John Cyparissiota

[…—the same until the end. Hence I do not deem myself worthy of praise ^A for this; unless one says, and I think rightly, that because I have said nothing of my own that is discordant with Scripture and the saints, I am worthy of praise. For to confess and write down the faith of the Fathers is exactly this; on which account many are crowned. But if, on these grounds, I say it is not right that I be considered worthy of praise, since others have labored and I have entered into their labor, by a much stronger reason it would not be right for blame to be created for me from there. For both will return to the doctrine of Scripture and the saints. For I say the same things again, that I have said nothing of my own, but those things which are taught by the holy Scripture and the teachers of the Church of God concerning the sound faith of Christians, these we have selected, and for the sake of clarity, having sketched them out in this present work in a humble and summarized way, as far as was possible, we have set them forth.

JOANNES CYPARISSIOTA. NOTICE.

YEAR OF OUR LORD 1355.

JOANNES CYPARISSIOTA. NOTICE.

JOANNES Cyparissiota, surnamed the Wise, almost the contemporary of Palamas himself, after the year 1360 wrote four books of *Palamitic Transgressions* (*Πλαμικῶν παραβάσεων*), the first and fourth of which Combesis published in Greek and Latin in his *Auctarium novissimum*, part two, pp. 68 and 85-105. [Thence in Latin in the *Bibl. max. Patr. Lugd.*, vol. 21, pp. 476-489.] The second and third books lie as yet unpublished, as do his other voluminous ^B works against the same Palamas, namely: 1) Eight Discourses (*Λόγοι*), against the Tome of Palamas and his new faith; 2) other eight discourses replying to the accusations of Palamas against his adversaries concerning the Uncreated Light, and embracing in several questions the entire consideration of that matter; 3) three discourses (*Λόγοι*), the first of which is divided into chapters, against the anniversaries of the Palamites in their curses and excommunications against their adversaries, or against their *apostasy* (*ἀποστασίαν*); 4) an Anti-Palamitic work, equal in size to almost all the others put together, and not yet published by Cyparissiota himself.

There exists also another work by this same Cyparissiota, looking to this same end, and at the same time teaching mystical theology, a subtle and learned work, which is inscribed *Exposition of the elements of those things which are said by theologians concerning God* (*Ἔκθεσις στοιχειώδης ῥήσεων θεολογικῶν*), divided into ten decades: 1) on symbolic theology; 2) on demonstrative theology; 3) on divine enarrations; 4) on divine names, their origin and formation; 5) on the properties of divine names; 6) on the manifestations of the divine light; 7) on divine participation; 8) on the infinity of God in creatures; 9) on infinity in God; 10) on divine simplicity. This work, found in Greek at Messina in Sicily in the library of D. Joannes Lascaris, Franciscus Turrianus dedicated in Latin, edited with notes, to Antonius Augustinus, Archbishop of Tarragona, Rome, 1581, 4to; whence it was reprinted in Latin in the *Bibliothecae Patrum* of Cologne, vol. XI, and of Lyon, vol. XXI, p. 377. (Fabr.) In the public library at Paris, codex 1246, there are by Joannes Cyparissiota: 1) 4 books of *Palamitic Transgressions*. The second is unpublished; it begins: *Πρόδηλον μὲν οὖν*; the third is also unpublished: *Ὅσα μὲν οὖν*. 2) Eight books against Palamas and his new faith; it begins: *Ὡς ἂν δὲ καὶ δι' ὧν*. 3) Eight books replying to the accusations of Palamas; it begins: *……* 4) Three books against the Palamite *apostasy*; it begins: *Τὸ τέταρτον βιβλίον πρὸς τὰς*. 5) Against Nilus of Thessalonica, five books of *Antirrhetica*.

[...] que; inc. *Tōn men hēgēsamenōn bibliōn to te proteron*. Add. Montfauc. Bibl. biblioth. Mss. p. 732 E et 776 C de codd. Paris. (Harl.)

Cyparissiota wrote after the death of Nicephorus Gregoras, whose corpse was treated with mockery by the Palamites—a fact he indignantly records in his book of *Palamitic Transgressions*, where he depicts the miserable state of the Constantinopolitan Church under Palamite patriarchs through ten questions. Gregoras was born in the year 1295 and died no earlier than 1360, as we have his history woven up to the year 1359. (FABR.) See Saxius, *Onom. lit.* II, p. 380, to the year of Christ 1370. Oudin, *Comm. de SS. Eccl.* vol. II, col. 1062 et seq. to the year 1360, who notes that his *Elementary Exposition on Matters* is held in Greek in the Royal Library of Spain and at Rome among the books that Turrianus gave to the Society; and Henry Wharton, in the *Appendix to Cave’s Hist. litt. SS. Eccl.* II, p. 65, to the year 1360. (Harl.)

OF CYPARISSIOTA: PALAMITIC TRANSGRESSIONS, SERMON I.

Since it is not permitted to publish in my *Auctarium* the entire Palamite work of Joannes Cyparissiota—such as the Royal Treasury contains in a thick, large volume written on cotton paper; it being a work equal in volume to a just tome, if ever it should happen to be brought into the public domain with a Latin translation, through the labors and industry of some learned man—yet, because it is not right that, while I am immersed in this dust and refuse, I should leave the author in question, and a copy of his that has been offered to me, unacknowledged; and that, just as I have our Calecas, I should add, through this Antipalamite study of mine, at least a lighter gift for his equal, one who was long ago a companion in the same arena and in the repelling of the impious and monstrous nonsense of the Palamites, though not quite their bishop: I have thought it worth the effort that, out of such a great harvest of his *logoi* (as he calls them), and into which he divides the *books*, I should here set forth for you, reader—from the first of the four books of *logoi*—one that is the first of all, composed by a man who is truly wise (a title which his singular and varied learning, along with his deep knowledge of divine and human affairs, has provided for him as a magnificent honor). By means of this, you will find exposed and laid bare, most clearly, whatever there is of Palamite dross and its origins; and this one piece may serve you in the place of all, if only you compare it with Calecas. The age of the author itself will be clear to you from this; not only because he writes thus after Palamas, Isidore, and the Palamite *Tomus* (just as Calecas does), but also because he reckons five hundred and seventy years, and even more, from the beginning of the Iconoclast heresy down to his own time. By this he proves that the calculations of Coccius and others—whom the Colonians even followed—are entirely false, for they supposed he belonged to about the eleventh century, clearly because they had only seen a few decades of his work. From these, we have this one certainty regarding his age: that he did not exceed the time of Euthymius, from whose *Panoplia* he derived the passage from Maximo into his own reservoirs. I am setting forth this discussion as well in this carefully considered volume, so that nothing may be missing here for the reader which might appear relevant to your cause.

INDEX OF CHAPTERS. 1. Concerning peace, and how Palamas undermined it, having been permitted only for a time; and what is the cause of these discourses. 2. That the Palamites cannot deny any of the writings of Palamas, or of any of those who came after him. 3. How Palamas began his destructive doctrine out of error and contentiousness.

^A 4. How he gathers together from his many and varied discourses a new God of error, constituted like light, boasting all that belongs to the one God. 5. How Palamas fabricates—out of the aggregation of such discourses—a god who does not truly exist in substance, so that he may appear as the creator and arbiter of every creature and the end of all blessedness.

CHAPTER I

I consider nothing more divine than peace, just as I consider nothing more grievous than war and strife. That these things are rightly said, all human affairs themselves are proof. For cheerfulness, public assemblies, festivals, the contribution of laws, courts of justice, commerce, agriculture, the mastery of the arts, the pursuits of philosophy, the cohabitation of men, the association of friends, the intermingling of marriages, and the whole happiness of cities—all these are the fruits of peace. And the reason that all these things flow together is that peace is well practiced and flourished. But what need is there to speak toward the times, when men are at peace with one another? ^B The fertility of the earth, the navigability of the sea, the states of the air, the good complexions of bodies, health, easy child-birth, senses that are pure for their needs, and memories without delusion. But even in music, there is unity; and in geometry, the much-praised equality. And the fact that the heavenly bodies respond to peace, and that all things are both joined and held together by peace, are the works of peace. And why is there a need to prolong the discourse, when peace flourishes even more in divine things, and Scripture everywhere sings of it and sounds around it regarding all things? "Glory," it says, "to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will to men." It seems to me that just as in the angels the most excellent thing is to see the glory of God, so also on earth he has called the most excellent thing "peace," which is itself at once the gatherer and the secure bond, both of the orders in heaven and of ^C humanity on earth; and for the former, it has been prepared for the glory of God, but for the latter, for the good will which has come to pass from God toward them. Or rather, one might say that the Word of God Himself appeared on earth as peace, for the glory of the God and Father who is in the highest, and for the good will of the human race. For in another place, He called Him "peace upon Israel," and "salvation to the nations."

It would be difficult to enumerate the voices celebrated everywhere by theologians concerning peace. For that great mystery of the Savior on our behalf, standing above all understanding, and His descent toward us with an ineffable love for mankind, has been called the reconciliation with God and peace. ^D

^A “And the peace of God,” he says, “which surpasses every mind,” calling that peace which surpasses every mind, by which God, having become man, reconciled to Himself us who were His enemies; and what could be more fitting for the setting forth of the excellence of peace than this?

I have also heard of peace going forth and returning if he who receives it is unworthy; although it is said: “Peace to you,” “Peace to her husband,” “Peace to the little child”; although it is written: “The God of peace,” and all things above and below in the Scriptures are full of peace—or rather, all things are to those who attend to them rightly, peace and security. But I do not know how those who have now invented a new faith have spun out long delusions of contradictions ^B in order that they might tear apart the union which is in God and break us away from the sweetest peace; for everywhere, loving with excess what is contrary to it, they have dissolved the great gift of peace. And they have placed such untimely folly into the minds of all that they have not only been eager to turn them away from the most genuine dogmas, and have contended to leave nothing of those things which have belonged to Christians from the beginning unshaken, but they have also rendered us ourselves perplexed in the books they wrote, doubting if they are even human beings at all and if they endure hearing of the creature of God, they who blather so much against Him in the manner of the drunken. For I do not think that the Apostle meant any other defection to happen in the last ^C times than this one, unique above all: inasmuch as those others, while acknowledging something of the things of God, removed the rest, but this shameless superstition and religion refuses to honor anything of God at all. For even if with noisy mouths it seems to say something about Him, yet to those who consider the meaning of what is said, it manifests a total atheism; and this, it seems to me, clearly shows it to be naked and pure defection. Thus, with such excess have they railed against the, good of peace, and this even though our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, after having fulfilled all the economy for our sake, when He was sending the disciples ahead to the work of preaching, ^D and was preparing their minds and hearts, and having secured them by saying, “Peace to you,” did not stop until He enjoined them to say this first, confirming that He Himself was the author and arbiter of peace, which He had said in other places: “My peace I give to you,” repeating this again Himself, and thus ending, “Peace to you,” He entrusts the apostolic office to them in such a way—a thing to be celebrated with no praises sufficient—: “As the Father has sent me, I also send you,” both honoring them and exalting them with dignity. But if even before all the preaching of Christ, and the preparation for it,

Chapter I

^A a proclaimed and unproclaimed greeting exists, and is announced among us in every sacred thing and in the celebration of the mysteries, who are they to be called who, both before and now, are eager to dissolve its goodness, and, omitting nothing of wickedness, have so shamelessly encroached upon all our peace, having first contemplated expelling it from God, and then also from the pursuits and morals that are among us? Do they not, therefore, immediately from the beginning, display their own arrogance regarding harmony, and [do they not show] how they happened to choose a nature inclined toward impiety? But while some began this frenzy against our peace at different times, it finally reached Palamas—a man, indeed, of an unstable mind; monstrous in his superstition and worship of God; rash and inconsiderate in whatever business may arise; one who knew this end for contention, not as nature established it for the sake of just necessity, but as the time of his life extended it. Carrying about such a soul, and seeking to surpass others in this, where winning carries more risk regarding God, he went about first searching for an occasion to display himself, bestowing great effort upon the most trivial matters, and being very ambitious to take the lead in all things; moving every string and omitting nothing, so that he might appear to want to stand above and dominate in all things; and every meeting of his each day, whether it had gathered many or fewer [people], departed full of tumult and commotion.

^B When, however, the time had arrived for every iniquity to be fulfilled among us, and for our affairs to become like Sodom and Gomorrah; and for the entire race to be enslaved, every city to be desolated, and the Holy places to be trampled by the profane feet of the Persians, and for their lawlessness and uncleanness to be set on a level with our customs and objects of worship (oh, the judgments of God!), this insolent man, having fallen into even greater boldness, was immediately like a Lydian on the battlefield, and a torch to combustible timber; and just as for others, the destruction and ruin of bodies and goods was procured and accomplished, so also he, having spread his poison of souls almost further and wider, so that from both sides he might bring about death for souls and ruin and a fall for bodies.

^C A certain generation appeared, provoking to anger; a generation driven to madness, comparing God to those who are no gods. For this reason, God also planned to compare them to a non-nation, and indeed he fulfilled it, almost exterminating their entire system from the earth; delivering them in his wrath to an unwise nation, and to a leader most wicked above all those who inhabit the earth. And now, the remnant of that wrath, not even having come to its senses after the blow, if perchance some trace of peace is left, is eager to strike it down and crush it, moving forward with such great shamelessness, carrying around and parading ^D dogmas full of strife, tumult, and every other kind of impurity.

^A To these things we, together with many blessed men, since this too has been a concern for the persecutors—all opportunity for free speech having been driven away from us—have deemed it necessary to prepare a defense, both for our own piety in particular and for the peace that formerly flourished, summoning as judges of this our defense those who will read it in the future and will scrutinize the mind and intention of each. From those things which we have gathered from the books of Palamas and brought forward, those who examine them with care can easily understand who those are who have cast aside the peace of both God and ourselves, and who hold that it is quite safe to be in opposition to Christ. For by initiating a war between the natural properties in Him that is incompatible and destructive to His divine and blessed essence, and from there passing the evil on to us, they think they have performed a fitting service; and just as those who are eager to capture a city first attempt to pull down its citadel, and repeatedly crash against it, setting ambushes by night and by day, so too have the present enemies of peace done no less. Having been eager to drive it [peace] out of the Church of Christ, they discovered this senseless crowd of absurdities for the sake of apostasy from God, and for the sake of destroying that peace, so that they might easily take it away from us as well. ^B Yet, just as the Lord is celebrated in Scripture as Life, Light, Truth, and the like, so too is He called the cornerstone and the stone of stumbling. Who, then, crashing against Him, will not shatter his own head? Even if one should attempt to shoot arrows from afar, he has the Babylonian furnace flame for retribution; for it did not burn against those for whom it had been kindled, but rather it rushed upon those who had kindled it and consumed them. It seems to me that each of these arrows returns to the one who shoots it and strikes with a more powerful blow; for the harder the substance against which they are dashed, the more violently they are rebounded. For what is more indestructible than the gates of Hades? For they are called bronze and iron, and stone and adamant, and whatever else is named as having unbreakable strength; yet Christ, the Head and Pillar of all, foretold that not even these would prevail against the Church of Christ. ^C It has indeed been permitted in many instances, in order that the proof of our faith might become manifest, and the wise steward might be revealed, for wolves for a time to creep into the fold, and to scatter the flock and ravage the stall; yet the outcome did not go according to their intention to the very end. But having become intoxicated with the stench of the souls of the perishing, they were shattered right there, ensnared by their own cords. Their fall was a spectacle both singular and almost unheard of. And indeed, they were often permitted for a long period of time to revel in their own impieties. Of such a kind was idolatry, which, after the preaching, was granted the freedom to flourish for three hundred years and more. Of such a kind was the Arian silliness, the foolish chatter of the Monothelites, and the crowd of the Iconoclasts. For more than five hundred and seventy years ^D [the duration of] each of these sects has lasted, and it has run its course...

against the Church of Christ; yet suddenly vengeance came upon them, and now they are not even known to exist. ^A Consequently, neither will those who trouble the Church today derive pleasure from it for long, nor will the patience of the poor be forgotten in the end, nor will Christ allow the rod of his inheritance to be idle; but He will utterly destroy it, along with these wretched people, [or] by removing us and taking us away to lowly habitations, He will establish it, just as He did earlier with the Jewish people, measuring out to them for their idolatry the destruction caused by the Babylonians and Greeks; or by His mighty hand He will drive them away, shutting them up in the deep pit of Tartarus, while He will rescue us with an uplifted arm from both impiety and captivity, and will restore us to our former dogmas, sentiments, and form of government.

And let these things be hoped for, and let better things be requested by us; but now we must endeavor to pursue the discourse, having set before us the supersubstantial power of all things, for whose sake we dare even these things; not at all wishing to do so, because we take upon ourselves to touch the mysteries of God with unclean lips, yet not for the sake of any other ambition are we undertaking the discourse, but rather are compelled by necessity to respond. ^B For unless we render an account of those things whereof we are slandered, while every day, in the manner of a herald, he who has obtained the prelacy as a reward for defending these wicked dogmas cries aloud and subjects us to the most dreadful curses, and what does he not contrive? What does he not persuade [the people] to do, so as to incite everybody against us and prepare the crowd to revolt? Perchance [he thinks] he will receive a prize for this from God! For regarding other matters, we are commanded to remain peaceful; but where God is in danger, we are bidden to be very bold and courageous; and we would deserve to be laughed at greatly by those who hear [us], if we thus ignobly betrayed the arguments on our behalf; and to tolerate it by silence provides not only the suspicion of consenting to the charges brought against us, but would also wrong those who come after us, while through sluggishness the things that are blasphemous are left unreproved. ^C Furthermore, we are not the first to have entered upon this path; but many of the blessed men before us, traversing this course, have come forth as victors in all things; whose footsteps we too, gladly following, and re-reading the divine sense in all their [writings], have determined also to contend for these things.

And first, if it pleases, we must endeavor to turn the discourse straight against the transgressions of Palamas. Then we must endeavor to refute the unions and distinctions by which he has, in a monstrous way, led men to believe [in his view of] God. After these matters, we must consider what it is fitting to inquire into and set forth concerning the Light; and lastly, those things [which have been] composed against

^A us each year in the Church, with the curses loudly proclaimed against us, which must be shown to be calumnies, and rather to be blasphemies invented against Christ, and [to harm] all those who are of Christ even more than ourselves. For the sake of clarity, our discourse will be set forth in relation to each of the points that arise, accompanied by proofs from the Scriptures. So that I may say again those words: "Take not the word of truth out of my mouth" [Ps. CXVIII, 43], O supersubstantial and transcendent Tri-hypostatic Beatitude and Virtue.

CHAPTER II.

^B Furthermore, it is impossible for those who are now causing this tumult to deny or not to confess some of those things which Palamas wrote, since they have so clearly professed these things in their own "Faith," as they have so inconsiderately called it, and have laid it upon the divine altar with hands as bold as they are profane. Yet it is ordained that only these two things be placed there: the most divine Gospels, and the ^C truly awesome flesh which is also God—that is, the immaculate body and blood of the Savior—or, if it should happen to be a third, the great ointment of our consummation. For, in short, Christ himself alone is placed upon it; and each of these things represents Him alone: the Gospels as Legislator and Teacher, the other as the same One who suffered for us, and the last, finally, that the same One is designated both High Priest and King. "For ointment poured out is His name, to which all is given" [Cant. I, 2]. ^D Since, therefore, it was commanded that nothing other than Christ, nor anything else holy, be placed there, these men, by a profane machination, and showing that nothing is sacred to them—just as nothing is divine—have brought in that impure Tome, asserting it to be the "Faith of the Christians," as they have termed it, thus acting with scurrility and falsehood. In this, therefore, they thus proceed concerning the books and treatises of Palamas, and those things which have been excerpted from them by the pious to refute their vanity, retaliating wickedness with wickedness and, as the saying goes, curing evil with evil: "Neither were those things which the enemies of the Church accused the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica of, left unexamined, even though these excerpts were taken from those which were examined at that time in the divine synod." Therefore, having found that these things, written by their own hand, had been presented to us by our most powerful and holy sovereign and emperor, and having read and examined each of these things in the book of the most holy Metropolitan of Thessalonica, when we had gathered at the Great Church and spent the day in disputation—and not once, but twice and thrice and often—we also...

^A found him in agreement with the holy theologians, and by the grace of Christ, a defender of the truth according to piety.

It appears, therefore, that those blessed men collected from the books of Palamas the most significant chapters of impiety, which we too shall set forth hereafter; and when these were proposed to the robber-synod for the refutation of their lawlessness, having made a thorough investigation, as they claim, and examined them one by one, they found that they indeed agreed with the truth, and should be added to those whom they were slandering. From these, therefore, it is easy to discern three things: that they were written by his hand; that they found these things to be blameless; and third, that they are in agreement with the truth of piety. But from the first point, we have cause to infer that the refutation of impiety was not won by any others, but only by those blessed men, who, fearing nothing of the persecutors' arrogance, nor their remaining power of dominion, but by certain truth from the books of impiety, brought to light what was of impiety. From the second point, [one may discern] what kind of sentiment and mind they had. For if they, selecting the things that were of their adversaries, ^B presented them as appearing blameless, what would they have done in those cases where they proposed what was from the theologians—where even to transgress by a syllable introduces a perversion concerning divine matters that is not even to be endured? Furthermore, may the Palamites not dare even to open their mouths hereafter, since those very men show that we are not slandering them. For you see with what excess they assert that they have investigated these things repeatedly, and found them sound. And again, from the third point, that they even dare to say, with pride, that such monstrous things and trifles—which you shall hear from the words of him who wrote the noble dogmas—are in agreement with the holy theologians and with the true dogmas concerning God, and they do not fear the punishment hanging from Christ over slanderers for such a magnitude of impiety; the more they accepted these things after scrutiny, and deemed them to bear witness to the truth of piety, so much the more are they absolutely forced to abide by them, and it is not fitting that they deny anything written by any other of his followers. For Isidorus, even if he died before the trifles of the Tome were stitched together, was nonetheless the author of the Tome, by what he wrote and confessed as long as he lived. Coccinus and Nilus, moreover, besides ^C being alive, were the very creators of the Tome. It is therefore impossible that those who cherish the Tome should deny any of the lucubrations of those who were the authors of the Tome.

There are, moreover, many kinds of oaths for those who consider the matter; but a greater one is when something of that which is highly valued is placed upon an image and taken up. And yet by far greater is it, if—though it is a sacrilege—one should draw near to the awe-filled altar. But the Palamites, having committed this iniquity, pledged their faith by the greatest of oaths to embrace the things of the blasphemous Tome. But contained within it are all the things of Palamas, and those things which we have removed from them for the purpose of refutation.

Therefore, it is impossible for them to deny that they admit something from the books of Palamas, even if it were to result in the greatest charges against those who examine the matter, unless perchance they wish to clearly convict themselves of perjury.

To this, the divine Apostle says: "If I build up again those things ^A which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor" (Gal. ii, 18). Just as, therefore, to build up what has been torn down constitutes transgression, so too, if anyone destroys what has been built up, he incurs the same charge of transgression. It is therefore impossible that those things which they have built up in favor of the books of Palamas—insofar as they pertain to them—they should ever attempt to destroy, unless they wish also, in this respect, to constitute themselves transgressors.

CAPUT III

That the destructive dogma of Palamas began from error and contention.

Lest we shoot our arrow far from the mark, by premising a few things, we will show from what beginning Palamas was led into this insanity and from what fuel he kindled the great fire of impiety. Everyone knows what Barlaam laid to his charge: not, as he himself said, that he was bringing an accusation against the whole monastic and celibate life, but that he was reproving ^B those to whom it was a serious concern, while they were slower in other matters and not in accurate discipline, so that they were shut up in darkness for a while, and, as if expiring for a little because of the void, were forcing themselves to inhale rather than exhale, and were fixing their eye immovably and more firmly upon the navel. When these things were easily accomplished, monstrous and vain lies would clearly and immediately be at hand.

What then followed? They claimed to see a fire, existing within and without the viscera; and they claimed to perceive certain strange pulses and movements of the heart, and even certain heats coming forth from the nose; and that, after they had done these and other things, and had experienced them—whereas those who were giving their effort to this discipline were then at that time only three or four in number; for the rest, as I have heard from many men illustrious in piety, detested these things and utterly mocked them, and the majority had not even heard anything of them by report. ^C

Barlaam, therefore, having learned and suffered this from someone, certainly did not bear it at all, and thought it worth the effort to render to his venerable parents the rewards of his upbringing. Instead, he denounces that structure of contemplation and that practice, calling it a seduction and a Satanic affliction, and traced the greater part of that malady, which he attacked in his writings, back to the Messalians.

When Palamas had fallen upon his books, or rather had stolen them by breaking into the room where he searched out the book hiding and concealed in a corner, he writes in opposition an impiety, namely, teaching that that light is not subject to any error and is true, but that the— ^D

God’s creation. He proceeded to maintain, therefore, that it was not among created and servile things, but he imagined this to be the uncreated God and the Deity properly the creator of the universe.

Manifestly refuted again by Barlaam, and still laboring most of all under the mindset of the Massalians, and cherishing their delusions and lies, the man—rash and wicked in his stubborn boldness—seeks a refuge, and belches forth something from the evil treasure of his heart. To be sure, he scorns Principalities and Dominions, Thrones also and Powers, and rushing into the bosom of God, he searches out the deep and hidden things of His Power; and he strips the substance of God of this power, by which it is able to be and able to live; and he separates them from one another by a demonic measure and other differences, which you shall hear. And giving a name and designating that light of error, he says it is the life and power of God, but not His essence; by a most depraved impiety, truly, freeing himself from the Massalianism which is lighter—the one whose adherents he heard claiming to see the very essence of God. For he thought it more seemly to fit to that Fire of his the power or potentiality by which it pertains to the essence of God to be fearsome, and to see this as being Light, with a lesser boldness and artifice than the Massalians.

Covering over, therefore, this new and recent God with the name of operation and power, and also with the light of the Lord’s Transfiguration (for he found this to fit him better because of the usage of the name in one or another sense), and also with grace and gift and the other things ^C he was accustomed to mention for the deception of the masses, he thus proceeded and revealed it, declaiming throughout the whole discourse and smiling. It is in vain, therefore, for us to oppose responses to the Palamite syllogisms, with which they trust to cover their new God; but it behooves us rather to question them: whether that light which appears to them is the uncreated God. For wishing to establish even this, they have turned aside to these most absurd divisions and incisions. It is necessary, therefore, for those who come upon them to discuss first the principle concerning this light, leaving the rest far aside; and from these it is manifest to discover whence Palamas began to speak and to create confusion concerning these matters.

Furthermore, unto each of the sciences and arts there appears a certain fitting principle. It is permitted, therefore, to one endowed with science and art to look from the principles to see whither the method of business ^D tends, of which this principle happens to be something. But the principle of the Palamites has consisted, as you have heard, of contention and strife; hence, therefore, it is possible to conjecture what their whole structure is, concerning which our discourse exists.

Furthermore, the Lord says: “From the evil treasure of the heart…”

…” ^A that is, as if He were saying, “From evil causes, evil outcomes follow.” Gregory the Theologian also follows this, saying: “For the sowings of evil things produce evil fruits.” And again, the Savior says in those same places: “You will know the tree by its fruit,” [Matt. xii, 33] as if to say: “Understand the origins from the outcomes.” Therefore, from both sides, one may detect that the madness of the Palamites is destructive. For whether one looks at its origins, one would see they are driven by contention and strife; or whether one looks at the outcomes that have come from it, one would see that the resulting events are very bad, as shall be shown.

Furthermore, not even the author and parent of this impiety conceals the truth; but just as he who spoke with him and through him confessed, “What have we to do with you, Son of God?” [Matt. viii, 29; Mark i, 23; Luc. iv, 41] so too does he not keep silent about the fact that he began from contention. For in the confession of faith which he wrote, he says: “Nor would I have said these things, had I not been forced by the necessity of one contradicting me, entering into the struggle against him through the resistance of an adversary.” Therefore, the struggles—that is, the contentions and strifes—of the Palamite are the offspring and contests of necessity and resistance, and for this reason he was impelled toward them. Otherwise, he would not have spoken about these things, and he admits this even against his will.

Chapter IV. How he describes the symptoms of error as if they were his own correct actions.

It seems more fitting, before other things, to present him as he describes the movements and leapings of his own fervent heart, the fiery writhings and revolutions that burn and breathe from his breast, the heats and sparks leaping from his nose after the manner of Typhons or Chimeras, and the rest of the absurd pulses and disjointed conceptions, from which that light of error gushes forth—whether leading, accompanying, or following. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, I shall pass over most of what he wrote to many people, and I shall mention what he wrote to that Menas, a man, forsooth, of wondrous visions and breathings. “But if anyone,” he says, “does not receive the exultation of the saving Christ,” [Luc. i, 46] “which the Fathers have in many places called a ‘leaping,’ ^D a ‘breathing power,’ and a ‘movement of a living heart,’ such a person, I think, has not yet perceived its meaning.” And again in the same place: “But the divine Habakkuk, what Spirit does he say we conceive and bring forth? Is it not that of the Lord Jesus, who works in fire among the faithful and fulfills salvation? And what fire scourges demons and puts them to flight, as the blessed Father John says? Is it not that of the Lord Jesus, who is kindled within the soul by the recollection of Him? And what is the ‘odor of the Most High’ other than the fervor and heat of the Spirit, which sometimes even issues from the nose in a manner that no one can explain?” Having gathered these and many other things, and mixed them with sacred words, just as those who [clothe] the shapeless...

^A faces of those who look at them in order to hide them, or even those who season the vilest poisons with sweet-smelling and most delightful substances, he brings the thing out into the open; and by these pains and fiery parturitions, he persuades [men] to attend to them as if to a precious light, not of the earth, having first recounted to us many apparitions of old—so that the light faked by him might take the place of those, or even a greater one, due to the freedom of the times, and the malice of his soul, and the other shamelessness of his conduct, which he uses to speak against God in every word.

If it were now our task to refute these things, we would have produced many of the God-bearing Fathers, who declare these things to be plain insanity and a subversion of the sensitive spirit that reigns within us; among whom are the divine Diadochus, and the wondrous Nilus, and the illustrious Isaac; men who reached such a height of asceticism ^B and contemplation that they themselves became a brilliant example of every virtue, both existing and conceived, to all others. And indeed, one of them defines contemplation thus: that the one who has encountered it through prayer should appear breathless and astonished, not as the foolish say, imagining some form or shape or figure; but that one ^C says that the demon attacks the aforementioned place, and turns the light that is around the mind as he wishes, and that thus the passion of vainglory is stirred, shaping the mind into an idea in pursuit of a counterfeit of divine and essential knowledge. The great Diadochus [says]: “If to any of those engaged in the struggle there should appear either a light, or a figure, or some sign in the manner of fire, let him by no means accept such a vision; for it is a manifest deception of the enemy. Which many, having suffered through ignorance, were turned aside from the way of truth; for we know that ^D as long as we are at home in this corruptible body, we are away from the Lord; that is, we cannot see either Him or any of His supercelestial visions with our eyes.”

If indeed, as we said, it were our purpose to enumerate those who say such things, and to bring into the middle with how much excess they reject the visions thus formed in prayers, we would have provided very many things refuting this delusion. But since we have simply decided to set these things forth, it is worth the effort only to consider the causes of the delusion from the beginning, and for the sake of what Palamas has undertaken such a struggle, and has stirred up a war against God; and how, having cast Him out from His own creation, he has set up another as heir to His rights. For the heatings of the entrails, and those inward fires, and the leaps and movements of the heart boiling in him, and the exhalations...

^A proceeding like volcanic craters through the heat of the nostrils—this whole system arising from all these things he named the divine fire, and the light shed around it, divine, and both essence and substance and operation, illuminating and shining and acting upon the worthy unto deification, and this he proved to be the God who oversees the whole, by the means of which He spoke as He turned.

CAPUT V.

Such, then, is this light, and from such leaps and fiery movements—a light sensible and imbued with color, such as those who have risen from drinking not infrequently are wont to see, when they have shut themselves for a little while in the darkness, and suddenly see it spread around within and without their viscera—Palamas, ^B as we said, embarking from contention, and struggling as if with an eagerness to drive away an opponent, proclaims it to be uncreated God and Deity, and a true light, and not symbolic, but eternally existing. For thus he thought only to receive a just penalty for the things Barlaam blamed him for, if he could show that he was not falsely calumniating him, but could persuade [others] that the vision of light remains and exists, though not such as the other said. Therefore, that we may not seem to wander far from the aim of Palamas's words, and may fall behind that admirable man's divine birth of God, let him now come forth himself, and let him say what this light is in its beginning, and what rank and class it has attained in the registry ^C of things, and what, being mixed with these, it brings about; and what it says and commands.

"To be sure," they say, "to see the 'light in substance' spiritually; which same exists, and is not symbolic: for it always is, and is intelligible outside of matter and mind; which they know through certain experience. It is not the essence of God, for that cannot be palpated. It is not an angel; for it bears the marks of the Lord." The dignity of the light, and what its worshippers say they see spiritually, is of such a kind and order: but the things it performs are these: "It is one," he says, "when it is with the seer; at other times another is seen: sometimes it lifts [the seer] from the body ^D and carries him to an ineffable height; at other times, conversely, it adapts the body itself, and having imparted its own brightness, and peace, and love, and God-like pleasure and freedom from passion, it makes it filled, to bodily eyes—O the wonder!—it becomes graspable, having been changed by the Spirit."

Since, therefore, it does such things, and confers such gifts upon them for their pleasure and grace, it does not define the grace merely up to this point; nor does it deem it worthy of the worshippers to be left without contemplation or friendly converse. "For sometimes," he says, "just as a ray shed around things that are by nature intelligible makes them plain to him who has been judged worthy of such a gift, even while it emits no voice at all; at other times it speaks clearly to the seer through ineffable, so to speak, words; and this is what it says at the beginning, openly to him: 'I am; do not fear.'"

' ^A For the Godhead is not separated from me, in whose communion I deify those who are deified. I am He who is present and who works deification. Do you not see all things in me, and me before all things? But for your sake I become all things in you; for your sake I also become visible to you.

Is there any part of theology left over that he has not adapted to this light? For except for the fact that it is not the essence of God, he has applied every other attribute to it. Thus, this reckless and ruinous man, having no regard for any of those divine Fathers who have spoken thus, whereas that blessed mind, which in the posture of prayer attained to perfect formlessness, ^B says: "During prayer, do not shape the Divine within yourself, nor allow your mind to be impressed by any form; but approach Him who is beyond all matter immaterially, and you shall understand." And another says: "God sees everyone, but those who see nothing during prayer see God." And yet another: "The divine Apostle clearly teaches that whatever appears in a form, whether as light or as fire, comes from the enemy's artifice, saying that he transforms himself into an angel of light." " It is not right, therefore, for anyone to pursue the ascetic life with this hope. And the great Dionysius: "We too pray to be made fit for that darkness which is beyond light, and through ignorance and the absence of vision, to see and know Him who exceeds all vision and knowledge, by this very fact of not seeing and not knowing. For this is truly to see, and this is to not see and not know." ^C

Having scorned all these things, and having danced upon divine definitions and doctrines, he removes from the midst the God whom we know by ancient tradition as tri-hypostatic and invisible, and separates Him from the governance of our affairs; and he himself sets up another, outside the essence of God, a God who is perceptible to bodily eyes. And if one were to examine and scrutinize this innovation of his from the very beginning, one would clearly grasp it thus: for in saying, "It is not the essence of God, for that is intangible," he indicated that this is not the tri-hypostatic God; and in declaring, "It is not an Angel," he removes it from every created existence whatsoever; but in adding, "For it bears the characters of the Lord, and it is existing, and is not symbolic; for it is ever-existing, immaterial, and intellectually perceivable," ^D he maintains that it is the uncreated Lord Himself. And by gathering together the rest, he sees what is mingled with these things, and speaks of what is seen, and brings it forward as a God visibly present to the whole of creation, boasting and arrogantly claiming everything that belongs to the one God. It is clear, then, from these things, what the whole imposture of the man is, and that he both conceives of a God other than the tri-hypostatic and omnipotent essence, and delivers Him to the Church that now is for her to adore and worship.

^A Furthermore, Palamas calls this light a more plainly visible God, in the writings where he says to Barlaam: "He who possesses and beholds that light, no longer by analogy, but by a true and transcendent vision of things, thus knows God, and in himself possesses Him." And again: "This, then, is the glory by which we acquire and truly see God." Furthermore, where Palamas says that Gregory the Theologian spoke regarding the one tri-hypostatic God—"God, united to gods and becoming known"—he is not referring to Him, but to this second and visible God. For he writes in the same place: "Whence also the theologians call this light infinite, by which, through the cessation of every cognitive faculty, in the power of the Spirit, God becomes visible to the saints, as God united to gods and becoming known." For he once and for all defined the divine essence as completely untouchable and unparticipable. ^B Furthermore, where Palamas says that the same [Theologian] spoke regarding the one tri-hypostatic God, saying, "When God willed this world..." and what follows, he is not speaking of that [God], but of this light, this second and visible God, which is by no means the essence of God. For he says in the sixth of the second discourses to the blessed Acindynus, the beginning of which is, "To those indeed concerning action and the world": "By attributing this light to created things, he clearly proclaims God to be a creature. For when He willed to construct this world, which is composed of visible and invisible things, according to the Theologian Gregory, He Himself is light—and nothing else—to those eternal beings, namely, the deiform angels. For what need had those who possessed the highest light of a second light?" ^C But Acindynus teaches that this greatest light, which illuminates the deiform angels (which is nothing other than God Himself), is a creature, and that the light exists corporeally and in matter.

It is clear, therefore, from the fact that he says demonstratively and with reference, "this light"—which is the very thing disputed by the multitude and not believed as Palamas has deified it—and from the rest of the argument, that that admirable man was not debating with him concerning the light that is in the Trinity. For if anyone else was a worshiper of that [Trinitarian light], he also was; rather, he was debating concerning the most absurd light that has been falsely fashioned—as has been shown—and admitted into the rank of God, which he also calls God, the very one who constructed all things out of visible and invisible, and all the other things which the Theologian has theologized concerning the supersubstantial and adorable light which is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. ^D Furthermore, Palamas does not say that he speaks of the one tri-hypostatic God, saying, "God is the supreme and inaccessible light," but that it was said by him concerning the light that has been recently fashioned by him. For he says in that same discourse or book: "Where, then, is that light fashioned by Barlaam and Acindynus between God and the angels, which is neither God nor angel, but..."

is something earthly and gross?" ^A Yet even though the Theologian says, "This is the supreme light in the intelligible realm (namely, God), just as the sun is in the sensible realm," it is manifest that he casts his own disgraces and the blasphemies he has fabricated upon others. For he is the one who has fashioned a light to be seen spiritually in a substance, which is neither divine essence nor angelic, and thus he has established an existence between God and the angel. But let the calumny be forgiven, as that is a habitual matter for him in all things; but let one consider only those things which we went through before this, the ravings of his slander against God. For as it seems, he overturns only this earthly and gross substance, but concedes that everything else may be called his light.

Furthermore, Palamas says that the divine Gospel did not speak of God the Word in the words, "It was the true light," and what follows, but about the light he has fashioned and imagined, as you have heard. For he says in the same place, in the fourth discourse, which begins: "Whispering, therefore, into the great light." "Therefore that light is both a symbol and a true light, not simply 'true,' but it was the very true light, as even the great Basil says: 'If the Son was the true light, it was that true light which enlightens every man coming into the world.'" ^B Here too he uses his customary calumny, citing the great man as if he had spoken of two true lights; and not simply two, but as if he presumed the Word of God to be a particular true light, and the light imagined by himself to be the following, universal one. As if he were to say: "If he is a man, he is also an animal." But no one until today has ever said that the Lord is a particular light; for since He called Himself absolutely, "I am the light," He provided no handle for those who choose to blaspheme by supposing Him to be a particular light. ^C The saying of the great man is not to be understood in this way; rather, because there is one true light, he happened to use these terms as equals, as if he were to say: "For if he is a man, he is also a reasonable, mortal animal," the man signifying nothing other than the reasonable, mortal animal.

Furthermore, Palamas does not say that the supersubstantial essence and power, the one three-subsistent God, is the supreme object of desire, but ^D that demon whom he has imagined as a light, and whom he has evilly deified today. For he says in the same discourse: "For even if it has the title of light, it is also called true light; nay, rather it is the very true light, which God puts on like a garment." And to omit the interjected, indistinct, and incomparable things: "Light," he says, "which is seen by the saints, and by them in the spirit." Then he adds, that which

that they be in all things contrary: ^A "A light into which the angels cannot fix their gaze: a light which the angels praise, by which every spiritual adornment of the heavenly beings, feasting spiritually, is provided with a most evident proof of the Word's exceeding kindness and clemency toward us." And again, after many divine names: "A light," he says, "by which God is truly seen."

It is therefore manifest that he who mixes all things with a deadly and impious design, says to those who are driven by the same madness as he, that God is truly seen—that is, this phantasy, not a light that truly exists—while he does not deign to say that the angels can fix their gaze upon it. Thus far, from these and other things I have omitted on account of the utter futility and absurdity of the matter, he calls ^B the supreme object of desire the impious emotion and error of his own phantasy.

Furthermore, Palamas does not say that the evangelical sentence, "No one has ever seen God," and the apostolic one, "Whom no man has seen, nor can see," deny the vision of God universally; but he explains what is thus said as true regarding the essence. However, concerning the light imagined by him, while he confesses it to be God together with its divine properties, and affirms it to be the innate, natural, and substantial power and operation of God, he denies that it is comprehended. Although, having spoken of God indefinitely, and added the negative particle, "no one," if there were another God according to Palamas's notion and fiction, he would be comprehended ^C by that negation and judgment.

CHAPTER VI

How, from the aggregation of such discourses, the non-existent God whom Palamas imagines, appears as the creator and governor of all creation, and the end of all blessedness.

Almost all the Palamite nonsense is encompassed by such vanities, and those far worse. That we may, therefore, by summarizing and gathering the account back together in this part, contemplate the production and manifestation of this new God: the first point includes both his origin and his communion with those who see him; also the reasons for what kind of being he is, and that, with his divinity not separated from him, he himself is all things, and in him are all things, and he is before all things. Yet for the sake of those who are enclosed ^D in darkness, and who aspire, and who have their lower jaw set firmly against their navel, and who gaze unswervingly toward that same center, he becomes visible. The second point, most clearly, proves that he is believed to be this God. The third teaches that he is even truly seen. The fourth asserts that he is also the God who is united to all. The fifth declares him to be the author of this universe of things. The sixth hands down that he is the supreme and inaccessible light of the world that is understood by the mind and perceived by the senses. The seventh contends that he is not only that supreme light, but also the true

^A truth. And the eighth adds to these, that such a one is the supreme object of desire and the fullness of all blessedness.

I ask by God (I speak of the God who is tri-hypostatic, and who in times past was commonly worshiped by all as one God, but to us who are persecuted, is now our only God), what has Palamas left to the former that he should be called God? For if he says that this light, which is not the essence of God, exists before all things, and that all things are in it, and that it is seen as God, and is united to all, and creates and sustains all things, and that it is in fact the supreme and true end of all blessedness, what worship has he left to the God worshiped of old—he whom Palamas himself calls "transcendent" in opposition to the God now brought forward? It is evident, then, from these things that by stripping away all worship from God, he has bestowed it, as if it were a phantom, on this light, and that he worships it alone as the governor and administrator of the universe.

^B Furthermore, all worship and adoration is offered by us to the tri-hypostatic nature as the Savior and Creator of all, because, as they say, "The Uncreated Nature is the creator of all things." But if the Palamite light, which is not the essence of God, does all these things and performs these operations, it is necessary to attribute the adoration and worship especially to it, and not to the other.

^C Furthermore, men are constrained to turn their minds to the Divine in three ways: from the past, that He is the Creator; from the present, that He is the Savior; and from the future, that He is fearful because of justice, and that He is also the end of all objects of desire. If, therefore, as Palamas says, the divine essence is untouched by these things, then there is no necessity to turn one's mind to it either.

Furthermore, if the Palamite light—which he himself perceives as existing both within and without his inmost parts—is the supreme object ^D of desire and the whole account of blessedness, then the divine essence, and everything else we believe concerning it, is completely removed from the center, and only that light is God. For it is irrational to seek anything beyond that which is the supreme and final good. Rightly, therefore, were we also saying that this is truly the apostasy which the blessed Paul spoke of as being about to appear in the last times.

OF THE PALAMITE TRANSGRESSIONS, SERMON IV.

INDEX OF CHAPTERS

CHAPTER I.

With such a confluence of heresies, and with such a defe-

defection, Palamas leaped forth, ^B and having at first made three or four disciples for himself, while also stealing away some from those on the Holy Mountain, he began decrying Barlaam as if he were slandering the divine apparitions that had been shown anywhere, and the illuminations that had been afforded to other blessed men at different times, and as if he were overturning the entire monastic institution. Having seduced them by these means, and having prepared them, out of simplicity, to subscribe to that Tome which had been hastily composed against piety—a Tome to which he also gave a name derived from its place—he then proceeded to the Great City. Showing there an account that was at once impious and deceptive, and presenting those who followed him as fuel for shamelessness and garrulity, he clearly accomplished among some of the powerful men what the great Apostle says: "For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires, they will heap up for themselves teachers, having itching ears; and they will turn their ears away from the truth, and be turned aside to fables" (II Tim. iv, 3). And he did not even bring these men in simply and as it happened, but as one might say, after long labors and all the things that are pleasing for the theft and securing of authority, so that it might be spoken of for us.

Those, therefore, whom they had thus heaped up for themselves as teachers, having achieved these feats, they established in the Church, and having named this the Church of God, they drive everyone toward their religion, shouting: "The Church holds these things." For this reason, we too have composed the present discourse, demonstrating how this Church progressed, and showing that it does not justly or holily claim this title for itself.

It is worth noting, however, that our discourse is not directed against all those who presently fill this body, but is spoken only of those who established this authority—being a few men, and almost those who are mentioned by us as witnesses. For there is no need to speak about those who only complete the number, ^C nor about any of those who are distinguished in rank, since the time and custom have forced this upon them, nor indeed about common, ordinary men whose occupation is life, and not the concern or diligence for dogmas.

But so that we may first know the definition of the Church of God: the holy Church of God is, according to the divinely-transmitted oracles, a sacred gathering not only of many and blessed men, but also of those who are lesser, having come together in the name of the true light that "enlightens every man coming into the world" (John i, 9). For the divine Word said at one place: "Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii, 20).

Furthermore, the holy Church of God is a sacred assembly, the allotment of the inheritance of Christ, a royal priesthood, a people for God's own possession (Deut. xxxii, 9; I Pet. ii, 9), ^D upon the rock of the apostolic

^A and patristic traditions founded, and admitting nothing novel for the subversion of the dogmas received from the beginning. For our saving Word provided for this, saying: "Teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matth. xxviii, 20); and the divine Apostle likewise: "Avoid profane novelties of words" (I Tim. vi, 20). And again: "But though an angel from heaven preach a gospel to you besides that which you have received, though I Paul, let him be anathema" (Gal. i, 8).

Furthermore, the holy Church of God is the teacher of divine and human matters; and, as the great Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (II Cor. x, 5)—to the common notions regarding God, that is. And from these, as the divine Basil says, ^B deriving the origin of every question, and striving to refer it back to them again; and if any Scriptural word should occur, as the holy and ecumenical synod at Chalcedon decreed, not interpreting it otherwise than as the lights and teachers of the Church have set forth in their own writings: in nothing transgressing the limits already set, or the tradition received from the Fathers.

Finally, the holy Church of God is the integrity of the members of Christ’s body, brought back to one head, according to that which was said by the Lord: "And there shall be one fold, one shepherd" (Joan. x, 16).

There follows of necessity, for the holy Church of God so beautifully defined from the divine utterances, the fruit of the Spirit. This is, according to the divine Apostle: Charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, ^C faith, mildness, continency (cf. Gal. v, 22-23). Against such there is no law, for they are spiritual, and have risen above every law, and are entrusted rather to legislate and command than to be guided by the discipline of laws.

CAPUT II.

Whether it is called the holy Church of God on account of this or that person who exists as patriarch.

These things having been thus constituted and explained, every Christian ought to consider what must be called the holy Church of God, and who are they that shine within it; and not think that merely because someone has seized the throne and has formed a faction of like-minded men, ^D and persuaded them to hold such and such views, that such a body is to be esteemed the holy Church of God. For if that were so, the congregation of the Arians would seem from the beginning to be the holy Church of God; likewise the Monothelites and the Iconoclasts, since many and varied such men have seized the throne and convened synods far more numerous than those now existing, and have embraced the whole world in the contagion of their wickedness, while a few remaining here and there—men held in no account by their adversaries—were those who truly understood and taught the right dogmas.

Furthermore, according to that which we have assigned, the holy Church of God...

^A requires that one who is set over it should both think and teach rightly. But if one should act contrary to what has been established, and does not confine himself within the limits defined, then, as far as he is concerned, it is not the holy Church of God. Therefore, such a person cannot properly be heard in this sacred calling; he only appears to be not such as he ought to be.

Furthermore, those before us have declared that the "door" is not only the accurate understanding of the divine dogmas concerning Christ but also the approach to divine matters through ecclesiastical status and canonical order. Therefore, whoever is introduced to the flock through both of these is clearly entering through the door and is a shepherd; but he who climbs up another way is a thief and a robber, as the sacred Word has said. ^B

CHAPTER III. Whether the holy Church of God is that which was established through confusion and the reward of treason.

That the faction of the Palamites basely established its leadership, being a fruit of confusion and a reward for treason, everyone knows; and the events that have now been squandered bear witness to this. For the wicked, first wandering around the great city, conferred about treason with the magistrates who were outside, and joined those who were stirring up sedition within the city, and hastened to contribute their efforts to that useful end. And having set up brilliant trophies of faithlessness, they persuaded him who was invested with the empire that he should deign to provide them with no other reward for those long struggles, but only the proclamation of their innovation; having previously deceived him with persuasive words into impiety. And he, with greater liberality, added the direction of the Church to the innovation; and in that way, the Palamite council first began, existing as a fuel for treason and a prize of confusion. ^C

If, however, these things need to be considered from afar and one wishes to examine them in detail, let him read the book written about these things by the great champion of the truth, Nicephorus; and he will know everything accurately, for in it there is nothing lacking of those things that have been well practiced for the sake of truth and beauty. Therefore, the faction established by such principles could not justly be called the holy Church of God.

Furthermore, the Savior placed peace before the initiation of teaching and leadership. For having first said, "My peace I give to you," ^D he then adds, "As the Father has sent me, so I also send you." It is clear, therefore, that the Savior’s peace takes precedence over all priesthood according to reason. But the faction of the Palamites took its origin contrary to peace, from sedition and turmoil; therefore, it was first formed by customs contrary to the holy Church of God.

^A Furthermore, every betrayal and wickedness, being considered among the greatest injuries and harms to the state, is subject to the harshest of penalties under the laws. It is therefore illegal for any person thus liable to be called to any ministry, and much more illegal for the divine authority to be entrusted to him.

^B Moreover, it is worth while that whoever is called to the episcopate and the governance of souls should carry with him the testimony of God; and this is: "Just, irreproachable, abstaining from every evil thing." But the Palamites might be conscious of the opposite toward themselves, if indeed they wish to judge with an honest mind. Therefore, they have also unworthily seized the holy Church of God; and they would no longer deserve to be called the holy Church of God, but might more justly be heard of as separated from the Church of God and as apostates.

CHAPTER IV.

In order, therefore, that those who wish to think the things of Christ might consider not only from what causes such a foully assembled faction was formed, but might also consider it to be held in greater disgrace, I shall bring forward to the middle a few things from its sacred records, ^C including those actions performed against them by the truly holy Church of God, and the penalties imposed, even before their betrayal came to pass.

The blessed of memory and great patriarch and confessor John (1), in many of his various synodical acts, declared Palamas and those who shared his sentiments to be excommunicated and cast out from the divine enclosures, pronouncing this by a formal sentence. In his defense against that Robber-Synod, the beginning of which is, "Some object, in order that the final achievements of the man might be remembered rightly," he says: "The Palamites, therefore, as those who slander and malign the truth, and who crookedly and craftily attempt to overturn the decrees of the first synod, our mediocrity subjects to the excommunication which is from the holy and consubstantial and blessed and life-giving Trinity, and condemns them with the curses of anathema, until they repent and sign and confess the truth." ^D And after a few words: "Wherefore, we also subject Palamas himself, and those who share his sentiments, and all who defend those novel dogmas and do not reject them, to the same excommunication."

But the twenty-two bishops who later completed the synod, collectively signing in a sacred Tome both the deeds performed before them on behalf of piety, and those performed with them, and—as you have heard—the Palamites, who had been excommunicated previously, having obtained ecclesiastical [offices] as the reward for their betrayal, from Christ and all his priesthood—

^A cutting [them] off and subjecting them to like censures, they say in the Act, the beginning of which is: "Hear, O tribes of the earth and tongue": "And first of all, they immediately attempt to withdraw Isidore, existing as a suffragan of the most holy metropolis of Monemvasia, from the dogmas of Palamas and his faction and associates. For he too was one of those who held his opinion, although he was imprudent and had become subject to episcopal judgments. But when they found him resisting and of a completely inflexible mind and purpose, they cast him forth from the holy chancel, when he was already prepared to perform the holy rite and to con-celebrate with the patriarch. Then they also summon him to judgment. He, however, having openly professed that he would never accept what was theirs, but would rather surrender his soul and the Church, than that he should dissent from Palamas, if any force were applied to him, renounces his episcopal dignity and the Church over which he had been constituted bishop; and thus he is also subjected to a synodical deposition, so that a little later another might be ordained as prelate of the church which he had obtained.

^B But Palamas, who was the ringleader and protector of the blasphemies, he himself also having been condemned with his associates by an equal sentence (for he neither yielded regarding the contention, nor in the slightest degree relaxed his irrational babbling and prattle), is cast out from the Church of God and the priesthood, as the records against them relate, signed by the then patriarch of the Queen of Cities, and by the patriarch of the God-protected [city] of Antioch, and by each of the individual bishops, both those now present here and those who have gone to the ^C dioceses which they have obtained. And thus their deposition and suspension and interdiction take place; although, reckoning the censure as nothing, they clung to the priesthood, boldly offering the mystic sacrifices in secret.

Exinde vero, when the Church of God was enjoying peace and things in this regard were quiet, a certain violent storm breaks out from the opposite side, stirred up by the winds of Satan, and overturns everything and changes it into a grievous tempest; and it seats those who have been revealed as blasphemers, those enemies of the truth, at the first rudders, and makes ministers of sacred things and priests the artificers of nefarious and obscene things, ^D [and makes] deserters the presidents of dogmas, and wicked men the stewards of souls.

And since it is permitted to set forth many synodical sentences issued against the dogmas of Palamas, both by patriarchs and by the bishops subject to them, collectively and individually, that I may pass over all of these, I shall make mention of one alone, which the bishops who were then [in office] decreed as a token of their own piety: "That no one is to be accepted into the dignity of the episcopacy who cherishes and receives the innovations of the phrases of Palamas, as long as he persists in them."

Seeing, therefore, that such great struggles and actions have been brought against them, those men, shameless in all respects, taking none of this into account, because clearly

^A they have completed the betrayal, scorning all divine canons, postposing all ecclesiastical discipline, they invade the priesthood as if it were a miserable prey, and openly profess impiety. They make light of those dread punishments to which they had been rendered liable, but following the secular powers that were then in force, they become canons and rules and laws unto themselves; and just like assassins, they seize as their own what belongs to others. ^B And with no consideration for divine justice, which quite often avenges us, they push themselves forward with arrogance, crying out that the Church of God is holy, while they, as you have heard, had been excommunicated from it long before. Therefore, the assembly of the Palamites is no longer in any way the holy Church of God.

Furthermore, every action, divine and human, is for the most part judged from what has preceded it. From these things, therefore, the assembly of the Palamites is convicted not only of being profane, but also of being rejected by all the votes and judgments of the assembly of the orthodox.

Furthermore, the unlawful assembly of the Palamites is rejected in two ways: both because it was expelled from that holy synod in the first place, and because it obtained the priesthood as a reward for betrayal.

Furthermore, for human powers, the first good is that they be ordered, though sometimes it happens even by chance; but for divine powers, it is always only by order. The Lord also said this to Peter: "And when you have turned, strengthen your brothers" (Luke XXII, 32). What order, therefore, did the Palamites preserve in sacred things? By the judgment of what synod, having first cleared away their crimes, did they obtain their episcopates? And who is he who received those who had been expelled, and who had the authority to release them from the bonds by which they were held? They cannot show a single one at all.

^C But if they should call that robber synod, which shook the great bulwark of piety, a [valid] synod, let them first carefully heed the divine judgment, which immediately refuted them. For in one night, they both revealed the just man to be useless to them, and were themselves seized and bound by the enemies. Then let us consider that these very men were those who had decreed those punishments and depositions with a common vote; ^D yet these were the ones who had earlier written a script of defection against the emperor, and had cast him out of the assembly of the faithful, whereas they had subjected themselves to oaths and cursed imprecations, having pledged never to receive him, but to expel him with all their might. Who, therefore, absolved those who had acted prevaricatingly against these things so established for them, and rendered the perjurers innocent in the very things they had condemned?

Furthermore, even if these things were also removed, it is permitted to bishops subject to a province to choose and ordain a worthy man for themselves, or even to discipline and depose one if they have found him guilty of crimes; but without a presiding authority, it is forbidden to stir anything, let alone matters of dogma.

^A Indeed, those things inherited from ancient traditions require a synodal inquiry, unless perchance they are bogged down in the error of the Acephali. Therefore, the Palamites cannot boast that they have observed ecclesiastical laws and rights in this matter, nor even to the extent [B(heading)] CHAPTER V. Is it the holy Church of God, which, on account of the license presumed for the freedom of its own right, appointed as its patriarch one who had previously been bound by canonical crimes and deposed from all priesthood?

Therefore, being subject to so many penalties, and being in such a base and unworthy condition, that they should not only hasten toward the great and august office of the priesthood, but—since it was not even permitted for them to perform any other public task—yet relying on secular powers and permitting everything to themselves, they invade divine matters; and, emboldened by the crime of treason, they administer the affairs of the Church, rashly appointing whomever they wish for the guardianship of souls. And since it was necessary for them to gather a leader for their own superstition, what did they contrive? Without any regard for divine laws, nor for established canons, nor for ecclesiastical order, but referring everything to themselves through a license and liberty of error, like some sort of legislators and inventors of monstrous mysteries, they brought forth a patriarch—a man who, as the synodal act concerning him sets forth, had been caught in three offenses ^C and had fallen from all priesthood. And I believe that God also seduced their minds in this matter, so that they might be manifest to all as having obtained a profane origin of the episcopate, and one appropriate to their own reasoning. For just as aborted fetuses are often maimed and harmed before they are even brought forth from the womb, so it happened to them. Before they had even arisen, they were deposed and disowned, and they suffered the punishments worthy of their future malice.

