that, however it is formed, it suffices as a help to those who believe.

On the perversity of the Greeks in their schism.

Therefore, those sowers of tares and workers of scandal, by these and similar things—some of which have the mark of hatred and contention, others of simplicity and ignorance, while others could more justly be retorted upon the accusers themselves as being linked to the very errors they brand upon others—have dissipated ^B the common body of the Church, and have led those who are under them to such a degree of hatred and madness and temerity that they think those who serve the execrable superstition of the Saracens are more tolerable than those who are joined to the Church of the West; and they prefer their friendship and communion rather than that of the Westerners, and do not even call them Christians, and many even doubt whether they venerate the Gospels with us; unless someone, having passed over the nonsense of the many, might simply consider them Christians. And although daily many are added to their religion, not only individuals, but even whole cities and nations, they think that nothing great has happened.

Furthermore, if there are any who assert that the Western Church thinks rightly concerning the procession of the holy Spirit, ^C bringing forward all the saints and teachers of the Church who agree on one thing, and at the same time showing that their common understandings and the principles of the faith are in harmony, they consider these people to be worse than Arius and Sabellius, and they no longer have any regard for them, thinking them to be those who have gone of their own accord into perdition. For thus the governors of souls call those who confess that the holy Spirit has his substance from the Father through the Son, and they harass him in all assemblies and in every custom and in all common things. And most wickedly they blaspheme the Church of the West, and they execrate the sacrifice and every sacrament which is performed among them. ^D Whom it is indeed fitting to pity and to pray for, since they are the work of God, who makes the dead alive. For they do not know those of whom they speak, nor those of whom they affirm; but they are entirely without sense, both regarding themselves and others.

But even if those who, because of love for their neighbor, wanted to bring them medicines, which are those of one's greatest enemies, seemed to be tempted by them, being harassed and put to flight by them on all sides—they have gained only this, that they have shown charity toward their neighbor, and a desire and readiness for what is good and honest.

On the primacy of blessed Peter and the Roman pontiff.

Therefore, to return to the first points: since the common opinion of the saints declares that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and indeed the very principles of the faith testify that this is true, and the arguments which are brought forward against this opinion have been shown above to be of no value; and the things which are objected as absurd against those who confess that the holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, appear absurd to no one except to those who raise the objections; and it has been demonstrated that the objection regarding the addition was a late and base thing, and merely the occasion of those seeking primacy and wishing to contend against the rules of the Church: but also the causes which they invented, so that the departure might not seem irrational, are themselves also a proof of contention and hatred. It is clearly evident that no excuse is left for those who have set themselves to contend against the Roman Church concerning the procession of the holy Spirit. Wherefore, anyone endowed with mind and reason ought to safely maintain the same opinion as it concerning the procession of the holy Spirit. And one would most justly assert that the one, holy, and apostolic Church which we confess in the Creed is this one, and with her as guide, he will not doubt that he who so confesses holds the catholic faith.

In addition to these things, one must also look at how great the magnitude of the Church is, how great the mass of affairs, and how no heretical opinion ever emanated from it, which blessed Peter founded, which always stood immovable against all storms; because it was founded upon the rock, that is, upon the Lord himself, or upon the firmest faith of blessed Peter: whom the Lord, when he was leaving the world in his bodily presence, appointed, calling him blessed, because not flesh and blood…

^A revealed to him the true faith, but the heavenly Father. Now, since the foundations of the ecclesiastical principality had already been laid, when the disciples were asked whom men supposed the Son of man to be, anticipating the others, he said: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." To whom response was immediately given: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church: and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." And again, entrusting it to him, he said: "If thou lovest me, Peter, feed my lambs; feed my sheep." And he of whom he said: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." And him whom he appointed as his equal when a tribute was demanded for the Caesars, he commanded Peter to cast a hook into the sea, and to give the stater he would find in the first fish that came to hand to those demanding it for himself and Peter. This is a sign of his desiring him to be honored equally with himself in the proportion due, and that he holds his word. For since nothing by the Lord has been said or done in vain, it is necessary to believe that even those things which were said or done to the apostle Peter, especially before others, signify something great. For what greater thing can there be, by which he established his Church to be governed under this leader, than that, as he himself willed, he solidified it in Peter, as these words joined to the facts attest? If indeed, with many or none being in command in human affairs, and with confusion reigning, nothing or very little could subsist. ^B

And surely when in the very nature of all things, individual things operate according to their order, by the removal of which the harmony of the whole world would be resolved: "For it itself," he says, "contains the celestial and the earthly"; how would it be possible for the Wisdom which disposes all things, and reaching from end to end mightily and sweetly disposing all things, to leave his flock, his Church, which he redeemed with his own blood, for which every reason and every mystery is his, without government, especially since it is exercised in the present by many temptations and questions? And although he was to depart from here corporally and sensibly, yet he never invisibly stayed away from the Church: "For I," he says, "am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." ^C

For even if after the ascension of the Savior to the heavens, the apostles needed nothing, being instructed by him according to evangelical doctrine, conversion, and diligence concerning dogmas; yet the Churches which individual apostles built, and those who succeeded them, always have needed, and do need, Peter and his successors. Which order, indeed, it behooved to be initiated first among the apostles, just as it also happened. For all the others who were shipwrecked in one way or another concerning the faith, or in danger of suffering this, Peter through his successors and his Church raised up and preserved; just as the Lord himself earlier, when he was in the boat with the others and in danger, when they cried out: "Master, save us, we perish," rising up, he saved them; which was an argument for the future perturbation of the Church everywhere in its ship, with all heresies seeking to sink it. Having assumed the government of this, Peter saved it in its peril, the Master being awakened by him. Nor in vain did the Lord entrust the keys of the kingdom to him; and he said he would place the foundation upon which he promised he would build his Church; and he commanded him, if he loved him, to feed this one especially, and in the payment of the tribute he desired him to answer for himself. ^D

And certainly, that which was said after the resurrection: "Tell his disciples, and Peter," signifies that he calls and honors him before the others. But also, he was the first of the disciples who entered into the monument, and saw, and believed, so that he, who was left as the prince of the Church, might be the first in the choir of the apostles to announce the resurrection of Christ to the rest. Indeed, and with everyone assembled, he is the first in the assemblies. Paul also: "I went up," he says, "to Jerusalem to see Peter," tending toward Peter as toward something principal. Although when some were scandalized on account of circumcision, and were attempting to introduce circumcision in the preaching of the Gospel, because indeed the apostles, about the beginnings of the preaching, on account of various necessities and dispositions of the elders, as physicians caring for souls: he indeed, because he was the teacher of the gentiles, was not compelled to circumcise any of those coming to the preaching: but Peter, taking those who had believed from the circumcision, so that he might gain greater things, despised the lesser for a time: it might be thought by those who were ignorant of their intention that they dissented from one another, when they were in fact most in agreement. For lest circumcision seem to have a place in the Gospel, the difference which was thought to be between them was necessarily assumed. For that they were very much in accord with each other is evident from this. Not only did Peter circumcise some, but Paul also circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother. For so the necessity then demanded for the dispensation of the preaching.

Nevertheless, Paul, not at all ignoring Peter: "I went up," he says, "to Jerusalem to see Peter," as if about to gaze upon something most excellent of sacred monuments and to render honor to him, or also to confer the Gospel with him; so that what was right might be confirmed, or what was lacking might be supplied. For even if all ambition was most remote from that apostolic choir (for they were each perfect, nor did they need a leader), nevertheless, among them also the order and the primacy of the best of all had been planted by the Lord; and all looked to Peter, as if to his successor. For the matter was not managed among them by chance, but, as if the leader were present, they awaited a signal from him: and they deferred to him first,

^A as it is evident in the Acts. For he is found to be the first among all, while others were present, to speak as the leader of that choir, now indeed to the Jews, and now to the brethren, when the talk was of appointing and choosing a successor to the traitor. For it behoved them to prefigure the order that was to be in the Church of Christ, so that just as they were leaders of all good things to the others, so too they might be of the order itself. Yet, if they, although they were perfect, nevertheless took the greatest care for order, and did not transgress the established limits, how are we not to judge that they have handed down to their successors that this was to be kept by all means? And those who had believed were indeed bringing money to the feet of the apostles; but Peter, at once admonishing the rest and preventing them from acting maliciously, just as a leader and judge of truth standing by, punished Ananias and Sapphira with a sentence of death.

It is written, moreover, in the history of Clement, who was his successor after Peter, that when the most blessed Peter was about to migrate from this life to the Lord, calling Clement, he handed over to him the leadership of the Church, which he had received from the Lord, and he directed the faithful equally to look to him as their own successor and successor of his dignity, just as they had attended to him while he was alive, as the leader of the Church. “For I leave him,” he says, “to you in my place.” Indeed, the most holy evangelists also in the enumeration of the apostles always place Peter first as the leader of the whole choir; and the Church everywhere calls him the leader of the apostles; indeed even in his hymns Damascenus, wishing to praise Peter and Paul, praises the one as the leader of all the apostles, and the other as one who labored beyond the rest. The divine Chrysostom also bears witness to this on Matthew.

Of Constantine and Sylvester

The kings of the Christians, of whom the first was the blessed Constantine, were not ignorant of these things; he calls Sylvester, who was then governing the steering-wheels of the Roman Church, the successor of Peter and Christ, and the first shepherd and teacher of the whole Church by a common decree promulgated everywhere throughout the world; and he clearly proves that he, by this decree, strengthened the custom he had found among Christians. For he is not to be thought to have wished to devise anything new in the Church, just converted as he was from the error of the Gentiles to Christ, and for this reason he abandoned Rome to him on account of the chair of the blessed Peter; deeming it unworthy, as he himself says, that where the seat of my most holy apostle Peter, the vicar of the Lord and of our king Jesus Christ, is founded, the kingdom of the earth should be set up, but we delegate this indeed to holy Peter and his successors; and we shall seek to build the seat of the kingdom in another place, namely, Byzantium. And he added other things, both telling of his own conversion and proposing edicts concerning the dignity of the successors of the blessed Peter, and handing them down to be kept by his successors, indicating that if the successors of the empire do not maintain equal reverence for it, they will be set down with the crucifiers of our Lord Jesus Christ, and will incur the indignation of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul. For besides other things he says again: We have fulfilled the order of the groom to the blessed Pope Sylvester, ^B successor of my most blessed apostle Peter, the vicar of Christ.

These things, even those who were Christian kings afterwards acknowledging, and being compelled to remain in them—if indeed they were heretics, they strove by all means to have the opinion of the Roman bishop with them, in what they could, knowing his dignity well, and so that his opinion might suffice for all things; for it seemed shameful as well as audacious to act imprudently, when they were of Christ, unless someone perhaps had set out to rebel against all laws. But if they were pious and religious, they awaited his judgment concerning those things which were in any way ambiguous, so that when that was had, while others said other things, no one would be permitted to inquire further.

In councils, in fact, he himself presided as the leader of all; and either by him, or by others acting in his stead, the true faith was strengthened, without which one could not resist against heretics; and not only to gather a council, but no one could prevail by fighting against adversaries without his authority. These things are attested to by these parties: partly by those who were hiding away at that time, and dared not utter a free voice for the faith, even though they felt it best; partly also by the great Basil, in his ^C letters rousing the Westerns, and beseeching them to bring aid while the truth of the faith was in danger, asserting that if they did not look to it, it would suffer, as if there were not enough orthodox left among the Easterns: or that they did not dare to take up the war for the destruction of the blasphemers.

But even the theologian Gregory, in the funeral oration which he wrote on him, testifies to this very thing, saying: “There were then present some of the Western bishops, drawing all the orthodox to themselves.” For although there were always some among the heresies who felt the truth concerning the faith, who remained as it were a certain spark of truth: in reality, they did not have enough strength to dare to gather a council, and to resist in other ways, since they were a very small part, and were more often hidden. Or if they had gathered it, that council would not have had strength. For no council, without his presence, or without his consent,

^A was considered either to have had the strength or to be catholic, for the Roman bishop. For just as the blessed Stephen the Younger intimated, ecclesiastical business could not be transacted or directed without him: and he refused to call the synod of the Iconoclasts catholic, because the Roman Pontiff did not approve it.

This dignity, however, did not come to him by favor of the Roman city, but because he was the successor of blessed Peter. The Lord set him over the Church in His own stead, and because of the surpassing glory of Him who appointed him, his successor, and the Church which he acquired through succession—wherever in the world or in whatever cities it was built—would surely have the same force in all matters of the Church. But if, indeed, it was right that the city, than which none greater existed under heaven, should be chosen for the seat, it was because it was congruent to the magnitude of the Church of Christ: so that, ^B just as the empire of all human affairs was there, so there also should be the head of the Church of Christ, to promulgate decrees of the faith throughout the whole world, and from where the precepts of idolatry had flowed, from there the decrees of ecclesiastical rule might be made known everywhere in the world; and that preaching might more easily be diffused everywhere under a single rule—hence also Rome grew as much as could be said in human affairs, so that there should be an equal proportion to the dignity of the situation, and from all sides the nobility and magnificence of the Christian faith might be gathered. This also belongs to Him who accomplishes contrary things from contrary things by the magnitude of His virtue, and lays foundations, and it fits best with what has been proposed.

The aforesaid things are also strengthened by the facts. For the heretics say that the gates of hell are the holy ones, and utterly all who oppose them; whom the Lord predicted would not prevail against the Church founded on the rock of Peter. But it is established that against other Churches, which the apostles built, those who brought in various heresies at different times have prevailed. For even if malice did not win throughout, yet in so far as it did obtain, it prevailed. Against the Roman Church, however, which Peter solidified, no one has ever prevailed. Nor is this the point at issue—whether someone was over it who pronounced something contrary to the catholic faith; although even if something of the kind had happened, it would have been at once cast out by the judgment of the Church, and he would have fallen from the seat and dignity of Peter at the same time. Nor would the Roman bishop be anything further, nor the vicar of Christ and Peter, and another would have been subrogated worthy of the apostolic seat, and the status of the Church would have remained the same, with no one prevailing against it, nor would it have been left bereft of a father or shepherd ^D (even if it had). So that from this also the true sentiment of the Lord is proven: "I am with you," He says, "all days, even to the consummation of the age," since it is necessary that not even now should the aforementioned sentiment of the infidels prevail, so that both other things may be believed simultaneously to be true, and may appear consonant in all things to one another and coherent. For truly even the blessed Maximus, in his disputes against Pyrrhus, clears Honorius, whom ^C some accused as a heretic, yet [claims] that [he was] the Roman bishop; when the heretic Pyrrhus was then ruling the Constantinopolitan Church, and was putting forward Honorius for the protection of his error. And he truly replied: that Honorius cherished piety, and that his sense in those things which he said concurred with him, and at the same time he proposed his words to Pyrrhus, asserting that some, ignorant of his sense or even calumniating it, had disseminated a false rumor about him.

That the excuse, however, was true, is clear from this. For besides the fact that no one would easily believe that saint Maximus could lie, and that this [was in a time] when he had been at Rome for a great deal of time, for ecclesiastical business, and the Church would not rightly have felt [as it did] if Honorius had felt impiously; but either it [the Church] felt false things with him, or he felt true things with it—this is surely discerned to be true, and from those things which holy Maximus said in his excuse, with which he himself also stood, battling for piety against Pyrrhus and the Constantinopolitan Church. And from this also, that no such blasphemy about it is handed down by history of that time.

It is not, therefore, asked whether some prefect of them ever brought forward anything against the catholic faith; for indeed if anyone were such, he would not be the Roman bishop; for it is necessary that one of this kind always pursue true things, and that this seat never be deprived of a father, who may determine true things about dogmas from there, although not even thus did any such thing happen. But it is asked whether anything of that kind was ever brought forward by the Roman Church, and if it prevailed even a little, which now is subject to anathema commonly, as happens often in other Churches. But no one can show this by any reason.

If, therefore, the gates of hell have prevailed against other Churches, whether a little or more, it matters nothing. And certainly, when it can be shown that the ruin of some lasted for more than fifty years, that alone suffices, that their opinions were handed over to anathema by the whole Church: against which opinions also the blood of martyrs was shed. Against the Roman Church, however, nothing of that kind has ever prevailed; it is established that the sentiment of the Savior is true in it alone, and that this is the Church of which the Lord said: "I will build my Church," and to whom He commanded to confirm Peter. But that others are founded upon this, and that confession consists, and that those following, as parts and members, have health at the same time and strength, when it is agreed to consider many as one; but that those deviating from the head and the body are cut off, and are no longer useful to others.

Whence also the Lord warned to persist in the vine, calling Himself the vine and designating the Church through the vine: but naming the faithful as the branches*, who through confession of Him and good conversation would bring forth fruit. By which words, surely, the sum of the Church

* John xv, 5.

is indicated, that remaining in the vine they might produce fruit, and that by never deviating from the integrity of the body from the Head, all the members might be vivified, and Christ’s Church might be joined together into the perfect man unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ ^A; not on the contrary, either being severed and becoming dead, or, having been cast forth from the vine, being condemned to be consumed by unquenchable fire.

And the Psalmist speaks of the unity of the Churches: *Bless God the Lord in the churches* 86; for it is to be said not of individuals, but rather of the Churches, which have been collected from the parts. But those which are severed and divided into contrary opinions, or against the Church, whom no one has prevailed over, because they are resistant, as has happened very often in prior times, the great Basil, explaining the saying of the Psalm, calls them severed members of the Church, and names them false synagogues, although the sum of the consequence through all things is present in the Church of Peter. For the Lord says to it: *Feed my lambs, feed my sheep*. This the Roman Church has persisted in doing for the others, and for those wandering into contrary opinions, and solitudes, and steep places, and precipices, it itself led them back to one shepherd and one fold: indeed, rooting out noxious and deadly herbs, and injecting healthy and joyful ones; yea, even standing before the flock, it has fought for Christ, and for His faith against savage wolves—namely, of Mammon and of Caesar—who were striving to ravage [it]; and it has always rendered a reason to everyone who asked for the hope that is in us, as the blessed Peter himself advised 87.

And that which the Lord prayed according to His humanity, saying: *Simon, I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not* ^C; this also has been preserved in the successors of Peter, whose faith has never failed in them. For it was necessary that that prayer should not be able to fail in the matters themselves: *For I knew*, he says, *that thou hearest me always* 88, and that some are always preserved on earth in His truth, for whom that prayer was poured forth: *Holy Father, keep them in thy truth, that they may be one*, and the things which are added there 89; so that on all sides, though other winds blow up against the building of the Savior one after another, those elect ones might stand unbroken upon the rock; and that those who were to save others, tossed by the storm and the waves, and to cure the infirm, might themselves first be made solid upon a safe foundation, and always be sound and inviolate.

This is what concurs in Peter, and in his successors, and in his Church entirely. For although there has not been any of the apostolic successors whom Satan has not sifted as wheat, sowing his tares, Peter never failed in his successors, but even through them confirmed the others who were failing, according to the decree. Nor ought we to think that that saying of the Savior regarding the resurrection, if anyone draws that word to this meaning, was spoken only so that Peter, being converted, should confirm his brethren ^D; nor is it to be thought that that prayer was poured forth merely so that faith might not fail through the denial of Peter—which is indeed true—but also so that the confession of the Church, which was revealed to it from heaven, might never be weakened in its successors, nor the foundation ever shake. For it must be most constantly believed that that prayer extended its efficacy of power to all his successors also, in that Peter's faith was never to fail: whom the Lord, preferring him to others as He willed, strengthened through himself, subjecting the foundation of His Church [to him], and has presentially and invisibly always preserved him in the truth, yea, and will preserve him, helping him even unto the end. For the Son of Man, coming to earth, will find faith.

For otherwise the Church which the Lord established on earth would be empty, unless it were to be preserved out of all things until the consummation of the age, concerning which, as something to be preserved, He foretold: *Behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the age* 90. Which, indeed, He wished to preside over the others, so that, as from a watchtower, it might dictate laws to the others; and all, looking into it from afar, might receive its decrees without ambiguity: knowing manifestly which the Church is, and having the persuasion that it necessarily always follows the true.

For, as has been said, when other Churches often preferred things contrary to the Catholic faith, to such a degree that they subjected those thinking the true things to curses and punishments: and compelled some to confess, and others even to write, letters of falsehood against the truth. But the Church of Peter, namely the Roman, has never fallen into any such slip; in them, indeed, the sentence of the Savior is not fulfilled, saying: *I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the age*. For He is never present to those thinking impiously; just as He is with His own continually in them, using them as if they were instruments, and as it were breathing into them, and through the truth of the faith transferring them from His sacraments and spiritual life to the heavenly fatherland, so that where He is, they also may be.

But in this Church, because it has never strayed from the truth, this sentence and promise most especially concurs, so that from this also it is clear that this is the Church which the Lord promised He would build upon Peter. Furthermore, regarding that which was said by Him, that if some difference should arise between brothers, first indeed he who is harmed ought to approach him who harmed him and ask for the things that make for peace; then, if he cannot reconcile him, also to take another with him; but if not even thus should he be reconciled, finally to announce it to the Church; to which, if he does not obey,

he is to be judged as a heathen and a publican; ^A that is, as one faithless and cut off from the Church, the word reinforces what we have previously said. For the Lord presupposes that the Church is a definite thing, and that it is always truthful in announcing and doing those things which are useful and necessary for others. For unless it were to be always truthful, He would not have sent the faithful to it indefinitely, throughout all time, to hear those things which are to be decided regarding ambiguous matters. Nor, if its indefinite nature were defined among the faithful, would they be able to know to whom they should turn, or to whom they should refer all their concerns, so that those obeying might be secure and safe; and yet those not obeying would know that they were to be classed with the heathens and the faithless.

But neither, if it were not presupposed that the Church to which they were sent would always dictate truly concerning all things, could they know when they ought to refuse and when they ought to obey, when those who differed among themselves appeared both to be bringing forward true arguments; and the common multitude of Christians, and indeed human weakness, could not discern them, and confusion and conflict would seem to spring up in ecclesiastical matters, unless the Church, being subject to it, decided each point definitely. And furthermore, they would be entirely blameless, yielding themselves to every spirit, unless ecclesiastical authority were open and manifest to the faithful: for while God demands things that are possible from all, yet they are not able to discern those things that are obscure; or it would behoove everyone to have constantly acquired knowledge of divine things in such a confusion of matters, and for them themselves to discern the truth of an ambiguous faith: but for this to happen in a multitude is not possible. And therefore, God would never demand this from everyone. And that statement which is also made: that the blind leading the blind are in danger of falling, and those who are disobedient to the Church are cast out together with the heathens, would not have a place if it were not possible to discern the Church and to distinguish the good from the evil.

^B Since these things must necessarily be conceded, while other Churches, as has been said, have often erred, one in one way and another in another from the truth: when they did not agree among themselves regarding the truth of the faith throughout the whole world, and they both held false opinions and proposed them to others to be held, and indeed compelled some even against their will to confess them, there would surely be none among them to which we might be sent indefinitely to hear things that are salutary and certain regarding ambiguous matters. For it is manifest that we admire all the more those who at that time contradicted it, and who struggled even unto blood against the heresies which it fostered, and so far are we from considering them faithless and heathens because they did not obey, that we even pursue them with due honor, and every year we celebrate their feast days, and we put them forward as mediators for us before God.

And certainly Nestorius, and Pyrrhus, and the rest of the prelates of the Constantinopolitan see, being heretics at that time, though they were with all the Church that was under them, still asserted themselves to be that Church which they kept saying must be followed by all in all things, and they punished those who did not obey them as heathens and publicans. But those who did obey them, we consider to be lost; and the more prone they were to impiety, by so much the more were they afflicted with greater punishment by the Church, and those who consented to them were punished with anathema.

But we know of no one who, at any time, when the faith was being debated, obeyed the Roman Church and received a similar condemnation. Nay, there is no one who, while openly resisting the Constantinopolitan Church, did not at the same time look to the Roman Church, and hold its opinion on the faith as an example of truth and piety, to which he might oppose it when it contradicted [him], and might prefer it as an ally and helper against its enemies. ^C And even now, when the name of the adversaries is obscure, that Church is both honored and celebrated both publicly and privately: so that it is evident from this that this is the Church to which, if one does not obey, he is numbered among the Gentiles and the publicans according to the sentence of the Savior.

One must indeed consider that other Churches also have authority in those things which pertain to them, and which are under them, and that they may both safely decide and direct, when time requires, when all are referred to the one [Church]. But this is true unless they struggle against the head, especially when the difference is regarding the confession of the faith. For then, ^D indeed, and in the Symbol of faith, just as other things necessary for salvation are required of them so that they may confess them: so also are they required to confess one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church: to which we are admitted as one that definitively decides concerning all things: and by obeying which we escape, free from troubles and anxieties. To be acknowledged also by all the faithful as possible and necessary is what is required. And without which neither can there be communion of the faithful, nor are we able to enjoy the virtue of the sacraments, nor by them be united to the head of the Church, which is Christ. The things of the Church of Christ are posited not in words, but in deeds. Although, even if there were some wheresoever in the world who, when others were saying different things about the faith, perceived the truth themselves, they have indeed been praiseworthy, carrying themselves over as a part toward the Church, and from there being sufficient unto themselves, they have been united through all things which pertain to the faith, and in this way also to others, they have preferred what is true.

They are most perniciously severed from the bond and life-giving influence of the Head, and they fall away; and there is a fear that those who are severed from the members, not only when due concord is absent, but even when a contradiction of the greatest matters is present, besides the fact that they can do nothing, should be numbered with the Gentiles and publicans. For by as much as the contradiction is about greater things, by so much is the condemnation more grievous. For we must not think that the sentence of the Savior, that the Church is to be obeyed, is pronounced only with regard to these common differences, but rather concerning those that are greater, and those which consist of the first order in the Church; such as are those matters regarding dogmas, among which there is also a contradiction concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, through which for so long a time the Churches have been dissipated.

For these things falling out in this way, it is inevitable that they not only fail to be enlivened and knit together in their integrity by the Head of the Church, which is Christ, but also that what they seemed to have should be taken away from them, as they contest these matters. For from him who has not, even that which he seems to have shall be taken away from him. ^A

Therefore, even if it were shown that it is true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that the arguments to the contrary say nothing, yet the very state of the Church, as has been said, would suffice to persuade the doubtful; and it would be fitting for individuals to receive everything declared by her without any reluctance, regarding her as the head of all Christians; and asserting that she is the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church which we have received in the Symbol of faith, and that she thus contains and confesses the catholic faith, while she most safely leads: especially if one also looks to the multitude of nations that follows her: very many indeed among these being ones who are most excellent in human and divine wisdom, as far as is possible for man, and very many likewise living in sacred and religious habit through monasteries, and meditating on the law of the Lord day and night. But yet it has been shown that there was a time when the Churches were united, and the Symbol of faith was read by that Church, as it is read now. ^B

As, therefore, it would not have been fitting for anyone possessed of mind and reason to consent to those who first wished to divide the members of the Church, and who were being cut off for their own desires from the common assembly of the Church, and at the same time to wish to be cut off with them, when no reasonable occasion suggested such a thing—but he would either have attempted to prevent the division rather, as did very many of that time who stood for the truth and the communion of the Church; or, as malice grew and others were rushing headlong over the precipice, he, standing upon the rock and preserving the union which he loved and honored with others only a day or two ago, would have remained united to the Church—so also now, if someone, imagining himself to have been at the time when the Churches were divided, looks at the matter with reason, providing for his own salvation and security, he will by no reason allow himself to be cut off from the Church of the Occident. ^C For it is indeed irrational, when those who are in charge behave in one way or another, to be willing to be severed just because they are willing to be severed from the Church, or to have endured those impulses as if it were in their power to do both as they please; and to lead the others wherever they want, as if they were slaves, with their freedom of will and opinion taken away to such an extent that it is permitted for them neither to discern opposite changes in matters, nor to choose the right opinion, nor to prefer it over the depraved.

No judge, therefore, will be so unjust as to decree that it is permitted for them to attack things contrary to salvation, but that for the rest, who are concerned for their own salvation and security, it is not permitted to choose what is of reason. Nor, indeed, will those who, because of their own levity and inconstancy, divide unity without any reason, have any reputation for prudence; while those who have chosen to preserve this entirely will be seen to have consulted better. ^D For much more will right and reason belong to those who remain in the good of unity, or who even return to it, than to those who, against all divine and human law, become the authors of sedition, division, and all evils. For if it shall be permitted for these to divide according to their will, it shall be granted to those by reason that it is not permitted to divide. And at the same time it is clear that no synod has ever been held in which it has been declared that the Church of the West is heretical, and that it is not permitted for the Roman Pontiff to use the just ecclesiastical privileges conceded to him from the beginning; nor that it is necessary for all to obey him according to the ancient sanctions of the Church.

It is therefore irrational and inconsiderate to follow, without any probable reason for the discession, and with no synod in any place bearing sentence against that Church, those whom their own will and levity carry about, and who bring forward nothing valid or reasonable; nay, even for them to take away in part, from a superfluous and fatuous contention, many things of the faith and of catholic doctors, and to be forced to confess in part against themselves. Truly, what these men think, that the many bishops who are partners in their contention sufficiently strengthen their opinion, is ridiculous: as if bishops of the whole world were not ordained by the Roman Church, who adorn the dignities themselves even by their names, while the Church guards the ancient order in all things. Furthermore, if anyone wishes to object, because they do not hold the very places, first of all, it is not from the place of the priest...

that the dignity of the priesthood is held to be derived, for indeed those who say such things would remove their own bishops, who participate in names only, being stripped of the realities; and at the same time, receiving the episcopate from the one from whom the dignity of the priesthood flows to all others, is surely of complete validity. Then, those who appear to preside over thrones, from which they are named, maintain the dignity in names alone without the realities, since the cities themselves were captured by infidels a long time ago and placed under the yoke. From this it happens that as ignorance, rusticity, and the rest of the corruption of morals gradually increase, not even the simplest rudiments of the faith are acknowledged among them, and they are Christians there more in name than in reality.

If, therefore, the fact that they are in agreement has great weight for division, the Church of the West will ^B nonetheless put forward these same people for its own side, and all the more so because they also have holy doctors on their side, and they themselves can easily render an account for the matters for which they are blamed. For this reason, no one desirous of his own salvation will choose to be divided along with his own people, partly because he is persuaded that the Church must be obeyed in all things, and that he who does not obey is to be cast out among the heathens; and partly because he perceives that the confession concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is true and necessary for salvation, according to many passages.

To those who are truly and firmly subject to these things, the person zealous for this truth will surely never be troubled concerning external matters. For some things are granted from the beginning ^C on account of custom; others are changed, as happens also in civil laws, because as times change, different things appear to be expedient for the state. Just as doctors also determine one diet or another, as their art dictates for the benefit of those being treated. These things, however, bring about no corruption of the faith. For no one has ever been accused of being a heretic on account of those external matters, whatever their state may be, or even on account of some custom.

Therefore, since it has been shown by many arguments that the belief concerning the Holy Spirit is as the Western Church holds, it is surely not just that those who are the first to be ailing in the faith should be cut off from the head, as if it were languishing, and thus be put in danger concerning the greatest things without reason ^D. For it is a wonder if anyone is so bold that, when there are so many things that compel one toward the common utility, he dares to hope for his own salvation while not only dividing himself, but also defending the most contrary opinions. For it was sufficient for danger to separate oneself from the Church through pride or any other such cause of disobedience. But indeed, to be divided for this reason above all—by dissenting from the Church concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit—which if one denies, one must necessarily also deny very many things that have been conceded concerning the faith, as was shown above, and by this division persists in opposing such truth, then what of the divine indignation and judgment? How great are the punishments for those who preceded them as authors of falsehood? How great, likewise, are the punishments to be inflicted upon their followers? For they, as much as in them lies, divide the common body of the Church and constitute themselves as lacerated members of the Church: *For not only*, he says, *are those who do evil worthy of death, but also those who consent to them.* For *we shall render an account for every idle word*, and *it is impossible to please God without faith*, as St. Paul the apostle says. And *if the blind lead the blind, both fall into a pit*; we judge what a danger there is in such blindness for those who are carried along with such levity, and especially for the prelates of the Church, whom Paul warned to watch over others, as they are to render an account for them: and from whom, unless they have kept watch, will the blood of others be required, according to the judgment of Scripture?

The condemnation of the Scribes and Pharisees must also be reconsidered, because they neither entered themselves, nor did they permit those who wished to enter to do so, by obstructing the way of truth. But if the most blessed Chrysostom persisted so strongly against the injuries of the powerful for the right of a widow, so that he was driven from his see and city, effectively like some wicked and lost man, how is it not fitting to readily and eagerly do and suffer all things for the right of the truth and the faith? Indeed, how is it not fitting to imitate the holy Athanasius, who, when the East and West were contending at that time over the name of substance and person, and the ends of the earth were in danger of clashing over these syllables, threw himself into the middle and appeased both, thinking it unworthy that they should clash over names which carry the same meaning, even if they seem to differ in pronunciation? For *if I shall have delivered my body to be burned, apart from love, it profits me nothing*, and what the Apostle said there concerning charity: how can it be safe for those who are not only divided from the flock of Christians, but who also dissent from them most inimically and against all reason concerning the faith?

Therefore, on both sides, for the sake of the truth and for our own security, it is necessary to show every zeal and all diligence concerning that which is expedient: preferring nothing to the discovery of the truth, nor suffering that which many others do, who fear external inconveniences and losses, and therefore, against their own salvation, proceed knowingly and prudently, most foolishly indeed, betraying such a great and truly necessary thing for the sake of most worthless matters, as if God were ignorant of our strength and the affections of our heart; but rather, let us willingly and freely strive, and set out toward others, to see if they might by any chance be able to bring forth something useful regarding such a great matter.

Therefore, free from all anticipation, and removed from every vice of contention, and relying on the help of God, let us omit no diligence: deeming it truly wicked that, for the sake of human gain, they traverse the long seas

and prefer the profit from this and the labor involved to many goods, especially since eternal life comes to us through this, which is the end of the divine dispensation regarding human nature. For just as he who does not believe is already judged, for here he receives the beginning of condemnation, and he who does not know will be made unknown: so the contemplation of God in this life promises the future to us; and to those things which are believed here concerning God, and are grasped as much as is possible, when the bonds of the flesh are loosed, succeeds the beauty of truth. Truth succeeds riddles; while faith and hope yield to the reality of the things themselves, when the mirror of this body is dissolved.

^B From which it is surely manifest that even those who are deceived here in the faith, and do not attain the true knowledge of God, will not enjoy that future contemplation either, but will be profane, and must be placed on the left side. If, therefore, the blessed Stephen and many others of that time showed their constancy unto death for the image of the Savior: and, indeed, when the matter itself was not immediately concerned with the primary faith and theology, but with the sacrament of the divine dispensation, and not directly with this, since the injury was referred only to the humanity of Christ; for the honor of the image, according to the great Basil, reaches to the primitive form: yet, against the opponents of the images, they showed constancy unto death. What manner of alacrity, what zeal, what strength can be shown with merit by them for the truth proposed concerning the Holy Spirit, who are lovers of the truth, and who care for their own security and salvation, for which there is every reason, every word, and the sacrament of the divine dispensation?

^C You have, set forth as you requested concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit—at greater length, indeed, than I had initially intended, but necessarily, as I think, the subject matter itself suggesting this length. If, therefore, these things have been said sufficiently, let us give thanks to God; but if less than would fully satisfy the industry of those who are studious, let them know that our infirmity is at fault, not the dignity of the subject matter itself. For since it is true in itself, it also relies on the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Whoever rightly considers that we have set forth their sentiments and opinion on this matter as you requested, will find that we have said nothing of our own. But that I was briefer in exposing it, while I desire to dispatch the task by flying rapidly, as it were, over each point, and while I do not consider it necessary to dwell upon all things, seeing that many have discoursed at length about these matters, someone might deservedly blame me. From these things, however, which have been said, it will be possible to see most easily toward what the truth of the proposed question looks, since the most necessary points have been comprehended: if only, as I said at the beginning, he who is to read it wishes to do so with an intent mind, far from a spirit of contention.

^D I beseech and warn all who are to read these things, not to take it heavily if, being of the same country and race as they are, I have wished to walk a different path than them, as the truth indicates. I certainly wished that there should be one sheepfold under one shepherd, and that all, bound by the bond of love, as Paul says, might think the same; and that there might be no schisms, with scandals banished as far as possible. For thus I myself, with the rest compacted into one body and having one head, would enjoy the greatest peace most tranquilly: nor indeed, since I prefer to be taught, and have need of it, would I assume the office of a teacher, which is least of all fitting for me. From which there will perhaps not be wanting those who might accuse me of boastfulness and ostentation; but since indeed it is necessary that scandals come; for he says there must be heresies, that those who are approved among you may be made manifest, and it is necessary for each person to be vigilant, lest he be carried about here and there by many errors, and, while one says one thing and another says another, he might, without knowing it, lose everything: For without faith it is impossible to please God; then surely, with scandals pressing, it would be the part of prudence to omit all anticipation of time and all popular folly, to examine the truth of the words in itself, and to consider more diligently, being intent in all things on the rules of the Fathers, to follow wherever the truth may lead. For this happened even to many who preceded us, teachers of the Church in former times; who, when it often seemed to them that the truth was otherwise than the common opinion, became wholly its own, and helped it in every way when it was in danger, and recalled it when it was torn: and, disdaining all things, if it were necessary, they surpassed them, being afflicted with fire and sword and the cruelest torments: which was their duty, fulfilling it and prescribing to those who came after, by their own example, how they ought to behave when such cases emerged. If indeed, therefore, it were possible to please God and men alike, it would certainly be more desirable and to be sought, and no one would wish one to be preferred to the other in this matter. But since it is not possible to serve two masters, who are mutually contrary: For if, he says, I pleased men, I would not be the servant of Christ; and: The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God. One must obey God rather than men; and that which Saint Maximus, when he was accused by his fellow citizens, with the heresy of the Monothelites prevailing among them, because he was attached to the Western Church and was contradicting his own, says: Namely, that he loved both; the former as orthodox, the latter as homoglossos, that is, of the same tongue as he himself was; that is now also to be said to those who accuse me. For men are to be considered friends, but it is necessary to consider the truth a greater friend.

We have not deemed it just, whether through indulgence toward friendship or from fear of the squabbles of certain people, to give way ^A to human passion on either side and, by omitting the line of truth, to look more to ourselves than to the things of God and of our neighbor, thereby causing harm to both ourselves and them through our silence. But, having the fear of God before our eyes—though it is bold to say so—and also not being ignorant of what the good and well-pleasing will of God is, and seeking glory from Him alone, even if we are pressed by straits, we have considered it necessary to deem all things as nothing, but to set our words in judgment, and for the sake of these persons and the love of neighbor, to deem that all things must be applied. For one must be bold, even to cause distress if there is need, and with the word, like iron, to cut away swelling wounds and to heal them with charity. By this action, one of two things will follow. For either they will become quieter and milder to argue against, or, being caught by weak and false opinions of their own minds, they will gain this profit: that they will grow fearful of standing against the truth. If, however, anyone is discerning or seeking God, he will surely not be ashamed of this best of changes. For according to the theologian Gregory, "It is not the changing of what is evil, but the observing of what is evil, that brings shame." Therefore, that we might seek no small profit for them and for ourselves, we have preferred the truth to all else, and, calling upon the Holy Spirit Himself, we have undertaken to speak of Him, at your exhortation. "I have not withheld the declaring of all the truth and the counsel of God to you." May this work of ours profit the utility of those who are to read it, so that both he who sows may reap fruit, and he who gathers may receive a wage, and that we may all together enter the heavenly homeland, to enjoy the joy of our Lord, to the praise and glory of the one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the holy and blessed Trinity, and the one and true Deity. Amen.

MANUEL CALECAS: BOOK ON ESSENCE AND OPERATION

FRANCIS COMBEFIS' PREFACE (Biblioth. PP. Auctar. nov. tom. II.)

The deeds of Manuel Calecas, as far as I am able to attain to them, I leave to be defended by my dearest fellow-soldier and associate in both arenas (that is, of the holier institute and of letters), the Reverend Father Jacques Quetif, who adorns the library and eulogies of the order of writers, and is to me the greatest author of this very work and undertaking, as a kind of specimen of that light which he himself is about to bring to these same authors through his own study: I transfer my pen to the work of Calecas itself, which is in my hands from the Royal Library, and which is clearly learned, and wherein he most gravely refutes the highly pernicious error of the later Greeks.

For there grew up among the simpler monks, those unlearned in the disciplines—just as in the times of Theophilus, Epiphanius, and Jerome with the error of the Anthropomorphites, or also of the Massalians—who thought that God was either of human or other sensible appearance, and that He made Himself visible to spiritual men in prayer; so, in the slightly later age (around the time of the Palaeologi), there arose the excessively insane delirium of the Palamites, who differentiate the divine virtue from His essence; which very thing is the Deity and is uncreated, and is natural to God, which shares itself with things and is seen, while the essence itself [is] utterly incommunicable and invisible. ^C How many things, finally, from the very synod of the Palamites themselves, Calecas recounts and solidly refutes; and [mentions] those who stood stoutly in the same arena fighting for the truth: Barlaam the monk, Acindynus, and Niphon the hieromonk, who is also Demetrius Cydonius, and John Cyparissiota, called "the Wise," whose great volume exists in the library of the Most Christian King, concerning this argument, besides those things which have been published only in Latin, and exist in Greek in the possession of the Reverend Father Petrus Possinus, S.J., in Rome. ^D Leo Allatius also reports on others, both in his book *On the Consensus of Both Churches, Greek and Latin*, and in the volume of his *Orthodox Greece*, and finally in his *Diatribe* on the writings of the Symeons, lately published by me, which it would be long to repeat here and would be to do work already done. It will not, however, be wearisome to transcribe the Tome of John, Patriarch of Constantinople, which is shorter, by which he strikes down the burgeoning dogma of Palamas; and whether our Calecas is looking to this, seeing that in the very beginning of his work he says that the Church once thought and decreed otherwise, and was therefore not the true Church if it so changes its faith. The Palamites proscribe John himself in that Tome under Cantacuzenus, which Calecas and the others mentioned impugn.

^A It runs therefore: “Palamas and those of like mind with him, and all their impious dogmas—or, to speak more appropriately, their ravings—as well as those who defend, receive, and interpret the content of the Tome according to their own explanation, or rather their babbling, and not according to a sense that is befitting of God and orthodox, as do the luminaries and teachers of the Church, whose footsteps we follow and to whose teaching we adhere, having inscribed the sayings of the saints in the Tome; all those who, for this very reason—namely, because we do not accept such ravings of theirs, some of which were sent to us by them and others appeared from elsewhere—have dared to cut off my commemoration without canonical warrant and without judgment, we subject to the bond of the life-giving and holy Trinity, and we consign to anathema.” The subscription: “John, by the mercy of God, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarch.” Palamas and his followers, and all their impious dogmas, or more truly ravings; and also their defenders, and those who assent to and receive what is contained in the Tome according to their exposition, or rather their vain babbling, and not according to a sense that becomes God and is orthodox, as the lights and teachers of the Church have handed down—whose footsteps we insist upon following, and whose opinions we follow, we have digested the sayings of the saints in the Tome; and all those who, for this very reason—that we do not accept their ravings, which they have in part sent [to us], and which we have in part known by the report of others—have dared, against the canons and without any scales of justice or equity, to erase my memorial, we subject to the bond of the life-giving and holy Trinity, and we strike with anathema. Subscription: “John, by the mercy of God, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarch.” ^B With the same zeal for the faith, Ignatius, Patriarch of Antioch, proscribes that new heresy; whose Tome, because it is somewhat long, Allatius did not publish. Barlaam the Calabrian, a learned man, gave occasion for the contention; who, as he handed himself over to the discipline of the monks, exposed and censured their errors; against whom Palamas, Archbishop of Thessalonica, showed himself to be a vindicator and author, and suppressed Barlaam himself. For once Barlaam the monk was condemned for his forwardness regarding the holy institution, the question concerning the dogma was suppressed, lest Palamas should depart condemned for his own perverse and heretical doctrine. See Gregoras book eleven; Cantacuzenus book eleven of his *Histories*, and in the Prooemion of his *Contradictions*, against the hieromonach Prochorus Cydonius, brother of Demetrius, concerning the Taborian light.

So rotten have some of Palamas's dogmas and ravings seemed, that his followers afterwards have striven either to deny them or to conceal them: of which matter, besides our Calecas, John Cyparissiotes is a wealthy witness, book one, chapter two, produced by me. After Palamas, the leaders of the heresy were Isidore, whom ^C Cyparissiotes testifies to be the author of the Tome, although he was published by his successor Callistus; and Coccinus and Nilus. And because the Taborian light seemed to the Palamites to be an illustrious example, thus distinguished from the essence of virtue, which might be seen by their very bodily eyes, and the divinity, an occult essence, and by that argument Palamas edited a twofold dogmatic discourse, it pleased one to represent it here, as a specimen of his doctrine and sect. Our people think that the effect of the superior order of God (the glorious appearance, to wit, and glory, in which God is considered to be seen, by some intimate sense and taste of his presence), such as it is permitted for mortals, especially in the body, to obtain of the gifts of God: not that that brightness and splendor is the very essence of God and uncreated divinity—to which opinion Leo Allatius suffered himself to be led in his book *On the Consensus of Both Churches*, for the sake of avoiding the inconvenience of which, however, the Palamites invented this distinction of theirs between virtue and essence, as our author Calecas maintains, and so that they might not be heard to be Massalians, thinking the very essence of God to be seen in divine apparitions.

Besides Palamas, another theologian is older than him, Symeon, abbot of Saint Mamas in Xerocercus, called by his own the "younger theologian": whose Life, written most verbosely by Nicetas Sthetatus (the author), exists in the Cardinal Mazarin codex, now the Royal [Library]; and he was the author [who advised] Henschenius and Papebrochius of the Society of Jesus not to insert him into their *Lives of the saints* for March, by which suspicion he labored, and as if he had been the source of the whole Palamite error. I was nevertheless going to represent him here, had not the mass [of the text] stood in the way, and the typesetter and bookseller, sparing of expenses, stood in the way. ^D Permit meanwhile, reader, to provide a greater knowledge of him and his doctrine here than any of us have hitherto had: to append also a specimen from his words, whereby it may be easy either to defend him as an orthodox, pious, and excellently spiritual man, or to proscribe him as a man seduced and not of sound mind. Pontanus’s conjecture on the age of the man, the cause of his imprisonment, and other matters, is not sufficiently happy, by which he published certain of his works in Latin from the Bavarian codices. Leo Allatius hunted for someone closer to his age from the author of the *Life*, Sthetatus (we say Pectoratus), who it is clear struggled much against the Latins with Michael Cerularius, and favored the parts of Cerularius; yet the cause of his imprisonment, because the monuments failed him, he himself could not attain; and divining it, he perhaps marked the man’s memory with a blacker vote. From the *Life*, therefore, have this summary. Symeon was a Paphlagonian, born in the town called Galata, of noble parents, Basil and Theophano, [born] under Basil and Constantine Porphyrogenitus; his uncle being powerful in the court and of the sacred bedchamber, he himself also serving in the office of spatharocubicularius among the senators, although he was a youth in age, and his uncle having quickly died, by the counsel and work of Symeon the Studite, called the Venerable (whom he constantly calls his teacher and spiritual father), in the habit of a servant in the Studite monastery

and exercised himself under him. The very beginnings of his sanctity were such that some of the monks were delighted, while others were offended. The superior attempted to call ^A him away from this stricter discipline, and when he did not obey, he cast him out of the monastery. Symeon the Venerable committed himself to Anthony, the superior of Saint Mamas in Xerocercus, and he took care of him there, clothed him in the monastic habit, and strengthened him with stricter teachings. Here he was refreshed by divine visions and was united to God in a deeper contemplation: his daily bread, the life-giving Bread and the precious Blood of Christ; herbs and legumes, upon which alone he sustained his life, except on Lord's days. A very strict solitude, a constant study of prayer, a diligent reading of the Scriptures and of the Lives of the monks who had been distinguished for holiness in a previous age; the most accurate exercise of every day, an unheard-of preparation for holy communion, and fasting during the days of Lent, except on Saturday and Sunday.

After the death of Anthony, he was put in charge of the monastery of Saint Mamas and was ordained a priest by Patriarch Nicolas Chrysoberges. The Spirit descended upon the head of the ordinand in the form of immense light; this vision was familiar to him during the sacred rite for the forty-eight years of his priesthood, as he himself used to relate to someone as if it were about another person, concealing himself for a time; it is written among his Apophthegms. Thus Nilus reports to Chrysostom that he speaks as if of another, clearly seeing the place of the altar full of celestial Powers at the very time of the sacrifice. ^B Furthermore, this sensible arrival and vision of the Spirit, although it is an unusual thing and might seem to lean somewhat toward the Messalians, who would boast of such constant divine visions, nevertheless there are not lacking even among Catholics similar examples in Basil and Chrysostom and another bishop, whose name does not now occur, and Pope Agatho: all of whom, in the wantonness of the ministers, are read to have been at times deprived of this wonted and familiar vision, until it was checked. They thought that they were not seeing the Spirit Himself—which is the heresy of the Messalians—but a sensible sign of His presence, whether it is necessary to call that light, or whatever else.

The opinion of the priestly office is immense: ^C Often asked by some what a priest ought to be, he would scarcely at length answer with a contrite spirit, groaning: "Woe is me, brothers! Why do you ask me about such things? The matter is tremendous, even in the very thought of it. Truly I am by no means a worthy priest, while I consider the tremendous height of the sacred office and dignity; yet I, a humble man, certainly know what a priest ought to be. First, indeed, chaste, not only in body, but to a far greater degree in soul and mind: and in his exterior composition and character, humble, but in his interior state and sense, contrite. When, however, he stands at the holy table, he ought to contemplate the Godhead with his mind, and with his senses the gifts set before him, and to possess in his heart, by the gift of knowledge and high contemplation, Him who is present in the gifts in an inaspectable manner, so that it may be permitted him to offer supplications with confidence, and to confer with God as a friend speaks to a friend, and to say without any condemnation of judgment, 'Our Father, who art in heaven,' as one who has the true God and by nature the Son of God dwelling in him, through ^D the presence of the Holy Spirit inhabiting him." He seriously deterred men from the love of that order, himself celebrating with an almost angelic countenance, and one whom those standing by could scarcely behold. Often a light cloud was seen which would cover the whole man as he stood in the sanctuary.

The monastery of Saint Mamas, over which he presided, was restored by him; the flock of monks was increased; by the vision of the light cloud, a certain deep wisdom was granted to him, and he had learned of strange and hidden mysteries. He did not possess himself, but the grace of God withdrew him entirely to Itself, and his tongue became the pen of a swift-writing scribe, while his mind became a fountain of the wisdom of God. Therefore, although he was altogether unlearned in the teachings from without, like the beloved disciple, he theologized, and he applied himself to the things of theology through entire nights.

The origins of the lucubrations of Symeon.

… ^A monastic brethren, and especially [to them] regarding the great confessor Theodore, under whom, as their prelate and leader, Symeon took the greatest glory in his monastic training. Weary of these monks, a portion of those serving under him (about thirty monks), having torn their cloaks, in one sudden onset, bringing a violent hand to bear and killing their pastor, having broken down the doors of the monastery, burst into the patriarchate and poured forth their grievances. When the satisfaction [offered by] Symeon was heard, and his exhortation, proved against his own people, was delivered, the insolent monks were condemned to exile by the patriarch; and only just, at Symeon's request, were they permitted to remain in the city, though excluded from the monastery. Symeon thus went about visiting those dispersed through the city, to soothe them and call them back to himself, and in a short time, with such kindness and diligence, he compelled them all to return to their duty and their fold. In a short time ^B the good shepherd gathered them all, and filled his fold once again with his sheep, who had been gentle but a short time before were fierce. This was the beginning of the subsequent disturbances and temptations of Symeon, and the cause was not much different; certain chapters of his discipline or doctrine were disapproved, no doubt. The author of his life represents the envy of Stephen Syncellus towards him; of which later.

His disciples were famous for their sanctity and customs; Arsenius the Paphlagonian, a eunuch, whom he also wished [to become] pastor in his place, after the prefecture had at last been resigned. The man’s training; the excessive force of his fervor was restrained; discretion and indulgence in food were suggested, as the necessity of the body demanded. Hierotheus, from a bishop became a monk, a disciple of Symeon. He resigned his see and episcopal dignity [having fallen into] the unexpected and accidental homicide of his nephew. He went first to Rome for the sake of penance; then to Constantinople, the new Rome itself. For it sufficiently agreed with both Churches during those times, with the Photian schism meanwhile quieted, and not yet renewed by the arts and fraud of that most turbulent man, Cerularius. For up to that time, as Michael Psellus is also witness in his ^C Funeral Oration, the predecessors had dealt more mildly with the Latins, and had considered that they held almost whatever the other side held, in the full communion of the Churches; for they felt that both sides were indeed professing the same faith in different words, although there were not wanting those who would carp at the Latins and accuse them of error. Thus, therefore, the author [speaks] of the bishop, whom he had called most religious in his customs, and famous in his life, doctrine, and eloquence, and zealous; whom his clergy would scarcely let be withdrawn from himself, even after the homicide, in such a way did he worthily fulfill the role of a pastor:

The bishop, therefore, having completed such a long journey on foot, with lamentation and grief, and arriving at Rome, dragged along by a servant in chains, confesses his crime to the Pope and the bishops who were at Rome, the voice of his confession ^D being broken by sobs and wailing. Seeing, therefore, the immense contrition of the bishop and his mind oppressed by grief, they not only quickly grant forgiveness for his transgression, but also comfort with myriad consolations his soul, which was deeply pained. He, however, seized and overcome by a heavier grief of heart, rejects all consolation. From there, therefore, he turned his steps toward the great city of Constantine. And completing this journey on foot, he comes to the imperial city; and having entered the Great Church, struck with tears, he confesses his transgression to the patriarch and the bishops who were sitting with him; and among his words, along with the chain, he lays down his episcopal dignity. This is a notable example of penance, and of that discipline by which the Greeks themselves resign the priesthood, wherever they have offended against the canons, even by chance or through the ignorance [of the clergy]. It also provides a new document for that age of the observance toward the Roman Church and its prelate, by the Greek Church: the confession made to him, the indulgence granted by him, and the dignity of the see offered, had he not preferred to resign of his own accord, and to spend the rest of his life in the labors of penance among the monks: with Symeon chosen as his guide for this, under whom he also brought forth notable examples of sanctity. But the narrative must be recalled to Symeon.

With the approval of the patriarch Sergius, he casts the burden of the prefecture upon Arsenius. Documents were likewise handed down to him and the flock. It will not be burdensome to transcribe a chapter of discipline from them; which itself is held in words not far removed in Oration 24, from those edited by Pontanus: "Knowing the infinite contrition of the bishop, and his state of mind in mourning, they not only hasten to give forgiveness for the suffering, but also console his pained soul with myriad encouragements. But the bishop, held fast by the pain in his heart, remained uncomforted. Therefore, from there he turns his guide toward the great city of Constantine. Having then made this journey on foot, he reaches the queen-city; and having entered the great Church of God, he confesses the fall with tears to the patriarch and the bishops, and with his word he lays down the dignity of the episcopacy along with the chain. Do not despise, under the pretense of gentleness for the sake of men's praise—[for] a small matter occurring to the insult of the evangelical life and the state of monks—; but imitating your Christ and God, being indignant, and stirring yourself up without passion, take vengeance for the commandments of God. Let there be for you, above all and in the scrutinizing of everyone's thoughts, accuracy, so that you may know which of them require the communion of those who pray and communicate, and which require excommunication, and the rank of those who are repenting; so that you may not, in knowing, make the Church of God, instead of a holy temple, a den of thieves or a brothel..."

and for this reason, you may not avoid the terrible judgment of God’s wrath. You will make your spiritual sons cautious, as it is written (Lev. 15:31), and you will teach them to hold the holy places and vessels of God, and His ministry, in reverence and fear. For know that it was ordained by the Apostles that it is for the ordained and most ^A reverent of monks alone—those who also partake of the mysteries—to touch them. For this reason, you will not allow everyone, and all who wish, to enter into the divine sanctuary (that is, the place of the altar and the priests), but only those, as it has been said, who are of the priestly order and the sanctified among the brothers. As for other things that are profitable for your monastery, you have the teaching and the norm handed down by the Fathers in the divinely inspired instruction of the great martyr of Christ and confessor Theodore, the common Father and teacher also of his servants, and of our holy Father the Studite.

^B Simeon, that divine man to whom the name "the Venerable" was fittingly and properly given, and who existed simultaneously as the father and teacher of this wonderful Simeon, when he had already reached a good old age—having legally completed forty-five years in the martyrdom of conscience—was deemed worthy of apostolic grace, performing healings and wonders, and although an unlettered man, he wrote by the Holy Spirit a book full of spiritual profit. It was necessary for him to rest from those long labors of asceticism, concerning which he who seeks to learn will understand accurately from those things written at length about him. Having fallen ill with the sickness of dissolution, he departed to the Lord, taking leave of his much-toiling and enduring body. ^C This man, therefore, and his brilliant achievements, the blessed man—as if a disciple—knowing, and being accurately acquainted with his apostolic life, not knowing how to bury the works of God and divine charisms, but rather to proclaim and sing them, composed hymns and encomia to him by divine revelation, and wrote down his entire life. And so that he might also rouse some to zeal, to imitate the one being extolled and to become workers of virtue, he celebrated his memory annually after the tradition of the Apostles, brightly with all the saints, having painted, as it were, a column of virtue inscribed with the history of his ^D icon. Thus, the divine man, who was fittingly and properly called the Venerable, who also stood as father and teacher to this wonderful Simeon, when he had reached a ripe old age—having duly discharged the duty of conscience for forty-five years—received apostolic grace; a worker of healings and miracles, an unlettered and unlearned man, he wrote down a book of great spiritual profit by the divine Spirit, and it was necessary that he rest from those long labors of religious exercise; (concerning which, he who seeks to know will understand accurately and fully from the things written at length about him), and laboring under a final illness, departing with his body—which had been a conqueror in many struggles and most enduring—to the Lord he migrated. This blessed man therefore, as a disciple, having examined his life and his brilliant virtues and deeds, and knowing his apostolic life perfectly, not wishing to bury the works of God and divine gifts but rather to preach and praise them, wrote by divine revelation songs of praise and encomia to him, and recorded his whole Life in the monuments of literature. But in order to provoke some to emulation, and to inflame them through the man's praises to imitation and the cultivation of virtue, he celebrated his memory annually every year, as we have received from apostolic tradition, with all the saints and with festive joy, having written...

^A a history depicted under the title of virtue, of that likeness and image. Thus far, Symeon, out of private revelation and knowledge, may seem to have indulged himself a little too much, in order to pay full honors of the saints to his spiritual Father. That economy and reasoning of his plan is indeed to be praised, that we should praise those whom we wish to be instructors and leaders for us and for others in the wrestling-school of virtue; and the Roman pontiffs distinguish themselves remarkably, by vindicating the founders of religious orders who are held to be more famous in the Church, if they have shone with the rays of sanctity; nor are they only inscribed in the Roman fasti, but also granted a solemn office, not only among their own, but in the entire Roman world and the Latin Church. However, so that this may be done rightly, not only by civil, but at least publicly by sacred honors, episcopal knowledge and proof is necessary; which Symeon, with an impulsive and overly eager zeal, did not wait for, although it followed later. For Sthetatus adds ^B that Stephanus Syncellus, the prelate of Nicomedia, a man learned and eloquent, and famous for his wisdom and virtue, and able with the power of persuasion to soften a hard and stubborn mind, was sent as an envoy to Sclerus, if he might be able to persuade him to lay down his arms. Meanwhile, Stephanus Syncellus, the prelate of Nicomedia, a man learned and eloquent, famous for wisdom and virtue, and capable of softening a hard and indomitable mind by the power of persuasion, is sent as an envoy to Sclerus, to see if by any chance he might be able to compel him with words to lay down his arms. Father Goar wonders in his notes on Cedrenus how Syncellus Stephanus, being as it were a colleague of the patriarch and assiduous to him, could be the prelate of Nicomedia, living his life there for the duty of his office, rather than in Constantinople at the patriarch’s residence; and that he was not designated as successor to the patriarch, which seemed to be the case for syncelli. Sthetatus could have brought some light to this, if he had the opportunity. He teaches, therefore, that having abdicated the episcopacy, ^C he lived so assiduously with the patriarch and truly fulfilled the role of syncellus, not having been adorned by title and name only; or perhaps he was otherwise coveting the Constantinopolitan see, and by that office was preparing for himself a step toward it: which, that he might not attain, could have been caused by the long age of Sergius and his twenty-year tenure of the see, during which time nothing prevents Stephanus from having departed this life, and where he had played out the whole story regarding Symeon, by whose death or advancing age he later enjoyed peace, and freely paid the solemn annual honors to his spiritual Father, the venerable Symeon; or, not at all ambitious for that see (as there was no certain or any law-sanctioned and necessary succession of syncelli to that see) as if more useful ^D to the patriarch, he assisted in governing the entire diocese, just as if a bishop were governing one single city or the metropolis itself; or whether of his own accord, or by the invitation of the patriarch, or even the emperors, because of the fame of his name, he left it and settled in Constantinople as an assessor to the patriarch, intimate and familiar with him. In which way, among the Latins, also archbishops are everywhere co-opted into the cardinals, the presbyters of the holy Roman Church; and the sees of those thus assumed become vacant by the law itself, which does not sufficiently befit both duties in one man: that one, namely, should be addicted to the Roman curia and the clergy of that city, and that he should diligently execute the parts of the pontiff in the Church and the people to whom he is assigned as bishop; yet, of law...