In order, therefore, that we may recall that action: "It was reported," it says, "concerning the monk Isidore, a candidate for the most holy metropolis of Monemvasia, such and such things." And finally, these things having been spoken, and the question having been asked as to what should be done in this case, it was judged and decreed synodally that he, being in such a state, ought no longer to be received as a priest or bishop. ^D For he who, before his finishing in the episcopate, performed things which belong to the bishops, and was in league with those who practiced violence, and received those who followed their own notions—not those by which the Church is established and proceeds—hence, it will deservedly not be permitted for him even to walk in the way of the episcopal office.

Furthermore, every sacred action must be done according to the rule of the apostolic command. And indeed the Apostle says, "He who is promoted to the priesthood must be blameless." Therefore, a priest—

^A who even before he was made such was subject to countless charges, would have been subject to them even after. And the Apostle says, "Beware the suspicions of men, even if they be false." 57 The Palamites ought, therefore, even if what was brought against them was falsely laid, to have run to a higher tribunal and freed themselves of the charges. But the heresy of autonomy did not allow them; rather, fearing the exposures, they contrived to remain in their place of purpose through silence, which was worthy of being stifled.

Furthermore, the Lord said that every ambition and autonomy belongs to secular and gentile authorities; but He ordained that His Church should have the opposite of these. "For you know," He says, "that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and the great ones exercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you; but whoever among you wishes to be great, let him be your servant." 58 But the Church of the Palamites, even before it was first established, chose the place of traitors, in order that it might suffer this very thing, into the form of which it now ends. It has obtained, therefore, an opposite purpose to that of the Church of God; and it continues, effectively, as a portion of the gentile—^B realm.

CHAPTER VI

Is the holy Church of God, which contains within itself two patriarchs of one flock who mutually depose one another and stir up tumult, to be proclaimed as such?

Therefore, having transgressed every apostolic and canonical precept—those by which they first intruded upon divine matters, and those for which they were set to the task—they have had nothing less in their own discipline even now. And that I may omit most things—unlawful marriages, plunderings of sacred things, absurd ordinations, and the reception of bribes—I shall turn my pen to these. For the one whom they had previously mockingly set up as bishop for themselves had departed. But another was summoned to perform the sacred function; and so that the peace of the Church of Christ—the primary mark—might flee from them, even as in other things, they cast down him whom they had, and lead in another.

But when the former returns from flight with the Emperor, they re-establish the one who had been deposed; and they drive out the one who had newly arrived; and thus they carry on the battle with vehemence. For the one who had been deposed against all right, having the stronger side with him because he has striven with justice, enjoys the throne; but the other resists, casting many things against the other, because he plunders his own. And the one deposes the other, and accuses him in turn of adultery. ^C And no sentence of condemnation proceeds from anyone against anyone; but both enjoy the same title and the same pomp; and in this great and single city, to some this one is named in the lists of the commemorations as the true one, to others the other, and to others both; and in this way, by all these things, the matter and pledge of divine peace is overturned, and that requested—^D

the commandment to love one another, which is the preeminent mark of Christ’s Church, is destroyed. It is very far, therefore, from the truth to call that ^A Church which destroys this the Church of God.

Furthermore, every oblation and sacrifice is acceptable only when it is performed according to the rule of the Lord’s tradition. For He says: "If you offer your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and go; first be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift." How, therefore, do the patriarchs who claim for themselves one and the same throne each offer their gift at the altar? Must we suppose they leave their gift before the altar and are reconciled to the one who has something against them? But they would not persuade that person unless they first yielded the throne to him. ^B But remaining irreconcilable, each one offers the gift in this sideways manner, and does not offer it according to the command of the Savior. Thus, their oblations and sacrifices are no longer acceptable to God.

Moreover, the Lord says: "Whoever shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven." Now, the commandment of the offering is broken by the Church of the Palamites due to the claim to and fighting over the one throne by two patriarchs, even though they exist within the same religion and one doctrine. Therefore, both those who break the commandment and those who offer in this manner will be called least and are utterly unworthy.

Furthermore, they are not only found to be acting lawlessly in these matters, ^C but they also attempt to overturn the Savior’s prediction concerning His own Church. "For there shall be," He says, "one fold, one shepherd." But the Church of the Palamites, in this respect also, acts in opposition to Christ, for it brings to light two shepherds for one fold at the same time. Therefore, the congregation of these people is not the Church of Christ.

CHAPTER VII

From such principles, therefore, and such a way of life, having seized for themselves the tyranny of the Church—so that they may subject it to themselves by force—they stir up, as has been said, ^D conflicts against one another, maintaining in all things an implacable hatred and discord. Yet they are of one mind in this sole respect: to overturn the entire meaning of pious dogmas. For this reason, they also set up camps against the singular Deity and proffer the insolence of their audacity in order to overturn the truth. In order, therefore, to summarize what has been said above at length, let us place before our eyes that God, who truly and in essence exists, is innately and infinitely higher than [all things], and that the power that is in [Him]...

^A they conceive of as a tri-hypostatic essence which they have fashioned; but that [which] thus has the innate power of God, they consider a non-substantial God, and inferior by so much to the Divine essence. By a standard method, therefore, they posit them as gods, just as they posit them as divinities; and they desire to distinguish them by this division, as well as by many other modes of opposition, just as the relation of the visible to the invisible, and the participant to the imparticipable, and the rest of the oppositions.

One capital point of their impiety is this: that not only do they strip God of true existence and introduce a portentous multitude of gods, but they also overturn the laws concerning the monarchy that were handed down to us from the beginning, the words and sense of which are these: “The Catholic Faith confesses one Divinity, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; other than which none shall be reckoned.” And: “To us there is one God, because there is one Divinity.” And as we have been taught to think of one God, so we have received [the tradition] to confess one Divinity.

Secondly, those who have determined to establish the second God and Divinity—the one whom they have invented—as the president, inspector, and creator of the administration and commerce of the whole world, fall into a monstrous madness against the essence of God, which is pre-eminent over every Divinity. And they say in these words and write: ^B “What envious demon with impudent boldness has introduced into the Church of God that the essence of God itself, dwelling in men, purges those who are being purged, and illuminates those who are being illuminated, and, dwelling in creatures, works these things? This, which we hear from you (and would that we did not hear it!), is truly a dark invention of demons.” Hence it is entirely clear that they are capturing from such great blasphemy nothing else but what we were saying, namely that they might remove the essence of God entirely from all administration and care of things, and in its place introduce that substitute God whom, imagining him to be like light, they brought forward.

Thirdly, with equal or greater impiety—which surpasses the above—not only do they banish the super-essential and uncircumscribed essence from indwelling in creatures and abolish the Scripture, which clearly cries out: “I will dwell in them and will walk among them, and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people;” ^C but also, lest any harm might befall men from it, they persuade them to flee from it, and have declared it to be endowed with a corruptive power, speaking thus in the Faith which they set forth: “And we think the essence of God, because it is called imparticipable and inaccessible, to be endowed with a corruptive power; and those who think thus concerning it—O the temerity and audacity!—they have pronounced impious; and this, even though God said to Moses: ‘No man shall see my face and live.’”

These two things, far from being greater than every impiety, more clearly demonstrate the former impiety, ^D

^A but also that it has stripped away the very hope of Christians; and this even though the Savior says: “He who loves me, will keep my commandments, and I and the Father will come, and we shall make our abode with him.” And the divine Peter says: “We have become partakers of the divine nature.” And the great Athanasius says: “According to these things is the holiness and sanctifying power of the Father and the Son, which sanctifies all rational beings that count themselves worthy, by their own free choice and diligence, to receive the holy and blessed essence for the exchange of sanctification.” And the sweet and holy Cantor: “Light, singular and three-fold in splendor, entity without beginning, beauty beyond description, dwell in my heart.”

The fourth point is equal and similar to the former; and while it attributes perfection and rule over all things to the second god and Divinity, it casts the super-substantial Trinity down among the creatures in the lowest place, saying this: “It does not suffice for the life that truly exists, or the wisdom that truly exists, or the power that truly exists, to be such of itself—or unless it abounds—unless it makes use of a life, wisdom, or power that does not truly exist;” for they call the life, wisdom, power, and common operation of the super-essential Trinity a life that does not truly exist, and that second god, ^B and thus they subordinate Him infinitely to the God who is above all. But if that which uses another thing beside itself to live, or to be able, or to be wise, is imperfect in itself, and mortal, and powerless, how then are the life and power and wisdom that truly exist—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (for each of these is what it is, and is truly existing life and wisdom and power)—not imperfect in themselves, and mortal, and powerless? These four things contain every impiety that has been devised or shall be.

They add yet other thousands of things, surpassing every excess of absurdity. For this second and subordinate god they ^C explain as being extended into many things and beyond number, uncreated and insubstantial; and they say that whatever kinds exist, these also are conformed to them; and that they are seen by bodily eyes, though the eyes have been changed, and that they move in concert with those who see, and that they change these [viewers] into their own uncreated nature, rendering them uncreated, beginningless, and uncircumscribed—and all the other things we have discussed specifically in our book on heresies. They twist, however, to serve their own impieties of this sort, whatever divine Scripture they might be able to distort; but that which is clear and beyond all controversy, this they reject and spurn.

With such dogmas, therefore, and with such nonsense, they ^D deploy their line, claiming that they themselves and their own godless assembly are the holy Church of God. For we have learned from Him and from His own that there is one God in three persons, and we have been taught to stop our knowledge at this point, as the great Athanasius says: “We say ‘Holy’ three times,

^A and one Lord, because of the one Godhead.” These things are sufficient for the faithful; the knowledge of men reaches up to this point; up to this point the Cherubim are covered by their wings. But as for God as essence and God as operation, divided into two in such a way and having this status, we have neither been taught this, nor have we heard it until today. It has been said that the Church of God is that which is founded upon the foundation of the apostolic and paternal traditions. Therefore, the Church of the Palamites is no longer the Church of God.

Furthermore, “Every plant,” says the Savior, “which my Father has not planted will be rooted up” (Matt. xv, 13). It is therefore manifest ^B that the faith which is outside the paternal traditions has not been planted by God. You have also heard the faith of the Palamites, altogether foreign and contrary to the divine dogmas established for us from the beginning; therefore, it will be rooted up. And if this is so, it is not the holy Church of God; for not even the gates of hell shall prevail against that one (Matt. xvi, 18).

To this, the divine Apostle commands that we avoid profane novelties of words, but rather that we be built up for the instruction of the Church of Christ (I Tim. vi, 20; Ephes. iv, 13). And it is evident that this means to avoid the Palamite Church, which is militant with so many novelties of words, and to be numbered instead among these divine men, who are gathered in the name of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, and who have Him in their midst: “For you,” he says, “count the myriads, but God counts those who are to be saved.”

Furthermore, the same divine Apostle says: “Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering; for He is faithful who promised” (Hebr. x, 23). ^C Therefore, one must not seek to make additions or subtractions to those things which we have confessed; nor are we to follow foreign promises, even if an angel from heaven were to announce these things to us. For thus, and only thus, shall we hold to the confession without wavering, and we shall have as faithful the Lord who promised. But if we seek otherwise, we shall render all our hope vain.

Furthermore, the Savior says: “My sheep hear my voice, because they know my voice; but a stranger they will not follow, but will flee from him, because they do not know the voice of strangers” (John x, 4, 27). It must be considered, therefore, whether the dogmas of the Palamite Church ^D are consistent with the voice of the Savior, so that we might follow them. For truly, to say that the Godhead is subject to and uncreated, and yet other than the essence of God, in such a way that it does not truly exist of itself and by substance; or that the essence of God is such that it has the power of being corrupted, or does not dwell in all things—that which is sanctifying, and which sanctifies them by itself; or that the subsistent wisdom of God does not suffice for itself, but has non-subsistent wisdom in order to be wise and wise-

- to remain, as we have not heard until now, then it is not the voice of Christ the Savior; for if it were, it would have been spoken from the beginning. ^A We would have heard and followed it, inasmuch as we have been deemed worthy, through the bowels of the mercy and compassions of His flock that uses reason, to be made sheep. But we do not know these voices; nor, therefore, shall we follow them; we shall flee from the Palamite Church, because we do not know its voice.

Finally, the same divine Apostle, foreseeing this Church, said: "There will be a time when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires ^B they will heap up for themselves teachers, itching in their hearing. And they will turn their hearing away from the truth, and be turned aside to fables." [II Tim. iv, 3.] It is manifest, therefore, that these things are now fulfilled, for what they say is similar to fables, having sprung from betrayal, but according to the desire and pleasure of certain ones, having been heaped up into a Church of teachers, contrary to all divine rule and law.

CHAPTER VIII

^C Does the holy Church of God, which after the impious innovation of the faith, heaped up the same persons as judges and accusers of the saints?

Since the things of impiety have been brilliantly laid open, and from the evil treasures of their heart the innovation of blasphemy has been poured forth more abundantly, what do they contrive for wickedness, or rather, what do they prepare for the ruin of many? So that they might seem to be striving for liberty ^D with reasonable frankness, that they might assemble a synod, and appoint these pestilent and most wicked men as its prelates—they could not endure to summon any of the monastics; but even the larger part of the bishops, convening separately, they took no account of, relying upon secular powers, and blowing tempests from the opposite side against piety. But when all things were cunningly and deceitfully structured by them, and it was settled that truth should be condemned by sentence and their own perverse opinion induced in its place, then, indeed, they ordered the men to be present in the stadium. And they constituted a council, far more faulty than that which was formed against Christ; inasmuch as that one prophesied even against its will, saying, "It is expedient that one man should die for all the people," [Joan. xi, 50.] but to this one, it was not granted to speak anything pious, even against its will. Constituting themselves at once judges and accusers, men—needless to say—worthy of the flames by every reckoning, if only they had chanced upon other judges. For those who ought to have been convicted and to pay the penalty for the things in which they had transgressed in all points, it was necessary for these, by seizing the chairs of the judges, to confirm with a sentence the liberty and license; and if anyone should in any way resist or dare even to mutter—which is the way of slaves—or should bring a complaint, he would immediately suffer worse evils. Having constructed these devices

^A of iniquity, they engrave that document, and with impunity proclaim the apex of their impiety, calling their own unholy congregation the Church of God, while calling the holy men profane and excommunicated; they call the Tome the manifestation of their impiety, and the faith that utterly destroys the worship of God. It is therefore worth our while to consider from all this whether such a thing has ever been practiced in the customs of Christians at any time, or even brought about by a decree in accordance with sacred matters. But if they cannot demonstrate this, being convicted on all sides of laboring under the error of license and lack of restraint, they are certainly not the holy Church of God.

^B Furthermore, it is forbidden even in civil courts to judge by pre-occupation, and thereby to oppress the accused; this is far more the case in divine matters, where the danger is greater for those who violate any of these things. But if the Palamites say that they did not pre-occupy, but rather oppressed, they should be held in greater derision for their impudence in all their wanton calumnies. For they are convicted of lying; first, by having appointed as patriarch Isidore, who had been deposed and reduced from his rank because of the Palamite doctrines; and with him, they also promoted the parent of that impiety, the prelate of Thessalonica. Then, again, they summoned after him the same man for this very purpose, whom they knew to be endowed with greater audacity in their own delusions than his predecessor.

^C Moreover, all the divine rules and laws prescribe that no one who is accused of a crime—much less in matters that pertain to faith and dogmas, where rash audacity causes greater harm—but in any other matters as well, is allowed to be promoted from the dignity in which he currently shines until he has cleared away the charges by synodal judgment. Let those who wish, therefore, show which patriarch first convened a synod and, having assumed a judicial order (so that, assuredly, one might not incline toward either side), the Palamites emerged victorious, so that they might be considered justly promoted and shine in the seats which they have obtained. But if they cannot show this, that council was clearly illegitimate and supported by no canons; it was held with equal guilt to those condemned, and because of the treachery and pre-conceived opinion, those who sat as judges were liable to every anathema. Therefore, that synod was no longer the Church of God, nor are its decrees worthy of acceptance.

^D Furthermore, the divine Apostle says: "For God is not a God of confusion, but of peace, as in all the churches of the saints." But that Palamite tribunal was a workshop of confusion; it was assembled contrary to all canonical order, as has been proven, and then later, with a worse counsel and machination, it was gathered to condemn a decree of piety. Therefore God was not in it, as He is in the churches of the saints. And if God was not in it, it is a grave matter to call it the Church of God.

^A Furthermore, the same divine Apostle says again: "I would that they were even cut off which trouble you. For, brethren, ye have been called unto liberty" (Gal. v, 12). Therefore, the Palamites, who have overturned the laws of the Church and the bounds of piety, and have reduced our liberty in Christ to servitude, might justly have been cut off long ago from the portion of the pious. "For what concord hath Christ with Belial?" (II Cor. vi, 15). Once they are cut off as those who trouble our liberty, it is not fitting that we should pay any regard to whatever blasphemies or curses they utter against us. For it has been proven that they belong neither to the rank of priests nor even to the faithful at all; rather, the divine judgment alone prevails against them, and they stand profanely—may it never have been!—in holy places and at sacred altars. ^B To this the great Basil says: "Let no one of those who hold false opinions about God think that their praises while chanting are acceptable." If these are not acceptable, then much less are those excommunications and curses which they threaten against those who choose to practice piety worthy of being approved or received. Finally, if (as Theodore the Studite, who is illustrious in the knowledge of divine things, says) "the Church is defiled by the mere mention of a heretic's name within it, because the divine guardian, the angel, departs from it at the time of heresy, and thenceforth such a temple becomes a common and polluted temple": if, therefore, this is the case, what should one say of the blasphemies uttered against us in the Palamite "Church"? It is manifest, therefore, that neither are those who speak them worthy to be received, nor is the place in which they are spoken chosen by God, but it has become common and polluted by them; nor are the curses and sentences and proscriptions which they cast against the pious what they are said to be, but they are idle tales rashly poured forth, and, to use the words of Scripture, "nothing other than vain babbling" (Matth. vi, 7), which exceeds all such superfluous loquacity. ^C

CAPUT IX.

Is the holy Church of God that which has decreed and judged various troubles, and long exiles, and imprisonments, and jails for every just and pious man? ^D

That we may know the fruits of this council, let us consider it after this manner, not far from what was sought before Christ. For that (the former) could not bear to see the just man, nor endure to be reproved by him; and, neglecting the legal process, it condemned him to the cross and to death. But this one, suffering from the evils of that one to a much greater extent, avenges itself with greater fury upon those who have labored in the struggle for Christ. And that one indeed, as the divine Apostle says, "had a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge" (Rom. x, 2), inasmuch as they undertook the defense of those laws which had flourished until then, and wished them to remain intact:

a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge" (Rom. x, 2), inasmuch as they undertook the defense of those laws which had flourished until then, and wished them to remain intact: ^A seeing on the one hand the magnitude of their impiety, they concocted [these new doctrines] from the beginning, and afterwards bringing them to light, they were enraged against everyone, sparing none, unless they revered these things; and they carried their arrogance to such an extent that they snatched away the authority of the power [of the Church] to do what they were able to do. For they did not refuse any limit of wickedness, so as not to destroy everyone in that bitter time; but if anything was saved, it was by the power of the Higher One, so that a divine seed might be left to Israel for the refutation of their absurd madness.

For immediately, in the very place and council, rushing in with heels and striking with fists—and what atrocious wickedness were they not perpetrating, what absurdities were they not uttering?—they forcibly removed those who were their superiors and held the [episcopal] see, and took away the insignia of the episcopal order from those who, beyond their confession, had adorned the episcopal seat, and they shut one person here and ^B another there in prison, cutting off all contact with others, and indeed delivered some to dungeons and stripes and other miseries, while others they relegated to the ends of the earth; not [doing] what they had at first determined. For they contracted these things into a very narrow space; and they did not even let them be free within the soil of the city in which they lived, so as not to betray them to the enemies, rendering thanks for the help which they had received from them, but [they forced them] wherever necessity drove them and chance scattered them. And many, thus exiled, having finished the struggle of their confession and kept their faith with an inviolable standard, now keep choir with Paul, having obtained the crown of righteousness which is laid up for them.

^C Such were the evils this faction plotted with crafty art against the saints, and having brought forth such fruits, they indulge more ambitiously and with far greater license in persecutions, and hasten the festival of evils. Their vows, however, are in vain, since the Emperor has become more humane, and does not allow himself to be led by their deceitful machinations and plans, nor does he listen to the tumults stirred up by them, or comply with them. Therefore, the Church of Christ is no longer this wicked sect, [but rather that] which does not resist even those who rage [against it], but prays for them, that no evil might happen to them resulting from the wickedness with which they serve against it.

Further, the great apostle Peter says: "Tend the flock which is among you, not by constraint, but willingly" (I Pet. v, 2). It is manifest, therefore, that the Palamites, who do not allow themselves to be fashioned according to the apostolic command—but on the contrary, by punishments, and even more by long exiles and prisons and other ^D bonds, they force the pious to submit to them and yield—are not the Church of God.

Furthermore, the same divine Apostle says: "For speaking proud things of vanity, they allure through the desires of the flesh, by lasciviousness, those who were truly escaping, [but who] do happen to be living in error, [promising] them liberty."

^A For of whom a man is overcome, of the same he is brought in bondage. It is therefore evident that the Palamites make themselves burdensome and wearisome to many in both ways. For those who do not comply, they attempt to entice with the desires of the flesh, promising favors and other things they will provide if only they draw them into their own way of thinking. Yet to those who are associates in their error, they promise the remission of sins, however grievous the offenses they may have committed. They are, therefore, servants of corruption, and not sons of the Church.

To this, the great Basil says: If anyone suffers persecution from those who appear to be of the same faith on account of the true doctrine, he is to be crowned with a more glorious crown than one who endures martyrdom under a raging idolater. ^B Such, then, is the crown that he who is persecuted shall have; but let those who persecute him bear the work and the name of an idolater.

Again, the Theologian Gregory says: It is impious that Christians should persecute Christians. For it is the mark of one who spurns Christ to persecute those who are Christ’s. It is therefore altogether manifest that the Palamites, since they have decided to persecute Christians, are themselves godless and spurn Christ.

Again, the divine Chrysostom says: For it is my custom to be persecuted, and not to persecute; to be driven, and not to drive. Thus also Christ proved victorious; not by Himself putting others on the cross, but by being Himself put on the cross: not by striking others on the cheek, but by being struck ^C on the cheek himself. For when He could have flashed lightning, and shaken the earth, and withered the hand of his servant, He did none of these things; but He overcame by gentleness, instructing you never to be fierce or indignant. But the Palamites have chosen a manner of life contrary to Christ and the saints, pursuing, driving, punishing, crucified-like—if it should come to that. They have not, therefore, practiced a nature in accordance with the custom of Christ and those who are Christ’s. Consequently, they are no longer the Church of Christ.

CHAPTER X

Augmenting the fruits of this malice, and not allowing them any limit—a thing not even dared by idolaters against the martyrs—they insult the last wills of the saints ^D and defile the corpses of the blessed men, overturning the former and causing the latter to be cast out unburied. Let the corpse of a man of noble birth be a specimen of their shame, having been cast out unburied for an entire summer day, and not even allowed a trial by him to whom he was subjected by the ancient judgment.

In addition to this, even that wonderful corpse of that great herald of the truth, being mocked and carried about for a considerable time; and this, too, while he was a philosopher such as none among them has ever attained a greater admiration, and among those practicing in the religious arena, such as none other was more diligent.

^A in those struggles for piety, and in the insults, revilings, and imprisonments at the hands of pirates, such as no other was more steadfast in all things; I speak of the admirable Nicephorus Gregoras, and nothing else did both these titles from God signify concerning him than that he should win victories, with a wakeful mind, against the enemies of the truth.

To these things, that great man, admirable both in wisdom and virtue, Ignatius, also bears witness; he is in no way inferior to the one previously mentioned in this regard, who says: "I was emulous of the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners," ^B and, "I have hated the church of the malignant," and, "I have hated them with a perfect hatred; they have become my enemies." Along with this, at the end of his life's course here, after many grievous injuries and disgraces, imprisonments, and scourgings from his persecutors, he was translated from the monastery in which he dwelt, and met the end of his life in hiding (for so did they threaten, who laid snares), so that his unburied corpse was cast out to be thrown to dogs and swine—he who was truly the precious pearl of Christ.

I pass over speaking of those blessed ones, the admirable Burdos, I say, ^C and the divine Polerianites, and the wonderful Lybdices. But I do not recount the very many blessed men who attained the great prize of philosophy and virtue; who, before a perverse opinion gained license and boldness, were frequently compelled by votes in many and great assemblies to be present and to discharge duties, but who were afterwards involved in worse evils, and to such a degree that they were not even permitted to receive proper burial or have their funerals conducted.

Indeed, the subversion of the law and religious standing of testaments, the holy man who had well completed the course of his confession, the destroyed cells which ^D were surrendered to the rapine and gluttonous maw of the pontiff's servants, and other innumerable things of this kind which I omit, for the very reason that they are present to and witnessed by many blessed ones daily—these things are enough, so that no one who seriously runs through these matters would be induced in his mind to call it the Church of Christ; but rather he would think it should be considered what has been defined as the fruit of the Spirit, and how completely otherwise it is with the fruit that has emerged from these men. Whence it is not deservedly called the Church of God, but one of the opposing spirit, whose fruits it both begets and increases, and freely enjoys and distributes them. And the more so, because the saving Word declared that the tree is to be known by its fruit. Whether, therefore, one were to enumerate the fruits of the church of the malignant, he would undoubtedly recognize its wickedness all the more extensively; or whether he were to understand the discipline it has established for itself, and from what principles it is composed, and what dogmas it has ratified, he would find no less a magnitude of its wickedness and malice.

[...] in any way be the foolish gathering of the Palamites the Church of God. ^B But if anyone, as we have said, wishes to examine these matters more accurately and to investigate them one by one, let him diligently read through the synodal Acts of the greatest patriarchs, John and Ignatius, published for the condemning, proscribing, and anathematizing of the Palamite dogmas. And let him read again that final synod, celebrated by that great luminary of the Ephesians, the admirable and great Father; which, through canonical and dogmatic proofs, brings into the open the innovation of the faith and the violation of the canons, refuting them item by item, and condemning them also by the monuments and narratives of the events that occurred. ^C But if anyone is more curious and wishes to read the ecclesiastical writings, so that, having grasped everything from the beginning, he may understand, he would certainly be struck with wonder, seeing the ordered composition of the writers, and with what pleasure and grace they have arranged these things, and have set them forth before our eyes by describing them in vivid colors.

Here are for you the discourses on the Palamite transgressions, the first and the fourth; the second and third are omitted, of which the first book is composed, the second bringing forward the distinctions of the new Palamite God, and the second from the first, and other things almost set forth by Calecas. In the second and third, he brings forward the heresies of Palamas, both his own and those held in common with others. Book II, against the heresy of Palamas, which consists of VIII discourses against the Tome of Palamas and his new faith. ^D Book III, itself likewise distributed in a vast work into VIII discourses, responding to the calumnies of Palamas against the orthodox regarding the uncreated light, and embracing within it the entire consideration of him through several questions. Book IV, against the curses and depositions issued annually by the Palamites against the Catholics: or more truly, the third of those, but which in bulk exceeds the remaining many, being spread out in the former into 75 chapters. Book V, itself divided into discourses, originally published in this order, as the author himself is Cyparissiota. This one book is of such mass, that it alone might appear nearly equal to all the rest. So great, indeed, is the harvest of Cyparissiota alone in this matter, were he to sit at the Royal Lupara, so that he might direct this literary and Christian matter through the work of some learned man. For you, from me, and according to the plan, let these things, reader, suffice.

JOANNIS SAPIENTIS COGNOMENTO CYPARISSIOTE EXPOSITIO MATERIARIA EORUM QUÆ DE DEO A THEOLOGIS DICUNTUR IN DECEM DECADES PARTITA.

I. Decas de Theologia symbolica. II. De Theologia demonstrativa. III. De divinis emanationibus. IV. De informatione divini nominis. V. De proprietatibus divinarum nominum. VI. De apparitionibus divini luminis. VII. De divina participatione. VIII. De infinitate Dei in creaturis. IX. De infinitate in Deo. X. De divina simplicitate.

PREFACE OF FRANCISCUS TURRIANUS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, TO THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND REVEREND LORD ANTONY AUGUSTINUS, ARCHBISHOP OF TARRAGONA.

^A I remember, most illustrious and reverend lord, something you perhaps do not recall yourself: that many years ago, when I had requested from you the corrections of Dionysius the Areopagite—which had been described and noted by you when you were young, after you had with the greatest diligence collated various manuscript copies at Venice—you liberally, according to your custom, sent me that very book, annotated and corrected, which I still guard as a sacred treasure. Now, however, when last summer, in the retreat of Amerino, I had decided to prepare for public use the book of John the Wise, surnamed Cyparissiota, which pertains in its entirety to the work of Dionysius *On the Divine Names*, by working it out both with an interpretation from the Greek and with the illustration of scholia, it came into my mind—and indeed with a willing and joyful spirit—that I should send it to you and adopt you as its patron. And since, on account of more serious duties of study, and primarily on account of the concerns of ecclesiastical government, you have been silent for a long time, whereas previously you were often accustomed to write to me—and I in turn to write back—in accordance with your customary kindness and benevolence, it seemed to me a way to compensate in part for my having ceased to write, if this book were to go to you as a witness of my remembrance of your kindnesses toward me and of my grateful soul and my regard for you. If you should also wish to have the Greek text, I will see to it that a copy is transcribed.

^B But because the title of the book seemed somewhat obscure, even though the author himself seemed to have prefaced the work quite sufficiently and learnedly in regard to the work itself, nevertheless, because perhaps not everyone will easily understand how correctly or otherwise I have translated the *Exposition of the elements of those things which are spoken of God by the theologians*—which is the title of the book—it seemed best to me, lest anyone should find fault with the interpreter in the very vestibule and entrance of the interpretation before understanding the rationale for such a translation, to preface an explanation. This author has used the philosophical term *stoicheiōdē*, which Aristotle explained in Book V of the *Metaphysics* among those things that all disciplines use as common principles; for they all have principles, causes, elements, and other things that follow thereafter. Therefore, after the Philosopher has explained the many ways in which a principle is accepted, and likewise a cause, he says that *stoicheia* (which the ancient Latins translated as elements) are “those things which are said properly, which are contained primarily and are not divisible into other species, as letters are said to be elements of syllables, in which they are primarily contained as their matter, which are not divisible into other species: likewise primary demonstrations, which are contained, he says, in many demonstrations, which are called elements of demonstrations.” Then the same philosopher says that elements are also spoken of not properly, but metaphorically, as those things which are most general: “because each thing,” he says, “is one, and simple, and is contained in many, or in all, or in very many.” Therefore, this author, since he has divided these decades into general matters, and composes each decade of parts in their own order, which are *stoicheia*, that is, elements and the matter of that decade, just as letters are of syllables, he for this reason rightly called this method an exposition *stoicheiōdē*, as if we were to say “elemental”: for which we have used a better and more ancient word and translated it as *materiariam* [material], because the same philosopher on the last page of Book V of the First Philosophy says thus: “That, however, is an element, into which a thing is divided, as matter, such as the letter ‘a’ and ‘b’ are to a syllable”; and Dionysius, Chap. 4 of the *De divinis nominibus*, where he says *archēn stoicheiōdē*, the old interpreter there translates it as *Principium elementarium* [elemental principle], which St. Thomas interprets as “that is, material.” And so, following the force of the word and the authors, I have, fittingly I think, translated *Ekthesin stoicheiōdē* as an exposition *materiariam*.

^C However, this author did not wish to title his book *On the Exposition of the Divine Names*, as it seems to me, out of reverence for the divine Dionysius, who titled his own book *On the Divine Names*, even though in other respects this entire treatise, cleverly distributed into decades, is concerned with the matter of the divine names which the theologians have used, and the divine names and the things said about God are spoken of *antistrophōs* [inversely]. How much utility this method of a material exposition of those things which are said by theologians about God, which are his divine names, will bring for perceiving the fruit from that manifold, varied, obscure, and scattered treatise of Dionysius *On the Divine Names*, the reading of this book itself, once it is made frequent and familiar, will teach. Then, because those things which are cited from Dionysius in this book are difficult to understand, like the rest of his work, on account of extreme brevity and the subtle comprehension of many things in almost every single word, we have added to the more difficult parts, where it seemed more necessary, the scholia of St. Maximus, Georgius Pachymerus, and St. Thomas. Whatever I do not assign and return to its own author will be my own. Furthermore, because these decades are composed of parts of the theology that demonstrates, both that which affirms and that which denies, divided into the subjects at hand, and since theological demonstrations consist of things revealed by God; and since those things which are revealed exist through the tradition of apostolic preaching—

we recognize as having been left in the Catholic Church, and preserved faithfully and perpetually as a sacred and divine deposit; and the witnesses to this tradition are the ancient theologians and doctors of the Catholic Church. This author has most conveniently collected in this book their authorities, which consent and conspire with the teaching of Dionysius, the apostolic disciple, in those matters concerning the divine names and their manifold subject matter which the same Dionysius learned from the Scriptures; I mean the authorities of Justin Martyr, Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Gregory of Nyssen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, and the other Cyril of Jerusalem, Germanus of Constantinople, Sophronius of Jerusalem, and others whom I pass over, so as not to enumerate them all. ^A And he could have produced others, even older ones, had he possessed an abundance of books when he labored on this work, as he himself laments in his preface. Therefore, these holy doctors left behind in their books testimonies of the apostolic tradition, which the divine Dionysius proposed for himself as the subject of the divine names. The author, Cyparissiota, therefore followed what he had read in the epistle of Athanasius to Serapion, and what he himself recited in his *Decade* IX, chapter 1: "Let us see," says Athanasius, "the tradition, doctrine, and faith of the Catholic Church itself, left from the beginning, which the Lord gave, the apostles preached, and the Fathers preserved. For the Church is founded upon this; and whoever departs from this shall neither be, nor be called, a Christian." ^B It must also be said that this exposition and method will be of much help for treating more richly and understanding more fully those matters which, in the first part of Saint Thomas Aquinas, are discussed with great subtlety concerning God and the names of God, concerning simplicity, infinity, existence in things, the knowledge of God, and other matters. Furthermore, there is this utility in knowing how the ancient theologians and Fathers of the Catholic Church felt about those things which were later discussed so subtly, and what words and forms of expression they used for them; which we, where it seemed more necessary, have illustrated and fortified with notes: so that we do not immediately rush forward to rebuke the holy Fathers impudently, but rather, out of the reverence and piety owed to them, are led with a pious and grateful mind to consult the whole good and interpret [them] conveniently. As to the time when this author flourished (for the age is also, and rightly, sought in authors), I could not discover it; this much is certain: he was not from five hundred years ago, since he says somewhere in this book that he is reciting things taken from a certain passage of St. Maximus in the *Panoplia* of Euthymius. Now, Euthymius wrote under the Emperor Alexios Komnenos and at his command. ^C This book, however, was found (if anyone wishes to know this as well) in the library of D. Joannes Lascaris, a man of the Greek nation, and a nobleman by descent and by his skill in many Greek literatures, whom he left in Messina in Sicily. You have, most illustrious and most reverend lord, our preface: let our Cyparissiota now proceed with his work.

THE PREMEDITATION OF THE EXPOSITION OF THE MATERIAL OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE SAID BY THE THEOLOGIANS CONCERNING GOD, BY JOANNES SAPIENS, SURNAMED CYPARISSIOTA

Among the sciences that use the method of reasoning, philosophy is the most beautiful. Yet the most outstanding part of philosophy is theology, which declares its excellence not only by its name, from which it is derived, but much more from those things which it treats and from the contemplation of those things which fall under understanding. For it is proposed like a certain sun, which dispels all the darkness of false opinion with its rays; but whatever is adulterous and imported, it convicts at the very first glance, and nothing ill-conceived will fall into it that is not immediately expelled by it. As, therefore, we lay down theology as a foundation after the manner of the geometricians' axiom, it is a discourse concerning God, worthy of belief in itself on account of the dignity of those things which are posited. The first of all, moreover, is the salutary discourse of the Gospel of God; next after it is the discourse of those who saw Christ on account of his love for the human race, and themselves heard his words; after them [come] those who expounded those first and second discourses, and those who followed them successively, provided that what they hand down consents with the seven ecumenical councils; so that they understand nothing more, nor take anything away, which is forbidden by dire curses. However, the entire discourse of theology is summed up in these three axioms. The first is that there is one God...

invisible, infinite, devoid of color, and unseeable, known from no [(1)] natural representation; who rejects entirely any notion of when or how he is; whom the mind can in no way grasp in any part, except only through faith [(2)] from his creatures, that he is, but not what he is. The second axiom is that God is one, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in whom is divinity, or rather, who are that divinity, which is the one and only uncreated nature. For there is unity in the Trinity, and the Trinity is adored in unity, and it has nothing else before eternity except the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for indeed, since divinity is complete in the Trinity, whatever is outside the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is entirely servile, just as we are. The third axiom is that from this one nature of the three persons, which is above substance and above the divine [(3)], all things that exist were made, when once they did not exist, whether they fall under sight or not; whether they began in time or not, but with the aeon; whether they are participating or participated [(4)]; whether they are universal or particular; and that there is nothing intermediate between the divine nature itself and its creatures, since the divine nature alone excels the creature; and all other things that are after the divine nature are created. In these three axioms, the most holy theology of all Christians [(5)] is concluded; the mystery ^B of the supranatural divine incarnation they did not call a mode of theology, but the emptying of the inexplicable dispensation of the Word of God made for our sake. Having followed this, wise and holy theologians in their divine books have driven every heresy from the Church of Christ, and have explained the entire theology most purely and clearly, and have divinely imposed it upon our minds. Having invoked them today, we have elaborated this material method of those things which are said about God, which they used, and we show how they are in agreement with one another, and resound fitly in the wisdom of theology as if in divine music. But since every material exposition passes from the first to the second and third, having invoked the same again, let us consider how they previously posited the whole of theology as distributed into two parts: one symbolic, the other demonstrative, and indeed they distinguished both: the former, symbolic, into the sacred formation of a configuration falling under the senses, and into the sacred formation of a translation falling under the intellect; the latter, demonstrative, into the affirmative and the negative, so that there are already four parts of theology. For either theology is described by configuration according to sense, such as that ladder reaching from heaven to the earth, that fire in the bush, those three men received as guests by Abraham, that poste-

Scholia.

C and as for the principles of this cognition through faith, they are not demonstrable, as the same Saint Maximus says, because, he says, faith is of those things which are above mind and reason.

(1) Since the author says that by no means in any part can the mind capture God, except by faith, only that he is, not what he is, he does not deny that God can be known by natural reason, *that* he is, since this can be demonstrated from his effects: but he speaks of a necessary higher cognition: for this kind of cognition of God is faith. This cognition of God the blessed Basil calls intellectual comprehension through faith. For he says thus, discoursing on that: "Attend to yourself: seek not in God cognition through the eyes, but commit faith to the mind, and have intellectual comprehension concerning God." In Greek he said *κατάληψιν*. Similarly, St. Maximus spoke in the first theological century, ch. 8. For he says thus: "Whatever things exist are called understood, and have within themselves demonstrable principles of cognition. But God is not called intellect by us; but from creatures, he says, understood by us, it is believed only that he is." When he says "it is believed only that he is," he does not deny that he is also known by natural reason from creatures; but he speaks of the cognition through faith, which God requires in us, as necessary, which indeed he himself gives, more firm than any demonstration, of which the Apostle says: "He who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder" (Hebr. 11:6). He did not say, "It is necessary to know *what* he is"; although to demonstrate this and to know it, that is, demonstrations cannot fully grasp it, yet all can believe, God assisting, and they ought to.

(4) They are called "participated," from which those things that are named are called, as the good from goodness, the living from life, the wise from wisdom, and similarly in other things which are said when abstractly considered, and are simply participations: received in a subject, they are called and are participated things; but the subjects themselves are the participating ones. The universal participated things are universal providences, which this divine name of "good" includes, as Dionysius says in cap. 5, *De divinis nominibus*. The particular participated things are particular providences, which other names signify, such as life, wisdom, and so on, as in the 6th decade, ch. 6.

(5) The ancients properly called the mystery of the Trinity and the economy the mystery of the incarnation, a term translated from it, because Christ, one in both natures, is the Son of God, and the same one is the Son of man, acting after the manner of a good head of a household, governing his house and all domestic matters well and wisely, as a faithful one, as the Apostle says, over his whole house, which house we are, having recovered and redeemed the human race lost through sin and sold to sins, with the highest mercy and wisdom and justice through his passion and death, restoring it, and indeed more abundantly, to the pristine glory, into which at the beginning in Adam he had led many children, as the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews.

^A higher things of God according to Moses, as also those according to Isaiah, Daniel, and Ezekiel, and others, formed according to sense; or it is described by the translation of a word according to the intellect, as the drunkenness and surfeit of God, his watching, his sleep, his weapons to protect and to strike, and all other things which have been made after the imitation of men. There are two other parts: one of the affirmative theology, as when we call God good, wise, holy, blessed, savior, and all the rest by which we praise him; or again, negative, as when we call him invisible, incomprehensible, suprasubstantial, super-good, super-living, super-wise: for all these things, whether stated privatively or superlatively, are declared by negations. Since, therefore, there are four parts, the first decade is composed of two of them, by which symbolic theology is contained in its entirety; from the remaining two comes the second, by which demonstrative theology is likewise entirely comprised; then, demonstrative theology in general is divided into parts: the affirmative is divided, first into divine emanations, and this partition makes the third decade; then into the information of the divine name, and it makes the fourth. Again, the very matter of the divine emanations is divided into the properties of the divine names, and the fifth and sixth decades are formed; and into divine participations, and the seventh decade is made: here ends the part of demonstrative ^B theology that is affirmative. But the negative part of theology, which denies, is divided into the infinity of God, which is in things, and it makes the eighth decade; then into the divinity which is in God, and it makes the ninth; then into the divine simplicity, and it results in the tenth and also final decade. Thus, the entire material exposition of those things which are said by theologians about God is brought to a close by these. The entire theology pertaining to symbols could also be subdivided into coincidences; but these matters, except for their properties, have been treated almost entirely in the first decade. Perhaps, however, with God as our helper and having obtained a supply of books, we shall discuss these as well, for now, because we were troubled and were held in gratis hatred by everyone, we lacked books and the leisure to meditate upon these things and those which pertain to another better composition; for this reason, we collected these things which we have now set forth with great labor, carrying some of them with us secretly and by stealth, for other uses and for other occasions: because of this cause, we were deprived of many aids to the perfection of these works, but in the meantime, we did not stray from those things which were most necessary. The exposition, however, of the matter which is in each decade teaches at the end of the decade that the very thing which is contained in the decade is the material exposition of those things which follow in it in order; there is also added the rationale of the inscription of the decade, and how the things which pertain to it are sufficiently complete.

FIRST DECADE — OF SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

That theology is twofold.

Dionysius in his epistle to Titus the bishop says thus: "Furthermore, it must be noted that the tradition of theologians is twofold, one arcane and mystical, the other indeed philosophical and demonstrative; the former is symbolic and pertains to mysteries, the latter is open and more manifest: and the arcane or mystical is implicated and connected with the symbol, ^C indeed, that which is philosophical and demonstrative creates faith, and binds the truth of those things which are said: that one indeed, the arcane and mystical, affects and confirms in God those things which are not taught by instructions." This saying St. Maximus and Dionysius the Alexandrian have noted: Maximus calls that theology symbolic and pertaining to mysteries, which is composed from symbols, of which kind are the mysteries of the Mosaic cult, and the mysteries of our sacred cult; even though ours are higher and more spiritual; but he calls that theology philosophical and demonstrative, which exists from the perception of creatures, and from the divine providence in certain things, and from the speculative exposition of those things which are said about God in the Scriptures. ^D Scholium: ...incident to the translation of a word according to the intellect, and in turn a translation of a word according to the intellect falling into a figuration according to sense, as in the examples of the aforementioned names. Division... in coincidence, which the Greeks call *sümpiptonta*, is a division into those things which indiscriminately pertain to the intellectual translation of a word, and to the sensible figuration: as saying "mouth," "eyes," "face," "hands," "feet" in God, and similarly in other parts of the body, which can be both figured according to sense, and said translated according to the intellect, as if one divided the animal into the rational opposite to the irrational, and into the irrational opposite to the rational, again a subdivision of the animal into the herbivorous and the carnivorous is made, which are not opposites, but coincide in the genus of the rational and irrational animal: since those using reason are found to be herbivorous, and others carnivorous, and living beings likewise lacking reason are herbivorous, and others carnivorous. Thus, divided symbolic theology into figuration according to sense opposite to the translation of the word according to the intellect, it is found again in certain things as a figuration according to... St. Maximus, in the Symbol, as truth covered by a shadow, as in the Mosaic pascha the true pascha, as it is written: "Christ our passover is sacrificed" (1 Cor. v, 7). To this pertains that to the Galatians: "Abraham had two sons," etc.; for these are two testaments (Gal. iv, 22); and that 1 Cor. x, 4: "They all drank the same spiritual drink; for they drank of the spiritual Rock that followed them: and that Rock was Christ," and similar things. But that which Dionysius, following the interpretation of St. Maximus, calls Symbol, he names *to rêtên*, that is, not tacit, because what mystically lies hidden in the symbol is *aporrhêton*, that is, arcane and tacit; and so the mysteries, which are signified in the symbols, are *aporrrhêta en rhêtois nooumena*, that is, occult things understood in Symbols.

^A Dionysius the Areopagite, indeed, says that philosophy and demonstrative theology perform and bind the truth; that is, it seals the truth of what is said as with a certain signet, and binds it as with a bond, and effects that those who hear it, believe. But the other part of theology, which is symbolic, through the things that occur, joins to God a certain habit and formation of the thing itself, which he has called "unteachable mystagogies." Hence, therefore, it is clear that, generally speaking, the whole of theology is comprised by these two parts; one is arcane and occult, which is not taught through rational arguments, whose power—both in affecting the soul and in imposing firmness in the minds of those who see or hear—is such; the other makes faith through conclusions of arguments and the famous authority of those who said these things before, and forces the listeners to assent.

CAPUT II.

The great Dionysius in the same letter to Titus: "Therefore, we have thought it necessary, as far as possible, both for Timothy and for others of every kind, to explain the forms which are fashioned concerning God through sacred symbols. For what appears externally in these forms and symbols is full of incredible and fictitious monstrosity, such as that which is fashioned concerning the supersubstantial generation of God in the womb ^B of the womb of the divine generation embracing the Son of God, and the spirit breathing from the mouth (3), and whatever Scripture (4) celebrates with praises in the manner of a body; or fashions these very things in the manner of a plant, and trees (5), and certain sprigs (6), and flowers, and roots (7) producing the fruits of light-bearing splendors (9), or certain other sacred descriptions of divine and supranatural things, which declare the providences of God (10), which we contemplate with the mind, or His gifts (11), or manifestations (12), or powers (13), or properties (14), or states (15), or dwellings (16), or emanations (17), or secretions (18), or unions (19); or else sacred theology attaches to God the form of a man, or indeed various figures of beasts (20), ^C and of other living creatures and plants (21) and stones; and it even places upon Him feminine ornaments (22) and barbarian armaments (23); and pottery and a furnace (24) as if for a certain craftsman."

*Scholia of St. Maximus.*

(1) Uterus. Ps. cvii: *Before the morning star.* (2) Heart of man. *My heart has belched forth a word.* (3) From the mouth. Ps. xxxii: *By the spirit of his mouth all their virtue.* In these is, as it seems to me, the mystical theology of the generation of the Son from the substance of the Father as if from the womb and bosom; and of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, as if from the mouth of the Father, and consequently of the procession from the Father and the Son. But that is called mystical which is covered either by the figuration of a thing or the translation of a word. Apoc. ii: *To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree.* (5) Trees. Prov. iii: *Tree of life*, etc., and Apoc. ii. (6) Sprigs. Isa. xliv: *Sprang up as a tender plant.* (7) Root of Jesse. Isa. xi: *A rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower*, etc. (8) Fountains. Jer. ii: *They have forsaken the fountain of living water*, and Ps. xxxv: *With thee is the fountain of life.* (9) Splendors. Heb. i: *Who is the brightness of his glory.* (10) Of providences. Deut. xxxii: *As the eagle protecteth her nest, and over her young*, etc., and Exod. xix: *I have borne you as upon the wings of eagles*, etc. That also pertains to Providence, namely, to punish the impious. Osee xiii: *I will be to them as a she-bear needing food*, etc. (11) His gifts. Ps. clxiv: *Open thy hand*, etc. (12) Manifestations. As when the figure of a Man appeared to the ancients, as in Gen. xviii, and in the species of a dove the ^D Holy Spirit. (13) Or powers. As eyes, which have the power of seeing, so that nothing may lie hidden in good or in evil. Ps. xxxiii: *The eyes of the Lord upon the just*; feet, which signify the power of walking, to bring aid or to punish. Gen. iii: *And when they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise*; similarly in the names of other parts of the body. (14) Properties. In the prophet Amos, cap. vii, God is called an adamant, which signifies that God cannot suffer, nor be tamed; and fire, Deut. iv, because it has the power of consuming perverse habits. (15) Status. *The unchangeable* of the divine nature signifies, that is, the divine nature is immutable. (16) Mansions. *The unmovable*, that is, not able to be moved, both signify mystically the stone cast into the foundations, Isa. xxviii. (17) Emanations. He speaks of the communication of divine goodness, which is mystically signified when God is called lily and flower on account of the communication of scent, as in Cant.: *I am the flower of the field and the lily of the valleys.* (18) Secretions. Which, says the Apostle, *what participation hath justice with iniquity? or what fellowship hath light with darkness? and what concord hath Christ with Belial?* This secretion, or separation which God makes, Scripture signifies mystically, when in it fire is also mentioned; for this property is in fire, to be *diakritikon*, that is, to have the power of discerning and separating; for it separates lead from silver and ash from coal. (19) Unions. Because God unites creatures with Himself and converts them to Himself, this is mystically signified when God is called the cornerstone. (20) Various figures of beasts. As lions, leopards, bears, Osee xiii, and of other living creatures, as Joan. i: *I saw descending as a dove.* (21) And of plants. Isa. liii: *He shall grow up as a twig*, and Joan. xv: *I am the true vine.* (22) Feminine ornaments. And Ezech. xvi, by which every kind of divine providence is described, by which God hedged His people, and by which He laid them bare; and that: *In gilded clothing surrounded with variety*, etc. (23) And barbarian armaments. Ps. xliv: *Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O thou most mighty.* But the *rhomphaia* is a barbarian weapon, as the historian Philarchus says. (24) Pottery and furnace. These signify mystically in God providence reforming and cleansing, or the power and faculty of discerning and purifying. Isa. xxix, 64; II Jer. ix, Malac. iii.

^A and He supposes horses (25) for Himself, and chariots (26), and seats (27), and prepares certain banquets furnished with feasts (28), and likewise makes Him drinking, and intoxicated, and taking sleep and affected by drunkenness (29). What need is there to speak of angers (30), griefs (31), various oaths (32), repentances (33), curses (34), inveterate angers (35), and the manifold and oblique ways of frustrating promises (36)? And that combat in Genesis with the giants (37), in which it is said that God laid snares for those robust men because of fear, when otherwise they had purposed that building not to injure others, but to keep themselves safe. And that council (38) in heaven fabricated to deceive Ahab, and those again of the Canticles, as if they were corporeal and harlot-like pleasures: and whatever other sacred Signs, which Scripture dares firmly to form in God, covering the hidden things with manifest ones, printing the sign with multiplied and divided things on those that are simple and indivisible, and multiform things on those that cannot receive sign and form, the hidden beauty of which if anyone could espy, he would find all things mystical and divine, and full of much light of knowledge about God; and that: In the light of Thy countenances ^B thy shall walk, and: In Thy light we shall see light, and the like. From these, therefore, it is perceived that symbolic Theology is a sacred formation, which with divine signs and marks, from those things which are delineated corporeally, adumbrates and paints those things which lie hidden in God, devoid of body and form. But it must be remarked that this symbolic Theology is again divided. For it is either formed in words, of which kind are sleeping, waking, being drunk, repenting, and whatever other things are so simply spoken in Scripture; or it is formed in corporeal forms, of which kind is that fire in the bush, God being seen sitting on a throne, that dove in the Jordan, those fiery tongues, and others.

CHAPTER III.

The divine Luke says in his holy Gospel: And it came to pass, when all the people were baptized, and Jesus being baptized, and praying, heaven was opened, and the Holy Spirit descended in corporeal appearance like a dove upon Him. This Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, explaining, says: It was fitting, he says, that this also should be ^B...

^A apparent, if indeed the Son was spending time with us in a corporeal manner. And again, the same author elsewhere: When the radiance and splendor of the angels are signified corporally, I believe it to be a symbol of their purity. To this, the divine Chrysostom, treating this more generally, says: Even if it could come to pass that the Holy Spirit be seen by the eyes of the body in the appearance of a dove, it was not, however, necessarily and continuously manifest to all; for Zacharias also saw many things in an appearance falling under the senses, and likewise Ezekiel, yet no one else saw the same things as them; and Moses saw many things that no one else saw; and that transfiguration which took place on the mountain, not all the disciples perceived; nor was the vision of Christ's resurrection shared with everyone, and Luke openly declares this when he says: *And He gave Him to be made manifest to witnesses prepared beforehand by God*. And again, the same Chrysostom in Homily 26 on the Gospel of John: Everything that falls under the senses cannot declare the substance of the angels, but a body, which has thickness and three-dimensional extension. From these things, therefore, it becomes clear that symbolic theology, which is formed in a corporeal species or form, becomes known to those who are worthy; yet to all others, it is left in arcana and in secret; because by those things being seen, it is elevatedly signified.

CHAPTER IV.

Great Dionysius, in the first chapter of *The Divine Names*, says: Yet theologians do not celebrate only these divine names, which are derived from the providences in the universe (1) or in part (2), or from those things that receive providence, but also from certain divine visions (3), which sometimes in sacred temples (4), or perhaps elsewhere, illumined the masters of mysteries or the prophets; on account of the manifold cause and power, they name the divine goodness ^B which surpasses every name and every splendor; and they introduce human forms, or those of fire, or of electron; and they praise His eyes (5), and ears (6), hairs (7), faces (8), hands (9), shoulders (10), wings (11), arms (12), posterior parts (13), and feet (14); then [they speak of] crowns (15), seats (16), cups (17), and bowls (18), and certain other things they attach to Him, of which we shall speak to the best of our ability in symbolic theology. But in the second chapter of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, he says: That those things which cannot be signified are appropriately covered by signs, and those which cannot be figured [are covered] by figures; no one will say that this is the only cause, that by our own proportion we are unable to climb to the contemplation of those things which fall under the intellect without an intermediary, and that we have need of aids familiar and related to our nature, which exhibit forms that we are able to grasp, of those things which cannot be formed and which surpass nature, but also because this more fittingly befits the mystical Scriptures, that they be covered by arcana and sacred enigmas, and that access to the sacred and hidden truth of the divine minds be not open to the common crowd. Hence, therefore, it is clear that all symbolic theology has something figurative, whether it be in speech, or in names, or even in forms subjected to the senses, but it is especially characteristic of symbolic theology, which is concerned with those things that are perceived by the senses, to fashion and clothe itself with forms from animals that are seen, or from their parts, and not only from such things, but from colors of every kind, which the true theologian Dionysius, in one word, called divine ^C visions, distinguishing them from profane and chance visions.

CHAPTER V.

Great Dionysius, in the second chapter of *The Celestial Hierarchy*: To this it must be said, by what sacred forms the sacred Scriptures figure the celestial orders; and

we must recall us, lest we also, in the manner of the profane vulgar, think that the celestial and divine minds have many feet and many faces, and are fashioned after the resemblance of oxen, or the form of lions, and shaped to the likeness of eagles with hooked beaks, or have wings like hair after the likeness of birds, and lest we think of certain fiery wheels above the heaven, and of those materials accommodated for God to sit upon, and of certain horses of various colors, satellites, commanders of an army, and all other things which the holy Scriptures divinely depict with various symbols. The same [author] in the same chapter: That, however, dissonant similitudes rather raise our mind, no sensible person, I think, will gainsay; for in depicting the nobility of forms, it is credible that some err, who think that the celestial natures are of a certain golden species, men who are shining, beautiful in splendor, in splendid attire, and vibrating fiery [light] without harming, and whatever other forms of this kind ^B there are, by which the theology of holy Scripture has figured the celestial minds; which thing, lest it happen to those who have grasped in their mind nothing higher than those beautiful and fair things which appear, the wisdom of holy Scripture, which has the power of leading upwards, holily lowers itself to dissonant dissimilitudes, not permitting our bodily senses to rest in those indecorous images; but rather it excites and stimulates that part of the soul which tends toward high things, by the very deformity of the figures, as if it were not considered right and true, not even for those who are greatly attached to earthly things, that those supracelestial and divine things ^C which are looked upon with admiration in symbols are truly like those absurd forms. Hence, therefore, it appears that the divine science of holy Scripture has not used sacred forms in the nature of God, who is above nature, but also in the angels, who cannot be figured: so that from this it may be permitted to perceive the nature of symbols.

Chapter 6. In how many ways symbolic theology is signified, whether it falls under sight or under the sense of hearing.

Gregorius Theologus, in the second book *De Theologia*, says: What will you be able to say concerning Isaiah and Ezekiel, who was a spectator of the greatest mysteries, and of the rest of the prophets, from whom the one indeed saw the Lord Sabaoth sitting on a throne of glory, and Him encompassed ^D and praised by the six-winged Seraphim, and himself purified by the hot coal, and instructed for prophecy; the other, however, describes a vehicle of Cherubim, and above them a throne, and above the throne the firmament, and Him who appeared in the firmament, and certain voices, and impulses, and actions; and whether this was indeed a daily vision visible to the holy ones; or a nocturnal and true vision; or an information of future things as if they were present in the mind, I cannot affirm; the God of the prophets knows, and those to whom such things happened. And the divine Chrysostom, in the homily *De Eutropio*, when he was found outside the Church, abstracted and snatched away, said: For no one, he says, has seen what God is; therefore when God is seen, it does not appear what He is, but what he is able to see to whom He appears, not changing His substance, but forming the aspect of the figure according to the variety of the things subjected. Saint Gregory Nyssenus in that book *Contra Eunomium*, the beginning of which is 'Prima quidem,' says thus: For indeed in the Jordan after the virtue of the Holy Spirit, and again to the hearing Jews, and in the transfiguration, the voice...

Scholia of St. Maximus.

^A (1) But what is one and simple. Thus, when Scripture attributes to an angel a form fashioned as an eagle, for example, it is necessary to know through this formation of the eagle, which is not of a simple nature but of a composite one, to what simple thing in the angel we are called back; namely, we are called back to understand that there is in the angels a certain keenest edge of spiritual and sublime perception; and that indeed it is necessary to know, lest it happen to us, as it does to the vulgar, that we might think perhaps that angels have feet, faces, wings, and similarly in other fashioned forms.

(2) And that indeed, whether it was a daily vision visible to the holy ones, or a nocturnal and true vision; or an information of future things as if present in the mind. Saint Maximus, explaining this passage of Gregory: He numbered, he says, in this place for us, the blessed Gregory, the species of prophecy, but I meanwhile affirming nothing, am led by conjecture to have called the daily vision the vision and hearing of things and conversations, which the saints, seeing no one and hearing no one, saw and heard through the spirit as if by sense; for it is not right to say that it is necessary that in divine matters, for the information of the imagination, that which falls into the imagination must be present, but ^D that it operates in an admirable and supernatural way, and with nothing present, and with voices falling under the sense not formed by the striking of the air, upon that part by which we imagine; so that he who is taught divine things truly hears and sees, nor is it believed to be divine, in which there is nothing more than that which is perceived in the order of nature. For thus we, when we imagine by night through sleep, often see and hear, when there is no one who speaks or is seen; much more will this truly happen to the saints [when they are] awake and vigilant, with God operating in them who are vigilant according to an admirable grace, which is accustomed to be done in us by the law of nature. I think he calls the nocturnal and true vision either a perfect intelligence of future things, which happens in the soul through sleep, as in Joseph and Daniel; or a vision of divine things falling under the aspect of the eyes because of the highest emptiness of passion, proceeding from great purity. But the information of future things as if present in the mind, I suppose him to say *kat' emphasin*, the figures of future things shown to the saints in a simple manner as if in an image, according to a simple and indivisible notion of the mind. These things I have dared, says Saint Maximus, to say by conjecture, having attained no grace of experiencing these things, for that cause only, that you commanded me.

[The text moves from that preceding argument] which was produced so that it might teach men not to suppose that what appeared was the only thing [existing], but that they might believe that the true, beloved Son of God also exists. Such a voice, so that those who heard might perceive it, was formed by God within a body of air, as those who speak are accustomed to doing; thus God, who wishes all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, impressed a word in the air articulately for the salvation of those who heard, just as the Lord said to the Jews, who thought that thunder had occurred, because the sound had been formed in the air: *This voice did not come for my sake, but for your sakes.* From these things it is clear in how many ways symbolic theology is declared in the prophets and other holy men: by name, indeed, in three ways, but secretly and hiddenly in other ways, as God, the [God] of the prophets, knows how to do.

CAPUT VII. That those upon whom this symbolic theology has fallen have called it *visum* (a sight) and *visionem* (a vision).

^AThat great spectator of God, Moses, says: *Passing by, I shall see this great sight, why the bush burns and is not consumed*; and the vision which Isaiah saw: *And I have multiplied visions, and I have been likened into the hands of the prophets*; and: *Your young men shall see visions*; and infinite other things of this kind in the ancient Scripture. But in the Gospels, our Savior, concerning his own theophany, that is, apparition of God, on Mount Tabor [says]: *Tell this vision to no one*; and the divine Dionysius, in chapter 13 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, says that that vision was shown to the theologian [John] through one of those holy angels who preside over us. ^B From which it becomes manifest that whatever holy sights, formed by divine symbols, the prophets perceived with the sense of sight, they named *visions* by a word related to them, having applied the word *vision*, although it is otherwise common, to the very things they were seeing, as if it were a proper term.

CAPUT VIII. That these visions and Theophanies, that is, apparitions of God, have been formed no otherwise than through the intermediary celestial powers.

The great Dionysius, in the fourth chapter of the *Celestial Hierarchy*: These, therefore, he says, are they who in the first place and in many ways manifest the hidden [nature] of God, for which reason all other things are excellently designated by the word *angels*, because they themselves are illuminated first by God, and through them our revelations are transmitted. Thus, therefore, the Law, as the divine discourse testifies, was given to us through the angels: and before the Law and after the Law, angels led our fathers toward God, either by explaining what had to be done, and leading them from error and a profane life to the straight way of truth; or by manifesting holy orders, or by explaining, as messengers and ministers, the hidden visions of mysteries which are above the world, or certain divine predictions. If, however, anyone says that God appeared to certain holy men of Himself, without any intermediary, let him learn even this from the wisdom of the sacred Scriptures: that absolutely no one has ever seen, nor will see, that which is the hidden [nature] of God; but that God has appeared to holy men by showing himself, as it behooved him, through certain holy sights, congruent to those who were seeing them. For the divine discourse, full of all wisdom, calls that sight, which showed the divine likeness figured in that very thing being seen, a *Theophany*—that is, an apparition of God—insofar as it is figured, what cannot be figured, because it leads those who see, to God; and [it is so called] because it sends a divine illumination into those who see, and teaches them something of divine things in a holy manner. With these divine [things...]

(a) The word *procession*, although otherwise common, has nevertheless been made proper to the Holy Spirit.

^A of our renowned fathers were initiated through the ministry of angels. Indeed, the great Athanasius also says (a): "Angels don the forms for whatever use the Lord God wills; and in that manner they appear to those who are worthy, and reveal divine mysteries to them." From these things it can be perceived that a vision, a likeness, and an apparition of God all represent the same thing; to this it is also added that through intermediate angels, in donned forms, such likenesses are formed at the nod of God.

CAPUT IX.

The great Dionysius, in the fourth chapter of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, says: "I believe, however, that the divine mystery of the humanity of Jesus was opened first to the angels, and through them later the grace of knowledge was transmitted to us." Thus, therefore, the divine Gabriel taught Zechariah the priest that the son whom, beyond hope, he was about to beget by divine grace, would be the prophet of Him who was to be displayed in a man ^B by divine operation for the salvation of the world, as became His goodness. But He taught Mary the mystery of the formation of God in her, in a manner miraculously beyond what can be told, to be worked by God; another angel instructed Joseph, in what way those things which God had promised to David, the progenitor of Christ, were truly fulfilled; another angel evangelized the shepherds, as if in solitude, a retreat, and quietude purged; and with him, a multitude of the heavenly host delivered that praise—very famous and sung by many—to those who were on earth. Furthermore, I shall ascend to the most sublime apparitions of God in the Holy Scriptures. For I see Jesus Himself, who is the author of natures beyond those of heaven, who came unchanged to our human nature, not shrinking from the preservation of the order which is proper to man, and which He Himself ordained and elected, but rather even obediently submitting Himself to the forms fashioned by God the Father through the angels, and through these same intermediaries, that retreat to Egypt—intended by God the Father for the child—was announced to holy Joseph: and ^C his subsequent return to Judea. We also see that He was subject to the paternal laws through angels (4), for I omit to tell you, as one already knowledgeable, those things which have been revealed to us by the holy Luke, through apostolic traditions (5), concerning the angel strengthening Jesus; indeed, the teacher of this one, and the light of the whole world, says: "But some one has testified in a certain place, saying, 'What is man that you are mindful of him? You made him a little lower than the angels, you crowned him with glory and honor, you put all things in subjection under his feet.' For in that he subjected all things, he left nothing not subjected to him. But now we do not yet see all things subjected to him. But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honor for the suffering of death." From these things, therefore, it is established: if our Lord Jesus Christ was made a little lower than the angels through the suffering of death, and we see Him subject to paternal laws through angels, and not declining from preserving that order befitting a man—which He Himself constituted and embraced—and having showed Himself obedient to those forms which God the Father effected through the ^D angels: it is manifest that the angels were first instructed concerning all the mysteries of Christ; subsequently, through them, the grace of knowledge reached us. How, therefore, could any man, as long as he lives a human life, even if he be a most powerful theologian, proudly refuse that, in himself also—in so far as he is man—forms be assigned by angels? And that he be educated about divine things, and be affected in a divine manner, as is fitting? It remains, therefore, that it is impossible for anyone to be taught this part of symbolic and arcane theology unless he is led to such visions by angels, through forms made by angels.

CAPUT X.

The great Dionysius, in his *Epistle to Titus*: "Let us not think," he says, "that the signs of the appearing forms were fashioned only for their own sake and reason (6), but rather..."

integuments to be of an arcane science, and hidden from the commonality of men, so that things which are most holy might not be easy for the profane to understand, but might be opened only to those truly studious of holiness, as being unburdened of all childish thought in sacred symbols, and who, by the sharpness of mind and the faculty of intellect suitable for contemplation, might be able to attain to the simple truth placed above the nature of symbols. And again, the same author, ch. 2, *De cœlesti hierarchia*: "Thus," he says, "all those instructed by divine wisdom, and ministers and interpreters of divine inspiration, purely separate the Holy of Holies from the profane and from those who are not initiated, and celebrate dissimilar forms, so that divine things may not easily be perceived by the profane; nor may those who are held by the desire of beholding these sacred images remain in those exterior figures and signs as if they were the truth itself." Indeed, also the great Basil: "Who," he says, "does not ascend from words to higher notions, but remains in the very delineations of bodies made by the composition of words, will hear from Moses that God is fire, and from Daniel the wise he will be turned aside to other opinions; thus it will come to pass that he will gather not only false thoughts, but thoughts conflicting with one another from the very things themselves." From these it is plain that one ought not to stick in symbolically fashioned forms, however they may be fashioned, whether in a species falling under the senses, or in words which seem to have much that is discordant and absurd; ^A but rather with all zeal to recur to higher cogitations.

To explain, therefore, with a simple and distinct repetition the chapters which I have handled: it was shown in the first chapter, as in a certain genus, that theology is simply distributed into two species, in the alternate of which—which is symbolic theology—it was necessary that it be explained next what and how many are the things which are opened and declared in it, and then it followed immediately that what these things were should be expedited—namely, corporeal and falling under the senses—afterwards, what is proper to these; then, not only that the things which are about God are constructed by such forms and images, but also those about the angels: it was next, how many ways these symbolic things are perceived and appear, then, by what vocabulary these are covered and called in an involved manner, to these, by what intermediaries these things are carried out, then it was shown that these cannot happen otherwise than through intermediaries, through angels namely; lastly, that one must not remain in types of this kind, whether they be fashioned in words alone, or in forms and images; nothing therefore is missing here, but that these are absolute. ^B And indeed, theology of this kind is called arcane and mystical to us, because it does not allow us to stop at things seen, but forces those who have received from nature wings by which they may be carried into the sublime, to proceed further.

SECOND DECAS. — OF DEMONSTRATIVE THEOLOGY.

The great Dionysius in the second chapter of his *Cœlesti hierarchia*: "Two," he says (1), "are the ways of the sacred nomination of God: one indeed, as it appears consistent, acting through similar images and sacred signs; the other truly fashioned through dissimilar forms into a species discordant and dissenting, and the mystic traditions of the Scriptures announcing God praise the venerable beatitude of Him who is above substance, and *Thearchia* (2), that is, the God of gods, sometimes as mind and Word and substance (3), when ^C they declare the reasoning (4) which becomes God, and His wisdom, and that He is such and so great, that He is the true cause of the substance of things; and they fashion Him as light, and call Him life, although otherwise forms of this kind, fashioned in sacred Scripture, are honorable indeed and grave, and seem in a certain way to excel earthly forms; yet they are below the likeness of God with the truth itself; for He is above every cause and life; since no light can express God; but every word and mind is distant from the very likeness of God by an infinite interval; but sometimes they declare Him by dissimilar things (5) ^D as *Theon archonta*; let us say God of gods, as David says.

*Scholia of St. Maximus.* ...appears; for they are not to be accepted thus, but rather according to the senses which the symbols have hidden within. (1) *Two, he says, modes.* That he gives God in two ways, either as similar to all things (for all things consist in Him) or as dissimilar (for He is none of the things which are), Dionysius then explains how these modes of naming are formed, such as that: "Who has known the mind of the Lord?" (Rom. 11), and that one frequent in the prophets: "And the word of the Lord came to me." (2) *Thearchia.* Dionysius calls God *Thearchia* from that which is the most powerful gift of God, to wit, to make angels and holy men, so far as it is possible, certain gods, just as it is written: "I said, You are gods" (Ps. Lxxxi), and that: "God of gods in Sion" (Ps. Lxxxiv). (3) *Substance.* As Scripture says in Exodus (ch. iii): "I Am Who Am"; and: "He Who Is, sent me"; and that in Ps. Ciii: "But Thou art the same self," *ab initio enim et ente ducitur essentia, quæ est exsistentia, hoc est, exsistens substantia, accidens enim non est ὕπαρξις sed ἐνύπαρξις*; that is, it is not existence, but in-existence. (4) *Reasoning.* This is said, that it might signify God to be rational, as a participant of reason, who is the whole of reason subsisting by itself. (5) *Dissimilar things.* He calls them dissimilar, because they declare, by denying things about God, not what He is, but what He is not.

^A From these it is concluded that demonstrative theology is twofold: the one which is induced affirmatively and from effects; the other which is negative and privative. The former is derived from similar forms made manifest; the latter from dissimilar. Yet, this is also to be discerned in affirmative theology, that it proceeds even through forms depicted in Sacred Scripture, though more honorably than through those which are spoken symbolically. In both kinds (1) of formations, which the fathers called *prosoudous* (terrene), we say that even though the other part of theology—namely, the symbolic—proceeds in translated and shadowed words, much that is discordant and inconsistent appears in them. For how will he, who hears of drunkenness in God, and repentance, and oaths, and imprecations, and other things of this kind, cogitate upon them?

CHAPTER II

The great Dionysius, in his Epistle to Titus, says: That such cover ^B ings are akin to our nature is declared even by those who, hearing open theology (2) without veils, fashion in themselves a certain type which leads them to the understanding of that theology of which I spoke; and the very structure of the world (3) which is seen is coated with the invisible things of God, as Paul, and Truth itself (4) bears witness. Other accounts Dionysius (a) concerning this say, that those who have heard of open theology, and have heard it naked of veils, form in their own thought types (5) which assist the hearers toward understanding. From these, therefore, it is made manifest that which was said before: that even those things which are spoken openly and without veils to us in Sacred Scripture concerning God are types, although they are spoken demonstratively by way of affirmation.

CHAPTER III

The admirable and great Apostle says (1): We see now through a mirror in an enigma. And again: We know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be evacuated. And again: We walk by faith and not by sight. ^C When the illustrious author Basil had perceived this, he said (b): That which is face to face, and to know perfectly, is promised to be rendered to the worthy in the future age. Now, however, even though it be Paul, even though it be Peter, he sees indeed truly what he sees, and is not deceived, yet he sees "through a mirror and in an enigma," and that which is "in part" he receives now with a grateful spirit, while he clearly awaits that which is perfect in the future. Likewise, with him, Gregory the Theologian (c) says: For this reason, he says, Paul posits that all knowledge which is had on earth concerning God is nothing more than mirrors and enigmas, seeing that it is located in minute images of the truth. And again, the same man in his oration on the appointment of bishops: Who is it…

*Scholia*

(1) *In both kinds.* That is, in the formation of an image falling under the senses, and in the formation of a translation falling under the intellect.

(2) *Which hears open theology.* Let the example be that which is written in Jeremiah, chap. xiii, concerning those things which the Lord said openly without any type or covering: how He had joined the people of Israel to Himself, and how they were to be punished because of sins, and concerning the loin-cloth, in which, as in a type fashioned, He wished that Jeremiah (chap. xiii) should the better understand the punishment to be taken from the people of Israel and His own conjunction with that people, and that he might better expound it to others. And the Lord said to me: Arise, and go to the Euphrates, and take from there the loin-cloth, which I commanded thee to hide there. And I went to the Euphrates, and dug, and took the loin-cloth from the place where I had hidden it; and behold, the loin-cloth had rotted, so that it was fit for no use. And the word of the Lord came to me, saying: Thus saith the Lord: So will I make rot the pride of Judah and the pride of Jerusalem, much. And a little later: And they shall be like this loin-cloth, which is fit for no use. For as the loin-cloth adheres to the loins of a man, so have I glued to myself the whole house of Israel and the whole house of Judea, saith the Lord, that they might be to me for a people, and for a name, and for praise, and for glory; but they did not hear, and what follows. There are frequency of examples of this kind in the prophets concerning open theology, and concerning types or symbols applied to it, [the] place of symbols holds, as Saint Maximus noted.

(3) *Structure of the world which is seen.* It holds the turn of symbols, as Saint Maximus noted.

(4) *Truth bears witness.* It says, Christ says, in the Gospel many things which pertain to open and demonstrative theology, speaking through symbols and parables, whence He said to Nicodemus, as Pachymeres, the paraphrast of Dionysius, observed: If I have spoken to you of earthly things, and you do not believe, how shall you believe if I tell you of heavenly things? as if this were, so it seems to me, as if He were saying: If I have spoken to you of heavenly and divine things through corporeal symbols, and things akin and familiar to your nature, and you do not believe, so that by believing you may understand, how will you believe if I speak of heavenly things without these images known to you? For the Lord had taught Nicodemus by the example of the wind concerning the hidden and spiritual operation of the creature regenerating from water and the Holy Spirit, where we hear only the voice: I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; but how it operates, or where it begins, and where it ends, we do not know; as in the wind, which is, as the same Dionysius says, in chap. 4, 5 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, an image and type of divine operation because of the properties of the wind which Dionysius noted in the same place, where he also cites the place of the Gospel: The Spirit breathes where He wills.

(5) *Types.* That it pertains to open and demonstrative theology—which, however, so that the auditors may believe more easily, and by believing understand—others among the ancient fathers fashion types and images of three lamps and one flame; others of the sun, ray, and light; others of the rose, flower, and odor; or root, branch, and fruit; or finger, hand, and arm, and the like.

^A He says, who can bear to be carried to such heights as to equal Paul? And yet he says he sees through a riddle, and that there will be a time when he will see face to face. And again in the same oration: How, he says, does the sense remain, and pull to itself that which is outside? How does the mind remain in you, and generate a word in another mind? How is a notion given to a word? If you have nothing of these comprehended by your intelligence, O man, you will perhaps comprehend at some time, when you shall receive that which is perfect: I shall see, he says, the heavens, the works of your fingers [*], so that we may suspect that the things which are now seen are not the truth itself, but likenesses of the truth; how do you think you know God, what he is, and how great he is? To this, the great Dionysius in his Epistle to Titus [says]: Yet not even in the most holy mysteries did the holy teachers of the Evangelical or Mosaic discipline abstain from the symbols in which God was represented; nay rather, we see that the angels, full of all holiness, mystically produce divine things through riddles, and that Jesus speaks of divine things in parables, and delivers the deified sacraments made by God through the types of bread and wine. For it was fitting that not only the holy of holies should be guarded, lest the common herd of men should pollute them; but also that human life itself, which is at once incorporeal and corporeal, should suitably receive the light of divine knowledge; and that it [should] destine and attribute that part of the soul, which is free [(2)] from the externally imposed necessity of suffering—that is, the mind—to the contemplation of simple things and things deeply and profoundly hidden, which represent God within images; but that it should adapt that part of the soul, which to the necessity of suffering is subjected to external force, as is fitting for its nature, and should stretch it out to the most divine things through typical symbols artificially veiled over them. Furthermore, Saint Maximus in his *Theological Chapters* [(a)]: The Lord, he says, sometimes travels, sometimes stays with us: he travels in the mode of contemplating face to face; he stays with us in the mode of contemplating in a mirror and in a riddle. And the same [author], furthermore, in the third century of charity: Through faith, he says, we walk, not through sight; and in mirrors we have knowledge, and in a riddle; therefore there is much need for us of study in this matter, so that by long exercise and meditation we may acquire a habit of contemplations that is greatly confirmed. From ^D these things it is clear that our soul deals with all theology in a way convenient to its nature, expressing types and notions from things related to itself and divisible, that is, corporeal things, whether it expresses these from material formations, or without covering from those things only which are placed in the world, where those things which we now see as beautiful are not the truth itself, but likenesses of the truth. Therefore, all theological knowledge of this kind does not pass beyond mirrors and riddles; this, however, is the partible and imperfect part of this knowledge; therefore, when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part and that which is partible in it shall be done away; and we shall see face to face [**], that is, the impartible things impartibly, and the immaterial things immaterially.

CAPUT IV.

That it is impossible for those who are endowed with a body to philosophize about God without corporeal things.

Gregory the Theologian, in his second book of theology: It is, he says, impossible even for him who strives greatly to pass beyond his own shadow (for the shadow always anticipates as much as it precedes), or just as it is impossible for a fish to swim outside the water, so it is impossible that those who are in the body, without corporeal things, can be altogether with those things which the intelligence embraces: for always something of our affairs falls in, although the mind may most of all withdraw itself from those things which are seen, and, collected alone with itself, strive to attain to related and invisible things by intelligence. The same [author] yet again in the same oration: Shall we conclude here, having advanced as far as matter and those things which fall under our sight? Or rather, because Scripture knows there was a tabernacle of Moses, the image of the whole world, which consists of things that can be seen and things that cannot be seen, shall we, having pulled away the first veil and passed beyond the senses, enter into the Holy of Holies, that is, to the intelligible and celestial nature? But we cannot see even this incorporeally, which, although it is otherwise incorporeal, is yet called fire and spirit. And a little before: Are not spirit, and fire, and light names of the divine nature? What then? Do you understand spirit without agitation and diffused breath? Or fire outside of matter, and not carried upwards, and having no proper color and form? Or light not mixed with air, and released from that which generates and illuminates it? And again a little below: Is there need, he says, that we, being withdrawn from these things, should see the divinity itself from these, as far as can be, through some private thought collected from conjectures? Saint Maximus [(b)]: All knowledge, he says, of this present age, even that which is very high and sublime, if it be compared with the knowledge of the future age, is crude, and as it were an image of a living figure, which will not exist afterward, when the true life and knowledge have been shown. For the sciences, he says, shall cease, and prophecies shall be done away. Rightly, therefore, did the great Basil philosophize concerning God: If you have comprehended anything of those things which are above this world which is seen, it is below the divine spirit. Indeed, the highest Theologian...

[*] Ps. VIII, 5. [**] 1 Cor. XIII, 12.

vision to that incorporeal imitation and contemplation of the celestial orders, unless it uses a corporeal aid suitable to itself. And the same author again: It is not possible, he says, for it to be otherwise, so that the ray of divine knowledge may shine upon us, unless it is covered by various sacred veils according to anagogical [mystical] interpretation, and adorned by divine providence in a manner suitable to our nature. In this place the divine Maximus says: While we are in the body, we cannot, without types and symbols, gaze upon incorporeal things and those that are devoid of matter. Hence it is perceived that, if our mind cannot by itself even imitate and contemplate the angels, nor attain to those things, unless it uses a material aid that falls under the senses and is suitable to it, by no reason or way can it come to pass that it should attain to the intelligence of God without matter and body; therefore it is impossible for those who spend their life in the body to ascend to the contemplation of God without corporeal things. But if we, wandering through a vacuum toward those things which are above the age, as is our custom, investigate what indeed existed even before these, we shall not thus lead ourselves away from those things which are corporeal, and near and kin to the soul, which are indeed by an immense ratio inferior to the spirit of God, which is above all nature.

CHAPTER V.

^B and ^C at their time you will see, but in its own time. And Gregory of Nazianzus: How, he says, can that be found, which nothing of those things that are known declares? Not form, not color, not circumscription, not shape, not quantity, not quality, not place, not conjecture, not likeness, not proportion; but rather it is always beyond every path of comprehension. The same author again: This, he says, is the most proper note of His concept: that His nature is above every note signifying a concept. And the supreme theologian Dionysius ^C: Therefore, to celebrate with praises that divine substance which is above all—that which is above every goodness, which is above goodness—neither as reason or power, nor as mind, or substance, or life, is not befitting to anyone who is a student of the truth which is above all truth; but rather it is necessary to praise it as supereminently abstracted from every habit, motion, life, imagination, opinion, name, speech, thought, intelligence, substance, state, foundation, union, end, immensity, and finally from all things whatsoever that exist. Hence it is made manifest that we cannot comprehend God, or philosophize about Him, by a notion informed by types and images, or by any other thought; but rather He is beyond all these things; since every phantasy, that is, every thought, has a triple use ^D: one represents those things which are perceived by the senses, impressing upon the memory whatever has been gathered from the senses, which it arranges and distinguishes, if I may so say, in order and articulately; this they call healthy phantasy, and the offspring of a great nature: another imprints certain obscure traces, which do not allow those things that are thought of to remain in any part; but it presents confused images, changed at different times and indiscriminately, and almost before they have been fashioned by thought, they slip away from those very images, and lack all fruit and utility; such is the thought of empty dreams in sleep, and of those things which are fashioned rashly and by chance in thought: the third is in those things which are to be done, proceeding without right reason, by which that which is not, is thought of as if it were, which rejoices in things over which one ought to grieve, and grieves over those in which one ought to rejoice; and what it has persuaded itself of, it cannot be dissuaded from; it loves and embraces those things which it depicts in thought, as if they were laws divinely informed for itself, and contends that those things which are most clear and placed before the eyes, if it can be done, should be perverted into its own error. Those who fall into such thought become incurable; and if they are powerful, they threaten the destruction of cities; if they are weak, and not possessing resources, they will not cease, as far as lies in them, to destroy them. Of these, Gregory the Theologian says in his second oration on theology: The great patriarch Abraham, he says, was justified by faith; and he sacrifices a new and unheard-of sacrifice, and the image of that great sacrifice. But he did not see God as God, but set food before Him as a man; and he was praised because he applied as much veneration as intelligence could comprehend. In the same place, when he had mentioned Jacob: And he wrestles, he says, with God as with a man; whatever this wrestling of God with man may be—perhaps a comparison of human virtue with the divine. Again in the same place: How did you not marvel at Manoah the judge before, and Peter the disciple later? The former, because he did not allow the face of God to be informed by type and image; whence that saying: We have perished, he says, we have seen God, as if men cannot grasp an image of God fashioned and informed in the notion of the senses, much less His nature; the latter, because he did not receive Christ, whom he saw, into the boat, and for that reason he was sending Him away. And again in the same oration: Nor is there perfect perception even of the creature itself, if indeed one must believe that you have only the shadows of this, when you hear: I shall see the heavens, the works of your fingers, the moon and the stars. [*] Job XIII, 23. [**] Ps. VIII, 4.

^A from these themselves have the demonstrable principles of notions: that God is named as unknown, or rather, He is believed to exist only from those things which are perceived by the intellect; wherefore none of the things that are understood is comparable to Him in any respect. The same author again, in the second chapter of the second century: Every intellect is of those things which are intelligent, and of those things which are understood; but God is neither one of those who are intelligent, nor anything of those things which are understood; for He is above these: since he who understands is circumscribed, as needing the condition of the thing which he understands; or he is naturally subjected to the intelligent being, who is understood because of his condition. It remains, therefore, for us to think of God as neither understanding nor being understood, but rather as above being understood and above being understandable. And Dionysius, most learned in theology (c): For as (3), he says, those things which fall under the intellect, we are unable to comprehend and contemplate by means of those things which fall under the sense, nor can we, through those things which are informed by types and signs, contemplate those things which are simple and are not marked by types, nor through the figures of bodies can we grasp things incorporeal, which can neither undergo the sense of touch nor take on shape and form; so, for the same reason, the Truth is above substances, that infinity is above substance; and above minds, that unity is above the mind, and that One which is beyond all reasoning is inscrutable to all reasoning; that ineffable One, beyond all language, is above language, the Good, the unity that is the producer (4) of universal unity; and He is a substance above substance, devoid of reason (5), [is] an intellect by name; and a mind not falling under the intellect, a reason not to be spoken, because ^B

CAPUT VI.

^A He has no likeness to any thing, and He is the cause of all things, yet He Himself is not, as One who is outside all things that are, and as He who can rightly and knowingly declare concerning Himself for His own sake. From these it is evident that God can never be known by any one through natural representation: for He flees from cognition by every means, both when and how He is, nor is He of those that understand, or of those that are understood; for He is a substance which cannot be a subject; He is a notion which has no reason for a subject. In what, then, is that founded which will know what cannot at all receive a subject into a notion? Rightly, therefore, is His immensity above substance, and He is a mind unknowable to all thoughts; or rather, He is a mind not falling under intelligence, and a reason ineffable to us, without ^B reason, without intelligence, without a name, and this because of the supereminence of His substance and intelligence; just as a light that is excellent makes the focus of our eyes darkness to us, and likewise a sound that is excellent [makes] our sense of hearing [experience] deafness.

CAPUT VII. Whence, finally, and from what things one must philosophize about God.

The Great Dionysius, ch. 7, *On the Divine Names*: Furthermore, he says, it must be asked how we know God, who is neither perceived by sense, nor by intelligence, and to speak universally, is nothing of those things that are. Or is it not rather truly said that we do not know God from His nature (for that which is of His nature is unknown, and surpasses all ^C reason and mind), but from the order of all things as if proposed by Him, and because it contains within itself certain images and likenesses of His divine exemplars (1) for the purpose of knowing that highest good, and the end of all goods, by way of, and in, the supereminence of all things, and in the cause of all things? Gregory the Theologian, in his second oration *On Theology*: Thus, he says, that perfect reason, innate in all, and the first law in us, and bound up with all things, led us from things that are seen to God. And again the same (a), God, he says, is only shadowed forth by the mind, and that too very obscurely and minutely, not from those things which are in His nature, but from those which encompass Him, gathered from one thing after another by the formation of thought into one certain image of truth. ^D This, however, others after Gregory have interpreted: God, they say, is perceived not from those things which are in Him, that is, from His substance, but from those things which are around Him, that is, from creatures. And Saint Maximus in his *Theologics*: From no thing, he says, whatever it be, can He be perceived (3), with this one exception, that He is known through faith, and that is known from those things which were effected by Him—known, I say, that He is, not what He is. And again the same in his *Third Century*: That which is properly, is known to be from that which is not properly; it is known, I say, not by any mode by which it might be referred to that which is not properly, or compared with it. For how can that which is properly, and as the cause of all things is above all things, and is known not by knowing that [as we know] other things, be compared in any part with those things which are not properly? Since otherwise we cannot indicate that which is above substance otherwise than if we indicate this little of Him from those things which are, namely, that He is. And further the same, in the *Second Century on Charity*, chapter twenty-seven: Whoever, he says, is about to philosophize concerning God, do not seek reasons for discoursing about His nature; for the human mind [is] unable to find...

Scholia.

...ch. 7, *On the Divine Names*. Imitating Paul, he called the wisdom of God, which is wanting in reason, both mindless and foolish, in order to signify His excellence, because it surpasses our reason, so that it is regarded as alien to reason; so [too] the mind, as though it were mindless and foolish; so in this place, because the knowledge of God surpasses by an infinite interval the reason, and intellect, and the names which are spoken of God, even though God can otherwise be investigated, and understood, and named from all creatures by reason; he says, however, that He is *alogia* (unreason), and *anoesia* (unthought), and *anonymia* (unnaming), that is, *alogos*, *anoos*, and *anonymos*, that is, wanting in reason, mind, and name.

(1) Images and likenesses of the exemplars within itself. Whatever exist, that is, the species and individual creatures, such as the orders of angels, and all sensible things, are images and likenesses of the divine ideas, that is, of the exemplars which are in God, which exemplars are indeed of the eternal intelligence of God, through which, and according to which, all things were in Him, which were not other than He; and through them, and according to them, all things which He produced were made, as the blessed John in the Apocalypse, ch. iv, says that those twenty-four elders said: All things were in Him, and were created. Concerning the ideas, it was said that... [they] were; but of the images and likenesses of the ideas, that is, of the exemplars, that they were created.

(2) In ablation and supereminence, and cause. There are three modes by which we ascend to know God from creatures: in one way, by removing from Him negatively whatsoever created things are seen, because we say that nothing of them is God, but we deny all things, saying: God is not an angel, nor soul, nor any animal, or this, or that, whatsoever it may be; in another way, by removing the perfections of creatures, such as life, wisdom, and others of this kind, from God, because the wisdom of God excels all created wisdom, and the life of God [excels] all life, and the perfections [of God] surpass all other perfections of creatures; in a third way, inasmuch as all things that are in the nature of things and in the universality of the world are created by God.

(3) [He] does not deny that it is possible to demonstrate from creatures that God exists, but he denies that He can be known according to essence from effects; but St. Maximus remembers the knowledge of God by faith, that it is, and not of natural knowledge through demonstration from effects, because to know this by faith is much more excellent and more powerful than to know by natural reason, by as much as grace is more excellent than nature; for faith is from the grace of God.

^A Indeed, even if you were Moses, and the God of Pharaoh, even if you were to reach the third heaven, as Paul did, and hear the secret words; even if you were to ascend above them to some state and order of angels or archangels. For although every heavenly thing, and something even above the heavenly, is of a nature far more excellent than we are and nearer to God, yet it is further removed from God and from his perfect intelligence than it excels this composite, humble, and downward-inclined nature of ours. And the great Athanasius, as if inquiring, says: Since God is incorporeal and lacks form, what, then, are the posterior parts of him that Moses saw? Then, resolving the question: We believe, he says, that before the ages and before all creatures, God exists, whole and sole, uncreated. From which it follows that the posterior parts of God are the creatures and their reasons, which, when he had seen them, he expounded, saying: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Likewise, the divine Gregory of Nyssa in the book ^B *On the Life of Moses*: The uncreated glory, he says—that is, the divine nature—is entirely ineffable in itself, and is such that it can neither be comprehended nor seen; for nothing that is, can this very thing in itself, ^C naked, be clearly comprehended by the intelligence, or in any way seen by the eyes of the body; for it is uncreated. But whatever is uncreated, no one can see with the eyes of the body, even if it be Moses, even if it be Paul, who ascended into the third heaven, even if it be an angel who sees God. For what truly is, is true life, and this cannot be known by angel or by man. From which it clearly appears that even the most powerful theologians do not progress beyond the creature in those things by which they see God; but rather they consider the creature itself, and what is contained within its nature. But if they discuss God in this manner, and by this way and reason, it necessarily follows that the theology which is concerned with negation is far more excellent, and more suitable for contemplation, than that theology which is seen in affirmation.

CAPUT IX.

That in demonstrative theology, that which is concerned with negations is more proper and principal; and that in this theology, affirmations are not contrary to negations.

The supreme theologian Dionysius, in the first chapter of *On Mystical Theology*: It is necessary, he says, in this to posit and affirm all the affirmations of all things, ^D and not according to those things that are around him, that is, the creatures.

Scholia.

^A Likewise, the same author says in the second chapter of the *Celestial Hierarchy*: "Sometimes," he says, "he is divinely praised in the sacred Scriptures by dissimilar names," when they call him invisible, and infinite, and incomprehensible, and similarly in other things, which declare not what he is, but what he is not. But this, as I believe, is more proper to him, just as the tacit, that is, the unwritten, priestly tradition has expounded; we truly say that it is not according to the nature of that thing among those which exist; otherwise, we are ignorant of that which is not defined in him, what that is which is above essence, and which can neither be understood nor spoken. If, therefore, negations in divine matters are true, while affirmations are not in harmony ^B with the hidden divinity of those things which cannot be uttered concerning God, it follows that for those things which are not visible, that naming which is formed through dissimilarities is more proper. And Gregory the Theologian, in his second oration on theology: "It is much easier and briefer," he says, "by saying what it is, to declare what it is not, than by denying what it is not, to indicate what it is." And again: "But it is necessary, after it has been said what it is not, that it also be said what it is: and this all the more, because it is easier to grasp one thing, than to deny all things one by one; so that from the negation of those things which it is not, and the affirmation of that which it is, we may grasp that thing by the intellect." Saint Maximus in his *Theologica*: "He who philosophizes," he says, "about God by asserting, makes the Word flesh, since he cannot from elsewhere than from those things which we see and handle, know God as a cause; but ^C he who philosophizes by denying, using abstraction, makes the Word spirit, inasmuch as it was in the beginning, and was with God, knowing rightly him who is supra-incognizable, from nothing at all of those things which can be known." Hence it is clear that it is more proper to philosophize about God through negations than through affirmations, inasmuch as the one makes the Word spirit, and the other makes the Word flesh. And theology indeed, when affirming, has the power of comparing and figuring and conjecturing; and this proves only this, namely that God exists, from those things which were made by him; but theology, when denying, demonstrates that God is above all things; and he most attains to the truth who says that God is not any of those things which are, but is above substance, and above all things. Furthermore, in God, negations are not contrary to affirmations: for neither did the negation deny that very thing which the affirmation affirmed: ^D nay, rather, just as an affirmation does not posit what God is, so neither does a negation take away what God is: for what it does not posit, how could it take away? Finally, both an affirmation and a negation equally fail to attain to the substance of God: they differ only in this, that he approaches more closely to the truth who says, God is not that which we think.

CAPUT X.

Magnus Dionysius in the first chapter of his *Mystical Theology*: "My prayer, therefore," he says, "may be this, but you, my friend Timothy, leave behind, by vehement study and by exercise of contemplating mysteries, both senses and mental intelligences, and all things which fall under sense and intelligence, and all things which are not, and which are, and as much as you will be able to attain by your strength to the conjunction with him who is above all substance and intelligence, ignoring and by not seeing at all, you may be led to the ray of divine darkness."

And again, the same man in the second chapter: "In this," he says, "darkness, which surpasses light, may we pray that we be, and that by not seeing and by ignoring, we may see and know, and that we may praise him who is above all substance, above substance, separated from all things, and that we may behold that divine darkness, which is hidden from all light that is in created things." And again, the same in the first letter to Gaius: "Darkness," he says, "is driven away by light, and especially by abundant light from the sight of all; cognitions drive away ignorance, and many cognitions drive it away even more. But this superlative ^B, not privative, understanding, pronounce most truly, that those who have what is light [(3)], and have the knowledge of creatures, the ignorance of God [(4)] lies hidden from them, and his darkness is placed above, and is hidden by all light, and is withdrawn from all cognition; and if anyone has seen God and known what he saw, he did not see God, but some of his creatures, and those things which are seized by cognition. But he, while constantly remaining above mind and substance, by this very fact that he is neither known nor is he substance, is known above substance and above mind, and that better and universal ignorance is the knowledge of him who is above all things that fall into cognition." And Saint Maximus: "God," he says, "has this only true knowledge: not to be known." From these it is evident that God is above every affirmation and negation, and that we know him and philosophize about him only by ignoring him perfectly, and by not seeing him.

THIRD DECADE

^A From all things, therefore, which have been said thus far, it is most firmly evident to me that theology in general consists of four parts: symbolic, indeed, in two parts, namely, in images and in words; but demonstrative in the other two, namely, in affirmative and negative ones. But that which is beyond these pertains to the ignorance of God, who can neither be known nor seen, which indeed is not set down as a part of theology—for what is born to be perfected above mind and speech and reason, where will they place it, those who inquire into this matter? Unless they resolve to call this part, a knowledge above mind, all those ^B illustrious and divine men who, as it seems to me, out of the fact that they have experienced it, gave it a name, and not out of any demonstration. For conjunction with God above mind—that is, to enter through perfect ignorance into that infinite, and what cannot be comprehended, and into the immense sea of his nature, where every nature stands exhausted and dares not proceed further—which from a certain divine fragrance, and a certain withdrawal from the body and from creatures, [leads] into a praiseworthy and blessed state, not only more admirable than can be said, but than can be understood—this conjunction, I say, with God above mind, and this kind of divine ecstasy, was then numbered as no species of theology. For every science ^C and information is made for the sake of those things which are known and informed; but where nothing of these is, what art of this science is to be said to exist? In order, therefore, that we may expound this part in repeated chapters, it has been demonstrated that theology is twofold, demonstrative; then that not even this is seen without type and enigma; thirdly, it is necessarily concluded that in all theology the manner of mirror and enigmas is involved.

from which it followed that those who are still in the body ^A cannot philosophize about God without corporeal things; fifthly, that neither can we perceive the phantasy of God—that is, his knowledge—whole and entire through types and images, because of the flux of bodies. Next, in the sixth chapter, [it is held] that if we are so infirm, we should by no means attempt to grasp his knowledge from natural representation, nor suppose that he is [derived] from those things that understand or are understood. The seventh chapter contains [the point] that if we are not fit to philosophize about God because of our body, nor can God be comprehended due to the excellence of his super-eminence, where then ought we to turn to philosophize about him? Having concluded, however, that we must take [our starting point] from those things which are around him—which are indeed creatures—the question was then asked whether perhaps the chief theologians philosophize from things more excellent than creatures. But having shown that they treat of God from no other source than from creatures, [the] chapter ^B contains the comparison [as to] what is of greater validity: [the] theology which denies or [the] theology which affirms. Having concluded, moreover, that the theology which occupies itself with negations is more appropriate than that which occupies itself with affirmations, and that, in this instance, negating and affirming are not contraries to one another, the tenth chapter arose from the proposed premises: for if they are not contraries, it remains that both theologies are distant from God by an equal interval; and that, finally, God is above all negation and affirmation, which is his knowledge, and [above] theology, namely, to know or philosophize nothing about him, but rather to be joined and coupled to him unknowingly, and without any understanding of those things which are perceived by understanding. These things, therefore, are absolute, so that nothing is lacking. Theology is, however, rightly called demonstrative, as if constituted from affirmations and negations; and because above these it occurs to that inexplicable, occult, and mystical theology which surpasses demonstration.

THIRD DECADE. — DE DIVINIS EMANATIONIBUS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

That there is a twofold emanation: one in God, the other outside, from God himself to the creature.

The great Dionysius, in the second chapter *Of the Divine Names*: "These," he says, "are the unions and distinctions in that ineffable union and essence." But divine distinction is an emanation ^C of God, [fitting] the divine union, which is multiplied by the goodness of God beyond what is unified. Expounding this, the interpreter of *The Inexplicable* says: "He now philosophizes about the emanation of the Trinity down to the three persons, that God and Father, without time, suitably and lovingly moved by God, proceeded to the distinction of the persons, without diminution and partition, remaining whole in himself, above what is unified and above what is simply emitted by his own splendor, so that he might exist as a living image; and the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father, to be venerated, and proceeding everlastingly above what is, as the Lord teaches: the cause of all things is multiplied in the three divine persons by the goodness of God." St. Gregory the Theologian, disputing *Against Eunomius*, says: "There is also, however, in another way, a divine distinction, the emanation of God, because of his immense goodness, toward a multiform creation, visible ^D and invisible." From these, however, it becomes manifest that God and Father, flowing toward his own, brought forth the supersubstantial Son and the Holy Spirit, the two lights of one and the same divinity, in a univocal manner—in no way having gone out from himself as a whole, but rather, having moved to himself without intermediate distance from eternity, he rested in the nature of three persons. This emanation, therefore, having moved from the divine person into the divine persons, halted in the Trinity, to which it moved, and exhibited non-created motion. For every emanation is made the cause of those things which emanate. Such, therefore, is the emanation, of the same kind as those things toward which the emanation is made. If these are not created, and surpass understanding, the emanation which is made toward them themselves is similar and equal. And furthermore, in the supersubstantial Trinity there is another distinction of a different nature, which emanates toward creatures; and by this emanation the Trinity creates those creatures. But if the reason for this distinction is different, it is clear that it is completed in those very things toward which it has emanated. Wherefore it is not obscure that emotion is twofold: one, namely, by which God and Father has moved toward himself univocally; the other, by which he moved toward a creature equivocally—that is, the former naturally, the latter voluntarily. At the same time it is demonstrated that every distinction of this from that is a certain motion and distinction.

CAPUT II.

That every cause, motion, and principle said to be for the sake of generable things is a generation, which is brought about simultaneously with the effects themselves.

Saint Maximus in his interpretation of that sentiment of Gregory the Theologian (a): "For this reason, unity moved from the beginning (1)," etc.: "Everything," he says, "which is for the sake of a cause, and moves for the sake of a cause,

necessarily requires a beginning in order to be; it requires that same cause, for which it is moved, and toward which it hastens. Everything, moreover, which exists and moves for the sake of a cause, is necessarily generable; but if the end of that which is moved is the cause for which it is moved, then that same cause is necessarily the cause for which it was generated, and for ^A which it exists. And again, the same author in the third title from the excerpts in the Dogmatic Panoplia: Nothing, he says, of those things which exist is made by itself, nor is it devoid of a cause; but what is not devoid of a cause is not immobile; and what is not immobile is necessarily moved for the sake of a cause, which comes about by the very fact that it is moved naturally by the cause for the sake of and toward which it makes its motion. For nothing of those things which are moved is naturally suited to be moved without a cause; it remains, ^B therefore, that the generation of those things which are moved is the beginning of all natural motion; but the beginning of the generation of those things which are generated is God, as the author of generation. In the interpretations, however, which are offered on the text: 'The Lord created me' (*), these things also are found: Every beginning, he says, is a beginning of some things; and it signifies a relationship, not the making of the substance itself: for such are the things which are referred to 'something', as 'right' and 'left'. Wherefore the wisdom of God, which is a substance, is not a beginning of some things (for the wisdom of God has its essence before the creature), but when it has received ^C a relationship to the creatures, then it is made the beginning of the ways of God, for the acting and ^D thence it flowed: wherefore the wisdom of God, which is a principle and end: for the sake of which cause all that exists and is moved both exists and is moved; for the effective power of God both makes those things which come to be, as befits God, and provides for, and draws, as an end, those things which are moved; and it circumscribes them. But if that which is moved and generated exists and is moved and generated for the sake of a cause, then everything which is not for the sake of a cause is neither made, nor is it mobile; for that which has no cause at all does not move, as it is. But if it has no cause, it is necessarily also immobile: God, therefore, is immobile, as one who has no cause for his own essence, and is himself the cause of all things. At this point holy Maximus poses a question, to which he replies: How, he says, will anyone say, this admirable doctor (he refers to Gregory Nazianzen) makes God mobile? For thus he says: 'Therefore unity moved into duality, and rested in trinity.' We shall answer, says holy Maximus, that Gregory knew most of all that God is immobile: but (to use an example) just as the principle of the knowledge of any art, remaining itself entirely immobile, while it is fashioned according to the individual forms or species which are contained under that art, is said to be moved, while it rather moves in itself that which is made by art, rather than being moved; and just as light, which moves the sight to see, is said to be moved, when it properly moves the whole sight rather than being moved; so God, since he is entirely immobile according to substance and nature, being indeed infinite, and solitary of every relationship, and uncircumscribed, is said to be moved as a certain principle of knowledge existing in the natures and substances of things, while he provides for moving each creature according to the principle by which it is innate to it to be moved; and as the cause of all things, he receives all things that are predicated of those things of which he is the cause, without being affected: because, clearly, he himself is all things, in so far as he is the author of all. And indeed Dionysius (b), having engaged with this question, says: 'What then do the theologians mean, who sometimes call God love and affection, and at other times lovely and to be cherished?' In so far, clearly, as he is love and affection, because he pours forth love from himself, the begetter of love is said to be moved: in so far, however, as he is lovely and to be cherished, he moves towards himself those things which are capable of love and affection, in which is present the power and faculty of desiring him, as is fitting for each; and-that I may speak again more clearly—the begetter is moved in the creatures themselves by producing an internal relationship of love and affection; but he moves as one drawing by nature the appetite of those things which are moved toward him. Thus far holy Maximus. More on these matters in the fifth decade, cap. 3, where he treats of the properties of divine love.

(1) 'Is not the beginning of some things.' Saint Maximus in the first theological century, cap. 7: Every beginning, he says, and middle, and end do not entirely deny the category of 'relation', but God is superior to every relationship by an infinite interval; wherefore consistently there is neither beginning, nor middle, nor anything else at all among those things in which the category of 'relation' is considered according to a relationship.

^A But now, he says, that we may not suspect some variation in Him who is unchangeably the same; but rather a singular multiplication, and simple emanations to all things. The divine Maximus, while explaining this very thing, says: When he speaks of a singular multiplication, one must understand that God, remaining in His simplicity, produces the manifold and various species of creatures; for he calls that emanation as it were a motion and endeavor toward the fashioning of creatures. Again, the same Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of *The Divine Names*: For if, he says, the cause of all things, through the emanation which is the producer of creatures, and starting from goodness, and passing through all things, and filling all things with existence from Himself, and exulting in all creatures; having all things anticipated within Himself ^B by a single, superlative simplicity excluding all duality; containing all things similarly by His infinity, which is above that which is simple; and being uniquely participated in by all. Commenting on this passage again, the same man as before says: He calls it an emanation, not only that He contemplates Himself, but that He pours Himself forth, and progresses, and produces creatures. And again, the same Dionysius in the second chapter of *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*: For as, he says, our illustrious teacher said, the first motion of the mind toward divine things is the love of God; but the emanation of holy love, which is the highest and chief source for the doing of the holy divine commandments, is that most mystical generation, by which it is brought about that we are divine. ^C But the great Basil, in the notes by Saint Maximus, regarding energies, against the Monothelites: One thing, he says, is he who operates, another is the operation, another is the work; and these differ most significantly among themselves: for the operator is he who is moved to operate; the operation is as it were the operative motion, and, if I may speak, the endeavor of the will tending and looking toward the working of something, and at the same time, once the choice has been made, resting and ceasing, and quickly moved and passing away; but the works are those things which are perfected by this operation, and exist from it. And the same man again in the second book, *Against Eunomius*: For the creatures indicate the power and wisdom and skill of God, ^D but not the substance of God Himself, nor indeed do they necessarily show the whole power of the author himself; for it happens sometimes that the craftsman does not employ all his strength in the things he makes, but rather very often uses relaxed strength in the operations of his art. And again the same: The greatness, he says, of God, and His power and wisdom, then His goodness and providence, by which He cares for us, and the justice of His judgment, we are said to know, but not His substance itself. Again, the same Basil in the homily on the beginning of *Proverbs*: Whoever knows, he says, from the fabric of the world...

CHAPTER III.

Saint Maximus in the disputation against Pyrrhus: Just as, he says, conflagration brings with it the inflamed and the inflaming, and refrigeration the refrigerated and the refrigerating, and vision the one seeing and the thing seen, and intelligence the one understanding and the thing understood (for a relationship cannot be understood or signified without those who have the relationship): so, as is consequent, deification brings with it the deified and the one deifying. And again, the same, in the second chapter of the third century: Those whose being is seen in a multitude, their being is different and various; but those whose being is different, their relationship is inseparable; but those whose relationship indeed is inseparable, it is proper to them that they be mutually prohibited from one another, so that they might not be thought of as infinite things: but those whose being is not infinite, those to wit, whose generation is thought to have been preceded by an age or time, it is clear that their generation is from that which was not. And John Damascene: It is necessary, he says, to reduce those things which are "toward something," whatever they may be, under some other category, so that they might first be considered in themselves; afterward, as having a relationship, there is need to reduce them under the category of those things which are "toward something." For it is necessary that some things exist first separately, and afterward their relationship be considered. Nay, even blessed Cyril: By a relationship, he says, to God we the adopted sons are deified. From which it is made that it cannot happen that the generation of any things be considered, with any one of those things which pertain to the relationship taken away. Which indeed is true in the divine persons, because these are eternal, and thus it is that the relationship exists simultaneously; yet in God and in His creatures the relationship is produced afterward, when those very things which have a relationship exist, as has been demonstrated.

CAPUT IV.

Great Dionysius in the ninth chapter of *The Divine Names*.

^A This same thing is also potency, if it is permissible to say so, of God: *For the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* And again, in the same place: And in the *Summa*, that passage: *The Lord created me the beginning of his ways*, is said of the wisdom which appears in the world, which, by means of those things which are seen, as it were, gives voice that it was made by God. Furthermore, there are certain reasons of wisdom which, as if the first seed-plot, were generated before other creatures in the very creation. This wisdom, by being silent, cries out its Creator and Lord, that through it you might refer yourself to the contemplation of Him who alone is wise.

In the first and ecumenical synod, from the response of the Fathers to the philosopher, which Eusebius committed to writing: It is to be noted, they say, that this is the Lord who created the reasoning wisdom, the beginning of His ways; which He prepared for man, created by Him in His own image: and in the Wisdom of Sirach: *All wisdom*, he says, *is from the Lord, and it is with Him for ever: the wisdom was created before all things, and the understanding of prudence, from everlasting: the root of wisdom to whom hath it been revealed? and who hath known her wise counsels? One is most wise, to be feared, the Lord sitting upon his throne: he created her and poured her out over all his works.* Divine Chrysostom says: Let us see what Philip wants to see: is it the wisdom of the Holy Spirit? Or His goodness? By no means; but that [which asks] what God is; the substance itself, I say. And Gregory the Theologian, in the second oration, *On Theology*: I did not see, he says, the primary and eternal nature, which is known to itself—that is, to the Trinity—and how much remains within the first veil, and is covered by the Cherubim, but that which is extreme, and reaches unto us: which is, as far as I understand, that amplitude, or, as David says, ^B magnificence, which is seen in creatures, and in those things which are brought to effect and governed by Him. For these are those posterior things of God, which after Him are His indications and tokens. Great Dionysius, in the eighth chapter of *The Divine Names*: God of infinite power, not only because He produces all power, but because He is above all power, and is potency in and of Himself; and because He is above that which is powerful, in order to produce infinite other infinite powers: and because infinite powers can never, in an infinite production, blunt or dull His infinite power. And again: He possesses [potency] in such a way that it is from that very potency which is above substance.

And divine Chrysostom in homily 64 on Matthew: When He says, *None is good*, He does not say this, he says, as if denying that He is good—far from it! For He did not say: "Why do you call Me good? I am not good"; but he said, *None is good*, that is, no human [is good strictly], and by saying this, He does not deprive men of goodness, but it pertains to the distinction of the goodness of God. And again in the same Matthew, homily 21: *If you*, He says, *being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children*, even there He called them evil, not because He condemned all human nature to malice; for, He says, you are not men [in that sense]: but rather He named them so, that is, evil, comparing the goodness of men with the goodness of God. Likewise from the *Panaria*, a synod held against the Manichaeans by the bishop of the *Carorum*, Abucara: Goodness, he says, which is seen in the universe of the world, receives accretion and decretion, as it is an accident. And again: Goodness in God is substance; but in creatures, it is an accident. For be, he says, *merciful as your Father is in heaven*. And again Dionysius: It is true, he says, that we know God, not indeed from His nature (for this is unknown and surpasses all reason and mind); but from the order of all things, as one created by God Himself, and having certain images and likenesses of His exemplars.

Indeed, also John of Damascus, in the third book, chapter 62: It is said, he says, ^C *energeia* is *energema*, that is, operation is work, and work is operation: just as *ktisma* is *ktisis*, that is, creature is creating, and creating is creature—that is, the created thing; for thus he speaks, every creature, when we signify created things. But it is to be noted that energy, that is, operation, is a motion, and is more being-affected than affecting, as Gregory the Theologian says, in his oration *On the Holy Spirit*; and if energy is the Holy Spirit, it is being-affected, surely, not affecting; and as soon as the effect exists, it will be at rest. From these things it is clear that operation and emanation are the same. For just as emanation is motion and effort toward producing creatures, so operation is as it were an operative motion and the very effort (if I may so say) of choice, and again, as there WAS, the habit of the effort and motion among those things which have a habit among themselves: thus operation is intermediate ^D between the works which are done and the one who operates. Emanation, therefore, and operation, and habit, and generation...

and the same movement are the same thing: and consequently, it follows that the habit and movement of God toward the creation of creatures, and the art and wisdom and power and generation of creatures, and his emanation and operation, are the same.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VI.

the emanation and operations of God proceeds, differs, as reason demands, from the substance of God, because that will of God indeed began, and is outside the maker and creator, but this—that is, the substance of God—is eternal, and remains fixed within itself; that begins and ends, this is devoid of beginning and end; that receives non-existence when God does not will it to be, this never receives non-existence.

CHAPTER VII.

Athanasius, in the third *Contra Arianos*: "Everything," he says, "the Father gave to the Son, and everything again the Father has in the Son: for the divinity of the Son is the divinity of the Father, and thus the Father exercises providence over all things in the Son." And the same author again, *Contra gentiles*: "Through the incarnation," he says, "the providence of the Word over all things was manifested, and the Word Himself is the provider and author of this providence; for He Himself became man so that we might be deified, and He manifested Himself through a body so that we might apprehend the knowledge of the invisible Father." ^B Indeed, even the great Basil in his *Morals*, on the forty-fourth Psalm: "Attend, proceed prosperously, and reign," that is, O You who have begun to take care of men through the flesh, grant that You may intensify this care, continue it, and never at any time relax it. And Damascenus the Theologian: "Providence," he says, "is the care of God for all things." And Theodorus, surnamed of the "Scriptures": "Of what thing," he says, "will there be providence if there is not that which is kept unharmed? For providence is of those things which are for a purpose." Wherefore it is clear from these how, on account of those things which were made by Him, God possesses providence, by which He provides for them and governs them; and He Himself is the Word of God, the provider and author of this providence. But if He was made because of these things, how is He not founded and created and numbered among those things which are for a purpose, according to the nature of operations and emanations, and of other things which are understood to pertain to relationship?

CHAPTER VIII.

The great Dionysius, in the first chapter *De Divinis Nominibus*, says: "For not only is He the cause of holding all things together, and the cause of life and perfection, so that from Him alone, or from another providence, goodness, which transcends every name, is named, but He has simply and incircumscriptly anticipated in Himself (1) the perfect goodnesses of His own unique and universal-effecting providence, and is fittingly praised and named by all things." And yet, the theologians celebrate not only these divine names, which are said from general providences, or ^C from providences in part, or from those things by which provision is made, and sometimes from certain divine visions. The same author again, in the *Epistle to Titus*: "In the providences of God," he says, "which we contemplate with the mind, either in gifts (2), or visions (3), or properties (4), or faculties (5), or states, or mansions (6), or emanations, or distinctions (7), or conjunctions (8)." And again, chapter four, *De coelesti hierar.*: "All things," he says, "which exist, participate in providence, which flows forth from the divinity that excels every nature and is the cause of all things." In which place Saint Maximus says: "He declares the summation of all works of creation, and calls Him [the cause]; for all things, namely intellectual and sensible, God made when they did not exist, and for this sole reason, that they might enjoy His goodness; but they enjoy this through providence itself, as each thing is suited; for the providence of God is the principle of the nature of each thing." And hence it is clear that Dionysius called every emanation of God 'providence', for this is that which is found in Dionysius: "From this alone, or from another providence"; and that: "from general providences, or providences in part, or from those things by which provision is made"; and that again: "In the providences of God, which we contemplate with the mind." Dionysius was clearly content to call emanations 'providences'; unless perhaps one should say that providence and emanation are the same thing, for for what else is to emanate for the sake of another, than to provide for His own?

^A And it is still the case that He cares for them; which is made all the more evident from the fact that the providence of God is the principle of the nature of things, and every principle of some things is concluded within those things which exist from that same principle. It is clear, therefore, that providence is one of those things which were made by God by His own will. Dionysius enumerates in his *Providences* gifts and visions and other things, using the word in a sense of distinction, or to declare that it is not to be disapproved if someone calls these things by this or that term.

CAPUT IX.

That according to these very providences and emanations and operations our divine participations and divine names occur.

CAPUT X.

That God is one, and impartible, and not multipliable, and immovable: yet in these emanations He seems to be moved, and partitioned, and multiplied, and divided.