^A and sometimes greater sees are committed; and if there are not wanting those who, having performed both offices brilliantly, have adorned both the purple and, even more, the mitre—entrusted especially to a flock composed of holy morals, and considering nothing before that, according to God, whether you speak of the purple or any other human dignity, and being vigilant in its care—truly authentic Pastors, and those who sedulously follow the footsteps of Christ the 'Archipoimen' [Chief Shepherd], have adorned [them]; among whom a certain sun shone forth, Charles Borromeo; many followed this excellent example, [such as] Francis Sourdis of Bordeaux, my own metropolitan and the asserter and defender of religious life in the most holy coenobium of the Friars Preachers of Bordeaux, into which I gave my name to a more sanctified institute (truly holy at that time, and in a way, a sodality); our Galaminius, and others.

Stephanus, therefore, having resigned ^B the episcopal throne, was always with the patriarch, and he carried a great reputation for knowledge among all. Having rejected the episcopal seat, he stayed always with the patriarch, and was held in high esteem by all for his knowledge. A learned man could, therefore, hold it suspect that both Symeons, being unlettered men, spoke such great things about God and divine matters as if by mere inspiration; and that the one, consecrating the memory of the other who was already deceased, would collect almost the whole city for his solemnities, so that now a great part of the citizens held nothing to be holy except what they had received from those authors. Therefore, his doctrine concerning God was the first thing tried by them; then that honor of the Father was challenged, for a year or two, [with] the patriarch and bishops assenting with difficulty, in order that they might condemn what they themselves had previously approved. At length, Symeon was dragged into council for that reason, and the very image of the Father [was] consecrated with divine honors: his cause was debated in it; and there was a long satisfaction by Symeon, for himself and for the image: accordingly, from that [image], the word "THE HOLY" was wiped out; and all his other images in [the church of] Saint Mamas [were] abolished. A second synod was convened; Symeon was ordered either to cease from those praises of the Father, or [to depart] from the coenobium; and to leave the city. As he was unwilling to yield, the penalty of exile was decreed by the synod. He was deported to Chrysopolis, into a small town which they call that of the Palusiatae. Having found there an oratory almost ruined and deserted, he sat therein with a disciple. He obtained it as a gift from Christopher, a man of the senatorial order whose property it was, on the condition that if God should grant him better [fortunes], he should build a monastery there. Through him and his other disciples, the complaint was carried to the patriarch. He himself was recalled into the city; his constancy was tested again; honors were offered, a metropolitan see in some noble city, if only he would remit the contention for a little while. To all these he remained unmoved, [so] permission was granted to honor the Father as he pleased, whether dwelling in the city and his former coenobium, or in a new solitude. He chose the solitude; in it a new flock was gathered, and a noble coenobium was built with magnificent buildings, sufficiently equipped with all things necessary for an ascetic life; they call it [the church of] Saint Marina. In it, the religion and cult of Symeon the Venerable increased, with an ^D innumerable multitude of men flowing together from the imperial city itself and the whole surrounding region to his yearly solemnities. The malice was derived and transferred to various other coenobia. No trouble was created for Symeon thereafter. Patriarch Sergius perished shortly after the restitution of Symeon, and Eustathius was surrogated for him, throughout whose entire time Symeon seems to have lived, and even [to have lasted] until the time of Alexius, who had been a Studite monk. [Either] Stephanus himself died at the time when Sergius died, or, after he was removed, he laid aside his animosity; [with] other patriarchs by now more favorable to Symeon, and of greater firmness than Sergius, who, having approved the method of Symeon’s institute in honoring his Father, ought not—with the Syncellus [trying to] obstruct him—[to have] fallen away from constancy, only for that reason, and unless he had certainly discovered that he had miscalculated, and that he was not a holy man, but either a hypocrite or a heretic. This is the sum of the Life of Symeon, which would fill many long pages. From it, it is clear how his affairs did not remain in obscurity after his short exile and imprisonment, nor were his hymns, sermons, and other writings buried in oblivion, as Leo Allatius had seemed to divine, [fearing] that ancient monuments had failed him. I find it difficult to admit that such a man stood for the adversaries, or [that he was] the fountain of the Palamites, except for this alone: that to them [his] words, spoken more simply and with excessive emphasis regarding the union and vision of God, and His light and divinity, were distorted into their own opinion; just as it also occurred to those above him—Dionysius, Basil, Gregory, Chrysostom, Maximus: and hardly anyone occurs among those who have treated mystical and moral theology more propensively, to whom it is not easy to impute almost the same calumny as to Symeon. Thus also some seemed to detract from our Thaulerus, whom Ludovicus Blosius, a learned and pious man, rightly vindicates. That vision, and others of its kind, is a certain taste of the awaited happiness, and a sense of God and His union in the perfect [that is] higher than [the] presence which Symeon, in denying it in them, marks as heresy; nor perhaps did Stephanus reproach anything else in him and his spiritual Father, Symeon the Venerable. It is pleasing to transcribe [a passage] from his Oration:

On True Knowledge

^A causes [him] to see? Cease, lest we overwhelm you with stones. As for you, Friends, no one at all—as you yourselves say—from among those who have decided to take up the cross and walk the narrow way and lose their own souls for the sake of eternal life, has seen [this]; yet many even before saw it, and more, I think, see it even now, and whoever is willing shall see it, even though you, through the perversity of your mind and the malice of your disposition, are unable to see them. Many things of this kind [are found in] that whole discourse, which for this very reason might seem to be a crime before the Syncellus; yet these were so diluted by the author, Sergius, that they appeared as mere calumnies to the judgment of the synod, with only this point in it being censured: that he celebrated the memory of his Father in such an ambitious and celebrated way. For thus he [spoke] to the nobles and to the disciple of Symeon: "I, indeed, noble men, never entertained any evil suspicion against the master Symeon; but even when I had read at first what had been written by him about his Father, I rejoiced in them, having known his life, and I permitted them to be sung in church, having highly praised his faith. But I know not whence, and [between] whom, a difference arose between him and the Syncellus, and countless accusations were stirred up against him and his Father, having nothing more than mere slanders. But that which has been inflicted upon him by us, it was not inflicted because he had erred in the dogmas of the Church, in which the straight and blameless faith entirely consists, but because he remained immovable in his own purpose and would make no end of honoring his Father and celebrating his feast days with splendid and magnificent observances; and by this his accusers were disturbed, and became a daily nuisance to us. This is the reason why I removed him from his monastery and the city. But now, if he wishes, and will yield to my words, he shall again be the master of his monastery, and with the approval of the entire holy synod, he shall be ordained by us as a bishop in one of the high metropolises, ^B and the things that have turned out poorly will receive the fitting correction."

And concerning those who are envious: They do not believe, and they persuade themselves that it is impossible for a man to be perfectly cleansed of passions and vices, and to receive the whole Paraclete substantially into himself. Therefore, they both speak and act against their own salvation, closing the gates of the kingdom of heaven against themselves and preventing all others who wish to enter from doing so. But if they happen to hear about someone else who has struggled lawfully, and who is cleansed of all passions, and who proclaims to all the great works of God—that is, as many things as God has wrought in him according to His most true promises—and [who tells] how, as he speaks for the benefit of his hearers, he was deemed worthy to see the light of God and God in the light of glory, and how he knowingly [saw] by experience in himself the visitation according to the operation of the Holy Spirit, and that he has become holy in the Holy Spirit, they immediately, like rabid dogs, bark at him and hasten, if possible, to devour the one who says these things. "Cease," they say, "you deceiver and proud man. Who has become such [a person] now, as the holy Fathers were? Who has seen God, or who can even see Him in the slightest? Who has received the Holy Spirit in such abundance as to be deemed worthy through Him to see the Father and the Son? Cease, lest we have you stoned." ^C But among you, O sir, as you yourselves say, there is no one at all; but among those who choose to take up the cross and walk the narrow way, and who have lost their souls for the sake of eternal life, many indeed have seen Him before; and more, I think, are seeing [Him] even now, and each one of those who are willing, is able; only you, through the perversity of your mind and the baseness of envy, are unable to see them.

^A ... of the intelligible manna. Of all those good things, he partakes, into which not even the Angelic Powers dare to gaze fearlessly. Being thus, he is fired by the Spirit, and he sees the mystery of his own deification from this source. He becomes entirely fire to the soul, imparting also to the body of his own splendor; just as burning fire imparts of its own nature to the iron. And the soul becomes for the body what God has become for the soul, as the Theologian’s voice says. For neither can the soul live, unless illuminated by the Creator, nor the body, unless empowered by the soul. Mark accurately the power of what is said. Body, soul, and God: these three. God is without beginning, without end, inaccessible, inscrutable, invisible, ineffable, unspeakable, intangible, impassible, and beyond telling; ^B yet in the last days He appeared to us in the flesh through the Son, and was made known through His all-holy Spirit, as we believe: equal to us in all things apart from sin; He is mingled with the rational soul for the sake of my soul, as someone once said, in order that He might both save the spirit and immortalize the flesh.

But indeed He also gives a promise, saying, "I will dwell in them and walk among them." But pay heed. Since God, according to His truthful promises, dwells in us, His genuine servants, and walks about in our souls through the energies and illuminations of the all-holy Spirit, we confess that those who believe are worthy of such souls being favored by God. And since the soul is shown to be in the whole body and neglected in no part, it is absolutely necessary that the flesh itself, being inseparable from the soul—or rather, not even able to live without it—should likewise be entirely led by the will of the soul. And just as there is no living body without a soul, so neither is there a will for the body to have...

On Apathy and a Virtuous Life

Having often conversed with many who are in the world, he is joined to the angels; he is mingled with the light; he tastes of life; he is entwined with immortality. He comes to participate in delight; he ascends into the third heaven; he is caught up into paradise; he hears unspeakable words; he enters into the bridal chamber; he comes into the marriage bed; he sees the Bridegroom; he becomes a participant in the spiritual marriage; he is filled from the mystical chalice, is refreshed by the fatted calf, the life-giving bread, the cup of life, the spotless Lamb, the spiritual manna; he enjoys all those good things into which not even the Angelic Powers dare to look. Being thus, he is inflamed by the Spirit, and thence he discerns the mystery of his own deification. ^C His soul is completely set on fire, and he imparts his own brightness to the body itself; just as fire, visible to the eyes, takes iron into the communion of its own nature. ^D And the soul becomes for the body what God is for the soul, according to the way the Theologian speaks. For it is not possible for the soul to live unless it is illuminated by the radiances of Him who created it, nor for the body to live unless it is strengthened by the soul. Pay diligent heed to what the things being said point toward. Body, soul, God. These three. God is without beginning and without end, inaccessible, inscrutable, invisible, ineffable; He who can neither be touched nor palpated, is subject to no affection, and cannot be told, yet appearing to us at the end of time...

in the flesh through the Son, and manifested through His most holy Spirit, as we are taught by faith, is equal to us in all things without sin, and is mingled with the intelligent soul, which is the cause of the soul—as some say—so that He might make the Spirit safe and grant immortality to the flesh. For He promises, saying, “I will inhabit them and walk among them.” But heed the mind! Just as He truly promised, in us, His true servants, He inhabits, and in our souls—in those who are worthy of such things—the afflatus and illuminations of the most holy Spirit walk, and we believe it to be explored that we cannot be separated from God. And since, on the other hand, the things of the mind pervade the whole body and are wanting in no part, it is absolutely necessary that the flesh itself, which is inseparable from the mind—nay, which cannot even live without it—should be entirely ruled by the will of the mind. And just as the body cannot live without the mind, nor then can it have a will without it. This is the mystery of Christ and of our own Trinity. Christ is as the exemplar, because in Him God exists in a deeper and different way than in us. For in Him, there is one being in the hypostasis, and that in which the flesh is, as Gregory says, one God. In us, however, by the gift of grace, of illumination, and of whatever God works in the saints, as in those who are more particularly sons and gods—though not by nature, but by gratuitous gift and adoption, which Symeon professes in plain words—lest one should seek a flaw in the bullrush and be troubled by these things, his created Trinity, the image ^B of the divine, in which the three are one God, even if all things must be reduced with caution to the standard of sound theology. And this caution is most especially to be applied to mystical matters, for want of which they can be a cause of offense to the simpler, and give them a handle for error. Symeon therefore infers: ^C It is proved, therefore, that just as in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one God is worshipped inconfusedly and indivisibly, so again, in God and the soul and the body, the man who is made such by grace comes to be indivisibly and inconfusedly, neither the body being changed into the soul, nor the soul being transmuted into the divinity; but God remaining as He is God, and the soul as it has its nature, and the body as the clay was fashioned. He who paradoxically has bound them together, and mingled the intellectual and immaterial with the clay, He Himself is united to both of these inconfusedly; and I, according to the image and likeness of Him, as the word has proven, come to be. But again, if it pleases, let us repeat the argument. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God, whom we worship; God, soul, and body, the man who was created according to the image of God and is deemed worthy to be a god. O the miracle! That man is united to God spiritually and bodily, if the soul is not separated from the mind, nor the body from the soul; but by an essential ^D union, man also becomes a tri-hypostatic being by grace; one God by appointment, from body and soul, and that of which he has partaken, the divine Spirit. And then is fulfilled what was said by the prophet David: “I have said, You are gods, and all of you are sons of the Most High.” Sons of the Most High, that is, according to the reason of the image and the likeness of the Most High, divine offspring from the divine Spirit.

On the interpretation of these things

Nor is that passage far off from the 27th oration, which seemed harsher to Pontanus, and was brought as an example to Leo Allatius, which no pious person could bear with a calm mind in Symeon. ^B O wondrous thing! Man is united to God spiritually and bodily; since the soul is not separated from the mind nor the body from the soul; but even essentially, through the union which is by grace, man (one might say, of three substances) is accomplished; one, clearly, by adoption, God, from body and soul, and of that which he has become a participant, the divine Spirit. And then is fulfilled that which was said by the prophet David: “I have said, You are gods, and all of you are sons of the Most High.” Sons of the Most High, that is, according to the reason of the image and likeness of the Most High; a divine progeny from the divine Spirit. Pontanus and Allatius (take this) as if it were an essential union; and Pontanus warns that this should be referred neither to God nor to grace (for man, neither just nor together with God or with grace, is essentially united) but only to the conjunction of body and soul, which is, in any case, essential. I would rather render it adverbially, as it is, by which the word "tri-hypostatic" is determined—so that man should be said to be of three substances (as if, clearly, subsisting in them) by a certain likeness to the divine persons, not in any way whatsoever, but by a true and veritable union—but by grace, and by which he becomes one, not of one essence. It is known to the holy Fathers that ^C is taken for the same, as Damascene, Maximus, and others explain throughout: therefore among them it is the same as union. Therefore the union in Christ is natural, as declared by Cyril, anath. 3, it does not conflate natures in Him, as Theodoret wrongly cavils, nor does it construct one, the other being absorbed, by the error of Apollinarius; but their true union, yet (clearly in the manner of subsistence) thus also it signifies to Symeon, an essential union of three, or as by which man becomes one essentially a god, consisting of three, it is a true union, and as by which it truly becomes so, yet (by grace) not so that from them one certain essence emerges. Thus, the word is used once and again above by Symeon, in those things which we have brought from him; and it might be amended by the example of Pontanus or Theodoret, and the use of that word, as also by them...

we say that the union has come to pass, but from two unlike things, namely, Deity and humanity, that one Christ and Son and Lord has come into existence, we firmly assert. In essence, *Be dumbfounded, hearing the terrible mystery, and accept the discourse, which is faithful, with all certainty and faith.* We conceive of him, therefore, not corporally, as the Virgin and Theotokos conceived him, but spiritually, yet essentially; and we have him, that very one whom the pure Virgin conceived, in our hearts, as the divine Paul says: *God who said for light to shine out of darkness, he himself hath shined in our hearts.* To put it in another way, that he himself has become wholly and essentially in us. And *if we likewise receive the untrodden fire of the Godhead, hear the Lord saying: "I am come to send fire upon the earth."* What other [fire] is this if it be not the Spirit, consubstantial with Him in Godhead, with whom he himself also enters and is contemplated along with the Father, and becomes within us? We have in us, according to that which was said by him—*He that eateth my flesh*, etc.—the whole incarnate God and our Lord Jesus Christ, the very Son of God and Son of the Virgin and all-immaculate Mary, he who sits at the right hand of God and the Father; in my glory, in my light, in my Godhead. He makes him by grace a partaker of his own nature, the God [does]. *For he breathed into his face the breath of life*, that is, the Spirit of the Son. For He is life with the Father, containing all things in being. For in him those things which are capable of life move and exist. And to someone, I suppose, not of sound mind, it would seem that the breath which proceeded from the divine essence became the soul of the living being; but rather, that to the living being—[having been] already ensouled, and having arrived through both, I mean soul and body, at the character of a perfect nature—the Creator imprinted the Holy Spirit, like a certain seal of his own nature; this is the breath of life, through which it was being fashioned toward the beauty of the archetype; and it was being perfected according to the image of the Creator toward every idea of virtue, being held fast by the power of the Spirit which had taken up its abode in him. I do not think anyone of sound mind would ever judge that the breath proceeding from the divine substance came to be the soul for the animal; but rather that, to that which was already ensouled and brought to the property of a perfect nature out of soul and body, the Creator imprinted the Holy Spirit, that is, the breath of life, as a seal of his own nature; through which he might be formed toward the beauty of the archetype, and toward the image of the Creator, might be perfected toward every kind of virtue, preserved by the power of the Spirit implanted and situated within him. If these things were lost, they are restored through the faculty of choice (which, Cyril says, is in man a certain portion of the image), just as in Christ the union of the Godhead with human nature [is restored], and through him and by him as Mediator in us; the same [Cyril] pursues this at length: but these suffice for us. It is too much to declare [the gift] in such a way—concerning revelation, knowledge, illumination, and things of that kind—that it also seems to exclude the gift of grace, which would be hidden from one who possesses it, and seems to exclude altogether certain knowledge of the indwelling God.

^A It must be admitted, indeed, that in men who are perfect by the sense and taste of divine things, there arises a certain great persuasion that they are righteous, and that they are truly the temple of God, and that the divine ardors and illuminations which they suffer are indeed His; yet, with the revelation excluded—which anyone would certainly know to be from God—no one can so judge himself righteous that there is not some fear of the opposite, so that it is necessary for him also to say with the Apostle: "I am not conscious of anything, yet I am not thereby justified" [1 Cor. IV, 4]. In the act of exercise, however, as they say, they are so affected that they think only of God, nor do they ever think that they can be torn away from Him and His love. This affection Paul expressed when he said: "Who shall separate us from the love of God?" [Rom. VIII, 35]. And thus, surely, those things of Symeon that seem to have more emphasis must be understood. To this also tends that statement of the same Apostle: "Test yourselves, whether you are in the faith, in love" [2 Cor. XIII, 5]. To this test pertains what is held in the Sermon on the Judgment: "Let each of us see whether he has received the Word of God coming, whether he has become a child of God, whether he has been born not of blood nor of flesh only, but also of God; whether he has known the incarnate Word dwelling in him, and whether he has seen His glory, glory as of the Only-Begotten from the Father. Behold, he has become a Christian, and has seen himself reborn, and has known the Father who begot him, not by word only, but by the work of grace and truth. Let us remain, brothers, in this mirror of truth, and let us depart from the harmful and heretical teaching and folly of those who say that the glory of the Godhead of the Lord Jesus is not now being revealed to us faithful through the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the gift is given in the revelation, and the revelation or manifestation is provided through the gift." ^B These things seem somewhat harsh unless they are understood as concerning a certain sense and taste in the faithful, especially those who are wise and perfect, whom the Greeks call 'Gnostics.' Sometimes this happens even in beginners and penitents in their fervor of soul, whom Symeon says see the divine light, but do not attain it, because they refuse the further labors and struggles of penance. Nor can it be denied without error. But that all in whom grace works more secretly—and that is not the revelation or manifestation which Symeon seems to demand—have a dead faith, and that he means this, would be a sign of greater error. ^C And it may be that one or the other was opposed by Symeon and the Syncellus. The example which Symeon relates of the martyr Eustratius, a man most illustrious in virtue, does not settle the matter; namely, that he should have said: "Now I have known that I am the temple of God, and His Spirit dwells in me. Depart from me, all you workers of iniquity" [Ps. VI, 9]. And to the tyrant judge: "If the senses of your mind were not altered, and your soul were not fashioned for earthly things by a jumble of passions and affections, I would indeed have shown you this Crucified One, who is Savior and redeemer and benefactor." For it does not follow, as Symeon thus infers: "Do you see how faith without works is dead?" [Jas. II, 20]. For before the saint underwent the struggles of martyrdom, because he had only faith, he did not have the Holy Spirit in him; but when he showed his faith by his works, then he also knew himself to be the temple of God, and saw His Holy Spirit dwelling in him, knowingly, with the eyes of the mind. Thus, for what reason would a man, conspicuous for Christian virtue, be possessed of faith alone, and that so dead? Nay, he had both the Holy Spirit and the gift, but he had and knew it more amidst the struggles, as Augustine explains in his tract on John, concerning the promise of the Spirit made to the Apostles. There is one passage, which Leo Allatius reports from Symeon's Sermon on Prayer or Attention, which also Nipho the Monk urges against Palamas, who seems to receive neither the apparent medication nor any utility of feeling. That sermon does not occur to me in the Mazarin Library Manuscript, nor in those which Pontanus published in Latin. Certainly, if it was written in this way, he wrote in error. But that he should have written thus, and disseminated among his disciples what the Messalians and Omphalopsychi whispered only among a few more faithful followers, and which was condemned in them, I cannot easily persuade myself; because in other places he has nothing of the sort. He does indeed demand, as do other mystics, some preparation in us for receiving the divine light: purity of heart, contrition, humility; in short, everything so that a man may transcend his senses and die to them, which is as it were a removal of what might impede the divine breath: which itself is not necessarily a companion to these things, but happens as it has pleased the divine will, and the Bridegroom deigns to manifest Himself to the bride. ^D In which matter itself, the greatest necessity is

^A a certain modesty and caution, lest while the bride too much desires to hold and attach to herself, and enter into His secrets, she compels the Bridegroom to fly away. After the great and worthy condescension of God, in that He deigns to dwell and walk in us through repentance, to meet those who return to Him, to fall upon their neck, to receive them with a kiss, and to perform the other acts which were written under the persona and parable of the Prodigal in the Gospel of Luke; whence man, as if pregnant with God, and therefore full of Him, carries within his knowledge Him who carries him and produced all creation; ^B—a Treasure ineffable, indescribable, immeasurable, without form, immaterial, without shape, fashioned in inconceivable beauty, wholly simple, like light, which surpasses every light; that such a one—the man who has been counted worthy to become this, who has acquired the whole God as a dweller within himself—may be seen, lest you perform or bring forth from your lips anything unworthy of His will, and immediately lose the treasure hidden within you, as He departs from you. ^C Honor Him as much as lies in your power, and do not introduce into His house anything that does not please Him and is not naturally present in Him, lest, having abandoned you, He depart, and be angry with you. Do not be overly talkative toward Him, nor fall down shamelessly, thinking to yourself and saying: "I will show an excessive fervor, and much emulation of love toward Him, so that He may approve my purpose and will, and know that I love and honor Him." Know, therefore, that before these things come into your mind, He knows all your thoughts, and nothing escapes Him. But do not even attempt to grasp Him with the hands of the mind; for He is ungraspable; and as much as you dare to touch or think to hold Him, you will have nothing within; but immediately He will be wholly vanished from you, and you will greatly repent and weep, bruising and scourging yourself, and you will profit absolutely nothing. Seeing that it happens to you thus, to have obtained the whole God as a guest within you, take care lest at any time you act or utter from your lips anything unworthy of His will, and soon cause the loss of the treasure hidden in you, while He departs from you. Serve Him to the best of your ability, nor bring into His house any of those things that are less pleasing to Him, or that are not in Him by nature, lest, having left you, He withdraw, angry with you. Do not be too wordy with Him, nor shamelessly rush upon Him, thinking to yourself and saying: "I will show an extraordinary fervor, and much emulation of love toward Him, so that He may approve my intent and will, and know that I love and honor Him." Know therefore, that before these things have occurred to your mind, He knows all your thoughts, and nothing is hidden from Him. But do not try to hold Him with the hands of the mind: for He is incomprehensible; and as much as you have dared to touch, or thought to keep Him, you will have nothing ^D within. Moreover, sit quietly in your

cell.

^A is not altogether highly praised, his rivals—whom Symeon, in his very grave accusation, termed Chaldaizers—might have been able to impose this on him. As is easy to do, one might attribute to another some tract, sermon, or letter of this kind—a task not of such great bulk or industry—either for the purpose of defaming him or of gaining authority. From this comes that countless crop of [pseudepigrapha] both among the Greeks and the Latins. Michael Psellus, in his oration to the synod in the cause of Cerularius—who had been driven from his see by secular power and condemned by synodal judgment—since Psellus earnestly pressed for that condemnation and deposition, proved that the items presented, in which something not sufficiently befitting Christian decency and the reasons of God and the saints was intermixed, were diabolical inventions; and he showed what sort of person Cerularius presented himself to be as a patron, and from this he pressed him hard; being, namely, a spirit of superstition and of minds which—along with other things said and written against him, which I hope will be neither unpleasant nor useless to read—I trust will be exhibited in the volume of *Byzantine History* expected from me, in which they may be depicted and expressed in their true colors: those who stood forth as the authors of the schism among the Greeks; truly most wicked heads, and those who were the ruin and the ^B stain of so great a nation and of the Church; and they may also suffer the injuries which they seemed to have inflicted upon others. Thus far on this, perhaps with somewhat too much of a digression, though in these very matters I await better insights, if anyone has anything to teach, and either to vindicate Symeon more certainly, or to prove him guilty; it remains to note down, according to custom, a few things regarding the study of Caleca himself.

OF THE MOST WISE MANUEL CALECA, OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS, ON ESSENCE AND OPERATION. Translated by Fr. François Combefis, of the same Order.

The end proposed for us here, as if we were finishing our task, is that we might set forth more clearly the sentence passed by the synod concerning the divine essence and divine operation, and concerning the question stirred up about them; so that, clearly, those who indeed have zeal, but not according to knowledge [c. Rom. x, 1], might be instructed how to contend lawfully, whence they might acquire a crown for themselves; but those who are ignorant out of simplicity might be taught; for, as the divine Apostle is witness: If any man know not, he shall not be known [c. 1 Cor. xiv, 38]; and so that those too, who readily, or rather rashly and maliciously, slander and disparage others, might be convicted of injustice. This, indeed, was the sentence that the universal synod, with the emperor presiding, meeting frequently, and itself promulgating and committing ^C to writing, set before itself as a pillar of the right faith, and handed down to others to be held as a rule of piety; and it decreed that it should be called the *Tome of Palamas*. This, however, is known to the minds of those who [study] the present . . .

^A read it, that there was a time when this Church had previously delivered another sentence contrary to this one; and those who are still living and who were present at that synod bear witness to this, as do the synodal acts from that time, during the reign of Andronicus, and the accounts recorded concerning these matters. Consequently, it is doubtful which of these judgments possesses the truth within itself. For it is impossible for an affirmation and a negation to be true at the same time, and it is also impossible that what is called and believed to be the Catholic Church should be the same as that which, regarding the same articles of faith, judges and maintains now one thing and now another, and those most contradictory, and does so openly by writings and deeds. For the Catholic Church must always speak the truth; since the Lord himself decreed that he who will not listen to it should be a Gentile and a tax collector.

In order, therefore, to begin according to our plan and to weave together the judgment now prevailing concerning the question of the divine essence and operation, and to examine this very thing in itself as it is, it must be known that in the aforementioned ^B *Tome* of the synod, six heads and questions and conclusions are proposed to be demonstrated, and it treats of these in a general way. The first is that in God there is a distinction of essence and operation. Second, that this operation is uncreated. Third, that this distinction and difference does not produce composition in God. Fourth, that the name of Divinity is said not only of the essence of God, but also of his divine operation. Fifth, that the essence of God is superior to his operation. Sixth, that God is not participated in according to the essence, but according to the operation. From such questions as these, which they think demonstrate their position more elegantly, the faith of these men is revealed; but it must also be shown by their own words and from what they say, so that the scope of what is proposed might appear more clearly, and so that no one might think that something is being objected to them by us out of slander.

It is clear, therefore, from the judgment in the *Tome*, that they do not propose [a change] ^C regarding that distinction by which the one God is ineffably distinguished into hypostases—that is, according to the three hypostases and the three persons of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; or rather, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since the holy Trinity is one thing, whatever it may be, and one essence; and it is not the case that one of the persons subsists by itself while another does not subsist, nor that one is participant by itself while another is not participant. I omit others, which they say while distinguishing and discerning concerning essence and operation, as will be shown. But they speak ^D according to another distinction devised by them, according to which, as they wish, the tri-hypostatic God himself is distinguished into essence and operation—or rather, essence and operations. It is also clear that they call this operation divinity; or rather...

^A divinities; which will be more clearly known from the things which they believe and write. For regarding this very matter, in the same Tomus, before the publication of the questions which we mentioned, they say: "The most venerable chartophylax and prince of philosophers began, according to the ecclesiastical custom, to ask each one what his opinion was concerning the dogmatic chapters which had been spoken of and examined in detail. And all with one mouth, as if moved by one Spirit, confessed openly, along with that which is united, the distinction and differentiation between the divine essence and operation which befits God; and they embraced the uncreated divine operation, just as they did the essence; and hearing that this also is called Divinity by the theologians, they willingly accepted [that it is] so called." Among these, the most holy and œcumenical patriarch, being also asked to bring forth his own opinion, after he had first discoursed upon the distinction of the divine essence and operation, and had beautifully and distinctly set forth ^B all the modes of distinction which the saints speak of; and furthermore had shown it to be united and inseparable from the divine essence (in which he also asserted that the uncreated divine operation and Divinity were so called by the saints), he turned himself entirely to admonishing and exhorting those who disagreed.

From this it is evident that the operation, which they say is distinct from the essence, they also confess to be Divinity and uncreated. Whence also their discourse is concerning two and many ^C divinities distinct [one from another]. And it is more clearly demonstrated from the words of Palamas, who was the chief of this opinion and view, and who establishes this in almost everything, but most truly in that oration the beginning of which is: "Following the Spirit-moved decrees of the Fathers." For here, rebuking Barlaam and Acindynus regarding these things, he says: "They cry out against those who honor and keep the same confession as the Fathers, as if claiming in any way two uncreated divinities, one excelling and the other inferior; not perceiving, of course, that this accusation is turned against our holy Fathers, or pertains to them." And again: "Miserable men, therefore, they are ignorant ^D that they are becoming accusers of the saints, as the Theologian says, and they suffer the same fate as those who, for fear of death, break their own necks; so that they might not exert a little labor in asking what these divinities are, and what is the piously excelling and superior [element] in them." Again, in the dialogue whose title is, *Barlaamite and Orthodox*: "But other divinities, which the saints speak of, whether one, or two, or more."

From these, therefore, it is manifest that their discourse is concerning two and many divinities. But that these things distinguished in God—whether they be these divinities—are not distinguished by reason alone, but are also real things, and not simply names, this too they establish with many arguments, while before the questions they say thus: "Those who disagree began to accuse the archbishop of Thessalonica. And it was of such a kind"

...the accusation: namely, that in certain of his books which he wrote, he posits two or more Deities, some of which are superior and others inferior. And as they frequently repeated and hammered home this discourse, and kept accusing these very words, the Thessalonian replied: ^A “My concern for words is small: my struggle is over dogmas and realities.” And after a few words: “I have never held, nor do I now hold, that there are two or more different Deities in the Holy Trinity, such that one belongs to the Father, another to the Son, and another to the Holy Spirit; but I have called certain operations and processions, which belong to God by nature and from eternity, by the name of Deity, thinking that I was speaking consistently with the saints.” ^B Therefore, it is clear from what has been said that they confess that there are many uncreated Deities, and that they affirm these to be things. What he denied, saying, “I have never held, nor do I now hold,” he denied only to deceive the simpler folk, and concerning things for which he was not being accused. For they did not bring charges against him as if he were saying that there is one Deity of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit, but because he divided the one God into essence and operation—or rather, operations—calling each of these an uncreated Deity, and a thing in God distinct from His essence. And indeed, he immediately added the reason for his asserting that these Deities and things exist, in what follows. For he adds: “And I said these things, ^C struggling against that Barlaam and Acindynus, who say that only the essence of God is uncreated, as if there were also some other thing besides it; or rather many, as he himself confesses.” So what he denies, he confirms. And it is the same as if he were to say: “I speak of one, and not one; and I speak of one, and of many.” For he clearly affirmed it, saying: “But I have called the divine operations and processions, which belong to God by nature and from eternity, by the name of Deity.” Now these are the operations which he distinguishes from the essence, and says are uncreated, as belonging to God by nature and from eternity, and which he expressly calls Deities. They confirm these very things in the anathemas ^D which they added to the Synodicum against those who do not confess their many Deities. For they shout: “To those who think and say that the name of Deity is to be applied to the divine essence alone, and do not confess, in accordance with the divinely inspired theologies of the saints and the pious mind of the Church, that it is just as much to be applied to the divine operation, and thus again in every way worship one Deity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, whether one speaks of the operation, let him be anathema.” But that it is impossible for these two or more Deities to coalesce into one in number, as these men dream with their insipid little phrases, and say that it is one only by power—slandering their teachers in these matters—will appear from what follows.

^A For it did not suffice them to separate the essence of God and the operation from one another in such a way, and to say that they differ; but they also employed many modes of distinction and opposition regarding them, by none of which is it possible for the essence and the operation to meet in reality into one and to be a single Divinity, as these men falsely persuade the simpler folk. But let us examine this. For we shall set forth here, to their shame, or rather to the end that the false opinion and sentiment of these men may become manifest and be overturned, some of these things from those which they have confessed and believe in the new rule of their religion and faith which they published synodically (namely in the Tome).

The first mode of distinction, therefore, between essence and operation, as they conceive it in their own sense regarding God, is this: that in God, one thing is the essence of God, and another thing which is in Him is not His essence. ^B The second is that in God, one thing is His three-subsistent nature, and another thing is not a hypostasis. And for this reason they declare in the Tome, as if speaking in the person of those who hold this position, forming the account in these words and in this form of speech: "But I say that there is no other thing that is Divinity, besides the three-subsistent Divinity, nor is it a divine or angelic essence, nor a hypostasis or person, but I have called by the name of Divinity certain operations and processions or emanations, naturally and eternally pertaining to God." Again, in the same Tome, after the aforementioned questions concerning the light on Mount Tabor (for indeed they posit this also as one of the many operations, superior in number, whose power by itself [was about] those things which were lit up and illuminated), they conclude in these words: "That the light of the Lord’s Transfiguration is uncreated, and that this is not the essence of God." And likewise in their Anathematisms, [saying] that those who might say and confess: "The light which shone forth on the mountain of the Lord’s Transfiguration is uncreated; provided, however, that they do not say that it is the superessential essence of God—inasmuch as that remains altogether invisible and unparticipated—but rather say that it is the natural clarity or glory of the superessential essence, flowing indivisibly from it, and rendered visible through the clemency and benignity of God to those who have been purified in mind; ^C with which glory and clarity our Lord and God shall come at His second and terrible advent, to judge the living and the dead." Again in the same [document]: "To those who do not confess, according to the divine voices of the saints and their sentences, and the pious sense of the Church, that this most divine light is neither a creature nor the essence of God, but an uncreated and natural grace and illumination and operation, inseparably always flowing from the divine essence itself, let there be anathema." Again, in that same Tome, toward the end of the questions: "But for us the discussion is not about this operation and power (namely of the Son and the Spirit), but about the common three-subsistent Divinity, which is not a hypostasis and person, but by nature and in a manner above nature, exists in each of the divine hypostases or persons." These things indeed they hold ^D and teach in common; but specifically, the...

author and father of these dogmas, in his dialogue *Theophanes* and *Theotimus*, expresses them in these grand terms: "For even if this Godhead is neither hypostasis nor essence, it is nonetheless uncreated and coeternal with the essence of God." ^A

The third mode of distinction contrived and discovered by them is situated in this: that the essence has, while the operation is had. For after the questions the synod says: "Although some of the saints have called the Son and the Holy Spirit the power and operation of the Father, they did so in such a way that each is a perfect hypostasis and possesses an operation or power." And again in the first of the questions: "But that which has is, in some respect, entirely distinct from that which it has. If, therefore, there is no distinction between the divine essence and the divine operation, it cannot be that the essence of God has an operation. Moreover, that which has no operation is inert and inefficacious; and that which is inert, inefficacious, and devoid of any action, does not truly exist in the nature of things." ^B

The fourth mode of distinction is that the divine essence is spoken of in the singular, but the operation in the plural. And in the *Tomos* before the questions the synod says: "They have urged, however, that a distinction between the divine essence and the divine operation, or even divine operations, is indeed to be understood and spoken of." And again in the sixth of the questions, slandering a certain passage of the great Dionysius, they say: "By bringing them forward in the plural, he demonstrated that they are not the essence of God; for that is never spoken of in the plural. But by calling them 'illuminations,' and saying they are devoid of beginning and end, he showed them to be divine and uncreated." But also the renowned Nilus of Thessalonica, in the discourse or book whose beginning is, "The rule is theological," says: "Regarding the distinction of the divine essence and the divine operation, we say this: the essence is one, but these are many; for the one and the multitude are other and different." ^C

The fifth mode of distinction is that they call the divine essence the cause, and the operation the caused. The sixth, that the one is the agent, and the other the acted-upon. The seventh, that they call the essence that which is characterized, and the operation that which characterizes, and that which is marked, and the note or character or talent of the marked exists. ^D

Regarding the fifth mode, therefore, in the first question, after a long discussion on this, they conclude by adding: "The one, true, primary, and principal kind of distinction, one might say, is that which is according to cause and that which is from the cause."

Concerning the sixth, in the fourth question they put forward, as it were, a certain corollary and say: "Likewise it has also been demonstrated that to operate and to be operated upon can be spoken of not only in respect to created things, but also in respect to uncreated and eternal things; for those who dissent, when they hear of grace, immediately think it is a created thing, as if one were to say an operation is something created."

^A Regarding the seventh [point] in the second [book] of the questions, they say: "But those who say the divine operation—by which the divine nature is characterized—is created, must of necessity also present the divine nature as created."

The eighth mode of distinction between essence and operation is that the divine essence is altogether imparticipable, but its operation is participable. The ninth, that they posit the essence as indivisible, but the operation as divisible. The tenth, that they call the essence unnamable, but the operation something that has a name. The eleventh, that they claim the essence is unintelligible and greater than any concept, but the operation is something that can be understood and grasped by the mind. The twelfth, that they teach the essence is invisible, but the operation visible.

For in the first of the questions, when they had demonstrated ^B the distinction that lies between the cause and that which is from the cause, or the effect, they say: "They are distinguished from one another also by the fact that the divine operation is participated in and indivisibly divided and named, and in a way, although obscurely, understood from its effects; but the essence is imparticipable, indivisible, and unnamable, as being superior to every name and altogether unintelligible," weaving these four modes of opposition together into one.

Regarding the twelfth [mode] in the last of the questions, discussing the light on Tabor, they say: "But all the saints call it an illumination, a clarity or splendor, and deification, and Deity itself, even slightly more firm than sight." ^C Truly they are substantiating that visible thing, which they call slightly more firm than sight. For the Father of these dogmas more clearly interpreted the matter in his dialogue *Barlaamite and Orthodox* in these words: "Do you see that this Theologian (namely Gregory) acknowledges not only an invisible Deity, but also a visible one? And this is uncreated, since it is its light." And again in the same dialogue: "You see clearly that the Deity of God is not only that which is in every way invisible, unintelligible, and imparticipable, but is also that which can only be seen, participated in, and understood by the saints."

The thirteenth mode of distinction is that they call the essence of God ^D immovable, but the operation a movement. The fourteenth, that the essence is absolute, but the operation is a habit or relation. The fifteenth, that they invent the monstrosity that the essence is inimitable, but the operation is an imitation and that which is produced by imitation.

Indeed, they assert such things in the first question; for they say: "But we have not thought it to be outside the divine essence, but knowing this to be an essential and natural movement of God, as the theologians feel, we say it proceeds and springs forth from the divine essence as from an everlasting fountain." It is therefore manifest that such a movement proceeds as from an immovable divine essence. For movement...

^A would otherwise be as if it were from a movement; for you would have to seek also a movement for this, and so on until infinity. He who first discovered these beginnings indicates as much, however, in many of his own writings. For in the discourse which he titles *Confutations and Absurdities*, he says: "As the divine essence remains immovable, this Deity has by nature the property of moving and bestowing itself." And again, in the same work: "For Elizabeth was not filled with the essence of the Holy Spirit; for that is immovable and untouchable and uncircumscribable."

Not only in this way, then, do they distinguish the divine essence and operation by way of motion and the immovable, but, as has been said, also by relation and the non-relative, and by imitation and the inimitable, ^B boldly asserting these things in all cases, from those which the divine Dionysius, speaking of other matters, rightly and soundly said: "In as much as the absolute and inimitable surpasses imitations and relations." For they took the "absolute" and "inimitable" as referring to the divine essence, while the "relations" and "imitations" they took as referring to the uncreated and natural and essential—as they put it—operations of God subsisting in Him.

And they discuss these things even more clearly in the fourth of the *Questions*. For, they say, when this question was also raised by the holy synod—namely, if any of the saints has said that deification is uncreated, ^C and if a relation and an imitation and a likeness indeed exist, and are spoken of in relation to uncreated things—they brought forward testimonies of the saints, showing that these terms are not always used in reference to created things. And after a few words: "So that neither is the deifying gift of the Holy Spirit, that is, deification itself, created, because it is a relation toward those who are deified."

The sixteenth mode of distinction is that they say the essence of God is superior to His own operation, and that the operation holds a lower rank than His essence. And indeed, generally, concerning the distinction according to this inequality, ^D in the fifth of the aforementioned *Questions* of the *Tome*, they say: "After it was clearly established that the divine operation is called Deity, we sought to be shown by the theologians whether God in His essence is superior to this divine operation and to those things which are essentially considered around it; and this was seen to be proclaimed by the verdict of all the saints." Furthermore, Palamas himself, in his epistle to Akindynos, says this: "There is, therefore, a Deity which is lower, a gift of that which is superior and which is more eminent than it; and not only a Deity, but an uncreated Deity; and above that Deity exists God." And the same man, in the book against Symeon, the law-protector: "Unless, indeed, the operation be called submissive or subject or inferior or something of that kind, the great Dionysius, and those who follow him, do not truly teach that the essence of God is superior."

^A For to be superior implies that there is something that has been placed lower. Therefore, if according to the decision of the synod, the divine operation was revealed as Deity; and after this had been shown, it was further sought that it be demonstrated whether God is superior to this in essence; and it was revealed to all, as they say, to be proclaimed: how is it not clearly the case that, from both the doctrines written in common and those written specifically by the Father, this Deity would be called submissive, while God is called superior to it in essence? For this they themselves also lavishly add, concluding thus: Simply, if God is superior in essence to his own Deity, then it having been revealed through the passages that they slanderously use in this matter, why have they dreamt up this distinction of superiority and inferiority in every respect? For it is their custom not to appear to speak from themselves, in matters where they are seen clearly to be blaspheming, but having slandered the pronouncement of one of the ancients, they bring forward this same pronouncement bare, forcing what was said by others toward their own purpose, for the sake of setting forth their own wickedness. And here they are proven to be doing the same thing. For in setting forth the proof that "God is superior in essence to his own operation, which is called Deity," they have indicated in how many ways it is superior by the means they have adduced. And they call one thing superior by order, another by necessary consequence, another by place, another by quantity, and another by quality. ^B Indeed, a seventeenth mode of distinction has been devised by them alongside order, according to the prior and the posterior; which mode of distinction they support both from the great Basil, who says in his *Refutations* regarding the distinction that occurs in the divine persons—but not regarding the distinction of essence and operation, as they suppose—"That there is a certain kind of order," and adding, "For in such things we call the cause prior, and the posterior that which is from the cause"; and also from the great Athanasius, who says, "The name 'God' is posterior in nature." Since, therefore, the divine essence is the cause, and the divine operation is from the cause, they conclude that the divine essence is prior, and the divine operation is posterior.

A eighteenth mode of distinction has been devised by them, according to necessary consequence, because the divine essence goes before, ^C as that which pertains to nature, while the divine operation follows, as that which pertains to the decree of the will. And they attempt to prove this from the words of the great Athanasius, who says (though in another sense) against the Arians in this fashion: "If they grant to God the act of willing, which pertains to non-beings, why do they not acknowledge in God that which is superior to the will?" And again, he says: "Just as that which is against the will is opposed to the will, so that which is by nature is superior and precedes the act of willing." For from these words they introduce a necessary consequence, inasmuch as that which is by nature is superior to the will, and is superior to it; and the divine will is the operation of God; it follows, therefore, that that which is by nature is superior ^D even to the divine operation. But thus

says the teacher, "That which is by nature is superior to and precedes the will, just as that which is against the will is opposed to it; as, therefore, ultimately that which is by nature will follow that which is against the will according to the same sequence, so too will the divine operation follow the divine essence ^A."

The nineteenth mode of distinction has been invented by them, based on position. The divine essence, they say, happens to be higher, and the divine operation lower. And this they wish to prove by slandering the great Basil, who says, "So that if you conceive of anything beyond the ages, that too is lower than the Spirit." From which they conclude, saying, "What must we suppose are those things beyond the ages, if not clearly those that are before the ages? And all things before the ages are uncreated, to which the divine man said that the Holy Spirit is superior ^B."

The twentieth mode of distinction has been fabulously invented by them based on quantity: that the divine essence is infinitely and infinitely superior, while the divine operation is infinitely and infinitely subordinate. And wishing to prove this, they work mischief, slandering the divine Maximus, who most clearly uttered such a comparison concerning God and His creatures, that God is infinitely and infinitely removed above all those things that participate and are participated in; which they have taken to apply to the uncreated, natural, and essential operation of God; and from this they conclude that since the divine operation is seen to be among those things that are participated in, why is God not also infinitely removed above this as well ^C?

From this, the twenty-first mode of distinction has been added by them, alongside the super-elevations and submissions according to quality, in that the essence of God exceeds things as holy things exist, while the operation is exceeded as non-holy things exist—which super-elevations and submissions according to quality they think they can establish from two specific sayings of the great Dionysius, and this entirely against the intention of this holy man; one saying resolving the dilemma for Gaius, to him who asks about the operation, regarding [the operation as] glory, from that which is not-being toward that which is being; somewhere [he speaks of him] as beyond the arch-thearchy and the arch-goodness; [regarding] the thearchy and the arch-goodness, or the one beyond-arch and above-foundation of all those things that participate and the things participated in ^D.

^A There is one passage [note: Epist. 2, ad Caium] where he resolves the doubt of Caius, who had asked him: How does it come about that He who is over all things exists even above the principle of divinity and goodness? He shows that what is called the principle of divinity and goodness is itself that habit and imitation which from us is directed toward God; that we imitate God, not He us; and that this is the principle of divinity and goodness for those things which are deified and made good, inasmuch as they are endowed with divinity and goodness. And, as if concluding, he adds: He who is the principle above every principle, even above the so-called divinity and goodness, stands superior no less than to the principle of divinity and goodness: in that, being inimitable, incomprehensible, and absolute, He surpasses imitations and habits, and those things which imitate and are imparted. Another passage [note: De divin. nom. c. 12] is where he explains in what way He is called Holy of Holies, and God of gods, and Lord of lords, and King of kings; and he declares by saying these things that this excellence is designated, [to show] that by as much as holy, or dominant, or divine, or kingly things excel those which are not, and those things that participate in them excel the participations themselves, by so much is He who is above all things, the Cause Himself—who is impossible to participate in—sublimely exalted beyond all things, and beyond all participants and participations.

Hence they say it is most clearly found that the inferior divinity ^B is also called by that same name of participation, imitation, and habit. They set all these things out in their profession of faith, to prove this: that after it seemed that the divine operation, called divinity, had been demonstrated to be uncreated, they sought to have it proven whether God is transitionally superior to this in essence; and this also appeared as being proclaimed by all. They confirm everything in every way, which the author of the dogmas had privately composed in his dialogue, which has the title *Barlaamite and Orthodox*. He says, therefore: "Of the divinity—that is, the power and operation of God, who knows all things before they come to be, which is eternally divine—which the great Basil said was below the Spirit, and the great Athanasius said was after the nature—that thing which is truly called divinity, which is about the divine nature, as Gregory of Nyssa asserted; [if] such is the essence of God, which surpasses every name, which cannot be uttered by any voice, about which there are always pre-eternal virtues and operations, and [if] this itself is called divinity from its own operation, how would He not be superior?" But the great Dionysius must also be brought forward; for he says more openly [that there are] divine deifications of God, and one excelling another. And again in the same dialogue: "In every way, since these virtues are superior to things—for all things that participate have the origin of their own coming-to-be from those things which are participatable, and it is the same [as if] we said these participations and virtues never began, as the divine Maximus is the author—even though, according to the same [Maximus], God is infinitely and endlessly superior to all those things which are participatable." And again in the fourth book, *Adversus Acindy*...

^A num, whose beginning is *Susurrans igitur*: I say that in another place the divine Dionysius says that the virtues themselves and the participations are superior to those things which participate—that is to say, superior to the creatures. For every created thing has its being by participation (and as it were by precarious grant); but he says that God is superior to these virtues and participations, writing: "As much as they excel," and what follows. Hence, from these points, the entire proof of the excellence of the divine essence and of the descent of its operation is evident; and a certain rather external mode of excellence also manifests itself. For by as much as created things are inferior to the participations in which they participate, by so much also are these participations inferior to the essence of God. For this is clear from that authority which the author of these dogmas used for proof. But this, besides being impious, is full of great madness.

To these, moreover, a twenty-second mode has been discovered by them, with a view to the creature: that, namely, the divine operation is the effector of those things which are outside, but the divine essence is not the effector of anything that is outside. For as it seems, being desirous to altogether remove the tri-subsistent and blessed nature from human affairs, not only from the governance of things but even from creation, and to introduce in its place that light which they have invented, as has been said, and setting it down as one of ^B the many operations, they did not wish to call this the essence of God, but the operation of God; and they also conclude more fully, from the efficacy toward creatures, the distinctions between the divine essence and the divine operation. And indeed they teach that the operation (or, as it might be called, that light) is the efficient cause and creator of all creatures; but they believe that the divine essence is, by itself, the author of absolutely none of those things which are in the creature. And they say in the first question: "With the word 'from God' it has been said concerning created things also; but 'from the essence' has never been said concerning any creature; nay, rather, this has been entirely forbidden by the saints." But the father of heresies, in his dialogue *Theophanes and Theotimus*, says: "The divine essence happens not to be the effector of any external thing." And while saying these things, they have exceeded whatever can be invented by a fabulous and portentous mind. For inasmuch as they have said, as has been shown, that the divine operation differs so greatly from the divine essence, they assert that this [operation] and this alone, having first created everything, subsequently sustains it. Consequentially, therefore, to this argument they also weave the subsequent modes of distinction.

Whence the twenty-third mode is: That the operation approaches created things; but the divine essence is inaccessible. The twenty-fourth: That the divine operation, if it be received, ensures their safety; but the divine essence consumes them before it is received. The twenty-fifth: That the operation, when commingled with them, is not confused; but the essence, if it should enter into any intercourse, would involve confusion. The twenty-sixth: That the operation travels down toward the creature, and

is shared by it, and imparted, and sanctifies and illuminates, and takes up its abode, and deifies those who are worthy; but the ^A essence remains un-departing and un-communicated, in no way dwelling in created things, nor illuminating, nor taking up its abode, nor deifying them. The twenty-seventh: That the operation is strictly Godhead and life and wisdom and power; but the essence is not by itself Godhead, nor life, nor wisdom, nor power. The twenty-eighth: That the operation is the inheritance of all and the end of things desired; but the essence is neither the inheritance of anyone nor the end of blessedness.

In this manner they say the divine essence is inaccessible to every creature, and untouchable, and incomprehensible, and that which does not go forth and is incommunicable, not in order to proclaim from there the magnitude of its excellence (for it would be good to attribute these things to it magnificently and becomingly, according to the doctrine of the holy teachers concerning God), but striving for this, as it seems, under this pretext, to banish it as far as possible from human affairs. And with greater rashness and audacity, if it should be participated in by us, they assert that one of two things must necessarily happen to it: For, they say, it will either consume the nature before it can be partaken of, or, having partaken of it, it would suffer corruption. Thus, with these ^B polished and magnificent words, having equipped a lie against the divine essence, and on account of its excellent terror and majesty removing it from human affairs, they now openly and with confidence bring in that light, and assert that it is the very divine operation itself, and they place it as that which comes down to the creature, and is participated in by all gently and kindly at once, and deifies those who are worthy, and sanctifies and takes up its abode and preserves—all of which it does, obviously, in order to provide salvation and safety to all.

But that they think the divine essence is of such a kind that it can neither be approached, and consumes those who do approach, the following things confirm. For after the questions, near the end of their confession, wishing to cloak this crime, they say ^C thus: "And that they have pronounced those ungodly—O the audacity and rashness!—who think that the essence of God, because the saints say it is inaccessible and un-participatable, is of such a kind as to have the power of corrupting—and this even though God has said to Moses: 'No one shall see my face, and live.'" Thus, by the very things through which they seem to be warding off the view that the essence of God is thought to bring corruption and destruction, they unwittingly prove by these same things that they estimate it as having this power. For what else does this deception of theirs mean, and this even when God has spoken to Moses: "No one shall see my face, and live"? For if they truly were warding off that it is of such a kind as to bring corruption and destruction, they would have made mention of some passage ^D of scripture, of the life-giving and establishing of our affairs,

yet our God bears witness to the contrary. But he who first devised these things has clarified such a concept yet more clearly. For in his fifth book against Acindynus, the beginning of which is, “But who could persuade [one to the] contrary view?” he says: ^A “This divine nature, therefore, if it is participated in according to itself, will either undergo confusion, or it will consume the nature that has the power of suffering before it has been assumed.” But to say that it consumes this fragile nature—to whom else should this be attributed than to that which corrupts and brings destruction? For even if God is written in the words of Scripture to be a consuming fire, yet it is every wickedness, not human nature, that He consumes. Rather, since He chooses to save it, it is believed that He consumes its vice. ^B From these things, many other points, and indeed also not a small absurdity, are gathered regarding the incarnation of the Word of God. For since the blessed and ever-virgin Theotokos, having lent flesh to the Word of God from her own most pure and virginal streams of blood, and having conceived and carried and brought forth Him, the God-man Word, was neither consumed nor corrupted; in their opinion, she did not conceive the Word of God Himself, but she took up a non-subsistent operation, which does not truly exist or have substance in itself. Moreover, from the transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of the Savior, not small nor few absurdities arise against them.

The author and father of the dogmas himself refers to other oppositions in the fourth book of his work against Acindynus, ^C the beginning of which is, “Whispering, therefore, into the great light, blasphemy,” and he says: “And as His divine essence remains imparticipable and incommunicable and un-departing—that is, the Light—it is participated in and proceeds downward toward creation, that is, it manifests itself to those who are worthy and deifies them.” Philotheus, who was the third patriarch after them (whom they also inscribed in the catalogue of the saints for the sake of the struggle for these dogmas, though for other things he was worthy of many deaths), in a book which he entitled, *That none of the divine operations is created, as they say*, ^D says: “What jealous demon has boldly introduced into the Church of God that the essence of God itself, dwelling in men, purifies those who are to be purified, and illuminates those who are being illuminated, and brings back those who have been led astray from the path of the honest and right by some profane tide; and that, dwelling within created things, it works that which we hear from you (and would that it were not so!)—a truly dark invention of demons?”

Since, therefore, they attribute everything to the operation, consequently they also call it truly and properly divinity, and life, and wisdom, and the rest absolutely; and by reason of it they also say that the divine essence is these things and is called [these things].

^A For in the Tome, after the questions, the synod says: "How then is it right to destroy the natural and common power of the tri-hypostatic Divinity, by reason of which the Son and the Spirit are also praised by the theologians as power?" And he who, as their first [patriarch], brought them to be, namely Isidore, says: "We call thy Divinity truly and properly the operation; yet not infrequently, by desire and love, also the nature." Since these therefore are common to thee, and [belong to] the Trinity of one Divinity, we hymn thee as uncreated, whichever one of these one might call it. And this the man of godlike mind harmonized in the Hymns. For they not only committed to writing that they held these views in what they believed, but also enacted that they should be sung in the hymns in the Church. Before him, the father of these in the discourse, whose beginning is: "Following the Spirit-moved votes of the Fathers," says: "And the nature of God is called Divinity, but more truly and properly the operation."

^B Starting from this principle, they also liberally admit a multitude of many divinities and operations; partly indeed from those things which they affirmed before the questions, as if by satisfying the objections with some manner of wonder. For when they had said: "But even regarding those points by which they accused the Archbishop of Thessalonica, as if he said many Divinities, they did not add that he does not say so; but rather, in order to maintain that he does say so, they used the following words, saying: "Because he maintains that all the divine and common powers and operations of the three hypostases [or persons] are uncreated." Wherefore he did not remove this, that he says many divinities; but rather they proved by these things that they were uncreated. And partly from those things which the master and leader of such dogmas wrote separately in the dialogue *Between a Barlaamite and an Orthodox*. For when he had said: "One is the divinity of the three persons, that is, nature and essence, an essence superior to all, simple, invisible, imparticipable, in no way cogitable by any power of the mind," he added: "But the other divinities which the saints speak of, whether one, or two, or more, and the other things he constructs ^C for the sake of clarity, [he constructs] to declare that there are many divinities." If, however, his argument is not about words, as he said, but he is contending about dogmas and realities, how might one not rightly say that these Divinities also exist as realities? For they themselves, by the things they confess, also demonstrate this. And in the letter to the Bishop of Cyzicus, of which the beginning is: "I wish thee to know," he says: "God does not suffer multiplication, even if one should in this way speak of two or more Divinities." And one could take six hundred other such things from their books and writings, whence it is clear that such is their opinion regarding the multitude and throng of Divinities.

They seem to have fallen into this superstition ^D because they do not think that God himself, by himself, can produce all things by one power, and govern and keep them safe by the same (on account, of course, of His supreme perfection and simplicity and unity), but by this [power] one thing, and by another another thing, and from that something else. For he who was third to become their patriarch, as has been said, in those [writings]

^A he published in chapters, in the eighth of these he says: "The names that are spoken and written concerning God are names of his divine operations." Meaning, God possesses power and an operation operating in all things that are endowed with life, whether you call it human life or divine, and that operation is called the life of God. He has power and an operation in those who are illuminated, [which is] the light; and that operation is called light. Before these, he similarly has power and an operation operating in those who are being deified, [which is] the deification; and that operation is called the Divinity. These, therefore, when they speak of them as distinct from one another, they pluralize and name them divine operations and Divinities; but when [they speak of them] unitedly—much like the way we are accustomed to call the whole universe one world—they discourse as if regarding a single operation. For this reason, they also inquire in the fourth [book] of their questions whether the word "of the Divinity" is celebrated not only in reference to the essence, but also in reference to the operation. From what he has said—that God has an operation operating in all that are endowed with life, whether you call it human life or divine—it becomes clear that they consider both the life of God and human life to be performed and brought about by one and the same operation, and that the wisdom of God and human wisdom consist of one and the same wisdom, and other things similarly. For this is what they intend in the profession within the Tome, that both to operate and to be operated upon can be spoken of not only concerning created things, but also concerning eternal and uncreated [things].

From these things, therefore, as if heaping together ^C a kind of single cosmos, they say it is the inheritance of all the just, fashioning that visible [thing] as a whole, and setting this as the highest of things to be desired. For just as they named each of these a partial participation—the wisdom of the wise, that is, and the life of the living—so too do they collectively call all of them the self-participation together. They demonstrate this nearly throughout their entire faith; for what is intended by them in the Tome regarding "the uncreated grace being operated," which is also called deification and the deifying gift of the Spirit, and "an uncreated affection or habit," and "a motion from eternity, natural and essential to the essence of God"? And it is this which is participated in by all, while the essence of God remains altogether unparticipatable. More clearly, however, he who first discovered this faith, and later composed it in the manner he wished, in the book he entitled *Redargutions and Absurdities*, demonstrates [it]. "What then," he says, "will they inherit the nature and essence of God? By no means, but [they will inherit] the deifying grace, which is also called the Kingdom; which, although it is not the nature of God (for that is unparticipatable), is nevertheless a natural operation of God, naturally accompanying him, and grasped as [being] around him, inseparably cleaving to him." For this reason, he who is the heir and possessor of this is called the possessor and heir of God. But there are also very many other modes [found] in their decrees.

^A that have come to light. For it is not the purpose [proposed] here to set forth everything, but only as much as suffices to show the boldness of their shamelessness and their innovation through which they have divided the one, most perfect and most simple God into ten thousand [things], both small and great, and so diverse, and to uncover the falsehood of their blasphemy; for when they dare such things and things like these concerning God, they afterwards deny them and attribute those very things, in this respect, to the pious, whereas they themselves are justly convicted of them; and further, to place before the eyes of those who are ignorant the greatness of their error, so that they may know what kind of faith they are holding in their ignorance, and into what total danger of soul they are plunging; such is also that mode of distinction, which will be stated no less, for the proof that many others of the same kind exist among them, as has been said.

^B For they have dared to utter this as well: that essence is immortal by its own nature, but operation, while immortal by reason of the essence, is by its own nature a "mortification" (as if one were to say, a killing and an author of death). For Palamas says in the book *On Divine and Deifying Participation*: "If, however, they live immortally and die in this manner, and many who live in this age are dead, as he who is the arbiter of life and death has shown, then there is also a mortification of the Godhead, [which] remains immortal by nature."

It is therefore concluded, not from elsewhere, but from those things which they publicly promulgated through synodical examination, and wrote down into a formula and confession of faith, and believed—nay rather, believe, and subject those who do not believe them and conform to them to public curses—namely: that in God there is a distinction between the divine essence and the divine operation, which they have explained in just about this manner: That in God one thing is the essence of God, and another thing is not the essence of God; and one thing is the tri-subsistent nature, and another thing is not a subsistence or person; and one thing has, and another is had; and one thing is the one, and another is the multitude; and one thing is the author and cause, and another is that which is from the author and cause; and one thing is that which acts, and another is that which is acted upon; and one thing is that which is characterized, and another is that which characterizes; and one thing is imparticipable, and another is participable; and one thing is indivisible, and another is divisible; and one thing is devoid of a name, and another is that which is named; and one thing is imperceptible to any thought of the mind, and another is that which is understood; and one thing is invisible, and another is visible; and one thing is motionless, and another is motion; and one thing is unrelated, and another is relation; and one thing is inimitable, and another is imitation; ^D and one thing is prior, and another is posterior; and one thing is superior, and another is inferior; and one thing indeed, as being according to nature, precedes, whereas another, as being contrary to nature, follows or is a companion to it; and indeed one thing, as imparticipable, infinitely and infinitely transcends, whereas another, as that which is participable, is infinitely and infinitely subordinate; and one thing indeed, as being among those things which are holy, excels, whereas another, as among those things which are not holy, is subjected. These antitheses, then, distributed in this order, that

they attribute the dignified [name] to the essence of God, they nevertheless depress it to the utmost, which they have taught to be called the uncreated operation of God. But what follows, on the contrary, altogether depresses the divine essence indeed, while restoring the victory to the divine operation. For the divine operation is productive of things which are external; but the divine essence is productive of none of those things which are external. And the one approaches the creatures, but the other is unapproachable; and the one, being received, preserves these things, but the other, by dissolution, would consume them before ^B they could be received; and the one, being mixed with them, is not confused; but the other, if it were shared, would undergo confusion; and the one proceeds down toward the creation, and is participated in by it, and is communicated, and sanctifies and illuminates and dwells within, and deifies those who are worthy; but the other remains without proceeding and incommunicable, dwelling in no way at all in the creatures, neither sanctifying, nor illuminating, nor dwelling within, nor deifying them. And the one is properly deity and life and wisdom and power; but the other is not of itself deity, nor life, nor wisdom, nor power. And the one is the inheritance and possession of all, and the end of things desired; but the other is neither the inheritance nor possession of anyone at all, nor the end of beatitude.

Can things so divergent be joined into one thing, uniform and most simple and most perfect, such as is God, and one Deity? Or rather, can they be a single Deity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as those marvelous theologians themselves have contrived, saying, as has been set forth above in their Anathemas, that “to those who think and say ^C that the name of Deity is spoken of the essence alone, and do not confess—according to the pious mind of the Church—that it is placed no less upon the divine operation, and that thus again they worship in all ways one Deity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, let there be anathema,” as they themselves say? Is this possible? Or is it not impossible, just as it is impossible for something to both be and not be, for it to subsist and not subsist, for it to be simultaneously invisible and visible, for that which is infinitely above to be also—in the same measure—inferior, and all the other modes enumerated in addition to these? This, for those who are at all able to reason, is left to be considered whether it is possible.

Thus, therefore, according to these men, and after still more modes of distinction and opposition, having divided the one God into essence and operation, then—as if the essence and that which is without essence, and the subsistent and the non-subsistent, and the visible and the invisible, and the rest of the antitheses ^D coming together into one did not create a composition (for a composite thing is that which consists of many and different things, or that which is perfected by many things coming together into the same, according to the unerring teaching of the theologians)—they assert, against all reason and all teaching of the sacred lecturers, that no composition occurs from the essence of God and those things which they think really distinctly coexist with it.

^A For they are not so destitute of all sense and judgment, the Fathers, that they would affirm that which consists of distinct and diverse things—whose definition is different both in reality and in concept—to be simple, as those who slander them claim, reading with a crude, Jewish-style adherence to the letter of what has been written by them, and wrongly referring things said about one subject to another, which has everywhere been the cause of error for them; and not rarely, they even wander far away from the letter of the masters, a fact that will be manifest to those following.

Finally, regarding the fact that no composition occurs, Palamas says in the book whose beginning is, *Afflante Spiritu* [By the inspiration of the Spirit], ^B "Dictated by the Fathers, the Increate which is adjacent makes the Divinity, which is seen in this distinction, one, equal, and simple." For whatever is increate also enjoys equal honor and is united; and in those things which are increate, coming together into one, composition can never occur. And in another [book], whose beginning is, *Susurrans itaque* [Whispering, therefore], "Nor indeed could he understand this, who foolishly thought of compositions in these matters in his mind, that those things which are increate and truly simple, if they come together into one, make no composition." And he who was patriarch, Philotheus, in the ninth of his own chapters: "But we, having learned from the saints that natural properties never make even a man composite, nor do the rules and sciences of the arts—for no one would ever call a man composite ^C because he has a nature and a natural operation, or because he has a nature and an art, such as grammar, or smithing, or agriculture. And since the matter is thus in humans, what must be said of God, who has all things in an exceptional way and above what nature bears? But composition exists and is spoken of then, when two things, which each have their own subsistence, and each of which can exist and be understood by itself without the other; when, I say, such things enter into a composition and union with one another, if they form one hypostasis and one subsistent being, as in man, soul and body; or in a house, stones and wood and iron. For these, since each is a certain individual thing by itself, that is, a hypostasis, ^D when they enter into a composition and union with one another, then it is called composition, or the union of two things, or even of more, which exist by themselves." That these things argue the great madness of the men, it is not even necessary to mention.

Likewise also, in the *Tomos*, all pronounce in common: "After this, we inquired from the saints whether it is permissible to understand any composition in God, on account of the distinction of the divine essence and operation? And it was shown by the common proclamation celebrated by all the saints, that no composition is to be deemed in God from this. But also in their *Anathematisms* they declare in these words: "Those who think and say that on account of this some composition is altogether brought about in God, and do not have faith in the doctrine of the saints, who teach that from natural properties no composition exists in nature,"

of those who teach that natural things exist in nature, and as for in no way whatsoever this difference ^A harming the divine simplicity, let it be anathema, as they themselves wish.

For since there have likewise been found among them other most impious and irrational dogmas, which do not fall under the methods of division, it is necessary to set forth some of them here also, in order to demonstrate from this too the falsehood and madness of their new faith. For the "divinities" which they have newly concocted, they sometimes even call "Gods." Palamas, indeed, in one of his discourses on the light, wishing to show that the divine is twofold, says: "Not only is God He who is above things that are ^B (that is to say, the energy, about which his discussion was), but also above-God. And He is not only above all affirmation, but also above every negation; the excellence of Him who is above all things surpasses every excellence, whatever it might be." And again in the same: "Nor did he hear from theology that, instead of all things, the divine nature will then become for us that which it is, so that from this, forsooth, one might be persuaded that this light is God." And in the second book of his [works] against the secondary chapters of Barlaam, which he entitles *Catalogue of Resulting Absurdities*: "Indeed, since there are things that participate in God, but the superessential ^C essence of God is altogether unparticipable, there is, therefore, something between the unparticipable essence and those that participate, through which they participate in the things of God." And after a few words: "Moreover, a different God must be sought by us, who is not only self-complete and self-active, seeing Himself by Himself, but also good. And simply, we must seek a God who is in this way somehow participable, by participating in whom each of us, respectively and according to the proportion and mode of participation, will be existing, living, and divinized. There is, therefore, something between generated things and that unparticipable superessentiality, not just one thing, but many; and ^D as many as are the things that participate—these are not, however, in themselves, that is to say, these intermediate things, for they are powers of that superessentiality, having singly and unitarily anticipated and encapsulated the entire multitude of participable things." Because of these things, it is that sometimes he has vomited forth in his own writings, saying: "As many as are the things in species, so many are also the divinities, some being superior to others and some inferior." Again the same author, in the discourse whose beginning is, "It is not for us, friend": "And this divine splendor, therefore, and grace, and energy, and gift of the all-holy Spirit, the divine Scriptures call Holy Spirit; but they also call this divine grace, operation, and gift, which proceeds from the superessential Trinity, Divinity and God, and deifying power, and self-goodness and goodness-working—the author and creator of the universe, witness the Areopagite Dionysius." And he who served as patriarch, Isidorus, in a certain

one of his Stichera says: "To be, however, is not what we mean to signify, but rather that God is operation." ^A Furthermore, Philotheus, who served as patriarch, himself also says in his own Canticles: "Come, let us now enjoy the new produce of the tomb, the light being seen before the glorious day of the resurrection of the kingdom of light; praising it as God unto the ages." Palamas, moreover, in his orations which he entitles the "Former" and the "Latter," says these things: "Yet they say that one sees the light itself—which is truly existent—spiritually, and that it is not symbolic, for since it always exists and is immaterial and intelligible by the mind, those who have experienced it know this." And again in another of the same, the beginning of which is "Whispering," he says this: "Therefore, that light is a symbol of being, and it is also true light; and not merely true, but it was the true light itself." And again in the same: "For even if it has the name of light, yet it is also called true light; or rather, it is the true light itself, which God puts on like a garment." He further adds that certain blendings and mixings of such light occur with those who see it. And he says in one of the previously mentioned orations about his light: "It is one when it engages with the one who sees, yet at other times it is seen as something else: at times it rises above the body and lifts it up ^B into an ineffable height; at other times, again, it also transforms the body, and having imparted its own splendor, and having filled it with peace and love and deiform pleasure and impassibility, it becomes—o miracle!—perceptible to bodily eyes. At other times, like a ray flowing around them, it makes those things which are by nature intelligible to be objects of vision to one who has been deemed worthy to see; it emits no voice or sound at all; at other times it speaks clearly to the one who sees through ineffable, so to speak, words. And initially it addresses him openly: 'I am; do not be afraid. I am. For the Godhead is not separated from me, through which I grant deification to those who are being deified. I am He who is present and who works out the deification. Do you not see all things in me, and me before all things? But for your sake I become all things in you. ^C For your sake I even become visible to you.' Again in another, the beginning of which is 'Reasonably then the Word,' he says this: 'In the contemplation of the spirit, the light is with those who approach through pure prayer.'" ^D

' ^A that which is seen, and not divided from them. Again in another: 'Those initiated know, and say: It is not a union offering the connection by means of some few parts and powers, but as it were a commingling with the soul, a stay and habitation of the light of grace in it; a wonderful one, as it were, unspeakable and almost unheard of.' Again: 'The union of the marriage contract seems to have something more than the other unions; but not even that is a natural concretion 4 nor a commingling; but by some association, and as it were by adhesion, many become one. "For they shall be," he says, "the two into one flesh," and in flesh only, but not also in spirit. But the union of God with those who are accounted worthy, being in every way beyond knowledge, in that it is entire, is superior to the capacity of the one who perceives it, or to the Word, by means of all the pure spirits of the Spirit.'

Furthermore, they dogmatize that in some way the three persons of the Godhead are not distinguished from one another, but the persons also have the persons interchangeably in relation to the powers and operations. And Palamas says in the discourse *To Paul Assan*: 'When the divine is divided according to the hypostases, it remains undivided according to the operations; but when it is divided according to the powers and operations, it remains undivided according to the hypostases.' And in another, the beginning of which is, *Reasonably then the Word*: 'For since the divine is distinguished according to the hypostases and the operations, an otherness is seen according to each distinction, [the attributes] having them ^B interchangeably; for the proper names of the divine hypostases are common to the operations, and what is common to the hypostases are the proper names of the divine operations.'

Furthermore, they dogmatize that it does not suffice for the tri-hypostatic Godhead to have a self-existent and self-subsistent power and operation, but that it also has need of other non-subsistent ones. And Palamas says in one of his dialogues: 'The Father indeed has wisdom and power, and life and operation (namely, the Son), as essential and natural; but will the Son be devoid of power, and of life, and of operation, or even of the whole essence of the holy Trinity?' And in the *Tomus* they decree synodically: 'From these things, the holy synod has shown,' he says, 'that he who says that only the Son and the Holy Spirit are uncreated operations of God, as if he did not perceive the common natural operation of the three hypostases, dares to introduce and bring into the Church of God the heresy ^C of Marcellus, Photinus, and Sophronius, which long ago died and was abolished.' And after a few words, 'To us, indeed, the perfect ^D

discourse is not about this, but about that which is common to the tri-hypostatic Godhead, which is not a hypostasis or person, but nature, and which exists in each of the God-ruling hypostases by a transcendent and supra-natural reason. And again in the same place: 'How then is it reasonable to deny the common power of the tri-hypostatic Godhead, by reason of which the Son and the Spirit are praised by the theologians as power?'

Item, they teach that those who are cleansed among them, and the effects of such operations, are themselves rendered uncreated. And Palamas says in his *Epistle to Acindynus*: ^B ‘Do you see clearly that grace is uncreated? Not only is such grace uncreated, but also the effect of such an operation of God is uncreated.' And he says the same of the great Paul, that he no longer lived a temporal life, but the divine and eternal life of the Word dwelling within him, and thus became eternal and immortal. And after a few words: 'Paul was created as long as he lived the life made from non-being by the command of God; but when he was no longer living that life, but the one provided by the indwelling of God, he became uncreated by grace.' And: 'Whoever finally possesses within himself the living and operative Word of God alone has attained this.' And again in the same: ‘How then would anyone concede that there is one uncreated thing—if he grants no account of the divine operations—without adding nature, since by grace many are uncreated and gods, and endowed with a divinity of such a kind as is appropriate to them according to their reason?' And again: ‘For indeed, all these are uncreated by grace, as they are indeed gods; but this grace itself is uncreated, as was proved a little earlier.' And again: ‘The operations of God are uncreated, even if most of the effects of these are created things.' And in the discourse whose beginning is, *They contend indeed*: ‘How then does it come about that grace is not uncreated, by the gift of which those who have become participants of it have been called by the Fathers, according to it, without beginning and uncreated, and immortal and sempiternal and heavenly?’

Furthermore, they teach that there are many hypostases of God. For Palamas says: ^D ‘Since God has many and distinct hypostases and powers and operations, unless there be some one cause or author in them, there will be many and distinct principles of the Godhead.' And he confirms this from the fact that they also hold and teach that these many operations, which they formerly said were not truly existing and subsistent, are now also essences. Wherefore Palamas says in the discourse to Aenos, whose beginning is, *With modesty truly cast aside*: ‘And yet, according to the magnificent sense of the holy Fathers, truly breathed by the divine Spirit, one might piously call each of the divine operations an essence.'

Furthermore, those most impudent of men have dared to say that there is a certain reason and proportion corresponding between them, just as the legal mysteries correspond to the traditions of the evangelical doctrines, so too do these correspond to the new Palamite dogmas.

^A For the Tome published by the one who functioned as patriarch, Philotheus, as if from the person of the Athonite monks, and which is confirmatory of Palamas, says the following: "Those things which have recently been spoken of, and are commonly known to all, and are proclaimed openly as dogmas through Moses, were mysteries of the law, foreseen only by the prophets in the Spirit; but the good things promised to the saints for the age to come are the mysteries of the life according to the Gospel, which have been granted to those accounted worthy to see them through the Spirit, and have been given to them in a moderate way by way of a pledge and foreseen. ^B But just as if one of the Jews, not listening with reverence to the prophets when they said that the Word and the Spirit of God are co-eternal and pre-eternal, had stopped his ears, thinking that he was hearing things forbidden to piety, and contrary to the acknowledged pious voice—it is obvious, that of the one who says, 'The Lord your God, the Lord is one' [Deut. VI, 4]—so too might one perhaps suffer now, not listening with reverence to the mysteries of the Spirit known only to those who have been purified through virtue. But just as, again, the outcome of those predictions proved that what were then mysteries were in agreement with the manifest things, and we believe now in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, a Godhead of three subsistences, one by nature; ^C so too, when the age to come is revealed at its own times, according to the ineffable manifestation of the one God in three complete persons, the mysteries will appear to all to be in agreement with the manifest things. One must, however, consider this also: that even if the three-subsistent Godhead was revealed later to the ends of the earth, not in any way harming the doctrine of the monarchy, it was yet accurately known to those prophets even before the outcome of events; but for those who at that time heard them, it was unacceptable. In the same way, therefore, we do not even now ignore the words of the confession, both of those things which are proclaimed openly, and of those which now shine forth mystically in the Spirit to the worthy."

These things, from the many and numberless ^D [commentary material regarding Athonite monks and Triodion/Synaxaria omitted]

^A absurdist and blasphemous dogmas of Palamas and the synod held regarding him, were gathered and set forth for us here, as we deemed the multitude burdensome and for that reason excused ourselves from it. But I think what has been brought forward is sufficient to prove that their faith is placed entirely outside the limits of the catholic and apostolic faith preached by the saints; and this even from those very words, discourses, and definitions which they wrote down in common and privately, and having written them, have handed down to be believed, and subject to public curses and anathema in the Church those who do not believe them. For one part ^B has been taken from the discourses and dogmas of Palamas, who became the teacher and leader of this faith—due to which he has been honored not only while living, having carried off the prize of this faith, Thessalonica—but also after he died [(6)], he is celebrated annually with hymns and sacrifices equal to the teachers of the Church who once shone for piety, Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, and the rest; while the other part is taken from those things explicitly contained in the Tome, in which the whole Church and the whole synod, with the Emperor presiding, delivered that most firm faith of his to others to hold, as a canon of piety and a pillar of orthodoxy, ^C and which they honor equally with the holy Gospels, and strive in every way for it to be maintained and to have authority. Furthermore, that assembly of the Church specifically makes mention of him in it as most pious and as one who fought for the truth through everything, and at the same time, praising and legislating, delivers whatever was said by him anywhere as having been most rightly said and written according to the canon of piety.

They say, therefore, in the Tome, after the questions, near the end: "However, the aforementioned most holy metropolitan of Thessalonica, writing and thinking nothing discordant with the divine Oracles, but rather contending for our common piety and tradition as is fitting, is not only ^D not lower than those who are against him, but rather than those who are against the Church...

and her piety, we declare him a most secure defender, champion, and helper. ^A Since matters had turned out in this way, it remained for us, as we were still zealous, to remove every accusation from those wishing to accuse him, nor to leave unexamined even those points which the enemies of the Church, in their writings, made grounds for accusation against the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica, even if all these things might have been covered by what was examined in the holy synod. Since, therefore, our most powerful and holy lord and Emperor found these things written down specifically by his own hand and delivered them to us, we read and examined each one of them in the book of the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica, ^B having gathered in the Great Church and spending the day in that common assembly, not once, but twice, three times, and often. We found the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica to be in agreement with the holy theologians in these matters as well, and a defender, by the grace of Christ, of the truth according to piety; whereas they, falling into many great heresies and openly contradicting the things said by the theologians, then add such and such things—and all others they babble about, just like shameless women attributing their own filthiness to others.

They also proclaim him in things where they strike with anathema those not persuaded by their blasphemies. ^C They say, therefore, that Gregory, the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica, who synodically in the Great Church deposed Barlaam and Akindynos, the authors and inventors of the heresies, together with the wicked gang around them—then adding, in which they are not ashamed to slander and lie, they abundantly append: “Who for the common Church of Christ and for the true and unerring dogmas concerning the Godhead, fought most wisely and bravely with written monuments, sermons, and disputations, and proclaimed one Godhead and one God, three-subsistent, endowed with the faculty of operation and will, omnipotent, uncreated through all, according to the Scriptures and the theologians and their interpreters, and who became a fellow member, fellow synodal participant, fellow speaker, fellow student, and fellow combatant of all these, and manifested as such in words and deeds, may his memory be eternal,” as they themselves wish.

But how he says one God, is manifest from what was said before: that it is as the one from many and differing things. And how he is endowed with will and operation is because he contains within himself many and diverse ^D operations, and as he calls him omnipotent in many places of his own writings, not because the divine essence, which is infinite and super-abundant, can do all things and is all things—both life, and wisdom, and goodness, and power, and whatever else is absolutely attributed to it, and as Damascenus says: “God is the creative essence of all things because of supreme perfection, simplicity, and unity”—but he says he is omnipotent in such a way that he contains in himself many and all powers, differing from one another, and from the divine essence

^A just as we have reviewed in what precedes. This, indeed, is to add a perfection to the divine essence, which is most perfect and than which nothing is more perfect, adding to it—as one might add the power of sight and what is seen to the eyes—something that should not even be mentioned concerning the divine nature, which requires no assistance.

Since, therefore, the entire synod of this Church, in the Rule of faith which it published, declares that it has discovered Palamas neither writing nor thinking anything discordant with the divine utterances, but rather defending piety as is his duty; and that, having gathered frequently in the Great Church, and reading and examining one by one the contents of his books and writings, they have found him to be in agreement with ^B the holy theologians, their ally and fellow-combatant, and an advocate for the piety of the truth; from such things and the like it is manifest that those who are contained within this Church, and who keep this Tome as a confession of the catholic and blameless faith, cannot deny that those things said anywhere by Palamas are also their own faith. And perhaps those who, following him, have been moved to champion his words, being partly unequal to the arguments against them and partly blushing at the manifest absurdity of what was previously shown, have passed over not a few of such things. Nevertheless, those few remaining points will abundantly testify to his opinion concerning divine matters, however he may have held them. For even if none of his words existed in writing which seemed discordant with the common and received tradition of the faith, this Tome itself, providing a sufficient testimony about the man and his faith, and the questions contained therein, along with the arguments and the individual distinctions of opinion, would be abundantly sufficient to represent the entire innovation of his and their faith. And this is evident from what has been said.

Which question, therefore, concerning the divine essence and operation, the entire synod, having met and deliberated many times, has decided and pronounced; and likewise how it proclaims the faith of Palamas contained in that Tome, and what it is, has been stated here in a compendium and broad strokes. But that the Tome of this synod openly lies in claiming to agree with the holy doctors; and that the first of the absurdities ^D which have appeared, and upon the granting of which the rest followed, is this: that they have divided God into essence and operation, as if into being and non-being, the truly existing or subsisting and that which is not truly existing or subsisting, and what cannot be seen by eyes and what can be seen by eyes; and you might likewise say, into the essence of God and his life and wisdom and virtue or power and goodness, and other things of the like kind; by which primordial divine essence—or rather God—he lives, and is wise, powerful, and good through himself, existing in eternal and immutable identity in one and the same stability, himself being all things, and exceeding everything that exists beyond all comparison; it is necessary in this place to set forth some of the holy doctors, among whom they say that in God the operation is the same and undifferentiated from the essence, and life and wisdom and pow-

- ^A er and virtue, and indeed all things that are absolutely attributed to Him, are the same in reality, and that nothing is distinct or differs from His essence; as it may also appear that these things are discordant and inconsistent with the dogmas of Palamas in relation to the teaching and tradition of the saints (and one might say that the falsity of this Tome is shown), and [since] we wish to cleanse [our] bitter and false hearing—namely, the aforementioned blasphemy—with the drinkable [water of the] true doctrine of the saints—we shall set this forth in mild speech.

This, however, must be known before all else, as if in anticipation, that "operation" is said in three ways among the saints. For according to the divine Anastasius of Jerusalem ^B (7), operation is spoken of in three ways: both the power by which God is naturally apt to operate; and the relation from the operator to that which is operated; and the thing itself being accomplished from those preceding. And indeed, the divine John of Damascus [says] the same. Therefore, "operation," at one time signifies the operative power, at another time the operating, and at another time the "operatum" (the result). Therefore, the argument was not with those disputing about the third, the "operatum," nor about the relation between God—who is operating—and the "operata" being understood, for these are outside of God; and those things outside of God are creatures, even if some happen to be preferred over others by the differences of their dignities, as the great Basil says in his *Adversus Eunomium*; but [the dispute is] about the power and operation by which He is naturally apt to operate, and by which He is operation, and being, and form, and life, and wisdom, and goodness, or whatever that thing is. ^C

(7) Regarding the divine Anastasius of Jerusalem: I cannot be induced to think that it is a lie, nor that one of the two terms is corrupt. For [as for] what we should retain—"Anastasius of Jerusalem"—even if we must plainly move "of Jerusalem." For Calecas produces no authors other than those who are known to the Greeks and who are heard as approved masters among them; and by their authority [opponents] are pressed. But [as for] Anastasius Hierosolymitanus, who is clear in doctrine and faith among the Greeks, there are no monuments of him for us, nor any of his books, or at least fame reveals [them], but only [Anastasius] the Sinaite, who can also be called "the Theopolitan" (that is, the bishop of Antioch), but never "Hierosolymitanus." Calecas, therefore, may have written "Anastasius," from which it easily slipped for someone transcribing it: "of Jerusalem." But Andrew, archbishop of Crete, a man indeed most excellent as a scholastic and as an orator, looking toward the times of the Monothelites, in which it was thus debated among ecclesiastical ^D men—with the Monothelites positing one [will] in Christ as though it were one (a single will)—and [since] it is known that they suffered for this terminology in the Greek [churches], even without the name being inscribed: thus, I might [find] it in Nicetas' *Catena on Luke*, in its earlier chapters where there is an almost continuous exposition of his, not certainly [the same], [but] the same [author of] Theophylact, [that is] John, the presbyter Hierosolymitanus, though born in Damascus. Andrew was not a bishop of Jerusalem—as Hopperus dreamed—nor was he born in that city, as is proved to me by the Triodion and other more certain monuments: he is called [so] because he was a presbyter or cleric of that Church, while his nation was Damascene... [alt-version omitted]

^A always found above any apprehensive conception. For the being by operation in each thing, whatever it may be—which is regarded as perfection and form, and as some have said, ^B *entelechy* of any underlying thing—differs in created things from the underlying thing in which it resides, due to the duality, difference, and composition found in created things, such as the being from the non-being, the perfect from the imperfect, and that which gives form from that which is informed. ^C But in the case of God, who is whole, subsistent, and perfect operation and act, and from whom that which is potential and imperfect is cast far away because of His extreme perfection and simplicity, His operation is the same as His essence; or to say it equally, His life is the same as His essence; and the same applies to the rest of the attributes ascribed to the essence of God. For otherwise, His life would be without essence and His essence without life, and the one would stand in need of the other for existence and perfection, and the First and Supreme Good would be shown to be composite and imperfect. ^D Wherefore it should not be said that God *has* operation or life or goodness (for this indicates that God is something partial and imperfect), but that He *is* entirely operation, and entirely life, and entirely goodness subsisting by itself, because of His extreme perfection, simplicity, and unity. For that which has is distinguished from that which is had. But in God there is no real distinction, otherwise God would not be one essence, and one thing, whatever that may be, except only for the distinction and discretion of the persons or hypostases, which does not create a difference and distinction of things in themselves, but introduces a number of personal distinction in the Trinity. For according to the Damascene, the three holy hypostases differ from one another only in these hypostatic properties: paternity, sonship, and procession. And just as it would be ridiculous to say that the sea *has* water, since the system of the sea is entirely water, so it is more ridiculous to say that God *has* essence and intellection or life; but He is entirely essence, and entirely intellection, and entirely life. The same must be said of the other attributes that are simply and absolutely ascribed to God. And this is evident from what follows, for theology will prove the proposed truth. And indeed, first the Lord Himself says: *I am the life, and the truth, and the light*. If, therefore, the Son and Word of God, who said these things, was not [these things Himself], but something else outside His essence, devoid of essence and not truly existing or subsisting—as those who set these things as something other than the essence wish life and truth and, in general, operation to be, saying the same of the light which appeared on Thabor at the Lord's transfiguration—then, if we grant and assume this, it follows that the act of the divine incarnation is destroyed, or if indeed He Himself was truly the Word of God, the one

^A who spoke these things concerning Himself—just as He truly was and is (for the whole divine nature is incarnate in one of its hypostases, according to the tradition of the saints)—it follows of necessity that we must confess that truth and life in God are the same as essence.

Next, the blessed Paul says that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God [1 Cor. 1, 24]. But if anyone says that there are two wisdoms in God, one subsistent and the other non-substantial, he says nothing. For since the wisdom of God—the subsistent power, the Son of God, through whom all things were made—is most perfect and overflowing in plenitude, it is superfluous to attach another, non-substantial one to Him, as though the subsistent One did not suffice by Itself; and at the same time, the absurdities of composition and imperfection emerge. For here one could not say that the two wisdoms are one in number, just as we call the Son wisdom from the Father’s wisdom, even as life from life and light from light; we confess them to be one wisdom and life in number, and one thing. But this cannot be said in this [former] case. Why? Because they say that these things differ from each other ^B really, so that the one is substance and the other is non-substantial. And things differing to such a degree could never be able to subsist and become one thing in number. But we say that the Father and the Son (8) do not differ really in any way at all, according to the position of faith. Furthermore, Athanasius (9) refutes the one who says these things in his books against the Arians, speaking as follows: "For where did they find it at all said in the divine Scripture, or from whom did they hear at all, that there is another Word besides this Son, so that they might invent such things for themselves? How is this not their monstrous fabrication, to say that wisdom coexists with the Father, but that this [wisdom] is not Christ?" And again, "For life does not live in life; ^C for otherwise it would not be life." And furthermore, in his discourse on the dispensation in the flesh (10), "For if He Himself is Life, how does Life receive life?" Moreover, the Apostle says about the Son of God, "Who being the brightness of glory, and the character of His substance" [Hebr. 1, 3]. So that in this place, character and brightness are the same, and substance and glory are the same as essence. And all the teachers of the Church of Christ ^D thoroughly overthrow every diversity. See Athanasius himself, Orat. 3, in which he pursues these matters.

(8) That the Father and the Son are in no way really distinguished our Calecas asserts, and it is sufficiently clear in what sense he spoke; insofar, that is, as concerns wisdom, light, and other absolute things. For thus the Father produces one really distinguished by personal property, in that the Son is, and is the Father Himself; so that there is one nature or essence of both, one wisdom, and the rest. And Damascene speaks well concerning the divine generation, l. c. 8: "I did not say resemblance, but identity." For the essence is the same, etc. The Arians, as Athanasius refutes, asserted that Christ was some other, which is far from the faith and the mystery of the Trinity.

(9) Orat. 3, p. 409.

(10) On the dispensation in the flesh. This oration, "On the appearance in the flesh," which the Greeks call *oikonomia*, our [writers] call "dispensation," and it embraces the whole business of our salvation through Christ and His Incarnation; and that is the reason why that word is not rarely rendered as "Incarnation." The passage of Athanasius itself was mutilated, and even laboring in its sense, which I have restored from the editions. In the same way Chrysostom and others explain that He receives life, [in] that He is life begotten.

^A They remove all otherness and duality, and the real distinction, in God. Great Basil, while writing *Against Eunomius*, says: "That which is in the form of God is the essence of God. For neither is form one thing and essence another, lest He be composite." Again, the same author: "Every image is an image either of form, or of figure, or of species, or of color; but God is in none of these, but in essence alone." And the divine John Damascene says: "Essence and form and nature are the same in God." And again: "The divine is simple and incomposite. But that which is constructed from many and diverse things is composite. If, therefore, we have spoken of the uncreated, and immortal, and without beginning, and creative, and eternal, and providential as essential differences in God, that which is constructed from so many things will be composite, not simple; which is of the extreme of impiety." The same: "One must not speak of quality in God, lest we call Him composite from essence and quality."

Saint Maximus, in his *Capita to Elpidius*: ^B "Every act of intellection, just as it has its existence in substance entirely as a quality, so also has its movement around a substance imbued with qualities. For nothing absolute and simple, existing by itself, can receive it, because it is not itself absolute and simple." But God exists in both ways as altogether simple; and He is at once substance without a subject, and intellect entirely lacking any subject. The same in the same *Capita*: "God, whether we call Him substance, does not have the power of understanding (so to speak) passively, which might be naturally conceived along with Him, lest He exist as composite; or whether we call Him intellection, He does not have a substance naturally subject to Him, in which it might be received: but God is Himself by essence intellection, and is wholly and only intellection, and He Himself is essence according to intellection, and is wholly and only essence, and is wholly above essence, and wholly above intellection, for the reason that He exists as a unity indivisible and impartible and simple." The same: "Do not seek habits and aptitudes in the simple and infinite substance (namely, the holy Trinity), lest you make it composite after the manner of created things." The same in the *Scholia on Saint Dionysius*: "God alone is truly and properly simple, and truly and properly one, and unity, and monad; ^C but all things after God are dualities (so to speak) and composite. For even spiritual things, and those which we understand by the mind, consist of substance and of a constitutive difference, by which individual things are distinguished. For whatever has something that is conceived along with it for the manifestation of its own substance or essence is not truly and properly simple. But those things which fall into the senses are composite of matter and form."

Furthermore, the divine Dionysius: "One must not divide," he says, ^D the good of many things; about all of which Maximus prefaces nothing, almost contrary to custom. Yet did Calecas [really] have those things inscribed to Elpidius, or has he been deceived by the fact that he [Maximus] had subject [to his work] the *Capita de Charitate* to Elpidius? Which preface, however, exists [but] for those four hundred special *Capita de Charitate* alone, in which Photius praises the genius of Maximus above all others.

^A And beauty in the author and cause, [which] comprehends all things in one. For as we divide these things among all existing beings into participations and participants, we call that which partakes of beauty "beautiful," and the participation itself "beauty." But the super-essential Beauty is called both Beauty and Beautiful. And again: "I do not say that goodness is one thing, and life another; nor [that there are] many causes, and other deities that are producers of others, some supereminent and others inferior." ^B And again: "If goodness is substance in God, he who is changed from goodness will be at one time existing, and at another time not existing." The same [author] says: "Let us, then, now proceed in our discourse to that appellation of goodness which the theologians singularly attribute to the super-essential Godhead above all, calling, I think, the divine substance itself Goodness." Again: "Because [it] is good, as essential goodness, it extends goodness to all things that are." Furthermore, the synod convened against the Manichaeans says: "Goodness in God is essence; but in created beings, it is an accident." To this, the great Basil, in his chapters to Amphilochius concerning the Holy Spirit, [says]: "The Holy Spirit is good, as the Father is good, and he who is born from the Good is good, having goodness as [his] essence." ^C Again: "But there is this difference between the divine powers and the Holy Spirit, that to the latter, holiness is nature; but to the former, that they are holy is through association and participation." These things also are his in the Epistle to the Neocaesareans: "Unless the Holy Spirit is simple, [it must] consist of essence and holiness. And who is so insane as to call the Holy Spirit composite?" Furthermore, the divine Chrysostom, explaining that, "I am the light of the world," says: "If, therefore, life is one thing, light another, and the essence or substance another, [He] will be composite and not simple." ^D And again, explaining [the text], "In the beginning was the Word": "This one might see, a little later, also called light; and the light, in turn, called life; and the life, truth." Again in the same place: "He said this, namely 'In him was life,' clearly not that we might suspect composition, but that we might little by little be led up to the height of the doctrines. For because it was not easy for anyone of the common people to grasp in their mind how His life exists of itself and truly, He first said what was more humble, and then leads the trained hearer to that which is more sublime. For he who had said, 'He gave to him to have life,' this one again says, 'I am the life.' And note how the saint considers it composition if anyone were to call life one thing in God, light another, and essence another, as he said above." Furthermore, the divine Cyril, in the Acts of the third synod, says: "Just as unity would not be divided into two unities—for that which is divided into these would not be a unity, but a duality, so to speak—so also [if] the one...

^A by reason of supreme union should be divided into two, then the God of all things would be simple." The same author, in his *Treasuries*, explaining the text, "As the Father has life in himself," says: "In this place, for those who do not wish to understand aright, the danger of an enormous blasphemy arises. For if the Father is said to have life in himself, then there is some other thing besides the life that is in him. But if we grant this, a certain duality and composition will be perceived in him. But this is absurd." The same author elsewhere: "For if God is one thing, and the knowledge that is in him is another thing besides him, he will be composite and not simple. But since he is admittedly simple, the knowledge that is in him is not some other thing besides him. We, however, are not like this, for we are something by essence from eternity; but we have goodness placed in our essence." ^B Again: "God is love," according to the voice of John, "and he is not one thing, and what is in him another; for he is simple and lacking all composition." Again: "For the God of all things will not be simple in nature; but rather composite and consisting of two, if the life which is in him is something other than himself."

Furthermore, Nyssenus in the *Confutations*: "Therefore, if also the Son is one sincere and pure life, remote from all dual reasoning and composition, and no thing is subject [to him] beside his life, how in him who is simple could any commixture of an alien thing be suspected," etc. The same author, in the *Catechetical Oration*: "For that which is said to be one thing in another is not free from composition. But it is entirely necessary, since his simplicity is established, that the Word himself be life, not a participant in life." ^C Furthermore, Saint Augustine, whom the ecumenical synods and certain [others] of the same rank and equal stature, who attained a great name for virtue and the brilliance of their lives, have established in many of their writings [as teaching] that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. And indeed we are persuaded by these to speak and think in this way; and not to insult the Fathers by accusing them of heretical opinion. But first, it is clear to all to say to them: if ten or even twenty of the Fathers spoke this statement, but ten thousand did not speak [it], who are they who insult the Fathers—those who circumscribe the whole of their piety in a few, and set these up as speaking against and contending against ecumenical synods and an innumerable multitude of God-bearing men, or those who take to themselves a much greater number of advocates? Does someone insult the Fathers, as you say, by not saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son? For indeed, they [the others] spoke in this way. And how does the one who says this not insult the much greater number? For they by no means deigned to speak [it] ^D anywhere. Indeed, says he; but the great Ambrose and Augustine and Jerome, and certain others of the same order and equal dignity, most renowned for their virtue and life, have written in many of their books that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. And we so believe, that we so speak and think, and do not—by traducing the Fathers under the name of heretical opinion—bring them into disgrace. Furthermore, it is permitted to say to them first [that] which is clear to all. Namely, if ten or twenty Fathers uttered this voice, but six hundred did not speak [it], who, I ask, are they who bring the Fathers into disgrace?

^A They bring forward the most excellent doctor of the Church, and they subject to anathema him who does not accept his words. He therefore, in book VII *De Trinitate*, says: "In that simplicity, it is no other thing to be wise than to be, but the wisdom which is there is the same thing that is his essence." Furthermore, in the same book: "It is sacrilege to say that God is sustained and subjected to his goodness, and not rather that goodness is the substance; nor that goodness is God, but that it is in him as in a subject."

^B Furthermore, the great Athanasius, in his writings *De Filio*: "For if the wisdom and the substantial Word were not the essence, but he who is truly [the Son] were something else as wisdom and Word, and the Son were in the Father, the Father himself would be composed of essence and word." The same author, in his *Apologetic Oration* for the synod: "If any one therefore imagines that God is composite, as if an accident were hidden in a substance, or by an outward covering, or that there are certain things which complete his essence, so that when we speak of God and call him Father, we do not signify his invisible and incomprehensible essence, but something around him—let him rebuke the synod, which wrote that the Son is from the Father; yet let them understand, who form such opinions, that they utter two blasphemies: namely, that they introduce a certain corporeal God, and also that they falsely claim the Lord is not the Son of the Father himself, but of those things which are about him." There are also these things from the same Athanasius, in that oration in which he shows that the word *homoousios* was rightly placed by the Nicene Fathers: "Hence you will not say that the creature is the work of the true God himself, if indeed what is called Father and what is called God does not signify the very essence of him who truly is, but some other thing which you contrive. But if this is very indecent, it is surely impious even to think it." And after a few words: "For although we cannot comprehend what in the end he is, yet, while we hear 'Father' and 'Son' and 'Preserver of all,' we do not listen to some other thing, but to the very blessed, simple, and incomprehensible essence of him who truly is."

^C ...those whom he boasts of, nor can he bring forward even one who expressly denies that it proceeds also from the Son, or who at least has indulged himself by adding an exception; namely, from the Father alone. The Latins never denied that it proceeds from the Father; they rather explained it more fully, by adding *Filioque*. The Greeks [are] more prone to say "through the Son," by which they signify him to have proceeded from the Father as the first author, through the Son as if by a intermediary, who himself is author from the author, and thus with the Father, and from him having received [the power], is the author of the Spirit. George Metochita relates that the word *monon* (only) had been added through a plagiarism in one of the copies of a certain ancient Father, which I do not recall, and that the plagiarism was easily detected. Thus, windbag men lack [means] by which to defend their error; since the testimonies of those saying that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, or has existence and substance from him, are so clear that, by reading them, when the collector Nicephorus Blemmydes [provided them], John Beccus was recalled to a saner mind; being tenacious of which during his patriarchate, and an excellent defender of the faith, he was finally cast from his seat. Let *Cardinal Baronius* be consulted. For it is not the business of this place to inquire further into that letter.

^A We understand, therefore, that this refers to some other thing; rather, we conceive of it as signifying the blessed, simple, and incomprehensible essence of the Being. You yourselves have also said the Son is from God; it is evident you have said this [meaning] from the essence of the Father. The same [author], in the same place: "It was not fitting for you—the Arians, clearly—to write that the Son is from the Father, but [that He is] from things about Him, so that in avoiding the true statement that God is Father, you might—conceptually making the simple composite and corporeal—become authors of more insolent blasphemies." From the words of this saint, it is evident that the name God, and Father, and Creator, and preserver of the universe, signifies that very blessed essence, even if none of the names represent ^B what that [essence] is; and that those who say there are certain things about God, other than His essence, which are natural, essential, and uncreated to God—be it life, or goodness, or whatever else they might be from which they say God is known, and that He who is invisible according to essence becomes visible according to these, and that there are certain things that complete His essence—by thinking of the simple God as composite and corporeal, they become authors of a more insolent blasphemy, and by fabricating something else concerning His essence, they invent what is impious even to think or utter.

But the theologians, in order to extricate themselves from this absurdity, teach and treat of what has been said as a duty. And by the same reasoning, they say that what we call the "reasons" (logoi) of things in God differ in no way from His essence. For surely the divine Chrysostom, in explaining the passage: "In whom are the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," saith: "See, although he seems to say something great, he said even this in a lowly manner for the sake of the simpler ones; for He is wisdom itself and knowledge itself." And holy ^C Maximus, explaining the authority of the great Dionysius, who says: "Certain images and likenesses of His divine archetypes," says: "Of the Cause of the universe, the eternal thoughts which He holds are the archetypes of all things, through which and according to which all things were in Him, not being other than He." Again, in the same scholia: "Neither is God in a place, nor are the things in Him as in a place; but He holds them as one who holds Himself, and He exists in them and they in Him." From the same in the same place: "For if His essence is one thing, and the things which He knows are other than He, He Himself will be lacking in intelligence, that is, His essence. But if He has anything, He has it from Himself, not from another. But if He understands from Himself and out of Himself, He is Himself the things which He understands. Therefore, since He is truly Mind, He knows the things that are, as He who is. If, therefore, in understanding Himself, He understands the things that are, He Himself is the things that exist."

And thus far these things, and out of many, a few. But we, gathering together what has been said, observe in conclusion that from what has been said it has been manifestly proven, first, that if the essence of God is one thing, and the things that are in Him are other—for instance, life and wisdom and goodness, and if anything else of that kind is absolutely attributed to God—they would be ^D really distinguished from the essence and from one another,

as we have recounted in the foregoing: and they are so related to the essence that without it they could not subsist of themselves; just as the Tome, according to the faith of Palamas, decided and proclaimed, they will be universally in the essence as in a subject, and it (the essence) will be the receptacle for them; and there will be matter, or that which corresponds to matter. For that which underlies another in order to exist in it is either matter, or something like matter; and thus, to the essence there will belong privation and a passive power; but what is in it, such as habits and qualities and forms or operations, will be perfections of this essence: because, ^A from the concourse of many, one thing will arise, and it will be a composite which is formed from them. For the meeting into one of at least two things, of which one is not the same in reality and definition as the other, or which is capable of receiving another in which it may have its existence, by the concurrence of which one is formed, or which is perfected by many coming together into the same, or however else one may choose to define it, is a composite. For that which is completed by something else, even if it is inseparable from it, is composite. ^B

Secondly, that imperfection will have a place in God. For each of the things that are in the essence will have the power of completing, and will have the nature of a part in relation to the whole. And every part, or that which is analogous to a part, is imperfect. Therefore, the most common concept of God proclaims Him to be partless. Consequently, we do not say that God the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit is a part of the one and total and more-than-full Divinity.

Thirdly, that along with the imperfect, that which is finite will also be introduced in God. For that which consists of two things is not infinite. For the dyad is neither without beginning nor without limit, the divine Maximus said, since each monad has the other as its limit. Therefore, there are not three monads in God, but ^C just as He has one essence, so the Catholic faith confesses and acknowledges one and the same undivided monad in three persons.

Fourth, that along with the finite, that which is circumscribed will also have a place in God. For God will not be entirely, through and through, His own essence and life and wisdom, and all the other things that God is called and is; nor will He be entirely most perfect in every way, as Dionysius says in the thirteenth chapter of the *De Divinis Nominibus*; but one thing will be His wisdom, another His goodness, another light, another essence; and each one will be bounded by another, being really distinct, and all together distinct from the essence. And indeed, each of these, insofar as it is the opposing effect toward which it is ordered, and not another (as, for instance, it will operate wisdom and not life)—but then all the things which flow from God as kindly gifts to creatures will be a finite power. And that which is finite is, of course, also circumscribed. But these things are utterly inconsistent with the true understanding concerning God. For by common knowledge, He is simple, and indivisible, and incomposite, and ^D

^A agreed to be perfect and infinite and uncircumscribed.

Moreover, if God is one by the concurrence of distinct things, we must first inquire who joined these distinct things together; and secondly, that God himself is one by participation in the One. But in this way He would not be one strictly and primarily, but one in the way that things composed of diverse elements are.

Furthermore, there will be something other that is better and more excellent than God. For that which is participated in is, by the one participating, and by the fact that it possesses the power to unite many distinct things, to be called first and better and more excellent. For if the life and goodness of God, and all other things which they say are distinct from the essence in such a way as to be divided over against it—and that the essence is not the very thing that goodness is, and likewise in the other cases—were indeed more excellent than the essence, since that by which a thing is wise or good or just, being as it were the form of that which is imparted, and a perfecting ^B act, is better and more excellent than the thing itself. For universally, that which imparts is better than that which is imparted. And here, these virtues, as a perfecting act of the essence, are something nobler and more excellent; yet as they cannot subsist by themselves, but derive their being from the essence—and these are indeed non-essential, while that is essence—so too, whatever else the modern theologians bring forward by way of division is something less and deficient, and, as has been said, each is entirely in need of the other.

To these things, if in God there are life and wisdom and goodness and essence, by a much stronger argument there will be in Him distinctly contrary things, that is to say, the reasons of opposites. For the reasons of all things are in God; among which are all things, including opposites. But all things, and even the opposites themselves, are in the Cause of all things uniformly, unitedly, absolutely, comprehensively, and ^C singularly, as the divine Dionysius teaches in the fourth chapter of *The Divine Names*; just as in the monad all number subsists formally, and it has in itself everything of number singularly and unitedly; and just as in the center all the lines of a circle coexist in one union, and the point holds all the straight lines united in itself formally. But also in the nature of all things, all the reasons of the nature of each individual are held together in one unconfused union. Therefore, neither life nor wisdom nor goodness are things in the essence of God that are in reality different from it. Since, as has become clear from what has been said, both by logic and the testimonies of the saints, the essence is in no way capable of receiving anything other than itself; nor does it stand in need of anything else, on account of its supreme perfection and simplicity and unification. For he who thinks otherwise will not escape the absurdities mentioned, and at the same time will speak in opposition to the Scriptures and the pronouncements of the ^D saints.

From what has been said, it is also equally clear that in God essence and operation do not differ. For because those who posit that they are distinct and diverse from His essence in actual reality

^A and in God name life and wisdom and virtue and goodness, and the rest that are attributed to Him, as operations of God, and they call them operation, and assign them to Him as a perfecting operation (or act), by which He lives and is powerful and good, and whatever that operation or act may be: and since it has been proven that these are not other than His essence, it is manifest that neither is His operation, by which He is operative—that is, according to the first meaning of the aforementioned operation, according to the terminology of the saints—anything other than the essence of God Himself. Yet the argument wishes, from abundance, to demonstrate this expressly from the holy ones.

Immediately, therefore, Saint Maximus in the digression of the second chapter ^B of the first *Century*, the beginning of which is: "The good by essence is strictly," says: "God is known from goodness and operation, and from the works proper to His providence, but not from His essence." By operation, however, we mean the works, not the power of the operation; for that is nothing other than the essence of God, lest composition be imagined in God. The same author in... "To every man who has received the good from God, the learning itself is self-taught. Since the divine is an essence that is super-essential and a power that is super-powerful, and an operation removed from every operation." The same author in the *Scholia* on the blessed Dionysius: " The super-goodness itself, being mind and all operation or act, is an operation turned into itself."

^C Nyssenus in the *Exposition of the Song of Songs*: "Nature is a power and operation eminent over all things; whose works are all other things, as well as the heavenly beauties." The same author in the *Confutations*: "Discussing nothing about these (namely, Eunomius), nor showing how that which we call operation and essence is the same, he finally adds," and what follows in that book. It must therefore be observed in this place, that Eunomius himself indeed divided operation from essence, but cast it as a crime upon the orthodox, that they felt it to be the same. Whence he also says in his own work: "It is not fitting for those who believe in the truth, to unite operation to essence based on the opinion of others without examination and certain judgment."

^D But also the great Athanasius, when heretics said that the Son is the image of the operation of the Father, and not of the essence, takes this as the minor premise of a syllogism; but he himself posits the major premise, and says thus: "Since you say that the Son is the image of the operation; and operation is the same as essence; therefore the Son is the image of the essence." And so to divide from the essence the operation by which God is operative was the opinion and mind of the ancient heretics.

Saint Theodore Graptus (the one branded upon his face) in his treatise against Eusebius and the Iconoclasts delivers it in this manner: "They posited one thing as essence and another as operation, just as in those things which are considered corporally; and so indeed also in the Word of God, which is forbidden to the worshippers of piety. For in things that are simple

^A and incorporeal, they know that they in no way differ. For these things must not be separated from one another, lest that which surpasses all simplicity be understood as composite. For neither would the divine essence ever be ineffective, nor the operation devoid of essence. The same person says in the same works: Of those things whose nature is diverse, the operations are also of that kind; and of those things whose operations are the same, the natures are also of equal dignity, on account, to be sure, of the contrariety of those things which have come together, as ecclesiastical doctrine ^B and the mind hold. For thus may the divine operation be piously understood as eternal; or rather, as self-operation, in that the operation is not separated from the essence, but receives the same account on account of the property of a simple and incorporeal nature. These things he also says.

But how it stands, and what its quality is—that it is the same—the divine Maximus teaches, in the place where he shows that there is a distinction of things, that is, of substances, in Christ. He adds therefore: Indeed, those things which are not altogether the same among themselves do not in any way receive one and the same account of being. For those things which are absolutely the same among themselves are also incapable of distinction. Therefore, according to the opinion of Saint Maximus, it cannot be said that ^C operation, or even [that which is] minimal in God, is distinguished from the essence, and that it receives one and the same account. But it does receive it; for in simple and incorporeal things these in no way differ; for there these things are altogether the same; wherefore they are also incapable of differentiation. But if they do not differ in any way, but differ [only] by the aforementioned mode of opposition, it is impossible for them to receive the same account.

These things the great Basil also confirms in his *Confutations*, saying: In a simple and incorporeal nature, the operation or virtue receives the same account ^D as the essence. And therefore, according to the opinion of this teacher, if anyone were to say that the essence of God is one thing, and His operation another reality, and that it is distinguished in such a way that the one is essence, [and] the other is devoid of essence, it would be impossible for God to be a simple and incorporeal nature. For the account of [that which is] devoid of essence would never be one and the same as the account of the essence; and it would happen that, even in those things which are composite, essence and operation would be the same. And lastly, either God Himself would be composite, like we are, if in Him essence is one thing and operation another; or [else] composite things would be simple and incorporeal, like God, since, if it is the same, essence and operation would befit both Him and us. But indeed, as far as we are concerned, essence (or substance) and virtue and operation are distinct in reality and in account; for the account of essence (or, if you prefer, substance) is to subsist by itself; but [the account] of virtue and power is to be an efficient principle; and operation, by its own account, is form; and it is the act of power, in that it is power; but both lack substance, and are both devoid of essence or substance, and exist in substance as in a subject; and indeed they have mutual need of one another. But because corporeal and composite things have themselves in that manner, but God is [confessed] to be simple and in

corporeal, it is established that all these things are one in God, along with his essence, according as the saint teaches.

But if anyone should say that, even if the distinction remains, one may, as he wishes, allow the same definition for [the essence and the operation] according to the "uncreated," he says nothing. First, because the teacher spoke simply, and did not say that they are different in some specific respect. Next, because even if they were to admit the same definition according to the "uncreated," they would not admit the same definition according to the "reason of being," while the distinction between essence and operation remains. For they assert that the one subsists, and the other does not, and [they invent] all the other things besides by which they distinguish them. For if the "rational" added to an "animal" has made the definition of the [human] different from the animal simply so called, it will never be the case that things so far apart would admit the same definition. And indeed, even according to the "uncreated" itself, the distinction of being infinitely, and again infinitely, secondary—by which they distinguish the operation from the essence—will by no means allow it to admit the same definition. For that which is secondary to the essence of God, and certainly that which is subordinated infinitely and again infinitely, is surely created and made. As the holy Epiphanius in his discourse against Aetius is the author: "One is that which makes and creates, in the one essence of the perfect Trinity; but all other things are made and created." For this reason, we also do not worship anything that is secondary to the essence of God; and as the great Basil says in his *Refutations*: "Things that are after God are created and are our fellow-servants."

But it is true that the essence also admits the same definition as the operation, as the saints determine. And we do not know what that definition might be, yet we designate it as the whole of what it is, by each of the names. For he says, we set Him as Light, and Life, and Good; being essentially whole as Life, and whole as Light, and whole as Good. And, as he himself said again, "Every image is an image of essence, or of form, or of color; but God is in none of these, but in essence alone." From which it is also clear that when we call Him an operation, we are positing His essence itself; and he who said He is only an operation has signified the essence itself only, albeit with different names. For if, he says, we say "essence," He is whole essence and nothing else; if "intelligence," He is whole intelligence and nothing else; if "operation," He is whole operation and nothing else, because He is a monad, indivisible, simple, and without parts, and so that He may not be thought of as composite, He who transcends all simplicity.

So also the divine Cyril, in the second book of his [treatises] to Hermeias, says: "The nature of the Godhead is indeed one and simple, but we say that it is life and power and wisdom and glory." Thus the same thing is named in different ways according to different conceptions. The great Basil demonstrates this also, writing to Eustathius. For he says: "All divine conceptions and names lead the mind to one subject. For the appellation of 'Good' does not carry the mind to one certain signified thing, and the naming of 'Wise' and 'Powerful' and 'Just' to another; but whatever you might say, it is one thing that is signified throughout all.

^A Even if you call Him God, you have pointed to the same being as you do through the other names. And elsewhere: "All divine names which are attributed to the divine nature are indeed equivalent to one another in that they indicate the subject, but according to this or that nuance, they lead our mind toward the same thing."

These things also, holy Maximus ^B in the Dialogue against the Anomoeans, sets forth thus: "The very substance of God is also His immortality; and not only immortality, but also incorruption, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, and dominion, and virtue. And God is not these in the manner of composite things, but is called such according to divers concepts and reasons. Immortality, indeed, because He is immune from all destruction and end; incorruption, because He is of indissoluble life; justice, on account of equity; sanctification, because He preserves from sin; redemption, because He keeps our life safe from destruction and corruption; dominion, because He holds all things under His command; virtue, because nothing can oppose Him."

This teaching of this holy man will suffice for the ^C solution of all the authorities in which "one thing and another" is mentioned. For just as here: "Justice is one thing, and immortality another," and there is a distinction according to reason, not indeed according to the reality; so also wherever else among the saints anything of this kind is said—that there is one thing and another in God—we shall say that it is a difference according to reason, not according to reality, so that we may not be compelled to admit many absurdities concerning God, and be carried far from the aim of the saints. For if anything is distinguished in reality, it is necessarily said to be one thing and another; this, according to the mode of being, is really distinguished.

Furthermore, the Anomoean saying: "If God gives birth to some things and creates others, He is composite," Maximus adds: ^D "I do not say: 'He gives birth to some and creates others,' but, 'He gives birth in one way, and creates in another.' For even when someone both gives birth and creates by the same act, there is nothing to prevent him from giving birth in one way and creating in another; and that which is begotten is distinct and diverse from that which is created, and the one begetting and creating is necessarily simple. If, however, He gives birth to some things and creates other things, as if using different members or organs and powers, it is impossible for Him not to be composite."

God, therefore, being one and the same reality, is named in one way or another according to His diverse respects toward existing things, since we cannot, because of our own frailty, signify with one name or concept Him who is above all fullness and His ultimate perfection. And according to our own mode of reasoning, life and wisdom and power [index: entries preserved] are indeed one thing and another; for to each of these, the reason,

or definition, is distinct and diverse; but according to the essence ^A they are the same thing. Just as a grain of wheat is called and is both seed and fruit, and as a point in a line is called both beginning and end—beginning of that which follows, and end of that which precedes. Thus, to the point, both the end and the beginning are attributed according to a different reason and different conceptual models; yet the end and the beginning are not diverse things, but the one thing that underlies both is the point itself. Furthermore, neither are “going-away” and “coming-near” diverse things; for the movement is the same in reality in both; they differ only in reason, according to these concepts.

And the holy Cyril said in the second book of his *Thesauri*: “The Father possesses the power to beget by nature; He possesses also the power to create by the power of the Creator, through the Son; and he is not composite on this account, for such things are the fruit of one and the same nature.” ^B The same author says again: “To do and to create belong to operations; but to beget belongs to nature.” Likewise, the Damascene also said: “The work of the divine nature is the pre-eternal generation; the work of the divine will is creation.”

Furthermore, as that passage of Scripture has it, “Who begot the drops of dew,” He did not produce the drops and the Son in the same way. For God and Father begets the Son, yet He also created the creatures. For according to the great Athanasius, the cause of the Son, of the Spirit, and of all creation is the nature of God. ^C But clearly, He begets the former timelessly, synonymously, and out of Himself; whereas the creatures He brought forth in time, homonymously, and through the power of the Creator, external to Himself. It is clear also from the words of the holy Maximus that the things caused by God are after one manner and another, not through one and another. For He does not beget by one, and create by others. And as the same author says: “He is entirely begetting and entirely forming and creating; yet not in the same manner, but entirely begetting, as He is entirely essence (for the entire Son is God from the Whole); entirely forming and creating, as He is entirely ^D the operation and act truly existing from Himself. The same Person is entirely bestowing wisdom and goodness, as He is entirely wisdom and goodness and power.” For in as much as He is endowed with that power to communicate His own nature, He begets; but in as much as He imparts His own likeness according to art, He creates; so that no mode of participation might be missing from Him who is perfect, good, and supreme; things which are only believed by us, but are known accurately only by Him.

And as we are led from obscure images to the Author of all things, weighing great matters with a small reason—just as if someone were to contemplate another sun proceeding from the sun, which, as soon as that first one enters the mind, shines forth together with the rationale of generation, and appears in all respects just as the former one does; and then again were to contemplate that same sun, while being one, multiplied into many by way of similarity, just as we see it in waters and mirrors, with that one remaining motionless and not

subjected to any change, but ^A existing in itself just as it is by nature. And just as from the same countenance many faces result distinctly, by which same reasoning blessed Dionysius said that the creature has certain images and likenesses of His divine archetypes. These archetypes the divine Maximus called the eternal reasons of things in God, fashioned with skill; which He possesses, not as things other than Himself, but as possessing Himself, and being one with them, as was set forth above according to this teacher.

Finally, let Saint Augustine come forward. For in book VI of *On the Trinity*, where he had said: "How the creature, which is called manifold, is not also called simple," after he responded about the creature, he says thus of God: "But God is indeed called manifold, great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else may appear to be said worthily; yet His magnitude is that which is also His wisdom; for He is not great by bulk, but by virtue; and the same is His goodness, which is also His wisdom and His magnitude; and the same is His truth, which is all those things. Nor is it one thing to be blessed there, and another to be great or wise or good, or strictly to be itself." By which words he signifies that God is understood and named in a manifold way, and that these many things are, as in a subject, in our mind, other and distinct; but in God, one thing corresponds to all of them.

^C Furthermore, Nyssenus in his *Confutations* says: "For if no one of the names is apprehended with any peculiar notion or definition, but all are confused with one another through the confusion of what is signified, it would be in vain to use many names for the same thing, when there is no distinction of that which is signified by which names are distinguished from others." Then, when he shows that peculiar concepts and definitions must be assigned to individual names, yet that distinct things do not for that reason correspond to them in God, he adds: "We, however, do not divide what is the subject of these concepts along with them, but, believing that whatever exists according to essence is one, we consider that what is understood relates fittingly to all its concepts."

Ad ^D these, the great Dionysius, in chapter 2 *On Combined and Discerned Theology*, says that all divine names, and indeed the very name of goodness itself, unless one admits that it is said of the whole Deity, he dares to blaspheme and impiously to tear asunder the super-united unity.

Let us also add these [things] concerning operation. Saint Cyril in Book II of the *Thesaurus* says: "If therefore the Son is the entire operation and virtue of the Father, through whom He works all things, how could He be of created nature?" The same [author]: "Therefore the Son is of the same nature as the Father, as one who has the same power and virtue; nay rather, who [is...]"