Scholia. (1) *Absolute*. Ex parte principii, sive essentiæ divinæ, quia essentia divina secundum se non communicatur cum creaturis, sed remanet soluta ab omni habitudine participationis, communicatur tamen secundum similitudinem.

immovable motor, and one who remains in the same way, while his will is called that by which he wills those things which are, and the emanation of providence to all things. From these it is clear that God is moved by none of those motions which Dionysius cleverly enumerated, except only that which is external, and by which he produced creatures through his divine emanations, multiplied and parted and distributed, not in so far as he is, but in so far as, remaining immovable and impartible and devoid of multiplication, and in the same state before and after, he produced all things by his will alone, nor in doing so retreating in any way from himself. For by what would he be moved, he who fills all things with his substance? Indeed, as if one who acts remains, whose form is varied in no part and in no way, and let us suppose many faces sparkling around from its brightness, I seem to myself to form a conjecture about these things from this slight image and likeness: in this way one may rightly say that God is not distributed or divided or multiplied, but that we rather are distinct and varied from him like likenesses and images of his exemplars, and have undergone multiplication and partition; for such affections befit likenesses, not God. Thus, by Dionysius, most expert in divine things, this distinction of what appears in God is named. For he says and it is said that the distinction and multiplication of one God [exists]; yet it is nevertheless the principle of divinity above every nature, one God impartible in partible things, and united with himself, and devoid of the mixing of many, and of multiplication. ^C But that we may now reduce the chapters of this decade to a summary, I shall set forth a simple series of them. It has been demonstrated that there is a twofold speculation of divine emanations: one of emanations in God naturally; the other of emanations pertaining to creatures outside God voluntarily: approaching therefore this external one, in which the multitude of divine emanations is handled, secondly we demonstrated the principle, the creature, and the motion and cause consistent with the generation of things; but since there is no generation without a relationship, it thirdly followed necessarily that, if one of those things which make a relationship is lacking, generation does not subsist; fourthly, in the next place, every effecting which is referred to effects is an emanation in it and operation; afterwards it was sought what might be the essence of these emanations and operations, and whether they might exist by themselves, and not rather be while they are coming to be; ^D but this being explained, in the sixth place it fell to discuss the will and desire of God, and how, just as the emanations of God are those things which emanate from God, so the will of God is those things which God wills; next it was explained how the wills, as well as the emanations, as well as the providences of God, and the governances of things are spoken of; after the seventh, the eighth chapter followed, in which we taught that the name of divine providences is accepted for emanations; in the ninth and tenth chapters, however, two things are concluded in order: the one is that, according to these divine providences and emanations, every divine name and participation of God comes to be; the other, that he who is one God, and impartible, and immovable, and not multipliable, is seen to be distributed, moved, and multiplied in those very providences and emanations. Rightly therefore has it been explained by the theologians concerning the divine emanations, and they are deservedly called emanations of God; for God is the founder and author and effector of the effecting, or creation, and of other emanations; and no motion is referred to a created end, but that according to the end to which it is referred, it has taken on a nature; for on account of the creature it has taken a beginning, and has existed, and is perfected, and where there are beginnings and ends of things, the universe also is concluded in them.

QUARTA DECAS. — DE INFORMATIONE DIVINI NOMINIS. CHAPTER I.

That every name of God is an invention of our mind, and for that reason every naming of God is called *voητή*, that is, intelligible, or falling under intelligence.

Gregory the Theologian, in the sermon on Epiphany: When we contemplate the infinite in a twofold way, he says, when the mind has looked into that deep above, because it has no place to stop and lean while thinking about God, this infinite above, and from where it cannot depart, he called *ἄναρχον*, that is, lacking a beginning: but when it looks into the depths, and those things which are below, without destruction and immortal: but when it embraces the whole, he calls it *αἰώνιον*, that is, eternal. And the same in the same sermon: By the mind alone, he says, it is shadowed forth and delineated; and that very obscurely and thinly. Dionysius, however, the supreme theologian, chapter thirteen of the *Divine Names*: These, he says, are the divine names which we have collected, in so far as we could, we have explained. And in the end of the same chapter: But these indeed, as is pleasing to God, may they be held and said; and let that which pertains to us be the end here for the names of God which the mind has devised, but with God as leader, I shall pass to symbolic theology. In many places, when he treats of the names of God, he is found to call them *νοητά*, that is, pertaining to the mind. From these therefore it is clear that every name of God, and every appellation of a divine name, pertains to the business and treatment of our mind, and is thence called *νοητή*, that is, pertaining to intelligence, when of course the mind is stirred either to those things which are above, or to those which are below, or surveys the universe; and thus it discovers the namings of God.

CAPUT II.

That God is praised from effects, and from them is named. Great Dionysius, chapter one of the *Divine Names*: Since indeed God, as being goodness itself,

^A in the very fact that He is, is the cause of all things, the providence which is contemplated in the universality of the world; whence He, the prince of those who are called gods, who is the source of all good things, is to be praised from all effects, because all things are around Him, and on account of Him; and He Himself is before all things, and in Him all things consist, and His being produces all things, and makes them to exist. But holy Maximus has explained and restated this: "From these," he says, "are dissolved the foolish opinions of those who dare to say that there is in God a certain natural power of creating, just as it is inherent in spiders to weave; for he demonstrates that God produces all things on account of goodness alone." Wherefore the theologians do not dare to praise God from those things which are His own—that is, from His nature and essence (for these are unknown)—but from the emanation which is His providence in those things which have been effected by the Author Himself. This divine providence, by which God provides for all things, they celebrate with praises. Again, the same Dionysius, in the second chapter of the *Divine Names*: "There is no perfect and absolute similarity between those things which are effected and the causes; but rather the effects have, as far as can be, images of the causes; the causes themselves, however, are exempt from the effects, and, according to the reason of their principality, are situated and founded above." And noting this passage again, holy Maximus says: "The effects are all created things, whether in heaven or on earth, but the efficient or creating causes are the Persons of the holy Trinity. It is manifest, therefore, that there is no similarity between these, namely, between causes and effects." Again, the same author in *Centuria* VIII, chapter 24: "It is to be noted," he says, "that effects have images of their causes, as far as they are able to have them, being whatever things are created; but the causes, which make and create them, have no similarity to the effects." From which it is clear how the human mind, by considering created things, invents the names of God by which we praise and implore God.

CHAPTER III.

What effects are, and what their matter is.

Gregory of Nyssa in his *Explanation of the Canticle of Canticles*: All the wonders, he says, which we contemplate in the universe, provide the matter for divine names, by which we celebrate God as wise, powerful, good, holy, blessed, eternal, judge, savior, and others of this kind. And Damascenus the Theologian (a), God, he says, because of His ineffable goodness, willed to be named after our affairs and in our manner, lest we be entirely devoid of the knowledge of Him. ^B From these it is clear how the human mind is the cause which forms and, as it were, with "species" (1) affects the divine names; but the matter is those wonderful things and effects which are seen in the universality of the world; whence it gathers the form and distinction of divine names of this kind.

CAPUT IV.

Why God is named from effects, and not from those things which are of His nature.

Great Basil in those things which he wrote against Eunomius: If, he says, we could contemplate the divine nature in itself, and find through those things which are perceived what is proper to it and what is alien, we would have no need at all of arguments or conjectures to comprehend what is sought: but because what is sought is higher than it can be perceived, and we hunt for the knowledge of those things which escape us by means of conjectures, it is necessary by all means that we be led to search out the divine nature through operations. And again, the same author in the first book against the same: Since the Lord is one, and is one substance, simple and free from composition, He names Himself in different ways, fitting to Himself designations which differ among themselves in our thoughts; for He imposes diverse names upon Himself, just as the subject operations are diverse, and their habit toward those things which come to pass is diverse. The same author also: "We, however, say that our God is known from His operations; yet we do not promise to approach His essence, for the operations of God descend to us, but His essence remains inaccessible." From these things, therefore, it is made manifest that, just as we cannot philosophize about God from those things which are in God, neither can we name God through them; but rather we gather a knowledge of God from certain conjectures which are the likenesses and simulacra of those things which are in God, understanding conjectures and operations to be the same thing. For just as we reason about God from conjectures, so we are led to understand Him through operations; or rather we say that we declare our God from the operations and from those wonders which we contemplate in the universe. And hence, according to the difference of the subject operations, and as each operation is referred to the things which come to pass, we construct the business of divine names, not thinking that we are acting inopportunely by gathering and imposing these names from conjectural arguments. But what else is it to conjecture, ^C if not to draw a likeness and form from those things which we contemplate as wonderful in the universe, and from the effects themselves to which the emanations and habits are referred? When, therefore, we say that from which and whence the matter is, we do not approach that toward which we tend—that is, His essence—just as when we say whence the name of "heaven" is taken, we do not touch the substance of heaven; yet we reason most especially about its operation, for we argue that it is looked upon by us from all sides. ^D

CAPUT V. How God becomes of many names to us.

Gregory of Nyssa, disputing against Eunomius: "I," he says, "what I have learned from Holy Scripture, I declare confidently: that He who is above every name becomes of many names to us when He is variously named according to the variety of His benefits; for He is called light when He dispels the darkness of ignorance; life, when He bestows immortality; the way, when He leads from error to truth: thus He is called the tower of strength, and the fortified city, and the fountain, and the rock, and the vine, and the physician, and the resurrection, and by all such names." And again the same: "God indeed is, according to Himself, that which He is finally believed to be; however, He is named by those who call upon Him, not [as] that which He is (for His nature cannot be explained), but rather, because He is believed to operate those things which pertain to our life, He has homonyms, that is to say, names which are called equivocal." And Basil the Great: "The divine nature," he says, "insofar as it is, declares nothing of those things which are devised." From these things, therefore, it is clear that God becomes of many names to us, since we are in need of His many benefits for the preservation of life, and we are they who are entangled in difficulties, and in them we implore God with devised and invented names. Wherefore, this is also made manifest: that although God is affected—or rather, designated—by many names from infinite operations, our intellect does not fundamentally attain to what kind of nature He has. For since the question is twofold—what God is, and what He is like—the former, that is, that He is, is agreed upon by all entirely; but what He is like, and of what nature, is unknown, not only to us, but even to the angels. ^{B C}

CAPUT VI. Whether the names of God are from eternity.

Basil in the second book *Against Eunomius*: "For," he says, "the nature of things does not follow the names, but rather names are invented after the things themselves; for indeed if this were true, that names were not posterior to things, it would be necessary that those for whom the designations are the same, should have one and the same substance; from which it would result that, because those who are perfect in virtue are held worthy of the name of God and are called gods, they would be men 'homonoii', that is, of the same substance as God; but just as it is a manifest insanity to say this, so it is equally dementia to say that." Indeed, even Gregory of Nyssa in book XII, disputing against Eunomius: "The Lord," he says, "is a pitier and merciful, patient, and of great mercy; what do they say these signify? Nature, or operation? No one would say they declare anything else except operation. When, therefore, is the Lord a pitier, so that He might derive a name from the operation of pity? Is it not before human life? Who then was in need of mercy? But truly after sin there was absolutely need of mercy, and sin existed after man; therefore after man the action ^D of pitying and the name of mercy [existed]." And again the same in the second [book]: "For as," he says, "He would not be a physician unless for the sake of the sick, so again He would neither be merciful, nor a pitier, nor be called by other names of this kind, unless for the sake of him who is in need of mercy and pitying: thus also He would not be omnipotent unless every creature had need to be held and guarded by Him." And again in the first book: "Some names," he says, "signify useful to something, as helper, protector, succorer, and the rest which are found of the same signification: in which, if you take away him who is in need of help, the force which is discerned in the name itself will be empty." Whence it is made manifest that the names themselves are posterior to the eternity of God and were invented after man and the mind of man, and that it happens sometimes that the very nomination is superfluous if by chance you take away one who is in need of help. Finally, it is demonstrated through all things that, just as the mind discovered the names of other things, so also, having engaged with and having obtained, as it were, the matter of the names of God—those very effects and admirable things which it contemplates in the universe—following these and inquiring about God, it imposed the names. Those who first invented these declare this, whether they say that a certain very ancient Theuth, or some other person, was such. The Gentiles were thus far, and others educated in the dogmas of the Gentiles, who, beyond the mystery of our humanity which is in God and above nature, discovered and named other names of God, just as we do today. But because every name and notion was introduced from the beginning for the sake of use, but is referred to something, it has been said from whence divine names are taken and what they signify by themselves; but to what [thing] the subject refers, and what is signified by these names in such a way, will be manifest from those things which follow.

CAPUT VII. That just as divine names taken from effects represent the difference of operations, so when referred to God they cannot represent diverse things.

Basil the Great, in his epistle to Eustathius: "All," he says, "notions and names which befit God are of equal honor among themselves, insofar as in the signification of the subject thing they do not differ; for the appellation of 'good' does not lead the mind to one subject thing, and the appellation of 'wise', 'powerful', and 'just' to another: but rather, whatever names you may say, it is one thing that is signified, and if you say 'God', you have shown the same [being] whom you conceived in your mind through the rest of the names." From these, therefore, it is made manifest that the same divine names and the same notions are spoken of God, and when referred to God they represent no difference of the subject thing, and that the names of God have a triple cause: indeed the efficient [cause], the human mind itself; the material [cause], that from which they are gathered, that is, the effects; the final [cause], God, to whom they are referred.

DECAS IV.—ON THE INFORMATION OF THE DIVINE NAME. CAPUT VIII.

If divine names cannot represent distinct things in God, it remains that they declare only His substance, not what He is, but that He is.

Magnus Athanasius, teaching ^A (a) that the term *homoousios* was rightly used by the Fathers of the Nicene Council, says: When we hear, "I am who I am," and: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord," and: "Thus says the Lord Almighty," we understand nothing other than the simple and blessed substance, which cannot be comprehended, of Him who is. For although we cannot comprehend *what* He is, yet when we hear "Father" and "Almighty," we understand nothing other than the very substance of Him who is. And the same author again in the *Apologetic for the Nicene Synod*: If God is something simple, as He indeed is, when we speak of God and name the Father, we understand nothing as if it were accidental to Him, but we understand His very substance. And Gregory the Theologian (b): "O on," that is, "He who is," and "God," are in a certain way names of substance more than others; and of these, "He who is" is more so. And the same author again: "Are not Spirit, and Fire, O friend, and Wisdom, and Justice, and Mind, and Word, and other nominations of this kind, [names of] nature?" And again the same author against Evagrius: "But nomination," he says, "is useful, which leads us by necessity to the notion of those things which fall under the intellect." Some, however, while they opine crudely that the substance is divided along with the names, opine in their own minds what they conceive to be thoroughly unworthy of divine things. It is consistent with us, therefore, who are studious of the truth, to know that the divine and simple substance of God is impartible and of one form. ^B Likewise, Gregory Nyssenus: If, he says, the name "God" declares a person, when we say three persons, we necessarily say three gods; but if the name of God signifies substance, when we confess one substance of the holy Trinity, we consistently think of one God: since the name of God is the name of one substance. And also the great Basil: But if, he says, we posit that the substance of God is light, or life, or the whole good—that is, since He is life, He is whole light, and whole good, yet life has the unbegotten as a consequence—how is He not devoid of composition, who is simple according to substance? The same author also: The names of the great God indicate ^A nature. And Damascenus the Theologian: Divinity, he says, declares nature, but Father [declares] person. From which it is evident that when the theologians look at where the names of God are gathered for us, namely from those things which we behold as wonderful in the universe, and from the effects themselves, they say they represent the operation and the bringing-to-effect of God, and not *what* He is, and His substance itself; for after man existed, names were invented; indeed, the human mind invented these for its own use; but when they wish again to express the thing signified through these names, and we are referred to something, invoking God through these names, the subject thing is not divided, as notions are divided (for the substance of God is devoid of part, and indivisible); therefore, they affirm that they signify this very substance of God by these names, representing not *what* He is, but only *that* He is, just as is accustomed to happen in other names. For when we perchance ask whence the name *anthropos* (man) is derived, and what it signifies by itself, we affirm it to represent the force of *ana athrein*, that is, the faculty of looking above, or *ana threin ha opopen*, that is, the faculty of reflecting upon what one has seen, by a name devised by the human mind from a certain etymology and action regarding the thing. But when it has thus signified some named thing, we return to its definition, and what it is. It is therefore one thing what this name declares, and another thing again to what the thing so named by us pertains: and indeed names were invented by convention ^C (2), with the affections of the soul as guides; but things exist outside insofar as each one is. It is consistent, therefore, in every name to ask who first invented it, and whence the mind of man received it: and to what thing of those that are outside we are brought through names.

CAPUT IX. That divine names related to the thing itself, namely the substance of God, signify it properly, and not by catachresis: and that through each one of these names we declare the Trinity, which is above substance.

Saint Cyril in the *Thesauri* (c) says: "It was necessary to be silent, and to reply nothing to their so foolish argumentation." And a little later: "Wherefore if someone has named a man, because man is not this name entirely, [the name] which signifies man, as they argue, let him then understand something else, and not this entirely, which the name signifies: but if this is ^D understood according to the common manner of signifying, it signifies the nature without the hypostatic properties, and it is not predicated properly of the persons. For the Father is Father by divinity and paternity as by form and hypostatic property; and similarly in the others. (2) This says that names signify from an agreement, and the things that are in voice are signs of the affections that are in the soul. [Scholia by] S. Thomas. [The name] also signifies and declares the persons, and is predicated of them: but because it not only declares the person, but also one common nature not by thought alone, but in reality, therefore he who says three persons does not say three gods (as one who says three men) but one: but divinity, although it contains the persons, and is predicated of them according to reality, nevertheless because it signifies the nature without the hypostatic properties, it is not predicated properly of the persons.

^A It is said to be. And again the same: How, he says, is it said that something exists, which is not proven to exist even properly? For it is necessary, in those things where the proper existence is not certain, to be placed alongside opposing names; for what is not proper is utterly improper. Wherefore, when anyone argues that something does not exist properly, we demonstrate that it does not exist at all in itself. And blessed Dionysius in the second chapter of his *Divine Names*: And this, therefore, he says, has been examined and demonstrated by us in another place, that all divine names ^B do not signify God singularly, but in a whole, perfect, integral, and plenary manner.

Scholia.

(1) Divine names: From this passage it appears that it is not so, as some have thought, that divine names, according to Dionysius, are spoken of God only according to cause; such as "good," because He is the author of goodness; "wise," because He is the author of wisdom; and similarly in others. For if they were spoken of God thus, they would conclude in their intellect, as Saint Thomas says, the goodness of the creature; and consequently they would be said of the creature in the first place; as if God were called good and wise in the likeness of the good, to whom He gives goodness, and the wise, to whom He gives wisdom. But Dionysius did not think thus, that divine names are spoken of God only according to cause; but thus, that they are attributed to God primarily, as befitting Him; that is, unparticipatedly and essentially. For when Scripture says: *None is good, except God alone* (Mark x, 18), it is as if it said: No one is good by himself, that is, no one above participated goodness except God alone; for so the same Dionysius understood and interpreted in the second chapter of the *Divine Names* in the beginning, so that God is already called good and wise because goodness in Him excels and surpasses all created and participated goodness. Again, the same Dionysius says in the same place ^C that the divine names befitting God are attributed to the Divinity of the three persons unparticipatedly (*ἀμερίστως*), that is, not participatively; therefore fully, for whatever things are participated from God are participated from the fullness [of God], and consequently absolutely, perfectly, and in all ways, just as the divinity itself is in each of the three persons, total, perfect, integral, and plenary. Such divine names, which are rendered to God according to fullness and not according to participation, Dionysius calls *θεοπρεπῆ*, that is, names befitting God. If, therefore, they were spoken only according to cause, they would not be names befitting God, because, said thus, they include in themselves, as I said, only created participations, such as "good" for participated goodness, of which God is the author; "wise" for wisdom, of which God is the author; and other things in the same manner. Wherefore he contradicts and opposes Dionysius who says that divine names, according to Dionysius, are spoken of God only according to cause; for, said thus, they are not names befitting God, and consequently, accepted thus, they are not divine names. But with Dionysius as author, divine names befitting God belong to God absolutely, perfectly, integrally, and fully, that is, surpassing and eminently. From these things, therefore, it is clear that both are true: that divine names properly represent ^D the operation and not the divine nature when we consider the matter of them and whence these have been compared and collected by us; and again, they properly signify the substance of God when we are led to the very thing underlying the name itself. Saint Thomas also knew both of these things regarding the names that are spoken of God, p. 1, q. 13 art. 6, in these words: "It must be said that, as far as the thing signified by the name is concerned, they are spoken of God prior to creatures; because such perfections flow from God into creatures; but as far as the imposition of the name is concerned, they are imposed by us first on creatures, which we know first; whence they also have a mode of signifying which befits creatures." What Saint Thomas said: "As far as the imposition of the name is concerned, they are imposed by us first on creatures," this author Cyparissiota said: that divine names properly signify the operation when we consider the matter of them, whence they were collected; for we consider the matter of them, whence they were collected, when we consider creatures, which have the perfections of God participated and produced from God, by which participated perfections these names have been imposed by us to signify them properly; nevertheless, in this way, these names signify the operation primarily and properly—that is, the perfections created by God—when we impose them on creatures, and that they are not said of God thus properly and absolutely, but according to cause; this does not prevent them from being said of Him properly and absolutely for another reason, and not signifying the operation or cause, but rather the very substance of God. To this belongs the passage of Gregory of Nyssa cited, and the passage of Cyril; which, so that it may be better understood, must be repeated in its entirety; for thus says Cyril: "Are you then," say the heretics, "so unlearned, that you contend that the names imposed upon things are not something other than the things themselves? Behold, the heaven is the primary work of God, and its name is something else entirely; for the primary thing is not, moreover, the heaven itself as it is a visible thing, the name however is subjected not to the sight, but to the hearing; therefore the Son of God is called the Word, and yet He is not the Word as many understand, but something other essentially than a word." Cyril answers: "It was necessary to be silent, and to answer nothing to such reasonings, and yet, lest the simpler ones be seduced by these, we cannot be silent. We say, therefore, that words imposed upon things signify the essences of the things themselves, even if they are other than they: for a man, for example (this word I say) is something else than the man himself, and yet it signifies the very thing underlying the word; for if it did not signify the man himself, this name being heard, a man would not be understood, but something else, which is most foolish; therefore we must not understand anything other than what is signified by the word; and thus the insanity of the heretics vanishes. Or let Eunomius demonstrate to us that 'Word' is not the proper name of the Son of God." And a little later, ch. 3: "To this, the Word is called Son in Scripture, and the foolish man Eunomius understands the utterance of a voice, being ignorant that the word is taken from our custom; for the Father speaks ineffably to the Son; for the Son has naturally perfect knowledge of the Father's will, nor does He await a word, since

^A divinity is praised by the holy Scriptures, and it itself refers all things, imparticipably, absolutely, without the observation of any difference, universally, to the totality of the perfection and of the whole divinity: since, as we remembered in the divine information of the divine persons, unless one were to say that this name refers to the whole divinity, he dares indeed to distract and disparage the divinity, which is above what is one and simple. From these things, therefore, it is clear that both are true: that divine names represent the operation properly, and not the divine nature, when we consider the matter of them, and whence these have been compared and gathered by us; and again, that they also signify the substance of God properly, which is, yet not *what* it is, when from each name we are led to the subject thing itself; and through these names we invoke the blessed and supersubstantial Trinity.

CAPUT X.

Magnus Dionysius, in the first chapter *On the Divine Names*: Since theologians knew this, they praise God both as being without a name, and as being away from every name, as if [he were] without a name, as when they say, in one of the mystic visions of the symbolic apparition of God, that he who had said, "What is thy name?" had been rebuked by God; and, as if drawing [him] away from every divine name, He had said, "Why do you ask about my name?" And this is wonderful. Is this not truly a wonderful name, I say a name which is above every name, which is without a name, which is placed above every name, which is named whether in this age or in the future? But they make use of many names, as when they introduce God Himself, saying: "I am who I am": life, light, God, truth; and when the wise praise God Himself, the maker of all things, from all [His] effects; as good, as beautiful, as wise, as beloved, as the God of gods, as the Lord of lords, as the Holy of holies, as eternal, as Him who is, and as the author of the ages, as the giver of life, as wisdom, as mind, as the Word, as the one who knows, as having superlatively all the treasures of all knowledge; as power, as powerful; as King of kings, as the Ancient of days, as the one who does not grow old.

Scholia.

^A and immutable, as salvation, as justice, as sanctification, as redemption, as surpassing all things in greatness; and as in a gentle breeze. And yet they say he is in minds, and in souls, and in bodies, and in heaven, and in earth, and at once the same in the same, in the world, around the world, above the world, above heaven, above substance, as sun, star, fire, water, spirit, dew, cloud, and as stone itself, a rock, [as] all things that are, and none of those things that are. So, therefore, it is fitting for him who is the cause of all things, and above all things, to be without a name; and yet it is fitting that all names of all things [be attributed to him], so that he may be perfectly the realm of the universality of things, and all things be around him, and all things depend upon him as from a cause, a principle, and an end, and he himself be, as Scripture says, all in all. From these, therefore, it becomes manifest that God himself is both of no name and of many names: of no name, indeed, insofar as what he is, but of many names, insofar as he is proved to be from those things which he made. That which follows from what has been demonstrated does not conflict; for it is true that the human mind discovers names for God, using the wonderful things, which it observes and contemplates in the universe, in place of matter; and therefore, by leading itself to one subject matter, namely to God himself, it is recalled to the information of that thing which it seeks.

Therefore, that we may summarize these things and review them according to the exposition of the subjects: first, it was demonstrated ^B how the human mind conceived names for God; and for this reason this treatise on the names of God is called *noētē*, that is, pertaining to the intellect. Second, it was demonstrated that God is praised from his effects. Third, what the effects are, and what their matter is. Afterwards, it was asked how God is named from his effects, and not from those things which are of his nature. This doubt having been solved, there was a question and doubt in the fifth chapter as to why God is invoked for us by not a few names; then, having known again the manifold and varied usage of naming God, and the multitude of names having been granted, we are led to the sixth chapter, again doubting whether names are attributed to God from eternity; but after we have heard that names were invented after the things themselves, and were imposed after man, we arrive at contemplating those things of the seventh chapter; which is, namely, that just as we represent the variety of operations by a variety of names, so by various names related to God we cannot understand the variety of the subject things. However, after it was shown that many things are said of one subject, the eighth chapter necessarily followed, namely that there is no other subject in God except his divine and blessed substance, which in the ninth place we learned to be properly named, not inquiring curiously what he is, but only what he is; to put an end to the decade, the tenth chapter followed, in which it was concluded from what had been demonstrated ^C that the same and one God to us both lacks a name, and is of many names: the former, that is, being completely without a name, insofar as what he is; but the latter, insofar as he only exists; for thus he is called by infinite names from those things which he produced.

Therefore, the theologians have left out nothing of those things which it was necessary to know here; and the decade was rightly inscribed, *On the Information of the Divine Name*; for we were not enumerating the properties of divine names, but were arranging the material exposition of them handed down by the theologians; for we shall speak next about them briefly and as concisely as may be possible. We have shown above in how many ways the divine name is treated, having divided them in threefold manner: the information of names, and whence they are taken, and to what these names lead us and perfect us; other things have fallen in [as needed] in accordance with these things which we were seeking.

Scholia.

As justice, as sanctification, as redemption (1 Cor. 1). As in a gentle breeze (3 Kings 19). And yet they say he is in minds (Eph. 3: for Paul there calls hearts ^D minds). And in souls (Wis. 7: And into holy souls, he says, he transfers himself). And in bodies (1 Cor. 6, and 1 Thess. 5: That your whole spirit, and soul, and body may be preserved without blame; but this is done by God dwelling in the mind, and in the soul, and in the body; Paul here called the mind 'spirit'; and 2 Cor. 6: And I will dwell in them, namely in minds, and souls, and bodies). And in heaven, and in earth (Jer. 23). And at once the same in the same. (The same Dionysius explains this in chapter 9, about the great, and the small, and the same, etc.). In the world (John 1). Around the world (Eccli. 41). Above the world (Isa. 66). Above heaven and above substance (Ps. 113: His glory above the heavens). Sun (Malach. 4). Star (Apoc. last). Fire (Deut. 4). Water (John 7). Spirit (John 4). Dew (Osee 14). Cloud (Osee 6). As stone itself *autolithon* (Ps. 80. For to be the foundation of proper power, and in itself, belongs to Christ because of his divinity, which is one and the same in three persons, which he made in Christ himself, the chief cornerstone, to which it belongs to be *autolithon*). Rock (1 Cor. 10. Therefore B. Peter (so that we may everywhere withstand the heretics of our time) is the rock of the Church, as the Gospel testifies; yet he is not *autolithos*, nor *autopetra*, that is, a stone or rock in and of itself; nor if he is ever called so in Scripture, as Christ our God, who is thus *autos*, that is, the foundation in and of himself, besides which no one can lay another foundation that is a foundation in itself, as the Apostle says: for he speaks of this as the foundation in and of itself).

FIFTH DECADE — CHAPTER I. ON THE PROPERTIES OF DIVINE NAMES.

What things are to be observed in the individual properties of the divine names.

Magnus Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of *On the Divine Names*, says: "We shall comment only as far as the reason of the proposition demands; for the intention is not to open up and declare what the substance is that is above substance, as far as it is above substance (for this cannot be said, and it is unknown, and it cannot be fully expressed, and it surpasses the union of the mind itself), but rather the intention is to praise the deifying substance, and the principle of all substance, that is the maker of the substances that emanate into all things that are." Since the name of "Good" from God declares all the emanations of the substance and the maker of life, and the cause that grants wisdom to those that participate in substance, life, mind, reason, and senses, this treatise of ours does not say that the Good is one thing, and the Existent another, and Life or Wisdom another, nor does it posit many causes and other divinities that are makers of other things, superior and inferior; but that the emanations of the one God are all good, and the nominations of God lauded by us, and that indeed there is one nomination which declares the whole providence of the one God, while others make manifest the more and less general providences. From which it becomes manifest ^A to bring forth, that is, to express and subtly recount, insofar as the substance that is above substance has its nature and seat and foundation, and is the absolute author of all things, and this nomination is extended ^B by God both to those things that are and to those things that are not; and it is above those things that are, and above those things that are not. The name of "Life" from God is extended to all living things, and is above living things; the nomination of God from "Wisdom" is extended to all things that understand ^C, that reason, that perceive; and it is above all these things. Therefore, the intention is to celebrate these nominations of God, which reveal the providences of God; for our treatise does not promise to clarify and open up the goodness of God, which is above substance, nor the substance and wisdom of the divinity, which is above what is above substance, and which is above all goodness and divinity and substance and life and wisdom, which is, as Scripture says, in secret*; but rather it celebrates with praises the manifested providence, the maker of good things, the most excellent goodness, and the cause of all good things; and the Existent, and Life, and Wisdom, which is—as I have said—that which comes to us through full ignorance and silence on all sides. Hence it is not now our discourse concerning that, nor is it our intention to explain how goodness above substance is, in itself, substance, or life, or wisdom, and all other things that our God is believed to be in himself, but rather I say that the nomination of God, which declares the things that are around him, is the order of things, and providence, and the apt disposition of the universe. This, therefore, is our intention in this treatise: to praise God from his emanation into all things as the maker and deifier of all things; for the external providence of God toward us, and the emanations in those things which he produced, are effected, and the emanation, or providence, that is the maker of substance, is called the very making of substance, the maker of goodness, the very enactment of good things. ^D Θεαρχική καὶ θεαρχία (Thearchic and Thearchy), the principle of deification, just as death is praised as being *thearchic*, that is...

life and received God (a). Therefore, from Providence, the producer of good things shown in creatures, we must praise the super-abundant goodness and the cause of all good things, the very God Himself. For it has been demonstrated that not only we, but not even the angels, can reach the nature which God possesses; however, in so far as He made all things out of nothing, He is to be praised by us. Wherefore, in the individual properties of the divine names, one must attend to the origins of the things of the universe, and the emanations concerning them, and from thence derive and celebrate the praises of God, and inquire what property each naming of God has obtained. But as for what the goodness of God is, or His substance, or life, or wisdom, or another thing according to His nature, we must fundamentally beware of inquiring; for to seek to express the substance of God is just as if one wished to express His life, or wisdom, or power, or goodness. It remains, therefore, that God be praised from the life which He produced, and likewise from the wisdom, but not from the life or the wisdom which God Himself is. Furthermore, it is clear from these points, since we are later to hear about principles, and participations, and participations *per se*, and, individually, life *per se*, wisdom *per se*, essence *per se*, just as Dionysius admonishing and forewarning says: It is necessary, he says, to observe that in naming of this kind one must not assume that one thing is good, and another is *existent*, and another is life or wisdom, nor that there are many causes, nor other divinities producing others, superior and inferior; but that all are the good emanations of the one God according to the names of God praised by us; and one thing, indeed, which declares the universal providence of the one God—namely, the name of "good"—while other names are emanations more or less general, as the very progression of the discussion will declare. Moreover, this must be observed, that when we hear of "goodness above all goodness" and "divinity above divinity," we must not ^B imagine there is a super-abundance in His own goodness and divinity; for it is most alien to reason to think that God is superior to Himself, because, rather, as the holy Maximus explained the words of Dionysius, Note, he says, that it is rightly said here that goodness is above all goodness and divinity: understand, therefore, the inferior divinities to be those of the angels and of just men. And in general we must observe, as Dionysius said again, that it is alien to reason and absurd to think that one should not attend to the force of the object proposed, but to the words only; for this is not the property of those who wish to understand divine things, but of those who perceive only sounds, and keep these indeed outside the ears, and do not allow them to penetrate into them.

CHAPTER II. On goodness and the beautiful; and where they are joined, and in what they are distinguished, and what their property is.

Dionysius, in the fourth chapter, *On the Divine Names*, says: Come, he says, let us proceed to the name itself of "good," which, exempted from all things, the theologians attribute to the divinity above divinity, calling, as I think, goodness itself the divine essence, the origin, that is, of created divinity: and because God is so good in His essence that He extends goodness to all things, as if He were the substantial good. Noting this passage, Maximus says: He calls God Himself "the Substantial Good"; and a little later: God, he says, does not have goodness from accident as a certain quality, just as we have virtues; but rather, God Himself is the substance of the good, just as light is the substance of the sun (2). The same Dionysius, chapter four, *On the Divine Names*: This "good," he says, is praised by the sacred theologians as "the beautiful," and as "beauty," and as "love," and as "the beloved," and whatever other divine names exist, by which He Himself, as the illustrious ornament and effector of beauty, is decently named. But "the beautiful" and "beauty" are not to be distinguished in the cause which has comprehended all things in one; for these, dividing in all things into participations and participants, the beautiful ^C and the joined, which is called an accident, neither as an animal, just as if it were endowed with a soul, receives light within by a will to benefit, and distributes it to all things (for rather on the contrary, it is neither animated, nor has a will to benefit; for it lacks reason, nor does it receive light from elsewhere; for it is this very light, and it illuminates), so in God one must understand that God, namely, does not have good joined to Him as a certain quality, as we have virtues, but rather God Himself is the substance of the good itself, just as light is the substance of the sun; and as He who is the very good, He extends the radiance of goodness to all things. Thus far S. Maximus, who, when he says that light—which is otherwise a quality—is the substance of the sun, speaks in the manner of philosophers, who refer the property of any nature to that category to which that nature belongs: as the same holy Maximus noted in *The Divine Names*.

^A Indeed we say that it is a participant of beauty, but the participation of beauty we attribute to the cause that makes all things beautiful. In which place the holy Maximus says: "God is called beautiful in the Song of Songs, and David: *Fair in form above the sons of men*." Beauty and the beautiful are spoken of because there is a distinction in things between participants and the participated, but not so in God: for the Greek *kalon*, that is, beautiful, is said both because He gives beauty to all, and because He calls all things to Himself; and again, *kalon* as *aei on*, that is, beautiful as ever-existing, according to the etymology of the Greek name, as it never diminishes nor increases. In the same place also Dionysius says: "Wherefore the same is beautiful and good, since all things according to every cause seek the beautiful and the good (3)": and there is nothing in the nature of things that does not participate in the beautiful and the good: I shall even dare to say this, that it is not that which does not participate in the beautiful and the good, for then it is the beautiful and the good itself, when in God it is praised above substance by removing all things (4).

But that the beautiful and the good are the same in God, who is above substance; and that these things which declare the substance of God, which is the source of deification, pertain to Him through the divine names of the beautiful and the good: and that, regarding those things which are in God, they are not distinguished into participants and participated, is evident from the consensus of the theologians. Yet in those things in which goodness is distinguished, and through it the beautiful—and which are distinguished in the creature, and what the property of those names is—let this be manifest from these things. The synod against the Manichaeans held by bishop Caron, which is cited in the *Panaria*, says: "Goodness in God is substance, but in creatures it is an accident." And the same in the same place: "For goodness, which is seen in the universe, receives intension and remission as an accident." And Dionysius in the thirteenth chapter *Of the Divine Names*: "Nor do we fit the name of goodness itself to the Divinity as if it were fitting, but from a desire of understanding and saying something about that hidden and ineffable nature, which is the most venerable of all names, we first consecrate it to Him." Where the holy Maximus says: "For this reason, the name of good or beautiful is not properly accommodated to God, because these are found in things: so you will also find it said above, that these passions—

^B and accidents—are considered in things, which is not so in God, who excels all things. Again the same: "With a desire of understanding and saying something about God, the theologians attributed the name of good to Him, for God is properly more than good, and more than substance, and goodness is a name of veneration." Again, the same, dwelling on those things which are in the fourth chapter of the same *Divine Names*: "The good, he says, and the beautiful, which is in all things, is not that first beautiful and good of all, by participation in which all things are beautiful and good, for that which is beautiful and good in things is not substance, nor a genus of substance, but an accident, which has a similarity somewhat joined." From which it is evident, how goodness and the beautiful itself are coupled in God; and the same is good and beautiful, while outside God, and in His creatures, they are discrete, and passions and accidents are numbered. We also understand the property of these things, if we mark what the supreme theologian Dionysius says: "The name of good, he says, which declares the universal emanations of the author of all things, extends and reaches to those things which are, and those which are not; and it is above all things which are, and which are not: if then the good is the same as the beautiful, it will have a property fully common with it; and the property of the beautiful will be to extend to those things which are, and which are not. For because of the beautiful and the good all things were produced, or rather because of these very things—I say the beautiful and the good—also those things which are not ^C are produced, since one sun was made on account of the good and the beautiful, and the other sun which does not exist was not made on account of the good and the beautiful: therefore the two were not made on account of the same goodness and beauty. For if we cannot endure one sun in its heat, if there were two, who would not be consumed? Therefore, on account of goodness and beauty, even that which is not was not made." At the same time it is demonstrated that all names in God are not divided into participants and participated: but outside God, when there is talk of emanations, then both participations, and passions, and accidents are reckoned: just as motion in moving things, and operations in effects; nor are such things called substances, because as was demonstrated before, then they are, when they come to be.

Scholia.

CHAPTER III. On love, and charity, and what their property is.

The great Dionysius, in the fourth chapter ^A *On the Divine Names*: "Let those," he says, "hear who malign the name of love: 'Love her and she shall keep you; hedge her about, and she shall exalt you; honor her, that she may embrace you' (Prov. iv, 6); and whatever other things are celebrated in the amatory discourses about God." And yet it has seemed good to certain of our interpreters of the sacred Scriptures that the name of "love" is more divine than the name of "charity." For the divine Ignatius writes: "My love has been crucified." And in those things which prepare the way for the Scriptures (1), you will find someone saying of divine wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty" (Sap. viii, 2). Wherefore let us not fear the name of love on account of this, nor let any discourse about this name move or terrify us, for it seems to me that the theologians have indeed thought the name of love and charity to be common, but have attributed true love to the divine Scriptures on account of the base anticipation of the mind in men of this sort. For since true love is praised not only by us, but by the holy Scriptures themselves, as is becoming to God, the common herd of men, not having perceived that one thing which is the divine name of love, is also said otherwise, and this also participates in the good, ^B because it has fallen away to a partible and corporeal and distracted love, which is not true love, but an image, or rather a fall from true love; for the multitude cannot grasp in thought that singular love, divine and one: wherefore, as a name which commonly seems harsher, it is placed in divine wisdom, so that the multitude may be elevated and raised up to the knowledge of true love; and in us, in turn, where frequently men stuck to the earth might think something absurd, a name is placed which seems more honest: "My love," says someone, "fell upon me, as the love of women" (2), since sacred theologians use the name of charity and love according to divine utterances, so that they may have the same force among those who hear divine things rightly. Moreover, there is a divine ecstatic love, which does not allow those who are lovers to be their own, but [property] of those whom they love. Whence the divine Paul, ^C seized by this divine love, and made a participant of the ecstatic force, says with a divine mouth: "I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me" (Gal. ii, 20); as a true lover, and one who has stepped out of himself unto God (3), and no longer living his own life, but living that of the beloved as vehemently dear. What, then, do the theologians finally wish to signify, who call love and charity itself (4)?

Scholia.

(1) He understands the divine Scripture of Solomon, as St. Maximus says; whence it is written: "I became a lover of her beauty" (Wisdom viii). From which it is clear that it is false what some have written, that Philo is the author of the Book of Wisdom, which then, when Dionysius wrote these things, was not yet held among the canonical Scriptures, when clearly in this place Dionysius seems to enumerate them among the divine Scriptures, which he calls *proeisagogas*, that is, to express word for word, preceding introductions to the Scriptures; and again a little later calls the sacred Scriptures in Greek *ta logia*, in which the name of love is found; ^D but it is also found even in Wisdom, from which the same Dionysius had produced authority (Wisdom vi). But it must be explained why Dionysius called the books of Solomon *proeisagogas*, which indeed can be understood from the thing itself, when he designates the books of the holy Scripture of the Old and New Testament from the meaning and notation of the arguments of each book in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, ch. [?]. For he says: "Either Scripture sets forth the precepts of the actions of life; he understood the moral books of Solomon: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom, and the book of the Wisdom of Sirach, which is called Ecclesiasticus," he added: "Or the canticles of divine loves, and divine images;" he understood the Canticle of Canticles, which are written by the same Solomon through symbols and images. Since, therefore, the holy discipline of living well and from virtue, which is handed down in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom of Solomon, and in Ecclesiasticus, is necessary for understanding the holy Scriptures, which are not understood without faith, and faith without the study of virtue is wont to be lost, as the Apostle wrote in I Tim., chapter 1. Which some rejecting—namely, a good conscience, of which he had spoken—have made shipwreck concerning faith. And Wisdom, ch. 1: "Into a malicious soul," he says, "wisdom will not enter; nor dwell in a body subject to sins;" whence Paul admonishing Timothy: "Attend," he says, "to yourself, and to doctrine" (1 Tim. iv, 16); for he said to you before, that the virtue of the teacher, and a virtuous life, should lead into the way of teaching rightly as a guide; therefore, as it seems to me, Dionysius called the moral books of Scripture, which I mentioned, *proeisagogas*, that is, (to express the whole force of the word) preceding introductions to the perception of the wisdom of the Scriptures. The great Athanasius wrote excellently in the final page of the book *on the Incarnation of the Word*: "He who desires to attain the intelligence of the theologians, ought first to wash and cleanse his soul, and approach them through similarity of life and morals."

(2) "As the love of women." The words of David mourning the death of Jonathan. Which foolish men, says Theodoretus, criticize, when David here, to signify the vehemence of his love and charity toward Jonathan, took likeness and example from the most intimate love of wife and husband; which is so great, that the conjugal law says: "For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," which thing Elcana also signified, when consoling his wife, "Am not I," he said, "better to you than ten sons?" Therefore as the connubial conjunction makes the spouses one, so charity couples the souls of those who truly love one another into one. Thus far Theod.

(3) "And has stepped out of himself unto God." St. Maximus observed here how this place is understood, which the Apostle says, II Cor. v: "Whether we are beside ourselves, it is for God!" Namely, it is understood, as Dionysius accepted it, of the ecstatic love of Paul, which he described in his epistle to the Galatians, saying in chapter 2: "I live now not I, but Christ lives in me"; thus also S. Diadochus understood the place of Paul, in the book *On Spiritual Perfection*, ch. 14. Concerning this ecstatic love, St. Maximus noted in the same place that what is in Ps. CXV is understood: "I said in my excess," that is, in the ecstatic love of God.

(4) "And charity." Here Dionysius interprets what John says in his epistle, ch. IV, "God is charity or love"; for He himself is the author and generator of love and charity, who produced these things which were in Him outward, that is, creatures, moved by charity. So it is said (says St. Maximus)

^A that He calls God the emitter and parent of affection and love: for He Himself brought forth these things, which were in Him, into those things which are outside, that is, concerning the creatures. The same author says in the same place: The amatory motion existing first in the Good, simple, mobile in itself, operating in itself, afterwards proceeding by external providences into the creatures, returns again to the same, so that it is without beginning: which indeed declares our desire for God. Note, however, how he speaks of a circle in the Good, with it proceeding into those things which fall under the intellect and the senses, and again converting them to Himself, and neither ceasing nor ending. And again the same Dionysius in the same chapter. And this, he says, we truly dare to say: that He who is the cause of all things, because of the excellence of His goodness, loves all things, perfects all things, contains all things, and converts all things to Himself; and the divine love is the good of the Good because of the Good; for divine love itself, which operates goodness in those things that are, because it existed first in the Good superlatively, did not allow itself to remain in itself without fruit, but rather moved itself to operate according to the excellence of its virtue, which is the producer of all things. In which place St. Maximus wondrously says that good love, which existed before all things in the Good, did not remain without fruit, but rather brought forth for us good love, through which we seek the beautiful and the good. Observe ^B from this the divine motion, for love, the producer of goods, moved God to provide for us, and to constitute us, so that when He was moved, He produced, and did not remain devoid of fruit. Hence it becomes manifest that the name of divine and venerable love was celebrated by the theologians from the beginning; and that the name of love and charity is the same and has the same power, and that there is also distinct divine love, which does not allow its lovers to be their own, but [to be of those] whom they love; and that the providences are outside of God, and according to ^C

Scholia. God is charity, because of the creatures which He produced; He is otherwise God, lest anyone think this is taken away: absolute charity itself, by itself, is superlative, not created, but the creator of all things.

...[one] makes the second property of charity, which is that it causes him who has love or charity to tend toward Him, towards whom he has the charity, contrary to what cognition does, which draws the known thing to the knower; but love draws the lover to Him whom he loves; the third property is that the motion of charity is simple, because it is the first motion of the appetite: and the first in any kind ought to be simple, because the others in that kind exist composite from it; the fourth property is that it is mobile in itself, because in any kind that which is by itself is prior to that which is through another; whence in the kind of the motion of the desirer, it is necessary that the first motion, which is love, be mobile in itself, whence fear, because it is like a violent motion approaching from the outside, is not in charity, as blessed John says (1 John iv), but perfect charity casts out fear, because charity is a motion proceeding from within, as St. Thomas says; the fifth property is to operate by itself, which is proper to charity, in which it differs from hope, for he who operates for the sake of hope for another, operates for the sake of something else, but he who (says St. Thomas) operates out of love, operates through itself as if this pleased him. It is advantageous to know what charity effects, and what its properties are, in order to recognize its excellence and preeminence over faith alone, which heretics vainly boast of, not understanding what they say, ^D [when they speak of] the amatory.

(6) Motion. Inasmuch as love and charity flow from God Himself to the creatures, the author of love and charity is said to be moved; but insofar as He Himself is lovable and worthy of being loved, He moves and stirs all things to love, in which the power of loving is conveniently implanted.

^A And God Himself is also outside of Himself, revolving in an unceasing turn like a circle; and because God existed in God as love, simple, of Himself mobile, of Himself operating, and because His divine and blessed substance existed, for this reason the whole Trinity, which is suprasubstantial, which is love and sweetness and desire, did not permit Itself to remain within Itself without fecundity, but rather moved Itself to make and to create. Therefore, the external providences of God are nothing other than creature and creation; and from these it becomes clearly known to us that every creature has God as producer and generator, for when He held these things within Himself, He brought them forth outside, that is, around the creatures: wherefore the name of love and affection returns into one and the same with the beautiful and the good; and since they are in God, and are referred to the same, they represent His divine and blessed substance, which is so much; but when they are outside of God, they end in the business of the creature; therefore, they are considered and numbered as passions and accidents around it. It appears also through these things that the reason for love and affection pertains to the property of these names, for it is the same as the reason for goodness and beauty. For God produced all things on account of excellent love; and on account of the same love, He did not produce things that are not, while He took care, in producing, not to injure anything of those things which He loved. It may also be understood that something is even more specifically proper, namely, that the divine goodness proceeds to infinity, but the divine love revolves like a circle; for it begins to operate indeed from Himself, then through those things which He produced, remaining in His providences outside, it returns again to Himself.

CHAPTER IV

The great Dionysius in the fifth chapter, *Of the Divine Names*: "Come," he says, "let us praise the Good as that which truly is and causes the substances of all things, and according to Its power which is above substance, ^B truly the effector of existence, of person, of substance, of nature; likewise the principle, and the measure of ages and times, and It makes the ages and times to be: It is the age of those things which are: the time of those things which come to be; It is being for those things which are in any way whatsoever; it is generation in any way whatsoever for those born from Him who is; age, substance, and one: and time, and generation, and what is begotten: It is these things which are in those things which are; and which exist in any way whatsoever, and which exist of themselves. For God is not in such a way that He is in some manner, but He embraces all being simply and infinitely within Himself." And a little later: "And before His other participations, being was produced, and it is being itself *per se* more ancient than life *per se*, and wisdom *per se*, and divine likeness *per se*, and other things, the participation of which those that have them participate in being before the participation of all those things: indeed, those things which are participated in by those things that are, participate in being itself *per se*; and there is nothing of which its substance and its age is not being *per se*. Since God, therefore, is, as is consonant, more primordial than all other things, He is praised from His more ancient gift, since He has being prior and more excellent, and prior and more excellent He made that which is, I say, being *per se*, and through Him He made everything that is in any way whatsoever to exist." And yet the principles of those things which are, all participate in being, and they are, and they are principles; and they are first, and afterwards they are principles, and if you wish to call the principle of those that live, insofar as they live, life *per se*, and of those that are similar, insofar as they are similar, likeness *per se*: and of those joined, insofar as they are joined, union *per se*; and of those ordered, insofar as they are ordered, order *per se*: and similarly in others, whatever this, or that, or both, or many participate in? And this, or that, or both, or many are participated in, you will find.

^A For if these things, which are reckoned as principles of others, exist by participation, much more so do those things which themselves participate in those principles. Therefore, the first gift of existing *per se*, since goodness produces it *per se*, is deservedly praised as the earlier and the first of all participations. And a little later: "But if Clement the philosopher wishes to call the things that are more fundamental in reality 'exemplars,' he proceeds indeed by speaking in this way, not through proper and perfect and simple names (1): but if we concede that this is said rightly, we must remember the Scripture, which says: *See that you do not show them to you* (2), *as you would after them*; but that we might be led, according to the proportion of our knowledge of these things, toward knowing the cause of all things, so far as we are able." Remarking on this, S. Maximus says, "God imposed this name upon Himself when He said: *I am who I am* (3); by which it is consistently praised before others which are said of Him, such as the name of life, of wisdom, and others of that kind; but that *being*, and *being above being*, declared Him to be God, lacking a beginning, and that God is entirely understood ^B by intelligence in an ineffable way, as He Himself encompasses all things in Himself, and has made all things to be, as it were, in an exemplar and idea, entirely within Himself; for the mind immediately thinks of this first notion, namely *being*, and afterward contemplates it as being in this or that or another way." Therefore, He declared *being* simply, and not *being* in some way, when He said *being per se*, just as He subsequently spoke of *life per se*, *likeness per se*, and other things of that kind; for to be life absolutely, and to live simply, does not signify this particular life; and similarly in other things: just as, for example (4), in qualities, internal qualities exist *per se* first, and afterward accidents operate; in this way, by proportion, it must be understood in the things we have spoken of. Likewise, the same Maximus says in the first chapter: "God made the creation of life and the creation of substance, that is, the things themselves, to exist." Therefore, we first form in the mind the notion of the thing itself; afterward the universal notion of that thing, as the notion of life or substance considered universally; then we accept it by part, that is, the notion according to individual species, as of life, or of angelic or human substance, or of the rest in the universal species. Furthermore, in the fifth chapter, the same author speaks of participations, which the things that are participate in.

Scholia

(1) *Not by proper and perfect and simple names*, that is, *per se being* and *per se life*; and *per se wisdom*, and similar things which are principles and causes of those things which exist, which live, and which are endowed with wisdom, cannot properly be called exemplars; because the things of which these are the principles do not come to be so as to imitate those very principles, but come to be so that what divine Wisdom ordained might be fulfilled in them, that is, what was in the divine idea and exemplar; they are not even perfect exemplars, since they themselves require other exemplars; they are not simple, because they are simultaneously exemplar to the things formed (which are commonly called exemplata) and exemplars, according to Saint Thomas. ^C (2) *Dionysius cites not according to the letter, but according to the sense*, that is, not according to the words but according to the meaning; thus the apostolic disciples learned from the holy apostles to cite Scripture at times, just as the holy apostles themselves sometimes do, for thus says the Scripture: *Look, and do according to the exemplar, which was shown to you on the mountain* (Exod. xxv, 40). When he says, "Look, and do according to the exemplar (or exemplars, for there was not one exemplar but many) shown to you on the mountain," he quite clearly says: "I showed you the exemplar or exemplars, not that you should worship them (for this was the error: to go after them, to worship them, and to hold them as gods), but that you might have the exemplars for doing according to them the things that are to be done in the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the priests and their sacrifices, and in other things," for the law had a shadow of future good things, namely spiritual ones, which were indeed shown to Moses in the spirit, the images of which exemplars were all the things that were done in the law, as the same Dionysius says on the last page of chapter 4 of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Since, therefore, Clement saw *ta noēta*, that is, the spiritual things shown to Moses, called in the Scripture of Exodus *paradeigmata*, which are directed toward something, because they are referred to images (for an exemplar is said of an image, and an image of an exemplar), in a similar way Clement wished that the things which are more fundamental in reality be called exemplars, which are referred to something, namely to those things of which they are principles, as causes to effects, and effects to causes. If Clement accepted it in this way, as he clearly seems to have accepted it, he accepted it rightly; and thus also these more fundamental things, which he calls exemplars, have been created, just like those spiritual exemplars shown to Moses on the mountain, not indeed as those divine exemplars which are uncreated and eternal, invisible to God, and to be worshipped, which are God Himself, most simple, but as exemplars created and divinely informed to the mind of Moses, so that according to them he might do what God commanded him, which were all images faintly and obscurely ^D shadowing forth those exemplars. Others have noted that this place cited by Dionysius is taken from Deut. ch. iv; but it fits on no account. I have followed George Pachymeres, who referred it to that place in Exodus xxv, which I said was cited by Dionysius according to the sense, as apostles and holy Fathers are accustomed to do at times; likewise, Dionysius cited in the same place the passage from the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 1: *His invisible things are perceived from the creation of the world by the things that have been made*; he cited, I say, this passage according to the sense, which is, as Dionysius says, that by the proportion of our knowledge of creatures we are led, as far as we are able, to knowing the cause of all things. Therefore, when he said: *His invisible things* (to observe this in passing), Paulus clearly seems to have understood those eternal exemplars in God, which are called ideas, according to which He knows all things through His most simple essence, and made all things as if through the principle and cause of all things, and is all things, as the cause of all things.

(3) *Life*, when life is considered absolutely; so that the whole consideration is of life, not insofar as it is of all things, or of particulars, that is, it is not considered generally, nor particularly; but simply life, which is called life *per se*.

(4) *By way of example*, [the case of whiteness] coming to a body makes the body white, and after it happens to the body, it separates the vision, which is its proper operation.

^A Such is "being-in-itself," "life-in-itself," "wisdom-in-itself," "order-in-itself," and the rest; these "participations" are indeed divine gifts, which he has called the principles of those things which exist. From these, therefore, it is clear that just as God, according to His power or virtue which is beyond substance, is the efficient and creative cause of all being and of its parts—existence, person, substance, nature, or age and time—if God is the effector of all being, there is no doubt that He is the effector of its parts, and that He fully accomplishes the whole; and the whole is "being," which the mind informs at the first notion. According to this first notion, we contemplate genera in our arguments; then we set forth the parts of the whole in order, and just as logically from genera we proceed to species, so it is with "being-in-itself," that is, the whole being; and that which the mind aims its strength at first to understand is more ancient than the others which the mind contemplates afterward. For we cannot contemplate life in itself, or wisdom, or likeness, unless we posit "being" first, for life is a primary thing; and then, contemplating these in themselves, we call them, *to ti esti*, "life-in-itself." If, therefore, "life-in-itself" and "wisdom-in-itself" and "likeness-in-itself" and the rest are placed under "being," and God is the author of the whole of being, how will He not be the author of these things which are called "in themselves," whether they are invoked as existents, or as motions, or as the formation of life, the formation of substance, the imitation of likeness, and the rest? For God first made the beings themselves, and afterwards the general notion of them, such as contemplating life or substance in every genus and in every way. From these things the opinion of Dionysius has become better known: that just as God is the author of those things which are singular, so He is also of those things which are primary, from which he solves the hesitation of Clement the philosopher concerning those things that exist more principally in reality—that is, concerning their natures—by two authorities of Scripture. One is: "I will not show these to you, that you may follow after them"; the other is: "The invisible things of God from the things that are made are understood, being perceived, for the effector is considered from the magnitude and beauty of the creatures." For this signifies what he said, that through the proportion of the knowledge of these things we are brought to the knowledge of the cause of all. Yet how does it not clearly reveal, in solving the doubt, that those things that are in this way more principal in things are created? And he concedes they are called "likenesses" to something, so that through them, in a certain proportion, we might perceive divine things as if through mirrors and enigmas. From those things also which were demonstrated before, it appears that it belongs to "propriety"—for in them, namely in the good and the beautiful, the propriety of the name of the good and the beautiful is extended to those things which are and those which are not; but in these, only to those things which are is the divine name *tou ontos*, that is, of the Existent, extended—and this is its propriety. Note, however, this too, that we say "being" ^B is the first participation, and a certain divine or angelic [gift]; he says ^C that it is more ancient than other divine gifts *tou ontos*, that is, of the Existent; since goodness does not have a similar rationale in the order of gifts, because it is extended and reaches above those things which are. Furthermore, there can be the propriety of that which is "being-in-itself," because God produced this before other things that are. Then, by using this "being-in-itself" as a kind of nature, He produced the universe, however it is. Besides this, other principles of things can never be without "being-in-itself," but this [principle] is without them. Then, by participation in this, others are called participations, and are called "participations-in-themselves," and are said to be and to remain. But with this taken away, there will be no participation; then even "being-in-itself," which is the first participation, is participated in by nothing before it, but all things after it participate [in it], and become participations for others below. These things, however, hold no small question: how Dionysius [speaks] with a warning. If you wish, he says, to speak of "life-in-itself" as the principle of the living, insofar as it is manifest that these are absolute—not properly "absolute beings," for only God is called the cause of these absolute things; but those things which are effected by Him are left to His will, so that He might name them [as such], but with an addition, that "life-in-itself" is the principle of the living insofar as they live, not however insofar as they are substances, or wisdoms, or reasons, for these things are placed under one principle and then another, which is not consistent to attribute to God, since He produces all things with one cause and one principle, as will be demonstrated.