^A is Himself the living and essential operation, and power, and wisdom of the Father."

Saint Athanasius, in his epistle to Serapion: "Since the Son is one, the living Word, it is necessary that His living, sanctifying, and illuminating life be one, perfect, and full, being His operation and gift, which is said to proceed from the Father, because it shines forth, is sent, and is given by the Son, who is acknowledged to be from the Father."

It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that this also follows: that the operation of God, according to which He is operative, does not differ from His essence, but essence and operation are the same thing. For in a simple and incorporeal nature, operation admits the same definition as essence, lest that which exceeds all simplicity be understood as composite, according to the teaching of the saints set forth above, which we proposed to demonstrate. ^B

The synod, in the Palamite Tome, decreed and established the contrary; and it innovated by asserting that it not only simply differs, but is divided and opposed in the manner enumerated above. And since those who acknowledge this operation—or rather, these operations—so divided in God from His essence, to be Gods and Deities are not ashamed, it is evident from this that their fabrication is contrary to the common opinion of Christians regarding God. For the Catholic faith teaches us to worship one God and one Deity; and this is innate, as a common and primary concept in the minds of those who acknowledge one God; so that if one were to admit many Deities, it is necessary that he also acknowledge many Gods. ^C Hence, even regarding the holy Trinity, we do not acknowledge three Deities because of the threefold nature of the hypostases, so that we may not be compelled to acknowledge also three Gods—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But these [men] speak of many Deities, as is clear from what has been set forth, so that they are forced also to acknowledge many Gods. This shall be demonstrated more clearly from the sayings of the saints.

Immediately the great Theologian says: "But to us there is one God, because there is one Godhead." And it is clear from this that for those to whom there is not one Godhead, there is not one God. But what is the Godhead? It is the very tri-hypostatic essence of the one God. For so the same [author] says: "For the Godhead is one in three, and the three are one, [those] in which is the Godhead, or, to speak ^D more accurately, which is the Godhead." He deliberately avoided the phrase "in which," lest any composition be suspected, as if the Godhead were one thing in the persons, and he added "which is the Godhead," calling the persons themselves the Godhead—namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

But what need is there to impute this absurdity to them, when they themselves expressly acknowledge and write, asserting that there is no absurdity in proclaiming each of those operations and powers to be God; and they assign this to God in their hymns and confessions.

For we do not attach a multitude of gods to them ^A as a consequence of their proposals, but rather we exhibit it from their own confession. But if they say that these operations and Deities are many and uncreated, and exceed number, and are indeed really distinct from one another, and likewise from the essence—as that which is destitute of essence is from essence, and that which is subsistent is from that which does not truly exist itself, and that which is visible is from that which is invisible, and that which is inferior is from that which excels (and infinitely, boundlessly excels according to all the types of oppositions they have devised)—it is clear that even the gods in God, to use their words, will be as distinct from each other and from the essence.

Let them, however, listen to the divine Maximus, saying: “That which has no substance is not Deity.” And likewise to Gregory the Theologian, saying in his funeral oration for his own father: ^B “But how does that which is infinite admit of measure, so that the quality of finite things—being measured by superior and inferior degrees—should be the same for the Deity?” And saying in his first oration on peace: “Why do you love vanity and seek after lies,” by not introducing one or a simple nature of the Deity, but rather three, in our view, alien to one another, scattered, and—not strange to say—warring through excesses and defects?

Furthermore, the holy and oecumenical first synod pronounces ^C in this manner in the Acts: “But the catholic faith knows one Deity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, beside which no other will be counted.” To this the holy and oecumenical third synod also pronounces in the Acts: “If anyone does not confess in the holy Trinity one Deity, one kingdom, and one dominion, let him be anathema.”

Gregory of Nyssa, in his oration, *What is the Profession of a Christian*: “It is only for those who labor under the error of a multitude of gods to extend the number of deities into a multitude and a crowd; but to deny the Deity altogether would be the impiety of those who would remove God.” The same, in his *Confutations*: “Except for the divine nature, nothing is uncreated; and no one would deem there to be any difference between one uncreated thing and another.” To the same effect he writes to Pulcheria: “There is nothing else eternal, ^D except the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.”

Holy Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem: “As we have received to think of one God, so we have been taught to confess one Deity.” Of the same: “I confess one Deity of the holy Trinity. This alone I acknowledge as eternal, unoriginate, and uncreated.” The same in his aforementioned confession of faith: “The most holy Trinity is numbered, not by essences and natures or distinct Deities—far from it—but by hypostases only and properties.” Saint John Damascene: “Not a Trinity of Deities, but

^A a Trinity of Persons, and we revere the unity of the Deity, cutting off those who divide this.”

Moreover, the civil laws also concern themselves not a little with the one Deity. For thus it is written in the legal Sixty-Book [Code]: “A Christian is he who believes there is one Deity in equal power of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but he who thinks contrary to what has been said is a heretic.” From the same book of the Code: “He who does not glorify the holy Trinity in one Deity of equal power, is not even called a Christian, but is a madman and a heretic and disgraced, and shall be punished.”

^B That the ruling of the synod regarding essence and operation, according to the faith in the Tome of Palamas, is contrary to and hostile to the common and acknowledged opinion concerning the one God, and to the faith proclaimed by all the saints in the Church of Christ, is sufficiently proven by what has been said, unless someone is deaf and wishes to be blind. Perhaps someone will wonder how they were carried off into such folly and madness, and what is the cause for them to decree such things about God and so contrary to the truth. Regarding this, if it is worthy of wonder, it is yet nothing marvelous; for one will find many such corruptions that have happened and exist in the world; since it is easier to partake of vice than to impart virtue; and, “It is necessary that scandals come,” and, “There must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest among us,” as Paul says. Then, such things have fallen upon the Church, which frequently and often has fallen into many great and manifest heresies, and has been the cause of many evils to many, having both long suffered shipwreck itself and having sunk many others with it. And if this is as it were an ancient custom for it, what is it to be wondered at that something similar has happened now, when wisdom and the study of divine things have failed the race?

If it is necessary to state a cause: pride and an opinion of wisdom have ^C been the cause of this corruption, of which the one makes God an enemy to men—for “the Lord resists the proud,” and “into a malicious soul (14) God will not enter”—the other fills those who possess it with vanity and contentiousness, persuading them out of themselves in a giddy manner to think they are something, when they are nothing; from which it happens that they despise all others, and seem neither to see nor hear, like the deaf adder that stops its ears, which does not listen to the voice of the enchanters. Concerning which the Psalmist also spoke. ^D

(14) *Into a malicious soul.* There is no doubt that it refers to the passage of Wisdom written in the margin, whether he wrote it from a different letter, or from memory, or rendered the sense rather than the words. It is there: “Into a malicious soul,” and can be rendered: “stubborn,” “not obeying the word,” “prevaricating,” “nor standing by agreements and arguments.” See Hesychius and Suidas. These things sting the Greeks, who, while they claim wisdom for themselves and wish it to be the property of their race, and despise others, have often fallen into grave errors: although there have never been wanting among them those who are truly wise, even in extreme times, and when wisdom seems to have left Greece together with liberty. The proper cause of the error of the Palamites is the very one which Maximus frequently inculcates in the Monothelites: namely, that they did not distinguish the meanings of terms. For just as those [the Monothelites] in the term *will*, so these in the term *operation*, in which the Monothelites themselves erred, although from a different head; calling that one thing in God and man in Christ, which the Palamites posit as multiple and distinct in God Himself; for virtue itself, and that by which God is: namely, that He is endowed with the power of acting. For it is certain that effects are many.

^A Hence it so happens that they despise all others, and are seen neither to see nor hear; being like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ears, which will not hearken to the voice of charmers [Ps. LVII, 5]; of whom the Psalmist also said: Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun [Ps. LVII, 9]; and: For which things sake the wrath of God cometh upon the children of unbelief [Ephes. V, 6]; and: For which cause God delivered them up to shameful passions [Rom. I, 26], according to what has been handed down in the words of Scripture.

Whether these were the causes of this corruption, and whether it took its origin from them, I leave to be told by others; but as far as the present is concerned, it seems that from the subject matter of the question, the cause of this corruption has come to pass; first, because when it was established that they should speak concerning essence and operation, they did not first distinguish in how many ways operation is spoken of, since it is both spoken of and understood in three ways, as has been said; nor did they define concerning which of these their discourse was, which itself became the cause of their not discussing the problem in an orderly manner. ^B From which it happened to them that they did not judge correctly; rashly declaring the operation, by which God is endowed with the power of acting and is efficacious, to be really distinct from His essence, and denying that it is His own operation. By which reasoning, this very thing seems in itself impossible, so that it is said that the essence of God is not His operation. For it is a contradiction, just as if one were to say that the essence of God is not His essence. For it has been said that the operation, by which God is endowed with the power of acting and is efficacious, is His essence.

Secondly, because when operation, as has been said, is spoken of in multiple ways, those things which were spoken by the saints in one sense concerning operation, they accepted in another; and the same thing happened to them as if some people were holding a discussion about a dog, and one were disputing about a land dog, while the other were talking about a sea or celestial dog; for this would make them seem to be mad at one another, and to have an undeclared war due to the error arising from the variation in the acceptance of the word.

Thirdly, that whatever distinction the saints spoke of according to reason, they understood as a distinction according to reality in God; and in that way, what were distinct in reason, they handed down as distinct things.

Fourthly, that they accepted those things which were spoken by the saints concerning the distinction of the divine persons, as if they had been spoken concerning the distinction of essence and operation in God; ^D indeed not knowing that one of two things is necessary: either that they must posit the operation as a subsistent person, or else must say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are non-subsistent, which is what they opine; and that they do not believe them to exist as truly subsisting by themselves, as they themselves speak, according to the operation.

Fifthly, that they understood things said by way of circumlocution as being about distinct realities. Just as when Damascenus says: The Deity of the triple light, a singular radiance shining forth from one tri-subsistent nature, a Begetter without beginning, and the Word of the Father of the same nature, and the co-reigning Holy Spirit, elegantly adorning these things by way of circumlocution. For it is not

^A one thing, we must understand, that is the thing which is the tri-hypostatic Deity, and another in the radiance shining forth as unity; nor another the one tri-hypostatic nature; nor another the Begetter, and the Word, and the Spirit. Nor, when the great Hierotheos says in his Amatory Hymns, "That God is one certain simple power, obviously revolving itself from itself, and through itself, and in itself, and always reverting into itself in the same manner," shall we be compelled by these diverse prepositions to divide God into diverse and distinct things; nor when it is said by the divine Dionysius that God proceeds from Himself.

^B 6. Sixth, that those things which were said by the holy fathers regarding essence and operation, were intended to be applied to created things, just as if they had also been spoken concerning God, and that they willed them to be understood in the same way in Him. For example, as when the holy Dionysius says, "Nothing of existing things is without natural operation;" and again, "That which has no operation, neither is, nor is anything, nor is there any standing or affirmation of it at all." For these things were said regarding "existing things" (that is, of those things which have being). For, he says, there is nothing among existing things. But God is none of the things that exist, nor is He of the same order as they, nor is He counted with them, but is incomparably exalted above things that exist and created beings. ^C Likewise, John of Damascus speaks thus: "Operation is one thing, and the operative (so to speak) is another, and the work is another, and the operator is another. For operation is the effective and substantial movement of nature; the operative, however, is the nature from which the operation proceeds; the work is the effect of the operation; and the operator, finally, is he who uses the operation; that is, the hypostasis, the subsistent person itself."

For he also, looking toward the things that exist, or toward created things, made this distinction. For that he does not speak these things concerning the operation by which God is endowed with the power of acting, but holds discourse regarding those things which are numbered among the creatures, is first of all clear from the fact that the saint, in saying these things, did not add: "In God, operation is one thing, and that which is endowed with the power of acting is another," and the following aspects, or [did not specify] "I say this concerning God," but [spoke] simply thus. ^D Then, it is also clear from the fact that he said the operator "uses" his own operation. For God does not use anything in order to create from non-being, or to make things simply, as if He were not sufficient for Himself. For the fact that God and the Father creates through His own Son does not harm the doctrine in any way. For it is not as through an instrument or a servant, but as through His natural and hypostatic power, the same saint says, and it is the same as if you were to say that He creates or makes by Himself. For He says: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (John v, 17). For the Father and the Son are one substance, and one power, and one thing; which they do not say regarding operation and essence. But it is even clearer from the fact that they call this operation "motion." For we do not speak of motion in God. For motion is in itself imperfect; for it comes to pass for the sake of some end; but God, being the final end of all things, is (if I may so speak) to others indeed the author of motion, while He Himself is motionless. Therefore also in

the ninth chapter of the *Book of Divine Names*, the divine Dionysius says: "But what, again, when the theologians say that He who is motionless proceeds and is moved? For if there is motion of activity in Him, it will be a common form of the passive power of beings and of His own effective power. For motion is the completion and the form of each power, insofar as it is power; just as building is the completion of both the building to be built and the builder." But there is no common form between God and beings.

^B Seventhly, regarding that operation itself, by which God is endowed with the power of acting, which is sometimes spoken of by the saints; and further, regarding life, wisdom, power or virtue, and goodness—namely, power or virtue, and life, and wisdom, and goodness; or rather, wisdom itself, life itself, and power or virtue itself. Because these things have been handed down in a more human and (if I may so speak) coarser way, according to the mode of human speech, since it is not possible to express concepts and names otherwise than as they are compared to us; they believed that these things, as they were said, also strictly obtain in God. As, for example, because it is said that God has life, or virtue, or wisdom, or operation; and: "As the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also, to have life in himself,"20 and things of that kind. From these texts, they determined that the one which has is one thing, and that which is had is another thing, paying no attention—or refusing to pay attention—to the explanations of the saints concerning these matters. ^C They decreed that that which has—the Father, for example, or God, or the essence—is one thing, while that which is had—life, or wisdom, or power or virtue, or the operation by which God (whatever He is in act) subsists in eternal and immutable identity—is another. Indeed, it happens to them much as if, because Scripture also says: "Thy hands have made me and formed me,"21 or, "I heard Thy voice walking in paradise in the afternoon, and I hid myself,"22 or: "The Lord smelled a sweet savor,"23 or, "I will walk to you in a twisted fury, saith the Lord,"24 they were to conclude from these and similar things that God is a certain being endowed with a human form, and is one who feels and is angry, and whatever else divine Scripture speaks of on account of the weakness of the hearers, ^D while through these things it leads us to other, higher things. Although God is said not only to have life or operation, but even essence or substance, as is the author Justin in his book *Against the Greeks*; and to have the whole of being comprehended within Himself, as Gregory the Theologian thinks. Since, therefore, they say that that which is had is one thing, and the thing that has it is another, it follows in their opinion that God is one thing, and His essence and substance another; and again, that He Himself is one thing, and His being another. Furthermore, according to the rules of their theology, God will be without essence; nor will the essence of God or His substance be God. For according to the division which they have introduced of the one having and that which is had,

^A regarding being, since they do not wish the operation to be substance, nor the substance to be that which is the other. Further, since they have posited the operation by which God is operative, or the life by which He lives, as something had and non-subsistent, it will follow for them that they must also posit the substance as non-subsistent, since this too is brought forward as something had, according to the saying, "As if God has substance." But if that which is non-subsistent is non-essential, it follows for them that they must also blaspheme in this, namely, to say that the substance of God is lacking in essence; but that which is lacking in essence is not-being; and thus, beings are from non-being; and at the same time it happens that they believe in non-being. And indeed, according to holy Maximus, that which is lacking in essence is not God. ^B Item, since the name "God" is, by them, declared to be the name of the operation so posited, and according to them it is an operation, and it is said that "God has substance," for this reason that which has is the operation, and the substance is that which is had; and thus it is false what they say, as if the substance has an operation, and the operation is had. On the contrary, it is most true that the operation has, and the substance is had. And since the thing had is from the thing that has, and proceeds as from a cause (for this too they say in their own faith), they will simultaneously confess that the substance is from the operation. And how do they say that the substance is the cause, but the operation is caused ^C by the substance? For this is also contrary to their own positions.

Regarding all such passages, as many as have been spoken in a more human way, that such things are stated because of the custom of discourse and human weakness, the blessed Chrysostom will suffice for us, explaining the words, "In Him was life," in the sixth homily of his exposition on John. For since from the saying, "In Him was life," it followed that one might suspect a composition in God, as if He were compounded of substance and life, he provides the reason why He said that He has substantial life. He says, therefore: "He said all these things not that we might suspect a composition, but that we might be led up little by little to the height of the dogmas. ^D For since one of the many would not easily have understood how His life is self-subsistent, he first said that which is more humble; then, having instructed him, he leads him to the more sublime. For He who said, 'That He gave Him to have life,' this same One says again, 'I am the life'; and again, 'I am the light.'" Wherefore, that light and life and beauty and goodness are not to be understood as something in something else, even if they are so spoken for the sake of those who cannot easily understand how each of these is self-subsistent. And the present passage is sufficient for

solving all the problems which they describe, saying that God has an operation and that it is something within Him; and that operation comes from the essence, and whatever other things are of that kind. It is also clear that those who are not yet able to understand life and light as self-subsistent, and the other things, belong to the category of those who are being instructed in a condescending manner in Divine Scripture, for whose sake such condescending language is used; and that theology speaks in one way to those who are beginners and being initiated, and in another way to those who are perfect. Nor should one always be learning and never understanding, or remain in the lessons of children and be left behind in perfect instruction, hearing Paul, who says, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life," and, "As many of you as are justified by the law, you are fallen from grace." Although so many expressions are contained in Divine Scripture, leading us from the lower to the higher things; for this reason, since it is impossible for all these things to be subsistent as individual realities, one must assume that all these are one subsistent reality, just as the subjects and predicates within us are, and are infinitely more according to one and the same existence.

^D The eighth cause of this corruption is that they have taken what has been said in some places by the saints concerning the essence of God as if it were about the operation, through which He is empowered and effective (for this is used interchangeably by the saints, as has been proven), according to their own will regarding the operation, which is divided from the essence of God, in the manner related above. For the great Dionysius says—and John Damascene, following him, later explained this in the same words—namely: That divine illumination and operation, being one and simple and indivisible and good-giving, while it is diversified among divisible things and bestows upon all things the preservative properties of its own nature, remains simple; for it is multiplied in divisible things indivisibly, and gathers and turns the divisible things toward its own simplicity. For all things desire it and have their existence in it, and it imparts being to all, according to how their nature is constituted; and it is the being of things that are, the life of those that live, the reason of those that exist in the manner of rational beings, and the intelligence of those that exist in the manner of intellectual beings, while it itself exists above mind, above reason, above life, and above essence.

These they use as most powerful proofs to demonstrate that the divine essence is not the producer of any of the things that are outside it, but that it is the operation or virtue, which they said differed so greatly from the essence, and was infinitely lower than it; namely, that this draws near to the creatures and preserves them, and descends lower toward the creation, and is participated in by it, and sanctifies and illuminates and dwells within and deifies those who are worthy, and is properly divinity and life and wisdom and power and inheritance.

of the saints, and the end of blessedness, and the most supreme of desirable things; wherefore he who is the heir of this is called heir of God, and all other things which were mentioned before in the first part, in which we demonstrated the faith of men from the writings they themselves put forth. They use this, therefore, to prove what has been said, being ignorant that the phrase: ^A "Divine illumination and operation, being one, becomes all things to all," was spoken concerning the divine essence, as the very words abundantly testify, which openly conform to the manner of theology in explaining the essence of God and attribute every excellence to it, just as the great Dionysius said in the book *On the Divine Names*: "God is present to all things by way of providence, and in all things everything becomes the cause of the salvation of all, while remaining in himself, and established without departure from his own identity according to one incessant power." ^B And again in the same place he says: "As it itself handed down concerning itself in the sacred Oracles, that it is the cause of all things, and principle, and essence and life, and whatever else it enumerates one by one concerning God becoming to us, as being a principle transcending every principle." For thus also the Damascene, in the twelfth chapter of his *Theological Chapters*, as it was edited from that blessed man, says: "God is the essence and principle of all things; of those that are, the essence; of those that live, the life." Therefore, what he called divine illumination and operation in those passages, in these he calls God; ^C according to what, truly, Gregory of Nyssa thinks in his *Oration against the Greeks*, while speaking thus: "But if the name of God is one signifying essence, and we confess one essence of the holy Trinity, we rightly sense one God: since the one name of one essence is God." It is clear, therefore, that this, "Divine illumination and operation, being one and simple and indivisible," is said concerning the divine essence. For thus also the divine Maximus said concerning it: "The super-goodness itself, being mind and total operation or power, is a power or operation turned into itself." ^D To grasp these things in a general outline, these were the causes of this corruption, and this is what they suffered, wishing the light that is visible, which they fashioned for themselves, to confirm Godhead and God; and the true light, and the most supreme of desirable things, they posited not as essence of God, nor as person, but as operation, and the whole operation itself; which, whether they amassed for themselves from the delusions of some once-called Massalians—who, formerly blaspheming that the essence of God was visible, then, being convicted by the catholic synod, found a refuge for their heresy in that the essence of God was not visible to them, but that an uncreated light was seen, existing from eternity in God, not being Essence of God, nor Person, but Operation—or from some monks, feigning virtue, irrational and deluded, [(16)], thinking the Divine to be

tangible and perceptible to the senses, who, sitting in a dark corner, resting their chin on their chest, and fixing their physical eye—together with their whole mind—in the middle of their belly, that is, toward the navel, and holding the breath drawn through the nostrils so as not to breathe freely, they search within their innards to find the place of the heart, and apply themselves to this task night and day. For they say that thus they find ceaseless and unending gladness, and that the mind straightway sees what it never knew before. For it sees the air between the heart and itself, and beholds itself as entirely luminous and full of discernment.

Whether, therefore, from this source or that, or from within themselves, they obtained such abundance of this light, I leave to others to discuss; for not a few things have been written about them. But what has been said by us is clear, and manifest from what is said ^B in his discourse *On Watchfulness and Attention* by a certain Symeon, who was superior of the monastery called Xyloceri, to whom also the title "New Theologian" was given by those who are initiates and guides in such matters. And yet Palamas himself, in one of the fourth discourses which he designated as "Earlier," says these things: "By reason of the transgression, the inner man is naturally disposed to be conformed to the outer gestures. How, then, would one not bring about a great achievement in the one who hastens to turn the mind in upon itself, so that it might move not in a straight line, but in a circular and unerring motion, by not casting the eye hither and thither, but, as if by some support, fixing it upon his own chest or navel? For in addition to winding itself in a circle, as it were, externally, as much as is possible, in a way similar to the motion of the mind being cultivated within, it also sends the power of the mind, which is received through vision, into the heart through such a bodily posture."

Such ceaseless gladness, then, and these lights, and the whole stage-play of such things, this man also, as it seems, ^C praised and deified; wherefore in his letter to Menas he says these things: "If anyone does not receive the exultation of the saving Jesus—which the Fathers in many places have called the 'leaping' of a soul in motion, a breathing power, and an impulse of a living heart—such a one, I think, has not yet felt its force." And again: "But the divine Isaiah, what kind of Spirit does he say we must receive and bring forth? Is it not that of the Lord Jesus, who works in fire among the faithful, and fulfills salvation? And what fire scourges the demons and puts them to flight?" ^D

I have now refuted and continue to refute these errors of Symeon (or whoever they may be), because they are too closely related to the error of the Messalians, and are not sufficiently derived from the majesty of God; and even if they are understood as referring to some sensible presence of Him, which they call light, they are not to be understood as a vision of His true Essence, nor of His power. Instead, let our senses be gathered, and the force and thought of our mind be concentrated, so that we may hear God speaking to the ear of our heart and, if He grants it, obtain some sense of His presence; yet not with that affection and certainty of outcome that they demand, but rather with modesty of sense and compunction.

^A And, as the divine Father John says: Is it not that of our Lord Jesus which is kindled within in his memory? Moreover, the odor of the Most High, what other is it, if not the fervor of the Holy Spirit, which also sometimes proceeds in an ineffable way through the nostrils? These things, indeed, in his discourses concerning the light, which he entitles *Prior* and *Posterior*, he explains in this way: "They claim to see this light itself in the hypostasis and subsisting spiritually, as that which truly has existence, and is not symbolic; for it is always existing," and what follows. These things have indeed been said before in the first book, where we showed the faith of these men.

^B But being refuted by some on these points—as clearly asserting that the essence of God is visible to the eyes and sensible to the breath—in order to avoid an absurdity, as he supposed, he attempted to heal the blasphemy with a worse evil; and he dares to divide the supernatural existence of God, the supra-unitary unity, by a distinct real division into essence and operation, or rather, [he dares to divide it] into operations. And he says in one of the aforementioned discourses that this light is not indeed the essence of God; for that cannot be touched. It is not an angel, for it bears the characters of the Lord. And again: "This light was a vision, not of the divine nature, but of the glory of His nature, which the Lord also gave to the disciples and through them to all who believe in Him." And after a few words: "Wherefore He even gave to human nature the glory of the Deity, but not the nature; therefore the nature of God is one thing, and the glory of this is another." But even if it is different from the divine nature, it should not have been numbered among created things. And that he might confirm his faith with such discourses, he uses the light which shone forth in the transformation of the Lord, and discusses that same light in various places in his discourses; ^C following in whose footsteps, the synod which we mentioned above confirmed the faith. For this reason they offended many, being driven into error by the causes I have mentioned; especially indeed by the homonymy of terms and the different acceptations of them, from which it happened that not only did they badly understand the name of operation, which is of such a kind and homonymous, as has been shown, and voluntarily blinded themselves to the clear truth, but they also [did the same] regarding the name of power, and goodness, and life, and wisdom—and of self-life and self-wisdom, and providence and will; from which, just as in darkness and confusion discerning nothing, they proceeded against the common faith and against themselves, concluding things worthy of the abyss.

^D And it is clear (for a few things must be said, having taken them up for the sake of demonstrating the error and perverse exposition of these Arians), St. Maximus says in the twenty-fifth chapter of the third Century on Charity: "That God, because of His supreme goodness, made common four divine properties, which have the power to contain and guard and preserve created beings, by producing into the nature of things a substance partaking of reason and intelligence; namely, that which is, and always is, goodness, and wisdom." And of these He bestowed two upon the essence: that which is, and that which always is;

so that what He is by essence, the creature might become by participation. For this reason, the creature is said to be made to the image and likeness of God: to the image, inasmuch as He is, and inasmuch as He always is—if not without *beginning*, then at least without end; but to the likeness, as the good is to the Good, and the wise is to the Wise—that which is by grace being related to that which is by nature. And every nature that uses reason is to the image of God, but only that which is good and wise is to His likeness. The same author says in the same places: "All things that are immortal, and immortality itself; and all things that are good, and goodness itself; and all things endowed with virtue, and virtue itself, are manifestly the works of God." And after a few words: "For God is the maker of all life and immortality, and of holiness and virtue." It is clear from these words that when this saint says in those same chapters that God ^B stands infinitely infinite degrees above all participants and things participated, he is looking toward these creatures and these perfections which we possess from God by grace, and by a kind of likeness, and by another manner of naming, and of which we are participants, just as things made by an artist are related to the artist. Thus, he calls the subjects themselves the participants, but he calls those things which are connatural and proper to us the things participated; for by grace, through the intercourse granted to us, we are called good, wise, just, and immortal, and we are said to be such as always to exist, in that for us there shall be no end. For it is not by the same goodness, wisdom, and immortality that we and God are good, wise, and immortal. Therefore, he rightly said that God excels these things infinitely infinite degrees, as being the effects proper to Him, but certainly not that He excels His own wisdom, life, and immortality infinitely infinite degrees, as they understood it. For this would be to say that He is superior to Himself; yet nothing is superior to itself, especially not infinitely infinite degrees.

Again, the great Dionysius says in *The Divine Names*: "It is not contradictory to call God virtue itself or power itself, or life itself, and also to call Him the maker of life, or peace, or power." For on the one hand, He is called these things as the author of all that exists, from those things which are, and especially from those which are primarily; but on the other hand, He is called these things as He who is above all, and who superessentially superexists above even those things which are primarily. And again: "We call Him self-being, self-life, and self-deity, according to the reason of principle, divinity, and cause, as the one principle of all, exceeding every principle and every essence, as principle and cause; but by participation, which comes from God—of whom there is no participation—there emanate from the reasons of providence the virtues, the power of essence, of life, and of deification; by the intercourse with which, according to a manner appropriate to them, those things that are, are, and are called beings, and living, and divine, and other things likewise." Therefore, the Good is said to be first the maker of these things themselves, then of the universals themselves, then of the particulars thereof; and then of those things which ^D [index: entries preserved]

^A some of our divine teachers call the maker of the goodness-in-itself and the divinity-in-itself, the one who is beyond goodness and beyond deity; saying that the goodness-in-itself and the deity-in-itself are the goodness-making and deity-making gifts that have come forth gratuitously from God. The divine Maximus, annotating all these things in his Scholia upon them, among other things says this as well: "When you hear of ‘inferior deities,’ understand them to be angels and just men."

And the holy Dionysius himself in the same works defines it thus: "I do not say that the Good is one thing and Being another, and Life or Wisdom another; nor are there many causes, nor do some deities produce others, being superior or inferior." That the aforementioned things are outside of God ^B and for this reason the saint considers them to be created, and posits God as their maker, is clear also from those who composed the *Dogmatic Panoply* (17); for they interpreted the word “maker” in place of “creator”; for so it has been paraphrased there. He shows this also by speaking as follows: "The One who is, is the maker and creator by power, being an essence beyond essence, of the whole of being." He says "of the whole of being," certainly not of his own being.

It is worth noting that whatever the holy Maximus spoke of as participations of beings—virtue, goodness, life, wisdom, that which is, that which is always, and infinity—and the rest—which, as he himself said, were brought into existence and created, and which the creation has by participation—the great Dionysius seems to call goodness-in-itself, life-in-itself, wisdom-in-itself, maker-in-itself, creator-in-itself. ^C Hence also the first of them is called maker, then of the universals themselves, then of their particulars, where indeed some of our divine teachers speak of the one who is beyond goodness and beyond deity as the maker of the goodness-in-itself and the deity-in-itself, or [they call] the goodness-in-itself and the deity-in-itself, which are beyond goodness and beyond deity, the maker [and] creator.

(17) The *Dogmatic Panoply*. I suppose that it is that *Tomus* of Palamas of which he so often speaks and calls “the faith”: which exhibition of faith they issued in that erratic synod of Callistus, and seemed to themselves to approve by the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers. Beautiful are those things which Calecas pursues from Dionysius and Maximus, his interpreter, concerning participations, or concerning the abstract and the concrete, concerning forms and those things having them, ^D metaphysically and rationally, by which he refutes the dreams of the Palamites and discloses the true sense of Dionysius, in which he speaks so metaphysically, in both the affirmative and negative theology. But this must be observed more carefully in the Scholia of Maximus themselves, which are to be produced by us, much more complete and emended, in which and in other sentences of Maximus exist the clear and immaculate seeds of a sounder theology and a true scholasticism. Yet it is pleasing in advance to cull something here also (where there is so much of Dionysius and of Maximus). Which [the text] of Lancel and Cord. has thus: emended from the Sandionysian [manuscript] and our own of Saint Hilary, Sarrac., and others, and here in the Greek: "First of the forms," which are said to be the participations themselves, and of the universals [of them], and then of the particulars (which words Cord. omitted in his version), God is called the creator, because these natures are of course prior to those which participate in them; all of which Calecas himself, having followed Maximus, explains excellently. In what follows, the same Cord. is immediately happier, who was able to fetch better things, even from his companion Linselius. That [index: entries preserved]

^A essence, αὐτοεἶναι (being-itself), and things similar to these. He names these things in this way because he separates these participations from those that participate, and considers them in themselves by subtle thought without a subject; for example, power apart from the powerful, and wisdom apart from the wise, and life apart from the living, he calls each one of them itself, for example, power-itself, as if this alone were pure and clean power, and life-itself; and similarly also the others; just as he also calls human-nature-itself and whiteness-itself, which are predicated without subjects, things that are primarily, because by nature the participations are prior to the beings and the participants. Therefore, he also says that God is the producer of all these things together, not because they are prior to the things named from them in time, but because they are prior by nature; for these do not have being in themselves, but in others. Then he says that he is the cause of each of the universal participations; then of each of the particular ones. And in the case of the participants, doing the same, he says that God is the cause first of those that participate in them generally, and then of those that participate in them particularly. For the intellect, by removing the participations from the participants, first considers them as participations, then as such and such participations; for example, goodness-itself, wisdom-itself, or however else, then as the wisdom-itself and goodness-itself of this or that. He says, therefore, that God is named from the things that are, for example, powerful, wise, just, and most especially from the things that are primarily; for example, power-itself, wisdom-itself, justice-itself; for these are prior by nature, not by time; wherefore, as being prior by nature, he is primarily said to be their producer and creator as one who generates them; then of the species themselves; then of the individuals. Therefore he says, ^B "These indeed are named from the things that are, and especially from those that are primarily; but those that are beyond life-itself, beyond wisdom-itself, beyond goodness-itself, as producer and creator of all things, [are] beyond all things and those that are primarily." Wherefore, if we call both these and God life-itself, wisdom-itself, and power-itself, yet he is so fundamentally, divinely, and causally, as the one supra-originary and supra-essential beginning and cause of all; but participatively, or rather causally, those powers derive from the unparticipated [beginning] as providential forces. Just as, therefore, from the participant created beings God is named wise, or good, or just; so also from the participations, which are created, for example from wisdom-itself and justice-itself, he is called wisdom-itself and justice-itself, as their author, ^C according to the force of theology, which relies on the reasoning of causality; and again [he is] above wisdom-itself, above justice-itself, according to the apophatic [theology], insofar as he is nothing at all of the things that are. It is manifest, therefore, from the things that have been said, that all life and holiness and simplicity and virtue and goodness and wisdom are called, in relation to us, natural participations; but in relation to God, as things that participate insofar as they are artificial, ^D [by way of] the pro-

-^Aduction after His likeness, and sharing the same name as Him. And since God is neither known nor named from the goodness, immortality, and wisdom that are within Him, but from those things which are in us—which are also spoken of in relation to Him, just as our own possessions and works, whether results or indeed energies, are spoken of in relation to us—for we do not gather [knowledge] from those things that are *of* Him, but from those things that are *around* Him, gathering one representation from another, we arrive at some lean image of the truth, as the Theologian Gregory ^B states (18). For this reason, His goodness, wisdom, and simplicity are also called His works by Saint Maximus. Furthermore, [they are said] to be considered regarding Him essentially, as energies; and "essentially" because He shows that these things are God Himself, not by participation, but according to His own essence—wisdom, goodness, life, and the rest, uniformly and unitively.

Proinde, those things which are called participations of God: some indeed are natural, which are created; others are exemplary and, as it were, artificial, which are He Himself; and these are uncreated, which He possesses just as He possesses Himself. And these natural participations of God are called by Saint Maximus "works" that are not begun in time; not that every life exists in Him essentially, or realiter—that is, in itself vegetable and irrational, and rational and intelligent—but according to its own rationale, on account of the rationales in God that are without beginning, which never began in Him; but, as has been said, ^C He possesses them, as He possesses Himself. And just as the lives, simplicities, and infinities in us are called "without beginning" because of those beginningless rationales of them in God, so the life, simplicity, infinity, and immortality in God are said to be essentially regarding God because of the things around Him—that is, the natural participations—from which it comes to pass that we understand what He is, as if [these were] around Him, according to the manner of our own intellect. Nor is it necessary to attribute the manner of our intellect to God; for we do not attribute immateriality to a stone, even though we understand it immaterially.

Præterea, it is manifest that the divinity in us is created. For if there are many gods and lords, as Paul says, beside the one who is ^D God and Lord by nature, it is manifest that their divinity is also a perfection proper to them, in terms of "more and less," and as it were a quality and habit bestowed by God for the constitution and perfection of the rational nature, and for the accurate forming of the likeness and image. For God has given us the gift of being able to be deified and to be made good, and to approach Him by way of imitation; for "Be," He says, "merciful, as your Father is celestial" (Luc. vi, 36); and, "Be imitators of God, as beloved children" (Ephes. v, 1); the which He planted in our souls as a kind of seed of our

^A reformation, whom the Author of all things implanted in our minds, who created us in His own image and likeness; and this is a connatural principle in us, by which we may become gods and good; and it is called the first among the gifts of God, as it becomes for us, if we will, the starting point of many goods. For the blessed Dionysius posits the likeness of the goods that are in us from God as the first, and he says that God towers over this very likeness, and over the things that are likened or imitate, and over the very participant of the gift, and over every participation that is spoken of. For just as He is said to be superessential, above every created essence, not that He towers above His own essence, so also is He above principle and above God, and above the principle of goodness and of divinity, as being above every principle and cause of our perfection in any way whatsoever, and above all those who are gods by grace, and above all their divinity, and every gift and grace which belongs to us and exists in accordance with our nature.

^B The occasion, therefore, or the reason and the gift, whereby we are able to become gods and good, has been called the Divine-Principle and Good-Principle; and it follows that this ^C Divine-Principle is coeval with us, and therefore created, and is a habit in our soul, produced by the God of all; in a catachrestic sense, it is an efficient principle proximately, just as the foundational fear is called the principle of love toward God; but properly speaking, it is a formal principle, befitting our rational nature for the attainment of its perfection. And thus God is the efficient principle of divinity and goodness: for, according to Dionysius, "Form is in those things which lack form, as a figure and a principle." But that which is called the principle of divinity and goodness in us is a formal principle, by which we are gods and good. But God towers over this, as one who is devoid of form amidst forms, and superior to form. Wherefore also God, from these as from created things, is praiseworthily affirmed as their author; and of Him again, as One who towers over them, these things are denied. Therefore, this divinity is rightly also called a gift, by which we are made gods and good, to Dionysius, in the Epistle to the monk Caius, who asks: "How is He who is above all things even above the principle of divinity and goodness?" To whom he responds, saying: "If you understand divinity and goodness as the very thing of the wonder-working and deifying gift by which we are deified and made good," and what follows.

^D According to that, therefore, according to which something is rendered such, according to this it is also specified, and to it belongs that which is specified, and to it is both its proper and its commensurate [element] according to its reason, and this is imitation. And that imitation of God, by the power of that gift, than which there is no greater gift to us from God, by which we are made like unto God, as has been said, as far as it is possible, effectively, is called form and species to those who imitate; and with respect to this, in so far as they imitate, they are naturally constituted; and the imitation itself, inasmuch as it does not attain to the archetype at which it aims, is called by the great Dionysius an inimitable imitation; that is to say, an imitation that does not imitate its

archetype as it is able. For while an energy may indeed imitate an essence, it cannot reach out to imitate anything other than creatures. Wherefore, God is beyond them. He adds, therefore, "Inasmuch as He is inimitable" ^A and independent, He excels all the imitations and relations, and all those who imitate and participate.

But this imitation has also been called "deifying," either because through it we have become "gods by grace" and preserve our likeness unharmed, or because it is the cause and reason that we become such. Just as divine baptism is continuously called a deifying gift, and Dionysius calls the words of Scripture "deifying lights."

If, therefore, the Theoarchy and the Good-archy is an imitation of those who imitate God, and is a participation of those who participate, occurring by way of imitation—whereof God stands above all—it is evident that it is created. For, according to the great Basil: ^B "Things after God are creatures and our fellow-servants, even if some happen to be preferred as more noble than others."

Furthermore, from what has been said, it is evident that the name of "providential power" is also equivocal. For God is indeed a providential power, just as He is a creative power—the substance and power of all things. But there are also the aforementioned providential powers that have subsisted from God—I mean the natural participations, and all that the divine Maximus called the "preserving and guarding" powers of beings: those that are consubstantial and specific to each, and proper to them; ^C when these are removed, those things which participate in them fall from their proper and natural order. Indeed, even the air is to be considered a participation, being poured out for our breathing so that we may sustain our life. And we understand the senses to be providential and saving powers of the things that are within us; and also medicine, and legislation, and, in short, every virtue, science, and art.

Moreover, regarding the fear of God and other things given by God to man when human nature, in and of itself, is at a loss, for the attainment of higher things—whether you call it a spirit of wisdom, or a spirit of ^D knowledge and strength, and things of that kind—one would not be wrong to declare them providential powers coming forth to us from God.

But since "Providence" is spoken of as God Himself who provides—and there also exists, according to the holy Maximus and Damascene, the care bestowed by God upon existing things—and the great Athanasius, in his work against the Greeks...

says: Through the incarnation of God the Word, the providence of all things was made known, and the dispenser and creator of this, the Word of God himself; and since the Word ^A showed in few words that the stated participations—which the mind, dividing by subtle thought from the things that participate, calls each one a “something”—are joined to created things; for this reason the divine Maximus rightly said, "God is infinitely and beyond all measure exalted above all things that participate and that are participated in." And the divine Dionysius, solving the doubt and question from himself, as to what he considers the divinity itself, and the kingdom, and the lordship, and the deity, and what the doubling of names implies to him—for instance, why God is called the “self-holiness” of holinesses, and “self-deity” of deities, and other such things—adds the solution: "For in as much as holy, or divine, or lordly, or royal things excel those which are not, and again, in as much as the self-participations excel those who participate, by so much is He who is above all things exalted above all beings, and is the unparticipated Cause of all things that participate and are participated in."

Truly, if those things which are called "first beings" by the holy Dionysius were to subsist in God, and were uncreated, and differed in existence, God would by no means be acknowledged by all as one thing and one being, unless perhaps such a one as those things which, from many, are one by the participation of the One. ^B Nor would God be called their creator, or producer; for if He is these things in Himself, He would also be the creator of Himself. Nor would any of them be called older than the others, and the more particular and more universal would be discerned in them, according to the nature of genera and species; for that which has something older than itself is neither uncreated nor eternal. For thus the same doctor says: "The first gift of His 'to be,' when His super-abundant goodness brings it forth, is rightly praised as being older and the first of participations." Therefore, it would not be said concerning them that they themselves participate in existence. For that which exists primarily does not participate in anything. Thus he says: "For indeed, the principles exist, and they exist primarily, and then they are principles." And if you wish to name the principle of living things, as living, "self-life"; and of similar things, as similar, "self-likeness"; and of united things, as united, "self-union"; and of ordered things, as ordered, "self-order"; ^C and of the others, as many as are said to be this or that, or both, or many, by participating in this or that, you will find that these self-participations participate in existence primarily; and by existing primarily, they are first; then, being principles of this or that; and by participating in existence, they are both existing and participated. It would not be said concerning those that participate and the participations, that the Cause, where He is established, ^D participates in of the participations.

^A Understand also the principles of beings, those which have primarily subsisted in creation; and do not think that beings participate in these according to their own nature; for "according to one's own nature" denotes what is natural. ^B Indeed, this would not even have been said concerning them by the blessed Dionysius, that these are more princely among beings, and that they are not properly said to be primarily. For he adds as follows: "But if the philosopher Clement also claims that those things which are more princely among beings are called paradigms relative to something, his discourse does not proceed by way of precise, complete, and simple names. But if we concede that this also is rightly said, it is necessary to remember theology, which says: 'I did not show these to you that you might go after them,' but that by way of a proportional knowledge of these, we might be led up, as much as possible, to the Cause of all." See that the saint clearly wishes to indicate in these words that one ought not to go after these, nor worship them as uncreated; for they are images and likenesses of the primarily existing paradigms, which God Himself is; for He has these, as He has Himself, and He is in them; they are not things other than Himself; through which likenesses and images, indeed, we are led up proportionally to the first Cause. ^C But if these too were uncreated, they would also be called paradigms, and would be said, absolutely and properly, to be primarily. And what is greater: if these—which God excels so much—are in God and are uncreated, it follows that those things which are in God are, as the new theologians assert, neither beings, nor holy, nor lordly, nor royal; and the essence of God the Father will have in itself things natural, as if compared to a non-being, which even they themselves confess, and as something holy compared to things not holy. But not even the devil himself would say that there is in God anything not holy, nor lordly, nor royal. For it is the same thing as to blaspheme that there is in God anything unclean, servile, and enslaved.

Nevertheless, these men, having found in the things said the name of Divinity, and of self-life, and of ^D that which is to be honored and worshipped as we have received from Scripture, deservedly theology, because it has thus shown the paradigms as the pattern of the work, and because it is forbidden to go after idols, does not teach that we should go after these paradigms themselves: that is, that we should worship them. And thus, Pachymeres cleverly declares in his paraphrase when he says: "The Father says, therefore, that even if he called the intelligible things the paradigms of the sensible things (for see, he says, 'You shall make according to the pattern shown to you'), yet those intelligible things are not such paradigms as are also to be worshipped, as are the divine wills; but those also are created things, and we must also hear concerning them, just as Moses said concerning the sensible things, as if from God: 'I did not show these to you that you might go after them.'" And thus, the Father, even if he also called the intelligible things the paradigms of the sensible ones (for "See," he says, "make according to the pattern shown to you"), yet those intelligible things are not such paradigms as are also to be worshipped, as are the divine wills; but those also are created things, and we must also hear concerning them, just as Moses said concerning the sensible things, as if from God: "I did not show these to you that you might go after them."

^A And, having been hampered by such homonyms, and if any such thing has been said mistakenly or in a more human fashion, they have confirmed what was said above—things which are as much at odds with the true mind of the saints as light is opposed to darkness. And because they reached conclusions worthy of such pits, they have confirmed the faith previously set forth by themselves, paying no regard to the common and noteworthy concepts concerning God, nor to Scripture, nor even to the teachers. ^B In the same way, they explained all the sayings of the saints which they used in the *Tomus*; for instance, that saying of the great Athanasius, who stated that "the name 'God' is secondary by nature," failing to understand here too that, since there is no name or definition of the essence of God—that is, something representing what it is—we attribute to God all names in a secondary sense, gathered from the effects, from which we grasp that He is wise, powerful, and just. For this reason, the great Athanasius said the name "God" is secondary: either because He was invoked as God afterward, when humans were brought into the nature of things from non-being. But they say that the operation signified by the name "God" is secondary to the essence, although the theologians say that God is eternal essence, the creator and author of all things; misusing and perversely distorting the words of the great ^C Basil, who said in his *Refutations*: "There is some kind of order," and added: "In these, therefore, we call the author 'prior,' and that which is from the author 'secondary'"; not understanding that the terms "prior" and "secondary" do not introduce a difference of natures or of disparate things, when they are not considered in terms of time, but only in terms of the author, that which is from the author, and that very order itself—just as it is in the case of God the Father and the Son. And that Basil used the stated words when speaking of the order which the divine persons, Father and Son, have toward one another; certainly not to signify a distinction of essence and operation or power, as Palamas misused [them]. But if they do not [admit this], let them grant the inalterability of essence and operation, as it is in the case of the Father and the Son, seeing that their substance is one; and then let them make a distinction according to author and that which is from the author. ^D Or rather, they will be compelled to face one of two things: either to distinguish the Father and the Son by a distinction of essence and operation, as they themselves say, or else to confess the operation or power to be an essence and a subsistent person, consubstantial with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Again, when the great Athanasius said against the Arians: "If they attribute volition to God regarding things that are not, why do they not acknowledge that which is superior to volition in God? And that just as that which is against one's mind and counsel is opposed to volition, so that which is according to nature precedes and takes precedence over volition"—from these words they conclude, as has been said before, that the divine essence bears the same relation to the divine operation. Thus, here too, they did not understand the same thing regarding different matters, which...

^A are said to be effects from a cause, being named in various ways in relation to them. Just as one and the same man, to speak by way of example, is called both father and builder, and general—if it so happens—by regarding the effects and those things that are from him; yet, by one reason he is called father, as by nature and kind, and the cause within the same kind; but by another reason he is called a cause, as an artisan. Thus, God and Father also (to weigh great things in a brief discourse), regarding the Son and the Spirit, relates as nature; but regarding creatures, He is spoken of along with the Son and the Spirit as will or volition. For regarding things that are possible to come to be and not to come to be—I mean those things which are spoken of as being of the will or volition—the will is called the cause. And since nature is always directed toward one thing, as toward its proper end—for fire generates fire, and man generates man—but the things that depend on volition are many and various; for this reason the Father always generates the Son and proceeds the Holy Spirit, without beginning and without end; but the creatures, the one God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as one will, bring forth the effects according to the time determined by His own will.

^B Secondly, that which the theologians say escaped them: “That it is a greater thing for the Father to be the begetter of His own Son and the producer of the Spirit than to be the maker of creation.” For, in general, in all things, the end of nature and of the species is greater than that of art. For these reasons, since the Arians called God and Father a maker and artisan, but in no way a Father by nature, the saint said: “If they concede that which is less in dignity, why do they not grant the greater? And if they perceive the cause and maker to be by will, why do they not attribute to God that which is more excellent in dignity and superior—that which is by nature?” For just as among things that are from a cause there is something greater and something lesser, so also in the names by which these are expressed, we consider some to be more noble and venerable than others.

^C Again, since the great Basil in his writings to Amphilochius has said thus: “So that even if you conceive of something beyond the ages, this too exists below the Spirit.” They themselves in the Tome think that the things beyond the ages are pre-eternal; and that the things before the ages are uncreated, of which he called the Holy Spirit superior. And from these, as has been said, they conclude that the divine operation is below the divine Essence. For they did not know that this is what the saint desires, that not only have these creatures been created by the Holy Spirit along with the Father and the Son, as one God, but also many more than these; and furthermore, if it is possible, by rising in the mind, to conceive even beyond those ages themselves, of which God is the maker, to imagine creatures and effects, whatever the imagination might suggest, even above these is the Holy Spirit, and He is able to create all these things; for He is God, consubstantial with the Father and the Word. Therefore he also said, “Even if you conceive of something beyond the ages, this too exists ^D below the Spirit.”

And those things that are outside the Spirit are also subservient to us, however much they may be more noble than others by greater excellence and eminence.

Rursusque dicente divo Dionysio: ^B And again, when the divine Dionysios says that divine minds are moved circularly while they are united to the splendors of the Beautiful and the Good, which lack beginning and end, they [the adversaries] inferred from this that there are certain powers and deifications that lack beginning, and they even pronounced that those who are deified are without beginning and uncreated. Now, that the angels will have no end is a belief held by all; but how could anyone believe that those who obtained a beginning of existence and were created in time are without beginning? Therefore, they misunderstood the holy man here, thinking that he meant the movements and perceptions of the angels regarding God. For he adds: “Whether one should call them receptions or perceptions.” And because these perceptions, knowledges, and illuminations conclude from the same [source] to the same, and revolve around God, he said they were moved circularly; and because they are around that which is without beginning and end, he says they are without beginning and end. And they are called [perceptions] of the Beautiful and the Good, either because the angels obtained them from the First Beautiful and Good, just as a creation is called [a creation] of the Beautiful and the Good, or because they are referred to the Beautiful and the Good and are images of the Beautiful and the Good.

^C Since, therefore, the saint called these illuminations (as if they were apprehensions and considerations of the mind), it is manifest that these illuminations are not something uncreated in God, but are knowledges concerning God, as has been said, by which some are united to Him more, and others less. Even if he were to call them eternal, one ought not to be disturbed by the argument of “lacking a beginning.” For the blessed angels always have these perceptions without any interruption. For, he says, “They always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.” Furthermore, the addition of “circularly” does not allow them to be without beginning, as they interpreted it. For God is not without beginning and end in the manner of a circle, but absolutely and indefinitely. In the same way, they also misinterpreted the other sayings of the holy doctors which they used in their Tome, and by perverting them wickedly, they confirmed their own novelty; although they not only openly oppose the saints, but also clash with themselves. For falsehood, as they say, fights against both the truth and itself. For how is it possible that what is infinitely ^D inferior to the Essence of God can again be inseparable from it, as they claim? For how can it be that from the essence, not being life, [could it be produced...?]

beforehand, just as it is said concerning the Father and the Son, life from life, and light from light. And how is that which is inferior to these properly called Deity, and this ^A even though it is neither essence nor hypostasis? How, moreover, is this very thing, which is strictly Deity, motion in God? And how is it an "operated thing"? For that which is operated is also generated and produced. But to be generated and to come to be is spoken of in relation to matter and form, in which there is room for potentiality, motion, and generation. And how is there in God that which is non-existent? For this is what it is—neither essence, nor hypostasis, nor even an accident. And yet, the great Basil says in his fourth book *Against Eunomius*, that the unbegotten in God is either essence or an accident. For there is nothing else besides these. ^B So, if he had known that there was a third thing besides essence and accident—namely, operation—he would not have omitted it in this division. And how do they call "a thing" that which is neither essence, nor hypostasis, nor even an accident? And how, from that which is subsistent, [do they derive] that which is non-subsistent and without essence? But Gregory of Nyssa in the books *Against Eunomius* said, "What is devoid of substance is not God."

And again, this monstrosity of the new doctrines is to believe in nothingness. But what reason is there for introducing that which is not subsistent in itself and lacks substance as the creator and author of subsistent things, and for calling it the highest of desirable things, the end of beatitude, and the inheritance of the saints? ^C And how, again, do they proclaim that which is without essence and without hypostasis to be natural, or even the natural properties of God? And yet, as the natural properties of something are, so necessarily must that which proceeds from the natural properties be. How is it not a manifest contradiction to say that the essence of God is at one time immovable, and at another time operating and the cause of operation? For that which operates and is a cause is endowed with the power of moving and operating. How, then, is it said to be immovable? And how do they say that the natural properties of God are visible of themselves, but the essence is invisible; and this when Paul says, *Now we see in a glass, in a dark speech; but then face to face*; and, *The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal*?

And I pass over saying that it is not holy, ^D nor divine, nor kingly—as they say, O, what temerity and brazen audacity!—for it to be natural, uncreated, and co-eternal with Him in God. When they say these things, and utter such blasphemies, and are carried away in such a manner—things for which they ought to feel shame and hide their faces—they proceed even further and slander those who do not comply with their blasphemies, saying that they contradict the sixth ecumenical council,

^A for it is said in that council regarding Christ that he is perfect God and perfect man, and that we know each operation of each nature, proceeding indivisibly from each substance and nature. They think that from these words they can conclude their own position, neither knowing what they are saying nor understanding concerning what they affirm. But although I could say much about this, I shall mention only one point, which may suffice for the more stubborn.

No one struggles and defends more clearly and courageously than the divine Maximus the fact that in God substance and operation are the same. For what does he say? "Whether we call God substance, he is entirely substance, and only that; whether we call him intellection, or operation, he is entirely operation, and only that. And existing as completely simple, he is both substance without a substrate, and intellection not possessing any substrate at all; for even things that are intelligible exist from substance and constituent difference. For all things that are after God are binary and composite; but God alone is truly simple. And everything that has something contemplated in it for the revelation of its own existence is not truly simple. And we call the works operation, not the power of the operation; for that is nothing other than the substance of God, lest composition be thought to exist in God; and, 'The substance is not separated from the operation, but receives the same definition because of the property of a simple and incorporeal nature.'" These things, brought forward from the divine Maximus and Theodore the Branded, ^B signify nothing else than that in God his operation is the same thing as his substance. But this is most contrary to the construction of the Tome. If, therefore, he who thinks these things destroys the sixth council, as they themselves babble, it is clear that the divine Maximus and Theodore the Branded also contradict it by positing that the operation is the same as the substance, as do many other of the saints before them.

But if to say these things is utterly foolish (for ^C the noble person is no small part of this council),

ion is the same as the substance, as do many other of the saints before them. But if to say these things is utterly foolish (for the noble person is no small part of this council), and he who merely thinks and [understands] the whole of God, having no subject at all, and saying everything in accordance with all that the holy fathers have taught, surely such a person does not oppose the Sixth Council. ^B For no one would dare to write off this one or that one, or any of the holy teachers one by one, without thereby challenging the whole council as well, in challenging the individuals. For it was they who made up the councils; and if one writes off an individual, he writes off them all together, and overturns all the councils together; and indeed he will make all the writings of the saints idle and useless and unworthy of belief. At the same time, he will also overturn himself, when he wishes to conclude something and invokes those very people as witnesses.

If, however, something more must be said: the council did not intend this, to show a difference between the divine substance and the divine operation, but [it intended to show] that Christ was two natures, divinity and humanity, in one hypostasis; and from this, two wills or two operations: for now He worked miracles as God, and now He operated as man, without any stain of vice; since the heretics were saying there was one nature in Christ, or one divine will—whether they blasphemed out of a confusion or because the human part had been swallowed up. ^C It is necessary, therefore, that each nature has its own operation, just as each has its own nature. And since the divine nature is simple and uniform and without quality, being capable of nothing besides itself, it is manifest that this operation also is what that [nature] is to itself. But the human [nature], while being one in subject, yet because it embraces many things, has an operation convenient to its own character.

^D But truly, neither does the preposition "from" signify a cause everywhere, nor does it introduce an author and that which is from an author. For we do not, when we say that all things are from nothing, signify that nothing is an author or a cause; for what could nothingness even bring about? Nor, when the theologians say at one time that God proceeds from Himself, and at another that the deity itself, which is truly what it is, is from itself without cause, and [say] many other things, are we forced by that preposition to divide God, as God, into a cause and that which is from a cause. As neither, when the council says that the operation proceeds from the substance, shall we understand a cause and that which is from a cause; if otherwise, many absurdities will follow.

[The remaining fragment is a comment on historical-textual censorship]: ...wipe away! Perhaps he would have made a medicine, and, something which Baronio, Sirleti, and their followers never achieved by their ingenuity, he would have erased his name from the list of condemned chapters.

am propositionem dividere, necesse habebimus. Quamobrem nec cum synodus operationem ex essentia dicit, causam et quod est ex causa intelligemus; sin autem, multa absurda sequentur. ^A It is manifest, moreover, that for there to be a real relation, two things are required. For there is no real relation of the same thing to itself, as when we say: "The same is the same as itself." Furthermore, it is necessary that those things to which the relation is directed be actual things, and not mere concepts and notions. For the relation of genus to species is one of notion, just as the genus and species themselves are, which do not subsist except in the mind. Again, these must be quantities, of the sort that "double" and "half" are; or they must be related to one another as a producing cause and that which is from the cause, such as a son to a father, or a founder or craftsman to the thing founded or made by craft, and other similar things. ^B Since, therefore, essence and operation are not the same thing in reality, as the new theologians say, nor are they mere concepts and notions, but are distinct things; and since they are not quantities, for there is no quantity in God; and since they are related to one another as cause and that which is from the cause, as the Tome asserts; and since there is nothing in God that exists bereft of substance and does not subsist, lest He be composite, according to the doctrine of the saints—it is necessary that there be more than three persons in God, and thus God will not be a Trinity, but an infinite multitude of persons, since their operations are also infinite according to their account. But it must be said, without any absurdity following from it, that the relation denoted by the preposition "from" is one of notion; and that this pertains to the account of the operation, which requires a beginning, just as it also has from the account of essence its subsisting of itself, in that it is a substance; and just as it is also the producer of life, in that it is life; and that it produces many things from nothing, in that it is the Creator; and that it acts, in that it is an operation. ^C Yet it does not follow that, because it is the same thing that receives all these things according to different aspects and relations toward existing beings, and is one and the same thing that responds to all our thoughts and names, as was said above, that these accounts concur and are confounded with one another. For even if essence has the capacity to act from the account of operation, it will not have this insofar as it is essence. For if two things are the same in reality, but are not the same in account, what follows from the account of the one does not follow from the account of the other. For instance, although the beginning and the end are the same in reality, yet the account of the beginning does not follow the account of the end, and vice versa. For the end is not that from which the line comes, nor is the beginning that into which the line goes. ^D Great Athanasius first says this, and then also the great Maximus says the same things in the dialogue against the Anomoean, when the Anomoean says: "Essence is one thing, and hypostasis or person is another," he replies: "Another and another, not as a thing." And when the Anomoean adds: "Therefore it is a composition," the holy Maximus adds: "I said 'another and another,' not as a thing, but as essence signifying one thing, and hypostasis another..."

and yet another of the hypostasis: just as the grain of wheat is called both seed and fruit, but "seed" signifies one thing, and "fruit" another. Therefore, the saint, ^A conceding that the hypostasis of the Father is essence and divinity, does not admit that there are two divinities, just as there are two hypostases; for the same thing does not signify divinity and hypostasis in the same way. For divinity, he says, signifies "what it is," while hypostasis signifies "that it is."

If, therefore, "that it is" and "what it is" are there the same, on account of supreme simplicity, yet because the hypostasis signifies the "that it is" of the same thing, and the divinity signifies the "what it is"—divinity is taken as the common [nature], for there is one divinity of the three—the definition of "that it is" is different, since with our own hypostases and persons, the definition of "what it is" is the same, but that of "that it is" is different. ^B Similarly then, concerning essence and operation: it is not because essence and operation are the same thing that what follows from the essence must necessarily follow from the operation, and vice versa; since the definition is not the same. For essence is indicated as subsisting in itself, while operation, according to our signification, is from something being; and the same thing, insofar as it subsists in itself, is called essence, but insofar as the essence is also understood as operating, it is called operation. Since, according to our conceptualization, it is necessary first for the essence to be posited as a subject, and then for it to operate. And in this way, the very operating and the operation are said to be from the essence, on account of a relation of the mind. For indeed, according to the Damascene, even the act of operating itself is called operation. ^C This, therefore, is the operation of God; it is His very essence, which is understood as operating, and which, in relation to things that exist, is called Creator, or Governor, or Providence, or something of this sort, with a relation of the mind. For things are related to God really; but God Himself is not related to things according to different things existing in Him, but by a relation of the mind, taken from created things and established in our intellect.

It is also necessary to keep in mind what was said, that much of human speech is accustomed to be spoken from the habit of our own nature. For some things are said that can be understood in a way other than how they appear to the many, just as it is the case here also, in the Acts of the sixth synod, where an "innate and substantial quality" of God ^D is spoken of, although it is clearly forbidden that qualities be spoken of in God. However, it must be stated in general that things said more crudely according to the manner of bodies and the habit of human weakness, and by a certain accommodation to it, should not be accepted so literally, but rather, by passing from the letter to the spirit, we should attain the appropriate spiritual meaning and contemplation, so that we may not hold absurd opinions about God, and set the saints at war with one another. Furthermore, to those who do not comply with the innovations

^A regarding these matters, they join that absurdity which they invent in the Tome: namely, that he who does not perceive a common, natural operation of the three hypostases is rashly attempting to introduce into the Church of God the heresy of Marcellus, Photinus, and Sophronius, which died long ago and was abolished.

Now, that the Son of God is the operation of God and the Father, and the subsistent power of God and the Father—and likewise the Holy Spirit—has been proven in the preceding pages by the utterances of the saints. But no saint has ever spoken of such an operation—neither as an essence nor as a hypostasis or person in God—as being destitute of substance, uncreated, and so distinct from and abhorrent to the essence of God as the Tome has introduced. On the contrary, they drive far away those who have spoken this, as has already been proven by many. And now, the divine Chrysostom will ^B also demonstrate this, in his explanation of the Epistle to the Philippians: "Marcellus," he says, "and Photinus and Sophronius say that the Word is an operation; and that this operation, and not a subsistent essence, dwelt in Him who is of the seed of David." Gregory of Nyssa also says: "God signifies the one operating; but Deity signifies the operation." Furthermore, no one of the three is an operation, but rather each of them is the one who operates.

Therefore, the saints eliminate such an operation, devoid of essence and non-subsistent, such as the heretics thought of; such an image of operation Eunomius set before the Son of God, calling Him a phantom of that which does not subsist. But Nyssa called the operation essence, and nature, and deity, not something else ^C beyond the essence. For such an operation admits of the same rationale as the essence, as Damascenus also signified, saying: "Deity signifies the nature, but Father signifies the hypostasis," or person. Wherefore, if Deity, as Nyssa is the author, signifies operation, but as Damascenus is the author, nature; then operation and nature are the same thing. And looking to this, Nyssa said that Deity signifies operation; not, however, as some wish, a non-subsistent operation, such as the heretics thought.

From these things it is manifest, first of all, that those who posit a common operation of the three as non-subsistent, are themselves the ones who are wrongly introducing the heresy of Marcellus, Photinus, and Sophronius. And just like those men, they too will necessarily be forced to say that the subsistent Word of God, existing in person, did ^D not take on flesh, but rather a non-subsistent operation—especially since they also say that the essence of God is incommunicable to the creation; for otherwise, it would consume the nature before it could be grasped, or would suffer admixture through communion with it. Yet they say that it is this non-subsistent operation that created all things, and sustains, and illuminates, and sanctifies, and all other things that have been said about it above.

Secondly, it is clear that they represent the essence of God as having need of this operation—the subsistent needing the non-subsistent—those who say in the Tome: "How then is it reasonable to deny the common power of the tri-hypostatic Deity, for which the Son and the Spirit are praised by the theologians as power?" From which it follows that God is not whole in his activ

operation, nor whole in his essence, nor whole in his life and wisdom and power; but he is ^A altogether, through and through, most perfect. And thirdly, that they make God composite, imperfect, finite, and circumscribed, and introduce all the absurdities previously mentioned. Although, according to the teaching of the saints, if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not subsistent in God, the divine would not be simple, but composite. For the holy Maximus says, explaining that theological dictate which says: "Therefore the monad, moved from the beginning into a dyad," he teaches that God [shows] the angelic or human mind, without division at the first approach, the reason concerning the monad, lest any division be introduced into the first Cause. But then he leads it forward to receive also His divine and ineffable fecundity, saying mystically and more secretly that one must never think that that good of the Word and ^B Wisdom, or of the sanctifying power, is sterile, since these are consubstantial and subsistent, lest the Godhead be thought composite, as if these were accidents, and not that these always exist as God Himself.

And finally, since there is nothing in God that is not subsistent, it remains of necessity that we must either confess that the many operations are many hypostases or persons, or else believe that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not subsistent; but both of these are contrary to the Catholic faith. For what reason is there, when many words, and diverse operations and powers are introduced into God as lacking essence and subsistence, [that] only the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are declared to be ^C subsistent powers? Or, of the other non-subsistent powers, as they say, what is the separation, that the Son and the Spirit are not non-subsistent according to them? Moreover, they will confess that these things, falling so far short of essence, have fallen away from that which is truly Being. Wherefore that which is super-essential, which is most peculiar to God, will suffer non-being, having this within itself. But if this is so, it will also be subject to malice. For the diminution of the name becomes an addition to evil; and from this arises that which is a privation of being. For as each thing has standing with regard to being and substance, so also it has with regard to being good. But if each of these is a God distinct ^D from the others, why do we reject the Greeks? But if it is not God, then the divine will be completed from that which is not God, and some multi-part and anomalous monster will be conceived, with so many things dissimilar to each other converging into one.

Furthermore, since the being of each thing is that which is by act, and the substantial being of each thing is one; if there are many beings by act in God, it follows that He will not have one form and species, whatever that may be, but many; or that one is His substantial form, and the others are by accident.

Besides these things, God is confessed by the faith to be three and one: one indeed according to essence, but three according to the hypostases; for in so far as they are three persons receiving number, they are not one. Therefore there remains the one according to

^A essence. But if someone were to divide this singular "one" into so many dissimilar things, according to the aforementioned antitheses of these men, he would find no indivisible "one" in God. Yet that it is indivisible, the common faith and the proposed doctrine of the saints bear witness.

Since there are many other such things which I might have brought forward to demonstrate the corruption of these men—from which they have written and openly professed their faith—and to refute their lying, by setting forth the manifest and true theology of the holy teachers, and [to show] how they have irrationally and maliciously slandered many of the sayings of the saints, and how they have not cared in the least to speak in harmony with the divine Scriptures, and into how many absurdities they are rushing, and how many things about God that have been examined and established [by the Church] are being removed by them, and how all the theology of the saints falls apart if this synodal decision has any force, and how they fall into self-contradiction in countless ways—I refrain, fearing to weary the reader with prolixity. ^B For what has been said is sufficient for those whose minds are not entirely blinded, to demonstrate that those who hold to the positions set forth in the Tome profess a faith that our Fathers did not know; that is to say, a faith alien to that which is preached by the saints in the Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ.

And, as I began by saying, since a double synod has occurred in this Church, and a double and contrary decision has been set forth regarding the question of the divine essence and operation, and it might seem obscure which of these decisions has truth as its companion (for they are contrary to each other), it has become completely certain from what has been said that the one which now prevails carries with it falsehood and holds blasphemy. ^C Consequently, the Church which constructs and proclaims these things has lost its status as the Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church, which we profess daily; and we must seek where on earth it is, since it is impossible for the Church of Christ to fail. For against the one that now professes false things concerning the faith, the gates of hell have, as they have often done before, now also prevailed shamefully.

ON FAITH AND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH ACCORDING TO THE TRADITION OF DIVINE SCRIPTURE AND THE CATHOLIC TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH, COMPOSED BY THE LATE LORD MANUEL CALECAS

ON FAITH AND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH AS WE HAVE RECEIVED THEM FROM DIVINE SCRIPTURE AND THE CATHOLIC TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH, BY THE LATE LORD MANUEL CALECAS

1. To the one who asked. 2. Concerning the one God. 3. Concerning the same one God, who is Trinity. 4. What sorts of symbols the saints have handed down regarding the Holy Trinity. 5. Concerning the incarnation of the Word of God according to the divine Scriptures. 6. Concerning the seven sacraments. 7. Furthermore, concerning the incarnation, as far as it is possible to attain by reason. 8. Concerning the future resurrection of the dead. 9. Concerning the future restoration. 10. Epilogue.

CHAPTER I. To the one who asked.

^AThe love of learning in men is praised by the wise, and especially when they desire to learn the most beautiful of subjects. For this is truly the property of a rational soul, and it alone can provide knowledge and wisdom to men, as indeed one of the ancients said: "If you are a lover of learning, you will be a lover of knowledge." For it is clear that he who is quick to learn will certainly seek, and he who seeks will find. And he who finds will also understand and know; and from this he will preserve the property of the human soul for himself, and such a one will be, and will justly be called, rational. Just as, on the other hand, he who neither seeks, nor finds, nor ^B understands anything of what is fine, falls...

^AThe desire for learning among men who possess the praise of wisdom is considered worthy of praise by all merit; and most especially when an ardor for learning those things which are most beautiful and best takes hold. For this is plainly the property of a mind that uses reason, and it alone is of such a kind that it can increase men in science and wisdom: just as someone of the ancients said in a certain place: "If you have been a lover of learning, you will obtain a wealth of knowledge." For it is clear that he who loves will surely seek, and by seeking will truly find. But he who finds will also understand and know; and hence it will come about that the property of the human soul remains intact for him; and deservedly he who is of this sort is also rational...

^A, whereas he who is not acquainted with the truth of being truly a human being falls away from this, and is compared to irrational beasts. For this reason also Christ, who is Truth itself and Wisdom itself, wishing to make us seekers after those things that are good, at one time taught, "Ask, and it shall be given to you; for everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it shall be opened"; and at another time, "Search the Scriptures." For indeed, as the blessed Paul says, "Whatever was written in former days was written for our instruction."

^B You, therefore, show from many things that you are a lover of learning: at one time by considering those who are uneducated to be such as perceive speech and wisdom as a damage to the soul; and at another time by considering it a very great loss to yourself that you have not been able to share in discourses and wisdom to the extent of your capacity. Yet that you occupy yourself with things that are of the greatest importance and profitable for the soul, even this is shown by the fact that you now seek to learn from us concerning matters pertaining to our faith as Christians. For my part, while I praise your love of learning, I do not praise this, that you have deemed us capable of fulfilling your desire. For it was worth your while to seek such things from others, men, that is, who, supported by a most pure life and daily meditation on the law of the Lord, would be able to ^C provide answers sufficient for those who inquire about such things. But as for us, being lacking in all these things, how then could we be able to teach others such things, when we ourselves stand in no less need of being taught by those who are knowledgeable? Nevertheless, deeming it not well that if someone does not possess great and abundant resources, he should therefore not provide even what he can, and at the same time wishing to comply with your request by duty of friendship, we shall endeavor, with God granting the supply, to provide to you with reverence whatever we have been able to grasp from holy Scripture and the teachers of the Church regarding the things you ask. We shall be like those drawing a few small drops from an infinite ocean, taking little thought for the elegance of diction and the beauty of words—nay, even neglecting them insofar as we are able, for the sake of clarity—but ^D aiming only at this: that the meanings may be true and most correct, fortified on every side by the words of the saints. And in this matter, the principle to be kept by us is so holy in all respects that we promise here at the very beginning to say nothing of our own that is original. We shall only contribute this, laying out what our holy Fathers mentioned, inspired by the Holy Spirit, as will be manifest from what we shall set forth; showing in each of the points made what opinion they held concerning the matter at hand, and for whatever we may say, we will bring forward the testimony and the trustworthiness of the words of the saints, so that we may not appear to be putting forward products of our own utterance.

^A For he who speaks about God speaks best, not he who gives voice to his own opinions out of his own belly, but he who matches everything with the decrees of the Divine Scripture and the interpretations of the saints, adding nothing nor subtracting from the sense. Therefore, I myself, if I did not most firmly hold the pronouncements of the saints concerning the subjects about which you have asked, would not have dared to utter even a single word—fearing on the one hand that I might myself join some view foreign to the truth regarding God, and on the other hand knowing that there is a very great danger for those who both think and speak falsely about God. For there is nothing more dangerous and more likely to lead to perdition than for someone who is wandering about God to suppose that things which do not exist, exist; just as, conversely, there is nothing more useful or more profitable than to speak the truth when one speaks about Him.

I think, moreover, that it is proper for me to discuss a few other things before the questions asked, as they are most necessary and will make the present treatise appear almost complete and perfect; and indeed, because it is not possible to sufficiently find and solve even an ordinary difficulty unless one recurs to certain more universal points and those proper to the subjects before us, so that through those, we might proceed by a way and order to the things inquired after.

CHAPTER II. De Deo uno.

^B We believe and confess that there is one and only one true God of the universe: without beginning, without end, eternal, indestructible, immortal, omnipotent, infinite, invisible, nameless, uncircumscribed, incorporeal, good, simple, wanting in nothing, most perfect. For we are taught by Him in the old law: ^C *Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God, the Lord is one* (Deut. vi, 2). And: *There shall be no other gods for you besides me* (ibid. 15). And again through Isaiah the prophet: *I am the first God, and I [am] after these. Before me there was no other god, and after me there shall not be; and there is none except me* (Isa. XLIV, 6; XLIII, 10). He who, out of non-existence into existence, brought forth the heaven and the earth, and all things contained within them; and before these, the incorporeal and heavenly powers—not that He could not or did not know previously, and later created these when He was able or when it came to His mind, as happens among men who are imperfect and who only slowly and by degrees arrive at the goals of perfection; but being most perfect, and always able and knowing, without any change or motion, when He willed, He created all things that He had foreordained, moved by His own goodness. He who is not known by any creature as to what He is by essence; but He alone knows Himself from Himself, as the most divine man from Damascus says: *God knows Himself from the*

^A blessed essence of His, through which and in which He made all things. That He is God, or one God, or wise, or good, or just, is known only by this; and this indeed moderately, and as much as the human mind is able, according to the analogy of its own perfection. For indeed, *no one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him*, says the Evangelist John. And *His invisible things*, according to the blessed Paul, *from the creation of the world, being understood, are seen by the things that are made*. And the great Basil, struggling against Eunomius, speaks thus: "It is reasonable to consider the essence itself unseeable to all, except to the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit; but that we, rising from the operations of God, and understanding the Creator through the things that are made, conceive a sense of His goodness and wisdom. For this is the known part of God, which He manifested to all men." Likewise, holy Maximus in his *Chapters on Charity* says: "When you are about to discourse or think about God, do not seek the reasons of Him, for the human mind cannot find them; nor indeed of any other of those things which are secondary to God, but consider those which are regarding Him, as far as is permitted by your faculty, such as eternity, infinity, immensity, goodness, and wisdom, as well as the power by which He is Creator, by which He provides, and by which He exists as Judge. For he is a great theologian among men who finds out the reasons of these things, even so far."

^B Furthermore, that the human mind cannot comprehend even the reasons of these things, this same holy man has also declared; but in his *Theological* works he teaches more clearly, saying: "One is the super-eternal and super-essential Good, the holy and three-subsistent Unity, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, an infinite conjunction and as it were a concretion of three infinitudes; which is of such a kind that it possesses a reason for its being, and how it is, and what it is, and what kind it is that is absolutely inaccessible to all beings. For it escapes every thought of those who think, exceeding all inherent natural intimacy by no means, and infinitely surpassing the knowledge of all knowledges." Here he affirms that not only is the *what* God is completely ineffable and inaccessible, but also the things regarding His nature. For whatever is said to be in God, whether it refers to the *that* He is, or to the *what* He is, or to the *how* He is, not only is the reason of the *what* He is and of His essence ineffable and unknown to us, but also the reason of the *that* He is. For although we know that there is a Father, and a Son, and a Holy Spirit, yet how this is, ^C and what kind the Paternity, and Filiation, and Procession are there, we do not know. Nor do these things reveal what God is according to essence. For the begotten and the unbegotten and the proceeding ^D regarding the nature, not

^A nature are. And indeed, that God is wise or good, we know; but what that wisdom and goodness is in Him, we are ignorant of. Well, therefore, did the saint whom I have mentioned say: That the reason for His being, and how and what and what sort it is, that divine nature keeps utterly inaccessible to existing things.

We have, therefore, the same knowledge regarding His essence and regarding all things that are in Him. For if names explained His essence, it would follow that God was most composite. For the divine Basil says, writing against Eunomius ^B, speaking of the Unbegotten as the essence of God: "How is it not altogether ridiculous to say that the creative power is the essence of God, or again that the providential power is essence, and, in a word, to posit every operation as essence?" And Gregory the Theologian says in his theological orations: "Or else that which is immortal and that which is innocent and that which is unchangeable is the essence of God. But if this be so, there will be many essences of God, and not one." God, therefore, is unnameable, and nothing of what is said about Him portrays what He is. For He is not named from what is according to Him, but from what is around ^C Him, with one image of truth being gathered from another's vision, according to the same Theologian. For God has not left us to live in utter ignorance of Himself, but, as the theologian from Damascus says, through His ineffable goodness He has willed to be named from human things, so that we might not be entirely destitute of the knowledge of Him.

For since, as we have said, He created the entire world through goodness alone, and finally fashioned man according to His own image and likeness, as the ancient Scripture teaches, so that he might rule over all visible creatures, for this reason He also fashioned him rational; we are able, using this very power ^D of reason which God has placed in us, to infer His glory and hymn-singing from visible things, and in this way to take a certain conception about God. For the world proclaims the greatness of the divine nature, and to those who pay attention, it cries out its own creator; for example, since, looking upon creatures, we understand that they are mutable and changeable, and born and grow and decay; for even the angels, though they are incorporeal and immaterial, if they are compared with the most pure simplicity of God, they too are composite; wherefore they are understood to be mutable; and the entire world is in decay. Having brought these things together, we infer as we are rational. Since all visible things are mutable and changeable, it is clear that they are also created

^A For whatever is created is changeable and mutable; and if they are created, they were certainly created by someone, and the creator of these must be uncreated and immutable. For if he too is created, it is clear that he was created by another. And again, if that one is created, he too is created by another, and this must go on to infinity until we arrive at something uncreated. If then it is uncreated, it is also immutable. And if it is immutable, this is admittedly God.

From these things, then, and again from how the world is composed of many, diverse, and opposite things, ^B yet remains in a continuous sameness of order, and such a great magnitude is preserved; for things do not hold together in this way merely by chance and at random—since neither a house nor a ship can hold together, be managed, and be saved if there is no one to steer, administer, and govern them—from these and certain other things of the same kind, we conclude with certainty that there is an uncreated and immutable God, who created all things, visible and invisible; and who, with supreme reason, carries and conducts these things as His own works with insurmountable power. And hence we believe that the world did not come into existence by chance, as some erroneously supposed.

Again, in a similar way, we argue in roughly this manner: If we say there are many gods, it is necessary to establish that they are distinct and diverse. ^C For where there is a multitude, there is also distinction or diversity and contrariety. But if we establish that they are distinct and diverse, how can it be that they are perfect? For in whatever respect one differs from another, in that respect he is inferior to the other, lacking that which is sought, and he labors under a deficiency, whether it be in wisdom, power, or some other excellence. Therefore, one will need the other, and thus they would be neither perfect nor uncircumscribed; for it is not possible that there be many things that are in themselves infinite and uncircumscribed. Per accidens, however, nothing prevents this, such as an infinite sea or infinitely spread-out spaces of plains. How then, if they are such that they need one another, can they truly be uncreated, lacking all end, and immortal gods?

Furthermore, ^D since where there is distinction and separation, there is also inequality and contrariety—if indeed they are of one mind and, though distinct and separate, are partakers of one, and are gathered into one—by a far stronger argument, that which thus unites the distinct and separate things will be God; for that which imposes order is greater and more perfect than that which receives the imposition. Nor would it turn out any differently if someone were to say that each holds a portion subject to his command (which was the opinion of the Greeks). For we shall ask: What indeed has established that these things are divided among them and has ordained that they, being thus distributed, rule over others—suppose one over the sky, another over the earth, and one over something else? For that which did [the distributing] would rather be God. But if that which is necessary…

occurs, so that between many and discrete and diverse things a battle follows, and that multitude falls into dissension with contrary impulses, the world will be dissolved, since those by whom it is ruled and governed thus act diversely and fight against themselves. From these things, therefore, we conclude that there is one God, perfect and infinite and uncircumscribed, the maker and governor of this whole universe; which the divine Scripture also clearly teaches. ^A Again, since everything which is moved is moved by another, when we examine that too, and who moves it, and this for a long time, we are forced to arrive at some thing which moves those others, but is itself moved by nothing. For the primary mover is immovable; and this is the one God, having nothing prior to himself conceived. We conclude, therefore, from this also, that God is immovable and unchangeable, having infinite power. For if he did not have this as infinite, he would not have power concurrent with his will, extending itself without weariness from end to end mightily, and graciously ordering and governing all things. ^B Moreover, if he did not possess infinite power, he would be neither infinite nor uncircumscribed nor perfect; but since he is infinite and uncircumscribed and perfect, he possesses infinite power as well; and if he possesses infinite power, he is infinite and uncircumscribed and perfect. For nothing finite has infinite power. Again, since we see that each of the things that exist consists of four elements and is dissolved into them; and furthermore, that even the elements themselves consist of matter and qualities, and are divided into them by reason and thought alone—for instance, earth into matter and the qualities existing in it, namely coldness and dryness; and to these belong weight, shape, color, and holding the middle place ^C of the universe—which indeed are the properties of those things which are composite; likewise also the others, if one were to consider them, he will find to be in the same state; wherefore they are also imperfect and divisible and composite: we declare that God is simple and indivisible and perfection, having nothing of this sort, nor consisting of different things, just as those things which consist of elements do. For Damascene says in his theological chapters, "One must not speak of quality in God, lest we say he is composite of substance and quality." For if composition were said of God, there would also be dissolution in him. For composition is the beginning of battle; ^D and battle of division; and division of dissolution. But indeed, both the natural law and the divine Scripture teach that God is incorporeal and infinite and uncircumscribed and simple and impassible. There is, therefore, no dissolution in him; for this is alien to God. But from...

these things we conclude that God is everywhere. For to Him who is uncircumscribed and infinite and knows all things, it follows that He is present everywhere. For according to the most theological Dionysius, the Divine is impartible, whole and entirely present everywhere; and it is not divided into parts in the manner of bodies, but is whole in all things, and whole above all things. And it seems and is said to be a distinction ^B and dispersion of the one God; yet He is none the less the supreme God and super-divine God, super-essentially one God, united to Himself indivisibly within those things that are divided, and unmixed and unmultiplied among the many. And again, before this, the Scripture says: "Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." 11 Heaven is also called His throne, but the earth His footstool; by which the Scripture signifies that He is everywhere and fills all things, and that nothing falls outside His most efficacious and supreme comprehension and power.

^C Furthermore, since we see that there are living, wise, and good things in the world, and that God possesses the reasons of these within Himself as the author of all; for the Apostle says He is all things, and from Him they have come to be, and in Him they consist. 12 And as the most divine John says in the Apocalypse that one of the elders said to him: "All things were, and have come to be," 13 which the divine Maximus explains by saying that the Ideas were what "were," while the images and likenesses of the Ideas, that is, of the exemplars, were what "have come to be"; we understand that He who founded living things, and fashioned all creation in wisdom, and imbued angels and mankind with wisdom, and produced the light subject to our eyes, is Life and Light and Wisdom; and that these things shine forth there far more perfectly than in the things subject to our eyes. For the divine Dionysius says that the perfections which exist in the effects exist far more previously in the causes, and that the effects remain in their causes abundantly and essentially; ^D and that all things exist in the Author of all, even those things which are contrary to one another, held together in a singular and unified and uniform and united manner. For God, producing all things, has granted to all these—the inanimate, the plants, and the rational and irrational creatures—perfections according to their nature; and each of the beings is united to God, its own Cause, in as much as it participates in Him. They participate in Him more or less, in proportion, of course, to their own perfection; for the inanimate things participate only according to their being, plants also according to their living, and irrational creatures according to their

being, living, and sensing; but rational beings participate according to their ^A being, and living, and sensing, and reasoning; and they participate in virtue, in wisdom, in justice, and in the rest. There is also, even among rational beings, a difference and a preference. For angels are more perfect, being exempt from the union with mortal bodies; but humans are less perfect than they, enduring the evils that come from the body. Yet even these can excel one another, if, fixing their eyes upon God, they strive with intense zeal to be made like unto Him. For just as we turn toward Him, just so much are we made like Him; and just as we are made like Him, just so much do we participate in Him; and just as we participate in Him, just so much are we united to Him who is the beginningless cause of all things, and the resting-place, and the stability.

We shall not, therefore, say that the perfections in us are the same as the supreme perfection of God. For God and humans do not live by the same life, nor is He and the angels and humans wise by the same wisdom—for this is absurd—nor are we and He good by the same goodness. For it would follow that we also, in like manner to Him, are gods. For those whose perfections are equal, their essences also are equal. Therefore, God is incomparably superior to us and to all things that are in us. For we, indeed, are all things—whatever we may have—temporally and by participation; but He is eternally, and by nature, and properly, and primarily good, wise, creator, life, holiness—whatever, in fine, one might call Him—as the first cause and most ancient origin of beings. ^B And since God is by nature good, He could never be the cause of evils. For it is the property of the one who is properly good always to provide good things. But if we see certain evils coming to pass in the world, He is not the cause of these, nor is some other opposing power; but withdrawing from the good, we find ourselves in evil; and this is the genesis of evil, just as the withdrawal of light is the genesis of darkness. We ourselves, therefore, are the causes. For by provoking the passionless One through wicked works, we are punished in proportion to our sins; which things, indeed, seem to us to be evils because we do not know their causes; but if anyone should know how to judge rightly, he will find these also to be good. For they come to pass for our benefit; since even doctors cut and cauterize the sick man, so that he may recover his original health. If, therefore, considering the causes, we endure them with thanksgiving, we derive benefit from them; for we are cleansed from our sins, and are chastened, and thus we become better; but if we persist like hard stones, and still stumble by continuing irremediably in evils, we are abandoned by God, and become alienated from Him, and are led and carried off by the devil, to whom we have made ourselves kin through our wicked works. ^C The things, therefore, that come from God, some are of a more favorable

^A will, when we do His will and receive goods and gifts from Him; others are by permission and something like indulgence, when we sin and are punished for our correction, that we may return to a better state; others are by dereliction, in the manner we mentioned. And some things happen that others may be instructed; others occur for probation and a more abundant reward, as was the case with the Apostles and other saints. And, in short, nothing happens without a cause, even if we do not know the reasons for them. For we have heard in the Gospels that not even a sparrow falls into a snare without the will of our Father.

But when we say that we grieve and provoke God to anger, we must not attribute any passion to Him, just as we do not attribute hands and feet [to Him], according to what is written: "Your hands have made me and fashioned me," and, "I heard your voice as you were walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and I hid myself," nor eyes and eyelids and sight and a mouth and such things. For these are taken from bodies, and using human custom, we speak about God with a certain hidden and pious understanding. "For it is impossible, being human, to understand or speak about God, unless we use images and types and symbols that are akin to us," says the Damascene. But [we say it] because we ourselves depart from Him, choosing and doing perverse things, on account of which "the wrath of God comes upon the children of disobedience," as it is written, and from this we suffer and are oppressed, which also happens among men when they disobey their masters. Therefore, using human custom, we say that we have grieved God, and that God has become angry with us. ^B An irrational passion of this sort, therefore, is not to be attributed to God. For He Himself is impassible; but we are the ones who are subject to passion and mortal, from whom these [terms] are taken.

Just as when we say, "The Lord became propitious to us," and, "Lord, you have become a refuge for us," and, "God loved us," we must not posit anything that has happened to Him. For He did not exist as something else and later become a refuge; nor did He not love before and later love. For how could He who loved before the foundation of the world those whom He predestined, as Scripture testifies, not love them? It is, rather, the motion and change that occur in us. For since we turn to Him and find Him, we then say that we have begun to be loved by Him, experiencing His philanthropy, ^C and, according to our turning away or drawing near to Him, we are plainly either hated or loved. Again, we draw near to Him and depart from Him not by intervals of place—for God is everywhere—but we draw near by likeness, and we depart and are removed by dissimilarity. For the Creator of nature has implanted in our souls, as it were, a seed of reaching out toward Him; and by Him we are spurred toward the imitation of God. "For be," He says, "merciful, as your Father"

^A in heaven is; and: "Be imitators of God, as beloved children." The divine Dionysius also, in the book *On the Divine Names*, says: "They say that God, who is above all, is like to no one; yet He bestows a divine likeness upon those who turn to Him." And again: "These things, therefore, should be called God-like, which are according to the image and likeness of God. For we would not say that God is like to them, for not even a man is like to his own image. But likeness is primarily of those goods which are in us from God. For whether we are saints, or gods, or servants, or masters, we were created according to likeness." In this sense, the Apostle says: "Be renewed in the newness of your mind." For these things are said to the new man, who is being renewed in the knowledge of God according to the imitation of Him who created him in His image. ^B God, therefore, does not undergo change, as we were saying; but it is we who undergo change, just as even light is harsh to sick eyes, but gentle and sweet to those that are well and strong—not due to its own nature, but to their weakness and change.

In a similar manner, when God is called Creator, King, and Lord, these titles do not attach to Him subsequently; rather, the movement is understood in those things which are in time, while He eternally, before all ages, already is Creator, Provider, Lord, and King. But these titles are attributed to Him by us, after we were created in time; since these things are also said with reference to us. For indeed, the creation existed beforehand in the Creator, but not as creation and creature, but as reason and archetype. ^C Thus, God was the Artificer and Creator of all things before all ages, yet without relation and absolutely; but the relation which He has toward created things, since it is spoken of with reference to a temporal end, exists and is so named on their account. But if anyone thinks that this [relation] is in God from eternity, he will necessarily also make the created things co-eternal with God. Since, therefore, God is perfect, and from eternity was endowed with the power both to create and to provide, He was later called "Creator" and "Provider" by us, once things had been created, because this relationship pertains to them. For when created things did not exist, it is clear that neither was their creation spoken of, nor their conservation. For, as Theodore—whose face is inscribed with the ^D look of a brother—says: "For whose sake would there be providence, when there is no one who might be saved or preserved by it? For providence is of those things which are brought to pass in each." But the divine Gregory of Nyssa says: "Just as, he says, one would not be a doctor were it not for the sake of the sick; nor would one be named merciful and compassionate and the like, were it not for one who stood in need of compassion and mercy: so neither would He be called 'All-Sovereign' [Pantocrator], unless the whole of creation stood in need of Him who holds it together." And Damascenus says, Pro-

^A Providence is the care which God bestows upon things.

Now when, after the manner of men, as we were saying, we attribute feet and walking and hands and suchlike properties to God, we do so in a specific way, interpreting those concepts in proportion to the things that are understood more coarsely according to the conditions of bodies. For by mentioning the movement of feet, Scripture wishes to signify that God’s arrival is imminent, either to succor those in need, or to avenge them of their enemies, or to perform some other action, since it is through the use of feet that we ourselves are accustomed to accomplish an approach. By "hands," we signify the most efficacious and prompt power of the divine virtue in all things; for we, too, accomplish necessary tasks, and especially those of higher importance, by means of our own hands. We speak of the "right hand" to signify His help given to the saints, for the reason that we, too, are accustomed to use our right hand for matters that hold greater dignity and are more excellent and require the greatest strength. When we speak of God’s eyes, sight, and eyelids, we intend to denote His power that inspects all things ^B and the unerring nature of His knowledge, for it is through this sense that we ourselves attain more perfect knowledge and certainty. We call the mouth and speech the manifestation of His will, because we ourselves use the office of the mouth and speech to reveal the thoughts of the soul. In a word, we speak of all such things in relation to God so that, starting from our own operations and virtues, we may understand the things that are above us, and use human affairs as an image of those that are greater—much as those who paint the circle of the heavens on a small brick or tablet; and the same applies to all other names that are spoken of God.

Truly, therefore, as we said at the beginning, God is unnameable, ^C as He is superior to every name, and there is no limit or definition of His essence. For if the power of a definition is such that it contains and manifests the thing of which it is spoken, how could that which is infinite and uncircumscribed be manifested and comprehended by any power of definition or by any name? And if knowledge is of existing things, how will that be understood which is above all existing things and all substance, and even above being itself? But if He is above all substance, it is clear that He is also above all knowledge. In another way, however, He is both understood and named from His virtues and operations, and is called by many names. For even when we say in the affirmative that He is, as in that saying, "I am who I am," and simply call Him the author of things, and Him who was and is and will be, we do not ^D represent what He is in His essence. If we call Him God (Theos), we are not declaring His nature, but rather that He runs and oversees things, or the name is derived from *aithien*, which means to burn. For God is a fire, consuming all wickedness, because He is the preserver of things as they were created, or from the fact that He beholds all things. For He is unerring and the overseer of all. If we call Him wise,

^A we do so because of the wisdom that shines forth in the world, as the great Basil said in the first chapter of the book of Proverbs; for that text, "The Lord created me the beginning of His ways," speaks thus of the wisdom shining in the world, which all but utters a voice through the things visible, declaring that it was made by God. The prophets also inquire concerning this, of what nature it might be, just as the most learned Sirach said: "The root of wisdom, to whom has it been revealed? And who has known her shrewd designs? There is one wise, greatly to be feared, sitting upon His throne. He created her, and poured her out upon all His works." If we call Him power, we mean by this that He is the preserver of the things that have been made, and that He furnishes the power by which these are held together and remain intact. And again, from the preservation of existing things, we call Him Providence. For God exercises providence over all things, as the great Athanasius says in his third book against the Arians. We call Him Light, as the maker of light, and as the splendor of souls that are purified by reason and by life. For if ignorance and sin are called darkness, it follows that knowledge and a life lived in God would be light. Indeed, the divine Dionysius, in his exposition of the divine designation of light, says that the Good, which surpasses all light, is called Light, because it puts to flight ignorance and error and fills the intellectual eyes with knowledge. "For I," He says, "have come as a light into the world"; and, "Your law is a lamp to my feet and a light to my paths"; and, "Your commandments are light upon the earth." Again, we call Him Life, because He is the nature and the constitution of all nature, both rational and irrational. "For in Him we live and move and have our being."

^D All things, therefore, are applied to Him as the author of all. Yet His essence is not shown by these. For the Damascene says thus, that as the author of all essence and of all things that exist, He is called both Being and Essence. And as He is the author of all reason and wisdom, and of those endowed with reason and wisdom, He is called Reason and Rational, Wisdom and Wise; and similarly also Mind and Intellectual, Life and Living, Power and Powerful; and likewise for all the rest. If, therefore, His essence is not demonstrated by affirmative names, it will be even less so by negative ones. For no negation signifies what a thing is or its essence, but rather what it is not; it is a removal of what exists, not a positing of something that does not exist. For if we call Him non-essential, or without origin, or timeless, or invisible, or incorruptible, we are declaring that He is above all essence, and origin, and time, and sight, and corruption.

^A It is not that He is not, as that which is in no way whatsoever non-existent, but that He is transcendentally removed from all existing things, and is none of the things that exist, but is above all things. Likewise, in calling Him "super-divine" (hypertheon), we indicate that He is above all those who are gods by grace, and "immovable," because He is not moved by another, but is rather the Mover of all; and "incorporeal," because He is not a body; and "unbegotten" (ageneton)—which signifies the uncreated, written with a single nu—whereas "begotten" (genneton) from the Father is written with a double nu, because He has not received His generation and being from anyone; and "infinite," because He has no limit, nor is He comprehended by human thought.

^B Hitherto, it was said that it is more fitting to name God from things that are affirmed. For affirmations signify existence and that which is; negations, however, signify privation and the absence of being. Moreover, that which is, is more noble and better than that which is not; and existence [is more noble] than non-existence and privation. For both existence and that which is relate to the good; non-existence and privation, however, relate to the evil. For the good is being and the author of both being and existence; but evil is non-being and the privation of the good and of being.

^C And again, among things that are affirmed, He will be more appropriately named from those that are more noble and approach closer to Him. For more noble are those which participate more in Him. It is better, therefore, to name Him from these—sun, light, day, life, fire, spirit, water—as He is a vital good, than from darkness and night and other things contrary to those mentioned. For God is also named night and darkness; these are indeed affirmations, but they possess the power of a transcendent negation. For we call God darkness because of the hidden and unknown nature of His essence; not that God is darkness, but that He is not light, such as that which we perceive with our eyes, but [is] above all light. And in the same way, we also call Him light, meaning that He is not darkness, such as that which is conceived by the mind; intending through these terms to dismiss every imagination we might form concerning God, as He is beyond every essence and intellection. ^D Often, too, we name Him from both—affirmation and negation—as when we say: "Superessential essence," "super-divine deity," "super-archic principle." By the part of the negation, we indicate that He is above existing things and those who are called gods by grace, and above any principle we might name—as we understand Him to be superior to all these, and that we do not drag down the majesty of the divine nature to any corporeal imagination. By the part of the affirmation, we grasp Him as true essence, and true God, and a true principle, and we remove from Him every privation of imperfect thought. Whence, even if the Damascene mostly employs the affirmative regarding God...

and the divine Dionysius the negative, and in this they appear to differ from one another, yet, according to this sense, those who see rightly understand that they agree most fully.

^A As we were saying, God is nameless according to His essence, but multinominal according to His operations. For the Divine, whatever that may be, is one in nature, but manifold in operations. For since God is known from things seen, according to the divine Apostle, and the things seen are many and various, we reasonably name Him by many names as the Cause. For we draw the matter of the names from them, according to the divine Gregory, who says: "The miracles contemplated in the universe provide the material for theological names," by which we name Him wise, powerful, holy, good, blessed, eternal, judge, savior, and such like. The names and concepts, therefore, gathered by our minds from the operations according to the manner and power of the human intellect, being many and various, some spoken in the masculine, some in the feminine, some in the neuter, are indicative of the greatness of the nature, according to the great Basil in the third book of the *Antirrhetici*; and they signify to us the same God, and lead us to a conception of Him, to some one image of the truth, as the Theologian Gregory says: not that we are compelled by the pronunciation of the names and the weakness of the intellect to call Him there either male or female; but we drive away completely every concept and every weakness that happens to things subject to generation and decay; which is indeed necessary.

^B The same great Basil teaches again in his work *to Eustathius*, that divine concepts and names guide the mind to one subject; and whatever names you might speak, the thing signified through them all is one; and if you say God, you have indicated the same as you did through the other names. In the first book *Against Eunomius*, he explicitly says thus: "Our Lord Jesus Christ, when He spoke words about Himself to men, to reveal the love of the Godhead and the grace of the Incarnation, signified this by certain properties that we can consider in Him. For He named Himself the Door, and Life, and Bread, and Vine, and Shepherd, and Light; not that He is endowed with many names; for neither do all these names..." ^{C D}

lead to one ^A and the same thing, for the meaning of "Light" is one thing, and of "Vine" another, and of "Way" another, and of "Shepherd" another. But being one in subject, and one substance, simple and free from all composition, He names Himself now in one way, now in another, adjusting for Himself designations distinct from one another by mental conceptions. For according to the diversity of His operations and their relation to those who receive the benefit, He bestows upon Himself varying names. For He calls Himself the "Light of the world," partly to signify the inaccessibility of the majesty of the Godhead, and partly because He illuminates those who have the eyes of the soul purged by the splendor of knowledge. He calls Himself the "Vine," because He nurtures those who have taken root in Him through faith with the fertility of good works. He calls Himself "Bread," because it is the most fitting food for the rational part of the soul, maintaining its vigor, preserving its nature unharmed, and always repairing from Himself what flows away, and not allowing it to slip into the sickness which grows from the irrational affection of the soul. Thus, if one were to examine each of the names, he could find various concepts, although one thing according to substance is ^B subject to them all. This is the only thing concerning God that can be comprehended: that He is infinite, according to Gregory in his Theology; and as Nyssen says, "In that He cannot be comprehended, He is known." For this is His most proper mark: that His nature is superior to every concept and to every characteristic notion.

This being so, if one were to ask, "How then does Scripture say that the prophets saw God?"—such as the passage, "I saw the Lord Sabaoth, sitting upon a throne high and lifted up," and others of that kind—it does not follow that the infinity of God is thereby removed. For the Theologian Gregory says in his Theological Orations: "If anyone has known God, or is testified to have known God, he is to be considered to have known Him only in as much as he is a partaker of a more abundant splendor than one who has received less light from God." By this excess, a knowledge that is full and absolute in all respects is had, and it is weighed not according to the truth of the thing itself, but according to the measure and capacity of others. But he also calls the visions of the prophets "spectra," and passes a general judgment on those things which were seen by them. Thus, whether this was a certain daytime spectrum, visible only to holy men, or a truthful nocturnal vision, or an impression and formation of the ruling faculty, so conversing with future things as though they were present, or some other secret kind of prophecy, I cannot say; but the God of the prophets knows, and those who are inspired in these ways. However, neither these of whom we speak, nor any other of the same kind and order, stood in the existence ^D and substance of God, according to what is written; nor did they see or explain the nature of God.

spoken. And concerning Abraham, he says: “He did not see Him as God, but refreshed Him as a man.” And furthermore, concerning the knowledge of God that he himself received in this present life together with Moses, and concerning the vision and the experience of it, he explains: “Looking in for a little while,” he says, “I did not see the first and unalloyed nature, and that which is known to Itself—I mean to the Trinity—which remains within the first veil and is covered by the Cherubim; but [I saw] as much as is ultimate and reaches even unto us. And this is, as I understand it, the majesty manifested and administered in created things, or, as the divine David names it, ^A *magnificence*.” For these are the “back parts” of God, whatever exist after Him and declare His Divinity to us. And to show what these revealing manifestations are, and that they exist as if they were signs, he added: “Just as shadows and images of the sun in water represent the sun to weak eyes, since one cannot look directly at it, because it surpasses the sense by the purity of its light.” And concluding everything, he says: “Thus, therefore, you shall theologize, even if you were Moses and a god to Pharaoh; even if you reach to the third heaven according to Paul, and become superior to him, having been deemed worthy of an angelic station and rank.”

The great Basil, in the first book *Against Eunomius*, says: “Whatever appears to have been written by the theologians concerning the essence of God, the words carry the mind toward other thoughts by means of certain tropologies or allegories.” In addition to these, the divine Chrysostom ^B in his orations *On the Incomprehensible* asserts that God is not seen even by the Seraphim, but declares that all the visions of the prophets and the saints are *condescensions* [συγκαταβάσεις]. And interpreting what a “condescension” is, he adds, saying: “A condescension is when God does not appear as He is, but shows Himself as he who is able to behold Him is capable [of seeing Him], measuring Himself to the capacity of the seers.”

^C *Who has stood in the counsel [ὑποστήματι] of God?* Literally, *hypostasis* and essence. [...] ^D [...] divina essentia, even to us mortals, but also inaccessible to them, and whom He inhabits in light, as the Apostle is the author [I Tim. vi]. So that you may know that He is inaccessible not only to men, but also to the supernal powers. Where Theodorus Gaza does not interpret *incomprehensible* sufficiently aptly. Whether the solutions which our authors use everywhere are sufficient to the mind of Chrysostom is not for this place or work to investigate. It is certain that the Anomoeans gave the occasion for this great dispute, who—most impudent of men—said that they comprehended God, and thus clearly saw and knew Him, even as He knows Himself. Whom Gregory in his *Orations on Theology* and Basil in book 1, *Against Eunomius*, denounce, in refuting whom it is no wonder if the holy Fathers seem to have gone beyond the mark for a time. Certainly, they seem to recoil from *We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is* [I John iii, 2], and *not as He is*. For John would not wish us to see God in any other way than the supernal Powers see Him; since it is a great thing that the measure of man should be that of an angel, and that we shall simultaneously be in heaven as the angels of God.

^A Exposing even what "condescension" is, he adds, saying: "Condescension is when God appears, not as He is, but showing Himself according to the capacity of one able to see, conforming Himself to the weakness of the observers, presenting Himself to be seen." In the Old Testament, too, it is said as if from the person of God: "I have multiplied visions, and in the hands of the prophets I was made like." The divine Dionysius also says this (42): "But if even the philosopher Clement thinks that examples should be expressed in some way, the principles that are in existing things do not proceed according to proper, complete, and simple names for him. But granting that this is also rightly said, one must remember theology, which says: 'I did not show you so that you should walk after them, but that through the analogical knowledge of these things we might be led up, as much as we are able, to the cause of all."

^B We will not, therefore, say that God is seen according to His essence. For holy men reject this to such a degree that they do not even admit the grasping of His essence in natural symbols, which we might perhaps conceive from material things among us. For the divine Gregory of Nyssa, dwelling on the statement, "I sought Him and He was not found," says: "How, he asks, could He be found, whom none of the things that come into knowledge indicate? No form, no color, no circumscription, no quantity, no place, no figure, no comparison, no conjecture, no proportion; but He is always found to be outside every power and effort of comprehension?"

^C Then the divine Maximus removes from God the concept of "when" and "where" and "how," which banishes the mind from every conjecture. For this exists either in the "how"—such as reasoning about what is being reasoned—or in the "where" He is present, as "where there is smoke, there is also fire," or in "what He has done," as "this woman is nursing, therefore she has given birth." For if humans, while still in the flesh, cannot see God according to the measure and reason of our sense, what then will be the goods in the promises stored up for the saints, concerning which the Apostle says: "And all these, having been attested through faith, did not receive the promise, God having foreseen something better for us, so that they might not be perfected without us"?

[...], clearly before the coming restoration. ^A And how does the same Apostle say also: "For now we see through a glass, in a dark manner; but then face to face"? And the divine Dionysius says: As long as we are joined to the body, it is impossible for the deifying ray to shine upon us, unless it is anagogically covered by the variety of the sacred veils, and arranged in a natural and familiar way through the paternal providence for us. This the divine Maximus explains more clearly, saying: It is impossible for us, while we are in the flesh, to behold immaterial and incorporeal things without figures and symbols. And how the same person again, as if from the Apostle, has said that all the knowledge of this age, however lofty and sublime it may be, when compared to the knowledge of the future age, is elementary, and like an image of a living person, which will not exist once the true life and knowledge have appeared. For, he says, whether knowledge shall be destroyed, or prophecies shall vanish, according to the Apostle who says evidently: "But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."

How, therefore, will all these things be preserved, along with the things said previously by the saints, if someone says that God is seen according to His essence? ^B But if the name of God, which is found in the visions of the prophets and other saints, disturbs anyone—such as "The Lord God appeared to Abraham," and "God said to Moses from the bush," and other things, so that I need not recount each one individually—the marvelous Dionysius says: It is irrational and foolish not to pay attention to the power of the end intended, but to the words. For this is the crime of the Jews; if they had been willing not to pay attention to the words, but to the power of the end intended, nothing would have prevented them from confessing Christ as the Son of God, and being and being called Christians together with us; to whom we will certainly become similar, ^C if we...

^A interpret the Scriptures in this way. Moreover, we will appear even worse if we conceive of God as compounded with a body and subject to the same affections as a body. For immediately the Old Law is said to have been given to Moses by God, and for this reason, it is termed "God-written." Yet the Apostle says concerning it: "If the word spoken through angels was made steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just reward of retribution," and so forth. Again, Scripture explained this very thing to us regarding Moses, when it said: "And He called to him," calling Him Lord from the bush; yet it was not God who called him from that bush, but an angel, as it is clear to hear from the holy teachers who explained this passage. ^B Again, it says that God was entertained by Abraham; but that it was not God, but angels, the divine Paul teaches, saying: "Be not forgetful of hospitality; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares," alluding through this to Abraham; concerning whom also Gregory the Theologian says: "What made Abraham a host to God?" Elsewhere he says: "He did not see Him as God, but fed Him as a man." And again he writes elsewhere: "God being crucified," and this in the midst of thieves; which, if we understand it according to the Godhead, the statement will turn into great blasphemy. But thinking this to be said by reason of the assumed flesh, we do not depart from the true understanding.

Theophanies

Adjoining this, Manue says the Scripture spoke: "We shall die, woman, we have seen God"; surely calling "God" the sign that appeared to him and had shown itself to him. And again: "God stood in the congregation of gods; and in the midst He will judge the gods." And Paul: "For if there are many gods, as indeed there are." ^C I omit saying other things, whatever Scripture calls God and divine apparitions, which the holy ones have described as having been spoken and appeared in many parts and in many ways, all of which Saint Dionysius demonstrated are far removed from the essence of God and were staged through angels as a certain scenic representation, resolving the question concerning divine apparitions which are said to be immediate, and teaching that all the holy Fathers, both those who preceded the law and those who followed it, were led to God through angels.

Moreover, we also call Baptism a theophany, because in it Christ was seen in the flesh, and the Holy Spirit is said to have descended, although at that time He appeared in the form of a dove for the sake of the dispensation of Christ, fashioned from an airy body for the occasion, as the saints relate, and especially Augustine in his book *On the Trinity*; and by the voice heard

we say that the Father is known. If, therefore, we call those things which appeared to the saints before the Law and after the Law the essence of God, we shall be compelled to say that the voices heard by them were also from God, and so we shall even attribute to Him vocal organs—which is altogether absurd and ridiculous. ^B Since these things are so, we would not rightly say that the divine Scripture or the saints have used these names in their proper sense concerning these beings, but rather that they have used them improperly, and have indiscriminately attributed to types the names and properties of things that are formless and without shape—as is the case with that of Paul, *And the rock was Christ* (I Cor. x, 4). And we speak of these things equivocally, calling the things which represent by the names of the things represented; since these [representations] are many and diverse, and have appeared in different ways at different times. For likenesses were found in the hands of the prophets (Osee xii, 10); and the saints interpreted them as symbols, condescensions, and signs, as is evident from what they have set forth. But the God who is figured and represented through all things is one and the same, and is immutable for all time.

But that the Scripture declares that God was seen by the saints means nothing else than that they have received knowledge concerning Him, according to the proportion and purity of those who behold, through the symbolic things seen by them; since the knowledge and understanding of God is also called the "vision" of God, and he who has received this knowledge is said to have seen Him. ^C For Gregory the Theologian in his *Oration on the Son* (53) says: "He who has understood the Son (for this is what 'to have seen' means) has understood the Father." And divine Chrysostom (54), having made mention of that evangelical utterance, "He answered the Jews and said, Not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is of God, he has seen the Father" (Joan. vi, 46), has said: He calls "vision" here the *knowledge*, which knowledge and understanding he teaches was also brought about for those then present through the miracles of the Savior. For he says: "But why did He not ascend immediately into the boat? Wishing to perform a greater miracle, and to reveal His divinity more clearly." And the same author, in his exposition of the Gospel of John (55), calls these miracles His glory, saying: "The Evangelist, therefore, having brought together all these things—the miracles, those in bodies, those in souls, those in the elements; the commands, the gifts, those unspeakable things higher than the heavens; the laws, the practice, the power of persuasion, the future promises, His sufferings—breathed forth this admirable voice, full of heavenly doctrine, saying, 'We beheld His glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.'" For we do not admire Him only because of these miracles, but also because of His sufferings; as, for instance, since

He was nailed to the cross and scourged, since He was slapped, since He was spat upon, since He received blows upon the cheek ^A from those who had been benefited by Him. For indeed, even in these very things which seem to be full of reproach and ignominy, it is again worth uttering the same word; since He Himself called the matter "glory." These are the words of the divine Chrysostom. But the great Basil says: "From the winds and the sea having obeyed Him, they recognized His divinity." Indeed, this knowledge being rendered more perfect, is deemed the kingdom of heaven by Gregory the Theologian. For in his *Oration on the Constitution of Bishops*, ^B he says, "I believe that the kingdom of God is nothing other than the attainment of that which is most pure and most perfect. The most perfect of all things is the knowledge of God. But let us hold part of it, and strive to grasp part of it, while we are upon the earth; and let us reserve part of it for the age to come." In his *Oration on the Lights*, while exhorting the one being baptized to receive and believe the future reward along with the commandments, he says that this is "light to those who have been purified in their understanding, that is, God, visible and known according to the proportion of their purity; which we also call the kingdom of heaven; but darkness to those whose ^C governing faculty is blinded; that is, the alienation from God according to the proportion of the blindness resulting therefrom." This knowledge of God that is stored up for the saints after the hoped-for resurrection, Saint Dionysius calls an "union surpassing the mind," according to which God shall be all in all, as the blessed Paul is the witness. But more on these things later; for now, it is most clearly evident to all, as we were saying, that God has no name, and yet again that He has many names. He has no name ^D that pertains to His essence; but He has and is named from those wonders which shine forth in the universe. For thus Gregory of Nyssa also said: "The wonders observed in the universe provide the material whereby we may call Him wise and just and things of that sort." In like manner we might say both things correctly: that no one has ever seen God, and yet again that the prophets and saints have seen the same God, clearly according to one thing and another; the former, because it is impossible for the nature of God to be encompassed.

^A and the infinite and boundless is held fast by the finite; the latter, because of the knowledge which they had of Him through certain symbols, according to the analogy of those who see, and the conjecture and mental image of the things that are seen.

The same can also be said regarding participation. For we are indeed partakers of God. "I will dwell in them," He says, "and will walk among them," and, "I and the Father will come, and we will make our abode with him." But not as He is according to His nature or divinity; for this is the heresy of the Massalians ^B—but rather as the synod held against them states. For it says: "There occurs a certain advent and presence of the Paraclete, and God dwells in the saints, but not as He is in His nature or divinity." If, however, there were any Massalians who claimed to partake of the essence of God, in that it changes into something appropriate to them, and that in this way God dwells in them, we reject such impiety onto their own heads. For following rather the words of Saint Dionysius, we say that all that is hidden in God so appears as not to be revealed, and that which is imparticipable is participated in without participation; and that which does not depart from itself proceeds without departing, and is everywhere, while remaining in itself, providing His presence to all, ^C as those who enter into communion and participation with Him—insofar as their nature allows—do so without God Himself being changed in anything. For God is present in one way by His own nature, insofar as nothing is by nature able to obstruct Him, and in another way by His providence, when He becomes all things to all men; and again in another way He is in none of the things that exist, insofar as, existing by Himself, He is not in any way any part of the totality of things.

CHAPTER III.

On the one God who is the Trinity.

This one and true God, the creator and sustainer of all things, the fountain of blessings and the cause for the subsistence of each thing, we believe and confess to be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And this we have not gathered by human reasoning ^D from created things, but have received from revelation. For since it was not possible in any way to grasp this from created things through the senses, it was necessary for us to be taught this by divine

revelation. And the One of the Trinity himself, the Son of God, having become man for the sake of His own goodness (of which we shall speak shortly, as far as possible, gathering these things likewise from the holy Scriptures), revealed to us the mystery of the Trinity, so that we might not be led astray by human teaching and worship created things.

And previously, indeed, He hinted at the truth of this matter through the prophets, wisely drawing men little by little away from the worship of idols; then He also taught it clearly, in harmony with what came before, through Himself: a thing truly so wondrous and beyond all custom that it exceeds the entire power of the reasoning mind. For we believe in Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; and neither does the Unity bring about a confusion and as it were a concretion of the three persons, nor does the number of the persons divide the unity of the Monad, that is, of the essence; but it is both one according to essence, and three according to the hypostases—that is, the persons. For it is divided unifiedly and connectedly divided, as the Theologian Gregory says. And again: "I have not yet finished thinking of the one, when I am shone upon by the three; I have not yet finished distinguishing the three, when I am carried back to the one." For among men, truly, the three men are not one; and again, the one is not three; but in God, as things are one, they are three, and as they are three, they are one; which, as I was saying, exceeds all the power of the mind.

This union and distinction our Lord Jesus Christ delivered, saying: "Going into the whole world, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." For by saying "in the name" in the singular, He manifested the one essence (for three, since they are two and three, are never expressed in the singular number); but by adding "of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," He taught the three-hypostasied nature of the single essence. And when in another place He said: "I and the Father are one," He attributed the "one" to the essence, but the "I and the Father" he assigned to the persons. The great Athanasius also, following this theology, says: "Thrice they cry 'Holy', because of the three hypostases, but once 'Lord', because of the one Divinity." These things are sufficient for the faithful; up to this point knowledge among men reaches; up to this point the Cherubim are covered by their wings.

Following, therefore, this rule, whereby we speak of God (who is the holy Trinity), and standing as it were in a midpoint, we escape the absurdities on either side. For by confessing one essence or substance, we reject the doctrine of Arius, who asserted three differing essences—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—and who, together with the names, divided also the underlying subjects. And by confessing three persons, we [reject] the doctrine of Sabellius likewise

^B or rather, we declare that any one of the divine persons is perfectly and without any deficiency God, lacking nothing in regard to essence from the one, whole, and perfect divinity. For the Father is not a part of the whole divinity, nor is the Son a part, nor is the Holy Spirit a part. For God has no part or member, since a part is imperfect. Furthermore, this would introduce composition and circumscription; ^C and because in any one of the three, the whole is present. For the Father is the whole God, and the Son is the whole God, and the Holy Spirit is the whole God. And for this reason, we do not say that the whole and one divinity is divided into these three persons, as a genus into species, or a species into individuals, or a whole into parts. Neither do we say that the Father is a greater or fuller God than the Son and the Spirit, nor [do we say that] the Father together with the Son [is greater] than the Spirit, or that the Father alone is greater or fuller or lesser than the Son ^D or the Spirit alone, however much a number may be introduced by reason of the persons; but we confess that the whole, same, and one [divinity] is perfect, perfectly in the perfect Father, and the whole is perfect, perfectly in the perfect

Son ^A, and the same complete and perfect [divinity] is in the perfect Holy Spirit; and again, the whole Holy Spirit is in the whole same [divinity], and the whole Son is in the whole same, and the whole Father is in the whole same. And again, the whole is the Father, and the whole is the Son, and the whole is the Holy Spirit. And again, the Father is whole in the whole Son and in the Spirit perfectly, and the Son is whole in the whole Father and in the Spirit perfectly, and the Holy Spirit is whole in the whole Father and in the Son perfectly. For there is one essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, with one not being or being conceived without the other.

For this reason, the Theologian Gregory says in his

Oration on the Lights

On the Faith

^A there is a multitude of persons; and for this reason, whether among men one could be called father and true progenitor is not properly said, on account of the diversity of substance and the deficiencies and variations. But in God, whom we have been taught by faith to be Unity and Trinity, and in whom we have received by tradition no other person besides those, it is a crime not to confess one truly and properly always as Father, another properly and truly always as Son, and another properly always and truly as Holy Spirit.

We must therefore be careful, since the unity of those three persons is held in this way, because one Author exists, as we have said, relying on the doctrine of the Catholic faith, not to understand any division or separation in them even by a bare thought or figment of the mind. For Gregory the Theologian says, directing the force of his argument against the heretic: ^B "Do you fear generation, lest God suffer something, He who exists immune from all passion? I fear the creature, lest by the injury and this unjust cutting I lose God, wounding the Son from the Father, or the substance of the Spirit from the Son." And the great Basil, in his letter to his brother Gregory: "For neither will He who is always in the Father be able to be cut off from the Father, nor will He ever be separated from the substance of His Spirit, who works all things in Him." But it is fitting to preserve the unity of persons in the three hypostases in this way, and in them it should be understood and believed according to the capacity of our intellect, so that we perceive the single essence united with itself and undivided. For these three persons are the essence of God. ^C Nay, not even "union" should be described in them; for they themselves are the union, that is, the unity and identity of the essence; the essence itself, indeed. For these three holy hypostases and persons are not besides the essence, but are the one essence of God, as we have said. The divine persons differ from one another only in this, that one is the author, while the others are from the author. That is, the Father indeed is devoid of principle and cause, having from no one that which He is as Father, which might be understood prior to Him; but He is the author of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Of those who are from the author, one is the Son, begotten from the Father; the other is the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father, but not begotten. ^D For this is another mode of existence, inexplicable in words and arcane. Therefore, the Son indeed, as begotten or born, has the Father as His author, and is referred to Him as Son; but the Father is called His Father. But the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, does not proceed from Him insofar as He is Father (for so even the Spirit would be Son), but from the Father, who is Himself the Producer. Wherefore the Spirit is also referred to Him as proceeding, not insofar as He is Son; and the Father is compared to the Spirit as the Producer of the Spirit, not as Father. For the Spirit, as the author Gregory of Nyssa says, has no Father. And it is entirely forbidden that two sons...

in the Trinity, or two Fathers or two Spirits, as being contrary to the tradition of the faith. For thus, the Father, or the Son, or the Spirit would not strictly exist as we have stated; rather, a mutation regarding the Trinity, and a confusion of the three persons regarding their properties, would be observed, which is absurd. But we have received that this one distinction—and only this one—should be maintained among the three: that we call one the Father, another the Son, and the third the Holy Spirit. For as the Theologian Gregory says in his discourses on the Son (67), “The property of Him who is without beginning is Father; of Him who is begotten without beginning, Son; and of Him who proceeded or progresses without generation, the Holy Spirit.” And Damascene in his theological chapters (68), “Through the Father, the Son and the Spirit possess all things they possess; that is, through the fact that the Father possesses them, except for unbegottenness, generation, and procession; for only in these hypostatic properties do the three holy hypostases differ from one another.” ^B Therefore, they differ only in these points: that the Father is Father and is neither Son nor Spirit; the Son is Son and is neither Father nor Spirit; and the Spirit is Spirit and is neither Father nor Son. For these names do not introduce a difference of natures; but as the Theologian Gregory said in his discourses on the Son (69), “The name Father is not a name of essence or of operation, but of relation, and of how the Father is related to the Son, or the Son to the Father.” And as the great Basil says in the first of his *Confutations* (70), “I would rightly say that the word ‘unbegotten’ should be kept silent, since the word ‘Father’ possesses the same power, except that, because of the relation, it brings with it the concept of the Son in conjunction with itself.” But so that, as far as we are able, we might have a clearer understanding of these things, following the principles of the faith, let us speak as follows.