CAPUT V.

Great Dionysius, chap. 9, *On the Divine Names*: But because, he says, you asked me by letter at another time what I mean by "being-in-itself," "life-in-itself," "wisdom-in-itself," and you say that you doubted with yourself how I sometimes call God "life-in-itself," yet at other times the effector of "life-in-itself"; I have judged it necessary, O holy man of God, to free you from this doubt as much as I can. And first, indeed, to repeat now what has been said a thousand times, it is not contradictory for God to be [called] "power-in-itself," "life-in-itself," or "peace-in-itself," or "power-in-itself." For God is called this out of those things which are, and especially out of those things which are primary, as the cause of all things which are; but the other is said as something that is subsultantially above all things which are, and which are primary. But you ask what we mean by "being-in-itself," or "life-in-itself," or whatever we posit as being absolutely and principally, and created by God and from the First. We answer that this is not ^D tortuous, but straight, and has a simple explanation; for we do not say that "being-in-itself" is a substance

^A and of nature, and that it transcends. Saint Maximus clearly resolves the proposed question in these matters: He says, "How it is necessary to speak, when at times we must accept God, when we say 'life-in-itself' and other things of this kind; and at other times that He is the effector of these, that is, that He created these—since He is called both principle and cause above principle by these names; while those things which participate in these are said thence, that is, from the participated things, to be, and to live, and to be divine. Therefore, the creation of life and the creation of substance—the things themselves, I say—God made. Therefore, let us first consider the thing itself; then let us form a general notion of the thing itself, for example, life or substance considered universally, and afterwards in part." The same Maximus, in chapter nine: "Dionysius is accustomed," he says, "to speak of God from His effects as 'being-in-itself,' and as the effector of 'being-in-itself'; and that He Himself is 'life-in-itself' and the effector of 'life-in-itself'; just as now [he speaks of Him as] 'likeness-in-itself' and the author of 'likeness-in-itself.' However, he says these things not as if he were saying that one is God Himself as life, and another is the created substantial one which exists as it were in itself beyond God, which those things that participate in life participate in; but rather, as he himself is his own interpreter, c. 9: 'God,' he says, 'is called life-in-itself, and power-in-itself, and likeness-in-itself, and other things of this kind, because this is as it were principally and divinely and efficiently—for this is the true fountain of them Himself; but He is the author of likeness-in-itself ^B and of those things which are like, as bestowing the participation upon those things which are the first among existing things, that they may participate in this gift; for all things, as befits the nature of each, participate in gifts of this kind; the primary and supreme creatures among the celestial minds participate in them especially; which things, however, participate subsequently below them.' From which it is made manifest that, just as we call God 'aeon' and 'time,' and again the author of aeon and time (for from the effects and created things, which He Himself produced, we have the abundance of imposing names upon Him), and just as we call God 'aeon' ^C more, from His first completed work; so also from those things which are according to aeon, absolutely

Scholia.

(1) *Life above divine.* The life of God is above the life of holy men and angels, whose life is divine, just as it is written: God of gods, etc. (Ps. XLIX), and that: I said, You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High (Ps. LXXXI).

(2) *That good, and makes gods.* As a participating principle of all things, which cannot participate nor be participated in itself, because it cannot become a part of anything, which is God alone, and as an unparticipated principle, because it is a formal principle to those participating in its own genus; as goodness-in-itself, a formal principle to good things, not in reality, but separated by reason from the good things, which by participation in created goodness are called and are formally good; life-in-itself, a formal principle to living things, not in reality, but separated by reason from those who, by participation in created life, which is a gift of God and a perfection flowing from Him, are called and are formally living: and similarly in other principles of this kind according to the nature and order of each principle, from St. Thomas.

(3) *And as more aeon.* Just as God is called aeon, who is the author of aeon, and of those things in which aeon extends; so He is called being-in-itself, life-in-itself, wisdom-in-itself, and similarly in other things, because He is the cause in creatures of being-in-itself, of life-in-itself, and of similar things, which are His gifts, in which aeon is occupied; for there was no time when these things were not, which began with aeon (if indeed they existed in the angels), which in our thought are absolute and abstract.

^A We name them "per se" being, "per se" life, and "per se" wisdom; for these things are not said to be simply absolute, but that something is of some thing; therefore he first said "being," whatever things of the same order with the aeon are said absolutely—for how does the aeon and time subsist of itself, unless they are considered in those things which perform the aeon and time? This also is manifest in another way: for if God is the effector of all things that are, much more is He named the author of those things which are first, and therefore of those things which are, and especially those which are first, as the author of all. But because he wishes to explain what he says more fully, he resolves very clearly those things which came into doubt: and having approached those things which are thus said absolutely, ὕπαρξις, that is, essences. Primary, and which in a certain way seems mostly to be substance, he says, we do not call some divine or angelic substance "per se" being, which is the cause that all things exist; but if it is more ancient, and the first of the gifts, which because it is and is participated in, other gifts are and are called so, it is neither divine nor angelic substance, indeed not even the cause that all things exist (for God alone, who is above substance, and principle, and essence, and is the cause that all things which are exist, and is simply Being itself), in what order then shall we place those things which are thus said to be more foundational? And if they are not causes of things that are, neither will they be effectives of these; which if they do not effect the things that are, nor are they a faculty nor an operation of God, the effector and creator of the universe, it remains that these are habits and emanations, ^B which exist only when they come to be, as has been demonstrated. But when Dionysius dilates the contemplation of these: We do not, he says, call another divinity which gives birth to life, besides the cause of all things whatsoever that live, which is above the divine, and the "per se" cause of life; for if there is no other cause of living things, nor any other divinity which gives birth to life for living things, unless it be the life that is above the divine, and the substance that is above substance: and it is the most singular and most splendid one, and this is the sole cause of all things, it is evident that these things which are first and principally, and are only effects, do not effect anything of those things which are afterwards as a cause: therefore the good God is called the effector of those very things which are first, then of those which universally [(a)] participate, afterwards of those which in part: thus he demonstrates that God alone is the cause of all things, whether they are called first, or universally, or in part; and whether they are said to be thus participated in, or participants, because if He is the same and the sole author of both the participants and the participated, it is evident that if the participants are creatures, the participated are altogether creatures—they differ only in that these are indeed first effects, and through these extreme effects, as if one should see in the least of creatures clouds existing before rain, and through the clouds God raining; and as motions exist because of things moving, and clouds because of the rain, in the same way the creations of substances because of substances, and the creations of lives because of lives, and the creations of deification because of things deified, but everything which is because of a cause and is moved, it has been demonstrated also to have an origin. Dionysius places God as the author "per se" of goodness, and "per se" of divinity, just as God is the author of the actions and motions of God, but understand the lower divinities to be of angels and of just men, but again understand that Dionysius has interpreted most openly that he declares these names, as a gift proceeding from God, and an effusion of beauty into those things which are outside; declaring, I say, the motion and action of God, as an effectuation and creation of God himself.

CAPUT VI.

Great Dionysius in the eighth chapter of *The Divine Names* says: And that God, the prince of deification, is carried above every power, and surpasses every power, however it is and is conceived; I do not think anyone of those who are high and educated in the divine Scriptures is ignorant, for in many places Scripture hands down that He is dominion itself, and separates Him from the very supercelestial powers. ^C How therefore do theologians praise Him as a power, who is placed outside every power? Or how shall we receive the name of power in Him? We say therefore that God is power, as one who possesses in Himself, and above what he has, every power; and as the author of all power, and as producing all things by an inflexible and uncircumscribed power, and as the author of the very "per se" power, or universal being, or of the singular power of anyone; and as infinitely powerful, not only in that He produces every power, but because He is above every power, and above the very "per se" power: ^D and that He is able to produce innumerably infinite other powers above power; and because infinite, and infinite in number produced powers can never be able to weaken or blunt the beyond-infinite effectuation of His powerful power, this therefore is the power of God, infinitely powerful, it proceeds and goes forth into all things that are, and none of those things which are, is altogether denuded.

*Scholia.* A thesis on existing things, not however simply absolute and abstract, because they are participated in by existing things, and are effects from God, from whom they depend, but this will be better able to be understood from cap. 7 of the 7th decade, and cap. 4 of the 8th.

(a) Universally, as the life of all living things; in part, as the life of men or angels, etc.

^A Since infinite powers, produced unto infinity, cannot ever blunt the action of his power which is beyond infinite. If, therefore, the power shown forth did not have the power of receiving these powers, Dionysius would never promise that those infinite powers, produced by the power-making power, cannot render his action dull; wherefore it results that power approaches the Good (a), for that which in general has no power, neither is, nor is anything at all, nor is its position [or state] at all; therefore we measure power by the same bounds, and that which is; nor does power reach out into things which are not, as the Good reaches out. Moreover, the property of the names of justice, salvation, and redemption is the same; for the justice of God, which is beyond-powerful, which is just, and loves justices, defines the order of each one of those things which are, and produces it, and sets it according to its own proper action; and according to his justice which is beyond-infinite, he has infused power into every justice produced by him, rendering to all according to dignity; whether it be the proper action of the parts of the soul, or the moderation between more and less, or an appetite granting equality; or again, a habit looking ahead to what is useful in common, or knowing what is to be granted and what is not to be granted; or neither, and to speak once for all, he has left nothing without the honor of the justice produced by him; nay rather, he numbers all the hairs of our head, and does not permit a sparrow of two assaria to fall into a snare without his most just will; and he proves our injustices, which are socalled, to be the deviations of our desires, but fills all things with his justice. And nothing of those things which are, is deprived in any just matter of his salvation and conservation, whence that common saying seems to me to hold: All indeed do injustice, but to no one is injustice done. ^{B C}

CHAPTER VII

Regarding Life, and regarding Wisdom, which is in God, and that Life itself and Wisdom and God is the Author and Creator of the life-by-itself and the wisdom-by-itself; and what the properties of these names are.

^A immortal, as if from themselves, but from the vivifying cause and the cause that both effects and preserves all life. And as we were saying of that which is (1), that the age is its [way of] being by itself, so also here, the divine life is by itself the vivifier and effecter of life, and bestows first, through itself, for life to be life; and for every life, and for each life, to be each one aptly according to its own nature; and (which is more divine) it promised to transfer us entirely—bodies and souls, I mean—to a perfect and immortal life, a thing which indeed seems to antiquity (2) to be against nature, but to me, and to you, and to the truth, it is a divine thing, and above nature—above our nature, I say, which is seen, but not above that omnipotent divine life; for to this, seeing that it is the nature of all lives, and especially of those which are more divine, there is no life that is against nature or above nature.

Certain things, therefore, annotating here, St. Maximus called the divine life *συνεκτικὴν*, that is, the containing cause, as being that which not only created life in the nature of things, but also one which contains and preserves life, so that it may endure and remain. And again, in the same: "This life," he says, "God, having fashioned it according to substance, made for immortality in angels and in our souls." ^B Again, the same Dionysius in the seventh chapter of *The Divine Names*: "This, therefore, lacking in reason and mind, and foolish wisdom, praising highly, we have said to be the cause of all mind, and reason, and of all wisdom and intelligence; and that all counsel is of it, and from it all knowledge and intelligence proceeds, and in it all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden; for, conveniently with those things that have been said before, as a cause more than wise, and knowing all things by itself, it is the effecter of wisdom, and of all wisdom, and of a part." In the annotations of this chapter, St. Maximus [says]: "Everything participated is older than those things which are from it; wherefore God is properly named both age and time, as one who made the ages and the times; so, therefore, it must be said also regarding life and wisdom, that He is their author." And again, the same: "Because," he says, "in the wisdom of God the world did not know God through wisdom; through wisdom, I say, which appears and is perceived in the concert and order of the creature." Indeed, even the great Basil, at the beginning of Proverbs, and finally on that [verse], *The Lord created me the beginning of his ways*, says: ^C He speaks of the wisdom of the world, which appears and sends forth a voice almost through those things which are seen, which, to be sure, having been made by God, and not by chance, adorns such great wisdom to those things which have been effected; for, as *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the work of his hands*, they declare, I say, without voice; because *there are no voices, nor speeches (3), whose voices are not heard*: in the same manner, there are certain speeches of wisdom edited of old, which, before other things in the fashioning of the world, were sown along with the creature; this, while silent, cries out its creator and Lord, so that through it you may refer yourself to the contemplation of Him who alone is wise. From which it is clear, that life, which exists in God more than unitively, and wisdom, and knowledge, and mind, and word, and intelligence, creates it from nothing, broadly and openly, and life created with the creature by itself, and wisdom by itself; and those things which live according to it by themselves, and are wise according to it by themselves, and every other life and wisdom which is found in those things which exist. But also the properties are open; for life is stretched out to living things only; and for those endowed with immortality, it is made a species of life and a subject; but for those endowed with a body, it is made a continuous motion of the body; ^D but wisdom is spread less widely than life, inasmuch as it is extended only to those that possess wisdom, and indeed in the immortal angels life and wisdom are spread equally; but in those things that have sensation, only life is extended; wisdom is extended only to those that are endowed with reason; and in these, not all are partakers of wisdom, but those who have been lovers of wisdom either on account of study divinely kindled, or on account of sincere discipline, or on account of both. Furthermore, living things indeed have obtained life by nature; but those who have wisdom have been fit and dedicated to the study of knowledge; furthermore, wisdom is of that part of the soul which is busied in contemplation; but life is a substantial habit, congenital, without intermission of operation, in those things which are apt to receive it, as much as it can be received.

CHAPTER VIII.

Great Dionysius, chap. 11, *De divinis nominibus*:

Scholia. (1) And as we were saying of that which is, that the age is its [way of] being by itself. This he had said in chapter 5, when he said of *the age of beings*, as however time is according to cause, and those things which come to be are subject to time; so also is the age according to cause, and those things in which the age is. (2) To antiquity. He left the foolish opinion of the gentiles, as St. Maximus noted, and therefore he says that this was seen not by the ancients simply, but by the foolish ancients. (3) Nor speeches. The location of Scripture, to wit, there are no men anywhere in whatever language and speech they may speak, who do not hear and perceive what the days and nights, with that composed and settled vicissitude of mutual succession, proclaim and declare, to wit, the knowledge of God, who made, moderates, and rules all things. But the construction of the words is of the Greek idiom: *There are no speeches, nor words*, of men to be sure, *whose voices are not heard*, that is, by whom the voices of them, of the days and nights to wit, are not heard; thus Eusebius of Caesarea understood it in his most erudite Commentaries.

^A Concerning that divine peace and silence, therefore, which holy Justus calls *aphthensian*, that is, unspeakableness, and *akinēsian*, that is, immobility, regarding every emanation that is known—what it is, and how God rests and is silent, and how He is in Himself and within Himself, and is wholly with Himself more than united, and without entering into Himself or multiplying Himself, abandons unity; nay, rather, He goes forth to all things, remaining wholly within because of the excellence of the unity that surpasses all things—this it is neither lawful nor possible for any of those who exist to speak or even to think. But since we cannot otherwise speak of this, nor grasp it by the intellect, let us, being lifted up to the divine peace itself as set above all things, pay heed to its participations, which are understood and named, and this so far as we men—and especially we who are unequal to many good men—can attain.

And first it must be said that God is the author of peace itself, and of peace considered in the universal and in the part, and that He mixes all things with one another by a mutual conjunction not confused; through which conjunction they cohere without division and distance, yet each one subsists pure according to its own species, not troubled by the concretion of opposites. And a little later: And it is, he says, that perfect peace, the preserver of each one’s property unmixed, which, through its providences, being the dispenser of peace, keeps all things between themselves and with others without sedition and confusion. But what shall we say of the charity of Christ towards men, which has poured forth peace? From which we ought no longer to learn to fight among ourselves, nor with others, nor with the angels, but rather to work with the divine powers themselves insofar as we are able, according to the providence of Jesus, who works all things in all, and makes peace which cannot be explained in words, and which was predestined from eternity; who has reconciled us to Himself in the spirit, and through Him, and in Him, to the Father.

And again the same cap. 9, concerning the same divine names: This magnitude, he says, is infinite, and devoid of quantity and number; and this magnitude is excellence according to the absolute and supra-extended effusion of a magnificence not comprehended. Likewise, also, the cause of all is the Small; for you will never find the form of the small not participated in. Thus, therefore, in God the small is to be understood as being in all, and through all, an expedient means, and operating, and pervading even into the division of soul and body, and of the joints and marrows, and ^D the thoughts of the heart, nay, of all things that are; for there is no creature invisible in His sight. This small is without quantity, without number, without inhibition, infinite, uncircumscribed, comprehending all things, while it can be comprehended by no one.

Again the same: But now, when we speak of divine diversity, let us not suspect any variation in Him who is the same, and more than immutable; but the multiplication of His unity, and the uniform emanations of a manifold fruit into all things. And again: But if one were to say that God is Similar, as being the same, and as being wholly and impartibly similar to Himself, the divine name of “Similar” is not to be reprobated. But the theologians say that God, who is above all things, as He is in Himself, is similar to nothing, but that He Himself gives divine similarity to those who turn to Him: and, which is more admirable, Scripture says that *nothing is similar to Him*; even if this statement does not conflict with the similarity which is with God, for the same things are called both similar and dissimilar to God: similar indeed according to imitation, which can be of Him, whom nothing can imitate; but dissimilar ^B insofar as the effects are beneath the cause, and are distant from it by infinite measures, which cannot be compared. Likewise: But what do we say concerning the divine station, or throne? For He Himself is the cause of every station and throne, who is above every throne and station, and in Him all things consist from the station of the goods convenient to each of them, and are kept, lest they be shaken from the station of convenient goods. But what, when the theologians again say that the immovable proceeds and is moved to all things? Is this not to be understood as is fitting for God? For it must be piously understood that to be moved is, for God, to make all things to be, and to contain all things, and in all ways to provide for all, and to be present to all by the embracing of all that exists, without the habit of conjunction, by providence circumscribing all things, and working in all.

In the same place, saint Maximus: What, he says, is always the same, and is absolutely, is seen in the sole effective cause of all, which has granted to creatures that they should remain in the same state, and that those things which have themselves in a contrary or otherwise manner should be joined among themselves. Therefore, all things, even those which do not remain in the same nature, are seen to be in God; ^C since God is the author of all that exists in the same way, that is, similarly. From which it becomes manifest that peace, and magnitude, and smallness, and station, and motion, and to be the same, and to be diverse, and similar, and dissimilar, all these things are one peace in God; therefore, both here and elsewhere, it is clearly said and demonstrated by Dionysius that other and contrary things are all in God in the same way and unitedly, and with no duplication; yet those produced by Him are varied, having obtained diversity from the emanations themselves. God, therefore, as has been previously demonstrated, is such a substance that we can neither express it in words, nor speak of it, nor know it; so also is His divine peace, and besides, His wisdom, and His life, and whatever other absolutes there are, and whatever things now appear in Him to be brought forth according to contrariety. But we praise this according to its participations understood and named; that is, we praise it from those things which it has produced, which fall under the intellect and under the sense, by which we, instructed from those things which are seen, come to the contemplation...

of his great gifts, first revolving the actions themselves in our mind, as if one were first to contemplate the creature, or the fabric of the world itself, regarding it as the action and motion of God, and then to refer the reason to the products and created things. Dionysius himself, consistent with himself in each of these names, puts forward the names in the same way as elsewhere, with a defining addition: namely, that God is the author, cause, and effector of that which is "peace itself," "magnitude itself," and "likeness itself," as well as of the others, and of those things which are brought forward as contraries—such as "dissimilarity itself," "diversity itself," and everything that exists, whether it be the whole or the parts thereof. ^A Throughout, he shows by the same tenor and form that the entirety of things are products, and that there is but one principle and cause of them all—one, clearly, which is above substance, which is that blessed nature of the three persons.

But in order that we may also perceive the properties from what has been posited: Divine peace is that which connects diverse things into one (for it is called the gatherer and binder even of those things which are of the most diverse genus and nature), mixing many things into a temperament without confusion or mixture; but preserving the unities in each, it reduces them into one simple concept of the mind. Furthermore, this divine peace, like a union of multiple and diverse voices and sounds, creates a most beautiful harmony and symphony, changing nothing from the grave or acute, but rather, as they remain according to their nature without confusion, it constructs them such that a coupling is produced, beyond what can be conceived, by certain alluring attractions, or—if I may say something more divine—a reduction into unity. In consistent fashion, we also attribute to this divine peace the divine names which, in that One which is above substance, seem to be contraries. Thus, referring magnitude to pravity, we have brought them into one peace, defining magnitude as that than which no greater mass can be found, and parvity as that than which none can be smaller; through both names, we recall peace to the infinite God. For what is greater than infinite substance? Or what, on the other hand, is less than that which is entirely pierced by an indivisible speck? Likewise, we also consider to be "similar" that which possesses a similitude of communion with another, either in colors, or inclinations, or habits, or modes, or in the governance of things, or in any other way in which one might conjecture a comparison of likeness; but "dissimilar," that which has no similitude in accordance with the reasons and modes known to us. Yet the desire for the name of God, by which we are held, has gathered these things into one peace, and, praising the similitude of God, it names that which is similar to us ^B because He himself becomes similar to us (for there is no true likeness of the effects with the effector, since they are infinitely and immensely distant in measure and intervals from the author), but rather, as we have said, because He is the effector of "likeness itself," by which we are made similar to God: "Be therefore," He says, "merciful, as your Father is celestial" (* Luc. vi, 36).

Yet He is also the author of dissimilarity, because He implanted in each of those things which were made by Him a property such that, as long as they are individually ordered, they never agree with one another. If, however, we attribute to God the name of "the same" and "the diverse," we take these from the things He has produced and granted. For there is *tautotēs*, that is, identity—the conspiracy and consensus of the universality of things with one world, and the generation of things that are entirely distant, while yet retaining their highest qualities in a similar way, and the same affection of diverse natures and dissimilar parts. But, conversely, there is diversity—the multipartite distance of those things which tend to infinity from one root, and the variation of every kind in the parts and members of each one, and the multiplex and varied multitude of the creation of forms. Thus, also, we praise the station of God from those things which He has placed and established, and to which He has given a place to remain; and we praise movement, in turn, because He—while being otherwise immobile and unable to decline, nor moved, changed, or varied by anything or in any way—by His will alone produced and renewed all species and forms movement, emitting them with one, absolute peace, consent, and concord when it is proper to emit them; and again, recalling them to Himself by His own peace, according to one never-intermitted operation.

CAPUT IX.

Of the omnipotent, the sustainer, the helper, and of other names which are spoken of God, and are of those things which are spoken "towards something": and of divinity, and similitude, and habit, which are spoken in the deified, and those imitating, and those taking on similitude according to imitation, and the formation of similitude, and the habit of God, who is released from all habit and surpasses all imitation, and of deification according to habit, and of those things which are spoken to declare excellence, such as "King of kings," "God of gods."

Gregory of Nyssa, in the second book of his *Confutations against Eunomius*: He says it is found that the name of "the Omnipotent" signifies nothing else in the divine power than that the operation containing in the empire and dominion those things which we contemplate in the creature of the world is referred in some way "towards something"; for the force which is discerned in this name demonstrates this. And just as there would never be a physician were it not for the sick; nor, again, would He be named merciful, or compassionate, and similarly [D... index: entries preserved]

^A nor the Almighty, were there not every creature in need of His rule, and in what it is, in need of His preservation. Just as a physician, therefore, is applied to him who needs healing, so the Almighty is applied to that which has need of being held by rule. And just as the well do not need a physician, but rather those who are ill; so consequently it can be rightly said that He, in whom nature cannot stray or fall, does not need another by whom He must be held. And the great Dionysius, in his second epistle to Gaius: How is God, who is above all things, above the principle of divinity, and above the principle of goodness? Namely, if you understand divinity and goodness to be the very gift which makes men gods and good, and that imitation of God and the Good which we cannot attain, by whom we are made gods and good, who is more than God and more than good. For indeed, if this is the principle by which we are deified, and made good, He who is above all principle is also above divinity and goodness, that is, above the principle of divinity and the principle of goodness. For because He is not imitable, nor can He be possessed, He excels all imitations and habits, and those who imitate, and those who participate in such habits. The great Athanasius in his book *On the Incarnation of the Word of God*: To God, therefore, he says, the Son is not similar as God, but is one and the same, as it is written: “I and the Father are one”*; he interpreted divinity as unity; but divinity not such as that of those who have been made gods: for indeed, opposing this to them, he says, God is not like a man made after the likeness of God, and named God because of that likeness. And Gregory of Nyssa in a certain book from his confutation against Eunomius: And if the enemy of the Lord calls the Lord God, he strives to compare Him with the divinity of Moses. Saint Maximus in his *Scholia* on Dionysius: He rightly, he says, called divinity above every goodness, and [above] divinity; therefore understand the inferior divinities as those of the angels and of just men. Saint John of Damascus, in book 4 of *The Orthodox Faith*, chapter 12: Begotten, he says, from the Virgin, but having gone forth as God with the assumed flesh, it was already deified ^B at the moment it was produced, and began to be: so that these three things existed at once, the assumption, the existence, the deification of it made by the Word Himself. Again, Saint Maximus in his disputation against Pyrrhus: As combustion [brings with it] the combusted, and that which burns; and vision [brings with it] the seen, and the seer; and intelligence [brings with it] the thing understood, and the one who understands (for a habit cannot be named or understood without those who possess the habit), so, as a consequence, deification brings with it the deified, and the Deifier. The same: It was necessary, to speak truly, that He who is the author of those things which are according to nature, should also be the author of deification according to grace. The same again: I have demonstrated, he says, that the divine power, which is above substance, effects the deification of those who have been deified according to grace. Gregory the Theologian, in the oration after he was made presbyter: I have, he says, most of all embraced solitude, and have vehemently admired it as an assistant and parent of divine ascent, and as deifying. Again, the great and divine Dionysius, chapter 10, *On the Divine Names*, says: But Almighty God is so called, as holding all things in His rule, and as being present to those things which He governs, in an unmixed manner; and as desirable and lovable to all; and imposing upon all things voluntary yokes, and the sweet pangs of divine love, and of His own almighty and indissoluble goodness. Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book against Eunomius: Other names, he says, only signify that which is useful to something, such as helper, defender, and protector, and whatever things of this signification are found, to which if you take away the one needing aid, the force which is discerned in the name itself will have been empty and useless. Again ^C Dionysius chapter 12, on the same divine names: For, he says, the author of all things is, according to one excellence, above all things, as the most full, the holy of holies, and is named by such names in praise, fitly for the super-flowing cause and sublime excellence, just as if one were to say: by how much the holy, or divine, or ruling, or royal [realities] excel those things that are not such, and again, the participations themselves, by themselves, excel those who participate; by so much does He who is above all things, [the] unparticipated cause, excel all those who are and [all] participants and participations. But the Scriptures call the more principal [orders] in each one kings, and lords, and gods. Which indeed, as Saint Maximus notes, he says that princes who preside over inferiors are called holy, and lords, and kings, and gods according to excellence; just as among men those who are most excellent are so called. From which it is made manifest that another [sort of deification] ^D

Scholia

^C to prefer the meaning which conveys those names that are said of God in relation to something else; but another, which are brought forth according to excess: and the former are indeed sometimes superfluous and idle once the work is perfected, as has been shown before and now; but these latter, which are brought forth according to excess, always declare excellence in the same way, and the former indeed show a clear indication in the creation of the universe. For on the seventh day, he says, he rested from all his works; wherefore he ceased from the creation of heaven, the sun, plants, animals, and, to speak universally, from all the work which he had made [*]. For it was because of his work that he was then called the Creator of the world. God is therefore always the Creator of the world, but as one for whom the fabrication of the world has already ceased; just as a creator who does not always create; and one who is apt to laugh, who does not always laugh: but this is because God is the sole cause and effector, for the effector excels his effects by infinite and immense intervals. Now when Dionysius shows excellence in these, he divides it into two parts: into holy and non-holy, and into things which are participations in themselves, and the participants. And, he says, by as much as existing things excel non-existing things, and participations excel the participants, by so much does God excel the holy and the non-holy, and the participations in themselves, and the participants. Therefore, the excellence of God equally pervades the participants and the participations in themselves, and the holy, or divine, or dominant, or royal, and those things which are not such. But if God equally excels both, what reason for production will those things have which are not holy, and which participate? The holy things and the participations in themselves will have the same reason; for if the latter are creatures of God, then the former also are creatures of God. However, properties appear here too, for those things—that is, the participants and the participations—are perfect because of the end for the sake of which they are, and their property is to be spoken of in relation to something else, to be in some way disposed ^B towards them; but that, that is, those which are said by way of excellence, is a property of being equal below God, with those which participate, and which are per se participations, by which those things also were made. Furthermore, omnipotence, reception, aid, and salvation, if they are said of God, are one peace, and rest, and silence; but if they are [taken] outside of God, and as emanations into creatures, they are produced for the custody, and protection, and aid, and reception, and salvation in those things which are being guarded and perfected. Again, holiness, and dominion, and kingdom, and divinity, when said absolutely of God, are his blessed silence and are above substance: but outside of God, they receive properties looking toward the creature; that is, holiness is liberation from every wickedness and stain; dominion exhibits true firmness, free from falling; kingdom is the distribution of every rule, and ornament, and law, and order; but divinity is providence contemplating all things. And similarly in other things, if anyone wishes to name the divinity which is above what can be expressed either by affirming or denying, and which is above being understood, and above substance, from the ways and actions of God.

CHAPTER X.

Regarding equality, perfection, unity, and the properties of these in things.

distributed into all things according to the dignity of each, and in so far as He has anticipated in Himself, exemptly and unitively, all intellectual, intelligent, reasoning, sentient, substantial, natural, and volitional equality, transcending all things according to power, as the producer of all equality. And again, the same author, chapter 13: "Perfect is said again of that which cannot be increased, and is always perfect, and cannot be diminished; also that which contains all things in itself, and overflows according to a single, never-intermittent, and same, and more than full, supply, which cannot be diminished, and which brings to completion all perfect things, and fills them with suitable perfection." And again the same: "For there is no multitude which does not in some way participate in the one; indeed, those things which are many in their parts are one as a whole; those which are many in accidents are one in subject; those which are many in number or in faculties are one in species; those which are many in multiple species are one in genus; those which are many in emanations are one in principle; and there is nothing at all that does not in some way participate in the one; I mean that which, ^B uniquely in itself according to all things, has anticipated all things, the whole of all things, and the contraries." Further still, the same: "It is necessary that we, converted from the many by the power of the divine unity to the one, should unitively praise the whole blessed divinity—the one, that is to say, the cause of all things which is before every one and before every multitude, and every part, and every whole, and every boundary and illimitation, every end, and every infinity; the one, I say, which defines all things that are, and being itself ^C (3); and it is the cause of all wholes, both simultaneously and before all things, and above all things singularly, and is above being, which is the one itself(4), and defines the one itself which is; since that which is one in things is numerable, but number participates in substance(5); but the one which is above substance, which is the one, defines every number, and it itself is the principle, and cause, and number, and order of the unit and of numbers and of all things that are." And noting these things, Saint Maximus says: "Observe, he says, that he rightly says that God is before the one, since to all ^D again: Observe, he says, that 'numerable' signifies the declaration of number; wherefore in those things which are, that is in creatures, when 'one' is spoken of, it is spoken of according to the notion of number." From which it is patent that God, who is Himself by Himself equality, and by Himself perfection, and by Himself unity, bestows upon Himself that which He is, yet this which He is, we can in no way understand, nor is it lawful to express. The theologians, however, speak of, explain, and understand the "by-itself" equality, perfection, and unity as regarding things produced in the nature of things. Equality, therefore, is an equal distribution of the universe, partly having something in common with the same, and with justice; partly something proper; for it abounds in various words, not as reconciling them into one, but as a certain principle and end terminating in one sound; for all things which harmonize with one another have a diversity of those things from which they consist; and a similarity of sounds according to the measure of the plectrum; but equality has more of the harmony of likeness of words; for it moderates this as a causing and finishing principle, as if starting from itself, and circling through harmonizing and mutually corresponding things, and terminating in itself again. From one reason of equality, therefore, must be taken the reason of other things also in which equality is accustomed to be involved; for the equal is that which is the measure of the same things; of which, therefore, the measures are the same, equality also is the same. Wherefore divine equality equally operates a similar progress of all things through themselves among one another, and an equal participation, so that each thing is apt, and an equal distribution into all things according to the dignity of each; but perfection in those things which are, casts out what is less and more in them; it renders an equal perfection to the parts, and it is perfect in numbers indeed, the whole being equal to the parts; but in things affected by quality, the perfect habit of those who are affected for this use by quality is a certain nature perfectly inborn in them by reason of much experience, having neither more nor less than the straight rule requires according to the use itself: in substances indeed, perfect

Scholia

life, and immortal; and to say it in one word, ^A everything divided, never lacking, is everywhere one, and of this the too much and the too little corrupts perfection. Equality, therefore, and life not deflected from the straight, effects perfection in substances; but in numbers, the whole is equal to its parts; and in those endowed with quality, [it effects] the knowledge that cannot fail. But God, who is perfection in Himself, is the effector of perfections, both of the perfection from which many perfections have been removed, and of the perfection in itself, which extends widely; for He produced and perfected toward the imitation of divine exemplars, which are above substance, those things which here are called absolutely so. But unity, which walks in all things, is decorated with the divine name of unity, operating infinite unities in genera, in species, in individuals, in parts, in members, and, if I may say so, what is most valid and most powerful, it multiplies itself into all things, recalling us to the imitation of the unity of God, who is unknown beyond what [we can comprehend], unto unities, so that in the multitude of unities, which were produced by Him, it may cause us—having turned from the many to the one by the virtue of divine unity, and having been made one—to praise the entire and one divinity, the one cause of all things. This, which is one by itself, is counted among things that exist; it is made the principle of that which is by itself, insofar as it is one, which, though it is "by itself," yet is not by itself, but as an accident, this also becomes one in each emanation; and likewise one ^B commonly in all emanations, whether they are genera, similarly, or species, in the same way; or whether—it is the property of the one by itself, in which they are present, to convert many things toward itself. But indeed, for a material exposition, we are content with those things which the great Dionysius set forth; but if, in some places, we have varied something while recounting them, it was not our intention to recount them more orderly than he did, for it would have been absurd to gaze directly at such a great sun, to use his own words in this regard. While we were weaving the chapters together, since this was our intention from the beginning, we gathered the properties from the joined and continuous matters, and for the sake of ease, we contracted some things and transferred others to a different place for the sake of a clearer distinction. Indeed, the Decad is inscribed *Concerning Properties*, not as if we had something abounding in us that the great Dionysius lacked, but rather, from those things which were copiously stated by him, we only explain where it is necessary to consider the property. For the intention is to make plain through everything that the nature of the three persons is the sole cause of the universe, which is above substance and above nature, but that all other things, whether they are called primarily existing things, or participations, or providences, and divine gifts, because they were produced for the sake of the Cause, are counted among effects; and they are like effects, generated and created. For every effecting (says the great Basil) becomes equal to its effects; and the effecting of "great [things]" is indeed of great effects; but that of small things is of small [things].

SIXTH DECAD. — ON THE APPARITIONS OF THE DIVINE LIGHT.

CHAPTER I.

Dionysius, in the fourth chapter, *On Divine Names*: "But that which in the middle, beyond falling, has escaped us, is the cause of the celestial principles and sub-terminations, as well as of this celestial substance, which neither increases, nor diminishes, nor changes at all, and [the cause] of the motions of the vast celestial course that do not grow weary, if it be proper to speak thus, and of the orders of the stars, and of the beauties, and of the lights, and of their fixations, and of the multiple wandering course of ^C certain planets, and of the two luminaries, which Scripture calls great, their circuits, and their reversion to the same place from which they departed, by which days and nights are distinguished among us; and the months and years defined by them, they distinguish, number, order, and contain the motions of time, and of those things which are in time. But what is to be said about the very ray of the sun? For light proceeds from the supreme good, and is an image of goodness; wherefore by the name of light the Good is praised, as the first exemplar appearing in the image. For just as the goodness of the divinity which is above all things [appears] from the supreme and most perfect ^D

substances reaching even to the lowest, and yet is still above them all, in such a way that neither do the superior reach up to its excellence, nor are the inferior not contained by it; but rather it illuminates all things that can be illuminated, and creates, and gives life, and contains, and perfects; and it is the measure of those things that are, and eternity, and number, and order, and connection, and cause, and end: so also that great and altogether splendid and ever-shining sun is an express image of divine goodness, insofar as the most subtle something of that goodness resonates from afar within it ^A, and illuminates all things that are able to participate in it, and has light extended above, which it multiplies throughout the whole world which is seen, both the superior and the inferior, by the splendor of its rays; and if anything does not participate in it, the cause is not a weakness or thinness of the faculty of illuminating, but rather that it is not prepared for the participation of light, because it is not suited to admit it. And in truth, there are many things which the ray of the sun has passed by, which illuminates those things that are beyond; and there is nothing of those things which can be seen, which the sun does not reach, so great is the power of its splendor. Nay, it even contributes to the rising of bodies subject to sense, and moves them to life, nourishes, increases, perfects, and purges, and renews; and it is the measure and number of hours, and days, and all our time (for this is that light, albeit at that time it was not figured, which the divine Moses said distinguished that first of our three-day periods), whence ἥλιος, that is, sun, is so called, because it makes all things ἀλάη, that is, keeps all things safe, and gathers the dispersed; and all things which have the power of sensing, when they seek either to see, or to be moved, and to be illuminated, and to grow warm, and finally to be contained and preserved by the sun: I do not say this, as antiquity supposed, that the sun is God, and the creator of the universe, who properly governs this world which we see, but rather that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are understood and seen through the things that have been made, as well as his eternal power and divinity. From which it is evident that every light which is seen was made by God, and that the sun is in many ways and by many reasons an image of the goodness of God: at the same time it is also demonstrated how, when God said on the first day: Let there be light, he gathered that light of the three days without figure, and brought it into the figure of the globe of the sun, predefining for it circuits and annual orbs. The great Basil shows the same in his Hexaemeron.

CAPUT II.

^A heavenly orders, but when God himself appears; and although sometimes they praise the very divinity by things of great esteem—as when they call him the Sun of justice, and the morning star rising on the holy mountain, and light without a veil, and shining in the mind; sometimes, however, they praise him by mediocre things, as when they call him fire that illuminates so that it harms no one; and water, which provides vital replenishment, and, to speak symbolically, flows into the belly, and rivers emanate, flowing with liberal eruption; yet others laud him from the lowest things, as when they call him fragrant ointment, and the cornerstone: indeed, they even clothe him in the form of a beast, and attribute to him the properties of a lion and a panther, and say he is a leopard, and a needy bear. I will add, moreover, that as for all other things that are fiery, and appear to be more alien from his likeness—which those who are skilled in the divine Scriptures have handed down, that he attributes to himself the form of a worm. The divine Maximus, explaining these things, says: Malachias names him the Sun of justice; and blessed Peter says, Until the day-star arises in your hearts; for this is the morning star. But Moses, in the bush, says: Fire, that is, burning without harming. Jeremias says: They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water. And Solomon in the Canticle of canticles: Thy name is as ointment poured out. But Osee and Micheas, from the number of the twelve prophets, commemorate the wild beasts mentioned here. But David speaks of a worm in the person of the Lord, who for our sake assumed flesh; not according to divinity, but according to the humility and ignobility of the flesh that was seen. But also Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, in the Oration on Baptism: God, he says, was that supreme and inaccessible light, which can neither be comprehended by intelligence, nor expressed by speech, illuminating every nature capable of reason, that is, in those things that fall under intelligence, just as the sun is in those things that fall under sense. The second light is an angel, a certain flux or participation of the first light, which has its ^B

CAPUT III. That God is named sun and light from sensible and nobler things, but fire from middle ones; and that the contemplation of symbolic lights is of manifold naming.

^A For this cause, he says, he does not even mention the names of those who were to ascend; for the others would have vehemently desired to follow, to witness the example of that glory; and they would have felt as though they were spurned. For although he showed this light more crassly and concretely, it nevertheless brought with it much desire. And again in the oration to Theodore who had fallen: "What," he says, "is that which shone like the sun?" Now the glory of immortal bodies emits not so much light as this body subject to death, which was not of such a kind as can be discerned by mortal eyes, but which had need of the sight of immortal eyes so that it could be perceived. The same author in the same oration: "But if we wish," he says, "we shall also see Christ, as they did then on the mountain, yet much more splendidly; for he will not come later in such [a manner]; for then, sparing the disciples, he showed only as much splendor as they were able to bear, but afterwards he will come in the very glory of the Father." ^B And Anastasius Sinaites, in his oration on the Transfiguration: "Here," he says, "the signs of the kingdom are prefigured: on this mountain the splendor of the just is adumbrated: here is an express image of future goods as if they were present." Indeed, even the divine Theodore surnamed Graptos, in his oration against Eusebius: "But yet, as the truth holds, let us speak of it thus: After the Savior explained to the disciples concerning the dangers, saying: 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me' 65, and other things of this kind: now these things that were commanded were otherwise most grave and difficult to tolerate; so that they might not be fatigued by the difficulty of these things which were said, he recreates their minds, and places the splendor of those things which were expected and which were to be in the future directly before their sight, very opportunely; ^C wherefore, in as much as the spectators of this mystical spectacle could sustain, he demonstrates that glory with which he is to come at the end of the ages; according to which they themselves too shall shine at the same time, ready to receive this reward for their struggles, so that, placed in dangers, they might more confidently despise present things, in no way comparing these to those things which are viewed, judging that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the future glory which shall be revealed in us 66." But these things did not endure always; but here they were managed and done for a time; for it is a manner of governance. ^D Saint Cyril of Alexandria, in his explanations on Luke: "We say that the transfiguration was brought about, not indeed in such a way that the human body lost its figure, but that it was clothed in a certain splendor. For because they were hearing that our flesh must rise again, but in what condition and form it was uncertain, so that he might give a token of the transformation, he changed his flesh, so that he might confirm our hopes. For now this body of ours is bare flesh; but at the time of the resurrection there will be a certain change befitting God and of splendor, not a change of figure: 'For the just,' he says, 'shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father' 66." But that the splendor which befits the divine substance, all things

^A of the created nature are unable to see, is proven by the disciples, who could not even endure that bodily vision manifested on the mountain. To this, Cyril of Jerusalem says in his tenth catechesis: "Since no one could see the face of God and live, He assumed the face of humanity so that, by seeing it, we might live; and when He wanted to show it with moderate dignity, when His face shone like the sun, the disciples fell down terrified. But if the face, made splendid—not as much as He, who had created splendor in it, was able to make it shine, but as much as the disciples were able to bear—terrified them to the point that they could not endure it, how could anyone have gazed into the dignity of the Godhead?" In the first canon before the feast, in the seventh ode, it is thus: "Thou who hast cleansed the human nature defiled by water and fire, Thou displayest the splendor of this nature in Thy flesh, O Savior, whose face was made more splendid than the sun to prefigure the future glory." The commentators on the Gospels say in their annotations as follows: "The Transfiguration shown to the disciples on the mountain brought forth an example of the future glory of the Savior; but it was shown corporally so that it might be subjected to mortal eyes for viewing, although they could not endure a splendor so excessive, so supreme, and so unequal to our eyes." And again: "Understand the Transfiguration not to have been a change of figure, but rather, while the figure remained as it was before, an accession of light occurred." And again: "He calls the splendor of the countenance like the sun and the brightness of the garments a transfiguration, which is not to be thought of as a change of figure, but as an accession of most splendid light, and this is the change which Paul speaks of, and which the Evangelists named a transfiguration." And elsewhere: "Not as if the human figure of the body were laid aside, but as if the body were clothed with a certain glory of splendor." And again: "The Transfiguration, as it is called, was in accordance with the splendor by which His face shone like the sun, and His garments became white and resplendent," says Luke 68. But Matthew says: "His garments became white as light; for no change of figure is to be expected in the kingdom, either of the Savior Himself, or of those who shall be like Him, but an accession of most radiant light." The divine Cosmas, endeavoring to explain what that splendid color was, and the ^D most splendid appearance of it, says: "The disciples, seeing Christ clothed in that luminous cloud on Tabor, prostrate and inclined to the ground, enlightened in mind, praised Him together with the Father and the Holy Spirit." The most divine John Damascene: "He who once," he says, "led the people of Israel in a cloud of fiery form in the wilderness, today shone on Tabor in an inexplicable manner in brilliance." Again, that golden-tongued one, in his oration to the fallen Theodore: "Then," he says, "He revealed as much on the mountain as could be seen by them, so that it would not harm the gaze of the viewers." And in his oration on the Transfiguration: "Here," he says, "the Lord Christ showed the ^A glory of the kingdom in a way not to be looked upon, not as great as it was in reality, but as great as those who bore mortal eyes could bear." And the blessed Basil in his explanation of the 44th Psalm: "Peter and the sons of thunder," he says, "saw His beauty, more splendid than the brilliance of the sun, and they were deemed worthy, who saw with their eyes the beginnings of His glorious advent." And blessed Ephrem in his oration on the Transfiguration: "He did not," he says, "show the whole abyss of His splendor, but as much as the measure of their pupils could grasp." And John Damascene, celebrating this feast: "But because," he says, "Christ had also once affected the face of Moses with splendor from without, He now eluded the devil by the splendor which here appeared to the sense of the eyes." From which it becomes manifest that the face of the Lord, which shone like the sun—because it fell under the view of the eyes of the body, and a bodily example of future glory was being shown, constructed in accordance with the appearance of the body, and ^B the sense-perceptible splendor figured the glory of the body of Christ glorified after the resurrection, and its beauty, and not the mere Godhead: "For no one," He says, "shall see my face and live" 69. It has been demonstrated, therefore, that the glory of immortal bodies needs eyes that are free from decay and immortal in order to be seen; but as long as the body of the Lord before the resurrection was similarly (except for sin) subject to passion, it was necessary that the light which appeared from Him be defined by bodily eyes; but if it was defined by such eyes, it is manifest that it was bodily, and that it prefigured the glory of the body to be glorified afterwards, and the splendor that is immortal and free from decay: for then the eyes that will see that glory will be intact from decay and immortal. At the same time it is demonstrated that the Transfiguration is nothing else than that, while the divine body remained such as it was before, ^C Christ was clothed in a certain splendid color, and this demonstrated the accession of most splendid light.

CAPUT V.

That light by which the Lord shone on Tabor, was neither His substance, nor a certain efflux of it, and radiance, but a symbol of the hidden and not-now-appearing Godhead of the Word of God, and a faint image of that glory which was to be His, and a likeness of the kingdom of heaven, and one to be numbered among the other miracles of Christ above nature.

The divine Theodore, in his oration on Eusebius against the Iconoclasts: "But insolently," he says, "does Eusebius boast that it was changed into an arcane, and inexplicable, and Word-of-God-befitting light. And yet it is necessary to ask, what was this light? For the excellent man did not overtly demonstrate what it is now; he only brought forward the Word of God, but further on he will speak more openly. We, however, let us now examine the reason against those things which appeared to him. What is it, therefore? Is it some substance, or something that exists by itself and does not need another for its existence?

or is it a quality devoid of substance and body, which is seen to exist in something else and not in itself? But if it is a substance, is it angelic? Since an angel is also light, and a brightness and splendor derived from the first and supreme light. But he will not say this. Theodorus, therefore, having dwelt ingeniously upon these things, had examined many absurdities which would follow; he later says: Such things are discordant and irrational, which are revealed from his principles, if he says that that inexplicable light is a substance: it remains, therefore, for us to ask, whether he said it was an incorporeal quality, lacking substance, having occurred like an effusion of substance, and a splendor emitted from it, into which that form had been changed; but nevertheless, the highest ignominy and absurdity of all would be branded upon the divine body; for ^A the definition of substance will perish, and thus it will be inferred that it does not exist by itself. Furthermore, a quality cannot be demonstrated without a subject as to what it is by itself, even if it is a quality from those things which exist naturally in a substance, or which is reduced to a part of a substance; as for example, rationality will never consist without a subject, which is an animal, unless one first posits an animate, sentient substance; similarly in mortal, and immortal, and other things of this kind. And elsewhere the same person says again: For thus, he says, the eternal divine operation will be piously understood, or rather operation by itself, if it is not distinguished from substance, but rather undergoes the same reasoning on account of the propriety of simplicity and incorporeal nature. And Saint Maximus in his more extended speculation on the Transfiguration: It has been said, therefore, above, how those three blessed apostles were mystically led through the splendor of the light, which appeared on the mountain on the face of the Lord, to that splendor of God, which is completely invisible to all who exist, according to the power and inexplicable and unknown glory of the hidden divinity, understanding that the light which was greater than their senses could sustain appeared as a symbol. And shortly after: I think, he says, that two modes of general theology are mystically explained through those things which were done on the mountain at the divine transfiguration. And again: They learned that that excellent brightness of the face of Christ, starring like the ray of the sun, as if surpassing every vision of the eyes, was ^B a symbol and mark of his divinity, which was above mind, sense, substance, and knowledge; but the garments, having become white, were a symbol and image of the words of the Holy Scripture. Again the same person: Let us see whether, correctly and wisely in both modes of theology already mentioned, a symbol is present according to that divine transfiguration of the Lord; for it was fitting that he who, according to our nature, had wished to be created immutably on account of his immense love for men, should become a figure and symbol of himself; and should symbolically demonstrate himself from himself; and through himself, shown outwardly, should lead every creature to himself, who is deeply hidden and invisible, and through symbols related to our nature should lead us to both modes of theology. And the divine Chrysostom, in his oration to the fallen Theodorus, leaning toward explaining that: It is good for us to be here, says: If, however, he was saying these things when he saw a certain thin ray of future things, what will anyone say when the very truth of things shall be present? Similarly Anastasius, who lived on Mount Sinai, celebrating the feast of the Transfiguration with praises: Since he wished, he says, to persuade them of the future from the present, he made a wonderful theophany on Mount Tabor, that is, an apparition of God, as a certain image and a certain likeness foretelling the kingdom of heaven. The blessed Chrysostom, in his Commentaries on the Gospel of John, chap. 6, homily 42: Just as, he says, in teaching doctrine they did not hear everything with the crowd, so also in signs they did not see all signs with the multitude of the common people; for it was fitting that those to whom the government and leadership of the world was to be entrusted should have something more than the rest. And what signs, he says, did they see apart from the others? The Transfiguration made on the mountain; the walking on the sea; and after the resurrection many and great things. Again the same person in his homily on the Assumption of the Lord, whose beginning is: Every feast is indeed joyful: There was admiration and stupor to the apostles; for when they were mortal by nature, and not accustomed to such spectacles, they were astonished. But someone will say: Had they seen before the transfiguration ^C

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CHAPTER VI.

That all the apparitions of the divine light at different times were the effects of the person of the one Son of God, and that the exemplar of his glorified body was a symbol of his divinity on account of the union of the two natures in Christ according to hypostasis, and because he was the same God and man; whence in each of Christ’s miracles his divinity was revealed, and was uncovered, and laid open.

Peter, and James, and John had indeed seen the Lord transfigured before, and the cloud which had covered them with its shadow; but they had not seen the cloud borne up into the air and into the heavens, and receiving the Lord. That was a miracle, and this too is a miracle; but this is firmer and more constant, and this more sublime than that, even though it was the power and mystery of the one God. Then Moses and Elias appeared to them speaking with him; but now a cherubic throne, that is, an invisible power, hidden in a cloud, suddenly looming, caught up the Lord speaking with his servants; then Peter confidently answered: "Lord, it is good for us to be here; let us make three tabernacles here, one for thee, one for Moses, one for Elias"; but now not even one disciple could speak, nor open his mouth; but rather they were struck dumb, terrified by a very great fear. ^B Gregory the Theologian says in his oration *On the Good Order of Discourse*: "Who are they that ascend the mountain with Christ? For not all were spectators of that miracle, but only Peter, James, and John." And again, the same author, *To Heron*: "When the radiance and splendor of the angels are depicted in bodily form, I believe it to be a symbol of their purity." And in those things which are sung on this feast: "That they who, he says, looked upon thy wonders, may not fear the things which thou hast suffered." And in his *Explanation of the Gospel of Matthew*: "He ascended the mountain, he says, that he might work a miracle in secret." From which it is evident that the light, with which the Lord shone upon Mount Tabor, was neither the divine substance (for that can in no way be expressed, nor known, nor seen, nor thought), nor was it some sort of efflux or splendor flowing from it (for the divine operation is eternal—or rather, the operation itself is in no way distinct from his substance; indeed, whatever is the substance of the divine is its energy or operation). Therefore, because it is neither this nor that, it remains that it was an exemplar of the glory and splendor of the body glorified after the resurrection, and a symbol of that occult and invisible nature hidden within him, and a faint image of future glory, and a likeness of the kingdom of heaven, shown now indeed before the resurrection in a miracle, and in a mirror and in a riddle; but in the future, when the mirrors are removed, with immortal eyes free from corruption, it is to be seen face to face, ^C fully and completely in the vision of the aspectable God, just as he himself is.

^D Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in his *Epistle to Theophilus of Alexandria against Apollinaris*: "For neither, he says, because the creator of the ages was seen in the last days, and conversed with men, are two Sons counted by the Church, one the creator of the ages, and another who at the end of the ages was revealed in human life through the flesh. For if anyone receives the fact that the only-begotten Son of God the Father appeared economically in the flesh in such a way as to construct another Son, when he has numbered all the apparitions of God made to the saints before the only-begotten Son of God appeared in the flesh, and all those which were made after his advent to those who were worthy, then by this second number of divine apparition he has constructed a multitude of sons: and he will have one Son who spoke to Abraham, another who appeared to Isaac; another who wrestled with Jacob; another who was seen by Moses in various apparitions, in light, in darkness, in a column of cloud, face to face, in the hinder parts; another again the Son who was present with the successor of Moses in battle; and another, who answered Job through a storm, and who appeared to Isaiah on a high throne, and was described in human figure by the words of Ezekiel, and who later shone around Paul in the light; and who was seen before on the mountain in more sublime glory. But if this is absurd, and utterly impious, to divide the various apparitions of the only-begotten Son of God into the number of as many sons, it is equally absurd to take the occasion of his advent in the flesh to constitute another Son of God. For we believe that God has always appeared according to the measure of the capacity of each of those to whom God appeared." And blessed Gregory in his oration *On the Proper Order in Disputation*: "But there was a need to ascend the mountain, that he might shine through the form, and show his divinity, and uncover him who was hidden in the flesh." And again the same: "Divinity is by itself invisible; but it will come, so that my..."

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^A opinion is such as he appeared to the disciples, or rather as he was manifested in outline, the divinity too much surpassing the human flesh. And again: "Light," he says, "was that divinity in the mountain, manifested in outline to the disciples," more solid, as it were, than that it could be seen. And Damascenus: "He takes," he says, "the most pure instrument of virginity, so that he who had seen the eternal glory of the Son, might thunder that, *In the beginning was the Word*." And the divine Chrysostom, explaining that: *We beheld his glory, glory as of the Only Begotten from the Father*: "They would never," he says, "have seen it, except through the body nourished and grown with us." And again in his oration on the Transfiguration: "He shows," he says, "and does not show the glory of his divine kingdom, which cannot be looked upon: he shows it indeed, that he might make them certain; but he does not show it, lest they should lose their life together with the sight." And the divine Cosmas in the festal canon, in the fourth ode: "From your flesh," he says, "rays of divinity went forth." The same man still in the fifth ode: "Mingled without confusion, you showed the coal of divinity." Again Chrysostom in homily 42, on John: "They see," he says, "him walking on the sea; and to them being troubled he says: *Be of good cheer; it is I* [a]; why does he not ascend immediately into the boat? Because he wished to perform a greater miracle, and to manifest his divinity to them more openly." And the great Basil: "From the winds," he says, "and the sea, which obeyed him, they recognized his divinity." From his operations, therefore, follows knowledge, and from knowledge proceeds veneration. And in the things which are sung in the middle of Pentecost: "The middle of the days of Pentecost has come, when Christ with divine power thinly veiled healed the paralytic"; and on the new Sunday: "Lord," he says, "in a tolerable brightness of divinity you were present when the doors were closed"; and infinite other things of this kind. From which it is manifest how the same is both one Son of God, and the Word of the Father, who was before his advent in the flesh; he himself wrought the apparitions made at various times, and in his advent with the flesh, as long as he conversed with men, he himself performed the same apparitions of God with power: and after he completed the economy of his advent in the flesh, and was taken up into the heavens, again he himself, according to the measure of the power of each, made and makes spectacles of his nature, which is above all things; and just as before he became man, every symbol and every exemplar was a symbol and exemplar of his divinity; so also now the exemplar of his glorified body is a symbol of his divinity; for ^B one is the Son and God; and after the assumed humanity we piously venerate the blood of God and the body of God. As therefore these things are, so we have been piously taught that the symbol of the glorified human body is a symbol of his divinity, and that in each of his divine signs we have accepted that the divinity, which is above substance, is manifested in outline, and uncovered, and opened, and seen, and beheld, rightly and soundly by the wise, who are skilled in divine things, not ^C affirming that his divinity is visible, infinite and incognizable, but a likeness of divinity, which we contemplate as in an image and a mirror and a riddle. And just as, when there are otherwise infinite divine images of Christ, there are not many Christs, but only one our Lord Jesus Christ; so when there are infinite images of the divinity, which is above substance, and as every divine image is inscribed "Christ," so every one of these likenesses is called "divinity." For from the order, he says, of all things, as one who was made by him, and who has certain images and likenesses of his divine exemplars, we ascend by way and order according to our strength toward that supreme one, which is beyond the entirety of things; and what is more, the divine Word says, *Let us make man according to our image and likeness* [b]; by which however he says that he signifies and shadows forth the likeness of the divinity, this becomes more manifest from those things which the same Gregory the Theologian writes, as if interpreting himself in the second book on Theology, how it is necessary to understand these things: "As," he says, "shadows and images of the sun in water show the sun in outline to weak eyes, because the sun itself, since our sense is overcome by its pure light, cannot be seen from directly opposite—therefore our sense is overcome, it cannot be seen from directly opposite; therefore this signifies 'to show in outline,' because the eye cannot clearly see it, it expresses its likeness through water, or through some other intermediate thing." So the same Gregory interpreted vision as notion, in the second book concerning the Son: "He who," he says, "knows the Son (for this is what that signifies: *He who has seen*), knows also the Father [c]." And John Chrysostom: "He answered," he says, "the Jews, and said: *Not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God*; here also he calls vision 'knowledge'." Therefore to have seen, to have beheld, to have manifested in outline, to have shadowed forth, to have uncovered, to have bared, to have indicated, to have made manifest, are to be accepted either for that which is 'to have known'; or they are to be accepted for that which is 'to have scrutinized as if in an image and likeness through the sight of the eyes'. Likewise to have disclosed a little of the divinity, and to have seen a faint splendor of it, so it is necessary to accept it, just as if we should say we have conjectured through mirrors and riddles. For the divinity is not shown to those seeing it as less or greater than itself: but rather the same, equally infinite, and ^D not to be tracked out and impartible, accordingly creates every kind of light according to the measure of those who see, and proposes it for the elevation of our minds.