Since we hold by faith that God is begotten from God, two persons are understood: one who begets, and one who is begotten; and they have an opposition which they call “by relation.” ^C For since there are four kinds of oppositions—because opposites are divided in four ways either by contraries, such as white and black; or according to privation and habit, such as “he sees, he is blind” (for the one is of habit, namely to see, and the other of privation); or according to negation and affirmation, such as “he is a man, he is not a man”; or by relation, such as father and son, great and small—since therefore there are four kinds of oppositions, those that are considered in substances have a place in the Holy Trinity according to the cause and that which is caused, ^D because, according to this relation of things-related, something is found producing its like, as the one who begets begets from himself a Son like unto himself in the same essence. But the other ways of being opposed—some introducing different things, others introducing the imperfect, others the

non-existent—are to be cast far away as having no place in God, who exists strictly, exists always in the same manner, and is most perfect. ^{A B} Those things are said to be “relative” which, insofar as they are named, are named toward other things and have a relation to them, yet cannot be spoken of by themselves; for example, father and son, slave and master. Truly, these are not spoken of by themselves, but toward others, as they have a relation and connection to them; for this reason, they are called “relatives.” For the name of “father” does not stand in itself, but refers to another thing, namely the name of the son, and the son likewise respects the father. Wherefore, neither is a father without a son, nor a son without a father. For each introduces the other conjointly through the relation. The others that follow this pattern exist in the same way. Conversely, those names are called “absolute” which stand in an opposite manner to these—those that are spoken of by themselves and have no relation to other things; rather, they are absolute and without connection; for example, beautiful, just, good. For these are spoken of by themselves and are not rendered toward another thing.

^C Since, therefore, it is said in the holy Trinity that there is a begetter and a begotten, two persons are understood, and they have an opposition toward one another according to the relative. For one is the cause, and the other is what is caused. The definition and property of opposition is that one of the opposites should not be like the other; just as it is impossible for white to be black, and black to be white, insofar as they are opposed. If this is so, it is impossible for the same one to be both the cause and that which is caused—that is, for the same one to be both the begetter and the begotten—when only two persons are considered, of the Father and of the Son. For if many persons were underlying, as happens in humans, nothing prevents the same one from being both father and son, as we have said. But when two persons are posited, and the one is properly father and the other is properly son, as is the case in the holy Trinity, it is absolutely impossible for the same one to be both father and son. And among humans, to speak by way of example, when we consider two persons, where one has begotten and the other is begotten, even among them the relation and connection is found to be incommunicable in the same way. For it is impossible that he who has begotten another should himself be begotten by the same person who was begotten by him. ^D For there is an opposition in them according to the relative, and the one is not like the other. In the same way, therefore, in the holy Trinity, in the Father and the Son, two persons are understood, and they are necessarily so because of the principle of the procession, since Scripture teaches that the Son is born from the Father; and neither is the Father the Son, nor the Son the Father, according to the principle of opposition.

Again, since it has been said in the faith that God proceeds from God, according to the same principle of opposition it is impossible for the same one to be both the producer and the product. For it is not the same thing in relation to itself and

^A that which is produced. For the opposition does not admit this at all. The Father, however, is God from whom God is born and God proceeds; but He is not from God. For if He too were God from God, He would be either from the Son, or from the Spirit, or from Himself, or from another. He is not, therefore, from the Son or from the Spirit, because He Himself is the cause of them, and it is impossible for the Father to be from the Son, His own offspring, or from His own production. He is not from Himself; for it is impossible that a person who exists as the caused be the cause of Himself. But neither is He from another; for then God would be a quaternity, or even beyond the quaternity. But we have been taught that God is a Trinity. So, the Father is God; but He is not from God; and the Son is God, begotten from God the Father; and the Spirit is God, proceeding from the Father as from the producer.

The cause, therefore, of why God is three persons is the procession; furthermore, the cause has been named, and that which is from the cause; namely, that God is born from God, and God proceeds from God. And it follows necessarily that there is strictly a Father and a Son and a Holy Spirit; and that these names do not introduce natures, but signify relations; showing how the divine persons stand in relation to one another, as the Theologian Gregory said ^B, and that no confusion follows in these. For if, because of the unity of essence, the Son is in the Father, and the Father is in the Son, and the three persons are in one another—which the saints call

circumincession (περιχώρησις)

The procession, therefore, is the cause. For if God were not born from God, and God did not proceed from God, ^C there would be no procession. And if there were no procession, there would not be three. And if there were not three persons, how would God be proclaimed a Trinity? For even according to other names, as many as are absolute and do not have a relation to others, by which God is called either wise, or good, or creator, He is not distinguished in Himself according to ^D those...

Thus, therefore, the divine persons proceeding, and hence having an opposition in relation to something, and by that distinction, as it were, return to unity, or rather, never depart from it—which words Damascene borrowed from Gregory, who also proves them with those words of the Lord: "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me"; so that they have, as it were, one another, and are in one another, and cohere without any commixture, through which it might pass into some third thing or fall from its own perfection; which seems entirely repugnant to that, and, as it were, such a great mystery.

^A For this reason, these are not called ^B relative names, nor do they signify any distinction of persons, because these names are not spoken relatively to other things, nor do they denote in themselves a procession, as those things do which are spoken relatively, such as "Father," "Son," "begetting," "begotten," "producing," "being produced"—things which do indeed signify a procession, introduce persons, and necessarily imply a distinction.

Therefore, for this same reason, the Father is equally and alike wise, good, and Creator, and the Son is wise, good, and Creator; just as there is one God, the three are wise, good, and Creator. The same happens with all names that have this meaning. For they coincide and occur together, and are spoken as of one being, provided they do not have an opposition to one another, and do not contradict either the definition of the Trinity or that of the Unity. In these respects, then, God is not distinguished personally in Himself, but He is distinguished by comparison to the creature; for it is in relation to us that he is called good, and Creator, and providence, and the inspector of all, and the preserver of all things by His omnipotent power, and the rest. But He is also called the Father of the creature, and the Father of mercies ^C and of compassion. "For there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things." But when Scripture says this, we do not understand a distinction between the Father and the Son. But, nevertheless, we are taught that the Son and the Spirit are also the father of the creature, so that we acknowledge one Father—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—as the cause of all creation. For if the person of the Father were understood to be "Father" in the same way as He is Father of the Son whenever He is called Father of the creature, the Son would also be one of all things. But the divine Scripture teaches that the Son is consubstantial and co-eternal with the Father. Thus, He is called the Father of the Son in one way, and the Father of all things in another; the one relatively and in Himself, the other absolutely and in relation to the creature, as we have said—even though the person of the Father is understood in that case too. And the Apostle says concerning Him, "There is one God, the Father, from whom are all things." For he adds, "And one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things"; by these words hinting at the primary cause as the Father, the creative cause as the Son, and the perfecting cause ^D as the Holy Spirit.

These things having been determined: with regard to the essence, God is not a Trinity, but with regard to the divine and ineffable processions, He is and is acknowledged to be a Trinity. For the fact that God is from God, this is what constitutes the persons. Whence it is not the case that the three are understood first, and then one of them is the begetting, another the begotten, and another the one being produced. For in that way, three essences would be introduced even without the processions, which is the Arian doctrine; and thus we would neither confess one God in one essence, nor would the doctrine of the monarchy remain. For with this supposed, one could say three essences and three gods, which we reject as the Greeks are said to hold. For if this were admitted, it would be permissible for anyone to say there are three essences and three gods, which we reject for the Greeks, as they say.

^A Furthermore, that there is a Unity and a Trinity entails a twofold account of theology: one is called the discrete, the other the absolute. For when we call God one, good, wise, just, and discuss such things concerning His goodness, providence, and other attributes, no distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is understood. This is called the united theology, consisting of absolute terms. But when we speak of the one God as Father, Son, and Spirit, and discuss the processions and hypostatic properties, this mode of discoursing about God is called discrete theology, consisting of discrete terms.

The same, moreover, are essence and nature, and person and hypostasis. ^B Regarding these, the Theologian Gregory says: "We shall not contend over names, as long as the syllables convey the same meaning." Indeed, that holy man also says that property and hypostasis or person are the same: "For when I say God, you are illuminated by one and the same trine light; trine, indeed, in respect to the properties." Explaining, however, what he meant by properties, he added: "that is, the hypostases." This he says in the *Oration on the Lights*. In the *Oration on the blessed Athanasius*, when he had said: "When one essence and three hypostases are godly spoken of by us," he added: "For the one denotes the nature, the other the properties of the three persons." There, therefore, having placed the properties first, he interpreted them as the hypostases; but in these latter ^C he exposes the hypostases as the properties.

Thus, when we call God wise, good, and living, we signify the one God and the communion of the essence; but when we have uttered a discrete name (namely, the personal name of one of the divine persons), such as Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit, we signify the same communion again with something particular. For the Damascene and other holy men define hypostasis or person thus: "the common with the particular," or property. For God is not one thing, and the three hypostases or persons another. For the Theologian Gregory says: "When I say God, I mean the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." And again: "One ^D and three." [alt-version omitted]

For the Damascene and other holy men define the hypostasis as the substance with its accidents; that is, the common with the particular. Consequently, the person is what has the common with its own proper and peculiar mark, and that, moreover, which exists of itself. Calecas, however, preferred to assume that which can be transferred to God, in whom the common is truly present, and in whom no accidents are found under the concept of accident.

the Godhead; and the three are one, those ^A in which is the Godhead; or, to speak more accurately, which is the Godhead." He avoided the phrase "in which," so that a composition might not be suspected, as if there were other persons in another essence; and he added what is more accurate and more proper, saying, "which is the Godhead."

And the divine Maximus: "We have not been taught that the Monad is one thing and the Trinity another, but that it is the same which is truly called Monad and Trinity; the one by way of essence, the other by way of existence." And again in another place: "The same is Monad and Trinity; the whole is the same Monad, and the whole is the same Trinity. The whole Monad according to essence, and the whole Trinity according to the hypostases." Wherefore it was well said that God is one according to essence, but three according to the processions; clearly, since the three have no difference in anything else, except that one is the cause, and the other is from the cause; and of that which is from the cause, one is by generation, ^B and the other by procession. Gregory of Nyssa also writes this, saying: "Considering the immutability of His nature, we do not deny the difference according to cause and caused, in which alone we perceive that one is distinguished from the other; in that the one is the cause, and the other is from the cause. For if the Monad, or the Godhead, were one thing, and the Trinity, that is, the hypostases, were another, what is worshipped would be a quaternity; and if the properties are also different from the hypostases, the progression will reach to a heptad." But the divine Maximus said that the Monad and the Trinity are the same; the one by way of essence, the other by way of existence. ^C And the divine Athanasius also says in a treatise titled, "The Fathers at Nicaea rightly used the term *homoousion*." Therefore, you will not say that the creation is a makeup of the Being God; since the names "Father" and "God" do not signify the very essence of the Being, but something else, which you invent. But this is unseemly and very impious even to think. But when we hear, "I am who am," and, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth," and, "Hear, Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord," and, "Thus says the Lord Almighty," we do not signify anything else, but the very simple and blessed and incomprehensible essence of the Being. ^D For even if we are unable to grasp what that is, yet by hearing "Father" and "Son" and "Almighty," we signify the immutability of the nature, which the term *homoousion* demonstrates, as it were, by the similar, the fact that the immutability of the similar in the essence is present.

[alt-version omitted]

^A We do not understand something else, but the very essence of the Being itself that is signified. And you yourselves (the Arians, of course) have said that the Son is from God, meaning that you have said He is from the essence of the Father.

^B We were right, therefore, to say that when we call Him both God and Father, we signify one and the same God; that is, the same One is signified both by the absolute names and by the distinguishing ones. By the absolute ones—that is, "God" and "Good"—He signifies the commonality and entirety of the essence; but by the hypostatic ones—when, for example, we say Father, or Son, or Spirit—He signifies that same commonality and entirety once again, along with the distinctive quality. For even if the saints say that the essence is one thing and the hypostasis another, they do not think that they are different things in a separate sense, as if it were to come about that there is an unsubstantial hypostasis and an insubstantial essence, which the great Basil calls unreasonable in his ^C letter to Count Terentius (81). For every essence is considered with certain properties; and the properties have an essence around which they are considered. For the hypostasis is "the common with the distinctive quality," as has been said. But on this meaning the saints have spoken, as the great Basil says in the same letter: "The relationship which the common has to the particular, the same relationship has the essence to the hypostasis." And in his letter to his brother Gregory (82) concerning the difference between essence and hypostasis, he says: "The account of commonality relates to the essence; but the hypostasis is the distinctive mark and sign of each." But the common corresponds to the simple, while the particular corresponds to the *how*. For we take the name "God" as being more common in relation to the Godhead, and not any one of the hypostatic and individual names, such as Father or Son; since it is not even reversible. ^D For the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one God; but God is not necessarily Father. The Father is God, but He is not the Son, nor the Spirit, even though the Son and the Spirit are likewise God. Moreover, if the common did not signify the essence here, or if it corresponded to the universal in such a way as it does when we say, "Man is a rational animal," it would follow that the super-essential Godhead, like genera and species, consists only in the combination of our mental conception.

But the Theologian from Damascus refutes this, saying (83): "In the case of created things, the division of the hypostases is considered in reality; for in reality Paul is seen separated from Peter; but the commonality and the connection and unity are considered by account and concept." And shortly after: "But in the case of the holy and super-essential and transcendent and incomprehensible Trinity, it is the opposite. For there, the common and one is understood in reality, but the distinction and division are considered by the subtle thought of the mind."

^A Thus it is evident from these things that what we were saying—that the commonality of essence, or the common essence, is signified both through absolute names and again, through relative names, the same common essence is understood distinctly (inasmuch as it is understood personally). And it is clear that Paternity, Filiety, and "Spirit-hood" (if it be permitted to speak thus), and, to speak simply, the properties, consist only in the relative. And there is no distinction other than the divine persons—that is to say, other than the fact that one is the Father, another the Son, and another the Spirit; just as the union is not one thing and the essence another. For if the distinction were something other than the fact that one is the Father, another the Son, and another the Spirit, then the union would also be something other than the essence. But this is absurd. For in that case, there would be something superior to the essence, since that which provides the union is better and more honorable than that to which it is provided. Nor is Paternity one thing, Filiety another, and Procession another; for if the definitions of these were different and opposed by way of contrariety, it would follow that God is composed of diverse and contrary things.

These are things that the great Athanasius also says in his disputation against the Anomoeans ^B, when he was seemingly goaded by them into a composition [of ideas], because he had spoken of essence as one thing and hypostasis as another. For he adds: “I did not call essence and hypostasis one thing and another as if they were different entities, but as signifying something different by 'essence' and something different by 'hypostasis'. Just as a grain of wheat is called and is both seed and fruit, not as this thing and that thing, but the 'seed' signifies one thing and the 'fruit' another." Thus, in reality, essence and hypostasis are the same thing; for there is one essence. However, we signify one thing when we call it hypostasis, and another when we call it essence. For "hypostasis" in divine matters signifies something relative, whereas "essence" signifies something absolute; and it is in this that essence and hypostasis differ: in that the one is spoken of simply, and the other in such a manner. This, therefore, is what the ^C saints mean when they say that essence and hypostasis are not the same; as if they were saying that in the super-essential Godhead, the absolute and the relative are not the same. For by the relative, the divine persons are distinguished, but by the absolute, they are joined. Moreover, union and distinction are not the same; for union is the accompaniment of the essence, while distinction is the accompaniment of the hypostases and persons.

When we say that the Son is begotten of the Father ^D, we do not understand it as a flowing, as it is in bodily things, nor as a dividing; but we understand it as whole from whole, and perfect from perfect. The same must be said regarding the Holy Spirit. For just as God creates in one way, and man in another—for the one [creates] without change and from nothing, whereas the other [creates] with change and alteration and from some pre-existing matter—so also God begets in one way, without passion or defilement, and as the Word from the mind; but man [begets] in another way, with passion, and not without the cooperation of a woman.

^A And that we may use the words of the great Basil regarding these matters, in the epistle which he writes concerning the canons: "The essence was not divided from the Father into the Son; nor did it beget by flowing, nor by putting forth [fruit] as plants produce fruits; but the manner of divine generation is unspoken and incomprehensible to the reasonings of men. For it is truly of a humble and carnal mind to liken other things to things which are corruptible and temporal, and to suppose that God begets in the same manner as bodily things; whereas one ought to draw the grounds for piety from the opposites: because since mortal things are in this way, immortal things are not in that way. Therefore, one must neither deny the divine generation, nor defile one's own mind with carnal notions." For as we have learned that there is one God, yet we do not know what He is; so also we know that there are three, but we do not know what the three are.

^B And as the divine Dionysius says: "That the Father is the primal Godhead, and the Son and the Holy Spirit are God-planted sprouts, and as it were flowers and super-essential lights, we have received from the sacred oracles; but how these things are, is impossible either to say or to conceive." Nevertheless, we believe that the Father is unbegotten light; the Son is begotten light; the Holy Spirit is proceeding light; and the three [are] one light. And the Father was always, and the Son was always, and the Holy Spirit was always. For He did not change from not being Father to being Father; nor the Son, nor the Spirit; but eternally and fluxlessly He begets a Son consubstantial with Himself, and puts forth a Spirit consubstantial with Himself; not begetting the Son first, and then putting forth the Spirit (for this is impious), but the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are simultaneous. For the cause and the caused are simultaneous. And the Son, being begotten, is not absent from the Father, nor is He separated from Him; but He goes forth from Him, and is in Him and towards Him, as in a thing. Likewise also the Holy Spirit. For the Son of God is a living and subsistent Word, and His living and essential and perfect power; and the Holy Spirit is likewise a living, perfect, and subsistent essence, and the power of the Father; not from without from... ^C

^D ...the one proceeding from the Father, [taking his] existence.

God of all. ^A

Therefore, the ungraspable essence of God and the unknown processions are kept in silence by faith; and no one investigates this, but [he who does so] will be made vain in his seeking and will fall into the judgment of the devil. But the things regarding God, as we have said, are understood and contemplated from the creation of the world by the things that have been made; and that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and the Holy Spirit as well—these are the things that have been handed down, these are themes on which all the saints theologize, and the pious follow them. But the ignorant and unlearned, when they hear someone saying something about God, immediately think that he is investigating the essence of God—what it is—and in what manner the Son is begotten from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds. They misrepresent these things ^B (88), and they turn such a person away. Those who do these things, as far as it depends on them, overturn all Scripture, both Old and New, and the explanations regarding them by the saints; wishing these to lie idle and useless, which were all written for our admonition and benefit. Indeed, they would not even have counseled those present then to struggle for the truth when it was being torn apart by the enemies of the truth; and they hinder men from taking the possible understanding about God from the divine Scriptures, forcing those men, because of their own rustic—not to say ignorant—nature, to live just like the irrational animals. And thus they injure human nature with respect to being extended toward God as much as possible, and toward praising and glorifying Him for their own benefit; and they also nearly injure God Himself, by preparing the more precious of His creatures, man, not to be praised and glorified by men, for which sake man was created. ^C

(88) And [they] misrepresent. It is to be wished that Calecas had noted openly those whom he here censures, [namely] the unlearned people themselves, who would not want to investigate divine pronouncements with others, nor treat theology seriously. It appears there were among them those who would not want to be taught, so as not to approach the Latin side, or to enter into union with them in one and the same faith, albeit a slightly more explicit one, having suspicion of whatever [claims] those men striving with diligence in that matter might put forward. Examples of these exist in the works of various men in both volumes of the Orthodox Greece edited by Leo Allatius. Certainly, no class of men is harder to lead to the faith than the unlearned and crude; they block [their] ears to the one teaching, and they do not wish to be taught, but [wish] to hold to this one thing, which they believe they have received from their ancestors. These things fit [these] ^D times, some time after the Council of Lyons, where the Constantinopolitans, having obtained [the rule of] the emperor Andronicus, were so badly treated, even those who had appeared to have striven for union or had contributed something to it in their works. To this point tends the fact that Calecas discourses on the Trinity in such a way that he could not seem to have given the Greeks the slightest opening, having deliberately [kept himself] apart from that controversy which was then rending the Churches, and [having] handed down and explained these things from the monuments of the ancients, which were confessed and accepted by both sides: which same economy of grace I have heard was observed, when a certain apostolic legate was sent, [who was] well-disposed toward the Roman See and Peter’s successor in it, and acknowledged one faith, one baptism, one Church: so that this more subtle difficulty might not trouble [the people], and to harass them with [such] disputes would be to dig a pit for them. Thus also my most dear colleague, the Rev. Father Goar, at the time when he, also sent as an apostolic legate, stayed in the island and city of Chios for about eight years, used to say that he had reached an agreement with both bishops of the Greek rite and the Latin [rite], that each might govern the portion of the flock as if they were brothers, and each might see to it that the other’s decrees were read before the congregation. He used to say further that the deacons of the Greek rite would voluntarily approach to communicate the holy Eucharist in the Latin rite. When he often approached them, he, the diligent investigator of those very rites by the will of God (who would later teach the Latin world with such clarity), [said] that they would rise as if to a master, and, a chair having been prepared, they would acclaim [him]. Perhaps this is a more convenient discipline for the gain of souls, because in it the heads of the faith remain intact, even if certain few points of a more subtle inquiry themselves remain enveloped in a mysterious kind of certainty, being clearly approved and utilized by Augustine, Gregory the Theologian, and the great Basil (not to mention others).

^A They therefore injure both, both God and human nature, in so far as it lies with them. Consequently, they do not consider that man was made in the image of God, and that for this reason he ought to return to Him, and become like Him through true contemplation and good works. They are ignorant also of the fact that Christ said that this is eternal life, that they might know His Father, and whom He sent, His Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. The truth, however, is such, that no one ought to wish to speak about God except according to what has been handed down to us by the divine Scriptures, the ecumenical councils, and the doctors of the Church; that is, to understand these things correctly, and to walk among them with much modesty and religious awe, saying nothing of one’s own, nor spouting forth things that happen to please, uninstructed, as if from the belly; but rather, putting forward what is accepted, and subsequently composing ^B and arriving at some truth, and at what is acknowledged according to the divine Scriptures, according to the common Christian notions concerning God, and in no way opposing them. Such a person has praise both before God and all His saints, walking according to the goal of human nature; and while he establishes the things of the divine Scripture, he also confers benefit upon himself and those who know less than he.

They are, therefore, the Son and the Spirit from God; but there is also creation. Verily, the Father is the author of the Son and of the Spirit; but as for all of creation, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are its cause, as one God and one Creator. In the former case, the Father is the cause as Father—that is, according to the distinguished names—and as Progenitor; in the latter, it is according to the absolute, in so far as the three are one. Whence the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are considered as one God, ^C just as [They are] one creator of the creation. And the Son and the Spirit are from God and the Father naturally and essentially; but the creature is indeed from God, who is the Trinity, but by way of operation or creation. For the Damascene says: “After these things, the creation was also made; yet not out of the substance of God, but was brought forth from nothing into the nature of things by His will and power.” But since in every respect, in a similar way, God and Father is the maker of all things, and the Son and the Spirit [are] as one maker and author of things; the Father, that is to say, is the original cause of things. For all things that belong to the Son and to the Spirit are referred back to Him. We call the Son, however, the operative cause; and the Holy Spirit, the perfective [cause], ^D just as the great Basil says to Amphilochius. Consider for me the original and primary cause, i.e., without beginning, since the Son and the Holy Spirit have from Him that which is, together with Him, the principle of created things; and the Son also is the principle, and the Spirit, through whom He proceeds from the Father, as the Greeks say.

^A Since the Father acts as the Creator, the Son as the Perfecter, and the Spirit as the Consecrator: so that, by the will of the Father, the ministering spirits begin to be; by the operation of the Son, they are brought into being and acquire existence; and by the presence of the Spirit, they are perfected. For this reason the blessed Paul also said: "One God the Father, of whom are all things,"—hinting at the person of the Father—"and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things,"—meaning the Son—"and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things." And the Evangelist John also says: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that has been made." He says "through Him," not as if through an instrument or a servant, or some such thing, but as through a natural and hypostatic power, just as our own mind operates through its own intellection—though this example is not entirely worthy of the subject, since God is far superior to all things.

^B Furthermore, all the saints say the same thing—that the Father performs all things through the Son in the Holy Spirit. And again: "Through whom we have obtained access to God and the Father." Great Basil, too, in his writings to Amphilochius, says: "The way to the knowledge and faith of God is from the one Spirit, through the one Son, to the one Father." And again, in a certain chapter whose title is "That the Spirit is shown to be glorified together with God," he writes: "Neither does the Father act without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit." And he speaks even more extensively on these matters in the letter to his brother Gregory (92) concerning the difference between essence and hypostasis, saying thus: "Every good thing that reaches us from the divine power, we say is the operation of that grace which works all things in all, as the Apostle says: ^C 'But one and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one individually as He wills.'" If, then, we inquire whether the supply of good things, having taken its beginning from the Holy Spirit alone, thus comes to those who are worthy, we are guided anew by Scripture to believe that the Initiator and Cause of the supply of those good things which are worked in us by the Spirit is God the Only-Begotten. For we have been taught by Holy Scripture that all things were made through Him, and that in Him all things consist. When, therefore, we are raised up even to that level of understanding, we are taught again through divine guidance that while all things are brought from non-being into being by that power, they do not, however, exist without a principle from it; but there is a power which exists unbegottenly and without beginning, which is the cause of all things, the initiator ^D and cause, who is the Author and Cause of all. For the Son is from the Father, through whom all things are—with whom He is known at all times to exist inseparably and joined to Him.

For it is not possible to form a conception of the Son without being first enlightened by the Spirit. And He says many other such things in the same letter; for the saints in all things strive to declare the indivisibility of the essence and the one power, together with the order of the persons, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, those who shone forth from the first unto the seventh Synod consistently assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. For the great Athanasius says: "For it was impossible for the Holy Spirit to be glorified in the glory of the Trinity if He were not being ^A in the manner of a procession from God through the Son, and not in the manner of an effect, as a creature—as the heretics, of course, say." The great Basil also says: "How then could those things be separated which are inseparable: the Word from God, and the Spirit from God through the Son?" And Tarasius, the most holy Patriarch of Constantinople, when the seventh Synod was assembled, sending a confession of the right faith to the bishops in the East, says: "We believe also in the Holy Spirit, the one proceeding from the Father through the Son, and Himself recognized as God." And Damascene: "He is Himself therefore Mind, an abyss of Reason, the Begetter of the Word, and through the Word the Producer of the manifesting Spirit." And again: "The Holy Spirit, the manifesting power of the hidden Godhead, is from the Father, proceeding through the Son."

But since the creature is also said to be through the Son, and the Spirit is also said to be through the Son, Gregory of Nyssen teaches in the first book of his *Antirrhetica* what the distinction is: "The Spirit, being joined to the Father in that He is uncreated, is again separated from Him by the fact that He is ^B not the Father, just as He [is not]; the latter indeed is without principle. He has no other author from whom He might have His being. For thus the Father alone is without principle and without cause."

[The interpreter’s translation is not pleasing: "Lest, however, they be produced even from that, without a beginning." The sense is clearly as if the Father without beginning—that is, from eternity—produces; the Son with a beginning, that is, in time; which is a heretical doctrine. Certainly, all the persons produce simultaneously and at once, and in the beginning of time. Among the Greeks, the word for "beginning" (ἀρχή) is ambiguous, as it is among us; therefore Gregory distinguishes it, and as he denies an origin from another, he removes it from the Son, as Basil also does here; but he attributes to the Son an beginning of duration, because He himself is co-eternal with the Father and never had a beginning. This is certainly the one genuine meaning of his word, nor do I see by what proven authority it could be drawn elsewhere. Damascene seems to have wished to discuss the Trinity and the divine names more accurately and cautiously, as the title of that chapter itself suggests. For here ^C he openly explains His existence from the Father through the Son, in the manner of the other saints; to which sense Calecas brings him, since he spoke in such a way in that chapter that he seemed to have provided an opening to those who think that the Spirit is given and manifested only from the Son, and not also from Him and through Him—and that He is the one true principle and Producer of Him. Therein Damascene explains why the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son: because He is manifested through Him and imparted to us; which he proves from John: "He breathed and said: Receive the Holy Spirit," etc. The modern Greeks, who strive for contention and foster schism, appeal to Damascene as if to a rule by which the sayings of the rest of the saints must be composed; the absurdity of which assertion John Veccus demonstrates brilliantly in his second oration on his unjust deposition, and draws Damascene himself to the right sense of the others, so that he only wished to deny that the Son is the primary and—so to speak—original cause, ^D which it is clear the Father alone is; not that He does not have from Him that He is one with that cause and author, and through Whom the Father produces the Spirit; which is the very force of that preposition *dia* (through), as it is used generally by Greek doctors in the mystery of the Trinity; with this caution, that by saying this or even by speaking of the Son simply, they might not seem to introduce two principles; which would be a grievous error itself, and one which Maximus—praised by Veccus himself—strikes down in his letter to Marinus from the Latins, even though they had written in their confession of faith and pontifical decree that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.]

^A And it is separated from the necessity ^B of union with the Son, in that it has the cause of its existence from God the author of all, yet it is distinguished again by the fact that it is proper to it, that it was not produced from the Father as the Only-begotten, and that it was through it that the Son shone forth. Again, since the creature was established through the Only-begotten, so that the Holy Spirit might not be thought to have any communion with it, in that it shone forth from the Father through the Son, the Spirit is distinguished ^C from the creature by being immutable and unchangeable. ^D For what is true God from true God is immutable and unchangeable, whereas the creature is mutable and changeable; and the former is ranked with the Father and the Son, and is inseparable from the Father and the Son, as one essence. "For it was not fitting for the Son ever to be wanting to the Father, or the Spirit to the Son," according to the Theologian Gregory. And the great Basil in his epistle to his brother says, "He who has received the Father, has by that very power received also the Son and the Spirit." And it is not possible to conceive of any section or division in any way, so as to think of the Son without the Spirit, or to disjoin the Spirit from the Son. But the creature is infinitely, yes, infinitely inferior to the essence of the Spirit. "For things external to the Spirit are fellow-servants with us," as he himself said in the third book of his *Antirrhetica*, "even if some seem to be preferred to others by the eminence of their dignities."

And the divine Epiphanius, writing against the Secundians, says, "Things which are after the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are rightly created, and have proceeded gloriously from Him for their subsistence, that they might exist and be in the nature of things without envy." And the Holy Spirit partakes of nothing, nor is it sanctified or perfected; for of it, it was said by Gregory the Theologian, "It was therefore always participable, but not participant; perfecting, not perfected." And the Damascene...

writes likewise: "Filling all things with its essence, containing all things; filling the world according to essence, while itself is greater than that the world could contain its power and efficacy." But the creature is both a participant ^B and is sanctified and perfected by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For the divine Basil says again regarding this: "The Holy Spirit, existing from God, is the fountain of goodness, a power bestowing life, a grace that perfects, through whom man receives the adoption of sons, and that which is mortal is rendered immortal, being joined to the Father and the Son in all things."

For the saints, as we were saying, just as they teach, when treating of God, that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and united to Him, and inseparable from Him; so too do they join and unite the Spirit to the Son and the Father, as true God and of one and the same essence, while preserving the order which the Father and the Son have between themselves. Therefore, at one time the great Athanasius, as in his book to Serapion, writes: "Since the Spirit has such an order and nature toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father, how could he who calls the Spirit a creature not necessarily think the same also concerning the Son?" And in the Tome to the Antiochenes: "One must anathematize also those who say the Holy Spirit is a creature, and divided from the substance of Christ." At another time, the great Basil, as in those things which he writes to Amphilochius: "As, therefore, the Son stands in relation to the Father, so the Spirit stands in relation to the Son, according to the order of the formula handed down in baptism. But if the Spirit is joined to the Son, and the Son to the Father, then the Spirit is certainly also joined to the Father." And in general, when the saints speak about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—who is the one and true God—and desire to rightly understand and preach the indivisible communion of the three persons, because of the one essence and the order of the persons among themselves, they weave their own theology with such words.

That the Trinity is one God, and that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are truly existing and perfect persons, and that each of these is true God, both the Old and New Scripture teach us, which I said was given to us by divine revelation. The holy men, having pursued this with all diligence, have set forth the things which have been expounded to us above. So that we too may discern the mystery of the divine Trinity, which is clearly explained and preached in the very words of divine Scripture, we shall explain a few things regarding the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, which we shall gather from the teaching of God and from those who received their faith from revelation, as if they were certain oracles and divine responses.

^A For concerning the Father, no one among the heretics has ever doubted that He is the true God, existing before all ages; nor do even the unbelievers, although they do not call Him the Father of the Son, nor the Producer of the Holy Spirit. But since some acknowledge neither the Son nor the Spirit at all, as the Jews do; while others acknowledge them, but not according to the divine Scriptures, but rather oppose them, we speak now.

It is said, therefore, in the Psalms of the divine David: "I have this day begotten thee," and, "He shall call upon me, Thou art my Father." Which the Jews, wishing to distort, say are referenced from God to David. But they are refuted by what follows. For he says, "I will give thee the nations for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." It is clear that his kingdom was encompassed by a small boundary. ^B But if they say that "He shall call upon me, Thou art my Father" applies to Solomon, it is added, "And I will set his seed for ever and ever." But these things did not happen to Solomon. Whence it is possible to understand that since some of the aforementioned words can be applied to David and Solomon, but others cannot in any way, these things are spoken—according to the custom of Scripture—not regarding David and Solomon, but as a type of another, in whom all things were fulfilled.

Again Solomon in Proverbs: "What is his name, and what is the name of his Son?" And in the Gospel: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son." And again, "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." And the apostle Paul: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." ^C But since Scripture frequently uses the name of paternity and generation, and the name of Father and Son, regarding created things, as Job says: "Who is the father of rain, or who has begotten the drops of dew? From whose womb came the ice, and who has begotten the frost in the heaven?" for this reason, distinguishing Him from created things, and calling the Son begotten, it says that He is also God, so that thus He might appear as having excellence over created things. For it says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." That He calls the Son the Word, after a few words He adds: "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. And we beheld his glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father." And the prophet Isaiah says: "A child is born to us, a Son is given to us, ^D whose rule was made upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called the Angel of Great Counsel, God, the mighty, the powerful, the prince of peace, the Father of the age to come." But if Scripture also says concerning others, "Sons..."

of the Highest are all of you," ^A in truth it calls none of the others the Only-Begotten Son of God, nor was it said of anyone, that "in him dwells all the fullness of the divinity," which is what the Scripture says concerning Him. Moreover, the Son Himself also says: "All things that are mine are thine, and thine are mine." And, "All things that the Father has are mine." And, "This is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ." The Apostle also says: "Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God."

But Scripture also numbers the Spirit third in order with the Father and the Son. For Christ says: "Going into the whole world, disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." And the Evangelist John says: "There are three who give testimony, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." And again, "But when the Paraclete comes, ^B whom I will send to you, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness concerning me."

That He is true God is clear, because adoration and worship, or service, is owed to God alone. For the Old Scripture says: "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and him alone shalt thou serve." But the saints also serve the Holy Spirit. For the Apostle says: "We are the circumcision, who serve by the Spirit of God." Furthermore, to sanctify men is the proper work of Him who is truly and properly God. For God says in the Old Testament: "I am the Lord who sanctifies you." But the Holy Spirit also sanctifies. For the divine Paul says: "But you have been washed, ^C but you have been sanctified, but you have been justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God." Likewise, it is also the proper work of God to give life. It is said in the Gospel: "It is the Spirit that gives life." And the Apostle: "If by the Spirit you mortify the works of the flesh..." ^D

^A "As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will." But giving life is in the divine Spirit. For the Apostle writes: "If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus Christ from the dead (that is to say, insofar as he was human) dwells in us, he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will also give life to our mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwells in us."

Likewise, to dwell in the minds of the saints is proper to God. For the Apostle says: "You are the temple of the living God, as the Lord says: 'Because I will dwell in them.'" But the Apostle attributes this very thing to the Holy Spirit; for he says: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" ^B Again the Apostle says: "But the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For who knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also, no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God." But to comprehend all the things of God belongs to no creature; for the Lord says: "No one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son." And in Isaiah, as if from the person of God, it is said: "My secret is to me."

Again, it is shown to be a proper work of God in prayers to reveal mysteries. It is said to Daniel: "There is a God in heaven who reveals mysteries." But this work is proved to belong to the Holy Spirit. For the Apostle says: "But God has revealed them to us ^C through his Holy Spirit." And again: "But the Spirit speaks mysteries." Furthermore, it is said in the Acts: "Ananias! Why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?" And after a few words: "You have not lied to men, but to God." Therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.

It would be a long task to seek out and bring forward testimonies by which the Deity of the Son and of the Spirit is proved, namely that the person of each is truly existing, and that each is true and perfect God. And since they are referred to one cause, the Father, from whom they have their being without time, and because that which is, is that which is and is truly existing, it is ^D manifest that the person of the Father also is that which it is, and is truly existing and perfect, which is confessed by all. And since God is true and perfect God, and endowed with reason and life; and since these things are from God (namely, both persons), nor is there any accident in God; it is manifest that these things (namely, the Son and the Spirit) are truly existing and subsisting: for each is shown by the other. And thus God is three persons and one essence and one thing, as the teachings of the divine Scripture and of the holy [index: entries preserved]

expositions that are applied to it, clearly declare. For the pages of both Testaments, and the commentaries of the saints upon them, abound with testimonies to this matter.

From these things, indeed, we learn nothing else at all than what has been said again and again: namely, that God is one, Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and that they differ in nothing, except in that the one is Father, and the other is Son, and the other is Spirit. For these are what the saints called the hypostatic properties of the divine persons. Nor do they differ by reason alone; for each of them is truly existing and subsisting, yet not in any thing that is other than the essence, for the essence of the three is one; and a person is said to be the common together with the individual. Wherefore ^B they are really distinguished by relative names, obviously according to the relations observed in the persons that exist—in those that are caused, and in the Cause.

And yet,, to speak by way of example even among us: when someone speaks of Peter and Jonah in an absolute sense, by each of these he has signified a man. And he who called Peter "son of Jonah," again designated the same man, and that he is a son born of the man Jonah, who is his father; and he has not spoken of one person, when he called each of these a man in an absolute sense, and another, when he signified him with relative names. This alone is the difference in the names, that by the absolute names he signified the essence of humans, which is without relation, while by the relative ones he signified their same essence again, ^C as to how the one is father and the other is son, just as we were saying before concerning this. But if, in cases where there is a division of matter and a difference of being in actuality, we signify both their essence by absolute names and this same essence as it is in such a relation by relative names—and because of these things, neither is Peter distinguished from Jonah in the respect of being a man, nor is it by reason alone (for it is clear that Peter is one thing by his properties and Jonah is another)—how then, in the divinity, where act is one, and there is one and the same essence of the three persons, will the distinction be either by reason alone, or by some other thing besides the essence?

Concerning these things, therefore, it has been spoken both now and previously. Furthermore, by these names the divine persons are signified. For the Father is called ^D without cause, principle, cause or author, genitor, producer, greater; which Damascene holds should be understood in the sense that He is cause and author. He is said to have the Spirit. For the Spirit is of the Father, says the Scripture. He is also said to send Him: whence He is also called His supplier. And we say that the Son is sent by Him. But He Himself is neither sent by the Son, nor by the Spirit.

^A Moreover, this mission does not introduce any distance or separation of the three Persons. For where the Son is, there also is the Father and the Spirit; or rather, it is not even fitting to say "there," for God is everywhere. Wherefore the divine ^B Chrysostom also said: "God is not sent, in as much as He is God; but in as much as He is a Person, He is sent." For how would he have said this, when the Lord Himself says that the Spirit is sent? Therefore, it introduces no distance; but because of the ignorance and darkness of our souls, we say that God has departed from us. But when the light of knowledge and of truth shines in our hearts (for indeed it is for this reason that God is called Light), we say that God has visited us.

He says also, ^C the Theologian Gregory:

"Think of the mission of the Father (that is, that He sent) as His inclined will; to whom He refers what is His, both having honor as a Principle devoid of time, and so that He might not appear to be opposed to God."

The ^D Son, however, is called caused, begotten, the Begotten. For the same one says:

For the same one also says:

"In order not to say much, it is not something else than the Father’s Word, wisdom, power, will, unless it is the Son." And the divine Cyril in the twenty-first book of the Treasures calls Him will, saying: "The Son (19) is the living and substantial will of the Father"; and in the seventh: "The Son, he says, is the Father’s Word. Therefore, He Himself is His will."

There is also said to be another will outside the essence of God, conceived according to human intention. For the great Athanasius says in the *Disputation against Arius*: "The essence of God neither began nor ends; therefore neither did the image begin nor cease; but the will both begins and ceases." Regarding which words the blessed Maximus observes (20) and says: "Will is not the same thing as the essence of God. For will both begins and ceases; but that which begins and ceases cannot be the same as that which neither begins nor ends." And the martyr Justin in his discourse *Against the Greeks* (21) says: "The essence (22) does not admit of not-being; but will admits of not-being. For God willed, and the sun was made; but He did not will that a second sun also be made, for it was not necessary." And the great Basil says: "Of whose help would He stand in need, who creates by will alone, with the creation consisting by my will?" Furthermore, the Son ^B of God is called the definition and reason of the Father; and one would not be wrong in saying that He is toward the Father as a definition is toward that which is defined, and as reason is toward mind. These things Gregory the Theologian says in his second *On the Son* (25). From which it is clear that not in the way the Son of God is named sun and light and bread and drop and pearl—which names are drawn for human use from created things, and which, before the creatures were made, were not so called (for these were formed from operations)—in the same way is He called Word and Reason, and again the Father Mind; but they are so called in such a way that, even if there were no rational and intelligent creature from which the name had to be taken, according to the sequence of other names, nothing ^C at all would have prevented Mind from existing, and Reason and Word. Since, indeed, He is from the Father before all ages; and: "He who has seen Him," ^D [has seen the Father].

the Word. ^A For if he is before all ages from the Father, and that "He who has seen Him has seen the Father"—that is, he who has understood Him has understood the Father (for thus the Theologian himself explains it in the same place)—and "has in Himself naturally the properties and unique characteristics of the Begetter," according to the holy Cyril in the second book of the *Thesaurus*, it is clear that He always exists as a definition to what is defined, and is the definition and reason, or Word, of the Father.

But since the word among us does not exist truly and per se, and possesses only a slight and obscure likeness with the mind; while there it is something complete and subsistent in the divine nature, and of the same nature as the Mind, it is named Son; and that to which it has a relation is called Father. For even among us, that which is from something, and which possesses the same nature as that from which it came forth, is accustomed to be called a son by the usage of human speech; although the Apostle says that the name of fatherhood has rather come to us from there, and was not taken by us: "From whom," he says, "every family in heaven and on earth is named," ^B to which opinion Damascenus also assents.

Furthermore, Scripture calls the Spirit of the Son the Spirit of the Father. For it says: "God sent the Spirit of His Son," and that He proceeds from the Father through Him. But it is not said that the Son is begotten of the Father through the Spirit, but that through Him He is provided, given, and sent; whence it is that He is called His giver, administrator, and arbiter, just as Gregory the Theologian praised and sang of the Son in his prayer. For the Son Himself says: "But when the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father." ^C But the saints, among whom Damascenus writes in his *Theological* works: "For He breathed upon them and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' Just as from the sun both the ray and the brightness proceed. For the sun is the source of both the ray and the brightness; but through the ray the brightness is communicated to us, and it is this that illuminates us and is perceived by us."

Moreover, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the Father, the Spirit of the Son, the Spirit of truth, existing from the Author, proceeding, procession; ^D and as Damascenus says in his *Dogmatics*, Spirit of Christ, Spirit of the Lord, Lord Himself, Spirit of adoption, of truth, of liberty, of wisdom. For He is the effector of all these. Furthermore, from His operations He is called the Spirit of faith, the Spirit of gentleness, the Spirit of the fear of God, and the rest which the blessed Chrysostom explains in the sermon which he wrote concerning Him.

^A Furthermore, He is called the image of the Son, as Paul says: "Whom he did foreknow, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son" (Rom. viii, 29). Furthermore, He is called the utterance of the Son, as the same one says again: "Upholding all things by the utterance of his power; who by himself purging our sins" (Hebr. i, 3). And the great Basil, in the chapter whose title is, "Why the Spirit is not also the Son of the Son," says, addressing the heretic: "Not because He is not from God through the Son, but so that the Trinity might not be thought an infinite crowd, as if it suspected that there are sons from sons, just as happens among men." But you will say: "If the Son is the Word of God, and the Spirit is the very Word of the Son, why is the Spirit not called the Son of the Son?" ^B Furthermore, the great Athanasius in his book *Ad Serapionem* calls Him sanctifying and illuminating—and further, his operation and gift. For he says: "Just as the Son is the only-begotten offspring, so also is the Spirit, who is given and sent by the Son, one and not many, nor one from many, but the Spirit Himself. For since the Son is one, the living Word, there must be one perfect and full sanctifying and illuminating life, which is His operation and gift; which, indeed, is said to proceed from the Father, because it shines forth and is sent and is given from the Son, who is confessed to be from the Father."

^C But this, too, it is necessary to know: often the names that are said of the Persons are taken absolutely of the whole God. For example, God Himself is said, entirely and absolutely, to be wisdom, namely the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; but the Son also is called wisdom. Therefore, we have one concept when the name is used of the Son, and another when it is used of God Himself. For when it is said of God, it is said absolutely, and is understood accordingly: the Father is wisdom, and the Son is wisdom, and the Spirit is wisdom, as one wise Being and one wisdom. But in the Son, it is said distinctly. For the Son, as begotten wisdom, is not the same as the Father, the wisdom that begets, nor, indeed, the same as the Spirit, in regard to the fact that He is begotten. Likewise, the Father is called the Father of His own Son; but He is also called the father of creation; yet in a different way in each case, as we said concerning this a little before. And again, the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit are called, in common, Spirit: "For God is a Spirit," He says, "and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth." But here... ^D The Holy Spirit, who is called the Son's, is said to be God's. [alt-version omitted]

^A we speak of the Spirit of the Father in another way. For we understand Him then as subsisting and existing properly by Himself, and ^B as being referred, as a procession, to the Father as the author of the procession. For the Spirit proceeds from the Father. For these reasons, ^C what is taught in theology regarding the three persons should be taken according to their hypostatic properties, so that we may not fall into error on this account.

CAPUT IV. What sort of images the saints hand down concerning the Holy Trinity.

Furthermore, it is not possible to take any proper example or image of this holy and blessed Trinity from human things, as It stands incomparably exalted above every essence and every thought. For what example and image taken from human things could there be, ^B when all such things are observed to be in constant generation, corruption, flux, and mutation? Nevertheless, just as we name Him from those things within our experience—so that we might not be devoid of the knowledge of Him (which, as the most divine Damascene teaches [29], He willed out of unspeakable goodness)—not to demonstrate what His nature is, but to show what He is like, in the same way we draw a likeness from these things and portray Him, so that we may arrive at a dim understanding of the unity and the property of the three persons. For it is ^C necessary to confess both the unity and the distinction, that we may believe in Monad in Trinity and Trinity in Monad.

Wishing, therefore, the saints deemed it necessary to give us some image, so that we might conceive in our minds that one and ineffable essence as three hypostatically existing persons, Gregory the Theologian says [30]: "I perceived a kind of eye, and a fountain, and a river." And: "Again [31], I thought of a sun, and a ray, and light." And ^D again he says: "For just as the rays of light, having an indivisible natural relation to one another according to nature, are neither separated from the light nor cut off from one another, and transmit the gift of the light as far as us; in the same way our Savior and the Holy Spirit, which is the twin splendor and ray of the Father, minister to us the light of the truth, and are united to the Father." And again [32]: "For just as it is impossible to conceive of any division or cutting between the mind, the thought, and the soul, thus neither is it to be imagined that any division or separation can ever exist between the Holy Spirit, the Savior, and the Father." And again [33]: "Indivisible in the divided, if one must state it briefly, is the Godhead, and as it were in suns"

^A interconnected with one another, a single commingling and tempering of light."

Nyssen also, in his Oration on the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians, says: "In those where the operation regarding the good has no diminution or variation, how is it reasonable to think that the order according to number is a sign of some diminution of a variation by nature? Just as if someone, seeing a flame divided into three torches, by the transmission through the middle igniting the tip, should then assert that the heat is greater in the first flame, and in the following one is lower, and has a difference in merit towards a lesser degree; and finally, that the third does not even enjoy the name of fire, even if it burns and shines just the same, and performs all the actions of fire."

Others of the saints have spoken of a fountain, a river, and a pool; and of fire, flame, and light. The divine Cyril also took the root, the branch, and the fruit. And in the book of the *Thesauros* he says again as follows: "Christ says, when disputing with the Jews: 'But if I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you' (Luke 11:20). He calls the Holy Spirit 'finger' here, as it were springing forth from the divine substance, and naturally suspended from it, just as the finger from the human hand. For the divine Scriptures call the Son the arm and the right hand of God, according to that which says: 'His right hand and his holy arm have saved him' (Psalm 97:1); and again: 'Lord, high is your arm, and they did not know it; but when they know, they will be ashamed' (Isa. 26:11). Just as, therefore, the arm is naturally joined to the whole body, performing everything that it may please the mind [to do], and usually anoints, using the finger for this purpose: so we consider the Word of God as naturally attached to Him and in Him, to put it so, and innate; and we consider the Spirit as extending naturally and essentially from the Father to the Son, through whom He sanctifies all things by anointing. The Holy Spirit therefore appears not as strange or estranged from the divine substance, but naturally in it and from it; no differently than the finger of the body, being of the same nature as the hand; and the hand, in turn, in the body, not being of a different substance toward it." In another place, the same [author] called the Father the rose-stock, the Son the flower, and the Holy Spirit the scent.

The saints also take our mind, and word, and spirit as an example, insofar as they are found in man, who excels in nobility among created things, in that he was created according to the image of God. But this too falls far short of the truth. For our word comes through learning and is brought forth by voice: and it is carried into the air, and being poured through the air it is dissipated, and does not truly exist, nor is it eternal, nor is it the same as the substance of the mind, but a certain thin and obscure

image; whereas the fact that it shares a communion with the intellect, ^A in that it announces the thought conceived by it and brings it into the open, and signifies what the internal word is like. But the Word of God exists substantively, and always is; for there never was a time when God was without the Word; and He is active, and omnipotent, and perfect, being the same in all respects as He from whom He is, coeternal and consubstantial, and inseparable, and never departing from Him; nor is He in some respects similar, and in other respects unlike. Likewise also the Spirit: for our spirit is a non-substantial breath, drawn from the air from without, and is of a different substance from our mind; but the Holy Spirit of God is subsistent and substantive and living and perfect, just as the Son is, active, self-moving, creating, having power as an accompaniment to His will (even if, according to the Theologian Gregory, ^B towards the first cause, just as all things of the Only-Begotten are, so also do the things of the Spirit refer back. For there is one essence, and one power of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which neither began nor shall end, having its cause from the God of the universe; never departing from the Father and the Son. For the Word did not fail the Father, nor the Spirit the Word, according to the teaching of the saints; concerning whom the divine David sings: "Your Word, O Lord, remains forever." And, "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the Spirit of His mouth." And, "You will send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created." And Job says, "The divine Spirit that created me; and the breath of the Almighty that teaches me." ^C

There is, therefore, nothing in common between our word and spirit, and the Word and Spirit of God. But we take a certain dim and very thin conjecture from such things concerning God—who is the Trinity—showing that even in our own affairs there are found certain things in each of which three are considered to be inseparable, and not severed from one another, being one according to essence, and as it were a certain whole; but distinguished from one another by differences alone: each of the three not being, according to its property, the same as either of the others; just as the eye [or source] of the fountain is not the fountain, nor the river; nor is the fountain the eye or the river; nor is the river the eye or the fountain. And again, in the case of the fountain, and the river, ^D and the lake: the fountain is not the river or the lake; nor is the river the fountain or the lake; nor is the lake the fountain or the river; although according to essence they are one; for they are water. And again, the mind is not word or spirit; nor is the word mind or spirit; nor is the spirit word or mind; although they seem to be a certain whole and inseparable from one another, or even in certain cases differing in essence; as is the case of the sun, and the rays, and the light, and likewise in the other examples. For these things, as we said, the holy ones take up.

^A in order that we also may be moderately led from these to an understanding that the divine persons in the Trinity are subsistent in themselves, incommunicable in their properties, and inseparable from one another; and so that, when any of the unbelievers accuses us, asking how we call one God three and the three one, we may have the means to silence such a person from examples among ourselves, showing that this is not absent even in things that exist, even though they fall entirely short and are far removed from showing the union and distinction that is in the Divine. For how could things that are servile and subject to the Lord, and things created to the Creator, appear equal in perfections? For this reason, we do not assume all the properties of those things which we have brought forward as examples in the case of God, but only as much as there is in them that has an affinity to what is imaged, that we take. From one thing we take the fact that the Father and the Son are inseparable; from another, that the divine persons are consubstantial and conjoined, and that they have an order among themselves, and one power and operation; ^B and we have one thing from another. But the intervals, and flows, and compositions, and transitions, and whatever other things are of our own indigence, we cast away to those things which arise and perish, as also Gregory the Theologian says: "There is nothing on which my mind can rest while considering in examples what I imagine, unless one be of such equanimity as to take one thing from the image proposed and cast away the rest. For an example is everywhere partly unlike the thing it represents, and partly like it. For if it were in all respects like, it would no longer be an example of the thing whose likeness it expresses in the highest degree, but would be identically that same thing; but if, on the other hand, it has no likeness at all, not even so will it be an example or image." For an example and an image in our experience desires to have a certain likeness in some respect to that which is imaged. In our case, it is thus; but in the case of the divine persons, the Son, who is called the image of the Father, is in all respects the same as He, being from Him substantially and subsistently, with every accident set far away.

^D But Saint Augustine, whom even the fourth and third synods called a most excellent teacher of the Church, does not take the word which is uttered by the mouth as the image of the divine Word, but that which is stored within the mind; and accordingly, he calls the Holy Spirit love; which love or affection is a property of a nature that uses reason. For to every mind, the power of will and the act of willing naturally belong. For the inclination and weight toward what is proper according to nature is present in all things; but in those which lack sensation, that very thing is called inclination and weight according to nature, such as in the earth, which tends toward the center, or in fire, which tends upward. But in those which are endowed with sensation, it is an appetite for what is proper and natural; and in those which are intelligent and rational, it is will or love, which, after the judgment of reason, either embraces and loves what has been approved as good by judgment, or rejects the contrary.

^A This love, then, which is a property of those who make use of reason, he says exists also in the divine Mind. For whence else would goodness and perfection be in us, if it did not come to us from Him in whom every perfection is understood to reside simply and in the highest degree? For, as the divine Dionysius says (35), the perfections that are in effects exist much more primarily in their causes. For as for the evils that are in us (I mean defects and deficiencies), there is no place for them in God, but for the perfections that are in us, there is place most certainly. Straightaway, the definition of wisdom is "the knowledge of divine and human things." In us, however, wisdom is contemplated imperfectly and discursively, according to the capacity of our mind; for it proceeds from one thing to another discursively, and not simultaneously, ^B arriving at the conclusion through premises. But we attribute to God, as far as concerns wisdom, this knowledge of divine and human things, but in a way much greater, more excellent, and more perfect; and we reject those things that accompany wisdom in us. As, therefore, God is and is called substance, and man is also so called, and each of those things that exist in themselves; and whatever relates to the perfection of substance and of that which exists in itself (which is its very definition, that is, a thing existing in itself which requires nothing else for its subsistence), this we attribute to God, who truly is. But being subject to time, change, and corruption, which are proper to matter that brings about the cycle of birth and decay, ^C we altogether remove from God; and in the same way, we hold regarding goodness, justice, and the rest. But if anyone says that this is not rightly spoken, then it would follow according to his argument that one should not call God substance, nor wise, nor good, so that we might not appear to honor God with human appellations; which is absurd. Although it is true to say, as we were saying, that God is neither light nor darkness (36), neither night nor day, nor this nor that—not as though He is that which in no way exists, but because He is not of such a kind as we, through different concepts and different names, conceive and understand in our mind, ^D but He transcends all existing things beyond all comparison. In the same way, therefore, love is spoken of in God, and it is also spoken of in us according to His image. But for us, that which we might love is often absent; and often also a base love arises in us, born of a base reason. To God, however, no good is absent which He might love; wherefore, neither is cupidity or desire predicated of Him; but just as He is Himself the intelligible object to Himself, as Damascene says, "God understands Himself from His blessed essence"; which very intellection Gregory the Theologian, hinting at, says that He "is moved" within Himself by His own contemplation.

^A The divine Dionysius also says: "For thus, if we behold [Him], we would revere the fountain of life pouring forth itself, and seeing it established in itself, and [he speaks of] a certain simple power, self-moving, self-acting, not abandoning itself, but a knowledge surpassing all knowledge, and always contemplating itself through itself." Or even as he introduces the blessed Hierotheus saying this very thing, and adding: "Who out of himself and through himself and in himself is as it were coiled, and always turns in the same way into himself."

Just as therefore He is to Himself an object of intellection, so also is He to Himself an object of love. For since the Evangelist John thrice called the Son of God the Word, and the Word is referred to the mind—for it is among those things which have a relation and are toward something; and it is called and is the Word of God—we all concordantly believe the Son to be the Word of God, and necessarily it is compared to Him, as word to mind, and He to the Son, as mind to word. For these names (Mind and Word) are not taken from human usage and transferred to God, as "pearl," "lamb," "sun," and other things of that sort (which truly and according to their own essence exist among us; but are predicated of God by a certain likeness), but they belong [to Him] substantially and properly and excellently. And even if no word or mind existed among men, nay more, even if among created beings there were not a single one endowed with intellect and the faculty of reason (or discourse) by whose likeness [the Son] ought to be named the Word—for the word is the perfection of the intellectual nature—since, therefore, the Mind is true in God, the Word is also true, and much more prior and excellent there, provided only that we confess a true Mind and a true Word in God; ^C which is most necessary, and is the companion of nature to those who understand and are endowed with the faculty of reason and discourse. And to this, furthermore, affection and love are necessarily the companion. For this is a property of one using reason and discourse.

Just as therefore God Himself is to Himself an object and that which is understood, and for that reason produces a Word similar to Himself, just as also our mind (for the sake of an example), when it understands something, generates from itself a word of the thing which it understands, for instance of the sun or of some other thing, and that word (that is, the definition) is similar to that thing which is understood, having all its species, except only the matter, in which that which is intelligible is something material. Since, therefore, God is Himself intelligible to Himself, He understands Himself, and in this way understands all other things, in that He is the author of things, and possesses and comprehends their reasons before all ages indivisibly and without any composition. For by understanding individual things, He does not produce a word for them; ^D for the things would then be the causes of knowledge for Him. For this belongs to our nature, which is posterior to the things and is imperfect and divided. So also He Himself is to Himself an object of love. For this being taken away, the will and the act of willing are also taken away, which is a property of the rational nature.

^A Likewise, for the reason that every thing consists in that which it is by nature, and maintains the perfection that is appropriate to it.

^B For this reason, the Son of God is also properly and maximally called the Wisdom and the Reason, or Word, of all things. But the Spirit—whom Augustine calls "Love" or "Charity"—has been hymned by the theologians as the perfecting and completing power. And just as the divine Word possesses a double relation: one toward Him whose Word He is, and as toward the cause and author from whom He proceeded, as the Theologian says of Him: "O great offspring, fruit, and expression of the Mind!" ^C and another toward the intelligible, as a definition toward the defined. For He exists as if He were the definition of God and Father, as the Theologian says of Him again: "The definition and reason of the Father," and "As each exists in relation to the Mind from which it is, so does the definition exist in relation to the defined." For he says this also in the Orations concerning the Son Himself; wherefore he also called Him an "expression." And indeed, in that respect in which He is the definition and reason and Word of the Father, He is neither greater nor less than God and Father, but is equal in all things. Wherefore He is also called the immutable image of the Father and "the figure of his substance" ^D and "an equal-formed signet," showing forth the Father in Himself, as the blessed Basil hymned in his prayers addressed to Him. For this is the virtue of the word, that is to say of the definition: that it neither oversteps the defined nor falls short of it in any way.

So also the love of God has a double relation toward Him whose love it is: both that it proceeds from Him, and that it is equalized to the object of love—that is to say, to God—whose love and charity it is. For each of the causative divine persons, the Son and the Spirit, is believed by the faith to be entirely from the entire God, though in a different mode of procession. And just as the divine Word is infinite, for the reason that the intelligible itself is infinite, so also the divine love and charity is infinite, being equalized to the object of love. For every thing is an object of love to such an extent as it is good. But God is infinite goodness. ^D Therefore, the love and charity which He brings forth from Himself is also infinite, if it is to be equalized to the divine goodness, and it must love Him perfectly. Just as, if He were to know Himself perfectly, it would be necessary that the Word be equalized to the intelligible object; which indeed is also the case, since it is established that the image of God is not in any way dissimilar, nor does it vary.

^A For just as His Word is coeternal with Him—for God, always thinking in act, has always begotten and begets His own Word—so also the Love which He puts forth from Himself is coeternal with Him; for He is always present to Himself, and always wills the good, and never the evil. And just as there is one intelligible object for God, namely Himself, whence it is also necessary that there be one and only one Word of God begotten of Him, whence the Word of God is also called Only-Begotten; so also there is one object of love, Himself. And since this is so, there is necessarily one and only one Love of His, namely the Holy Spirit.

^B Since, therefore, the Word of God is equal and coeternal with Himself, and one and alone and perfect—for that [word] of ours, being compounded of imperfections little by little, hardly subsists—so also the Holy Spirit is equal and coeternal with Himself, and one and perfect and alone. And since both the Word and the divine Love, each of these divine persons, is whole from whole; and the one, being the Word, is the unvarying image of God; and the other, being divine Love, is equalized to the divine goodness, albeit according to a different mode of procession; each is true God. For what could there be in divine matters equal to God, unless it be itself also substance and God? Whence it is necessarily both understood and gathered that the three are one substance.

^C Furthermore, since there is no accident in God, but He begets the Word and puts forth Love from Himself, it remains that the divine Word is not to be understood as one that is spoken or internal (40), nor is the divine Spirit to be conceived of as any airy thing or accident; but that they are substance, and indeed one and the same with that of God and the Father. ^D Thus, also, you should conceive the Son as never separated from the Father, and again the Holy Spirit from the latter, in the same way as thought is in the mind. There are also other passages where he urges the force of this word, as it is attributed to the Son, which tend in the same direction; namely, that it is the *horos* (definition) of the Father—His definition, by the understanding of which the Father may also be understood; which is what is meant by "to see," as the Lord speaks in John xiv, and it cannot be interpreted except of the Word, by which He comprehends Himself, and to which the interior word of the mind understanding itself is related. Thus also what Athanasius says in his *Second Oration Against the Arians*: "Unless the Son is coeternal with the Father, there was a time when the Father was" and so forth. I do not think that any word more appropriate for theologians can be found than that of "Spirit," which the Lord Himself handed down. Augustine himself shows, in those same books *On the Trinity*, how much he values the Greek expositors, and that he would rather be taught the mystery of the Trinity by them than teach it himself; though he lacked the facility of the Greek tongue, through which he might have been able to read their books and understand them sufficiently—which is certainly a matter to be regretted in so great a man, just as it is that he also did not know Hebrew. Hence it came about that, however much he possessed facility of intellect, he often wandered from the true sense of Scripture. As for the book of Augustine *On the Trinity*, which Calecas cites uniquely everywhere, since there are fifteen books, already long since distinguished in this way, I do not know if he had them all, but perhaps only this fifth one, thus translated into Greek, from which he mainly borrowed what he here sets forth.

^A but essence, or substance, proceeds naturally from essence or substance, when it performs its own end according to its proper nature; and the same is true, since there is always one end proper to each thing.

But indeed, the love and desire within us is twofold, on account of the difference and the impurity of the things that are loved. Whence also, love in us becomes base when we love base things that are present, and desire becomes impure when our reason is also necessarily base. But in God, the object of love is one—He Himself to Himself—and most holy, having been raised incomparably above all beings. And the love of God is holy and one. And since we call those things that have the secret origin of their own motion by the name of *spirit*—for thus we also call the winds *spirits*, because it is uncertain to us whence they proceed—for this reason, this divine love of God is called the Holy Spirit. For even if divine generation is likewise hidden and unknown to every generated nature, still, insofar as it is called generation, it appears more familiar in common parlance and as it were more appropriate to human nature than the procession of the Holy Spirit. For of this procession, it is not easy to find any conjecture or similarity in human things. We, however, approach some notion of the others from things that fall under the senses. ^B For God is the Word of God; and God is the divine Love; and the same God is Father and Son; and the procession of this Love is a procession of Love. And since in a rational and intellectual nature only two processions are conceived as internal—one indeed the procession of the Word, through which it knows the intelligible; the other that of love or will, through which it desires the known good if it is not present, or loves it if it is present—it is necessary that both be present in the divine Intellect, as has been shown. And the procession of intellection or activity is that of the Word and the Son; it remains that the other, namely that of love, is that of the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is the divine Love, with which God loves Himself.

^D Such, therefore, in the Holy Trinity is the example of Augustine and the teachers who follow him; and it is more connatural and more apposite than the others. For while all theologians say that the Father and the Son have a certain proportion to one another, just as the mind and the word have, nearly all the others compare the Word of God to the word that is uttered by our mouth; but Augustine adopts the similarity in the interior word that resides in the mind. For there, both the being in His image is placed, and the primary reason and discourse, by which we are rational (that is, possessed of discourse, and word, and reason), are made equal. But this word of his which flows toward external things...

is a sign ^A of the internal, and they are called by the same name on different grounds. For if we were called rational and after the image of God because of this spoken word, it would follow necessarily that we would neither be rational nor be called after the image of God, since after death we shall in no way have the spoken word, nor shall we draw in this airy spirit.

Thus, the internal word is incomparably nobler than the external one; and it is fitting that we draw similitudes of divine things from those which are nobler and more appropriate. And those presented by others are merely an image; but those of Augustine have a great similarity, so that even an unbeliever might be led from this to an understanding of the holy Trinity, provided he is not unwilling even to hear the things that are in divine Scripture, and possesses a good mind and is not disposed to contention. For it compels strongly, while also remaining in agreement with divine Scripture. ^B Rather, it draws its proofs from thence; and he who wishes will find the testimonies regarding this clearly, having read what the blessed Augustine wrote on this subject in his book *On the Trinity*.

Indeed, as long as one cannot deny that the Word is the Son, neither will he refuse to call the Father truly Mind: not such as the mind is among us, or in the angelic realm, but divine and infinite, and infinitely excelling all minds, yet of which the human mind exists as a certain example and image. From these it follows that we must necessarily posit Love in God; for this is a property of rational beings, as has been said. But also the procession of the Word from the Mind manifests ^C that procession more clearly because it is passionless and immaterial, than does this carnal generation. Similarly, the procession of Love from the will is a more manifest image of the procession of the Holy Spirit from God than is this bodily procession of spirit. Wherefore, by taking the image from the soul, we will more appropriately address the divine Mind, Word, and Love than by naming Him Father, Son, and Spirit from the body. However, since the Word there is subsistent and perfect and equal in substance to Him from whom He proceeded, He is called Son, according to the custom of human speech. ^D Wherefore also the ancient teachers of piety, and especially the great Athanasius in his works against Arius (42), reduced those who said that the Son and the Spirit were after the Father to this absurdity, as if they were saying God was mindless and will-less. For this seemed to them more absurd than to posit Him as childless and without spirit. For that would be conceded even to each of the immaterial substances. So it is clear that it is more fitting to call God Mind and Will than Father and Spirator. Moreover, they regarded it as the height of absurdity for it to be inferred that God lacks mind and will,

^A for it is impossible that there be mind without reason. And if God is willing, being rational, He necessarily has love or desire. For irrational beings, not possessing reason, could not rightly be said to will that to which they may be impelled. For they are moved toward this by a natural power. And again, if He is willing, He could not be without love proceeding from Himself. For love proceeds from the will. God, however, possesses the Word and the Spirit, as possessing Himself. For if, because of this "possessing," someone were to suspect composition—but this is also said, that the Son possesses the Father, and likewise the Spirit possesses the Probolens (the Producer). Therefore, the Father will not be "possessing" more than He is "possessed" according to the expression of "possessing." Yet this too is confessed by the Church, that the divine hypostases permeate one another; but confusion does not follow from this. "For it is not," says Gregory the Theologian [(43)], "so that they coalesce, but so that they cohere." Or also, as the Nyssen [(44)] maintains, and as we said earlier, that each is said to be in the other according to a different way of thinking: the Son in the Father, as the beauty of the image is in the archetypal form; and the Father in the Son, as the prototypical beauty is in His image.

^B But if here the Holy Spirit is said by Augustine to be love from the Father by will [(45)], while other saints have called the Son the will and volition of the Father, which we also set forth earlier—for example, the Damascene [(46)]: "There is no Word, wisdom, power, or will in the Father other than the Son"—and the divine Cyril in his *Thesaurus* [(47)]: "The Son is the living and substantial will of the Father"—and the great Athanasius [(48)]: "The essence of God neither began nor ceases; therefore, the image neither began nor ceased; but will both begins and ceases"—if they say these things, one must not be disturbed. For they are the declarations of saints, and it belongs to rational men who wish to be pious to embrace all that has been said by the saints, and not to discard some things and select others, as if they were goods in a market; but to accept all, ^C reconciling the authorities of the Fathers brought forward here with this distinction, and refuting the Anomoeans, who did not understand that we do things that we do by nature with a consenting will, nor can we not do them. Which is the highest perfection of will, even if it is not freedom, or such will that begins and ceases, according to what Athanasius or Maximus hands down, namely that it connotes this or that as an end in things. One must also cautiously note the proper and appropriated names of the persons, as they are called; the former do not vary, but the latter do; and they are in reality absolute, but are considered in such a way in this or that person, which is not the case in another.

^A Receiving and guarding all things as the voices of the Spirit, men must strive to interpret them in such a way that they harmonize with the most common conceptions of God and with the principles of the faith, and with the multitude of the saints, provided that we have no doubt regarding their holiness. It is necessary that we preserve this for them, and not pervert the sentiments and words of the saints for our own purposes in such a way that we make them seem to fight against one another, or introduce them as though they were overturning one another. For it is not reasonable that they should be thought to oppose themselves or one another; for this does not befit even those human beings to whom the light of reason shines in the least degree, let alone the saints, who have set forth all things moving under the influence of the Holy Spirit: so that those who fix their attention upon these men as teachers of piety, and obtain the truth through them, might be united in this way in Christ. ^B Regarding, therefore, the things that have been said by the saints, such should be our opinion, and such is the rule that must be used in all things. If not, it is better to say that we do not understand the intention of what is said than to overturn the worthy reflections concerning God, as the great Basil said. Here, however, we may say that the saints declare the same thing according to different viewpoints in one way or another. For the Son indeed is from the Father, as Word from Mind. According to this consideration they also said that will is from will, as Gregory the Theologian says: “To the Father, generation is the will to beget, and will is from will.” According to which mode, indeed, they have called the Son wisdom from wisdom, and power from power. The Holy Spirit, however, is from the Father, as love from the will: for this reason the procession is also distinct. But the creature, as from one will, is from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the will of the three Persons, regarding what pertains to creatures, is one. ^C This is, indeed, what the blessed Maximus also says in his disputation against the Anomoean. For when that man had said, “If God begets by one means and creates by others, He is composite,” he responds, “I do not say that He begets by one means and creates by others, but that He begets in one way and creates in another.” However, the divine Spirit, being love from the Father, is spoken of in a certain peculiar way. For Love is a relational term; therefore it is also a Person. For it is not like goodness, or the power that holds and preserves all things, or providence, which have a relation toward the creature, and are not in God Himself; but Love and charity is that which proceeds relationally. And just as the Word is said to be from the Mind relationally, although word or discourse is said of the whole God commonly and absolutely, so also is Love said. “For God,” he says, “is love.” (1 John iv, 8). Yet, properly and relationally, one thing is said of the Father, namely Mind; another of the Son, namely Word; and Love ^D

^A of the Spirit. In this way, the Spirit also might be called Mind, the same way he is God, as that saying has it: Thou art Life, Love, Light, Mind.

Likewise, also the Son. But He is not said to be [related] in the same relative way, such that the Word might proceed from the Son or from the Spirit. For if it were so, nothing would prevent the one God from advancing into many persons, which is contrary to the reason of the Trinity. And whatever shakes the reason of the Trinity or the Monad must be rejected.

Likewise, God is also called Wisdom absolutely, and this name must necessarily be common to the Father and the Son, and indeed to the Spirit. For the wisdom shining forth through the Word, which is the Word Himself, is the substance of the Father. And the substance of the Father is common to Him and to the Son. ^B Yet, nonetheless, in a certain peculiar way, wisdom is attributed to the Son; and although the wisdom of the Father and the Son is one in number, as has been said, yet the begotten wisdom is not the same as the begetting wisdom, namely, in respect to being begotten. These things, however, have also been stated before.

That we said the example of Augustine has its proofs from Scripture is true; for long before him, the divine Scripture said this in the Catholic [Epistle] of John the Theologian. For he, by saying, “God is love” (1 John iv, 8), seems indeed to have called God thus simply and without distinction, as one might speak; and what he said, he said truly, for this is consistent with the common opinion about God. For He Himself is both love and wisdom and every good. Wishing, however, to express his meaning ^C more clearly, he adds that the One whom he had called love indistinctly, is also from God. For having said, “Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God” (1 John iv, 7), he adds, “And everyone who loves has been born of God” (1 John iv, 7). By these words he indicated that he had called God that Love which he said is from God. God, then, is Love from God. For he said, “That God is love,” and, “That the love is from God,” and, “That he who loves has been born of God.” But how he who loves is born of God, he will say a little further on. But the phrase, “God from God,” signifies being from something. This, however, does not befit the Father; for He is without cause, that is, from none. It remains that it belongs either to the Son or to the Holy Spirit. But it is clear that he attributes this to the Holy Spirit. For subsequently, ^D having mentioned the love of God, not that by which we love Him, but by which He loved us, he says, “He sent His Son as a propitiation for our sins” (1 John iv, 10). From this, he taught how we also should love one another; and as we love one another, God remains in us; and conversely, as we love God, we love one another, and thus we remain in God. For pondering how much God has loved us, we are converted that we, in turn, might love Him and others. For it is not possible that he who loves God,

^A should not also love his neighbor. Therefore he said, “He that loveth is born of God”; that is to say, of the Charity which he called God from God. And he says, “But let us love, because He first loved us.”

He taught, therefore, from what has been said, that the love of God brings it about that we love God and our neighbor, and thus we remain in God, and He in us. And he clarifies this even more clearly as he proceeds. For having said that God is Charity, he adds, “In this we know that we remain in Him, and He in us, because of His Spirit He hath given us.” Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom He has given to us, causes us to remain in God, and Him in us. So that what he had previously called the work of Charity (namely, that we remain in God and God in us in return), he now says is the work of the Holy Spirit. ^B The Holy Spirit, therefore, is the Charity which he said is God and from God, and from whom he said those who love are born. That very Holy Spirit is therefore signified where we read, “God is Charity.”

God, therefore, is the Holy Spirit who proceeds from God; when He has been given to man (for that He is given and sent, no one will deny, the Lord saying, “When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send,” and, “Whom the Father will send in my name”), when, I say, the Spirit has been given to man, as He who sends knows, and He who is sent, the Holy Spirit, “Who breathes where He wills,” inflames the man with the love of God and neighbor; and then he is truly born of God, namely by spiritual regeneration, hating no one, nor thinking evil. And that which is given by the Spirit is charity: “For charity,” says the Apostle, ^C “is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.” Therefore also, as Augustine says, “The Holy Spirit is most rightly called the gift of God, being God and a charisma.” And the great Basil says that he calls it perfecting grace, and the charisma of adoption, and the pledge of the future inheritance. Cyril also called it the gift of the Son. “Which gift, indeed,” says the same Augustine, “what else should be properly understood as being, other than the charity leading to God, and without which any other gift and charisma you might name does not lead to God?”

That the Holy Spirit is indeed called Charity and a gift and a portion, he brings forward many authorities from Scripture, and finally adds this verbatim: “It were very long to recount them all. Moreover, indeed, what more could satisfy those to whom those things which we have said do not suffice?” For these people must be taught that, ^D since they already understand that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God, when they hear of the gift of the Holy Spirit

of the Spirit, that they may recognize that manner of speech ^A which is related: "In the putting off of the body of the flesh." Just as the body of the flesh is nothing else than flesh, so also the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing else than the Holy Spirit. Inasmuch as it is given, to those to whom it is given, it is the gift of God. But with himself, God is God, even if he be given to no one; for God was coeternal with the Father and the Son, before he was given to anyone. Nor, because some give and he is given, is he any less than they. For he is given as the gift of God in such a way that he also gives himself as God. For it cannot be said that he is not of his own right and power, of whom it is said: "The Spirit breathes where he wills"; and by the Apostle, whom I have already recalled above: "But all these things one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each one as he wills." Nor is there therein a subjection of him who is given, and a lordship of those who give; but there is the concord of him who is given and of those who give.

And lest anyone should say that it is spoken in this way, "God is Love," ^B in the same manner as it is said, "You are my patience"; and, "My hope," he says, "in them"; we will say that it is not said, "God is charity," in such a way that that charity is not an essence which is worthy to be called God, but that charity is a gift of God, as it is said to God: "For you are my patience." For it is not asserted for that reason that our patience is the substance of God, but that it comes to us from him, as we also read in another place, "For from him is my patience." For the usage of the Scriptures easily refutes this interpretation. For the statement "You are my patience" is of the same kind as "Lord, my hope"; and "My God, my mercy," and many other things similar to these. But it is not said, "God is my Charity," or "You are my Charity"; but thus: "God is Charity," just as it is said, "God is Spirit." ^C And let him who does not discern this seek understanding from God, not that the matter might be explained by us; for we cannot say anything clearer.

It is evident also that the things which are attributed by the Scripture to the Son and to the Holy Spirit bear witness to the aforementioned statements concerning the Word which is in God and concerning Charity, that they are attributed to them fittingly. For it is manifest from the things already said above that the Son of God is His Word, and as it were the Offspring of God, Who understands Himself. Therefore, it follows that the Word of God Himself, as if conceived and begotten wisely by the Divine Mind, is called Wisdom. For indeed the word stored up in the mind is wont to claim for itself the name of wisdom, just as operations and species also generally borrow ^D the names of the habits from which they proceed. For that which is done justly is often called justice; and

in general, that which is done according to virtue is called virtue. ^A According to this manner, therefore, that which is understood wisely is also called the wisdom of something. Hence the Apostle calls Christ the Wisdom of God. Now, it is necessary that wisdom be spoken of in God, in so far as He knows Himself; but since He knows Himself not through another species, but solely through His own essence—for God, he says, knows Himself from His own blessed cause—it is impossible for the Wisdom of God to be a habit, but it is His essence. For things do not allow that something not truly existing or an accident should be spoken of in God. But the Word of Wisdom, having been conceived in God, is a manifestation of the Wisdom of Him who understands, just as all habits in us are made manifest through operations. For it is necessary to be led upward to God from things among us, as if by dim examples. ^B Since, therefore, Wisdom is also called light, in so far as it consists in the clear operation and act of knowledge—but the manifestation of light is its splendor, and it proceeds from it—the Word of divine Wisdom is also fittingly named the splendor of light, just as the Apostle says concerning the Son: "Who being the splendor of glory." Hence also the Son attributes the manifestation of the Father to Himself, saying: "Father, I have manifested thy name to men." And one will find that the gifts and accomplishments which come to the creature are attributed by Scripture to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; to the one, indeed, as Word, but to the other as Love and Charity. ^C For this indeed is manifest, that through those gifts which are bestowed upon men by God, we attain this, that we enter into a likeness with Him. For having been perfected by these, we approach God, who is most perfect. Those things, therefore, which exist of wisdom and truth, and especially as many as are contemplative theories of the knowledge of God, one would more fittingly refer to the Word of God and His Wisdom. For all the words and reasonings of men, and likewise wisdoms and truths, are images of that first Word and Reason and Wisdom, and have their exemplars fixed in God. Whence also Scripture attributes the formation and distinction of things to the Word of God, saying that all things were wisely created through Him. ^D This, however, is not because "Every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights" (for all things are from Him through the Word and in the Spirit), but because the diverse kinds of gifts seem to have a greater affinity with the diverse properties of the persons. For the word of wisdom, by which we know God, is given to us by God, as it is uniquely representative of the Son; and in like manner, also the charity by which we love God is uniquely representative of the Holy Spirit. And thus the charity that is in us, although it is an effect of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, by a certain special reason, is said to be in us through the Holy Spirit. And in general the perfection from the gifts, for through this

as far as it is permitted, we are made similar to the divine perfection, is said to be bestowed on us by God. Just as God grants us wisdom, in [so far as] we are made similar to the divine Wisdom, so far as it is possible. And the Holy Spirit is said to be given in so far as, loving God, we are made similar to the Love (namely, to the Holy Spirit) — which ^B proceeds according to the manner of the love by which God loves Himself, as Augustine says.

What has therefore been said, namely, that the gifts of reason and wisdom are to be referred to the first Word and to the divine Wisdom, but the works of love are shown to be fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit. Immediately, Paul sets the love of God before all divine gifts. "For other things," he says, "are because they will pass away; but love," he says, "never fails," and he says that he who has not acquired it, even if he speaks with the tongues of angels and of men, has become as sounding brass or a clanging cymbal. To this gift, therefore, so illustrious, no other cause can reasonably be assigned than divine love and charity, by which souls are kindled into divine love. For those things which are after the first are from the first. Wherefore, also, whatever divine charity is in us is deservedly believed to be the work of the first Charity. But this grace, which joins men to God, Paul attributes to the Holy Spirit; "For the love of God," he says, "is shed abroad in our hearts." And while it was permitted to declare the whole Deity the author of this bounty, he attributed it more peculiarly to the Holy Spirit, adding: "through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us," referring it to the divine Charity as the primary and the author, ^C which is the love in us, which he said was shed abroad through the Spirit.

But also the indwelling of God—and our own in him—which is the greatest of human happiness, whose work should we say it is more than that of love, whose nature it is to cause those who love each other to dwell in one another? But also of this, as we have said, Scripture refers the cause to the divine Spirit. For it says: "In this we know that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit." But since from the good will which one has toward another it happens that one adopts him as a son, so that from that the inheritance of the one who adopts may belong to him, therefore, the adoption of sons is deservedly attributed to the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says: "You have received the Spirit of adoption, in whom we cry, Abba, Father."

But also from the fact that someone is established as a friend of another, all enmity is removed. For this is contrary to friendship; and [because] of the things in which friends offend, forgiveness is given by one another. For friendship ^D and love cause the friends to forgive those who offend against them. "For love," he says, "bears all things, endures all things." And the Wise Man,

^A the author of the Book of Proverbs, says: "Charity shall cover a multitude of sins." Since, therefore, we are constituted friends of God through the Holy Spirit, it follows that our sins are forgiven us through Him. For this reason the Lord says: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." To those, moreover, who blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, the forgiveness of sins is denied, as having failed to possess Him through whom the forgiveness of offenses is granted to men.

Hence it is that we are said to be renewed and cleansed, or washed, by the Holy Spirit, just as the Prophet ^B says: "You shall send forth Your Spirit, and they shall be created, and You shall renew the face of the earth." But it is also because men wish to share their secret counsels with others, since they are friends and love one another, a fact which Christ also declared with these words: "I will no longer call you servants, but friends; because all things that I have heard from My Father, I have made known to you"; as if to be a friend and to be a partner in secrets were the same thing. Since, therefore, by the gift of the Holy Spirit, through whom the Charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, we are constituted friends of God, the Scripture consistently says that divine mysteries are revealed to men through the Holy Spirit. For Paul, ^C when he had said: "It is written, that eye has not seen, nor ear heard, what things God has prepared for those who love Him," he adds: "But to us God has revealed them through His Spirit." And this, therefore, is an argument that the Charity which is from God is the Holy Spirit Himself, since through Him the divine mysteries are revealed to the saints; which all men everywhere know to be the work of charity.

Since, however, the expression through the tongue is also the interpreter of those things which are thought in the mind, it is worth the effort that we should ascribe the gift of tongues to Him who reveals the knowledge of mysteries. And Christ Himself showed this once again. For He assigned to the Holy Spirit the persistence and wisdom of the martyrs' replies to kings and governors on behalf of the faith: ^D "For it is not you who speak," He says, "but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." Hence it is also written in the Creed concerning the Holy Spirit: "Who spoke through the Prophets." But it belongs not only to the rights of friendship that a friend, by reason of the unity of disposition, reveals his own secrets to a friend; rather, that same unity requires that there be between friends a communion and partnership of goods. For since a man holds a friend as another self, it is necessary that he should assist him as he would himself, and for this reason shares his own resources with him. Wherefore, it is also the property of friendship that one should wish good for a friend and do him good. Whence also John the Evangelist says: "He who has the substance of this world, and sees his brother in need

^A of having a brother in need, and shuts up his heart from him, how does the love of God abide in him?" This also holds most true of God, whose will is most efficacious to act. And for this reason, all the gifts of God are not undeservedly said to be given through the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says: "For to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit." And after many things are enumerated, he says, "All these things one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each one as He wills."

And this too is a proof of overflowing love: that friends seek to spend time together, and rejoice in their common meetings, and in general, cannot bear to be separated from one another. Now the communion of men with God is achieved through the contemplation of Him, as the Apostle says: "Our citizenship is in heaven." Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit makes us lovers of God, rightfully through Him we also become contemplators of God. Whence the same Apostle says: "But we all, with unveiled face, beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory, just as by the Spirit of the Lord." ^B

Moreover, it is a property of friendship that a friend rejoices in the presence of a friend, and takes pleasure in his deeds and words; and from him finds consolation and relief against all hardships. Whence, in times of sorrow, we especially take refuge with friends for the sake of consolation. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit makes us friends of God, and makes Him dwell in us and us in Him, as has been shown before, it is fitting that by His gift we should receive from God joy and consolation against all the hardships and conflicts of the world. Whence also the Psalmist says: "Restore to me the joy of Your salvation, and uphold me with Your guiding Spirit." And the Apostle: "The kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." ^C And in the Acts of the Apostles it is said of the Church: "It was built up, walking in the fear of God, and was filled with the consolation of the Holy Spirit." And for this reason, the Lord also calls the Holy Spirit the Comforter.

Furthermore, to be under the yoke of no servitude, and liberty as a greatest good, is both sought after and loved. Those, therefore, who do not endeavor to please God out of fear of punishment, like slaves, but out of love for God and friendship, these are steadfast, being freely and willingly disposed toward Him, and not doing the good like slaves under necessity or force. And such as these are worthy to be called sons and friends of God. Therefore the complete and total liberty, freed from all fear, in which especially also the ^D

^A nobility of the image is made manifest, is given by divine Charity, that is, the Holy Spirit, to those who have been deemed worthy of divine sonship by grace. "For as many," says Paul, "as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." And again, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." And, "If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law."

From this it is also that the Spirit is said to mortify the works of the flesh, inasmuch as through the lusts and vices of the flesh we depart from the true good, toward which the Holy Spirit directs us through Charity, as the Apostle writes to the Romans, "If through the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." One might find many other things, moreover, by which clearly the works of Charity are shown to be fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit; so that it becomes manifest from this that the Holy Spirit proceeds from God [as Charity], just as the Son [functions] as the Word or Knowledge, both having their existence from the divine Mind and Father.

And thus far for these matters. Another, however, of the saints, being intent on this—that he might, as far as possible, make clear the union and distinction—thought of three candles equal to one another, lit in one room. For there we see the light of the three as if from one; and when one of them is removed, its light follows it, while the remaining two lights ^B are in no way lessened or increased in themselves. It is clear, therefore, that these three lights of the three candles, when they were seen by us as one, existed in themselves as distinct and not confused. Nor indeed would that one have been seen as unmixed and as if existing by itself after the other was taken away. Thus, therefore, we also conceive of the three persons: that they are one as regards essence, but that they nevertheless preserve their properties unmixed and unconfused, the persons themselves being understood as circulating and interpenetrating one another, even if our mind, as befits the subject, does not sufficiently attain to this.

The great Basil, moreover, to explain this matter, takes the rainbow in the sky, which appears when rain occurs, with moisture gathering around the air, and the sun’s ray entering the density of the clouds from an oblique angle, and then ^C fixing its own circle directly upon a certain cloud. For just as that (the rainbow) is one in respect to the substance of the air, yet many colors appear in it, and we clearly perceive the differences between them—even though one cannot be perceived by the sense as separate from the other, but it is in a certain way both continuous and divided, escaping our sense so that we cannot distinguish the medium through which it mingles and separates the difference of the colors—even so, in the common essence of the Godhead, the distinguishing properties shine forth, since, as far as the essence is concerned, no distinction is understood in the persons; and all that distinction lies solely in the properties.

^A Thus, it is taught that there is both conjunction in essence and separation in the persons, even if, as with a rainbow, we cannot sufficiently distinguish one from the other by sense; so here too, one cannot conceive of the one separated from the other because of the most perfect union. But if, regarding the things of our experience, we are not able to ^B fully grasp both the union and the distinction, how much more impossible will the comprehension of reasons be regarding the holy Trinity, the one God, who is incomparably exalted above all things and all understanding?

CAPUT V.

De Dei Verbi incarnatione juxta Scripturas.

Having considered these things according to the teaching of Scripture and the holy fathers, we further believe and confess that one of the holy Trinity, the Son of God, in the last ages, for our salvation, with His surpassing philanthropy, assumed a human body from the holy Theotokos and ever-virgin Mary, and was born of her as man without sin, being the same God perfect and man perfect, having two natures in one hypostasis, and two different wills appropriate and pertaining to the natures: the divine, clearly, and the human. ^C For sometimes He worked as God; at other times He acted and suffered as man. For raising the dead and strengthening the paralytic, and giving sight to the blind, and performing such-like works, were of the Godhead and testified that He was true God; while being hungry and thirsty and weary, and being delivered to the cross and burial and death, these were surely human and testified that He was truly man.

This mystery, namely, that God became man, is more miraculous than every miracle heard of from the beginning of time. For the catholic faith of the Church does not confess that in Christ there is only a human nature, and that the Godhead existed in Him not by nature but by participation, ^D as Photinus and Paul of Samosata thought; nor that the Son of God became man merely in semblance and appearance, as the Manichaeans thought. Nor does the Church of God teach that the Son of God was changed into human flesh, as Apollinarius said; nor that He assumed only flesh—soulless, irrational, and mindless—and that the Godhead existed for Him in place of a soul, as Arius thought concerning Christ; and Apollinarius, being convicted and persuaded by Scripture that the Son of God was not changed into human flesh, passed on to this, that He assumed only a sentient soul, but without understanding and intellect, which are proper to the rational soul, as Apollinarius also said; nor that the soul of Christ was created before the world, as Origen also thought; nor that a human soul and a human body were joined into one in Christ according to the likeness

of other men, and that in this man Christ dwelt as in a proper temple (by grace, clearly), just as in all other saints, which Nestorius taught. Nor [does it teach] two hypostases, nor one nature or will. The Catholic Church believes none of these things which the heretics have foolishly invented, and who have been rejected by the universal synods and cast away by them, ^B as having thought things alien to the sound faith concerning Christ; but she confesses and preaches that in Christ there is a divine nature that is perfect and a human nature that is perfect, constituted, that is to say, of a rational soul and human flesh; and that these two natures are united not merely by indwelling, nor according to any accident, just as a man is joined to a garment; nor by a sole relational and personal property (that is, by mere connection and name only), but according to one hypostasis and one subject. And just as in the Trinity there are several persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation, in several natures (namely two), one person is subsistent. For it is only in this way that what has been delivered in the Scriptures concerning the Incarnation can be preserved. For since Scripture indiscriminately attributes to the man what belongs to God, and to God what belongs to the man, as when it says: "This man established heaven and earth" [Ps. CII, 25]; and, "The Lord of glory was crucified and died" [1 Cor. II, 8]; it is necessary that it be one and the same [person] of whom both things are said; and because opposite things are said of him, such as being subject to passions and not subject to them, mortal and immortal; and, "He who is, comes to be," [cf. John I, 14] ^C and, "The Uncreated is created," and things of this sort; and since it is impossible for these things to be stated of the same [subject] and according to the same [nature] truly (for how can the same thing be at once mortal and immortal, and created and uncreated at the same time?)—the Church of God confesses that all things that are said about Christ are said according to one manner and another; that is to say, the divine things belong to him inasmuch as he is God; and the human things, inasmuch as he became man. For indeed, according to the form of God: "All things were made through him" [John I, 3], and "He and the Father are one" [John X, 30]; and, "As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself" [John V, 26] (that is, he begat him as Life, as the divine Chrysostom explains), and "He is the true God, the eternal life" [1 John V, 20]; and all things that the Father has are his. For he says: "All things that are mine are thine, ^D and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them" [John XVII, 10]. But according to the servile form of man which he assumed: "He was made of a woman, made under the law" [Gal. IV, 4]; and, "He came not to do his own will, but the will of him who sent him" [John VI, 38]. Many names, therefore, are spoken of Christ, for the reason that both natures have coalesced into one person. Of these, some belong to him as he is God, as we have said; and these names are attributed to him even before the union. But also, before

the union, all those things which were spoken prophetically concerning him are fitting; such as that: "Our God shall come manifestsly." And: "Behold, thy king cometh unto thee." And that: "Afterward he was seen upon the earth, and dwelt with men," for that is as if to say, "He shall be seen and shall dwell." And that: "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways," for "He shall create me." For some of the saints understood this of the flesh created for the Word of God; and they attributed what follows, "Before all the hills he begetteth me," to the Word of God begotten of God the Father before all ages; while others interpreted it of the wisdom which is manifest to the world. And a witness to this is the great Basil in the first chapter of Proverbs, whose pronouncement on this subject we have already mentioned in its proper place.

^B These things, then, are fitting for him before the union, some according to the divine nature, others prophetically, as we have said. But since in one person he united to himself human nature inconfusedly and immutably, and was the same who is at once God and man, and because of this ineffable union the flesh was able to partake of the riches of the Godhead—that is to say, it was deified—so that Gregory the Theologian says concerning this flesh: "And I dare even to say, it is also a partaker of the Godhead and is God." The natures communicate to each other the names, which they also call the mode of communicatio idiomatum (the exchange of properties); and sometimes we frame our discourse from the more excellent part, saying the "deification of the flesh" because of those riches which came to the flesh from its natural union and conjunction with the Word of God; ^C at other times, from the inferior part (that is to say, from the flesh), we speak of the "incarnation of the Word," "emptying" (kenosis), "becoming man," "humiliation." All these things are understood from the perspective of the humanity, and are attributed to the Word and God, while he himself has suffered nothing thereby regarding his own essence. Finally, at other times, we weave together names from both, when we speak of "union," "intercourse," "anointing," "conjunction of natures," and (if I may so speak) "conformation," which are understood in the nature of the flesh. For this served as the flesh united to the Word of God, and anointed, and deified as being lesser and needy. For the permeation (perichoresis) of the divine nature into the flesh—which we also call union—has bestowed upon it this intercourse, and the deification, and the anointing, and the conformation of the divine nature, so that it might be understood as residing around the flesh. ^D These things, then, it is fitting to say regarding the union.

After the union, those things which previously, before the union, were fitting also remain appropriate; those, namely, which pertain to the divine nature, and those which (as we have said) were spoken of him prophetically; for the divine nature was not changed into the vileness of the flesh. But even after the union, he remained the same God, perfect and human, perfect. Therefore, the flesh is in such a way called God, being anointed by him, that it is in no way separated from him by a personal distinction, since it otherwise keeps its own nature, and is itself also created, not being God himself by nature.

^A And it will rightly be said that the one born of a Virgin is God, the creator and maker of creation, who is more ancient than all the ages. Things said after the union by no means befit being said before the union; for even before the incarnation He was not born of a Virgin, nor did He consort with men. Nothing, therefore, of the things that follow the union is fitting to be said of Him before that union, unless perhaps prophetically, as we have said.

It is fitting, therefore, after the union, to speak of Him in terms of both what is proper to the divine nature and what is taken from the human part; as, for instance, the birth from a Virgin, the growth in age; in short, all things that afterwards came upon human nature on account of sin, none of which He was subject to, who was conceived of the Holy Spirit and had remained through all things most pure from any stain of sin. The things said of Christ in reference to the body, such as that He hungered, thirsted, labored, prayed, and was in agony—which are entirely natural and blameless passions of the body—are said in such a way that the divine nature is in no way whatsoever affected by them; even if we say that the Son of God hungered and was in agony, it is clearly according to the human [nature], because of the supreme circumincession ^B and union of the divine nature with the flesh, in an unmixed and unconfused manner, just as the soul does to the body, or as fire is shown to permeate the nature of iron without mixture, and communicates itself to the whole, to speak by way of example.

Therefore, all that is said more humbly pertains to the human part, such as: "Why do you seek to kill me?" [John 8:40] And the question, "Where have you laid Lazarus?" [John 11:34]; [the account of] his running under the fig tree [Matt. 21:19; Mark 11:13; cf. Luke 9:10], [the account of] his withdrawing, and finally that: "He acted as though he would go further." [Luke 24:28] To this also pertains: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" [Ps. 21:1] And that: "Having become a curse for us." [Gal. 3:13] And that: "The Son himself will be subjected to him who subjected all things to him." [1 Cor. 15:28] For He said these things by way of appropriation, attributing to Himself the person of man, and placing Himself in the same class with us. ^C For we were those who were forsaken and in need of being subjected, as being liable to sin and death, and not obeying the commandments of God. But He "did not commit sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth." [1 Pet. 2:22; Isa. 53:9] Therefore, neither as God was He forsaken (for He is one God with the Father), nor again did He sin as man; wherefore He was neither forsaken, nor did He have need to be subjected; but He said these things, appropriating to Himself what is human, as has been said. For concerning Him it is said: "Who takes away the sins of the world," [John 1:29] and, "He himself took up our infirmities and bore our diseases." [Isa. 53:4; Matt. 8:17]

As for that [saying], "The Father is greater than I," [John 14:28] some of the holy men ^D have considered it to have been said by reason of cause.

^A (that is to say, by the authority of principle). However, the Father, inasmuch as He is the cause and author of the Son, does not on this account claim for Himself that which is greater. For if on this ground the Son were distinguished from the Father—inasmuch as He exists from a cause, or that which is from an author—then it would follow that He is less, and in this manner the Father would be distinguished from the Son according to greater and less; which, as something contrary to the Catholic faith, has never been stated.

But the great Athanasius also says in his book *Against Apollinarius*: "The Son calls the Father greater than Himself, and He honors His own Father." Just as, therefore, the Father is not distinguished from the Son by honor, so neither is He [distinguished] by the "greater," inasmuch as He is the cause of His own Son; but He is greater as simply being the cause and source and principle. And just as the Father is called the principle of the Son—to which principle, however, no limit is assigned—and just as the great Basil ^B called the Father the original and first cause, or also, as Gregory the Theologian [says], "One must refer to the first cause," and no second cause is assigned to this cause, as if helping with secondary cares and works (for thus a double principle of creation would exist), in the same way the term "greater" spoken of the Father is to be understood by reason of cause, as some of the saints have said, regarding the cause explained in itself, and not as it is spoken in relation to anything else. Otherwise, the Son would be referred to as lesser than the greater, which is absurd.

Other saints, however, have interpreted it ^C according to the human aspect. And the divine Chrysostom says: "He said all these things because of the infirmity of the disciples." It is possible, therefore, to say that Christ spoke this in regard to the opinion of the disciples, because they surely thought the Father was greater, as author simply, and not with a view to His own nature and person. Just as, also, to him who said, "Good Master," He answered, "No one is good, except God alone."

And He says the Father is greater, having taken the form of a servant, and honoring His own Father. He did not say "greater" by any magnitude, nor by time, but because of the birth from the Father Himself; except that even in saying, "He is greater," He indicated again the property of the essence—that which cannot be compared. For what is surprising if God is greater than a man? ^D Or, as those words of the Symbol have it, that a man is less than God? Which conclusion, however, is not accepted by those who want the Father to be called greater than the Son, as Calecas also interprets; whereas Gregory finds the Father to be both greater and equal. Is it not clear that the term "greater" is to be referred to the cause, but "equal" to the nature? Thus Hilary: "Greater by the authority of principle," and others. This seems to me clearer than what Calecas appears to imply. Let the Father be greater, therefore, because He is the fountain and origin of the whole Godhead; nevertheless, the Son is not on that account lesser, because He received that very same nature of the Godhead, which is the Father's, by being born from Him. Nor is it easy to speak of anything else in the Trinity than what has been handed down by the words of Scripture and the saints.

^A

He says to the disciples who questioned Him about the day and the hour and the consummation: "No one knows, neither the Son, but the Father alone." [Matth. XXIV, 36] Thus they thought at that time, and He spoke condescending to their understanding, since they knew the things concerning Him in this pure way. And many such things are found elsewhere, represented in Scripture, just as it is said, "Adam became as one of us." [Gen. III, 22] For he had supposed he would become a god; but in truth he did not become one. The great Basil takes the words, "No one is good except one, God," as applying also to the human perspective. For he says, "The Lord speaks many things from the human part," but he also takes it according to the divine nature. For in one of his letters to Amphilochius he says thus: ^B "The Son does not place Himself outside the nature of the Good when He says this; but since the Father is the first Good, we believe that 'no one' is said with the inclusion of the first. And the statement, 'No one knows the Son except the Father.' For He does not therein accuse the Spirit of ignorance, but testifies that the knowledge of His own nature belongs primarily to the Father." And we think it reasonable to say that the text, "No one knows the day and the hour," refers the first knowledge of things that are and things that will be to the Father, showing the first cause to men in all things.

And again in the same letter, ^C he deems the statement of Matthew, "But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, but the Father alone," worthy of this explanation: "That He said this to distinguish Himself from the angels, and not that He Himself remains ignorant of the timing." ^D We consider this consolation to be found in Matthew. He deems it worthy of this explanation: "Because the word 'alone' is added, as also in Matthew; 'unless the Father' alone;—" [index: entries preserved]

^A and did not include him with his servants in terms of ignorance. The Lord, therefore, keeping silent about his own person—concerning which it had been explored in the authority of Matthew—said that the angels did not know, but that the Father alone knew, implying the knowledge of the Father, through this reticence, to be his own as well. For he himself said: "All things that the Father has are mine," 18 and "As the Father knows me, I also know the Father." 19 And he explains the authority of Mark: "But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels who are in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father," 20 as follows: "That no one knows, neither the angels of God; but not even the Son would have known, unless the Father [did]." That is to say, the cause of the Son’s knowing is from the Father. For since he is generated from him, and is consubstantial with him, he has the same substance and knowledge with the Father. And because, says the divine Cyril, "the whole of the Son proceeds from the substance of the Father, not even the Son would have known the knowledge of existing things, unless the Father [knew]."

These things are thus. But the saying: "Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with you before the world was," 21 is spoken for the sake of the manifestation and belief among us. For indeed, as the Damascene says, "He himself indeed was and is glorified; yet his glory was not manifested and confirmed to us, according to that which was said by the Apostle: 'Who was declared ^B Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness from the resurrection of the dead.'" 22 For through the miracles and the resurrection and the coming of the Holy Spirit, it was manifested to the world that he is the Son of God; speaking these same things directly to the divine Basil, who says: "From the sea and the winds obeying him, they recognized his divinity." For indeed, the natural glory of God is this: to be born of the Father eternally and without beginning. Just as, therefore, if anyone draws him down into the rank of a creature, as far as it depends on him, he destroys the glory of God; so also consequently, he who confesses him as co-eternal, of equal honor, and consubstantial with God and Father, glorifies him with the glory which he had before all ages.

There are also some things said regarding Christ according to the division in the mind. ^C For if we divide in our thought the nature of the Word of God and the flesh, which are inseparable in act, he is called a servant and ignorant; for the nature that was assumed was indeed servile and ignorant. And if it were not united to the Word of God ^D

^A by hypostatic union, it would neither be a servant nor ignorant according to human infirmity. In this manner also he called the Father his God.

Since, therefore, many names are predicated of Christ according to different reasons, it is worth the effort to attribute those that are more sublime to the divine nature; those that are more humble, to the human; and those that are common, to the composite one—namely, to the one Christ, who is God and man. And it is necessary that we understand these common names, which are appropriate to both parts, as belonging to the one Christ, and that all works proceed from him as from one person, yet so that each work is referred to that which is proper to it; so that, indeed, we refer the divine work to the nature of the Deity, and ascribe the human work to humanity. For a divine work is one thing, and a human work is another. And by holding this faith, we shall not err. From all of which, the distinction of the natures that are united is known, ^B and the fact that, as the saints (and especially the most divine Cyril) say, Deity and humanity are not the same in natural quality, even though there is one Son, and Christ, and Lord, who is indeed one by reason of person, since the hypostatic union is in no way divided thereby, because we acknowledge a natural distinction.

With this incarnation, however, we confess that the Father and the Holy Spirit had nothing in common, except for will alone and good pleasure; but when we speak of good pleasure and will, we do not in any way separate the Son from this good pleasure and from the good will toward us; for he is one God ^C with the Father and the Spirit, and one and indivisible nature. Whence also, when we say that he was in the world on account of the assumed flesh, and that through it we might recognize the Son of God himself and God, he was nevertheless never absent from the Father; but even when born of the Virgin, and dwelling on earth, and enduring all things as man, he was inseparable from God and the Father, from whom he is eternally born, and from the divine Spirit. For God was never without the Word. For we ought to remember that it was not fitting that the Son should ever be lacking to the Father, or the Spirit to the Son, nor can it happen that any section or division should be conceived in the holy Trinity, ^D as if the Son could be thought of apart from the Father, or the Spirit separated from the Son; which things Gregory the Theologian and divine Basil say, and Damascene, having followed them, teaches in these words: "It is necessary, however, that the Word also have the Spirit."

Since we were saying that God is one substance, which is also the Trinity; and that the Father is perfect God, and the Son likewise, and the Holy Spirit; therefore we say, according to the holy Dionysius and the

^A rest of the holy fathers, that the whole divine substance was incarnate in one of its persons. For the divine Paul says: "In him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily," that is to say, in his flesh. Those holy men who say these things say in the same way that the person of the Word of God was united to the whole human nature in one hypostasis. For in our own case too, the whole human nature is perfect in each individual, to use an example. For nothing was lacking; rather, he took unto himself all things belonging to the perfect human being: body, soul endowed with intelligence and reason, and their blameless properties. For that which lacks any one of these is not a human being.

^B He therefore took up the whole human being, so that he might grant salvation to the whole that had fallen. "For that which he has not taken up, he has not healed." But with sin, whether that which is of the mind or that which is of action, he had no communion whatever. For that is sin of the mind when someone consents to do evil; it is of action, when he also completes it in deeds. Of these things he had none, but he did possess all those things which are of nature and are blameless; for instance, hunger, thirst, fear, pain, anguish, and the shrinking from death, which naturally exist in human beings, and he was subject to the corruption of these. But to that corruption which comes from sin, or to the dissolution of the body after death, he was by no means subject. Therefore, ^C because of the aforementioned affections, we say the body of the Lord was corruptible, insofar as he was conversing with us and had not yet tasted death; but incorruptible after the resurrection, since he no longer needed those things by which the body is sustained according to the necessity of the former life, nor was he ever to suffer any dissolution or corruption. And if he did partake of food after the resurrection, this did not happen according to a natural cause; wherefore we say that this food was consumed by divine fire, as he himself knows. But it was done for a wise purpose, to procure belief in the resurrection, just as it was that he should be touched by human hands; ^D although this seemed to be contrary to his having entered when the doors were shut. For that which can be touched must also be corruptible, and that which is incorruptible cannot be touched.

His body was indeed incorruptible when he entered while the doors were shut. But just as, when he was born as a man, he kept the one who gave birth to him a virgin, and joined these two things—virginity and childbirth—which are impossible for men, so here too did he bring about a strange and inconceivable manner of entry.

^A For it was in a new way, and one surpassing all power of the mind, that our Savior, after the resurrection, displayed his own body as both incorruptible and palpable: that, indeed, by displaying it as incorruptible, he might call the faithful to spiritual contests and rewards; but by providing it as palpable, he might confirm us in the faith. So that he might show his own body to be of the same nature as ours, yet of a different brightness, he displayed himself as both palpable and incorruptible. As long, therefore, as he moved about in the world, as we were saying above, he was subject to death and to all those natural and blameless passions which we have mentioned (for he had assumed a perfect human being), in which he struggled as a man and showed how these things ought to be ordered within us, and that our nature must not be allowed to be dominated by them through some brute impulse and beyond reason. ^B For also, as a man, he had a human will; but it was subject to the will of his own divinity, and it was not moved in opposition; but he both willed and did those things as a man that his divine will prompted. For when the divine nature permitted it, he was for a time affected by the blameless passions proper to human nature, so as even to choose voluntary death; and again, when the same permitted it, he declined it. For he himself says: “I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again.” And: “My hour is not yet come.” But in us it does not happen in this way; rather, because of the bent of our free will, being easily seduced by base pleasure, we prefer the will of the flesh, which is contrary to the will of God and to the perfection of the soul. For regarding this it is said: “The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.”

From these things, then, is also solved that question: why he did not begin to perform signs before his thirtieth year. For since it is established by the consensus of all that, while being God, he became a perfect man, sin alone excepted, it is clear that, in so far as he was God, even when he was passing through the years of boyhood and infancy, he could have performed these signs in a human way. For although the Evangelist says: ^C “And Jesus increased in wisdom and in age and in grace,” it is not to be understood as if he grew little by little, and proceeded from that which is in potentiality to a more perfect act (as is the case with men); for “what could be more perfect than that which was from the beginning perfect?”—but because, in his face and gestures, as he was a man, beauty and grace shone forth, and because his divinity was revealed little by little through works appropriate to the degree of each age; as is the author Gregory the Theologian. For because the perfection of human age and knowledge is especially completed at that time, therefore he too, having been made man, just as he had undertaken all other things (for he was even circumcised and was brought ^D to the temple according to the law, so that he might not seem opposed to God), it is evident that

[589] ^A ...offered, according to what the law commanded; for He says Himself: "I have not come to abolish the law, but to fulfill it" (for otherwise He might have seemed an adversary of God); it is manifest that in the same manner He also purposed in His mind to perform signs, according to what was appropriate and apt for the habit and perfection of human nature; that He might teach us not to be eager for vainglory, and that we should not immediately, when the passions are in their prime, rush forth to contests and temptations. For He Himself also contended at that time against the passions: "For Jesus was led," he says, "into the desert by the Spirit, to be tempted by the devil," and so that He might not seem to have assumed the human [nature] merely as a phantom (68). For if, even when this had occurred, some still dared to say this, what would they not have said had these things not been ordered in this way? And yet, even before this, through certain means, He gave some dim indications of Himself. For the star in the cave, and the angels and the Magi, and [His] reading in the midst of the temple, and stopping the mouths of some of the scribes, though He had not learned letters—even if those present did not understand—these things nevertheless indicated that He was God. ^B Yet He previously refused to preach and teach constantly in public before many, or to bring disciples with Him and perform various miracles while assuming the dignity of a teacher, as this did not befit the childhood age of men, lest, as we said, He might seem to do everything as if by a phantom, deceiving the senses of the spectators.

Otherwise, as Gregory the Theologian says in his discourse On the Lights (69): "Since it was laid up for Him to undergo a saving death, it was necessary for all things related to the passion to converge toward the passion: the manifestation, the baptism, the testimony from above, the preaching, the convergence toward the passion, the miracles; and that they should become, as it were, one body, not torn apart nor interrupted by intervals of time. For from the baptism and the preaching [came] the commotion (70) of those who flocked together (for thus does the Scripture call that time); and from the multitude of the people, the showing forth of signs and the miracles which brought them to the Gospel. ^C And from these [came] envy, and from this, hatred; and from hatred, the plotting and the betrayal; and from this, the cross, and those things by which we have been saved." Having taken up human nature, and as a man having struggled through all things, and having conquered the adversary... ^D [regarding the aforementioned commotion] ...nothing violent is attributed to the element [of the earth], but it is metaphorically transferred to men, whether [the Scripture] meant the earth or water; and it signifies not so much a movement of the earth, but rather a commotion, an agitating, or a fluctuation and tumult of minds. Hesychius: though *seismos* seems to be said more commonly of the earth, and thus the Latins have applied that word to an earthquake; it is common to all things which in any way can be shaken and moved by some impression or passion. The Theologian judged that by that word was meant a massive commotion of minds in Jerusalem, by which the whole city appeared as if it were a sea rising in a surge or the earth trembling, thus preparing for the cross of the Savior.

^A And having struggled, and with the adversary conquered, while He Himself remained always invincible and suffered as much as we were bound to suffer—since we had sinned by our own will and counsel and had become alienated from God—He finally died and was buried, and overcame him who had mastered human nature through sin; and having condemned him, He freed us from that slavery by His own cross and death. For if through the sin of the first Adam, spread to us like a corruption, we were condemned and fell under death, how shall we not much more be justified through the death of the Son of God, who took up the old Adam without sin and became the new Adam? For as Paul says, "He destroyed the condemnation of sin in His own flesh," when death was put to death. And if through that old man we became enemies and apostates from God, how shall we not through Him be brought near and reconciled to God? ^B For the devil, having fallen from the glory of God through his pride, incurred death of the soul; since to depart from God is defined as the death of the soul. But he did not suffer bodily death—which is the separation of the soul from the body—because he was incorporeal. But not bearing to see himself fallen from his former honor, while man was deemed worthy of the glory of God, he envied us our nearness to God, and having enticed us, dragged us away from the commandments of God and brought in sin. Thus, therefore, he caused a double death for us: first that of the soul, and then also that of the body, which is brought upon us by sins. For, he says, "God did not make death, nor does He take pleasure in the destruction of the living." For death is the condemnation of sin. Therefore, it was also brought upon us who are clothed in a mortal body. ^C For we were fashioned by God midpoint between mortality and immortality, so that if we remained in the good, we would inherit immortality, but if we loved the evil, we would undergo death. For having been created with free will, we have no necessity from outside to embrace either virtue or vice. Whence we are also rightly worthy of condemnation or praise, since we possess the principle of movement from ourselves whenever we choose to do anything. ^D The Son of God, therefore, having become man, did not undergo the death of the soul. For how could He, who was born of a Virgin, and in whose mouth no deceit was found? For this reason, He was not even subject to bodily death, inasmuch as He had lived a life immune from all sin. Yet, since the devil cooperated through the God-slaying Jews, He voluntarily accepted it for our sake. For He could die, as He had put on the old Adam. And because there was no primal sin as a cause for Him to die, He took His body up again.

^A Through the death of the devil, we suffered a double death; but by the simple and single death of Christ, which He voluntarily accepted, we were delivered from death and made alive through it. And, as Isaiah says: "By his stripes we were all healed." For although we die bodily, because we have a mortal body, we believe that we shall receive our bodies back again in glory, when Christ, our life, shall appear, according to the blessed Paul; although in the struggle by which He overcame death, no help was contributed to Him by us. But because of the communion of human nature, which He received in its entirety in one Person, and because we invoke Him as Lord and Master and praise Him as Savior, and sing to Him songs of victory for the trophy over death, He makes us partakers of that victory and grants us freedom. For when God the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit condemned the devil, because he had unjustly brought death upon Him who was guilty of no sin, Life Itself could not be held by death; but as Lord of glory, He defeated the prince of darkness and the powers under him with exceeding might, and destroyed their strength; and in this way shattered their bonds and released the souls of the saints (by whose hope they were held), and gave them the gift of freedom, and brought them back with Himself, along with those who had just believed in Him at that time. Resuming His own body, He rose again on the third day as the victor over death, having crushed the vessels of the prince, and having consigned him like a captive to prison and chains.

^C Then He also made Himself visible to the disciples, and ate and was touched, for the sole purpose, as we have said, of confirming the faith of the resurrection; and finally, in the sight of all, He was taken up into heaven, something that had never happened to anyone before. For Elijah was indeed caught up, not into heaven, but is said to have been caught up as if into heaven. "For no one has ascended into heaven but He who came down from heaven." And while the one was carried up by another, Christ was carried up into heaven by His own power. Therefore, having become the firstborn from the dead and the firstfruits of them that sleep, He afforded us the hope that we too shall rise in the same way, and stand before Him, the Author of our salvation, either to receive immortal glory or punishments; then, of course, when (as we believe) He shall come again a second time to judge the living and the dead.

^D He, therefore, who was puffed up against the human race, and boasted that he would seize the world like a nest, is now mocked and laughed at by us who worship Christ, both God and man, and who cry aloud: "The grace of God our Savior has appeared to all men, instructing us that, denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly and righteously and godly in this present world." For no longer from this time...

let there be anyone who is free from the mark of his sin, ^A so much so, that we, being partakers and companions with him, are necessarily under the power and communion of that dire ruler of the world and author of sin. For we have from our own nature, as it were a gift and a sacrifice to present, the flesh which was taken up by the Son of God without sin—that is to say, the perfect man—with whom the enemy also engaged, and was utterly defeated. "For there comes," he says, "the ruler of this world, and in me he will find nothing." And, "Now the ruler of this world will be cast out." ^B

Being then taken up, and sitting at the right hand of God and the Father, whom he himself reconciled to us—who had turned away from him on account of sin and had been joined in alliance with the ruler of the world—he even now intercedes for us with God and the Father, as Paul says. And in the respect in which he is man, he entreats; but as he is God, one with the Father and the Spirit, he receives the prayers of the suppliants. Great, therefore, is the dignity conferred upon men; great is the confidence, great is the honor. For we might boldly say: God has ministered to men; man is adored and worshipped by all the service of the angels; we have in the heavens a brother and a friend. For he himself willed to be called the first among many brethren. For he says: "Tell my brethren." And, "No longer will I call you servants, but friends." ^C So that that which Paul says comes to pass for us: "By grace we have been saved, and not by works of the law." For what could be greater than such grace, that the Son of God, for our sake, when we had offered nothing beforehand, willed to become man, to deliver us from idols and error and the shadow of the law; and to teach us the true and righteous worship; and, having become our mediator and high priest, to tear up by himself the handwriting of our sin, and to bring us to God, and to work reconciliation with him; and to bestow as a reward upon those who obey him intimate relationship with himself—so that, passing through this age with most certain hopes, after our departure and the restoration of all things, we may dwell with him?

He is, therefore, at the right hand of God and the Father, "who is in the bosom of the Father," although, as he promised, he abides among us "even to the consummation," and directs and fashions our life, which is understood in secret; ^D which we already begin here through the sacraments, but we await its consummation in the future, if only we do not appear to be negligent, with such great apathy that, for the sake of small and temporary pleasure, we betray so great a gift; but rather that with all diligence, through his commandments and the sacraments delivered by him, we may strive toward our homeland, and return to it, and be joined to him as members to their head; and as

^A branches we may remain in the vine, and not be cast out to become fuel for the fire that is never extinguished.

CHAPTER VI. On the Seven Sacraments.

For certain divine sacraments have been delivered to us, by which it is possible for those who are initiated—that is, those who believe in him—to be sanctified and to obtain what is sought. For since the death of Christ is as it were a universal cause of human salvation, and it is necessary that a universal cause be adapted to each of its effects, it was clearly necessary that certain remedies be given to men, by which the benefit prepared by the death of Christ might be joined to them, and by which spiritual life is established, just as human life itself is formed. We have received by tradition that these things are done through sensible means, because man, also being a sensible creature, is raised through sensible things to those things which are spiritual. And since a twofold order is found in human life—for some are those who provide for and order physical life (namely, parents), while others are those who receive the provision and the order, who indeed establish the state with laws and rule it by the office of a magistrate—in the same way is spiritual life constituted.

Just as, therefore, each existing thing receives life through generation, so we too are regenerated according to spiritual life through baptism, by which not only is the stain of sin contracted from our first parents removed, but also whatever sins may have been committed by the one being initiated before baptism—not, however, those committed after it. For as Gregory the Theologian says: "It has remission of sins that have been committed, not ^B of those that are being committed."

What is visible, therefore, in baptism is water, but the holy Trinity is spiritually present—into which we have received the command to be baptized—and grants this regeneration. Christ himself also received this baptism, not as if he were in need of cleansing, but that he might renew and restore our nature, and teach us the manner of perfect baptism. For those things which existed before, since they had the character of a figure and preparation, were imperfect, at the time when the mystery of the holy Trinity was made manifest, the Son who was being baptized having the proclamation of the Father’s love for him declared by a voice formed in the air and filling human ears, and the holy Spirit descending upon the one baptized in the bodily form of a dove.

Again, because that which is born reaches its due magnitude through growth, to us also is granted the perfection of spiritual ^C strength through the anointing with oil. For in this is the spiritual strength and perfection made manifest, when we dare to confess the faith of Christ in the sight of all men, and do not—for fear or shame ^D

shrink back or flee from such confession. For this reason we receive it also upon our forehead, that we may not be ashamed to confess Him. And upon our hands and our feet, that we may offer these to God as weapons of virtue and righteousness. Hence we are also marked with the sign of Christ, that is, with His cross, by which Christ Himself fought and conquered, that we may show under what commander we serve. Furthermore, this anointing is prepared from oil and aromatics, so that we may both have a good reputation in the world for our works, which is spread abroad like the fragrance of a perfume, and also, just as athletes were anointed with oil when about to descend into the arena, so we too may contend for the decrees of the Church when the time calls for it. ^B

Again, just as physical life requires natural food to grow, be strengthened, and be sustained or preserved, so also in the spiritual life spiritual food has been given, so that through it those who are reborn may both be preserved and increased. And this food is the partaking of the body and blood of Christ; which is handed down through the symbols of bread and wine, things which men use more commonly for physical nourishment. Through this sacrament, moreover, we receive the memory and presence of the Lord’s passion. For our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, as the holy Gospel says, “on the night in which He was betrayed, took bread and, giving thanks, broke it (that is, He cut it apart and divided it), and said to His disciples: Take, eat; this is my body, which is ^C broken for you for the remission of sins.” And the cup likewise after supper, saying: “This is my blood, which for you and for many is poured out for the remission of sins.” And He added: “Do this in my remembrance.” Therefore, through this mystery we proclaim His death, and as if dying with Him through the mortification of our affections or vices, we are brought to life through Him and shall rise in glory. For the Apostle says: “As often as you eat this bread and drink His cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord,” and confess His resurrection, “until He comes.”

How, therefore, bread and wine are converted into the body and blood of Christ, human speech cannot express; yet because the Arbiter of creation has ^D testified that the matter is thus, just as we believe that by His word the world was created out of nothing; and once indeed in the beginning He said, “Let the earth bring forth green herb…”

^A”; and up to this very moment it brings forth its own shoots by the divine command which urges it on and gives it strength. In the same way, we believe this also to happen through the ministry of the priest: so that the bread is changed into His body and the wine into His blood through the power of Him who spoke. And as the divine Chrysostom says: “The priest stands fulfilling the form, but the power is all of the words.” For He Himself said: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, you have no life in you. For My flesh is true food.” And again: “He who eats Me shall live.” Hence, we ought to partake of them without any doubt, holding a pure and firm faith concerning them; and, as the divine Chrysostom says somewhere ^B, it is worth the effort for everyone approaching these divine mysteries to be so disposed as if he were going to drink from the very side of the Lord. For if we do not believe thus concerning them, not only do we derive no benefit from them on account of our unbelief, but we even partake of them to our eternal condemnation. The same thing happens if we are weighed down by the burden of sins and, having done nothing to purify ourselves beforehand, we partake of them. For we shall appear similar to those who tear the body of Christ apart. Therefore, the divine Apostle says: “Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup.” And: “He who partakes of the body and blood of Christ unworthily, eats and drinks judgment to himself, and shall be guilty of the body and blood of Christ.”