[a] Matt. xiv, 27. [b] Gen. i, 26. [c] Matt. xi, 27.

CHAPTER VII.

That the Lord restored to human nature that beauty which Adam had possessed before the sin of disobedience, He demonstrated first in the mountain of Tabor in His own person, and indeed in a living way; and afterward, following His resurrection, He shall naturally shine with that same light, now far more abundant [a], and He will have the just with Him, following Him and more splendid than the sun, thereby restoring them into that beatitude which existed before the sin of Adam.

The divine Andrew of Crete in his Great Canon says: I have lost my first beauty and my composure; and thence I lie naked, and am ashamed. And Gregory the Theologian [b]: He is clothed in coats of skin, perhaps with a flesh that is thicker, and mortal, and hard, and resistant. And the divine and blessed Cosmas and John, in their Canons on the Transfiguration: You who have borne the whole of Adam, O Christ, have changed his nature, which was darkened and dulled, and restored it to the splendor it had before; and by the changing of Your form, You have deified it. And again: For when You, Savior, had ascended into this mountain with Your disciples, You, being transfigured, have made the nature of Adam, which had been overshadowed, to shine again, changing it into the glory and splendor of Your divinity. And again: Today Christ in the mountain of Tabor has changed the nature of Adam, and rendering it splendid, has deified it. And again: You who with Your inaspectable hands, O Christ, formed man after Your image, You demonstrated the beauty of Your archetype in the nature formed by You, not as in an image, but as One who is essentially God and the same man. And again: He who once with Moses on Mount Sinai spoke through symbols, when He said, "I am who I am" [76], today, being transfigured on Mount Tabor before the disciples, has shown that human nature in Him has recovered the beauty of the image. And Saint Cyril, in the seventh book of those which he wrote in the manner of a dialogue: Do we not say that man was fashioned on earth according to the image of God? Who denies this? But He who engraves the divine image in us, and imprints upon us the beauty that is above the heavenly, like a seal, is He not the Spirit? And the divine Anastasius of Sinai, in his oration on the Transfiguration: Today that nature of Adam, which, having been made like unto God, had been obscured by the deiform shapes of idols, has been transfigured into its ancient beauty after the image and likeness of God. Today the nature which had wandered in the mountains and worshipped idols has, without any mutation of itself, been sought out on the mountain and has emitted the splendid rays of the divinity. Today he who was clothed with those sad and burdensome tunics has taken up the garment made by God, putting on light as a garment. Moreover, even that theologian of golden eloquence, in his homily on fasting, speaks thus: Adam lost the royal garment of immortality, a garment more beautiful than can be told, which indeed Moses and Elias carried on the mountain of the Transfiguration. ^A And the great Dionysius in the first chapter of *The Divine Names*: Now, he says, the love of God toward men in the sacred Scriptures and apostolic traditions conveniently veils for us those things which fall under the intellect with sacred coverings falling under the senses; and those things which are above substance, it conceals with those things which are in the nature of things; it covers with forms and figures those things which lack form and figure; and that one and simple thing, which is above substance and nature, and which cannot be figured, it multiplies and fashions by a variety of partible signs; but when we have become immortal, and shall reach that most blessed state similar to Christ, then always, as the true Scripture says, we shall be with the Lord, filled with the purest contemplations of the aspectable apparition of God, which shall surround us with most lucent flashes, as it did the disciples in that most divine Transfiguration, and we shall be made participants of the inaspectable illumination in a mind devoid of matter and impassible, and at the same time of the union, which cannot be conceived by the mind, in the unknown and blessed casts of the rays, which are beyond measure clear, in an imitation more divine than the heavenly minds; for we shall be, as Scripture says [78], equal to the angels, and children of God, having been made children of the resurrection. ^B This Saint Maximus notes when he says: The saints in the resurrection shall obtain a state similar to Christ with immortality, shining more than the sun shines, as the Lord was transfigured on the mountain, just as the Apostle says concerning the saints: Then they shall be as He is, and we shall always be with the Lord. And he calls His divine body "the aspectable apparition of Him" (ὁρατὴν αὐτοῦ θεοφάνειαν), so that this saying may at once quadrate with the Nestorians, and the Acephali, and with those who opine that the Lord is not now with flesh. There is in Christ a certain aspectable apparition of God, which is His animated flesh; and there is another apparition of God, which is perceived by the mind, which shall be more perfectly participated in by us when, having been turned to God, and having perfectly received the splendor from thence, we shall be made one, freed from the varieties proceeding from composition. And Anastasius of Sinai, in his oration on the Transfiguration: What, he says, is greater and more stupendous than to see God in the form of a man with a face shining as the sun shines, and refulgent more than the sun, and casting rays of light without any intermission, and with a most pure finger placed on His mouth [c], saying to the disciples who were there with Him: Thus shall the just shine in the resurrection; thus shall they be glorified, into this glory shall they be changed, into this kind of light, into this very image, into this species, into the same beatitude shall they be conformed, having been made conformable and fellow-sitters with me, the Son. ^C

[76] Exod. iii, 14. [77] Matt. xxii, 30. [78] I Thess. iv, 16. [a] That is, truly and in His substance. [b] In the oration on the Nativity of Christ. [c] This signifies what He said to the disciples there: Tell the vision to no one.

of God. And in those things which are sung for this feast: Thou didst ^A show, He says, the transformation of mortals with Your glory, O Savior, in Your second fearful coming, having been transfigured on the mountain. And Gregory the Theologian, in his oration on the Nativity of the Lord: How many, he says, are the solemn assemblies for me in each of the mysteries of Christ? The head of all of which is one, namely, my perfection, and restoration, and return to the first Adam. And Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book on Ecclesiastes: Such as the soul has been made, such will it appear again, once purified; such an object is the body, which was formed by the hands of God, such as the resurrection at its proper time will demonstrate. For as you shall see it to be after the resurrection, such it was altogether at the beginning; for the resurrection is nothing other than a return to the ancient state. From this it is manifest that the beauty which Adam had before he disobeyed, and that splendor in which he was then created according to nature, the Lord has prefigured that He would recover for human nature in His own human body, when He shone more brightly than the sun on Mount Tabor. Yet afterwards, following His resurrection, just as He liberated nature from corruption and rendered it immortal, so He restored to it all its splendor, shining with a light far greater than can be told, having with Him those who follow, the righteous, who shine more brightly than the sun: if not fully and perfectly today, then certainly in the common resurrection of the human race, when we, having become immortal in that same nature, shall attain the state of Christ and most blessed companionship with Christ, dancing in the choir with Christ. For the end of the Savior’s charity towards us, greater than can be conceived, is our perfection and restoration, and our return to the first Adam, accomplished most wisely by Christ through His humanity.

CHAPTER VIII.

That the light of the resurrection is future according to its essence, and that it is the kingdom of God prepared for us, and what the heavenly city is, which pertains to the kingdom of God.

Saint Basil in his sixth homily on the Hexaemeron: Neither I, he says, say that you or I can separate the light from the body of the sun, but that those things which can be separated by us in thought, can be separated in act by the author of nature: since you also cannot separate the power of burning, which is in the fire, from its splendor; but God, when He willed to convert His servant by an admirable ^B miracle, cast fire into the bush, which would have the efficiency of light from the splendor alone, but would be empty and inert regarding the power of burning; as David attests when he says: The voice of the Lord divides the flame of fire. Whence a certain hidden discourse is handed down, which teaches us that in the remunerations of works, the nature of fire in this life is to be divided; and that the light is to be separated for the righteous to enjoy, but the part that burns is to be reserved for the torment of the guilty. And again, the same [author], in the twenty-ninth Psalm, in the homily of the moral teachings: The ^C fire prepared is divided by the voice of the Lord, so that because a double power exists in fire, one of burning and the other of illuminating, that sharp and burning part is left for the torment of the worthy; but that which illuminates and is splendorous, is attributed to the joy of those who rejoice. The voice of the Lord therefore divides the flame of fire, and portions it out; so that the fire of torment may not shine, and the light of resurrection may not burn. And again, in the first book of the Hexaemeron: There was, he says, a state more ancient than the origin of the world, which befitted supernatural powers, beyond time, eternal and perpetual; and in that state the author and creator of the universe made [His] creatures; the intellectual light, which was fitting for the blessedness of those who love the Lord; beings endowed with reason, and invisible natures, and their entire order. And Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book of the Refutations against Eunomius, ch. 26: To all, he says, I think it is known—I mean those who have moderately considered the things that are—that the author of the universe, who made the ages, or time, and place in them as a receptacle for those things which were made within them, he creates all things in these; for nothing of those things which have been created, or are being created, can be otherwise than in place or in time. And the great Athanasius, in the second book Against the Arians: Therefore, much more did Peter not signify a creature, when he spoke thus; for he knew it was the Son of God, whom he had confessed, saying: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God; but rather, he signified the kingdom and his dominion in us being created and existing by grace. And the divine Chrysostom, in the oration which he inscribed Against the Heretics, and on the petition of the sons of Zebedee, which begins, Yesterday we returned from war, Consider, he says, also here the great providence for our race, when he speaks to those whom he crowns: Come, he says, blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you ^D before the foundation of the world; but to those who are tormented, he did not say: Depart from me, cursed, into the fire prepared for you, but prepared for the devil and his angels; for he prepared the kingdom for men, but hell, he says, not for men, but for the devil and his angels. But if you have lived your lives in such a way that you are worthy of punishment and torment, it is right that you should be deemed to have prepared the fire for yourselves. And behold how great is God's propensity to charity toward men: there were not yet any to contend, and already crowns and rewards were prepared: Inherit, he says, the kingdom prepared for you before the foundation of the world. The same, again: Christ not only liberated us from torments, but also granted us a life much more splendid than the former one; he introduced us into another world, he made another creature. And Saint Isaac: Fear, he says, God, and you will understand who fashioned you, and strengthens you, and guards you, and who, because of you, made a double world, one indeed as a teacher and instructor, nevertheless perishable; but the other as

an eternal dwelling, and a heavenly and immovable city, and his eternal kingdom, and dominion, of which he himself is truly king and Lord.

CAPUT IX.

The great Dionysius, in the first chapter of *The Celestial Hierarchy*: "Every good gift," he says, "and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights" (Jas. I, 17). But every emanation of light proceeding from the Father, which comes to us as a good gift, in turn as a certain unifying power, elevates us, renders us simple, and gathers us toward the unity of the Father, and converts us to ^B deifying simplicity, if indeed all things are from him and into him, as the holy Scripture says (Rom. XI, 36). Therefore, invoking Jesus, who is the paternal light, the true light that "enlightens every man coming into this world" (John I, 9), through whom "we have access to the Father" (Eph. II, 18; Rom. V, 2), let us look, according to our ability, into the illuminations of the holy Scriptures handed down by the Fathers. And again, the same author, in chapter 7 of the same *Celestial Hierarchy*: "The contemplative ones," he says, "not as observers of symbols, which are perceived either by sense or by mind, nor elevated to God by the variety of the contemplation of the sacred Scriptures, but as filled with the simple, higher light of all knowledge, and ^C satisfied with the contemplation of that beauty which is the maker and origin of beauty, and which is above substance, and shines in the Trinity, as far as it is lawful; but likewise participants of the communion of Jesus, not informed in holy images, which, as it were, express the deifying likeness in them as forms, but as truly approaching him in the very first participation of the cognition of his lights, which are deifying," etc. And again, the same author, chapter 4, *On the Divine Names*: "But now," he says, "we must celebrate with praises the name of light, by which the supreme good is termed; for the supreme good is called intellectual light, because it fills every super-celestial mind with intellectual light; ^D and it casts out all ignorance and error from all minds in which it is, and imparts sanctifying light to them all, and cleanses and frees their eyes of the mind from the darkness diffused by ignorance; and it awakens and opens those compressed and closed by the great weight of shadows, and gives first a moderate splendor, then, as if by light tasted, and with eyes now more longing for light after the tasting, it imparts itself more, and shines more copiously, because they have loved much; and it always leads them further forward, by the proportion of their study, toward looking upward. Therefore, the intellectual light is called that good which is above every light, as the fountain of rays, and an effusion of light inundating every supramundane, circummundane, and mundane mind, illuminating from its fullness, and renewing all their faculties of understanding, and containing all things, insofar as it extends above all; and excelling all, insofar as it stands above all, and, to speak once, as the prince of light and above light, it holds within itself every principality of illuminating, and what it holds, it pre-holds above; and it gathers together all things using reason and mind, and unites them into one; for just as ignorance divides those who err, so the arrival of light gathers and unites those who are illuminated, and perfects them, and converts them to that which truly is, recalling them from many opinions, and collecting their various aspects, or, to speak more properly, their various visions, into one true and pure and simple cognition, and fills them with one unitary light." Indeed, also Gregory the Theolo- [index: entries preserved]

- ^A gus, He is eternal, he says, and none other. For what need was there of a second light for those who have the greatest? But for those who are below us and around us, He makes the first power of this light to shine forth. Again, the same author in the second book Of Theology: How great, he says, is that light, if you have considered this? This is the sun among those things which are perceived by sense, just as He is among those things that fall under the intellect, as one of the ancients said. For the sun illuminates the sight, just as He illuminates the mind; the sun is the most beautiful of all things that are seen, just as He is of all things that are understood. And blessed Chrysostom says: "May your eternal light shine upon us sinners"; by the eternal light, understand entirely the Holy Spirit, who illuminates and sanctifies our souls, of whom the Apostle says: *God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts* ^B to illuminate them; whom he calls the grace of God: *For I say, by the grace of God that has been given to me, to all who are among you, not to think more highly than one ought to think, but to think with sobriety*. Of whom also the prophet David said: *Send forth your light and your truth*, and: *In your light we shall see light*. For the Son is light, the Holy Spirit is light, the Father is light. Furthermore, in the daily prayers: "O Christ," they say, "true light, who came into the world to illuminate every man, let the light of your countenance be signed upon us, that in it we may see the inaccessible light, and the joyful light of the holy glory of the immortal Father, the heavenly Spirit, blessed Jesus." When the sun has reached its setting, upon seeing the evening light, we praise the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And the divine Damascene, in his hymns, says: "O immutable Light, Word of the light of the unbegotten Father, in your light today seen on Tabor, we have seen the Father as light, and the Spirit, illuminating every creature." Indeed, even Gregory the Theologian says: "In the light of the Lord, see the light: in the Spirit of God, embrace the Son, the triune and indivisible light." And Saint Maximus in the *Theological* works says: "He is called light, and life, and resurrection, and truth; light, indeed, as the splendor of souls and as the expeller of the darkness of ignorance, and as one illuminating the mind to understand hidden things and showing forth mysteries, which are visible only to pure ^C sights; but He is called life, because He offers to souls that love the Lord the motion towards things divine which becomes them; but He is called resurrection, because He awakens the mind from the dead affection for transitory things and renders it free and pure from every kind of corruption and ruin; but truth, because He bestows upon the worthy the immutable possession of good things." From which it is manifest that every light, whether sensible or intelligible, shines forth from the true and supra-substantial light: and that God is called intelligible light, because by His fullness He draws the whole world away from ignorance, converts it to the knowledge of Himself, and fills it with one unitary light; and it is otherwise demonstrated that through every light—both that which is seen and that which we pray to be signed upon us from the divine face of the Lord—we are led to the other intelligible and inaccessible light which we contemplate in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, so that now, through the lights which are seen and which are understood, we may be called back to one thought, that God is above every light and every intelligence.

CHAPTER X

insisting as it were in the footprints of the most holy places of His intellect; and then, being absolute and free from those things which are seen and from those who see, he enters into the truly mystical darkness of ignorance, in which mystical darkness he excludes all concepts and clings to Him who at the root can neither be touched nor seen, having become wholly His who is beyond all things—neither his own, nor anyone else's, but united by the voiding of all cognition, according to the better part, with Him who is profoundly unknowable.

And Gregory the Theologian, in his oration on the baptism: God, he says, is the supreme and inaccessible light, which can neither be comprehended by the mind nor expressed in speech, and which has the faculty of illuminating every nature that shares in reason: this is, among those things which are understood, what the sun is among those things which are perceived by the senses. From which it is clear that all lights, whether they are those perceived by the senses or those by the intellect, are left behind by those who have escaped to the supreme contemplation of Him who is beyond all things, and have entered into the most splendid darkness of not comprehending Him, with no light expressing or designating Him.

From the chapters arranged, the material exposition of this part is established; for the showing forth of the divine lights is contained either in the lights which are perceived by the senses; and it makes the sun ^A an image of God, and likewise fire an image of God; and from the more noble things, as from the sun and light, it imposes on God the name of light; and from intermediary things, as from fire, it is contained in the symbolic lights, in which the chief is the apparition of light which took place in the most divine transfiguration of the countenance of the Lord, which shone like the sun, which represented as in an image the beauty of the body of Christ made glorious after the resurrection; and it was a symbol of the divinity which lay hidden in Him: because in Christ our Savior it is the same to speak of the symbol of the glorified body and of His divinity, and that the light, which thus appeared in the Lord on Mount Tabor, signified the beauty of Adam before the sin, and that He had already recovered that nature in the humanity of Christ, and that the splendor of the righteous will be such after the resurrection, and what light is according to existence, which will appear in the future after the resurrection: and that God is the intelligible light, which shines in incorporeal natures, inasmuch as He is truly the effector of their splendor; finally, in the last place, we have posited the voiding of all light, and the divine darkness itself. Nothing, therefore, is left out in the material exposition of this treatise on light, but rather the whole showing forth of divine light has been briefly treated.

SEVENTH DECAD. — ON DIVINE PARTICIPATION.

CHAPTER I.

That it is proper to God to be present to all things according to substance; and as substance is present, so also He is present by operation: and what the mode of His presence is, which cannot be explained.

Saint Justin Martyr, in his *Oration on the Right Confession*, says: How is the Word everywhere according to substance? And how is He in His own temple? For if He is there, just as He is in all things, He will have no more of a temple than all other things. And where shall we place that which is written: *In Him dwells the fullness of the divinity bodily*? But if one should concede that He is more in the temple, He is not present to all things according to substance, which is proper to God. It is an evident argument of infidelity to say concerning God: "How?" How is He the effector of the heavens, how of the earth, how of the sea, and of the air and of plants, and of all living creatures, and of yourself? You who inquire diligently about all things concerning God, you will clearly say that He produced all things by His abundant power. Did the power of God, therefore, attend the things that were being made according to accident, or according to substance? If according to accident, it attended them indeed as if they existed before they were made; since an accident ^B does not exist according to nature by itself, but exists in some subjects prior to it. But if this is ridiculous, it remains that the power of God is present to all things according to substance.

Was the power of God, therefore, ^C present to all things that are made according to substance, and did the temple itself in which He was possess nothing more? This has a difficulty, and that has one; and faith is the solution of both difficulties. You have seen how invincible reason overthrows infidelity; see the tongues fighting against God stopped. The same one also says: Tell us then, how did the Word, having become flesh, not abandon the heavens? Truly you will say that, remaining God, thus He was made flesh. Therefore, tell us again, how, remaining what He was, was He made what He was not? For if He remained what He was, how was He made what He was not? But if He was made what He was not, how did He remain what He was? If you have a doubt about the solution, have a doubt also about the mode of the union. But you believe that, remaining what He was, He was made flesh; believe also that the Word is present everywhere according to substance, and in a certain special way is in His own temple.

Indeed, even the holy Anastasius of Antioch, in his book *On the Incircumscript*, says: But some, he says, as it seems, transfer the infirmity of their own nature onto God, restricted in the greatest matters, and thinking it better to withdraw the divine nature ^D from matter than to imagine it being extended and stretched out to all things; altogether judging it to be a sacrilege and impious for that nature which is more than beyond all things to be clothed in bodies not becoming to it, full of filth and foul odor, or in impious souls; or in certain other things which are of least account.

They truly have lowly thoughts, and thoughts unworthy of God and of His greatness, which cannot be attained. And a little further on: "They weigh therefore weak and infirm things in their minds, holding no firm foundation, because God rejects none of His creatures; for He deems nothing of those things which exist to be sordid; nay rather, when He approaches us, He does not become a participant in our vice." And again in the same book: "But because they say that [His] operation is in all things (for they wish not to circumscribe this), they must be interrogated as to how they think about it. Do they say that it participates in earthly filth when it approaches them, or not? If they confess this to be true, it is manifest that it is possible for that which approaches not to participate in the vice of those things to which it has approached. But if they are going to say that it does participate, the same absurdity will follow those who say this, as when they were circumscribing God in order to escape away. Let them therefore contract [His] operation, so that they may dissolve the universe entirely. But if, fearing this absurdity, they be led as if by repentance to say that the divine operation is not harmed at all, why do they not affirm this very thing regarding [His] substance?" To these points, Photius the patriarch, in his *Questions to Amphilochius*, ch. 75, says: "Why, he asks, does he who doubts whether, if God is in all things, He is not above all things, not know that he is ignorant of what is written in Holy Scripture regarding the divine nature? He thinks nothing more lofty than what the custom of earthly things implies, nor any more divine thing regarding those which are exempt from matter. But indeed how is He in all things (a)? It has been said indeed, in no way of those things which exist, and if any thing more pertaining to contemplation must be said, and one must not fear to be lifted up along with those who are high-minded, to the height of theological dogmas, God is in the universe simultaneously according to operation and substance. And do not say to me: How? For it has already been said, in no way of creatures. How therefore is He according to substance? Just as you have understood according to operation. For because some things are occasionally in potentiality, and occasionally in act; God however, insofar as a sharp mind can understand, is always in act (for He does not proceed from imperfect to perfect; nor is He anything else than, through Himself, act, ^B and is in actuality), it is a clear consequence that, in those things in which He is according to operation or act, in those very things He is present according to substance." And the great Athanasius in his books *Against the Arians*: "Everywhere," he says, "is present the substance of His greatness; because the Son is equal to the Father, and is present everywhere with the Father by divinity; and because substance contains all things. For if you say He is not present everywhere, you will say that the things which were made are greater than their author is." And the divine Chrysostom: "That indeed God is everywhere, I know, and that He is whole everywhere; but how, I do not know; for it is not possible that we should see substance, neither that which is from itself, nor that which is from another." And Cyril of Jerusalem in his *Catecheses*: "In mere divinity," he says, "it is superfluous to think of ascent and descent; for that power which contains all things, He who is present everywhere to all, who encompasses the universe with His Spirit, is not transferred from place to place; His is the voice: *I fill heaven and earth*." If therefore He fills, whither is He transmitted? Thus it comes to be, that it is superfluous in divinity that He ascends and descends. But in the Savior, and in the dispensation of His advent in the flesh, it is properly said that He ascends and descends. And John Damascene (b): "God," he says, "is devoid of parts, whole in the whole everywhere; and not a part divided in a part of the body; but whole in all, and whole above all." From which it is made manifest that it is proper to God to be present to all according to substance. But as substance is present, so is His power and operation, for according to substance power is present; and operation is not one thing by itself, and substance another. But how God is present according to substance, and equally to all, and how He Himself is in all and above all, the manner can neither be told, nor known.

CAPUT II.

Magnus Dionysius in those things which he noted from the holy Hierotheus in his theological *Principles*: "The Cause of all, and which fills all, is the divinity of Jesus, which keeps the parts consenting to the whole (1): and neither ^{C D} [1] Scholia: [...] *Hierotheus therefore teaches how the divinity of Christ is the cause in all these things and begins from the extreme, that is, from the whole, and returns to the first, that is, to the principles of things. "It preserves, therefore," he says, "the universe, and the parts of the universe consenting to the whole, and conspiring with it; and it itself is not the whole, nor a part, because it does not have the perfection of the whole and the part, as the whole and the part, but is more excellent into infinity, and is again the whole and part of the divinity of Christ, namely because whatever perfection there is in the whole and in the part, this the divinity of Christ itself bestows, and has above [all]; the rest are easier. That statement, however: 'Substance subsisting in all substances unpolluted,' signifies that God is in all substances, and is participated in by them not through mixture, that is, not being mingled with them, from Saint Thomas on Dionysius.*

(a) Aristotle explains the ways in which one thing is said to be in another in Book IV of the *Physics*. (b) Lib. I, ch. 16, *Orthodox Faith*.

^A nor is it a whole; and it is a whole, and a part, insofar as it comprehends the all, the whole, and the part within itself; and it transcends and precedes, perfect indeed among the imperfect, as the principal cause of perfection; but imperfect among the perfect, as more than perfect and pre-perfect, the form of form, the producer in those things which lack form, as the principal cause of form, without form in the forms themselves, inasmuch as it is above form; a substance standing over all substances without pollution, and abstracted from every substance above substance, determining all principles and orders, placed above every principle and every order. And the great Athanasius, in his *Disputation against the Arians*: "According to these, the divinity of the Father and the Son is holy and sanctifying, which sanctifies all things that participate in reason, to whom has been given the power of free will and of striving to attain the holy and blessed substance in the communion of sanctification." And divine Cyril in the *Thesauri* (a): "As therefore," he says, "a woman is called the glory of her husband, because she received a part from his members for her formation, so man is called the glory of God, because he was made a participant in His substance through the Holy Spirit who dwelt in him." And again the same, discussing the Holy Spirit: "Therefore, since the Holy Spirit dwells in those who have been approved by God, and it is Christ who dwells [there], it is necessary to say that the Spirit himself is of the divine substance; and he makes those who participate in him participants of it." And again the same in the same works: "The Holy Spirit is therefore by nature God, since he regenerates the saints so that they may be one with God, who dwells in them." And further, the same in the same works: "What need is there then for a long circuit of words, and to weave multiple concepts? For we say that this very sanctifying power flowing from the Father, which grants perfection to the imperfect, is the Holy Spirit; and it is superfluous for a creature to be sanctified through an intermediate agent, when the kindness of God has deigned to reach even to the least, and to sanctify them through His own Spirit." And divine Theophanes in his *Canticles*: "Light," he says, "of one principle, and shining in three, substance without principle, beauty, immense, dwells in my heart." And again in the same: "Heavenly King, Paraclete, Spirit of truth, who art present everywhere and fillest all things, who art the treasury of blessings and giver of life, come and dwell in us; and cleanse us from every stain, and save our souls." From which it is clear that, with God present according to substance, we participate in His substance without mixture: and that it is He Himself who sanctifies us and dwells in us, and purifies us from every stain through His own Spirit, who is above substance. ^B

CHAPTER III

The Lord says in the Gospel: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word; and I and the Father will come, and we will make our abode with him" (John xiv, 23). This, indeed, the great and supreme of the apostles, Peter, explains in his Epistle when he says: "We have become partners of the divine nature" (II Petr. i, 4). Consenting with him are the words which Paul, also great, says: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" (I Cor. iii, 16). And again: "You are the temple of the living God, as God said: 'I will dwell in them, and I will walk [among them]; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people'" (II Cor. vi, 16). Similarly, those who followed afterwards are holy. The great Athanasius, in his *Epistle to Serapion*: "But thus," he says, "having been sealed, we become partners of the divine nature in a way consistent with it, as Peter said, and thus every creature of the Word becomes a participant in the Holy Spirit, and through the Holy Spirit we are said to be participants of God; for he says: 'Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?'" And the same in the same epistle: "But now, when we are called participants of Christ and participants of God, the chrism is shown, that is, the anointing, which is in us, and the seal, which is not of a created nature, but of the Son, who through the Holy Spirit joins us with the Father; for John, teaching a little above, wrote: 'In this we know that we abide in God, and He in us, from His Spirit which He has given to us'" (I Joan. iv, 13). But if by participation in the Holy Spirit we are made partners of the divine nature, he would be insane who says that the Holy Spirit is of a created nature, and not of God; for this reason He is in men, and through Him men are deified; but if He deifies, there is no doubt that His nature is the nature of God. The great Basil in the things he writes about the Holy Spirit: "No creature," he says, "can be participated in by an animal endowed with reason, so that it dwells in it ^C οὐσιωδῶς, that is, according to substance (b); but the Holy Spirit dwells in it, as the Scripture says: 'You are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you'; therefore the Holy Spirit is uncreated." And blessed Cyril in the things he wrote about the Holy Spirit: "Therefore, the Holy Spirit operates in us by Himself, truly sanctifying and coupling us to Himself in one by His conjunction, and making us participants of the divine nature." And again: "If, receiving the Spirit of Christ, we are led through Him to God the Father, as having become partners of the divine nature, how will He be a creature, through whom we are joined with God as [our] kind?" Further, the same in the *Chapters on the Holy Spirit*: "If He is a servant, as ^D

^A we cry 'Abba, Father'? Indeed, it liberates from servitude those in whom it is, or rather it refashions them into sons of liberty, making them partakers of its nature; therefore, it is not a servant; and if it is not a servant, therefore it is not a creature; and to be a creature and to be numbered as a servant would be nothing other than to shy away from the divine substance. And again, the same in the same place: 'God, therefore, is the Spirit who forms us to the likeness of God, not as if ministering through grace, but bestowing the participation of Himself upon those who are worthy through the divine nature.' And what is the proof of these things? Holy Scripture, Scripture inspired by God, which openly and perfectly joins God and His Spirit together; and it teaches openly that there will be no participation of God otherwise than through the Holy Spirit: for our Lord Jesus Christ says, I think, to every faithful and good person: *I and the Father will come, and we will make our abode with him* (John XIV, 23); and: *In this we know that He is in us, from the Spirit which He has given us* (I John IV, 13). For one is able to have within oneself the One who dwells and moves by nature and is truly God in abundance, when one has received His Spirit, not as something alien, nor distracted and divided from Him in substance, but rather as from Him, and in [those] who receive, and as His own, bearing a dominion equal to His, and thus named [(a)], and as if assumed in the order of the Son [(b)] on account of the same nature." And in chapter 1 of book IV of the *Thesaurus*, as if in the person of the heretics: "The Father is alien from our communication, and not participant to us by Himself on account of His excessive and supreme participation of divinity, which cannot be grasped by human nature, but is grasped, and is in us, through the Son, as if through one who is lesser, forsooth. How, therefore, is He similar to the Father, who is capable of being grasped by us, who cannot grasp Him?" ^B But answering this, Cyril says: "Drunken again, he says, are these opponents of God with their own madness, not understanding, as it appears, neither what they say nor of what they affirm. For if, as you say, all great things and things above nature are in the Father, it is necessary to concede that equal goodness exists in Him. How, therefore, can He who is supremely good not be grasped by those who are in need of goodness? How is He entirely good, who blocks the participation of Himself from all on account of goodness that is too great for the capacity of a creature? For it was fitting (which indeed seems to be the truth), that He who is supremely good should extend the goodness suitable to Himself to all, and bestow it upon all who are in need, for their enjoyment. But it is already apparent that He has done this, when He promises that He will dwell in us and will walk among us, and promises to adopt us as sons. The question of the impious is therefore empty; for it is apparent that God does not turn away from being grasped on account of the magnitude and ^C excellence of His nature; but rather, He leans the more toward gentleness, the greater the things that are in Him—one of which, and the most beautiful of all, is the goodness which extends through the Son, as He Himself says*, unto the evil and the good, denying the participation of Himself to no one at all. But the participation of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit takes place properly and decently; just as we participate in the sun through the radiance that comes from it, which is not produced without heat. Therefore, just as no one should say that the light emitted from the sun, or the heat, is dissimilar to the sun, because the sun is participated through these; so it is not necessary that the Son be dissimilar to the Father because the Father is participated through the Son; but rather, it demonstrates that He is similar in all things. For where we are made partakers of the Son, we are not deprived of the participation of the Father; how, then, will not the Father and the Son be the same? But where there is the same substance, what place will there be for dissimilarity? Let the opponents of Christ answer. From which it becomes manifest that, being partakers of the Holy Spirit, we partake of the Son, who is God, and thus participating in Him, we partake of God the Father, and thus we are made ^D partakers of the whole divine nature and substance. But how the participation of the Trinity, which is above substance, occurs in us, cannot be told; just as it cannot be told what the mode of His substance is, and how He is everywhere present according to substance.

CAPUT IV.

Saint Cyril, in the seventh book of the *Dialogues to Hermias*: "If," he says, "the grace which is given through the Holy Spirit were severed from the substance of the Holy Spirit, why did the blessed Moses not openly say that the Author of all, upon producing living beings, breathed in grace—I mean grace through the inspiration of life? But Christ to us, *Receive grace* [**], namely through the ministry of the Holy Spirit? Why rather was that called the *breath of life* [**]? For life was the nature of the divinity, if indeed we truly *live, and move, and are in Him* [*]; but it was said by the voice of the Lord: *Receive the Holy Spirit* (John XX, 22), because He truly dwells in the hearts of the believers." And a little later: "When, therefore, we are formed to the likeness of Christ, He Himself is also imprinted in us, and is beautifully expressed as if through the Spirit [who is] naturally similar. God, therefore, is the Holy Spirit, who forms us to the likeness of God, not as if by ministering grace."

^A And thus it comes to pass: "I and the Father will come, and will make our abode with him," as it has been said. For where there is light, there is splendor; and where there is splendor, there is the operation of it, and the splendid grace. And the great Basil, in his epistle to his brother Gregory: "Every good thing," he says, "whatsoever comes down to us from the divine power, we term the operation of grace working all things in us; for one and the same Spirit worketh all things." And again, the same: "The Holy Spirit who exists from God, I call the fountain of holiness, the power that effects life, and the perfecting grace; through whom man is adopted as a son, and that which is mortal is made immortal, being one in all things with the Father and the Son." ^B Furthermore, according to the homonymy of the divinity (a), which is above substance, certain other things are called grace. Paul declares this when writing to the Romans: "Even so then," he says, "at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work." And again the same Apostle: "For by grace are ye saved." And again: "For ye are not under the law, but under grace." And elsewhere: "In this grace, which is ministered by us." And again: "Since the day ye heard of it, and knew the grace of God in truth." And the divine Chrysostom, explaining that passage: "Of his fullness have all we received," and: "Grace for grace": "What grace," he says, "for what? For the old, the new"; and concerning: "By grace are ye saved": "Not of your own works," he says, "but gratis." And the great Athanasius, in the third book *Against the Arians*: "He knew where Lazarus lay, yet He asked, so that, by taking upon Himself our ignorance, He might grant us to know only His true Father, and Him whom He sent for our sake for the salvation of all, than which there can be no greater grace." From which it is clear that we are participants in the nature of God, not participants in a mere grace flowing from God and which does not exist by itself; but we participate in the Spirit Himself, who is above substance, life-giving, and existing by Himself. And through this selfsame [Spirit] ^C we are conjoined with the Father and the Son, and we are made partakers of the divine nature; and we are enriched by this grace, namely the grace of the three persons, which is grace in itself. And just as ^D each divine person from the three is also called grace individually; and most especially the supreme God the Savior, and He who is above substance, the Holy Spirit, both together are called grace. Therefore, just as these are called grace principally, and divinely, and efficiently, so by homonymy every good gift, which proceeds to us from the divine persons themselves, is called grace as a created benefit to us and

(a) That is, just as a holy man is equivocally called God, so also is the grace which is from God.

CHAPTER V

For just as God, who is grace by his own nature, and the power or virtue of the three persons, is efficiently participated in by us, so the same God produces and creates the distribution of divine graces, which were created to be participated in.

The great apostle Paul says: There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit; and there are divisions of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are divisions of operations, but the same God, who works all in all. And further: All these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each one as he wills. And again: Emulate the better charisms. Item: If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not charity, I have become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. Regarding which place the blessed Chrysostom, applying himself to it, says: Do you see where he extolled the grace of tongues, and where he overturned and broke it? And again the same in homily 29 on the Epistle to the Corinthians: Regarding spiritual things, he says, I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers; he calls symbols spiritual, because these works are of the Holy Spirit alone, human effort contributing nothing to the accomplishment of such miracles. And again the same, in his Oration on the Holy Spirit: The Spirit of God, the Spirit from God, the Spirit who proceeds from the Father, these are names of the holy and undefiled virtue or power; but there are other names, not of nature, but convenient to operation, according to his gifts. I say, therefore, when the Holy Spirit has bestowed sanctification upon me or another Christian, and he has received the gift such that he has a holy body and a holy soul, this gift is called the spirit of holiness, that is, the grace of holiness; if anyone receives from the Holy Spirit the virtue and gift of believing in the promise of future goods, he has received the spirit of promise; if one receives the gift of wisdom, this gift is called the spirit of wisdom; if one has the charisma of charity, he is said to have the spirit of charity; when one receives the charisma of martyrdom, he is said to have the spirit of ^A fortitude, or virtue, which is the charisma; and because he who gives is the Holy Spirit, the gift is also called homonymously by the same name as he who gives. Furthermore the same in homily 43 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, explaining that text: Created in holiness: See, he says, here how he calls the creation of the essence of virtue a creature, which creation of virtue, when it was not, came into being that it might be. And again the same: For this reason, that it may be demonstrated that what is poured forth is not the Holy Spirit but the grace of the Holy Spirit, ^B David says of Christ: Grace is poured abroad in thy lips; grace is poured forth, not he who gives grace. And the great Basil, in the third book of his Confutations of Eunomius: Just as the Father is said to divide operations to those who are worthy to receive them; and the Son is said to divide ministries to those worthy of the office of ministering, so the Holy Spirit is said to divide charisms to those who are worthy to receive charisms. Again the same in his homily on Psalm 32: Aptly, he says, is that text referred to the earth: "He spoke, and they were made"; in our formation from the earth, the text "It was made" is appropriate; but in the creature created to the image of God, the text "They were created" is appropriate. But since it is oftentimes said in the act of renewing and rendering better, such as: If any one is in Christ, a new creature; and that: That he might create the two into one man. Perhaps that text: "And they were made," is said of the first creation of the essence of man; but that text: "And they were created," is said of the second regeneration in Christ; and as much as the commandment of God excels the simple word, by so much does regeneration excel generation. And again, the same, in his epistle to his brother Gregory: But those searching whether the largesse of goods takes its origin from the Holy Spirit alone, and thus arrives at the worthy, are led back by the Holy Scripture to the prince and author of the largesse of goods, which the Holy Spirit works in us; ^C for we have learned from holy Scripture that all things were made through him and consist in him. Wherefore when we are raised to that consideration, we are taught again by the guidance of holy Scripture that all things are produced through that virtue or power, so that things that were not, might be; yet they are not produced from it without beginning. Gregory the Theologian in the book On the Holy Spirit: The Spirit, he says, is called the Spirit of adoption, of liberty, the Spirit of intelligence, of wisdom, of counsel, of fortitude, of knowledge, of piety, of the fear of God. For he accomplishes all these things. And again the same: The Spirit is indeed one, but the graces are not equal, because neither are the receptacles of the Spirit; to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, or of contemplation; to another indeed firm faith, and without any doubt; ^D to others the operations of virtues, and of more sublime miracles; to others the graces of healings; helpings, that is, prefectures; governments, that is, modulations of the flesh; kinds of tongues, interpretations of tongues, greater charisms; the second according to the proportion of faith. Athanasius in the second book against the Arians: Those terms therefore: "He created," "he formed," "he constituted," which have the same meaning, do not signify the beginning of the essence of the Word of God, nor that his substance was created, but rather the benefit of his renewal and grace upon us. And again the same: Just as us, he says,

born of God, not from the womb of his person, we are; thus also the spirits proceeding from God are not of his person. And the blessed Cyril, in his book *On the Holy Spirit*: "If," he says, "the varied largesse of charisms flows from the Father," yet Paul says: *But all these things the one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each one privately as he wills* [1 Cor. 12:11], how is the Spirit not God from God, and in God, who works all things that befit God, as having the authority to do so? And again the same in his commentaries on Isaiah: *Thus says the Lord, who dwells in the heights; for the Spirit of the Lord shall go forth from me* [Isa. 57:15, LXX]; but how he goes forth, he declared, saying: *Every spirit have I made* [Isa. 57:16]; for he is the Father of spirits; he is understood, indeed, not as if having begotten these spirits from his own nature as he did the Son; nay, nor does he say they proceeded from his substance in the same way as the Holy Spirit, but rather that ^B they went forth from God as creations, that they might have being. We affirm this, rightly understanding it; for he made every spirit, and where "making" is named, there is entirely an "egression," that is, an exit, not according to substance, but as the word "exit" by a catachresis signifies that they were made. Saint Maximus, chapter 38 and 39 of his fifth Century, says: *And there shall rest upon him seven spirits* [Isa. 11:2], the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of understanding, the spirit of cognition, the spirit of knowledge, the spirit of counsel, the spirit of fortitude, the spirit of the fear of God. It is, however, the proper function of these spiritual charisms—the spirit of the fear of God, to abstain from evils according to action; the spirit of fortitude, a prompt endeavor and motion toward the operation and effectuation of the commandments; the spirit of counsel is the habit of discretion; the spirit of knowledge is the certain and unfailing acquaintance with the ways that are engaged in action through virtue; the spirit of cognition is the comprehension of the reasons in the commandments; the spirit of understanding is consent toward the modes and reasons of virtues, or as I might more properly say, affection; the spirit of wisdom is the referring of oneself to the cause of the more spiritual reasons in the commandments, and to be joined with that cause. And again the same in the same place: "Just as," he says, "one receives the word of wisdom, another the word of knowledge, another of faith, and another another charism from those things which the great Apostle enumerated; so one indeed receives through the Spirit the charism of perfect and immediate charity toward God, having nothing earthly, according to the proportion of faith; another, however, receives through the same Spirit the charism of charity toward one's neighbor; for he says that every habit of a commandment placed into action is a charism of the Spirit." In the commentaries which are attributed to Job: "Those seven sons and three daughters were," he says, "the catalog of the sons is honored by Scripture, and in agreement with mystical reasons," ^A for the number seven signifies in an enigma the concurrence of the seven charisms; but the number three looks toward what is more perfect and divine; so that we may understand that faith is the maker of the seven graces of the Trinity. And the divine apostle and evangelist Luke in the Acts: *Many signs and wonders, he says, were done among the people by the hands of the apostles* [Acts 5:12]. And again the same: *And God wrought no common virtues by the hands of Paul* [Acts 19:11]. And in the holy Gospel: *And he did not many signs there, he says, because of their unbelief* [Matt. 13:58]. And the prophet David in the one hundred and tenth Psalm: *All his mandates are faithful, made in truth and equity* [Ps. 110:7]. And again the same in the fiftieth Psalm: *Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels* [Ps. 50:12]. From which it is manifest that the Holy Trinity, both by itself and through those things which are not, both produces and creates for our participation the effectuated and created distribution of divine charisms. For it itself, since it is the cause of all things (for only that which is above substance is the principle and cause of the essence of all things), through a Spirit of the same nature and above substance, acts, distributing to each one charisms, or graces, as it wills: if, however, these are works of his will, it is clear that they are creatures, and effects from nothing, and it is God himself who works all things in all.

CHAPTER VI

The great Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of *On the Divine Names*, says that the Good is not one thing, and Being another; and Life another, or Wisdom; nor are there many causes, and different effectuating divinities for different things, superior and inferior; in which place Saint Maximus says: "Because," he says, "a little before he had seemed in some way to speak of superior and inferior, when he said the Good is the cause of existence, of life, and similarly in others, lest those who read imprudently find an occasion for reproach, he says that the Good is not one thing, and existence another; and again life is not one thing, and wisdom another; for there is one cause of all things, and not many; and consistently one divinity producing all things, the holy and blessed Trinity, and not many creative divinities. This, however, he did not say in vain, but to rebuke the wise men of the gentiles, and the heretics, the disciples of Simon, who posited gods as the effectors of the world, and held that as they were more inferior, they produced more infirm creatures even unto the dregs, as they say, that is, even unto matter. He says that the name of the Good comprehends every

^A cause: for howsoever they are called, those things are rather the more general ones, whether they be called primary existence, or per se participations, or gifts of God, or providences, or divine communications (for it has been said concerning these by the Theologians), they will not deny nor gainsay that they are the works of Him who works all things in all as He wills, namely God the Father, produced for the ministry and sanctification of creatures through God the Son and His divine Spirit. But Dionysius, who learned these divisions of graces from the great apostle Paul, clearly explained that they pertain to the praising of providence from its effects, which is the principle for us to become good and to be deified, calling the effects themselves the participations of those who participate, set forth for the participation of the gifts of God, by the participation of which we are said to be divine and blessed and wise and powerful. ^B He retracts these things afterwards, discussing how these things stand when compared with Him who bestows them; for no similitude is perfect between the causes and those things which have been effected, but rather the effects indeed have images and likenesses, as much as they can, of the causes: the causes themselves are abstract from the effects, and placed above according to the reason of their own principle. And in this very thing the divine Maximus, insisting, said that those things which have been produced in the nature of things, whether in heaven or on earth, are effects, but the causes which produce them are the three persons of the holy Trinity. It is clear, therefore, that causes and effects have no similitude between themselves. And further, the divine Dionysius, insisting most strongly on these things: The same, he says, are called both like and unlike to God; like indeed according to imitation, which can exist of Him whom nothing can imitate: unlike, however, in as much as the effects are inferior to the cause, and differ from it by infinite measures, and measures which cannot be compared. The same excellence he placed above the effects, and above the per se participations: How much, he says, do holy, or divine, or dominant, or royal things excel those which are not such, and again, how much do per se participations excel those who participate in them, by so much is He who is above all, and the inparticipable author of all participants and of the participations themselves, more sublime. Explaining which, the holy Maximus says: ^C As much as a pure nature and cause excels quality and effect (for this is being, compared with that which is not properly it), and as much as that which is participated excels the participant, by so much does God, who is called these things, differ from those who participate in them. Therefore, just as causes excel effects by infinite measures which cannot be compared, so the sole author God, and the same inparticipable one, excels participants and the per se participations themselves. But it has been stated concerning these by the theologians in the fifth and fourth decades of the introductory exposition of the divine names. It is said, he says, in the Psalms: For with thee is the fountain of life. And in Jeremiah: They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water. Therefore, God is called a fountain as a certain parent, and the principle and cause of all those things which have appeared, and have arrived at essence: for the holy Scriptures say that He is the cause and fountain of those things which some have been accustomed to call universals, that is, genera, or wholes, or containers, inasmuch as they encompass the parts of His emanations: therefore, on account of the inexhaustible effection of those things which exist through the Holy Spirit, and because the Holy Spirit is the cause of all things, as it is said in Wisdom, it is rightly philosophized that He (as the per se cause) is the fountain. But understand that creation is not exhausted from that where he says: ^D My Father worketh hitherto, and I work; in like manner the Holy Spirit works unceasingly with the Father and the Son; for Scripture says: Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created. And again the great Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of his De divinis nominibus: For we do not say that that per se being, the cause of the essence of all things, is some divine or angelic substance; for only that which is above substance is the principle and substance and cause that all things which are should exist, and that per se being itself; nor do we posit any other divinity, which might beget life, besides the life beyond divine life of all things which live, and the per se cause of life itself, nor, to speak summarily, other principal and creating causes and hypostases, which some have rashly blurted out to be gods and effectors of things: whom neither they themselves, nor their fathers and elders, knew how to call truly and properly. These things have been set forth by the theologians so that we might know it to be demonstrated that which was before, namely that only that which is above substance, the blessed and more than divine Trinity, is the cause of all, and that neither the per se being itself, which is an older gift than the other participations which flow from the Trinity itself, nor the per se life itself, nor the likenesses of these, are of any thing.

But let this be excepted, that in the Son and the Holy Spirit there is ^A a cause; for this is said univocally of those things which are a cause; but those things which have a cause according to the will are called homonymously, inasmuch as all the works of God work in all things. Furthermore, that which has a cause is the cause of all things, while these things, having a cause from Him, exist singularly and solely from Him, and not from another cause [(a)]; for only that which is above substance, principle, and substance is the cause that all things are. Add to this that in the Trinity, the divine cause and that which has a cause exhibit a distinction most free from commixture, yet in the same they exhibit a union that is "supra-united," because in it is exhibited the first distinction and the first union; and first, as is the axiom, there is not anything contrary to it, but a true distinction and a true union; nor can the distinction ever be changed into union, nor again the union into distinction, but these remain unconfused because of each other, that is, distinction because of the union and union because of the distinction, proclaimed thrice at once and yet singularly. But in the creature, whose cause is the holy Trinity, the union indeed is according to the cause only, but the distinction of creatures leaves the things which have been made at immense measures below the cause, and the union precedes, and is stronger than distinctions of this kind, so that one and the same is the cause of the universe, but the creature is numerous, proceeding from primary and generative things to secondary, and tertiary, and multiple ones. Hence for theologians is opened the question of participation, which is one indeed according to cause, but another according to participation; another according to existence, with participation and existence consisting in the creature, that is, in that which is participated and in that which participates in the parts.

CHAPTER VII.

The great Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of *On the Divine Names*, says: "The first gift, 'to be' itself, the goodness per se producing, is praised as the oldest, the first among the rest in participation, and from it, and in it, is 'to be' itself, and the principles of those things which are; and all things that are [(1)], and in whatever ^D way they are, and that incomprehensibly, and the other participations of it are pro-^C duced: and it is 'to be' itself, older than to be life per se, wisdom per se, divine likeness per se; and other things, of which they have participation, before all those they participate 'to be': or rather, all things per se, which are participated by others, participate in 'to be' itself; the principles, therefore, of all things that are, exist by participating in 'to be,' and they are both principles, and are first, then they are principles; and if you wish to say 'to be' as the life per se which is the principle of living things, as living things; and likeness per se, the principle of similar things as similar; and union per se, the principle of joint things as joint; and order per se, the principle of ordered things as ordered; and whatever other thing this, or that, or both, or many things participate in this, or that, or both, or many things are; you will find their participations per se first participating in 'to be' itself; and these being first, then the principles of this or that; and by participating in 'to be' itself, they exist, and are participated in." But if these, namely the participations *per se*, are the principles of other things by participating in 'to be' itself [(b)], much more do those things which those very principles themselves participate—as becomes manifest from these things, and from those which we followed up more broadly in the fifth decade—that they are participations, which those things that are [(c)] participate, whatever are species, and their participations; since even in one species there are many participations, not only in colors, but in wills and in fortunes; as when we say: "He participated in a moderate will, or a right one, or one rejoicing in witticisms, or one otherwise affected; or to be fortunate, or unfortunate." Therefore, as prosperity, or good fortune, is a participation of fortunate ones, insofar as they are fortunate, but not insofar as they are humans; so also other participations have been brought forth, so that they may be participated in, not because they are, but because they are such. But when recipient subjects have been found, then they are said to be effected according to the existence of those subjects which have been found, and it is indeed one thing to be a participation, and another to be that which receives the participation according to its existence; for example: Life is a certain participation simply, which then is made according to the existence of someone, when it is a part of his substance [(2)], or is itself, or according to an accident. Therefore Dionysius, having approached...

Scholia.

^A treat of this generally, in substance simply and in participation simply; and he shows that, first, there must be a subject, which he said was an older gift of God, and then the participation which is made in that subject. Therefore, substance is proposed for the participation of participants in itself; which is the same as if it were said substance made for participation. For if we did not participate in substance, we would not exist at all in the nature of things; afterwards, other participations are proposed for the substance itself made to receive participation; and just as time is proposed more generally for the participation of those things which are in time (since otherwise there would be no substance of any kind, but simply participation), but then existence is produced for us who are in time, when on account of it we are in time; so every other participation that is not substance has the same consequence, once that prior thing is known and perceived, namely that God alone is the author and ^B maker of these participations, whether they are proposed simply for participation or also for the existence of the participants.

CHAPTER VIII.

For he makes the figures similar, expressed from this one and total exemplar, so that if they are soft and easy to be molded, and smooth, *εὐχάρακτα*, and are neither rough, nor hard, nor flowing and inconstant, they will have a pure and expressed and permanent figure; but if any of this habit, which has been spoken of, is lacking, this will be the cause why the image is not molded, nor expressed, nor do other things come to be which do not come to be, since there is no aptitude for receiving participation. But also Justin Martyr, the philosopher, says in his *Oration on True Confession*: "How the Word is in his temple, and in things similarly according to substance, and what temple will he have more than all others?" Let us hear at last the one who says: "He who is in the bosom of the Father is present to all things impartibly according to substance, and we do not say that he is in the Father as he is in others; not that the substance is contracted when it is in others, but because of the measure of the recipients, which cannot become a divine receptacle; in this way we say he is inseparable in his temple, and confessing that he dwells as the fullness of divinity, we say that he is present to all, and not present in the same way." And the divine Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book of the *Refutations of Eunomius*, says: "Because the fount and principle and largesse of every good is discerned in the uncreated nature; every creature, however, turns toward him by the communion of the first good made a participant of the sublime nature, necessarily according to the proportion of participating in sublime things, in some more, in others less, according to the free power of the will of the participant, more and less of participation is discerned in the creature; and according to the endeavor of each one, there is a place for more and less in the excellence of virtue; but the uncreated nature is far from such difference." From which it is clear that every difference of participations exists and is formed from the difference of the participants, and that participations become large and small because of the aptitude of those participating, obscurely or clearly; wherefore, as is reasonable, such participations, however they are proposed—whether simply according to participation, or according to existence—are discerned as being composed of small and large in the creature; but in those things which are in God, such difference ^D has no place. Therefore, with one consent, the theologians call those participations which, absolutely and abstractly, are substance in itself, and life in itself, and wisdom in itself.

Scholia.

The whole nature of the species, as holy Thomas says (1a, q. 51, a. 3), or from the body according to accident—because it lives through the soul, or from an angel; for because it itself is of an entire nature, and not as a part of a nature, it receives life from God in itself, and not by accident. Participation simply differs from participation according to existence in reason only; as life in itself is not distinguished from the living, by which they are participated according to reality: for in reality life and the living are the same; just as humanity simply, and man, differ by reason only, because just as humanity contains only those things which define a man, and not those which make the matter individual, nor does humanity contain, in act or in potency, the principles which render an individual, but man does contain them in potency; so that life in itself contains those things which define the living, insofar as it lives; and so, as man is formally man by humanity, so the living is living by life in itself. Participation according to existence is that life, simply joined, received into a living subject, just as humanity according to existence is in this man who exists; for only singulars exist in the nature of things, but universals and abstracts only in the mind.

^A They spoke of them in other ways by referring to them among creatures, and numbered them; because they were neither divine substances, nor angelic, nor producers of anything; only He who is above substance, the principle and substance and cause of these things. But if God is the author of these, and of those things which are beneath them, equally (for it is said that he is infinitely and immensely exempt from those who participate and from those which are participated in), how is it that every difference is not found in these, and that "more" and "less" have no place? These are the marks of a creature, as well as variety regarding emanation and the multiplication of forms. Justly, therefore, because we are not suited and fit, but rather infirm to receive God, we have alienated his participation from ourselves: but the cause of this is the power of free will, and the fact that we are prone to evil from our youth.

CHAPTER IX.

Gregory the Theologian, in the second oration on peace: "For nothing," he says, "of created things, or of things that serve and participate, and are circumscribed, touches the uncreated nature, which is Lord, and participated in, and infinite." And again, the same in the oration on Pentecost: "The Holy Spirit was therefore always being participated in, not participating; perfecting, not perfected." And the great Basil, in the fifth book to Amphilochius: "Nature unapproachable, capable on account of goodness, filling ^C all things with power, participate-able only by those who are worthy." And the great Athanasius, in his letter to Serapion: "Again," he says, "may someone quickly perceive from these things that the Holy Spirit is participated in, and does not participate; for it does not weary me to say these same things. For it is impossible that those who have once been enlightened and have tasted the heavenly gift, and have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God. For if angels and other creatures participate in the Spirit himself; for this reason they can fall who do not participate; but the Holy Spirit is always the same, and is participate-able." And Saint Maximus, in chapter 9 of the fourth century on charity, says: "God is indeed only participated in; but the creature participates and communicates; and indeed it participates in being, and well-being; but it communicates only well-being: but truly one way for corporeal substance ^D and another for incorporeal." And Saint Anastasius of Antioch, in the first book of our dogmas of truth: "How," he says, "can he who conquers prayer be praised by prayer? Or what can anyone say worthily, so as to demonstrate in thought ^B the firmament of all things, the foundation of all things, the principle of all things, from whom all things flow, and to whom all things tend; principle and end, Alpha and Omega, as he beautifully said who taught the theologian while handing down theology; the cause that those things which are exist; who gave substance to those things which were not yet constituted; who applied order to the substances he made from nothing, and caused them to endure and be preserved; creative nature, power having the force of making, inspecting, and providing; life and living, substance providing life; nature alone participate-able, which contains all things, and is contained by none; and what can anyone say about him who cannot be expressed, when he has tried the infinite? For what cannot be said at once, will not be explained: and what is beyond all things, no mind will comprehend, even if it be the most subtle of all for penetrating. Indeed, also the great Dionysius in the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy: "But it must be truly said of all things first, that the divinity which is above substance, by its goodness produced the substances of those things that are, and caused them to exist; for this is proper to goodness, which is the cause of all things and is above all things, to call all things to its own communion, as is defined for each of those things which are by its own convenience. All things, therefore, which are, participate in the providence flowing from the divinity which is above substance and the producer of all; for they would not exist unless they had participated in the substance and participation of all. All inanimate things therefore, by the very fact that they are, participate in the principle itself: for the being of all things is divinity, which is above being itself; but living things participate in the same life-giving power above all life, and those endowed with reason and intelligence participate in the same wisdom itself perfect, and previously perfect, which overcomes all reason and mind; but it is manifest that those substances exist around the principle itself, which have participated in it in many ways. And again the same in the fifth, *On the Divine Names*: "And it is, as I judge, true, that those things which participate more in God, who is one, and from whom infinite gifts flow, draw closer to him, and are more divine than those which participate less." From these it is clear that the only nature participate-able according to cause is God; and that according to the same cause he calls all things to his own communion; and those become closer to him who in many ways participate not only simply in his substance and life, but also in reason, and wisdom, and other spiritual charisms of his according to the proportion of the supreme mind...

Scholia.

Chapter X. That God is participable, and yet totally unparticipable, and that there is not something in Him that is participable and something not.