To those, therefore, who doubt concerning the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, we oppose the power of God. ^C For if they admit that God is omnipotent, they will have no doubt about this matter. For if, by a natural power, the underlying matter of air can be changed into fire as to its form, then by far more the power of God, which brought forth the whole substance of things, will change not only as to form but will transform the whole underlying substance of the bread and wine into the substance of flesh and blood. But if, again, anyone denies faith to this transmutation because of things that appear to the senses, let him consider that divine things are set before us in such a way that they are hidden under the veil of sensible things. And this is the very reason ^D why, under the symbols of bread and wine, [which are food to us...]

^A of which we partake as our customary food, He has permitted us to receive them, so that nothing strange or unaccustomed might appear to the senses; yet we do not believe that this happens merely according to imagination. For God is powerful, as we have said, to transform the underlying nature and at the same time to preserve the previous accidents.

It happens, therefore, that the spiritual life has a certain affinity and similarity with the bodily life. For just as in the latter, the generative, augmentative, and nutritive faculties—which are natural powers—are observed, so too in the former. For baptism, through which the intellectual rebirth of man takes place, corresponds to the generative power; the anointing with myrrh ^B, through which spiritual growth leads toward perfect strength, to the augmentative; and the reception of the holy things, through which there is spiritual nourishment, to the nutritive faculty.

Again, since it also happens that there is some impediment in bodily life, inasmuch as each person exists in a state of sickness, it is necessary that the healing of the one living in sickness be introduced from outside. This is observed also in the spiritual life. For man, because he is endowed with the faculty of free will, ^C is able to sin when he performs some action outside the reason and the sequence of the mysteries he has received. If, therefore, this sickness and perversion happens only in the soul, it is corrected through the sacrament of penance; but if the sickness passes from the sin that is in the soul to the body, for the benefit of the one who has committed the sin (for often someone falls sick on account of sins, so that he may be brought to his senses), it is corrected through the sacrament of holy oil, which is called extreme unction (78).

Sickness is given, therefore, to those who sin after baptism through penance and confession as a healing and correction. But this healing is not given ^D through being baptized again with the same baptism in this manner. For since we are crucified together with Christ through baptism, as the Apostle says, "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in his death" (Rom. vi, 3), and again, "Buried together with him in baptism" (Col. ii, 12); just as it is not fitting for Christ to be crucified anew, so too it is not right for those who sin after baptism to be again

^A baptized. And just as those who have obtained natural and bodily life through birth, should they fall into some disease contrary to this perfect life, are not reborn again, but are healed through another mode of change, being delivered from the disease; so too, they cannot return to baptism, which is a spiritual rebirth, in order to wipe away, clearly, the sins they have committed after baptism. But this takes place through repentance. ^B Now, as to what is the mode of repentance, and how many are its parts, and what kind of men those appointed as spiritual fathers (79) for this must be; and how those who repent ought to approach them, and in what way one might devise their healing; and how it is possible to be freed from sins—this would be the subject of another treatise, and also, it belongs to spiritual men to discern these things ^C according to right reason, which will be within the grasp of those who come after to read the writings of the teachers.

Since, however, as we said, from the sickness of the soul a certain disease is spread to the body because of their mutual relationship and sympathy—I mean the body and the soul—which disease indeed comes about for one’s benefit (for it is a chastisement because of the punishment owed to it, if only the man bears this infirmity with thanksgiving), yet often by this disease a man is hindered from working the good, and through the good work, from attaining spiritual salvation. Therefore is given the sacrament of the final anointing, that is to say, the oil of prayer; which itself is also a spiritual remedy, that we might be delivered from the infirmity of the body, which becomes an impediment to spiritual works. Concerning these, the divine Apostle writes: "Is any among you sick? Let him call for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him" (Jas. v, 14). But if they are not delivered ^D from the bodily infirmity through this, one must not blame the power of this sacrament. For often, to be healed bodily is not useful for the spiritual salvation of those who receive this sacrament worthily. For perhaps they would not use the health for their own advantage. Yet they do not receive the sacrament with a vain effort and with no fruit, even if bodily health does not follow. For it helps according to another mode. For incorporeal diseases, which are a proclivity toward evil and a neglect of doing good, are to be cured through the remedy of repentance, as we have said. Since, however, man, whether he labors under sloth or— 79: Spiritual men. Thus the Greeks call those who are set over sacred confessions and penances; most of them are monks shining with the priesthood, whom they call hieromonks. Nor do they judge much otherwise than by the rigor of the canons; the code of which they have ready at hand while they hear confessions, so that they may determine the penalties from it. Thus I have heard from those who, having used the familiarity of the Greeks, have been sent as apostolic legates among them. And that there may be a holy discipline, many nevertheless are thrust into the abyss while they prefer to hide their wounds than to be subject to that more austere discipline. That of the Latins is far milder, in which almost everything is permitted to the discretion of the confessor; he himself, however, being not entirely free, but bound by laws of equity, according to reason properly so called, and the ability and manner of the penitent himself; lest what is a remedy for salvation, through human frailty, should become an occasion of ruin.

^A is distracted by the various cares of life, does not perfectly heal the aforementioned infirmities within himself, this sacrament has been given to man for his salvation, so that by his receiving it, that which was desired for the perfection of that healing which repentance provides might be fulfilled, and he might be freed from the sentence of condemnation to which he is liable because he did not complete the canon of repentance; to the end that nothing may be left in him which could prevent his soul, when it departs, from attaining the future glory.

Moreover, it happens that one neither remembers nor truly knows all the sins one has committed so as to be able to blot them out through repentance. Further, there are daily sins, without which this life cannot be passed: from all of which man is necessarily cleansed through this sacrament. Whence it is also added: "And if he has been in sins, they shall be forgiven him." From which it is clear that this sacrament is the final one, being as it were the seal of all spiritual healing; and that it ought to be applied to those who are suffering from sickness, and especially to those who, because of that sickness, have not fulfilled the canon owed by them; and that it must be applied to the same people again if they fall into the same necessity. For nothing prevents man, due to the infirmity of nature, from relapsing into the same offenses, so that he may ^B often have need of the same kind of cure, just as it also happens in bodily life, where the same sicknesses occur, and the same remedies must be applied again to cure them.

Further, because the authors and organizers or rulers of the bodily life are considered in two ways—namely, either according to the fruitfulness of nature, which pertains to parents, or according to political rule and leadership for preserving the tranquility and peace of life, which is the duty of kings and magistrates—so also in the spiritual life, there are those who provide and guard the spiritual life; and they perform this regarding the spiritual ministry alone, which pertains to the sacrament of orders; and there are those who confer both spiritual and bodily life, which is provided by that sacrament whereby husband and wife come together to beget offspring ^C and nourish them with religious piety and the worship of God. For otherwise it cannot be that the human race should remain until this universe of things is changed to its end. And also, that marriage has nothing of disgrace; for although virginity is nobler, marriage is not therefore execrable or unworthy of honor. Whence Christ also honored it with His presence at Cana. Nevertheless, one must use this as well as the others with reason. For if even in this or in the rest, that which is done with reason is lacking, they not only bring no benefit, but even through our irrational use they cause us the greatest harm. Of those sacraments, therefore, which have been given to us

for the regeneration and healing of our nature according to the spiritual life, we have spoken in summary; those things which are deeper and more subtle will be more clearly revealed to those who read the divine Scriptures and to those who are teachers of the Church of God. ^A

Furthermore, certain wicked sacraments and mysteries have also been handed down by the devil, according to his own manner, to those who deny the name of the Son of God and his incarnation, and who submit themselves to the devil, or who are deceived by him under the name of God in the guise of piety. For among them, too, there are fasts and ceremonies and festivals and purifications and lights, for the wicked one transforms himself into an angel of light; yet we also have lights and illuminations, but not such as those which the witnesses of the truth saw in prison, which sometimes even the unbelievers saw, to their own refutation and condemnation, yet to the courage of the souls of those others, and as a pledge and hope and assurance of the blessedness that would await them, and as a proof that the deeds of the martyrs were acceptable to God. But those others cause disturbance and confusion and tremor in the soul. ^B Hence they differ so much from one another, that our mysteries are true purifications, lifting us up to heaven, procuring for us the kingdom of God, and uniting us to God himself, if only we have the appropriate reverence and faith for the faith handed down to us by him, and if we guard it healthfully both in words and in deeds. But the purifications of those outside, such as those of the ones who deny the Son of God and his incarnation, lead to the exterior darkness and make them heirs of the devil: those, namely, who, being deceived and led astray by him through idolatry and certain other erroneous doctrines, and through his detestable purifications, attend to him; or even, as they suppose, they worship God superstitiously and falsely, and not as is fitting. Now, whatever we confess without doubt from faith concerning the incarnation of the Son of God, these are the more essential points.

CAPUT VII.

In order that we may also have reasoning in accord with us in those things which are of faith, and that when one of the unbelievers reproaches us, saying, "How do you say that the Son of God was incarnate and died?", we may be able to answer that no absurdity follows from this, but rather that it is most just and most fitting, and that it could not have been otherwise, we say this: ^D It is manifest to all mortals that all rational beings—angels and men—operate according to reason, and this is most manifest in builders and all other craftsmen. For the builder conceives in his mind the form and position of any house, because such a...

^A particular house ought to be built; and through that reason he builds it, by which he had previously—and according to the same reason—willed to rebuild the exact same house, similar to the former one in all respects. This reason or interior word is said to be "immanent," and it is also, as has been said, an image of the Word of God, even more so than the others. For it is according to this immanent word that we are called rational, whether we sleep or are silent, not according to the spoken word; for the latter does not always exist. Therefore, the immanent word, which resides in the mind, is much more noble than the spoken word, which is uttered externally through words and names. For this consists on account of the former, and in a certain way is an accident ^B to it. For this reason, the spoken word is not so fittingly or appropriately taken as an example and image of the Word of God, but rather the immanent word, as it is more noble; since we ought to represent divine things by those which have greater excellence. Furthermore, there is nothing in the created things of our mind—and in the word, discourse, or reason within it—that is more excellent, and hence man is said by reason of this to be the image of God. For he was also created according to an image. However, even this falls far short of the Word of God. For the one is subsistent and effective; the other—the immanent word—is an accident to the mind. For it arrives to the mind from things that are seen and understood through sense, so long as it is with the body. Hence it is also imperfect, being gradually woven together ^C and subsequent in origin. For the mind itself, which is the seat of the faculty of understanding and the place of the intelligible forms, is a substance. But all those things that subsequently arrive to the mind through its own power from external things, with the sense faculty assisting after the perfection of the organic body, are all accidents. Hence we call him who knows many things "learned," or one who has learned much.

Since, therefore, God is also rational (or rather, endowed with the Word and reason), and there is no one who disputes this; and His Word is not an accident (for it is absurd to say that anything in God is an accident), but is subsistent, living, and perfect; ^D for this reason we say that God created all things through His own Word. If, therefore, all things were made through Him, and man was also created and fashioned through Him, it was fitting that he who had been crushed should be renewed through Him—through this way, namely: because the human race is among those things which were created by God using reason. Man surpasses other inanimate things and living, irrational creatures in that he is rational and possesses free will, and because the other things were made for the sake of man, so that he might rule over them through reason and knowledge. For irrational creatures do everything to which they are moved without deliberation, being moved toward these things by a natural force—just as the earth and trees bear fruit without reason, will, or deliberation. For this reason, it was fitting that such care should be applied to man, by which he might be restored, and more so than if any other of the visible creatures happened to fall and be crushed.

^A For man deviated from the true and straight path, and was led astray, and fell from the honor bestowed upon him by God. And he was led astray and fell because he did not conduct his life as God had ordained for him from the beginning; but because man perverted his own will, which ought to have sought heavenly things, and instead of loving and desiring and seeking these, he preferred earthly and bodily things, following appetites and desires and irrational pleasures. He rushed toward this, since man was created with free will, and God did not introduce necessity into man regarding virtue, in order that he might possess a crown and honor and a worthy reward, as one who chooses the good of his own accord. ^B By his own will, therefore, man went astray, according to which the perfection of man is considered, and he slipped and fell from the glory of God, clearly because of his perverted will. For this reason he was also condemned to death, because he possessed a mortal nature capable of dying. This occurred through the love of God for mankind, so that the evil might not be immortal, but that man might put an end to sin, mindful of death and fearing it. For it was for this reason that He joined the soul to the mortal body, so that, if he chose evil by reason of his free will, he would immediately be condemned to die through the mortality of the body; which was destined to be altogether immortal, if he had chosen the good and those things which God willed. For he was created midway between mortality and immortality. ^C But Satan, when he fell from God, was not condemned to die, because he did not possess a mortal nature, as we do, capable of dying. For these reasons, man repents, mindful of death, and he has the ability to do this as long as he lives with this mutable body; but after death he will not be able to do so, but will remain unchangeable forever, holding the place that fell to him. But the demon is not led to repentance because of the unchangeable nature of his own being. For what death is to men, that fall is to the angels. ^D Since, therefore, it is acknowledged that they are judged by God in a fitting manner, it was fitting that the disease of the human race be removed and healed through His own Word, through whom also the nature of men was created from the beginning. And since that disease of men was sin, which the evil will brought into effect, it was fitting that the restoration also be appropriate and suitable to the disease; just as doctors also apply remedies proportionate to the disease and the patient. For they say, "Contraries are the remedies for contraries." Thus, the healing would be appropriate and suitable, if man, in that he is endowed with the faculty of free will, were to choose the good by his own will (as he himself had chosen the evil by that same will of his own), and his very will—if it were guided and directed toward the path of

^A honesty—might love the celestial and divine things, having in hatred and casting away the evil things which it had previously desired. For just as the perversion of the will is to hate the good, so its rectitude is to love the same. For if man were to perform these things, they would entirely be his own and appropriate, and thus he could find restoration.

Now, it was not fitting for an angel to perform this, because it would not have been his proper task. For man was not created through him, so that he might also be restored by him after being broken; nor was he who had sinned to seek out the cure, but rather one for another—which was not sufficiently exact according to the standard of justice. Furthermore, it was not possible for any human being to perform this thing, because all were subject to sin. For even this first thing itself, that they are born through a woman by a man with lust, derives from the sin of the first parents; so that, even if all other things were lacking, by this alone all would be subject to sin. For this reason, also, the demon was in possession of the souls of the saints, because no human being was entirely free from sin, on account of his insatiable cupidity and unjust rapacity, and the similarity of sin by which he had communion with men (to some more, to some less), and by that communion had in them the sign and seal of his own kingdom—namely, sin—so that this was also a kind of right. This, in fact, is what greedy and unjust plunderers do; they always seek opportunities to snatch away the things of their inferiors and neighbors and make them their own possession and domain. It was necessary, therefore, that there exist a man ^C entirely immune from all sin, so that he might not have his own defects to amend, but, having taken upon himself the sins of others, might make satisfaction for them before God, to whom men were enemies and foes, both loving and practicing evil things.

Since, therefore, it was impossible for this to be done by men, as we have said, because every one of them was liable to sin, for this reason the Son of God, through whom all things were made, willed to assume our nature immune from sin. Whence he also willed to be born of a Virgin, so that he might be entirely free from original sin; and thus to live his life, so that no sin might be found in him, but all virtue might shine forth, by which he both taught and acted. He, being set forth as a standard and example of salvation for all, would foreteach mortals the mode and way of healing the sickness of the human race through the cultivation of virtue and a right will within them. For he taught by his own example, so that we might amend the disease from which we suffer.

For first it appeared through this mystery of the dispensation ^D that God so loved us that he even willed his own Son to become man; and by this, he powerfully persuaded us to love him, inasmuch as we understand his surpassing love toward us. And thus, by his help and grace, following the ways shown to us, we hope to attain the blessedness which consists in the vision of God.

^A For man, being conscious of his own weakness, would never have thought that he could reach this, unless he had seen such great condescension of God toward him, that God should become man, and unless God had invited us to himself. For if it were not possible for us to be raised toward God according to the capacity we possess, he would never have invited us to impossible things, as if they were possible.

Thus man, who holds the chief place among God’s creatures, recognized the true God through the fact that God became man, and he departed from the worship and error of demons, and obtained healing. For it was not fitting that God, who is good, should leave his creature destitute of all help.

^B Next, since we were saying that the sin of man consists in this, that he covets evil things and bodily goods, but by no means the eternal goods; how it might be possible for this to be remedied, and for man to rise toward God, he showed clearly by the things which he did and suffered. For he chose poor parents, who were nevertheless perfect in virtue, that no one might boast who is surrounded by the infirmity of the flesh. He lived the life of a beggar, that he might teach men to despise money. He lived devoid of dignity and worldly display, that he might restrain the inordinate desire for honors in the minds of men. He endured weariness, hunger, thirst, and blows in his body, that he might teach men, who yield their souls to pleasure, delights, and a softer life, not to depart from the good of virtue. Finally, he endured death, that no one might forsake the truth from fear of death. He chose the most ignominious death by the punishment of the cross, that no one might flee from an ignominious death for the sake of the truth. Thus it was fitting that God should become man, that by his own example he might move men to virtue, as the blessed Peter says: "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example, that we should follow his steps." ^C

But since not only the works of virtue are sufficient for one to attain eternal blessedness, but the knowledge of the truth concerning God is also necessary; and because it could not be that a man teaching the truth which is of God should have entirely certain faith—for a man is able both to be deceived and to deceive—for this reason also it was fitting that God, having become man, should teach the true faith, that it might have nothing ambiguous in it, as being delivered by God and man. ^D That he was God, he taught through miracles, which by no means can be performed by human power. Yet, because it was likely that those who were present at the time and were seeing him would believe then, but that those who came after would object that these were fabrications; a precaution was devised for this also. For if he who taught this faith, and who is reported to have performed miracles, had been rich, and had possessed immense power and armies, it could have come into some person's mind that his doctrine and his miracles were fabrications, and human

^A power and assistance, rather than the work of God. In order that no one might say this, but rather that everyone might confess it to be the work of God, He chose all that was weak and cast aside: a poor mother, an indigent life, and disciples and preachers who were unlettered. He willed to be rejected and condemned even unto death, so that those who came after might understand that His doctrine and His miracles were to be considered not of human power, but of God. Whence also, in whatever He did or suffered, human weakness was always conjoined with divine power. For in His birth, poor things were seen: a cave, swaddling clothes, and the like; yet He was praised by angels, and, with a star as a guide, was adored by the Magi. He is tempted by the devil; yet angels minister to Him. He lived a beggar's life and was poor; yet He raises the dead and restores sight to the blind. He dies, nailed to a cross, and is numbered among robbers; yet the sun is obscured at His death, the earth trembles, the rocks are broken, the tombs are opened, and the bodies of the dead rise up. ^B If, therefore, anyone seeks other signs beyond these in order to be induced to faith, he will be harder than the stones, since even those were rent asunder at the death of Christ. In the same way, He also chose and sent out to preach disciples who were unlettered, ignoble, poor, and fishermen; those whom He commanded to be abject, to bear contempt, and not to amass riches, honors, or glory. Yet they, while living in this way, performed miracles, so that their doctrine might also appear divine, and not to have proceeded from human wisdom and power. They performed the same miracles, and even greater ones. For the very shadow of these men raised up the dead. For He Himself said: "He who believes in me, the works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." They endured all things, indeed, because they looked upon the passion and death of Christ, who had said to them: "If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you." ^C But since man had indulged his own will, and had transgressed, and for that reason had done an injury to God—in that he had captured for himself the most noble of His creatures—man was therefore liable to the greatest punishment, in proportion as God, who was injured, is greater and more excellent than all things beyond any comparison; nor was there anyone who could take upon himself the punishment for such a great injury, as we have said. The Son of God, having become man, took upon Himself this punishment and suffered all things of which we were guilty, and redeemed us from our enemies, who held us fast as their own spoils, addicted to the guilt of sin. And thus justice was fulfilled in Him. For the sinner and he who offends and does injury ^D must be afflicted with punishment. But in our stead, the Son of God, having become man, bore the punishment; and in such a way, by a just reckoning, we obtained our freedom. For if we had obtained it in another way, whether

the decree and power of God, or through an angel, it would not have followed with justice. But God is righteous. As the ^A reason of justice demanded, so it came to pass. And the dissolution of the human transgression, accomplished by the Son of God, appeared sufficient; for He, having assumed flesh, possessed an infinite dignity, and was, both as God and as man, free from sin. Therefore, by as much as His dignity excelled, by so much was He the more easily able to dissolve the enmity of men toward God. For we know that one who possesses greater dignity—for example, a king or some other person of rank—when interceding for the resolution of some injury, is heard more readily than if someone else were to offer a petition for this same injury, such as a soldier or some other person of inferior standing. Hence, for this reason also, it behooved God to become man, so that, possessing infinite dignity, He might be able to dissolve the sins of men; which no other could ever have done, not an angel, not a man. For no one would have been equal in dignity to the God-man Word.

For these reasons, therefore, it must not be said that God could have kept man from falling into sin. For this would abolish the reason for free will; but God does not abolish the order of things, ^B but preserves it intact. Nor is it reasonable to say that He could have cleansed man without the dissolution of sin. For this would abolish the order of justice. It appears, therefore, that God, through the death of His Son, preserved the order of things both according to nature and according to justice. And nothing absurd follows for us when we say that the Son of God became man and died. Furthermore, in the works of God, one ought to consider not just that this or that might have been done in another way, but rather in what way it might most fittingly be done; and whether that which is best is as it stands.

But if, because we say "God died," some one of the unbelievers should doubt how this can be, so as to think that God was changed into human nature, we answer that we do not say this. For it is bodies that are changed into one another, as air becomes fire, changing into fire; but things incorporeal are united to bodily things by the active power of their own potency, and pass through and penetrate them, just as the soul is united to the body. And if the soul, ^C when united to the body, is not changed in its substance, then with far greater reason God, who is most simple—more than anyone can express in words—is able to be united to bodies without any change of Himself. Nay, even fire, in making iron fiery, is not changed into the nature of iron. But God dwells in created things in one way, and is united to them—to some more, to others less—being said to be participated in, in a way beyond all participation, according to the measure of their nature and perfection. But in this assumption of flesh which God himself established for himself, in a more exalted manner, and one which ^D befalls Him alone, more abstruse and greater than any mind can comprehend

^A (for even the human mind cannot grasp the effective power of the divine nature), and he is united to such a degree that what has been conjoined remains inseparable, even if at the time of death the human soul has for a short while departed from the body. And because this union is supreme, the one is called by the name of the other: God is called man, and man is called God; and both—that is to say, the one hypostasis—are the same God and man, according to one thing and another. Just as a human being, while seeing and hearing, does not see and hear according to the same faculty, but the one according to the visual faculty, and the other according to the auditory.

There is, however, no proper example of this union. ^B For if we should bring forth by way of example a natural power considered in bodies, or the word that dwells in the heart, which is manifested externally through the voice, or the soul in relation to the body, or fire in relation to the iron that is ignited by it, we shall speak of nothing appropriate. For these are non-subsistent, and are contained rather than containing. But the Son of God is subsistent, living, and perfect; and as something more noble and excellent, he contains and possesses the assumed human nature. Nor do we say, as we do concerning the human nature, that it consists of two parts (namely, soul and body)—for although the soul is acknowledged to be nobler than the body, it is nevertheless too imperfect to constitute a perfect human being by itself—that in this same manner the nature of Christ is composed in part of divinity and humanity; for the divinity is in no way a part. For every part is imperfect; and to the divinity, which is most perfect, no addition is made. But we say rather that the hypostasis of Christ is from divinity and humanity, not as if these were both its parts, but because both natures are joined into one by an immutable bond. ^C And we do not say that some third nature is brewed from two substances, just as wine and water are tempered into one, which is neither of them; but that even after the union there remain two natures distinct from one another, not according to hypostasis (for we confess one hypostasis), but according to the property of the natures, [alt-version omitted] distinct as one from the other.

Since, however, it is agreed by the consent of all that the divine nature is nobler by an infinite measure, and that lesser things adhere to more excellent ones and, as it were, hang from them, ^D for this reason we do not say that the human nature assumed the nature of God, but that God assumed the human nature—not as if the latter were changed into God, but because it has adhered to God and been conjoined to him. Therefore, as something more excellent, He possesses human nature, and it is possessed by the divine nature; just as we say that a man, because he is more principal and noble, possesses a hand, but not that the hand possesses the man. If, therefore, the divinity and the humanity were parts, in such a way that a single common nature was constituted from them, as a human being is from soul and body, we would say that God possesses the man, and

^A that the humanity possesses the Divinity; just as the situation holds for soul and body. For we say: The soul has a body, and: The body has a soul.

Since, therefore, the only-begotten Son of God—that is, the Word of God—possesses a human nature through the assumption of it, it follows that He is the substratum, or hypostasis, or person, of that human nature. For that which possesses a certain nature is called the hypostasis of that nature; just as that which possesses the nature of a horse is called the hypostasis or substratum of the horse. And if the nature which is possessed is rational, then it is more properly called a person. Furthermore, because He has possessed the divine nature from eternity—not by way of composition, but by simple identity—He is also called the hypostasis or person of the divine nature, insofar, of course, as it is possible for divine things to be expressed in human terms. Therefore, the Son of God is the hypostasis or person of two natures, namely, the divine and the human, subsisting in two natures.

But if anyone says: "Since the human nature is not an accident in Him, but a subsisting thing and a particular human substance, and appears to be apart from the hypostasis of the Word of God; why, for this reason, must we not understand two hypostases in Christ?" The answer is that that is called a hypostasis ^B which is not contained by something else more supreme and more noble. For the hand of a man is indeed a certain substance, but it is not called a hypostasis; for the human being, a thing more supreme and more noble, possesses it. If this were not so, nothing would prevent us from admitting many persons and many hypostases in a human being. Therefore, the human nature in Christ is assumed by the more noble divine nature; and, because it is possessed by that, it is no longer called a hypostasis in the proper and strict sense. He is one, because of the unity of person and hypostasis; but He cannot be properly called two. Yet, it will be properly said that Christ has two natures. For in one hypostasis He is the same God and man, as has been said many times.

Therefore, it is necessary to confess without any doubt the mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God. For ^C the Christian faith consists primarily in the confession of the Holy Trinity; but specifically, it boasts in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in it we look for salvation. For "the word of the cross," as Paul says, "to those who are perishing is foolishness, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God." And if anyone, with a religious mind, contemplates the passion and death of Christ as is fitting and proper, he will find such a depth of wisdom that, as he always reflects on these things in his mind, greater and more numerous theorems and insights ^D will occur to him, and by experience he will realize that it is true which the same Apostle says: "We preach Christ crucified; to the Jews indeed a stumbling block, to the Greeks foolishness; but

^A to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." And again, "The foolishness of God is wiser than men." ^B Thus, through faith in the Trinity and the confession of the incarnation of the Son of God, we hope by the help of God, which He grants us in this present life through the sacraments, and by the works of free will, to be accounted worthy after death of the future blessedness, which shall take place at the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment.

CHAPTER VIII

Concerning the future resurrection of the dead.

For indeed, among the heads of the faith, we ought to believe in the resurrection of the dead. First, because since God is just, it is necessary that He recompense just rewards; so that, indeed, He may return evil to the evil and good to the good. If we grant this, then there will be both enjoyment and punishment. If these things are to be, there will also be judgment; and if there is judgment, there is also retribution and the wage of works. Therefore, because God is just, there will be a resurrection. But it is a resurrection of bodies, for the soul is immortal. For the body (since it is an instrument) has companionship with the soul in whatever things it is moved toward by appetite, whether in contrary things or not. Therefore it is owed to it that it should attain, together with the soul, either glory or dishonor and shame. ^C If anyone, however, does not accord faith to these things, because bodies thus perish and undergo ^D countless vicissitudes by changing into other things, let him look to the omnipotence of God, to whom nothing shall be impossible, since we believe that He knows all things before they come to pass, and holds this entire universe, as it were, in His fist. Since, therefore, it is so established, certainly the human body, although it has undergone countless mutations, while it is contained within the ambit of the world, does not escape God, who is present everywhere and contains all things; rather, as a result of His will, by which He possesses omnipotence, the work shall follow. For since He brought all things into the nature of reality out of nothing, how could He be unable to do this? And that is so even with the matter lying ready, even if it has been reduced to the smallest size through many and various mutations. For matter has not utterly perished, but remains in a certain way, even if the matter is obscure to us. But if the same matter has served for the generation of many, that which pertains to each shall be reclaimed; and that which is lacking, the divine nature shall supply.

It is permitted, however, to take a certain image and proof of this matter even from corporeal things. For wheat, rotting in the earth, germinates again and is restored and rises into the same species of wheat; and since we see this happen yearly, we consider it nothing marvelous because of custom. But if anyone were to have a conversation about this subject with those to whom the fact that nature is so ordered was never explored, and who did not understand the power and nature of seeds, he would not obtain belief among them. They say, indeed, that there is also a certain animal in the regions of the East that is of long life; and then, dying ^D from its own rot, without copulation, being generated as if from a worm, the same animal, in the same species, is restored—

in which the same thing happens again, according to the period of so many years established by God. ^A Likewise, other animals are generated from other matter, although this exceeds human capacity, and not always the same from the same things—for instance, wasps from the head of a horse, or bees from oxen, and others from others. Through these things, God shows us that we should not be at a loss concerning more paradoxical matters, of which God Himself has been the teacher; and He alone, as being able to do all things, is able to bring them to perfection.

If, therefore, the resurrection and the retribution of works are abolished, it follows that one must admit a multitude of absurdities. For instance, that dumb animals are in a better condition than we are; inasmuch as they live a life free from troubles, whereas we are both afflicted by them and exposed to dangers, especially for the sake of divine truth. ^B For why have many of mankind chosen virtue and temperance, scorning the pleasures of the world, and struggled unto death for the truth? And yet it is clear that we humans are superior to all others; and God, being just, would not have allowed that the noblest of the things created by Him—namely, us, whom He made in His own image and draws unto Himself—should be so vainly worn out by tribulations, unless He were going to render to each their wages according to justice and the proportion of their labors. Abolished, too, would be the worship of God, the honor of parents, the reverence and modesty we show one another, friendship, uprightness, and the fellowship of all—and the laws, and the courts, and all things of that kind. For why would these exist? For whose sake? Since they would look toward no end. And if this doctrine prevails, we shall be forced to treat one another like beasts, and to know no measure in food or drink, or in any such things; but we shall seek every pleasure, and live a soft and dissolute life. ^C All of which things are absurd, and dissonant both to God, the Creator of all, and to the dignity of man.

Furthermore, since the union of the body with the soul is natural, and its separation from the soul is contrary to nature, it follows necessarily that the body, having been separated from the soul unnaturally, will not remain so separated forever. For the body is by nature united to the soul by God, just as matter relates to form. But death, supervening due to the guilt of sin, brought about the separation of the soul from the body. That separation, therefore, was contrary to nature. But that which is contrary to nature does not last long. ^D To speak by way of example: it is natural for a stone to be borne downward, but contrary to nature for it to be borne upward, when someone pushes it by force. This, then, which is done violently and contrary to the nature of the stone, does not last long. For in a short time it again returns to that which is according to its nature, namely, to be borne downward. So, too, the soul separated from the body—which is contrary to nature for it—will not remain in that state forever. For that which is contrary to nature, as we have said, in a short

time returns to that which is according to nature. It is therefore destined, according to God’s justice, that every soul should resume its own body, which is natural to it, and that it should remain indissoluble forever. And this is the resurrection; for the resurrection is called the second standing-up of that which had fallen.

Nor, however, must one wonder how each soul will recognize its own body. For there is in the soul a relationship toward the body that is unknown to us and which cannot be explained in words. ^B For just as there is no human body that occurs which has the signs and facial features shining upon it identical in every respect to another body, so too we must acknowledge that each soul possesses some other property toward its own body. For the soul is the perfection—that is to say, the activity and form—of a specific body. From this it follows that it naturally has an inclination and symmetry toward its own body alone, which remains with it even when separated from matter. Hence it necessarily follows that this is, by nature, the form of the matter of this human body, and that is [the form] of another, and it could never happen that it becomes the form of another; this is also the cause of the distinction of souls from one another. For the multitude of souls is taken from [the number of] the bodies, not as if the bodies were the cause of the souls—for they exist together with them, and neither exists before the other—but because of the relationship which souls have toward them, a relationship they have as a natural companion or as something innate to them. ^C It is not possible, therefore, for that which is the activity and form of one to be [that] of another. For even when two similar magnitudes exist, if their material form were to be separated from the matter (which is indeed impossible except in subtle thought alone or by divine power), they would differ from one another by nothing other than that this magnitude is the form of this body, and the other is [the form] of the other. Consequently, there is a certain inclination in souls toward bodies, and there shall be a union of souls with them, as God, who can do all things, accomplishes this, when, just as He has predetermined, He shall will that what is in potentiality should proceed into actuality, and that which is contrary to nature [should pass] into that which is according to the reasons of nature.

First, therefore, moved by these arguments and by many others ^D that pertain to the resurrection, we do not consider them impossible. Furthermore, we are compelled by faith to give them entirely indubitable belief. For since we have been liberated from sin and death by the Son of God, the author of our salvation—into which we had fallen through Adam’s transgression; for not only did his sin pass through to all because of the communion of nature and the same impulse toward evil and worse things, but also because of [that] sin death entered into the world, as the Apostle also says: "By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death" (Rom. v, 12)—it was necessary that we be liberated from both through Christ. For indeed he

^A himself, the Apostle says: "For if by the offense of one, death reigned through one, much more shall they who receive the abundance of grace and of justice reign through one, Jesus Christ" (Rom. v, 17).

In order, therefore, that he might show us both things in himself, he willed both to die and to rise—to die, indeed, that he might cleanse us of sin, as the Apostle says: "As it is appointed unto men once to die, so also Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many" (Heb. ix, 27); and he willed to rise, that he might liberate us from death. Whence the Apostle says: "Christ is risen from the dead, the firstfruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead" (I Cor. xv, 20).

We receive the effect of death, therefore, in the sacraments, insofar as it pertains to the remission of sin. For indeed the sacraments operate by the power of the Passion of Christ: "For we are buried together with him by baptism" (Coloss. ii, 12), and by communicating, we announce his death, and we promise to all that we are dead to sin. The effect of the resurrection of Christ, however—insofar as it pertains to our being immune from death—we shall see at the end of the ages, when we shall all rise through the power of Christ; whence the Apostle says: "If the dead rise not, neither is Christ risen; then our faith is vain, and we are yet in our sins" (I Cor. xv, 16). And again: "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them who have slept, God will bring with him through Jesus" (I Thess. iv, 13). And again: ^B "If Christ is preached that he rose from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen. And if Christ be not risen, then our preaching is vain" (I Cor. xv, 12-14).

Again, writing to Timothy, he says: "But avoid foolish and unlearned questions. For many grow toward impiety, and their speech spreads like a canker, of whom are Hymenaeus and Philetus, who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already" (II Tim. ii, 23, 16). For these did not think that there would be a resurrection of dead bodies, but claimed that the change of the soul from vice to virtue, and from error to truth, and the knowledge of God, was the resurrection—which the Apostle overturns, and all Divine Scripture, which says that the resurrection of the bodies themselves shall be. For the Apostle says: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body" (I Cor. xv, 44). And: "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality" (I Cor. xv, 53). In the Gospel, moreover, it is said by Christ: "The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live" (John v, 25). And again: "The hour cometh, in which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice; and they shall come forth"

^A unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John v, 28-29). Job also says: "For I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God" (Job xix, 25-26). And the divine David says: "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust" (Ps. ciii, 29). Behold, he is speaking about bodies. Then he adds: "Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth" (Ps. ciii, 30). Isaiah also says: "The dead shall rise, and they that are in the graves shall be raised" (Isa. xxvi, 19). And the blessed Ezekiel says: "And it came to pass, as I prophesied, that there was a noise, and behold a shaking, and the bones came together, bone to his bone, every one to his joint. And I beheld, and, lo, the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin covered them above" (Ezek. xxxvii, 7-8). Then he teaches whence the spirits returned that were commanded; and holy Scripture hands down to us many other such things concerning the future resurrection. From these it is manifest that the dead bodies will be raised, and that to the infinite power of God nothing will be impossible.

^B Since, therefore, the resurrection is confirmed not only by such words, but Christ himself also rose from the dead, so that he was seen and touched and ate, which was not according to the laws of nature—for he did not need food when he had been raised, but did so for the establishing of the resurrection—just as we too, after the resurrection, will neither eat nor drink, but will receive our bodies subtle, subject to no injury, and incorruptible, such as the body of the Lord was when it entered through shut doors ^C (John xx, 19). Moreover, he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, as a demonstration of his own divinity and to provide belief in his resurrection and our own; who also was frequently recognized and believed by all his own people and acquaintances, which certainly would not have been the case if the characteristic properties constituting his person had not remained intact in him.

Since these things are so, it is worth our while to believe firmly in the mystery of the resurrection, which is proclaimed by the divine Scripture that was given to us by God for the knowledge of the truth. For Christ would not be heard to be called the "Firstborn from the dead" (Col. i, 18; Apoc. i, 5), if others ^D were not to follow him. There will therefore be a great and illustrious day, on which the coming of the Son of man will take place with majesty, concerning which the prophet Daniel writes: "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and he was brought near unto him" (Dan. vii, 13); and there was given to him dominion and honor and the kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and langua…

languages shall serve him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom shall not be destroyed. And he says further, "I beheld until thrones were placed, and the Ancient of days did sit; and a stream of fire was drawn before him; and thousand thousands ministered unto him; and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him. The judgment was set, and the books were opened," ^A and the rest (Dan. vii, 9-12).

Therefore the Son of man shall come in his glory with his angels; and all who have been from the creation of the world shall rise from the dead. "And we who are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air" (I Thess. iv, 16-17), and every race of men shall stand before him, so that he may judge the living and the dead. And he shall judge, not as a man simply—in the humility of the flesh, that is—but with the glory of the power of the Godhead. For just as we say that "the Lord of glory was crucified and died" as a man, so he shall indeed judge as man, but as the Lord of glory. Then "every knee shall bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father" (Philipp. ii, 10). ^B And the prince of darkness shall be delivered into the burning of fire with his angels, just as the prophet Daniel says. For him "he shall slay with the spirit of his mouth" (II Thess. ii, 8), since he "upholds all things by the word of his power" (Hebr. i, 3), as the divine Apostle says. And reward shall be rendered to each of men according to their works. And the righteous indeed, in proportion to the virtue and to the labors endured for the sake of God and the faith, shall receive a corresponding splendor and illumination for their bodies and souls; but the wicked, in the same way, shall receive darkness for their souls and bodies, according to the measure of each one’s wickedness and malice. For the Lord himself says, "That the righteous shall shine forth as the sun" (Matth. xiii, 43); and the blessed Paul says, "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body" (I Cor. xv, 44); and showing the differences in luster, he adds, ^C "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon. For one star differeth from another star in glory" (I Cor. xv, 41). And again he says that this very body of ours shall be transformed so as to become fashioned like unto the glorious body of the Son. Furthermore, he says that nature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. ^D

^A signifying that the other creation shall also be more resplendent. For, as one of the saints says, "Even as it was subjected to corruption for our sake, so shall it join in the feast and triumph over the victory of men, and it shall receive the reward of the labor of the service which it fulfilled for the generation of the elect." Wherefore Isaiah also says that the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, and the moon shall shine as the sun now does, and there shall be a new earth and a new heaven.

Then that apostolic word shall be fulfilled: "When he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father, then he himself also shall be subject unto him that put all things under him." For the pious and just, in this present age, looking toward Christ and practicing virtue according to his commandments, administer through him their own spiritual life; which is indeed now hidden in Christ, but shall later be made manifest together with him. For this reason they are also called his inheritance and kingdom, those whom, as man, he brings to God and the Father through his own death and blood. For through him we have had access to God and the Father, to whom he subjected all things; and to these himself, in that he deigned to become the "firstborn among many brethren," and was made the high priest and steward of our salvation, so that as man he might bring [us] and subject [us] to the Father; but as God, who is with the Father and the Spirit, he is by no means to be subjected. ^B

The same one, therefore, insofar as he is man, shall be subjected, because he has assumed created flesh; but insofar as he is God, he shall in like manner subject those who are subject to him, as he who is one God with the Father and the Spirit. For this reason, as God with the Father and the Spirit, he is to judge as one judge; but as man, he shall sit as judge alone. For he shall come with those bodily attributes, so that the Jews also may understand that he is the very one who was nailed to the cross by them, and may thence be convicted, and all the faithless may see and be confounded—those, namely, who in this present age did not receive him who was preached, nor were converted through his teaching, but remained in their own error. For it was said to the prophet Daniel ^C according to his human nature: "And there was given to him rule, and honor, and a kingdom." And again, what the Lord himself said: "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son." This is indeed taken as referring to his human nature, as we say; yet the divine Chrysostom interprets it also of the divine generation in his exposition on John, saying: "And that thou mayest learn that 'hath given' signifies the same as 'hath begotten,' hear this same thing made clear from another place: 'For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given also to the ^D

Son to have life in himself. What then? Did he first beget him and then give him life? Then he would have been born without life. But not even the demons would say this. For along with impiety it contains much that is senseless. Therefore, just as the saying, "He hath given life," means "He hath begotten him as life," so also the saying, "He hath given judgment," means "He hath begotten him as judge," he says. Since not one of the many would have easily grasped how his life is self-subsistent, he first says the more humble thing; then, having trained them, he leads them to what is higher. For he who said, "He hath given him to have life," this same one says again, "I am the life"; and again, "I am the light." ^B Just as we were saying, for the conviction and condemnation of the unbelievers, and for their everlasting reproach and shame, he will come as man with power and great glory, so that he may also be seen by them, as far as is possible for them, as man. Whence he will not appear good to them, but as exceedingly good to the righteous. And the former will see him only as man, while the righteous will see him in both capacities, both as man and as God. And the former will depart into eternal punishment, but the latter into eternal life.

Chapter 9. On the future restitution in full.

^A And the blessed Augustine asserts: "They shall look on him whom they pierced," and, "They shall see him coming with great power and majesty." For he says that they shall not see him in the infirmity in which he was judged, but in the power of the majesty by which he is to judge. He then introduces a difficulty: since seeing God is the prize and reward set forth in the promises—"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," and, "Again I will appear to you, and your heart shall rejoice"—how is it that the wicked shall also see him in his majesty? Solving this, he says that the vision of the Godhead will not be common to the good and the wicked (for this is reserved for the saints), but rather the vision of the body in its majesty. ^B He will therefore deliver the kingdom to God and the Father, leading the faithful, that is to say, into the contemplation and knowledge of the Father and himself and the Holy Spirit, the one and true God, so that God may be all in all. Now, indeed, we believe and hope for what we do not see: "For what one sees, why does he also hope for it?" says the Apostle. "But if we hope for what we do not see, we await it with patience until the king shall be in his rest." And again, "So long as we are in the body, we are away from the Lord. For we walk by faith, not by sight." And, "Your life is now hidden with Christ; but when Christ shall appear, your life, then you also shall be manifested with him in glory." And, "Now indeed we see through a mirror and in an image, but then we shall see face to face." ^C For this is the vision promised to us, which is the end of all works and the eternal perfection of joy: "For we are children of God," says the Evangelist John, "and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. But we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." And the Lord himself has said, "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent." Concerning this, David also says in the person of God: "I will satisfy him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation." And as if from himself: "One thing have I asked of the Lord, this will I seek: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." ^D For we were to be transferred not through his destruction or death, but solely by change and new glory into heaven and the sight of God; which the just, through Christ, conformed to his death and resurrection, shall perfectly attain at last in the resurrection of the whole human race; the kingdom of Christ itself being willingly subjected to God, and in which God shall be all, the wicked themselves being likewise subjected through the power of the Godhead, so that even in those who resist, whatever God has decreed to be shall come to pass. Calecas could have pursued this argument differently, as some of the saints (especially Gregory of Nyssa) seem to have spoken in a quasi-Origenist manner; others have labored likewise to explain these things.

^A “I have asked one thing of the Lord; this I will seek: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the delight of the Lord.” So that from the faith here, we shall arrive at that future and ineffable enjoyment. For He says, “The Father Himself loves you, because you have loved Me, and have believed that I came forth from the Father. I came forth from the Father, and have come into the world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father.”

Thus, therefore, we believe here that this one of the Trinity—who is begotten of God and the Father eternally and immutably and inseparably, being in substance equal to Him and His true Son and Word, through whom all things were made—descended from the heavens, and took flesh from the holy Theotokos and ever-virgin Mary for our salvation, without sin and without any change or turning; and ^B was crucified according to the human, having become a curse for us; and having died, He descended into Hades with His soul as God, and on the third day rising from the dead, He raised up our nature with Himself, and was taken up into the heavens, and sat at the right hand of God and the Father—the expression “at the right hand” signifying the equality of the honor of His dignity; and the same shall come again to judge the living and the dead.

If, therefore, we believe these things, far from any doubt we shall attain to the future glory and contemplation. “For he who has My commandments,” He says, “and keeps them, he it is who loves Me. And he who loves Me will be loved by My Father, and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him.” And, “If you love Me, keep My commandments; and I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth, ^C whom the world cannot receive”—that is, those who are held by the love of the world. “Again I come, and will take you to Myself, that where I am, you also may be.” And, “I desire, Father, that those whom You have given Me may be with Me where I am, that they may behold the glory which You have given Me, for You loved Me before the foundation of the world.”

“Always, therefore, we shall be with the Lord,” according to the divine Apostle, and our heart shall rejoice, and our joy shall be full, and no one shall take this from us, as the Lord says, when He will no longer speak to us in proverbs, but will plainly announce to us concerning His Father. By saying “of the Father,” He gives Himself and the Holy Spirit to be understood inseparably. For God is one with the Father and the Spirit. ^D That is, there shall not be likenesses and symbols, since the vision will be face to face. For the Apostle also says, “When that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” Of this contemplation He had the image and figure

^A in Mary, who sat at the feet of Jesus and heard His words. For the practical side of virtue, which is the beginning of contemplation, will no longer remain with us, but will cease, seeing that it consists in the labor required for the body; but the contemplation we have here, even if its mode—according to which we contemplate—will cease, will nevertheless be for us the beginning of that future contemplation. For, just as the Lord says, “He who does not believe is judged already,” meaning that he receives the beginning of his condemnation from that very point, so again He said ^B that true eternal life is to know His Father as the true God, and Jesus Christ Himself our Lord, with the Holy Spirit being understood as included, inasmuch as true faith and contemplation and knowledge of Him here will be the cause and occasion for us of obtaining the blessedness that is laid up for us. For a person will see as much there as he has believed here, and the beauty of true contemplation will succeed the enigmas of the contemplation of this life, because faith and the mirror will pass away after this life, when this mortal body is dissolved for us and is repaired and reassumed into a better state. From which it is clear ^C that those who have erred regarding the faith in this age, and have not attained to the true knowledge of God, will not be partakers of the contemplation there either, but must be considered profane and among those who fill the ranks of the left side.

Therefore, they say that the virtue which is practiced, as being more imperfect, is for those who are being initiated, but the work of contemplation is for the perfect. Hence, the Lord also said to Martha, who represents the type of action and reflects its mode: “Martha, Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things. But one thing is needed,” ^D that is to say, to be occupied about the Word of God, and to contemplate Him. For “Blessed are those who hear the word of God and keep it.” Regarding Mary, however, He said: “Mary has chosen the good part, which will not be taken away from her.” For from this contemplation we shall arrive at that future joy, which no one shall take from us; for in this way indeed, images will give way to their exemplars, and faith will give way to contemplation.

On the images giving way to the exemplars.

^A Saint Dionysius, whom I have mentioned before, calls this contemplation a union above intelligence, that is to say, greater than the capacity of our mind. ^B For human understanding can only function through discursive reasoning; by moving from one thing to another and thinking of one thing after another, it finally arrives at the conclusion of the matter it is seeking. Hence, its knowledge is imperfect, as it does not reach the perfection of the concept immediately, but only by progressing little by little. This mode of knowing will not exist for us then; for if it did, we would possess an imperfect joy and happiness. We would not be filled instantaneously and without mediation, as is our nature to receive, but we would always be lacking in what is possible for us to possess. How then is it said: "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied," and again, "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears"? ^C Would not a certain sadness be mingled with our joy? And how could this be, when we are taught that we should not even see the wicked being tormented by the righteous, lest this should occur? And why do we pray daily that those who have departed may be stationed where there is no pain, no groaning, but life without end? For what has been obtained will not bring as much happiness as what is missing will bring distress. And if failure to reach the end always brings pain, why would this not be a cause of sadness for us, and all the more so the greater the thing we fail to attain? For we shall always desire more and always be seeking; and as long as we do not reach it, we shall be distressed, and we shall never cease from that distress. Since even our yearning will reach out to infinity. Furthermore, we shall not live any the less with faith and hope even after the present life. But indeed every yearning and hope and search will cease, and our entire desiring faculty will be fully satisfied by the contemplation of God, ^D [when that which is within]

The Antitypes of the Truths

^A And so, as human nature is constituted, each according to his capacity, the contemplation of God will shine upon us, and each man will be heir to it promptly and immediately, once the final judgment has taken place. For this is what the saint calls [bracket omitted: "union above understanding"], that is, an immediate fellowship with God, above what the human mind can attain. This is what Paul was saying: "face to face," and John the Evangelist: "We shall see him as he is."

Furthermore, this arcane vision and contemplation of the mind, which is the heritage and lot of the just—which the blessed Dionysius calls "union above the mind"—the great Gregory the Theologian ^B affirms is the "kingdom of heaven," whom we have already shown, by the things previously set forth, to be of this very same opinion. For in that Oration which he gave because of the Plague of Hail, where he makes mention of that future state and calls upon his hearers to recall to memory what rewards are to receive the just and the unjust: "Who," he says, "is a patron there? What pleading? What false defense? What artificial allure of words? When the thrones are set, and the Ancient of Days sits as judge, and the books are opened, and a river of fire is drawn forth, and light is before him, and the prepared darkness; and they who have done good proceed to the resurrection of life, which now is hidden in Christ; but they who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment, ^C by which they who do not believe have already been condemned by the Word who judges them." And light shall receive the former, along with the contemplation of the holy and royal Trinity, shining more clearly and purely, and blending itself wholly with the whole mind (in which I consider the kingdom of heaven to consist, and especially there alone); but the others, along with their other torments, or rather even before the others, this shall torture: that they have been cast out by God, and bear in their conscience the branded mark of eternal ignominy. See how he too teaches that the heritage of the saints is the contemplation of God, and that He is blended wholly with the whole mind, which also he names the kingdom of heaven.

^D It is not to be doubted, however, how it occurs that, as Paul says, we should see God "face to face," and the Lord himself says, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." For we shall indeed see Him, but as it is possible for us, according to our relative capacity for knowledge. Now, indeed, we see in shadows and in riddles, which the same Gregory the Theologian

[Beginning with the conclusion of the previous page's translation:]

...of God, after God, he spoke in his theological ^A discourses (89). Explaining what these indications are, he added emphatically, "Just as shadows and images of the sun in water show the sun to weak eyes, since it is not possible to look directly at it, because the purity of its light overcomes the senses; then, however, not in shadows nor in riddles, but God himself, as the saints say, not by perfectly comprehending his essence—for we do not have an equivalent faculty of knowledge; for if we were gods after him, beginningless and infinite and uncircumscribed and perfect, we would know him as he knows himself. But we shall see him in this way: just as when we lift our eyes toward the sun, we pass beyond the shadows of it in the waters. For then we might rightly say we see the sun, yet not that we accurately understand it, neither its size nor its essence, nor the underlying nature that is receptive of the light, nor all the things pertaining to him from which it is composed; yet we are said to see the sun. And this has been taken as an example; whence, one must not take all things concerning this and apply them to God, lest, among other things, we also imagine God to be circumscribed." ^B

We shall therefore be blessed, because we believe without doubt that which we do not see. For through faith we shall arrive at the secret contemplation of the holy Trinity, and we shall see God, according to the promise of the Savior; for when we possess him as the ultimate good, we shall be in need of nothing; but we shall be filled with eternal life, ^C and joy and exultation, according to the nature of each, in proportion to our faith and our labor; for we have heard that there are many mansions with God; so that, receiving by degrees what we are capable of, we might not have that eternal contemplation and enjoyment of God as imperfect and accompanied by sorrow, but also there might sustain our life with hope and longing; and it will then happen to us to have God himself, upon the attainment of whom all contemplation is quieted, which the Prophet says: "But the just shall live by faith." ^D

EPILOGUE

In order, therefore, that we may arrive at the good hoped for, we ought to believe and firmly hold to the dogmas of the holy Church of God, which we confess to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic; whatsoever it proclaims concerning the one and tri-hypostatic God; and whatsoever it teaches concerning the economy and the future resurrection; and to keep everything soundly and genuinely, limping in neither faith nor conduct. For to him who presumes to attain eternal life from faith alone, the Lord has said, "Not everyone who says to me, Lord,

^A Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven," and "Why do you call me Lord, Lord, and do not do what I tell you?" And to him who hopes from works alone, the Apostle says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," and works without faith are dead, just as faith without works is dead.

There are also some impious persons, or heretics, to whom future things are not infrequently revealed by God according to a certain dispensation, as is clear from historical records; just as it was in the case of Caiaphas regarding Christ. For being the high priest of that year, as the Evangelist says, he prophesied that it was expedient for one man to perish for the salvation of the people. ^B Indeed, they even perform miracles in the name of God at times; and yet, although this is the case, they are none the less far from God. For regarding them the Lord said, "On that day many will say to me, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons, and do many mighty works? And then I will declare to them, I never knew you; depart from me, you workers of lawlessness," whom He also warns us to avoid, saying, "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves." Whence such persons must be examined first by their faith, and then by their conduct. "For by their fruits," He says, "you will know them." The proper fruit of a man is especially the thoughts of his soul, through the manifestation of which it is known whether or not he agrees with the true faith of Christians. And as regards conduct, if they play the hypocrite and deceive, ^C they are nevertheless exposed after a short while.

What, therefore, we are taught by holy Scripture and from the holy teachers of God's Church concerning the sound faith of Christians, these are the things which we ought to believe with the heart unto righteousness, and confess with the mouth unto salvation, as the teacher of the Gentiles declared. For unless one believes this faithfully, he cannot be saved, as the great Athanasius (90) added in his confession of faith written to Julian, the Roman Pope:

(90) That the great Athanasius wrote clearly concerning the Symbol is asserted by the exceptionally learned ^D and catholic man, Gilbert Genebrard, a Parisian theologian; nor does he assert any other authority for the great Athanasius than that very one of Gregory the Theologian which our Manuel Calecas used, from which, however, I do not believe the matter is settled in the least. Gregory is speaking of the confession, or formula of faith, offered to the Emperor Jovian when he had requested documents of the faith from Athanasius, and was seeking his communion and that of the Catholics, while the Arians were attempting to win him over to themselves and to abuse his power, just as they had formerly done under Constantius, and later did under Valens. There are extant, however, the requests made against Athanasius and the rebuttals. The faith, therefore, and confession offered to Jovian by Athanasius is the Nicene faith itself, with a few things added to it regarding the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which Gregory thus sets forth: He says that they were revered; he says that he was the first and only one, or with very few, who did not hesitate to promulgate the truth openly and in plain words, confessing in writing the one divinity and essence of the three persons. Athanasius truly carried this out in that epistle which Theodoret records in Book IV of his *Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 5, which single-handedly explodes whatever Genebrard or others have written concerning the Athanasian Symbol, which is accustomed to be recited at Prime on Sundays, having been offered to him for the forming of his faith, although he had previously written it at Trier in order to render an account of his faith to Pope Julius. Another way of instructing the most Christian emperor, or even of defending and satisfying his own faith.

to which Gregory the Theologian, ^A in his panegyric, also makes mention: "Only he," he says, "or at most with a very few who dared..." But to say that he is greater than that which is conceived according to man is indeed true, but it is no great marvel if God is greater than man. They did not alienate the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, but rather they glorified Him together with the Father and the Son in the one faith of the holy Trinity, because of the fact that there is one divinity in the holy Trinity. These things Athanasius stated, not as a new faith, but by explaining the Nicene faith itself more fully, which the Nicene Fathers had set forth with a few words regarding the Holy Spirit: *And in the Holy Spirit*.

It is not sufficiently opportune to weary the most religious prince with other things, when the whole question revolved around that one Arian dogma and the Nicene faith, with the added shoots of Eunomius and the other impugners of the Holy Spirit, whom Athanasius—a husbandman and farmer as skilled as any—cut down with that confession; and the synod which was ^B at Constantinople, under Pope Damasus, followed. But before I take my hand from the table, as long as we are still in the Athanasian Creed which Genebrardus presents in his editions: *The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son proceeding*, and which Joannes Plusiadenus cites for the Council of Florence, while other Greek versions do not have "and the Son," which was done so through the varied study and faith of either the translators or the scribes; just as in the Greek versions that exist of the second synod, that word is missing, which some maintain was present in them. Be that as it may, the Greeks do not hold it for the authentic and certain [work] of Athanasius. Hence for the Catholic who objects: "At once the first before others, the great pillar of the Church, the divine and holy Athanasius, in his profession of faith which he presented to Pope Liberius, the beginning of which is: *Whosoever wishes to be saved. The Holy Spirit*, he says, *from the Father and the Son, not made, not created, nor begotten, but proceeding*. What then? Will you oppose this? Is not this holy man and teacher of the Church ^C if one were to say—is not this holy man and teacher of the Church one who is—hypostasis or person? Not by any magnitude or time, but because of... Note: The text here reflects the fragmented state of the primary source's argument regarding the "greater" or "lesser" nature of the Father and Son, and the definition of the Spirit.

Furthermore, by saying "the Father is greater," he again showed the property of the essence. Plainly, therefore, "greater" refers to the cause, and "equal" to the nature, and this we confess with great gratitude. Perhaps another, contending against our argument, might say that being from the same cause is not less than being uncaused, for one might share in the glory of the Unbegotten, because the birth is from the Unbegotten and is present, [as] a matter so great to those who have intelligence, and thus ^D [the rest is missing].

^A Mentioned with praise by him, "He alone," he says, "or with very few, dared to confess the truth in writing"; calling this Truth the profession which was written to him.

Regarding this faith of ours, we too have summarized in a brief epitome the most necessary articles that complete it—articles which you, O friend, asked of us. You now have the fulfillment of what was requested, even if not done nobly and sufficiently, yet according to our own power, insofar as God indeed granted it by measuring out the supply through my own small diligence in reading. And I would not have said even these things, as I said at the beginning, if I did not firmly know that they are preached by the saints, and if I did not have the testimonies from them to set forth. For I always have this custom on all matters, to follow those who have preceded us and are the best; but especially regarding divine things, I wish to keep this custom for myself: to think nothing, to say nothing, which does not seem [right] to Scripture and to the teachers of the Church, who were instructed by the Holy Spirit; to write nothing for which I do not have clear and certain testimony from the holy Scripture of God and its interpreters, whom the Church of God has both praised and glorified. And this is clear from the things set forth and is known purely, if one only goes through the written word without guile and with sound judgment. ^B For I have brought in absolutely nothing from myself; only this, that I have myself gathered here what was said by the saints in various places, for the confirmation and truth of the things mentioned. Yet not even this would I have done, had it not been demanded of me by you; nor indeed, if you had both the leisure and the books and the power of discourse to collect these things which lie scattered and to deposit them into the storehouse of memory, summarized in a brief thought; so that we might not appear to have come arrogantly to write these things, and to be suffering from the devil’s sickness, ^C whose very kind it is necessary that we drive far away.

I have therefore done something similar, as if someone, having taken our confession of faith—I mean, "I believe in one God," and what follows—were to say that this point is established from this scriptural phrase, and that from another, and another from another, and so on to the end; whence neither myself [remaining text is missing here...].

^C ...this profession of faith is said to be by Pope Liberius, and to others published, as also to our Caleca, [to] Julius: which the inscription renders shaky, and by its arbitrariness makes the attribution suspicious. The license for forging titles was once great; and there is no approved author to whom many other things have not been ascribed; which error has also crept into the holy and divine offices and [as Genebrard calls them] oracles. For how much of an imperfect author, a man not sufficiently Catholic, do we read under the name of Chrysostom? How much under the name of Augustine [is attributed to] Fulbert of Chartres, and many other uncertain authors? The rightful censure of succeeding pontiffs has wiped away certain Pseudo-Hieronymian [works]. These things, perhaps more than the matter requires, [are] perhaps not useless for the censorship of monuments of this kind. ^C ...is that saint and doctor of the Church? ^D Rhacendila opposes: "By me he is a saint and a doctor; nevertheless, the sentence brought forward by you is in doubt, whether it be legitimate; nor does he vindicate it otherwise than from common sources, namely, that the same Athanasius says similar things in other non-suspect places; which in any case does not suffice, unless the authentic books are also present, making faith and [providing] other aids." Which does not sufficiently occur in the Symbol; for it scarcely exists, except in the collections of the more recent [authors] and their polemical books, by which they either impugn or even defend it; and this is what is desired by those who say it is not contained in Greek books, for they do not seem so stupid as to deny that it is held in Greek. It should also be noted that Plusiadenus... [index: entries preserved]