Great Dionysius in the second chapter ^A *On the Divine Names* says: "And this is common and connective, and constitutes the whole divinity, namely, that the whole of it is participated by each of those who participate, and by no one in any partial way, just as the center point in the middle of a circle is participated by all the straight lines which are positioned around the circle, and just as many figures expressed by a seal participate in the archetypal seal, and in each figure the whole and identical seal is expressed, and in no figure is it expressed according to any partial part." But these examples, I say, fall short in that the divinity, which is the cause of all things, cannot be participated in; it falls short, I say, by this very fact, that there is no touch [(2)] of divinity, nor any other communion of mixture with those who participate. Saint Maximus, explaining this passage, says: "The Trinity, the queen of the universe, is participated by those who can participate in it, not comprehensively nor partially"—for the same term declares both—"for God is participated not ^B comprehensively nor restrictedly, but rather exists whole in the participation of each, and is exempt from all; just as all who are present participate in a great voice that has been sent forth, each according to his own strength, both men and children and brute creatures; but some indeed more strongly, others more obtusely, according to the power and faculty of hearing; and the voice is indeed participable, and in itself not participable." And again the same author in the *Theological Centuries*, century 3, chapter 7: "God," he says, "who is not participable according to substance, when it is his will to be participated in otherwise by those who are able, does not recede from his nature and hidden substance; even when the very mode by which he wills to be participated in remains always covered to all." Further, the same author in those things which are brought forth in the *Dogmatic Panoply*: "God is participable according to his communications; but unparticipable insofar as nothing of his substance is participated in, ^C or his life, or his wisdom, or anything of such things, which he has in all things according to excellence, and supremely." And again the same author in the third century, chapter 42: "To this end," he says, "God made us, that we might become partakers of the divine nature, and partakers of his eternity, and that it may appear that we are made like unto him according to the deification by grace, on account of which deification those things which are, consist and remain; and those things which are not, are produced and generated." And the same author again: "The nature of reason and intelligence participates in the holy God, insofar as it is participant by the very fact that it is and is fit to fare well." From these things it is now evident that ^D God is in his totality both participated in by us and not participated in; participated in indeed according to the rationale of cause, that is, insofar as he produces all things from nothing, both that they may simply be and that they may fare well; but again, he is not participated in according to our participation and according to existence; for we do not participate in him according to touch [(a)], as species participate in genera, and as singulars participate in universals: and as those things which are beneath the first ones participate in those very first ones, neither do we participate in him according to existence, and in that which he calls mixed communion, as if we should say: "Sensing life is a part of the substance of all things living by sense"; and all species concrete from matter participate according to mixed communion in matter and form; for in these ways and rationales he is not absolutely participated in by us: nor again is there something in him that is participated in, and something that is not; for it is absurd if it should be said that the existence of God must consist of two certain dissimilar things, namely, out of the participable and the non-participable. But that a good composition of order may appear in this Decade, it is evident from the contextual placing of the subject matter of this decade: since it has been demonstrated by the theologians that it is proper to God to be present to all according to substance; which if substance is present to all, all participate in his substance, but the participation of the divine substance is not accomplished otherwise than through the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for these are the divine substance, wherefore we participate in the nature of the three persons, and not in a naked one, or in a certain grace alone not subsisting by itself, but he creates and effects towards our participation the distribution of graces, or charisms; he creates therefore according to the convenience and proportion of the participants those things which are more general, so that they may be participated in by those which are more particular, so that this alone may be the cause and effectress of all things that are, whether they have been proposed according to participation or according to existence; since every difference and variety is most especially...

[index: entries preserved]

[LATIN COLUMN]

[887 A] ...which in the participants becomes [such] through participations, but in the participations themselves occurs [only by nature]; finally, the divine nature alone is [so] according to the reason of cause; and God alone is participable according to cause, but not participable according to the existence of the participants and of the participations, which occur through participations. Nothing, therefore, is lacking in the treatment of this decade. Moreover, this decade is inscribed *On Participation*, because it contains every participation, whether it be spoken of according to cause, or according to participation, or according to existence.

EIGHTH DECADE. — ON THE INFINITY OF GOD IN CREATURES.

CAPUT I.

That nothing of those things which exist lacks a cause, and God alone is without cause, who is the cause of all things.

The great Gregory the Theologian, in the first book *On the Son*: “What,” he says, “is in things without a cause? The divinity; for no one can name a cause for God: for if it has a cause, that will be more ancient than God.” Saint Maximus, in the explanation of that theological passage in the oration of Gregory *On the Son*: “Therefore unity moved from a principle to the number of two, etc. Everything,” he says, “which is not because of a cause; can neither be made, nor moved, nor is it moved at all, since it has no cause for its being; and if it possesses no cause, it is also plainly immovable; God, therefore, is immovable, as one who has no cause from which he might exist.” Again, the same person in the *Theological Centuries*, first century, second chapter: “That which,” he says, “is properly according to substance, is that good which has neither beginning, nor end, nor cause of existence; nor any motion whatsoever according to existence toward a cause: but that which is not so, is neither properly [that good], inasmuch as it has a beginning, and an end, and a cause of existence, and motion according to existence toward a cause. That ^C which is not properly, although it is said to be, is [so] according to the participation of the will of him who is properly, and is said to be.” Indeed, the great Dionysius, in his *Epistle to Titus*, also says: “For if we look in this way, we shall venerate, seeing the fountain of life, poured forth into itself, and consistent in itself, and a certain simple power, moving itself, acting of itself, not abandoning itself, the notion of all notions, and always contemplating itself through itself.” And saint Hierotheus in his *Amatory Hymns* speaks thus: “But come now, and gathering these powers again into one, let us say that there is some one simple power, that moves itself toward an admixing copulation.” And again the great Dionysius, chap. 10, *On the Divine Names*: “For not every thing that is absolutely unbegotten and truly perpetual do the holy Scriptures call eternal.” In which place Saint Maximus says: “He calls God absolutely unbegotten, since he is without cause.” From which it is made manifest that God, since he is infinite, and the absolute cause of all, at the same time exists in creatures as infinite, and without cause, and as one simple power, ^D moving through itself, acting through itself: for this declares the principle of all things, above principle, which is properly one, and than which nothing is higher.

CAPUT II.

That nothing of those things which exist is produced by itself, God alone creates from nothing, and is the effector of all things that exist.

The great Dionysius, in chapter four of *On the Divine Names*, says: “For from him and through him are [both] substance and every life of mind and soul, and of universal nature, the smallnesses, equalities, magnitudes, measures of all things, and the proportions of things, and the consents, and the concretions, the whole, the parts, every...”

coupling of a multitude, the perfections of the whole (1) of whatever kind, how much, how great (2); or small, infinite (3), comparisons (4), separations (5), every infinity (6), every end (7), definitions, orders, excellences, elements, forms, every substance, every faculty or power, every action, every habit, every sense, every reason, every intelligence (8), every touch, every science, every coupling, and simply everything that exists from the beautiful and the good, and is in the beautiful and the good, and is converted to the beautiful and the good; and whatever things are, and come to be, they are, and come to be, because of the beautiful and the good; and all things look towards Him, and are moved by Him, and are preserved; and for His sake, and because of Him; and in Him is every principle pertaining to the exemplar, to the end, to the efficient cause, to the form, to the matter, and finally every principle, every preservation, every end; and to say it in summary, all things that are, exist from the beautiful and the good; and all things that are not, are in the beautiful and the good above substance; and He is the principle of all things, above that which is principled; and an end more than perfect: For from Him, and through Him, and in Him, and to Him are all things, as the holy Scripture says ^A. All things, therefore, are desirable and lovable; and are loved by all, and because of Him, and for His sake, and the lower things love the higher by converting themselves to them: and those things which are of the same order love things like themselves, by communicating; and the greater things love the lesser, by providing for them, and each thing loves itself, by preserving itself; and all things, by seeking the beautiful and the good, do and will whatever they do and will. This, however, can be said confidently and truly: that He Himself who is the author of all things, because of His supreme goodness, loves all things, makes all things, perfects all things, preserves all things, converts all things to Himself, and is divine love, the good of the good because of the good; for love itself is the effector of the goodness of things, since it was before all things in the good excellently, it did not ^B cease to remain in Himself without fruitfulness, but rather moved to act, as was fitting for the excellent power, the effector of all things. Again, the same chapter, 7: And indeed, as I have said, this wisdom is to be known from all things; for this is that which, as Scripture says*, makes all things, and always adapts all things, and is the cause of the inseparable concert and order of all things, and always joins the extremes of prior things with the principles of secondary things (9); and it makes one conspiracy and consensus of the universe beautifully.

Scholia

(1) Perfections of the wholes. When from the coupling of ^C parts there exists a form, which is the perfection of the whole. (2) How much, how great, or small. This, which in Greek is called *πηλίκον*, refers to a certain magnitude or smallness, as bicubital, tripedal, bipedal; but "how much," to the uncertain. (3) Infinite. Namely, of power, which pertains to continuous quantity according to division; and to discrete quantity according to addition. (4) Comparisons. Comparison pertains to the relation of convenience, as the same, equal, similar. (5) Separations. Separation relates to the relation of difference, as diverse, unequal, dissimilar. (6) Every infinity. It is indeed manifold infinity, one of quantity, another of prime matter, which is not determined to one form, but is in potency to infinities. (7) Every end of substance, and of operation, and of perfection; definitions also are certain ends and terminations of things: therefore, where there is some end from these, there is not infinity. (8) Every intelligence. St. Thomas reads in his text, "Every action," as if in Greek it were *πᾶσα ποίησις*, as it is now, *πᾶσα νόησις*. (9) Always the extremes of prior things with the principles of secondary things. It signifies that there is nothing empty and void between creatures, but all being is full of creature; for this is the definition of those things which touch each other, whose limits are simultaneous: it signifies also that there is a certain conspiracy of all parts in the universe according to order and a convenient proportion; the extreme of fire to conspire and be joined with the principle of air; the extreme of air with the humidity of water, the extreme of water with the dryness of earth; and similarly, ascending from the element of earth to fire, a similar conjunction is found in the extremes of prior things with the principles of secondary things; in the same manner in the tempests of the year the extreme of winter with the principle of spring; the extreme of spring with the principle of summer, the extreme of summer with the principle of autumn; such conjunctions and conspiracies ^D are called by Dionysius *ἀλληλουχία*, which in one word in Latin cannot be expressed. And all things which are not, in the beautiful and the good are above substance. What are not, are not said to be from the good and the beautiful, as Pachymeres noted, because they do not have *σύστασιν*, that is, they do not exist, but are in the good and the beautiful negatively, because it is good and beautiful for them not to be—as "not to be two suns"; but negations, which St. Thomas says pertain to God by way of excess, because God is none of those things which are, but above all things, are not only in Him, but are from Him according to cause, as created goodness and created wisdom, which are denied to God: that also which is ungenerated, incorruptible, and immortal, and infinite, although they signify a negation, are not placed among those which are not; because they have *σύστασιν*, that is, they consist, and in Him together. Pachymeres reads neither in his paraphrase; perhaps it was added by someone for the interpretation of the word which follows, "Every touch"; for Dionysius calls intelligence "touch," as Pachymeres interprets, because there is in the operation of the soul through the intellect a certain touch of the thing, just as in bodies action is done through contact. So St. Thomas; therefore, he says: "Every touch," sensible, namely, and intellectual; and because through such intellectual touch multiple science is had, it follows in the text: "Every science." One must observe the order of understanding from sense to reason, from reason to intellect, which is a certain intellectual touch; from intellect to science, which joins the intellect with reason, as St. Thomas says; from science to union, which pertains to the intellect, which is united with the things understood; and to the will, which is united with the things loved.

^A Gregory the Theologian (a): For, he says, because it was not enough for that supreme Good to be moved only by the contemplation of itself, but it was necessary that It spread forth and flow out, so that more things might share in its benefits; for this was the sum of goodness; It first thought of the angelic and heavenly powers, and this thought was a work completed by the Word and made perfect by the Spirit. And a little later: Secondly, It thought of this material world, which is seen, and those things which follow thereafter. And the same author again, in his speech on the constitution of bishops: Answer me, he says, O disputer, to avoid difficulties. If it is created, how is it created? And ask me, how was it begotten; if there is passion regarding generation, there is likewise passion regarding creation; for if there is no passion in the informing of the thought, and the care, and the explication of all things thought of simultaneously into parts, etc. And again the same author: And if, because those things which exist among us, since at one time they did not exist, afterwards are, you therefore compel even the Son to come to pass from things that are not to that which is, etc. Further, the same author in his speech on the New Lord's Day: God, he says, who willed to constitute this world, which is composed of things that are seen and things that are not seen, which is a great and admirable herald of His greatness, is Himself, indeed, eternal. And St. Maximus, in the sixth chapter of the third century: If every participation is thought of prior to the participants, the Cause of all things, which by nature is prior to those things which are, and is both and is thought of ^B not as substance is prior to accidents (otherwise God would be shown to have composition, by which the complement of existence would consist, namely the very substance of things), but as that which is above substance, before substance is thought of: for if the arts found for themselves the figures of those things made by art, and the universal nature [found] the species which are beneath it, much more did God effect the substances of those things that are, from those that are not, so that He who is above substance, much more produced the substances of things from nothing, as one existing above substance. And the great Athanasius in his epistle to Serapion: But the nature, he says, of those things which are generated and created, is mutable, as being outside the substance of God, and existing from nothing. And John of Damascus: Who, he says, brought forth all things from nothing by your ineffable nod. From these it is manifest that God, who has no author of Himself, and is the infinite Cause, creates and founds all things from nothing; and He alone is that one thing ^C above substance, and the Effecter of all things.

CAPUT III

The great Dionysius in chapter 10 of The Divine Names says: God is praised from the antiquity of days, because He Himself is the aeon (1) of all things, and time; and [He is] before days, and aeon, and time; and indeed He must be called time, and days, and season, as befits God (2), as one who is immutable and immovable in all motion, and is always moved, remaining in Himself; and as the author of aeon, and time, and days. Again the same author in the same place: In the Scriptures also sometimes the aeon is celebrated, and eternal time, although we know those things which more properly are, are expressed and declared rather through aeon, while those things which are made, rather through time. It is necessary, therefore, not simply to assume that those things which are called eternal are coeternal with God, who is before eternity, but rather, following the most venerable Scriptures, it is necessary to accept things eternal and things which are in time according to the modes noted in them (3); but intermediate things (4) between those which are,

Scholia. (1) Of all things and time. The aeon of the angels who are in the aeon, whom before it had called eternal from the aeon; the time of those things which are subject to time, that is, of all those things which were made after the heaven, from whose motion time exists, that is, the number of the motion of the heaven according to what is prior and posterior. (2) As befits God. For the aeon is called, or the age, and time, and days, but immutably, because all things which are in them, namely in the aeon and time and day, receive change conveniently to their natures; but the aeon itself, and the times and days, in so far as they are aeon and times and days, are immutable by a certain imitation of God; for since all change happens in time, in what time would the change of time happen? But the variations of the year, namely of spring, summer, autumn and winter, which we call seasons, are indeed changes of times and days according to qualities, but not of times and days in themselves, that is, in so far as they are times and days. Just as therefore all things are changed in these, while they themselves remain immutable, so also God, as befits God, is always moved, while otherwise remaining in Himself. Perhaps someone might ask, where in Scripture is God called time, day, and season, if God is the cause of all things, that is, according to cause, because He made all things according to eternal ideas, which are God Himself, where Scripture says in Ps. LXXIII: Thine is the day, and thine is the night; thou hast fashioned the dawn and the sun; there he calls and praises Him as time and day; and when he says in the same Psalm: Thou hast fashioned summer and spring, there likewise God is called and praised as season, which is called by the Greeks καιρός; just as time is called χρόνος. (3) According to the scope of Scripture, according, I say, to nature. (4) Intermediate things. Because those things which are properly, divine, I say which are above every creature, He attributes to the aeon, or eternity, even though they are above aeon or eternity; but those things which take beginning and end, to time; therefore he calls angels and souls intermediate between those which are and those which are made: which indeed partly participate in the aeon, as the angels, as being immortal and free from destruction; but partly in time, because they are made.

And God should be celebrated as the author of all time and aeon, and as ancient of days, as being before time and above time; and as one who varies the opportunities and times, and again as existing before the aeons, in so much as He is before the aeon and above the aeon, or aeon, and His kingdom is the kingdom of all the aeons ^A (a), Amen. To these things, that great Moses also says: The Lord, he says, reigning into the aeon and beyond the aeon. 18. And in these, Saint Maximus also prepares for piety, saying that one ought not to suspect that those things which are called eternal are by that very fact co-eternal with God, who is before the aeons; for we have said above that "eternal" is not termed properly of the aeon itself, or ^B aeon, but of that which participates in the aeon. Therefore, it is necessary to call the incorporeal things, which properly are, as created immortals, eternal also. * Exod. xv, 18.

Scholia

Of those things which are said in the Scriptures to be eternal; or temporal; for the angels are called eternal in Scripture: Ps. xxiii, Lift up the eternal gates; because they are participants of the aeon, and the most ancient of all creatures; "aeon" or "age," in Greek αἰών, is also said, being the extension or duration of time itself, as that (Matth. 28): Even unto the consummation of the aeon; and Psalm lxxvi: I considered the eternal years; and II Cor. iv: The god of this aeon; for it is as if the interpreter had translated, of this aeon, or eternity, which in Greek is αἰῶνος. Exod. xxi: He shall be his servant into the aeon, or into eternity; therefore Scripture calls this temporal thing eternal, just as in Paul it is called eternal time, II Tim. i: Before the seasonal times, which is in Greek αἰωνίοις, that is, eternal; and Tit. i: Before the seasonal times, also in Greek αἰωνίοις, that is, eternal; and Rom. xvi: According to the revelation of the mystery kept silent ^C in eternal times; the same word is in Greek, which in this place the interpreter translates as "eternal," and in others as "secular."

(1) Substance which is simply, is substance considered abstractly, which is called substance per se, containing only in its notion what belongs to the essence of substance; we first inform this notion in the mind; afterwards, the universal notion: the notion, I say, of substance not considered abstractly, but universally, for common substance, as it is, differs in reason from abstract substantiality, just as humanity from man; afterwards we consider common substance according to individual species; this substance, both common and also individual, is substance not simply, but in a certain way, because common substance is by participation in substance per se, and particular substance by participation in both, namely, common and substance per se ^D and by itself of power; power of this kind, whether simply or in a certain way, is the mean between substance and the work, which is done through the motion of substance; for a work cannot be done unless there is the power of effecting it. The work simply is the work considered abstractly per se, that is, the very essence of the work; the work in a certain way is the work itself considered universally, which is by participation in the work simply, which is called work per se, or particular work, which is by participation in the universal work and the work per se; in a work of this kind, whether simply or in a certain way, the end is: as health however it may be considered, whether abstractly and per se, or commonly and universally, or whether it be in the particular, the end is of medication, which is the motion of the healer thought of before in terms of power than health, which cannot be done through medicine unless the power to heal is first thought of, but God is neither the end nor the mean, in so much as these are numbered among those things which are for something, which are thought of as existing at the same time, but with the infinite nothing finite can be thought of as existing at the same time. These things must be compared with ch. 4 of the fifth decade; and there also it is to be observed, how ingeniously, what Plato wrote in the Timaeus and Parmenides regarding innate species or ideas, and without destruction, separated, immutable, existing by nature as the efficient causes of singular things, he corrected and translated to the true dogma concerning principles, not which exist as causes per se, nor are unmade, but which have in us an existence only intelligible and immutable flowing from God, and are as it were certain intelligible forms separated by reason only from the things themselves; for what is singular is posterior to intelligence, which cannot be understood without the prior things, which are what the "what is" of the species is, and the species themselves, which are participated in by singulars, and have existence prior according to notion; for this man would not be in the notion, unless the species "man" first had intelligible existence; nor would man be said to be according to notion, unless humanity first had intelligible existence: for this contains what the "what is" of the species of man is. Similarly in other things, this life would not be in the notion, or this likeness, unless there were life and likeness considered universally; nor would that be, unless there were first according to notion what the "what is" of life itself and likeness is, which is called life simply, and likeness simply, or per se life and per se likeness.

^A And still the same: The Beginning, and the middle, and the end are notes of those things which are divided by time: and that which truly can be said, of those things also which we contemplate with eternity, for time, since it has a measured motion, is circumscribed by number, but eternity, since it has the category "when" thought of simultaneously with existence, undergoes dimension as though it were taking the beginning of existence: if, however, time and eternity do not lack a beginning, much more do those things which are contained in them not lack one. And again: One and alone according to nature always, properly is God, fully and properly including existence in all ways in Himself: since He is superior to existence itself properly so called: which if this is so, nothing at all of those things which are said to be, has proper existence; nothing therefore.

Scholia

^A Inasmuch as it can be thought by us, as it is said that God is above God, that is, according to our cognition; above God, I say, by participation, whom we know in creatures, as it is written: I have said, You are gods (Ps. LXXXI, 6); thus also He is above goodness, which can be known by us in creatures, and thus proper existence is spoken of from the creature and from God, but equivocally, as good, and God. It is not foreign to this chapter, nor to the one following, to explain how it is to be understood what the Roman Pontiff believed concerning the creation of the angels, and proposed for Catholics to believe in the chapter ^B *Firmiter credimus*, On the Sum of the Trinity and the Catholic Faith; for the decretal does not differ from what Dionysius hands down here; indeed it agrees, when it says: The one principle of all things, the creator of all visible and invisible things, who by His omnipotent power at once from the beginning of time created both from nothing, spiritual and corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and then human, as one constituted from spirit and body. Thus far the decretal, but this place must be somewhat dilated. St. Athanasius asks in *Questions to Antiochus*, quest. 4, when, and how, and whence the angels were made. He answers to the question, ^C that it cannot be said by human nature, neither when nor how they were made, except for this alone, that they were made by the Word of God from nothing; but when? Others, he says, say on the first day; others before the first day. That they were created, the Prophet testifies, he says, when he says (Ps. CXLVIII): Praise Him, all His angels; for He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. For Moses, he says, because he knew that the Jews were given to idolatry and a multitude of gods, for that reason did not make mention of the angels in Genesis, lest they worship them as gods, as they later did with the calf and other idols; what therefore could be taken from the holy Scriptures, namely that both creatures, spiritual and corporeal, were created at once and from nothing by God (John 1): For all things were made ^D through Him; and: He who lives for eternity, says Ecclesiasticus (Eccli. XVIII), created all things together, both of these the Catholic faith submitted. But that "together from the beginning of time," just as it relates to the corporeal creature, that is, to the world that is perceived, and whatever is contained in it, it was intended to refer, because it is written: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; thus it is not necessary, according to Scripture, that it be intended to refer to the angelic nature; because as Athanasius said a little before, when the angels were created, human nature cannot say, but because we cannot know the duration of the angels, which is not subject to time, because it is entirely *at once* and invariable, which is also called in the Holy Scriptures *eternity*, and we cannot manifest it to others, except through the extension of our time consisting of hours, days, and years, which Scripture also sometimes calls eternity, as Dionysius noted; therefore the Pontiff proposed to be believed, that both creatures, spiritual and corporeal, were created at once from the beginning of time; by the name of time therefore the Pontiff comprehended eternity and time, imitating Dionysius; wherefore this decretal does not prohibit one from thinking that the disciples of the apostles, Clement, and Dionysius, whom many others afterwards followed, felt that the angels were also created before the world, for Dionysius interprets the saying in Ps. XXIII regarding the angels: Lift up, O eternal gates: because it is ancient and invariable, and to be measured according to its whole being, he calls the property of eternity; wherefore if eternity is more ancient than time, and eternity is called, and is, the duration of the angels, then the angels were created before time, and before those things which are in time. St. Maximus felt this in his first century of theology: For if He did not create the angels before time, with which the world was born, then before ancient power there did not exist power, and before goodness there did not exist goodness; which seem to St. Maximus absurd; but what St. Maximus felt about this matter is to be explained and repeated more extensively in the next following chapter. Thus also is to be understood what Epiphanius, disputing against the heresy of Paul of Samosata, says, that the angels were not created before heaven and earth, since plainly, he says, this saying is not mutable, that before heaven and earth nothing was of created things; for in the beginning God made heaven and earth, that there might be a beginning, and nothing of created things exist before this very thing. Thus far Epiphanius. It is most true that before heaven and earth there was nothing of created things, namely in time; for so it must be understood; but the angels were created in eternity, for eternity is the measure of those things which are not subject to time. The same thing, which this decretal says, Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, said previously in a synodal letter sent to Honorius I, and not to Sergius of Constantinople, as Photius of Constantinople testifies in his *Bibliotheca*; this letter was recited in the 6th Synod and placed in the 11th action. Speaking therefore of the creation of the world made by God, Sophronius thus confesses: *Kai tois pasin horisen archēn chronikēn*, that is, And for all things He decreed a beginning of time. Because the angels—though they may be immortal—have this in common with those things which are in time, that they were made, for that reason He attributes time to them. The Pontiff has followed this clearly in his decretal, and Sophronius followed Dionysius clearly, whom he cites in the same synodal letter (lest anyone say Dionysius was unknown to Sophron). That the angels were created before this corporeal world, therefore, Dionysius hands down in this place, and the apostolic doctrine (bk. 5), Clement (12), and following him Gregory Nazianzen in his sermon on the Nativity of Christ, and in the 2nd on Pascha; and following him Damascene (bk. 2), *On the Orthodox Faith*. But how it is to be understood that spiritual and corporeal creatures were created together, the former with eternity, the latter with time, so that we do not pass over this either, the same Athanasius explained (bk. 1 *Against the Arians*), looking at that place in Eccli. XVIII: He who lives for eternity, created all things together; for nothing, he says, among created things was fashioned before others of its own kind, but all were made at once by one and the same command. And a little before he explains it even more, when he says there is nothing in created things, which itself one, alone, and first before others of its own kind was made, but with all things at once *kata genos ē taxin*, that is, with all things of its own kind or order. For no one, he says, of the stars, or of the great luminaries appeared in such a way that this emerged earlier and that later in the nature of things, but all took their origin on the same day, by the same command, although they differed from one another in splendor; similarly in quadrupedes, birds,

^A fish, cattle, and plants, he says, were created; likewise the Seraphim, and likewise the Thrones, and similarly in the other orders, in which, so far as concerns their creation, there is nothing prior or posterior, although they differ among themselves in glory and honor. Thus the blessed Athanasius proves against Arius that the Word is not a creature; otherwise, he says, it would have been necessary that He be created simultaneously with the others from the order of the virtues, and not before, even if He excelled the others in glory, from which it would follow again that He could not be the first and beginning of others, as the Arians wished; for they taught that the Word was created so that through Him God might create all other things; as if He were not among the number of all things: when yet such a beginning of all things, says Athanasius, is numbered among all things, and thus he concluded that the Word differs in substance and nature from creatures, and that He alone is the image of the true God.

[Scholia]

Adam, although he was formed from the earth alone, there were in him even then the reasons of the succession and of the posterity of the human race; he subjoins then: *And from the creation of the world visible, His invisible things* (the angels, he means) *we understand by this kind of works also to have been made*, and we gather that not even in them was anything created separately in its own kind, or prior or posterior; but all things which are of the same condition came into existence simultaneously. For the Apostle (Coloss. 1) did not enumerate single things, so as to speak in this manner: Whether some angel, or some throne, or that dominion, or this one, or this or that one of the powers, but he comprehended all at once who were of the same order. *Whether*, he says, *thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, etc.* So far Athanasius. Therefore all the Cherubim were created simultaneously, and likewise the Thrones, and in like manner in the other orders.

^A For it is established, and known to all who have moderately considered the things that are, that the Author of the universe brought forth the ages, and place as a vessel for the things that occur within them, and creates all things in these; nor can it happen that anything of those which were made through creation or through generation should not be, in its entirety, either in an age or in time. If this is true, it is evident that everything which is, if it did not begin from time, had its beginning from the age; and that naught of things is absent from the creation of God.

CAPUT IV.

time, by the participation of those things which have not begun in the aeon, neither has the beginning of time, nor in time, they are and are called what they are and are called. For God is the author of all life, and immortality, and holiness, and virtue; and from all things which are understood and spoken of, He is exempt above substance. Furthermore, the same chapter 8 of the first century says: "All things which exist are called 'intellects,' and have the principles of cognitions in themselves, which are indemonstrable: but God is not called an intellect by us, but is believed to be so only from the things that are understood; wherefore nothing of those things which are understood is compared with Him in any part." From which it is manifest that no work of God escapes being His effect: which is clear from the Prophet, when he says: "How magnificent are your works, O Lord! In wisdom you have made them all" (Ps. CIII, 24). And again: "Truth and judgment are the works of your hands" (Ps. CX, 7). But since the production of the works of God is twofold, and one is indeed produced with a beginning in time, and on the seventh day they ceased to be produced; but others, since they are above the origination in time, there does not fall upon them the thought of time, nor of the seasons ^A (a), but they are extended with the aeon, or the ages; therefore it was necessary to demonstrate in which works God acts the Sabbath, and in which He does not; and whatever things undergo origination and generation, because they have a beginning, they also have a sabbathism, that is, the rest of the Sabbath, the cessation itself. For on the seventh day, he says, He rested from all His works (Gen. II, 2). Again, however, whatever things were created by God before time eternally ^B in the aeon, no sabbathism falls upon them, and the status of the eighth day is signified in them, in which there is neither the beginning of generation, nor a sabbathism, that is, the rest and cessation of the Sabbath; but rather, as if free from destruction, and immortal, they all abide. Therefore, no works of God escape, because they may have a beginning, an age, or an aeon. For how could they escape, when He is their author, and infinitely and to infinity He surpasses them just as He does all other creatures? But yet God did not begin to generate these, of which there is no generation, nor time; yet with the aeon, which lacks dimension, even these were made from nothing. Therefore, not only because these are called works of God, and God their author, and He infinitely and to infinity surpasses them, is it clearly understood that they are creatures and effects of God; but also because it is everywhere explained that they did not begin with a preset definition of time, as those things which were begun in time are manifestedly distinguished ^C from those begun in the ages: and every virtue is said to lack a beginning, but to lack a beginning in such a way that it does not possess a time older than itself, yet it does not lack an aeon more ancient. And just as the great Dionysius says that God is the producer and begetter of charity and love, but the holy Maximus explains this in the scholia on him, and in the eighth century, chapter 88, he said thus: "He says that God Himself is the begetter of charity and love, for He Himself, when these were in Him, produced them outward, that is, regarding the creatures; and thus it is spoken."

Scholia

Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, in his responses to various questions on the passages of Scripture to Amphilochius, Metropolitan of Cyzicus: "There are," he says, "four operations of God; the first, by which He made the natures of all things from the beginning in seven days; according to this meaning it is said that He rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done. The second operation is the conservation from that time, perpetual, of those things which once existed, which does not permit any species to perish; this operation is called providence, from which operation God never ceases nor will cease, as long as this earthly concretion consists. The third operation is that by which He makes it so that the nature of each thing does not do anything dissimilar, or alien to itself, but rather generates what is similar to itself, and shows a legitimate succession; this operation also can be referred to providence. Besides these three, one concerning the creation of the essence, or substance, another concerning conservation, another concerning similarity, to which the succession of order must be referred, as in the sun, moon, rising, setting, conjunctions, and departures, and other energies, that is, operations, which God implanted in them, in the vicissitude of days and nights, in the maturity of seasons, and successions; besides these, there is another operation of the Lord's philanthropy, that is, the charity of the Lord God towards men; which is twofold, one pertaining to the body of man, the other to the soul; the former bestows sight on the blind, strength on the paralytic, raises the four-day dead, etc.; the latter liberated the mind vexed by evils, and restored it to the pristine state of His image, to which it was made. Therefore, the people of the Jews, ungrateful for the benefits of the Savior, ^D while accusing the Lord because He healed on the Sabbath, to whom the Savior, as Lord and preceptor, said: "My Father works until now" (John v, 17). For if He refutes those who calumniate the healing of the body done on the Sabbath, teaching that the Father neither ceased from such works, nor is ceasing; it is easy to understand from this sentence from which works He ceased, and from which He did not, since indeed He long ago ceased to create natures, but from conservation, and varied providence in them, and order, and beneficence, He has not ceased, nor will He cease."

"Whatever things were created by God before time eternally in the aeon." He said "eternally" and not "co-eternally": that is, in the aeon before time, which is accustomed to be called "eviternal," because of the angels, and their virtues, and cognitions. God eternally generates virtue, that is, before created time; for when God had these in Himself, He brought them forth outward, that is, regarding the creatures, as S. Maximus says. For if He had not created the angels before time, with which the world was born, it would have been more ancient than virtue not to be virtue, and goodness not to be goodness, which seem to be absurd; for it seems very becoming that those perfections, which flow from God and are participated in by creatures — that is, createdly — should be more ancient than time itself, with which creatures subject to time participated in them; and thus holiness, charity, life, wisdom, and other perfections of God, participated in from God essentially, that is, efficiently, or causally, did not begin to be created with the creation of man, but more anciently, before time, to wit, with the angels, who eternally, that is, in the aeon, and not co-eternally, were praising God.

(a) Seasons are spring, summer, autumn, winter.

And so it is not to be wondered at if he says here that God the begetter has the power eternally: that is, God, when he had it in himself, brought it forth, that is, about the creatures. Similarly, the statement "There was when there was not virtue and goodness," with the addition of time, is rendered consistent with itself and with the other things previously said. Nothing, therefore, of those things which have been demonstrated before is contrary to reason. But God, who has no cause and is the cause of all things, produces the creature from nothing; nor is anything of those things which are, whatever it may be, co-eternal with him, whether they be of those things which began in time, or which did not begin in time but are contained in the aeon, or of those things which are participating, or which are participated in, and are set forth only in order to be participated in by those who participate; or whether they be of those things which are understood, or those which understand. For God is to an infinite degree, unto infinity, the paradigm of both these and those: since he alone is the one cause of all; nor does he have anything greater before him, nor equal with him, nor lesser after him.

CHAPTER V.

Magnus Dionysius, chap. 4, *On the Divine Names*: "One must dare," he says, "to say this for the truth, that he who is the author of all, through the supreme excellence of his amatory goodness, exists ^B outside of himself through the providences of all things, and is, as it were, charmed and delighted by goodness and affection and love: and although he is above all things and exempt from all things, he descends to all things according to his suprasubstantial power, which, in going outside of itself, does not depart from itself." And again the same author in the same place: "Or because he woos himself, and moves himself, for by reason of love they call him desirable and lovable, as if he were beautiful and good, and as if it were a certain manifestation of himself by himself, and a good progression of an excellent union, and an amatory motion, simple, self-moving, acting by itself, which previously existed in the good, flows to those things which are, and again reverts to the good." And Saint Maximus in *Century* 8, chap. 87: "Understand," he says, "God to be the one who woos and moves toward amatory conjunction, I mean that which is with the spirit; that is, God is the sequestrator and the confector of this conjunction, and its reconciler, so that he is loved and cherished by his creatures."

^A He says "moving," as one who moves individual things ^B as is fitting for each, so that he may convert them to himself; but the name of "wooing," although among Gentile writers it signifies something not holy or chaste, here signifies the intermediate conciliation of conjunction with God. And furthermore, the same author in chapter 88: "The amatory motion of the good, which primarily exists in the good simple and immovable, proceeds from the good and returns to it alone; and that which is without beginning in the good, which indeed declares that our desire is always moved toward God; for union with God, because of charity, overcomes every union and is exempted from every conjunction." ^C Again, in chapter 89: "When we speak of love, whether divine, or angelic, or spiritual, or animal, or natural, let us understand a certain force or power that joins and mixes: moving the higher things toward the providence of the lower, those which are of the same order toward mutual communication, and lastly moving those which are of the lower order to convert themselves to more excellent and superior things." And again Dionysius, chap. 4, *On the Divine Names*: "This one good," he says, "and beautiful, is singularly the cause of all many goods and beautiful things." And in the fifth chapter: "For in the one God, as has often been said, he pre-has all things that exist, and has made them so that they might subsist, present to all, and everywhere, ^D and according to one, and according to the same; and according to the same, all, one." And in chap. 7, of the same *Divine Names*: "For if God bestows that they exist according to one cause, he will know all things according to that same singular cause." And chap. 12, of the same *Divine Names*: "These things, therefore, are without intermission to be celebrated with praises in the cause which excels all things; and it must be added that it is the holiness that is super-abundant, and the supreme dominion and kingdom, the most simple divinity: since from it, in one and at the same time, the whole is known and distributed, all unmixed diligence, all pure cleanliness, the order and composition of all things which exist." And in the first chapter of the same *Divine Names*: "Whence in almost every theological treatise we see the divinity sacredly celebrated as a monad and unity on account of the simplicity and unity of its supra-natural indivisibility, from which, as from a unifying power, we are made one: and, having been divinely contracted into one from divisible varieties, we are gathered into the good according to the likeness of God, and are joined in imitation of God." In which place says saint

Scholia (1) Example of this definition is frequent in the Canticle of Canticles, as in that chapter 1: "Behold my beloved speaks to me: Arise, my love, my dove," its diverse parts, but according to one and the same; and according to the same, all is one, and proceeding to all things, for it is all, insofar as in one simple essence all things exist by virtue, or power, as effects in a cause. (3) And it proceeds efficiently in one. This is what John says, in the Gospel, chap. 11: "For God does not give the Spirit by measure," just as the sun emits the whole light at once, although we do not receive it equally; thus in one he says, that is, not divisibly, and by parts, but the whole at once.

^A Maximus says: Since God, when he had purposed, produced all things by his will, he was not moved or multiplied like some kind of mind divided into volitions: but rather, he says, he remained in unity, and remaining in it, he produced and produces all things in the creature of the world indivisibly and without dispersion. And again the divine Dionysius in the seventh chapter concerning the same divine names: "But God is called in the Holy Scriptures by the name of praise, not only because he is the bestower of reason, mind, and wisdom, but because he uniformly anticipated the causes of all things." Furthermore, in the same chapter: "Wherefore the divine mind contains all things by a knowledge exempt from all, who, insofar as he is the cause of the universe, anticipated the knowledge of all things in himself: who before they were made, knew the angels and produced the angels, and all other things within, and from himself, to use this expression, ^B knew them, and brought them to essence; and I believe that Scripture teaches this, when it says: *Who knew all things before they were created*; for the divine mind did not know the things that are, by receiving a knowledge of them from the things that are, but from himself and in himself according to cause, he possesses the knowledge and cognition and essence of all, and at the same time anticipated them, not intending to perceive things individually according to their forms, but knowing and containing all according to the one complex of the cause: just as light ^C in itself according to cause anticipated the knowledge of darkness, knowing darkness from no other source than from light. Therefore divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows all things; knowing things that have matter without matter, divisible things indivisibly, and many things singularly from itself the one, and knowing and producing all things. For if God according to one cause imparts being to all that are, according to the same singular cause he will know all things, which both are from him, and previously existed in him, and he will not take the knowledge of them from the things that are: but rather, he supplies to them individually their own knowledge, and to others other knowledge. Therefore God does not have one knowledge of himself, and another by which he commonly comprehends all other things; for the cause of all, when it knows itself, cannot ignore those things that flow from it, and of which it exists as the cause. Thus, therefore, God knows the things that are, not by the knowledge ^D of the things themselves, but by the knowledge of himself: for even the Scriptures say that angels know the things that are on earth, not indeed by sensory perception, since they do not fall under sense, but by their own mental likeness bearing the virtue and nature of God. Discussing these things, Saint Maximus said: He declared this, when he said, not to know God from those things that are from them: and when he said, not to intend the perceiving of each thing according to its form, since as the author of all these things he has the knowledge of his works pre-anticipated, knowing how he would bring them to birth and generation: the depravity and defect of which, that is, frustration and infirmity, introduces evil, while that which is according to nature failing, that which is beside nature is produced. For he previously used the example of light; for darkness sub-exists by the privation of this; and it has as its cause the absence of the nature of light, just as habits are prior to privations, and as it can be said, they are the causes of privations. In this place, therefore, the father Dionysius speaks of those things which God produced, and of the nature of each of them, which he indeed said existed previously in God according to foreknowledge and pre-definition. Furthermore, see how he says that God knows all things not from a knowledge of all, but from a knowledge of himself, just as light knows darkness, having no darkness in itself. And again the same in Decad 1 concerning charity, chapter 21: God knows himself, he also knows the things effected by him; even the holy powers know God, and they also know the things that have been effected by God: yet not as God knows himself, and the things that have been made by him, so do the holy powers know God, and the things effected by him. And in chapter 22: God knows himself from his own blessed substance: but the things he has effected, he knows from his own wisdom, by which and in which he made all things. But the holy powers know God by participation, who is above participation, but the things made by him, they know by gathering contemplations within themselves. Furthermore chapter 24: The substance that partakes of reason, and the intellectual substance, partakes of the holy God, and knows God both by its own existence, and additionally by the habit of goodness, I say, and of wisdom and beyond existence by perpetual grace. Thus therefore

God knows himself; but those things which are produced by him, he knows, as has been said, by the artifice of wisdom in those things which are created, gathered together, which is bare, and not existing per se, formed in the mind, and yet, in no duplication, God is entirely simple, and above everything simple. And John Damascene, chap. 14, On the Divine Place, says: "For an angel, by the speed of its nature, and because it acts promptly—that is, it moves quickly—labors in different places; but God, who is everywhere and is above all things, acts everywhere at the same point in a varied, one, and simple action." From these things it is manifest that God does not know himself by one cognition, and by another the things which are effected by him, but rather, knowing himself, he also knows his own effects by one and infinite cognition; nor does he produce the creature by diverse powers and actions, ^B but by this cognition, and by one and infinite power he contained and had anticipated in himself all things, and afterwards, going out from himself, produced them; and in nothing, and according to nothing was he divided from himself, having these previously in himself, and producing them afterwards, and returning again to himself.

CAPUT VI. That God is made all things according to one singular cause: but nothing of those things which are made by him is uncreated.

Magnus Dionysius, chap. 9, On the Divine Names: "To all," he says, "God is present providently, and becomes all things in all things for the sake of the conservation of all, remaining in himself, and not departing from his same state, fixed in one and never-ceasing action." And again the same in the fifth: "He who truly pre-exists," ^C according to every thought of those things that are, is multiplied, and in him is properly celebrated, "was, and is, and will be: likewise it was made, and is made, and will be made; for all these things signify to those who understand as it behooves God, that he is above substance according to every thought: and that he is the cause of those things that are in all ways; for indeed it is not this, while that is not; nor does he exist in one way, and not exist in another; but rather he is all things, as the author of all: and he contains all principles in himself, and all things anticipated and concluded in all things produced, and is above all things, as being before all things, above substance, existing above it." In which place Saint Maximus: How, he says, when he had said above: "In him there is not, nor was there, nor is there, nor will there be, nor was it made, nor is it made, nor will it be made," does he say here: "In him there is, and will be, and that is made, and will be made, and he is properly praised?" Does Dionysius contradict himself? Away with such a thought. For above he said he is the *effector* of existence, of hypostasis, of substance, of nature, and of time; consistently, therefore, he placed therein "that which was," and the rest, so that you may understand that God did not begin from time, nor after time; but rather that he is superior to existence itself, since he said that existence is in him, ^D and he is not existence itself; but here, because he said he is multiplied according to every thought, he rightly said: "In him is that which is, and will be, and the things that follow," because where you will imagine time, or temporal moments, there you will find God, and that he is above all things, and before all things, and the cause and effector of those things that are, and that none of them is he himself: as we were saying, none of those things that are is he, and he is in all things. Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius: "In two ways," he says, "things being divided into that which makes, and that which is made, each differs from the other in nature, so that neither is that which is made uncreated, nor is that which is created the nature of those things which come to be." The same in the same books: "I," he says, "even if the discourse were of that Moses, who shone in the administration of the law, would not have spoken in such a way, if he had no splendor in him otherwise than by divine gift; for that splendor which arose in the legislator was not of anyone else, but of God himself." And the blessed Chrysostom, in the oration in praise of Saint John the Theologian, whose beginning is: "The beginning for us again arrives from heaven," speaks thus: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word." Nowhere is it: "He was not," but everywhere.

It did not create by someone else's authority, but rather, as it was everywhere, after it was, it created; not from an author, but from creatures; and so that you may know how it was and how it created, I say, enumerate them. *In the beginning was the Word,* and so forth. Behold, he mentions it for the fourth time, and he does not once say, "It was made." What then after these things? *All things were made through him.* He did not say here, "It was," because the discourse was about creatures. *All things were made through him;* he did not say, "They were," but *All things were made through him; and without him was made nothing that was made.* Again, "It was made." Where it is about God, it is "Was"; where it is about creatures, it is "It was made." *In the beginning was the Word.* Hence, God the Father was also revealed according to the Old Testament; for when Moses said to him, *If the children of Israel shall say to me: Who is he that hath sent me to us, what shall I answer them?* And God said: *I am who am; he who is hath sent me to you.* ^A The Father, who is; the Son, who was in the beginning. If anyone contends, saying that the same thing is not said in the Father and the Son, in the Father, "I am who am," but in the Son, "In the beginning was"; it is not, however, the same—it *is* and *it was*—I demonstrate the appellation in the Son; let him hear the Evangelist saying: *The only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father*; behold, you have the Evangelist's word in "is"; and again the Apostle: *Whose are the fathers, of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things God blessed.* You see how John protects you, who placed in God "Was," and in creatures "Were made." For it does not befit God to be "Made," nor creatures to be "Was." *In the beginning was the Word,* and the Word was with God, and God was the Word; this was in the beginning with God; *all things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made.* When "It was made" is posited, it descends to creatures; when "Was" is used, it ascends to the author; and again, *The Life was,* again it ascends to the effector; it brings today a ladder filled with many mysteries: when it ascends to God, it is "Was"—he proclaims; when it descends to creatures, it assumes "It was made"; when it ascends to God, it lays that aside, "Were made" and "It was made," and takes up "Was." Saint Maximus in the sixth century, chapter 84: *The prayer of a just man avails much,* which is performed either by the just man who employs it, or by another who requests that it be employed by the just man. By the just ^B man it is performed, because it provides him with confidence toward him who can grant what the just pray for; but from him who seeks a prayer from a just man, it is performed when he leads him away from his former wickedness and transfers his affection toward virtue. Magnus Dionysius, chapter 6 of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*: Renunciation not only of a divided life, but even of thoughts, in the commandments of God, which reconcile them into one, declares the most absolute virtue and discipline of monks when done knowingly; for it is, as I have said, not of the middle order of those who have been initiated by baptism, but of an order higher than all; wherefore many things that are done without reproach by the middle order are entirely forbidden to monks alone, and are alien to division. And in the Epistle to the Colossians, Paul says: *Teaching every man in all wisdom, that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus; whereunto I also labor striving, according to his working which he worketh in me in power.* From these it is now clear that God produces all things according to his own cause, which is one, not departing from himself; for it has been demonstrated that by not migrating he goes forth, and by the same returns, not distracted from himself in producing the creature, but according to one singular cause, which he himself is, all things come to be; and nothing that is done and performed by him is without creation. For to say that that which is performed is not created is clearly the same as if we were to say that a creature is not a creature; for that which is performed is the same as that which is made, because that which is performed is made, and that which is made is performed; but if that which is made is not without creation, and that which is performed ^C is without creation, therefore, he who says that what is performed, however it is performed, is not created, arrives at the point of saying that what is created is not created, or that what is is not; and whatever other things follow from contradiction.

CHAPTER VII.

^A is the end ^B, having within itself a division, led toward an end, with unity indeed set as the beginning of every number; but with two set as the beginning of an even number. If therefore a beginning signifies that which is most simple in every genus, how will the number of two be the beginning of all things? For the number of two is not a simple beginning, but a composite one; therefore a beginning consisting of composition is not simple, and how will it be called a beginning? For before a composite beginning, there will properly be a beginning of unity, from which, with units being composed, the two have been completed; from all sides, therefore, it is manifest that the number two is not a beginning. And again the same man in other places: The number of two, he says, cannot be infinite; for its units, composed among themselves by apposition, mutually define one another; but if the number two cannot be infinite, as has been demonstrated, neither can it lack a beginning, since the beginning of every number of two is unity; but if it does not lack a beginning, neither is it immovable (for it is moved by the number composed from units according to conjunction); but that which is moved is not a beginning, but is rather from the beginning of that which moves; but unity alone is properly immovable. And again the same man: Everything, he says, which has quantity in a multitude cannot be infinite, nor without a beginning, that with which another is thought of at the same time. And again the same man: No one, he says, who says that two or many things are without a beginning, will be able to live piously. The same man in the third century on charity, cap. 27: God indeed, he says, who is existence itself by itself, goodness and wisdom itself by itself, or rather, to speak more truly, above all these, has nothing at all contrary to Him: but creatures, which indeed all exist by participation and grace, while some are endowed with reason, and are intelligent, and apt for receiving goodness and wisdom, have a contrary; in them indeed to exist and not to exist are contraries: but in these, the contraries to the capability of goodness and wisdom are vice and ignorance, and to exist always, or not to exist, these are in the power of Him who made them; but to participate in goodness and wisdom, or not to participate, is in the will of those who are possessors of reason. Greg. Nyss., in his first book *Against Eunomius*, cap. 19: That which is not terminated is the same as that which is infinite, but to think more or less of the infinite is extreme madness; for how can the definition of the infinite be preserved, if more or less are decided in it? For from the arrangement of the ends among themselves, we adjudge what is more; but in those things in which there is no end, how can anyone think of something superfluous? The same man in the same place: Who does not know that according to its own nature, simplicity does not admit more or less in the holy Trinity? For in that in which there cannot be any mixture of qualities and concurrence of parts and of composition ^C thought of, how will anyone be able to understand a difference in other things according to more and less? Entirely it is necessary that he who judges these to be varied, should think that certain qualities fall into the subject. For either he thinks that these differ according to amplification and diminution, and for this reason introduces the thought of magnitude into that which is sought: or he strives to effect that, according to goodness and power and wisdom, and if any other thing is piously understood concerning God, it should abound or decrease: and thus he will not escape the notion of composition. The great Dionysius, in chapter five of *The Divine Names*, says that goodness is not one thing, and being another, and life or wisdom another; nor does he introduce many causes and divinities, some producing other things, some superior and others inferior. From these it is plain that just as nothing that is acted upon or generated is uncreated, so every two, or a succeeding multitude, or any other thing progressing according to superior and inferior, and to say it once, thus constituted, that something is contrary to it, cannot be infinite and lack a beginning; for to be without a beginning and to be uncreated comes to the same thing; but if it is without a beginning, clearly it is also infinite.

CHAPTER VIII.

That there is also a species of circumscription and limit, comprehension and vision, but God is in one way uncircumscribed to all ^D(a), and unaspectable, but individually to us, angels and souls are unaspectable.

Gregorius Theologus in the second book on theology: And not yet, he says, do I say that God is entirely finite, if He can be comprehended by the mind, for one species of circumscription is comprehension itself. The same in the same place: What indeed God is in substance and nature, no man has ever found, nor could he find. And again in the same place: Solomon, he says, who was wiser than all men who were before him and after him: to whom was the breadth of heart by the gift of God, and the flow of contemplation more abundant than the sand of the sea; the more he searches the depth, the more he surges: and he puts a certain end to finding wisdom as much as he had escaped. But Paul strives indeed to attain—I do not say the nature of God (for this by all means cannot be done), but only the judgments of God; but because he cannot find an exit, nor stand at any step of ascent, nor where the curiosity of the mind should end: while always something of that which is left behind appears below (O wonderful thing, that it should happen to me in the same way), he circumscribes his oration with astonishment; and calls the divinity of God and the depth this thing, and confesses that the judgments of God cannot be comprehended; speaking almost the same things as David, who now indeed judges the judgments of God (a) Because He is in one way infinite to all.

^A abyss, whose foundation is measure, as the Apostle says. If, therefore, it is not permitted to anyone of them to understand, either by sense; and yet sometimes he says that cognition is made wonderful from himself, and from his own formation. And further, the same author in the same book says: Because every nature indeed seeks the first cause; but it is not able to comprehend it because of the causes which I have stated; laboring with desire, and as if anxious, and not being able to bear the loss, it undertakes a second navigation, that it may look, for instance, into those things which are perceived, and make something of them God, foolishly learned. For what is it that falls under aspect, that which is higher than the observer and more similar to God, that this should worship, and that be worshipped? Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in the *Life of Moses*: "You cannot see My face: for man shall not see My face, and live." This, however, Scripture does not say as if God were the cause of death (how indeed can the face of life ever become a cause of death to them who have approached it?), but because God is the author of the nature of life, and the proper sign of the divine nature is to be higher than every sign. Therefore, whoever thinks that any of those things which are known is God, is as one who has turned away from Him who truly is, and has wrongly inclined toward that which is thought to be through the comprehension of fictitious thought, and has no life. For He who is the author of those things which are, He is the true life; but this can ^B be known as nothing. Because, therefore, the nature that is the producer of life surpasses cognition, everything that is comprehended is not life; and that which is not life does not have the nature to be made the producer of life. Thus is the desire of Moses fulfilled through that which he did, so that his inexhaustible desire might remain. The same author in his explanation of that beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God": He who has cleansed his heart, he says, from every turbulent affection, perceives in its own beauty the image of the divine nature. For the measure of the perception of God, which can be grasped by you, is within you. Therefore, he who sees himself sees in himself what he desires, and thus the pure in heart is made blessed, since looking into his own purity, he sees the exemplar in his own image. Divine Diadochus, the master of silence: No one, he says, when he hears the sense of the mind, should hope to see with his eyes the glory of God; for we say that it is felt by a certain taste, which cannot be expressed, of divine consolation, when one has purified his soul, but not that there should appear to him any of those things which fall under appearance, since now it is through faith, and not through sight. And let us not embrace ^C such a vision, if there appears to those who struggle (d) either a light, or any figure, or something in the likeness of fire, for this is a manifest deception of the enemy, which indeed has deceived many who, because of ignorance, had turned away wrongly from the path of truth. Blessed Chrysostom in his *Oration on the Incomprehensible*: That which is incomprehensible in God, we do not know as He knows the Powers, which know so much the more, the more pure and wise and perspicacious they are than human nature is; for the accretion of wisdom creates an accretion of reverence (e); just as one cannot bear the sight of the rays of the sun, nor does the blind man see in the same way as one who sees: in the same manner, that which is incomprehensible in God we do not know as they do; for as much as there is a difference between the blind and the one who sees, so much is there between us and them. And again the same author in the same: These angels, therefore, cover their faces, but these men, on the other hand, strive to fix their eyes impudently upon the inexplicable glory. Who would not weep for them? Who would not mourn such madness, and extreme dementia? And again the same author, when he explains that: "We beheld His glory, glory as of the Only-Begotten from the Father": We would not have seen it, he says, unless He had appeared to us in the body to which we are accustomed, and which is high with us. And further, in *Homily 15 on John*: "If no one has seen God at any time"; what then, he says, shall we answer to the grandiloquent Isaiah, when he says: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up"? And to John, who bears witness to it, when he says: "These things he said, when he saw His glory"? What to Ezekiel? Since he himself also saw Him sitting upon the Cherubim. What to Daniel? When he says: "The Ancient of days was sitting." What to Moses? Who said: "Show me Thy glory, that I may clearly see Thee," and Jacob received his name from this, called Israel, that is, a mind seeing God. What, therefore, does John say: "No one has seen God at any time"? It is clear that all those things pertained to condescension; for because it was to be that the Son of God would appear in true flesh, God was accustoming them from the beginning to the seeing of the glory of God, as much as it could be seen by them. For what God is, not only the prophets, but neither the angels nor the archangels have seen: only the Son and the Holy Spirit see Him. For how can any created nature see ^D (1)

Scholia. (a) Cognition is not possible, of what He is, specifically: for he speaks of this cognition. (b) For the learned man, through the response of God, ceased to desire to see God in this life, and is inflamed with an insatiable desire to see Him in the other. (c) In the little book *On Spiritual Perfection*. (d) He speaks of the struggle, by which we struggle against the law of the flesh. (e) For he shows reverence to God who knows that He cannot be comprehended; and he who knows this more, shows greater reverence to God: always the Fathers speak, when they take it away and deny it.

not created? For if we cannot completely grasp a clear vision of an incorporeal power, however much it might be created, and this has been demonstrated many times in the case of the angels; then much more [is this the case for] a non-created substance. Therefore Paul says: "Whom no man has seen, nor can see" (1 Tim. vi, 16); and of the Son he says that He is not visible, not only to men, but even to the superior powers (II Tim. i, 17); for after Paul had said shortly before that "He was manifested in the flesh," he added: "He was seen by angels" (1 Tim. iii, 16). Therefore, He was then seen by the angels when He put on flesh. But how does He now say: "Do not despise one of these little ones; for I tell you that their angels always see the face of My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. xviii, 10)? What then? Does God have a face? And is He circumscribed in heaven? What, therefore, is what is being said? Just as when He says: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" (Matt. v, 8), he speaks of the vision of the mind which we can have, and of the notion of God, so too must this be interpreted regarding the angels, because of their pure and vigilant nature, as meaning nothing other than that they always think of God. ^A Basil, in the homily entitled *Take Heed to Thyself*, says: "I believe that God is invisible when you think of your own soul, since it itself cannot be perceived by the eyes of the body; because it is not endowed with color, nor is it figured, nor is it comprehended by any mark or bodily sign, but rather it is known only from its actions." Wherefore do not seek to know God through your eyes, but rather commit faith to your mind, and have an intelligible comprehension of Him. Great Athanasius, in the *Questions to Antiochus*, says: "The eye which is subject to death cannot contemplate the substance which is free from death." From this one may clearly know that the angels do not appear to us according to [their] substance, since they do not even show themselves upon earth in one shape, but rather some put on the form of youths, others appear in the figure and appearance of soldiers; and finally, though there are many forms, there is but one substance of theirs which is invisible. ^B And the same author again says: The angels put on whatever figures the Lord God commands, and they appear in this way to those who are worthy, and reveal divine mysteries to them. And the great Dionysius: "Since our mind cannot be raised to that imitation of Him which is free from matter, ^C and to the contemplation of the celestial hierarchies, unless it uses a bodily aid convenient to itself." Chrysostom to the fallen Theodore: "The soul," he says, "no one has ever seen naked of the body." And the same author still further: "And we know that the soul is in our body: but how, we do not know; for God has for this reason obscured the knowledge of this [matter], that He might abundantly restrain and repress us, and persuade us to stand still, and not be curious and inquire into things that are above us." And Saint Gregory of Nyssa: "That which is comprehended by a notion is known not from itself, but from its operations; therefore the soul, which is unknown from itself, is known from its effects." From these it is now clear that God has no circumscription among creatures, nor comprehension: wherefore He is equally invisible and incomprehensible to all, and to us he is truly not only invisible, but neither are the angels (3) nor our own soul.

CAPUT IX. That none of the things that exist receive a name from their opposites; but God, though He is otherwise named from opposites, yet according to His own existence is altogether without a name.

Great Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of *The Divine Names*: "Wherefore," he says, "all things are spoken of Him and at the same time are not; and He is not of all things, He is of every figure, every form; without form, without beauty; having the beginnings and the middles, and the ends of things resolved and abstract within Himself in anticipation, and shining purely upon all by granting that they may be; according to one cause, and above whatever is conjoined [to another]." In which place the holy

Scholia.

(1) Although before the incarnation God was seen by the angels, and appeared to them, yet because when He appeared in the world through the flesh, He then appeared and was seen by those very angels more excellently, therefore the Scripture says then *ōphthē*, that is, appeared and was seen by angels, because when He put on flesh, then they more perfectly and divinely knew those things which are specific to God, His goodness, justice, mercy, wisdom, power, and others.

(2) It does not mean that the angels do not appear with bodily substances, but [it means] by phantastic figures fashioned by thought, which was the error of some, which Saint Thomas noted, and Athanasius refuted in his own work, [but] it signifies not to appear through their own substance, but through an alien [substance], though otherwise real, as those three men who appeared to Abraham were angels in the appearance of true solid bodies, though not natural [bodies], and lacking the natural properties of the human body, as the same Athanasius taught in the work which I mentioned.

(3) It does not mean that God is equally invisible in this life, as the angels and the soul are not invisible; for God is invisible not only because He is incorporeal, but because He is infinite; but vision is a kind of circumscription, which is repugnant to the infinite; but the angel and the soul are invisible because they are merely incorporeal, yet they can be comprehended by the intellect, because they can also be defined; but the vision of God in the blessed, to which the divine light approaches, does not circumscribe God, because through His own being, without any other medium by which He might be circumscribed, He is united to the intellect, and makes the intellect to be in act, as Saint Thomas hands down.

What at length God is. What God is cannot in any way be comprehended by any creature; but that He is, can be comprehended by natural reason from creatures, which comprehension is called *aisthētē* and is, that is, sensible; but by faith it is comprehended more excellently and more fully what He is, which comprehension is called by Saint Basil *noētē*, that is, intelligible.

^A Maximus, according to the notion of cause, says that all things are predicated of God as from their cause; and the end of all things, and all infinity, that is, that all things are understood in Him: for *katēgoreisthai*, that is, to be predicated, this, he says, he declares according to the philosophers; but He Himself is nothing of those things whose cause He is; because He is above being. Wherefore, on the one hand, negations declare this, as not having form, or being without form, without beauty, and the like; but that one—namely, being of every figure and of every species—declares Him to be the cause of every species and of every figure; and similarly the rest of this kind are to be understood. The same Saint Maximus, in the same place, against that "being of every figure," opposed "being without form," because He is above the incorporeal, and above the lack of matter: not formed toward any of those things which exist. But against that "being of every species," he opposed "being without beauty"; he says "without beauty" because beauty was made by Him; but He Himself is above beauty. The authorities of Scripture are: "We saw him, and he had no form," (1) "nor beauty." The same author, in Century II *On Charity*, chapter 29: Just as, he says, evil is a privation of good, and ignorance is a privation of knowledge, so that which is not is a privation of that which is; not, however, of that which properly is (for it has no contrary), but of that which is by participation in that which properly is. And the privations of those former things follow from the free will of those who were created; but the privation of this second thing is in the will of Him who created; who always, on account of His goodness, wills those things which are to exist, and to be always aided by Him. And again Dionysius in the same works: Therefore, the beginning and the end of all things, who is before all things, is the beginning as cause; but the end as ^B of infinity and termination, excellently, as of opposites (2). And the same, in the second chapter, concerning the same Divine Names: Joined indeed and common in the Trinity as the one beginning of all things, and substance above substance, divinity above divinity; goodness above goodness (a), the same above all things, the same in the whole propriety (3) which is above all things: unity (4) above the principal unity; ineffable (5), of many voices; ignorance (6) from every intelligible (7); the position of all things (8), the removal of all things. And again the same, in chapter 7, concerning the same Divine Names: Wherefore God is known in all things and separately from all things; and through cognition God is known, and through ignorance. And there is concerning Him cognition, and reason, and knowledge, and touch, and sense, and opinion, and thought, and name, and all other things; and He is neither understood, nor spoken, nor named, nor is He any of those things which exist, nor is He known in any of those things which exist; and in all things He is all things, and in nothing is He anything; and from all things He is known by all, and ^C by no one from any thing. And again, in the first chapter: Thus, therefore, he says, it will be fitting for the cause of all things, and that which is above all things, not to be named, and to be named by the names of all things. From these it is elicited as manifest that not one of those things which exist is said to be He Himself, and above substance: similarly in other things, neither life, and above life; nor intellect, and not intelligence; nor reason, and the vacancy of reason, nor the same thing participated, and not participated; nor named, and lacking a name, and other things out of those which are first (9), so that I might not enumerate them one by one: cognition and ignorance; light, and darkness.

Scholia.

and being ^A, and created; for all these contraries are inter-dependent and perish according to their nature. God alone, who does not suffer contrariety, receives all contraries according to one supra-substantial union; and all things are spoken of Him, and nothing of these is Him, for He is one thing according to cause, and another not according to existence; for by infinite measures, and those which cannot be compared, He is absent from the effects, He who is the author of all, and above all.

CHAPTER X

The great Dionysius, in chapter 9, *On Divine Names*, while setting forth in detail in what proper ways it is fitting for God to be called the same, he says: The Same Itself is above eternal substance, and after many properties concerning the same, he adds: As unmingled, devoid of matter, most simple, needing nothing, not increasing, which cannot be diminished, unbegotten, not as not yet made, or imperfect, or made from this or that, nor as in no way existing: but as above every unbegotten, and absolutely unbegotten, and always existing, and perfect by itself. ^B In which place the holy Maximus says: It must be noted in how many ways the meaning of "unbegotten" is accepted, that is, "not made," or that which is not yet generated, but to be generated, as Sarah said: *There is not yet born to me* 77; or that which is imperfect, as the tower in Chalane; ^C or not made *from this*, as the Apostle Paul *not from men* 78; or not *this* made, as "Justus" is not one of the twelve; or that which in no way at all exists, as whatever the Gentiles fabricate, Scylla, Chimera, and the like. Therefore, "unbegotten" is said of God specifically, and absolutely. And yet the same man says a little later: He knew, he says, the dogma of certain Gentiles, who used to say that all things intelligible and immortal, and endowed with the power of understanding, were generated and unbegotten; generated indeed, as existing by themselves through God the effector according to the emanation of the emitted splendor; but unbegotten, insofar as they did not proceed in time, but eternally, ^D that is, in the aeon, although we said above that those things which fall under sense have time; but those which fall under the intellect have an aeon, whence they are also called eternal; but those then shining forth from the emanation, they called unbegotten; again he knew others who would say that this world which is seen is generated and unbegotten: generated indeed, insofar as this universe proceeds from one into many; that is, into the generations of living beings, and plants, and others according to their various species and forms; or from many into one, when indeed, as they used to call this same world generated—that is, perpetual—insofar as, as they themselves opine, the movement toward generation and the return toward corruption never ceases. Therefore Dionysius says, however "unbegotten" may be said, whether as I have said, or as the Gentiles say, do not take it so in God: for some things are said to be unbegotten *aitiatôs*, that is, as having a cause; but God as having no cause, and absolutely; for what cause can He have, who, to speak once, excels all? The blessed Anastasius also observing this in the things which he published against the Monophysites: "Unbegotten," he says, that is, non-created, is God alone. Then, doubting how it had come into the mind of Dionysius the supreme theologian to say that God is above every unbegotten thing, he signified many unbegotten things, that is, non-created: But, he says, how can this happen? for no one is unbegotten, except God alone. After which, again refuting the opinion of the Manichaeans, he cites Dionysius of Alexandria, the interpreter of this word, when he says: External philosophy is accustomed to call every unobservable nature unbegotten; which having been so called, the theologian Dionysius said that God excels them. Indeed even Gregory of Nyssa: Nothing, he says, is non-created except the divine nature. And again: The divine nature alone surpasses the creature. And furthermore: By a bipartite, he says, contemplation of things into creature and non-creature, we define the holy Trinity as non-created nature: but all other things, whatever are said after it, both are and are named, as created. And John Damascene: Every thing, he says, which is, is either created or non-created; if created, it is entirely created by another, but if non-created, this surely is that which created the creatures. And again the same: He says that there is a difference of nature of *agenêton* and *genêton* in the Scripture, which indeed declares created and non-created, therefore the divine nature is unbegotten, that is, non-created. And St. Epiphanius: The unbegotten is exempt from every cause plainly; because one is unbegotten, and to be venerated. And again: It is understood that to be non-created and a creator belongs to God alone; and it cannot be that more are brought to the communion of such a thing; and further the same, One, he says, is what makes, in one substance of the perfect Trinity; all other things made, and created. For therefore we do not venerate everything that is below the substance of God, because it belongs to God alone to have veneration and worship applied. And again the same in those which he wrote against the heresy of the Secundiani: The universe, he says, will be reduced to one, which is that than which there is nothing higher; nor lower, nor lowest, except those things which were created by Him, and this will be manifest to those who have discerned the truth.

Scholia ...contains created wisdom; but to God alone, who is wisdom created according to cause (b); and is above wisdom according to existence. (a) He calls "ens" that which is its own being, who is the sole God creator of all. (b) That is, it is created wisdom, as its author: just as it is all things, as the effector of all.

^A that one God is Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit; but if there is one God, from whom are all things, and there is nothing sinister in Him, nor anything diminished, nor any degree of a lower order, except what has been created by Him: as for those things which exist after the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, all are created beautifully, and from Him, after having been brought forth and constituted well, they exist abundantly. Again, the same person against the heresy of the Marcosians: For we believe, he says, thoroughly, as the truth shows, and as probable reason suggests, and as it accords with the rule of piety, and with the Law and the Prophets, and with those who have followed in order from the original patriarchs, and with the very doctrine of the Saviour, and of the apostles who openly teach us to confess one Father holding domain over the universe, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and His holy Spirit, one holy Trinity not created, with all things having been made from nothing after the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, in those things which all the holy ones mentioned already have clearly confessed and believed, and the prophets, and the evangelists, and the apostles, no fallacious thought will ever be able to resist and oppose the ray of truth. And the holy and divine Germanus in the exposition of the faith says: But our veneration and worship, with a heart without doubting and with the mouth, confesses the sole uncreated, and infinitely powerful, above the principle-granting, and above the good, the author of life, and above substance, the holy Trinity, one divinity and power; for to this one alone is it proper to render worship. And Saint Cyril: Whether anyone, he says, goes past the angels, or any of the superior orders, and all intermediate things, to the Seraphim themselves, and approaches the supreme glories, he will not transcend nature; for either something is understood above, that is, from the Father of lights, and therefore God: or below, and infernally, that is, creature, and from creature; but there is nothing fundamentally interposed. And again the same: For what is in their opinion neither purely God, nor openly a creature, what place will it receive among the things that are? I would say it finds no place even in thought alone, although I might be able to choose it alone. And Justin the philosopher and martyr: For indeed if anything existed in principle outside of God, it is absolutely necessary to confess that this is either God or any other power whatever; but if anyone ^B denies God, he will have abrogated the divine voices, which clearly cry out: I am the first God, and I after these, and besides me there is no God 79. But if he does not say God, he will say, of course, angels, or powers, but in this way he will also disprove the divine Scriptures, which say that these were made by God: Praise him, all his angels; praise him all his powers 80. From these things it becomes clear that between the nature of God in three persons, and the things created by Him, nothing else whatever is found; but all things after the divine nature and substance have been generated and created, therefore nothing of the things that are is uncreated and unbegotten, except God alone, this Trinity above substance. The material exposition of this decade is also manifest to you. First, indeed, it posits that nothing of the things that are is without a cause, but God alone; he therefore who has no cause, is the cause of all, who produces the creature from nothing; therefore nothing of the things that are is coeternal with the author, but rather it is either from the beginning of time, or not from the beginning of time, but from the beginning of the age; for God rests and keeps the Sabbath from those works which are from the beginning of time; but from the works which are from the beginning of the age, He does not rest, and keep the Sabbath; and because God, indivisibly proceeding from Himself, produces all things by one power, being in no way divided on account of these things, nor because by producing all things, He becomes all things, therefore is nothing of the things that are made or done ^C by Him uncreated: nor can any two things, or a multitude after two, or anything else proceeding according to superior and inferior, be infinite, and without beginning: but one alone, that is God, is incomprehensible, and unlookable, and He alone is named by His contraries; but according to His own essence He is utterly without a name, because He alone is uncreated and unbegotten; but all things after the divine nature are created, because between God Himself and the creatures there is nothing, nor is anything thought of as any essence. Diligently, therefore, the matter of this decade has been explained by the theologians, since otherwise we would be unable to know the infinity of God Himself (1).

Scholia. To those things noted by the Fathers concerning the unbegotten, there can be added what Saint Chrysostom wrote, discussing the unbegotten against the heretics in his homily on that text: In the beginning was the Word (John I, 1), and: The Spirit searches the deep things of God (I Cor. II, 10): Do not think, he says, O heretic, that you attribute anything great to the Father when you say He is unbegotten; because many other things which were not generated are called unbegotten; Adam is called unbegotten, because he was not begotten, but fashioned; a man is also called unbegotten, not generated, nor fashioned, as when the Lord said of Judas: It were good for him if that man had not been born (Matt. XXVI, 24). And how was it better for him, if he had not been born? For to him who does not exist, nothing is beneficial, nor harmful. And Solomon declares him blessed who is not begotten, for he says thus: Blessed is he who is dead, more than he who is living, and above the two, who is not begotten (Eccle. IV, 2). The names of unbegotten nature. He called the man who was neither begotten nor fashioned blessed; wherefore the name "unbegotten" does not interpret the divine nature, nor, as you say, does it signify substance; nor does it bring honor to the Father. So far Chrysostom.

NINTH DECADE. — ON INFINITY IN GOD.

CHAPTER I.

^AThat in God, who is above substance, there is nothing uncreated other than the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, of one and the same uncreated nature, nor is there anything before the ages other than these three Divine Persons.

Magnus Dionysius, in the first chapter of *Mystical Theology*: "Trinity, above substance, and above the Divine, and above goodness, the president and guardian of the piety of Christians toward God, direct us to the unknown 1, and more than luminous 2, height of the mystical discourses of God; where the simple, and absolute 3, and immutable mysteries of theology are opened in the more-than-luminous darkness of the silent arcane doctrine. You, who in the darkest obscurity shine most clearly and most brilliantly, and in those splendors, which are most beautiful, ^B and which escape the touch and sight [a] of all minds 4, fill with your most-than-light the sightless eyes. I therefore wish for these things; do you, however, dear Timothy, in the vehement exercise of mystical contemplations, leave behind both the senses and the operations of the mind, and all that fall under sense and intelligence, and everything that is 5, and that is not; and strive, as much as you are able, to attain the union with Him who is above all substance and knowledge 6, in an unknown manner; and, having set yourself outside, purely and released and freed from all things, you will be brought to the divine ray of divine darkness, having all things removed and having been freed from all things." Observe, however, that no one should hear these things who is not instructed; those, I mean, who cling to earthly things ^C and think there is nothing above those things that are and above substance, but who rather think that they know by their own knowledge Him who has set darkness as His hiding place. But if above these are the knowledges of divine mysteries, what can be said of the other uninitiated ones, who designate the supreme cause of all things from the extremes [b] in the nature of things, and say that nothing excels it, but [rather equate it with] the impious images which they themselves fashion? And the great Athanasius: "For the holy Trinity alone is shown to be of uncreated divinity." And the blessed Basil: "There stood the blessed and uncreated Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." And Gregory Nyssen: "Nothing else before the ages except the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." And the divine Damascene: "The Only uncreated, who is worshipped in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit." From which it becomes manifest that in God, who is above substance, there is nothing else uncreated except the Trinity, nor is there anything before the beginning of time except the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit—the Trinity above nature. And in this are the simple, and absolute, and immutable mysteries of theology detected, and the very hidden discourses of ineffable silence; wherefore if there is any uncreated nature, it is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And again: "If the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are something, they are the only uncreated nature; and when we say 'uncreated nature,' the author of all things, or that there is nothing uncreated besides the divine nature, we imply the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and when we again say: 'The Father all-powerful'..."

Scholia.

1 Above all; for what God may be, which is the holy Trinity, is not only unknown—so that we might understand that something in creatures is unknown—but it is "more than unknown." 2 Dionysius signifies that it is not proper to God to be known as "what" He is, and that He is "good," and other things of the sort proper to God, just as we understand and know in creatures that they exist and are such-and-such, but His cognition is proper [to Him], above all created cognition; for by Himself alone, as it befits Him, that is, perfectly, is He known to be. 3 Ill those things which are without symbolic coverings, and without parables, and without words, which require explanation, are understood and seen, God opening the mysteries; which, having been thus shown and revealed, cannot afterward ^D be expressed in speech, just as Paul wrote in that rapture of his about such vision and revelation of mysteries, simple and absolute—that is, naked and open, with symbols removed, and with words which require explanation: "Which it is not permitted," he says, "for a man to speak" (II Cor. XII, 4); for to this it seems Dionysius has referred what he said here. In "the more-than-luminous darkness of the silent arcane doctrine," he called the "darkness" what Paul called *arrheta*, that is, arcana; for this darkness, and what cannot be explained (just as what cannot be seen can be neither darkness, nor can those things which are covered by darkness be seen) Paul saw, and knew in the light of most clear revelation without any symbols. But that is to be observed, lest one rashly rebuke the interpreter, because we translate: *Aperiuntur in caligine* [They are opened in darkness], for it is read badly in the Greek copies in Italy and Gaul as published hitherto, *egkalyptontai*, that is, they are covered; I found it better in a manuscript copy, which Cyparissiota had, *exkalyptontai*, that is, they are uncovered. 4 He calls the angelic minds "seized by eyes" because of the infinite excellence of divine splendor; they are otherwise endowed with many eyes because of the great knowledge of their own faculty. For even as God is said to be "invisible," so might angelic minds be said to be "seized by eyes." 5 Including things intellectual and sensible; for these were said by the philosophers to "not be" because of their continuous mutation. 6 He signifies how this knowledge of mystical theology happens through union with God, all other knowledge of things having been abandoned; that which the Apostle Paul signified when he spoke about that union of his with God, in which he saw those arcane mysteries: "Whether in the body, or out of the body, I do not know; God knows" (ibid.). "I do not know," he says, that is, I do not curiously inquire; it is enough for me to have seen and heard those arcane things, etc. (a) He calls these "intellectual touch and sight"; for knowledge is a certain touching and seeing of the intellect. (b) He calls inanimate matter "extremes" in things.

DECAD IX. — ON INFINITY IN GOD.

^A ...Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, we invoke one and not a created nature; moving nothing in the faith, which holds that there is unity in the Trinity and Trinity in unity.

CHAPTER II.

The Lord says in the Gospel: "Hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven." And again: "But if I by the power of God cast out devils." And further: "But stay you in the city of Jerusalem, until you be endued with power from on high." And the divine Apostle: "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." Gregory of Nyssen: "The power," that is, the virtue or authority, when it refers to God, is expressed in the singular; but when it refers to creatures, in the number of the multitude. Gregory the Theologian: "One three, and three one, in which is the divinity; or rather, I shall say, which are the divinity." And again the same: "But when I say God, I speak of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; neither diffusing the divinity beyond these, lest we introduce a multitude of gods, nor limiting the divinity within these, lest we be condemned for narrowing the divinity." And again: "O good men, honor the Trinity of one divinity." And again: "It is enough to know thus far the unity in the Trinity, and the Trinity in unity, having a wonderful conjunction into one and a distinction." And still the same: "For us, however, there is one God, because there is also one divinity." And the great Athanasius: "Thrice holy on account of the three persons, once Lord on account of the one divinity; these things are enough for the faithful: thus far knowledge proceeds in men, thus far the Cherubim veil themselves with their wings; but he who wishes to inquire more than this, hears the saying: 'Be not overwise, lest thou be astonished'." And the great Basil: "Our baptism is, according to the tradition of the Lord, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, with no creature, nor servant joined to the order of the Father and the Son, inasmuch as the divinity is complete in the three; what is outside of these, all that is a fellow-servant, although in the magnitude of dignities some surpass and excel others." And again the same: "The holy and ^D venerable Trinity is a certain chain, carrying everywhere one and the same divinity in one and perpetual glory." Still the same: "These things have been said, and it will be well, as it is for those who without curiosity believe in God the Word and Spirit, one substance and divinity: which alone is also to be worshiped; and let not a multitude in any way creep in." And in the disputation against the philosopher Phaedo, which is in the first synod: "The Catholic faith," he says, "knows one sole divinity and worships it, that of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; beyond this, no other shall be reckoned." The edition of the holy and ecumenical third synod: "If anyone does not confess in the ^A holy Trinity one divinity, and one kingdom, and one dominion, anathema." The confession of the holy and ecumenical sixth synod: "We neither know, nor do we recognize, three gods, or many gods in all, or natures, or substances, or divinities; nor do we know those who recognize them: nay, we subject to anathemas him who has, or feels, or recognizes them." Gregory of Nyssen in the book inscribed, *What is the Christian Profession*: "For he," he says, "who condemns those who say one divinity, necessarily assents to him who says either many or none; for nothing else can be thought of beyond these things said, nay, even the doctrine of Scripture does not say many, which somewhere mentions divinity in the singular, as when it says: 'In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily'." If, therefore, to extend the number of divinities into a multitude is the business of those who are sick with the error of positing many gods, but to deny divinity altogether is the portion of those who take away God, what is the reason for accusing us who confess one divinity? And St. Sophronius of Jerusalem: "As," he says, "we have learned that there is one God, so we have received that one divinity is to be confessed." And Gregory the Theologian, in the oration *On the Constituting of Bishops*: "If I could attain that I might have here perfect knowledge of all things, what would be left for me? What would I hope for? The kingdom of heaven plainly, you will say. But I think that this is nothing else than to attain what is most pure and most perfect, but the most perfect of all things that are, is the knowledge of God; but let us hold this in part, and in part let us proceed, so that we may comprehend as long as we are upon the earth; in part let us reserve it for the future, so that we may have thence this fruit of labor, namely, the splendor of the whole holy Trinity, whatever it is, and what kind, and how great, if it is lawful to speak." Still the same in the same oration: "I am content to hear that the Son is, and that He is from the Father, and that this one is the Father, and this one is truly the Son, and I inquire nothing curiously beyond this; lest it happen to me as with voices, which, when too raised, fall away entirely; or with sight intent upon the ray of the sun; for the more and the more sharply anyone desires to see, the more his sense is injured." From these it is evident that in God, who is above substance, there is no other divinity of His except the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; nay, the three themselves are the divinity; and there is nothing beyond these; nor is there anything lacking to these three, since the divinity is complete in these three; but what is outside of these is neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, but the whole is our fellow-servant. For the whole uncreated nature is perceived in these three, and is complete; and as the uncreated nature of the Trinity is one, so also is Its divinity, and power, and operation one; and as there is no other divine nature beyond the Trinity which is above all divinity, so there is no other divinity, or power, or virtue, and operation beyond It: but

because the nature, and substance, and power, and operation are the same, therefore God is one to us, the very unity of the three persons. Yet, at the same time, it is manifest that all theology is contained within the three divine persons: for he who curiously wishes to investigate more than these, falls away from that which is truly the truth.

CHAPTER III.

Great Athanasius, in his exposition of the faith in the first synod, says: In the beginning this is the orthodox faith, that we venerate one God in Trinity, and Trinity in unity; neither confusing the persons, nor separating the substance. And a little later: The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Holy Spirit is uncreated; and they are not three uncreated, but one uncreated: the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, the Holy Spirit is omnipotent; and they are not three omnipotents. The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal; and they are not three eternals. And not long after: And in this Trinity there is no one first, and no one last; no one greater, and no one lesser, but these three persons are eternal, and equal in all things. Therefore, let every Christian venerate the unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in unity. And Saint Maximus, in his subtle explanation of the prayer, *Our Father*, says: We have not learned that there is one unity and another Trinity (for the unity, which is a simple and single nature, does not differ from the Trinity by any dissimilarity of nature), nor one alongside another (for the Trinity is not distinguished from the unity by a diminution of power, nor the unity from the Trinity), nor as something common and general which can be contemplated by thought alone, is the unity varied by its parts; thus from the Trinity, the unity—which is substance properly existing of itself, and power truly valid of itself—is not varied; nor as one from another (for the Trinity does not exist from the unity, nor the unity from the Trinity by way of generation or precession), but we say that the same is truly called unity and Trinity: unity indeed regarding substance, but Trinity regarding the mode of existence; the whole unity being the same, not divided by persons; and the whole Trinity being the same, not confused by unity: lest the division introduce a multitude of gods, or the confusion, the negation of God. Gregory the Theologian, in his third oration on peace: Let us not think that the one term of piety is to venerate the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, venerating one divinity and power in three persons, nothing above nor below; for the former cannot be, and the latter is impious. And the same author further: For where each thing is incom- ^A prehensible, and greater than can be conceived, how in this case can that which excels either be understood or handed down? How indeed can we measure what is infinite: that what belongs to those things which are limited should come to the divinity, which we measure by superior and inferior degrees? And again the same: The Trinity is not an enumeration of unequals; otherwise, what prevents it from being a decade, and a hundred, and a myriad? And again: One divinity and power, which is found in three, and comprehends the three discretely, neither differing in substances or natures, nor increased by surpluses and remissions, in every way equal, in every way the same. And again the same in his first oration on peace: The unity, he says, which is venerated in the Trinity, and the Trinity which is reduced into the unity, of the same throne, of the same glory, uncreated, invisible, not falling under touch, incomprehensible, which alone knows what order it has within itself, which leaves every creature separated by a veil, partly first, partly second: first indeed the celestial and angelic creature separated from the divinity, but secondly ours from the angelic creature. Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book Against Eunomius: But, he says, that which does not harmonize with the dogma fashioned by them, to opine that the substance which is above all things is simple, although they grant this in word gratuitously, it becomes manifest even to one who pays little attention. For who is ignorant that according to its own reason, the simplicity in the holy Trinity does not admit of more and less? And furthermore Gregory the Theologian in his oration on baptism: I wish to call the Father greater; from whom it proceeds that those who are equal should be, and exist; for this is conceded by all; and I fear lest I make the principle a principle of the lesser; and offer insult by preferring; for there is no submission of those who are from Him to Him from whom the glory is. And again Gregory of Nyssa, in his book On Abraham: Therefore, in both cases Scripture speaks the truth, which confesses the equal, and does not deny the greater. For when Scripture looks to humanity, it confesses as greater that which is not seen, than that which is seen through the flesh; but when it leads the mind to the divinity, this comparison of greater and lesser is void, and the unity is preached in place ^D of these: *I and the Father are one*; for things which are varied according to inequality cannot be one. And the great Athanasius, in his book On the Incarnation of Christ: Where, he says, dignity is of the same honor, veneration is also of the same honor; in equal dignity there is no conflict, the unequal excites conflict; equality honors peace. And the same again: Against Apollinarius: If the Father is not greater than the Son by nature, neither by magnitude (for He is devoid of magnitude), nor by time, because He is without time, nor by quality, because He lacks quality: therefore, He does not call Himself greater than the Father in any other thing, except insofar as the Son, even honoring His own Father. And the great Basil, in the fourth book of his Con-

- futation says: “Greater,” he says, “is one thing by magnitude, or by thickness, or by time, or by dignity, or as a cause. But the Father is not greater than the Son by magnitude; for He is devoid of magnitude. Nor by thickness, because He is incorporeal; nor by time, for the Son is the author of time; nor by dignity, for the Son did not come into being as one who at some time was not, nor as an inferior, since He will exist equally with Him, and is greater than us, if He is the author of both Him and us.” And again Gregory the Theologian, in the second book of his Theology, says: “But if God is incorporeal, not even this demonstrates the substance, just as neither does ‘unbegotten,’ nor ‘lacking a beginning,’ nor ‘immutable,’ nor ‘immortal,’ and whatever else is said of God, or around God.” From these it is made manifest that in God, who is above substance, there is no other unity above the divine, and another Trinity above the substance, but we believe truly in the same unity and Trinity: nor is there in the Trinity anything unequal, and partly greater than it, and partly less, but rather one equality pure and immutable in the three; nor do we worship any one of these three in any respect more, and another less; nor is there in Him anything privative, and that of itself is devoid of substance, and does not exist in itself: for an imperfect introduction of a privative is insulting to that which most perfectly exists; for indeed not to be a substance, and not to exist by itself, demonstrates a deficiency of the most perfect substance, and of that which exists by itself. ^A

CHAPTER IV.

The great Athanasius, in his dialogue between the Orthodox and the Anomoean, says: “Substance is one thing, and person is another, a different thing and a different thing,” consequently a composition. I said “a different thing and a different thing,” not as one thing and another, but as signifying a different mode of signifying a person, and another [mode of signifying] substance, just as a grain ^B of wheat is said to be both seed and fruit: not as one thing and another; but seed signifies one thing, and fruit another. And the great Basil, in his epistle to Terentius the Count: “But if,” he says, “it behooves us to say what is seen in a few words, we will say this, that in the same relation the common has to the proper, substance has to person. For each one of us participates in being by the common reason of substance; and by the properties which are about him, he is ‘this one’ or ‘that one,’—in the same way, there, the reason of substance indeed is common, such as goodness, or divinity, or whatever else may be understood: but the person is discerned in the property by which He is Father, or by which He is Son.” Saint John Damascene, chapter 53, whose inscription is: That every divine nature in one of its persons is united with the whole human nature, and not part with part: “Common,” he says, “and universal are predicated of their particulars; common therefore is substance, as a species; but the particular is the hypostasis; but particular, not because it has a part of the nature and another part does not have, but particular in number, as an individual; for by number, and not by nature, are the hypostases said to differ; but substance is predicated of the hypostasis, because in each one of the things which are hypostases of the same species, there is the perfect substance; wherefore neither do the hypostases differ among themselves in substance, but according to accidents, which are properties designating the hypostasis, and ^C not the nature: since they define the hypostasis as substance with accident, wherefore the hypostasis has the common with the proper; but substance does not exist by itself, but is viewed in the hypostases.” The same [author] regarding the Holy Trinity: “It is necessary,” he says, “to know that it is one thing to be considered in reality, and another according to reason and thought. In all creatures, therefore, the distinction of hypostases is considered in reality, for in reality Peter is considered distinct from Paul; but community, and coupling, and the ‘one,’ are considered by reason and thought.” ^D

Scholia. Regarding the phrase “one thing and another,” it is said to signify in divine matters the substance and the person, because although substance and person signify one and the same thing, substance signifies it in one way, and person in another; and it is rightly termed in Greek ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, that is, a different thing and a different thing, where there is only a different mode of signifying: just as seed and fruit signify one thing, namely, a grain of wheat: yet they are said to signify a different thing and a different thing, not as one and another thing, but because seed signifies that one thing in one way, and fruit in another: for seed signifies a grain of wheat in such a way that we understand a similar thing to be contained in it potentially. For the seed is that in which there is a seminal power to produce another similar thing: but fruit does not signify the grain of wheat in this way, but rather as being the fruit of another, or produced by another; so also substance and person are one thing, and signify one thing: but person signifies it in another way, namely, singularly, but substance indeed commonly: for whatever relation the common has to the proper, says Basil, this has substance to person.

This mode, therefore, of signifying in different ways one and the same thing is called by Athanasius “a different thing and a different thing”; not because it is one thing and another, but because one and the same thing is signified in a different and a different mode; for there can be many names for one thing, just as one name for many things.

(2) Common and universal are predicated of their subjects. Common therefore is substance, as a species. Damascene does not say this of substance in the divine persons, that it is common in reality, just as in creatures a species which is divided by characteristic properties, which they call individuals, so that, just as the same Damascene says a little later here, Peter is distinguished from Paul in reality, because Peter is not in Paul; for Peter and Paul are one not in reality, but by reason and intelligence. But on the contrary, in the divine persons, it is found not according to reality, but according to the mode of signifying, that there is some resemblance of the common and the particular to creatures. St. Thomas observed this in Damascene.

^D toward another, no less than toward itself; that is, in all things, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one, except for the unbegotten [(1)], and the birth, and the procession; one, I say, it has, but distinct in thought [(2)]. St. Basil the Great in his sermon on faith: "I have spoken of the Son and the Father, preserve these properties for me; the Son therefore, remaining in that which is Son, is all things that the Father is, just as the Lord Himself said: 'All things that the Father has are mine.'" [Jo. xvi, 15] And Gregory of Nyssa: "Confessing," he says [(3)], "the same nature without any variation, we do not deny the difference of cause and of that which proceeds from a cause, in which alone we comprehend that one is distinguished from another." And the divine Anastasius, in his book *On the Truth of Right Dogmas*: "They are reciprocated," he says, "such appellations of this kind, God, Lord, and Holy Spirit, on account of the incorporeal and holy, since such nominations are suitable to each person, with this alone reserved to the Father, namely, to be Father, because He alone is Father as cause; and with this reserved for the Son alone, namely, to be Son, because He alone is begotten; and with this reserved likewise for the Paraclete, namely, to be the Holy Spirit." The divine Dionysius, chapter two of *On the Divine Names*, says: "Joined into one in the whole divinity, as we have demonstrated at length from the Holy Scriptures in the theological information, they are above-good, above-God, above-substance, above-living, above-wise."

Scholia

(1) *Except for the unbegotten, and the birth, and the procession.* Damascene does not say this as if unbegottenness, which is called ἀγεννησία, constitutes and distinguishes the person of the Father; for this cannot be done, since "unbegotten" posits nothing, but is taken negatively; nor does he accept "unbegotten" in place of that which is uncreated (for it is so spoken of according to substance, and pertains to substance), but Damascene accepts "unbegotten" here in such a way that it signifies that which is not begotten, so that it pertains to relation, in so far as the relation of the begotten, which befits the Son, is denied to the Father; so that the Father is thus distinguished from the Son not according to substance, but according to relation. St. Thomas observed and explained this in Damascene in 1 p. q. 33, art. 4, ad. 3. Item, birth, which is a notional act, pertains to relation, in so far as it is signified, as the same St. Thomas says, as a way to the person of the Son, constituted by a personal property, that is, by filiation.

(2) *But distinct in thought.* Let no one take what Damascene says here otherwise, for St. Thomas says the same thing in 1 p. q. 39, art. 1: "For relation," he says, "compared to essence does not differ in reality, but only in thought, in so far as essence, according to the mode of signifying, as the same St. Thomas says, is signified as the form of the three persons, and the person as a particular; but when compared to an opposite relation, it has by virtue of opposition a real distinction, and thus, he says, one essence remains, and three persons." Therefore a distinction of thought suffices so that persons may be multiplied, which are otherwise one essence, and the essence is not multiplied. So also Damascene in this place posited a distinction of thought, or of reason, between the divine essence and the persons, leaving a real distinction between the personal relations, which he had named.

(3) *Confessing the same nature without variation, we do not deny the difference of cause and of that which proceeds from a cause.* He speaks of *cause*, which is spoken of univocally; for it is not more perfect in divine matters to be a cause than to be from a cause, as it is in creatures, in which it is a homonym, that is, equivocal, to have a cause, which befits the effect; and to be a cause, which befits the efficient as more perfect. In divine matters, the Father is the cause of the Son, but not an *effecting* cause, which is called by the holy Fathers γενεσιουργός, but a cause only, by which he is called αἴτιος, or ἀρχή, or αἴτιος ἀρχικός. It was said concerning these in the seventh decad, chapter 6. Thus among the Greeks, *aitios* is spoken of in two ways, that is, he who is a cause: *aitios genesiourgos*, that is, effecting cause, and *aitios archikos*, that is, a cause which is a beginning; as the Greek doctors accept the name of cause in divine matters, which St. Thomas rightly understood and proved from the Greek Fathers; for thus he wrote in the opuscule *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, chapter 1: "Nor, however, is it to be understood that the saints, who use the name of cause and caused in divine persons, intend to induce a diversity of nature, or that the Son is a creature, but through this they wish to show only the origin of the persons." Thus far St. Thomas. Therefore, what Gregory of Nyssa says, that the distinction of persons exists from the sole difference of cause and caused, signifies because the Father is the beginning of the Son, through generation, namely, and the Father and the Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit through spiration, therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinguished among themselves by their personal properties. And what Anastasius of Antioch says, that this alone is reserved to the Father, namely, to be the Father, because the Father alone is as a cause; it is the same as if he were to say, because the Father alone is as the beginning of the Son. Among the Latins, however, it is customary to use the name of beginning in place of the word cause. The same St. Thomas has brought forward reasons for the use of this word; let him read who desires.

^A and whatever things are of removal according to superiority, with which are numbered all things that pertain to the account of cause—the being that is good, beautiful, vivifying, wise, and whatever things proceed from his gifts, which befit his goodness, by which he is named the cause of all goods—but the name of the Father is discrete, and the reality, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, with no reciprocation made among them, nor any communion introduced. There is, furthermore, a discrete and distinct, perfect—as in us [(3)]—and immutable essence of Jesus, and whatever are the substantial mysteries of his humanity [(4)]. From these it becomes manifest that in the Trinity, which is above substance, person and substance are not the same by way of account and thought; they are, however, identical in reality and substance. Similarly, the three divine persons are not distinguished among themselves in reality and substance, but only by way of account and thought [(5)]; for their essence is one, but there is no reciprocation of them among themselves. Therefore, no other opposition can fall into them, except that of things which are relative; for other oppositions are not assumed without matter, but oppositions in those things which are relative consist in a certain way above matter, because in this opposition the bond is not dissolved, since their being is in a certain way to be related to something.

Scholia.

[(1)] Whatever things are of removal according to superiority. Such are names above good, above beautiful, which remove created goodness in God, and created beauty, and attribute an exceeding and superlative goodness—namely, uncreated, which overcomes all cognition and intelligence.

[(2)] Discrete are the name, the Father, and reality. He says the name of the Father is above substance, because in divine matters the name of Father does not signify to us, or of the Son, what we understand in creatures—namely, persons separated in reality and substance. But he calls the reality of the Father not the substance itself, which is one and the same in three, but he calls the reality of the Father, and the reality of the Son, and the reality of the Holy Spirit the properties, which in the divine persons designate the order of origin or principle among them, whence they are called notional properties or acts; because they are properly notions or designations of persons; as it is the property of the Father to beget the Son; the nativity of the Son from the Father is proper; and the procession of the Holy Spirit from one principle, the Father and the Son, is proper. ^C These are called in Greek *chrēmata gnōristika*, that is, notional realities or acts; for reality, insofar as it pertains to relation, is predicated of the number of the many in divine matters; S. Thom. 1 p. q. 39, art. 3, ad 3: In these, therefore, there is no reciprocation, nor communion, nor in the names themselves of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, nor in their realities, that is, in their acts or uses, from which they flow; for neither does the name of Father befit the Son; nor does the name of Son befit the Father; because neither is it the Son’s to beget, nor the Father’s to be begotten, likewise in the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both. It is furthermore worthy of observation that Dionysius here says that the name of Father is discrete in divine matters, and *chrēma*, that is, reality; and the name of the Son, and reality; likewise the name of the Holy Spirit, and reality; for when he had first placed the name of the Father, and the name of the Son, and the name of the Holy Spirit, and afterwards in the second place placed *chrēma*, that is, the reality of the Father, ^D which is to beget, and the reality of the Son, which is to be begotten, and the reality of the Holy Spirit, which is to proceed, he plainly taught that which S. Thomas also hands down, that according to the mode of understanding, the divine hypostases are distinguished by relations earlier and more principally than by origins or notional acts, which Dionysius signified by the name *chrēmata*. The old interpreter of Dionysius, whom St. Thomas had, translates *chrēma* as "use"; S. Thomas changed "use" into "act" and "origin." They are distinguished, I say, earlier and more principally by relations than by notional origins; because relations constitute persons, since they are the very subsisting relations of persons: but notional acts, although they are identical in reality with the relations, nevertheless according to the mode of signifying and understanding do not constitute persons, since they are their origins, whether the origin be signified actively, as generation, ^B which is an act notional and is attributed to the Father, and spiration which is attributed to the Father and the Son; or passively, as nativity, an act notional which is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Spirit; for origins according to the account of understanding are outside those things whose origins they are: since an origin is, as S. Thomas says, a certain way from a reality, or to a reality, as generation is signified as a certain way to the begotten, proceeding from the begetter. And so the reality of the Father is to beget (*chrēma* indeed, as I said, signifies reality), the reality of the Son is to be begotten; the reality of the Holy Spirit is to proceed. Thus Gregory in his first oration on the Son: From the one not having a cause, he says, that is, from the Father, comes the reality of nativity. He speaks of the Son, he called it *pragma gennēseōs*, which Dionysius called *chrēma*. *Pragma* also signifies an act from the verb *prattō*, whence theologians rightly call it the act in Latin, which the Greeks call reality, for the word *pragma* signifies both. I have noted this, because it is of no small importance to be skilled in the proper vocabulary of any science. [(3)] Perfect, as in us, and immutable essence of Jesus. He says "perfect" against Apollinaris, because he had a body endowed with a rational and intelligent soul, as we have; "immutable" against other heretics, who said that the human nature from the very beginning of the union was conquered by the divine, and made incorruptible, which was to deny the truth of the human nature, by denying its property; this was Julian of Halicarnassus. [(4)] Substantial mysteries of his humanity, he says, because to thirst, to hunger, to weary, to be wounded, and other things of this kind, Christ truly suffered, and not fantastically according to heretics, although these passions did not touch the divine nature, since it was otherwise in the same hypostasis, from which it did not differ by anything but account and thought alone; of this kind also are walking upon the waves, entering through a closed door to the disciples; for these miracles Christ performed through his flesh by his divinity. [(5)] Similarly the three divine persons are not distinguished in reality and substance, but by account alone and thought. Insofar as the three divine persons are the same in reality and substance, thus they are not distinguished among themselves except by account alone and thought; the same is affirmed by S. Thom. 1, p. q. 39, art. 1, ad 1, when he says: The relations themselves are not distinguished from one another insofar as they are identical really with the essence, but the relations are identical in reality with the persons. Insofar, however, as the relations, which in divine matters are subsisting of themselves, have an opposition to one another, they are distinguished really, and distinguish the persons really, and one person is not another; for this is what the author says here, consenting with the doctrine of S. Thomas, but that there is no reciprocation among them—namely the persons—insofar as the opposition of relations falls into them.

CAPUT V.

^A That which is unbegotten in the Trinity is neither substance, nor a property of the person of God the Father; nor is there in it any other principle or 'fount of the whole divinity' except the Father alone; nor is there any other natural and proper power, or virtue, and divinity of the substance, and energy, or operation proceeding from the infinite and divine substance, except the Son alone, and the Holy Spirit.

Are you the same with Him according to substance? Or is it rather evident that, while the property remains immutable, we seek what the substance of God is—if indeed we are seeking—so that you may know that the unbegotten and God are not the same thing? If it were the same, it would be necessary that, because God is God of some things, the unbegotten should also be unbegotten of some things; or, because it is the unbegotten of nothing, God should not be God of anything. For those things which are entirely identical are also declared in the same way; but the unbegotten is not of anything (for of what could it be?), whereas God is God of some things, for He is the God of all; how, then, will God and the unbegotten be the same? And again: “Since,” he says, “the unbegotten and the begotten are opposites to each other, like habit and privations, it is necessary that the substances be introduced as contrary to each other,” which is not conceded; or because, again, habits are prior to privations, and habits themselves remove the privations, it is necessary not only that the substance of the Son be prior to the substance of the Father, but also that it be removed by the substance of the Father, as far as one can conclude from those things which have been posited by you. And again, the same author, in his discourse on the constitution of bishops: “Without beginning,” he says, “was the Father, for He did not have from elsewhere that He should be, nor from Himself; but the Son (if indeed you accept the Father ^B as cause) is not without beginning; for the Father is the beginning of the Son as cause; but if you understand beginning from time, He is without beginning; for the Lord of times does not begin under time.” And further in the same book: “Observe, however, that in my opinion there is one God, with the Son and Holy Spirit referred to one cause, not compounded or agglutinated, and according to one and the same, if I may so say, motion and will, and one and the same substance.” And again in the same: “The Father,” he says, “would be the beginning of the base and unworthy, if He were not the cause that the divinity should be in the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Great Dionysius, in the second book of *The Divine Names*: “There is, moreover,” he says, “a distinction in divine things, which are above substance, not only that which I have mentioned, that according to the very copulation of the persons into one, without mixture and confusion, each one of the persons that are *aparchikai*—that is, one and the beginning of all—is not placed into another, but that those things which are of the fecundity of God do not flow back in return, but the Father alone is the fount of divinity, so that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, while those things which properly pertain to each divine person are piously preserved in hymns and divine praises.” Great Athanasius, in his first book against the Arians: “If the Son is not,” he says, “how then do you call God creator?”

Great Basil, in his second book *Against Eunomius*: “We ask,” he says, “Eunomius, by how great a measure is the unbegotten distinguished from the begotten? Is it by some small and slight measure, such that they might at some time coalesce into the same thing? Or is this foundationally impossible—and much more so than that the same person should simultaneously be alive and dead, and the same person simultaneously in the same part be healthy and sick, and simultaneously awake and sleep? For such are all things that are opposed to each other by highest opposition, so that when the one is present, it is necessary that the other be absent; such things by nature are entirely repugnant and incoherent.” And in the fourth book against the same: “The unbegotten,” he says, “is either substance or accident; for nothing else remains besides these. He, therefore, who has demonstrated the absurdity in both of these, in the things that follow next, said again that the ‘unbegotten’ should be entirely passed over ^C in the Trinity because of the ignorance of the Arians.” In harmony with these are the things which Gregory of Nyssa said. Gregory the Theologian, in the first book *On the Son*: “How do you say that the substance of God is not the positing of what is, but the ablation of what is not? For the word declares that He has no generation; not, however, that it demonstrates what is according to nature, nor what is, not having generation. What, then, is the substance of God? It is for your madness to say this, who curiously inquire even into the generation, whereas for us it is a great thing if at some time in the future we may learn, when the darkness and thickness are dissolved, as He who cannot lie has promised. Let this, therefore, be understood and hoped for by those who will be purified for it; but we dare say little of this, that if it is a great glory for the Father to proceed from none, it is no less for the Son to proceed from such a Father; for He will have participated in the glory of Him who has no cause, because the very reality of His nativity—so great and so venerable to those who do not have a mind groveling on the ground and immersed in earthly things—exists in Him from Him ^D who has no cause. But if, he says, the Son is the same substance as the Father, and the Father is indeed unbegotten, then the Son will also be this. Rightly so, if ‘unbegotten’ were the substance of God; but if it is a difference regarding the substance, why do you say this as if it carried some weight? Or are you also the Father of the Father, lest anything be lacking which the Father has, since...

all things are through the Word, and in the Wisdom all things exist, and without this nothing can come to be, the Father does not have, in your opinion, that in which and through which He makes all things. If this divine substance is not prolific, but sterile in their opinion, like a light that does not illuminate, and a dry fountain, how are you not ashamed to say that He possesses the power of creation? And still the same author says: By participating in the Son, we participate in the Father, because the Word is proper to the Father, whence if the Father himself existed by participation, and not as Divinity by substance, He would never make gods. Divine Cyril, in the ^A *Thesaurus*, ch. 33: The Son is therefore of the same nature with the Father, not made from the unbegotten, inasmuch as He possesses the same power and virtue; indeed rather He is Himself living and substantial operation, and virtue, and wisdom of the Father. And further the same author: Who is therefore every operation and virtue of the Father, through whom He works all things, how could He be of a created nature? And again, in the chapters *De Spiritu sancto*: The Holy Spirit, he says, is not created or made, but is of the substance which is greater than can be conceived, and divine, as it were His virtue and natural energy. And again in the same place: For I will not dare to say what Christ has not worked ^B through me for the obedience of the Gentiles, in word and deed, in the power of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Spirit. Christ works signs and wonders through Paul in the power of the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is therefore a natural and living energy, and, so to speak, a quality of the Divinity of the Son of God. And again in the same: For the Holy Spirit is named Holy; if therefore He is holy by nature, He has not from outside that which makes Him such; rather, since He is Himself the energy—or the natural and living act—of the divine substance, and existing per se, ^C He bestows perfection upon the creature through His own sanctification and participation. And further: Since therefore that which God promised He would do, He fulfills with power by the Spirit, and awakens shepherds according to the promise made in the prophets, it follows that He is not alien to the divine substance, but existing per se, emanating from that very substance, and remaining in it, He works all things that are of God. And further: It was necessary for them to be taught concerning the mystery of the Holy Spirit, and to understand that the Holy Spirit is, as it were, a fruit of a certain divine substance, which exists ^D in it, and proceeds from it inseparably and indivisibly, and according to the same nature is conjoined into one. And further in the same: If the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, and is as it were a fruit, nor made, nor created, how could the Spirit be made, who proceeds from Him? And again: No one can say, "Lord Jesus Christ," except in the Holy Spirit (a). It is clear, therefore, that whoever participates in the Holy Spirit knows the Lord Jesus: but whoever does not participate, does not know. How then does he who is a participant of the Holy Spirit know that the Lord Jesus is? Just as those who have tasted honey recognize by its quality that the honey is sweet, so also is he who is a participant of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Holy Spirit, who is from the substance of the Son, exists as a quality, so to speak, of God, the Lord of all. If, however, this is true, then He is God, and not something made or created, as it seems to the heretics. And further: Therefore the Holy Spirit is not holy by participation, nor by composition, but is the sanctifying substance and nature, and, so to speak, the quality of the Divinity of God the Father; as the sweetness of honey (4), or a scent from a flower. And the great Athanasius, in his Epistle to Serapion:

Thus, he says, the Holy Spirit, who is given and sent by the Son, is himself one and not many, nor one out of many, but the Spirit himself alone. For since the Son is one, who is the living Word, there must needs be one perfect energy that fulfills, sanctifies, and illuminates, ^A which is his energy and gift, which is said to proceed from the Father. And further: How do some not proceed beyond all impiety, who place the Holy Spirit among created things, and do not rather confess that what proceeds from the divine nature itself according to substance exists from it, and dwells in us as God? Gregory of Nyssa in the Catechetical Oration: It is demonstrated, he says, from the divine Scriptures that the Word of God and the Spirit of God are virtues existing of themselves according to substance, which are the efficient causes of things that have been made, and contain those things that are. For by the ^B word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all their virtue by the Spirit of his mouth (Ps. XXXII, 6). From this it is clear, first, that the unbegotten in the Trinity, which is above substance, is neither substance nor the hypostatic property of God the Father; for the hypostatic properties exhibit a hypostasis, or person, and they define a person as common with a certain property, or as substance with accident. But if the unbegotten is neither substance nor accident, it exhibits or shows no person, and therefore it is not a hypostatic property; yet it is a notion of the Father having no cause, because he alone is Father and has no cause. The second ^C point is proven as if from this, namely, that there is not in the Trinity itself some other fountain of divinity, except him alone, who is the Father of all divinity and has no cause; nor any other natural and substantial energy proceeding from the incomprehensible divine substance, except for the Son who is above substance, and the Holy Spirit, who are natural and substantial energies, or rather the acts of God having no cause, as qualities and fruits of his very substance. And in this way there is truly constituted and declared to us the divine and supernatural blessedness of the three persons, lacking nothing, and most full in itself.

CAPUT VI.

That in the Trinity there is no other operation and hand by which God operates all things, except the Son and the Holy Spirit; nor any other wisdom and virtue and glory and image of God, except the Son and the Spirit.

The great Athanasius, in the fifth book Contra Arianos: Just as, he says, God the Father creates creatures by the Word, so by nature he has of his own substance the living ^D Word, which fabricates, creates, and governs all things; for all things were made by the Word, and by his ordinance all things remain. And in the Epistle to Serapion: Paul, he says, writes to Titus: Through the regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ (Tit. III, 6). But if the Father creates and renews all things through the Word in the Holy Spirit, what similarity or affinity would the Creator have with creatures? For it follows that such blasphemy might also remain against the Son, so that those who say that the Holy Spirit is a creature might say that the Word likewise, through whom all things are created, is a creature. And again, the same author in his disputation against Arius: If you wish to collect the inquiry concerning the Son which has accompanied us, you will find that the eternal virtue of the Holy Spirit, being of the same substance with the Father, is denoted by his "finger." Indeed, when the magicians in Egypt contemplated the unconquerable virtue of the Holy Spirit, they cried out, saying: This is the finger of God (Exod. VIII, 19); by the word "finger" they confessed nothing else than the virtue or power of the Holy Spirit, *homousion*, that is, of the same substance which he has with God the Father; against which word "finger" one cannot contradict or oppose. And saint Cyril, book xv of the Thesaurus: If all things, he says, were made in the wisdom and hand of God, and the divine Scriptures indeed cry out concerning the Word of God: All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made (John I, 3), the Son of God cannot be the work of wisdom; but rather he himself is the wisdom and hand by which God works all things. And further, the same author, book xiv of the same Thesaurus: Because, he says, God is simple, there is nothing else besides him which is the fortitude that is in him; but rather it is he himself, namely the Son, who has one substance and the same nature with the Father; for he is one with him who begot him, as if God shone forth from God, and light from light; he is the Filius, and not the Father, as is understood. Therefore, all the energy and virtue of the Father, through which he operates all things, how could it be of a created nature? The same author, in the chapters on the Holy Spirit, says in a certain place that Christ, disputing with the Jews, said: If I by the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you (Luc. XI, 20); in this place he demonstrates that the finger is the Holy Spirit, who in a certain way is naturally produced from the divine substance, and naturally hangs from it, just as a finger does from the hand of a man; for the divine Scriptures call the Son the arm and right hand of God, as it is written: His right hand and his holy arm have saved him (Ps. XCVII, 1); and that passage: Lord, your arm was high, and they did not know; but those who know shall be confounded (Isa. XXVI, 11). Just as, therefore, the arm is naturally adapted to the whole body, operating all things that the mind wills...

Scholia. The Holy Spirit, like sweetness from honey, and scent from a flower, and vapor from water. The same Cyril uses this example in chapter 7; for he says: It is left, therefore, that it must be necessarily confessed that it is of his substance, since they possess the whole virtue and operation of the Son of God, as if vapor were to rise from water, and it operates through those things which contain it, refreshes those among whom it is, and signifies the nature of the water from which it is sent forth. Thus far Cyril. Thus, therefore, he here called the Holy Spirit the quality of the Divinity symbolically, having applied a correction of the word, as if he had called the vapor of the divine substance, using a similar example and symbol.

^A For it is customary to anoint with the finger among those who use an arm: thus we consider the Word of God as naturally adapted from Him and in Him, and inserted, so to speak; but in the Son we consider the Spirit proceeding naturally and substantially from the Father, through whom the anointer sanctifies all things. The Holy Spirit, therefore, does not appear alien or separated from the divine substance, but rather naturally from it and in it. Just as the finger of the body is of the same nature as the hand, so again the hand is of no other nature than the body. Since these things are so, it follows that God is Spirit, and that He is not otherwise.

Further, the same author in the same place: God says in a certain place: "Do I not fill heaven and earth," says the Lord? He fills, that is, being present everywhere through the Spirit, which he who composed the Psalms knowing, said: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I descend into hell, thou art present." If, therefore, God fills all things through the Spirit, and is present everywhere, God is therefore Spirit, filling all things as God.

And in the same: "The Spirit, therefore, is not created, in whom is God, and through whom He operates all things; and for this reason, He is honored." The great Athanasius, in book II *Against the Arians*: "The Apostle," he says, "stirring up the Gentiles to reverence toward God, said: 'For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity'; but what the power of God is, the same Paul teaches when he says: 'Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God.'" ^B And again in the same book: "Let them listen, and as to wisdom..." And again in that same book: "For it is not as man that God is, lest they think human thoughts." And in this book, concerning Him: "For since men were made apt for perceiving wisdom, and God is not otherwise a partaker of anything, He Himself is the Father of His Wisdom, of which those who are partakers have been accustomed to be called wise." Furthermore, against the same Arians: "If, therefore," he says, "no other wisdom is found in the divine Scriptures besides this Son, nor have we heard anything of the kind from the Fathers, yet it is certain, and written, that wisdom exists uncreated with the Father, and is by itself the maker of the world; He Himself is the Son." And again the same author in the same place: "Indeed," he says, "to these two sayings, which are contrary to one another, one might justly say that the property of the Unigenitus prevails, because there is no other Word, or other Wisdom, except this one alone." And again in the same: "For it was fitting that one image of one God should exist, and one Word of Him, and one wisdom of Him; wherefore I marvel how, when there is one God, these men devise many images and wisdoms according to their own thoughts."

Saint Cyril in the *Thesaurus*: "If the Son is created," he says, "is called and is the power of God, and the wisdom of God, there was therefore, a time in which God was without wisdom, and without power, since the Son not being, the creature is clearly made from nothing; but God was always wise and powerful; therefore He had a Son, who is all these things." ^C And further, he says: "You confess, albeit unwillingly, O heretic, that the wisdom of God is naturally inherent, and that power exists in Him uncreatedly. When, therefore, you hear of the Son, say also again that there are two uncreated things: this very wisdom and power in God we believe to be the Son, existing uncreatedly and without time, who created all things, and for our sake became flesh." And further, he himself in his seventh book to Hermias, arguing in the manner of a dialogue: "Cyr.—In whom are the wise, who become wise? HERM.—In wisdom. CYR.—Therefore, if the Spirit teaches wisdom to those who are apt to receive wisdom, it will be wisdom entirely, and we shall understand Him to be God." And further in those things which he wrote concerning the Holy Spirit: "I will therefore gladly boast in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me"; if, however, it is the Spirit who dwells in us, and through Him Christ, then His Holy Spirit is power; if this is so, how will He be a creature, who is naturally present in the Son? Unless it is time for you to say that God the Word, who has nothing composite, is composed of the created and His own nature, which, if it be absurd, then the Spirit is not created or made, but is of the divine substance, and that which cannot be comprehended by intelligence, as His own power and natural energy.

And the great Athanasius, in his *Epistle to Serapion*: "And again, because the Son is wisdom and truth, it is written: 'The Spirit of wisdom and of truth.'" ^D And again: "The Son indeed is the power of God and the Lord of glory; but the Spirit is called the spirit of power and the spirit of glory." And again: "Then, since the Father is, as Paul said, the only wise God, the Son is His wisdom, for Christ is the power of God, and the wisdom of God, and when the Son is the wisdom of God, receiving the Spirit of wisdom, we have the Son; and in Him we are made wise." And again the same author, against those who serve the words: "For the Only-begotten is called glory, he says: 'And we saw his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father'; wherefore, that saying 'God of our Lord Jesus Christ' is the same, as if it were said: God of the flesh of Christ, Father of glory, Father of divinity. For Isaiah calls the Savior 'glory' according to the dignity of divinity. For when he had narrated the miracles which were done in the desert, and had brought the good news to the desert: 'The solitary place of Jordan shall rejoice,' he says, 'and shall flourish like the lily; for the glory of Libanus is given to it, and the honor of Carmel'; and, 'My people shall see the glory of the Lord and the height of God, and all flesh shall see the salvation of God.' Glory, therefore, is from glory."

^A and the figure of his substance. [Heb. 1, 3.] The Father, therefore, is the glory of the Only-Begotten; but God is the glory of the flesh of Christ. Furthermore, against those who serve the words and not the nouns of the divine Scriptures: the Apostle says, 'The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, and Father of glory' [Eph. 1, 17], here he designated the economy, that is, the mystery of the assumed flesh; and he indeed calls the Only-Begotten himself glory; but Jesus Christ [he calls] the proclamation of the economy. Likewise, in the third book *Against the Arians*: 'For if we were made unto the image, and we were called the image and glory of God, [it is] not on account of ourselves, but on account of the image which dwelt in us, and on account of the true glory of God, which is the Word of God.' And again in the same: 'Since, therefore, the Son also is the image of the Father, it is necessary to understand that the divinity and property of the Father is the essence of the Son (1), and this is that: *Who being in the form of God* [Philipp. 2, 6]; and that: *The Father in me* [John 14, 11]; not a form of divinity in part, but the fullness of the paternity of God, which is the essence of the Son.' And further in the same: 'What the Son works, are the works of the Father; for the form of the divinity of the Father is the Son (2), who works the works.' And in the *Epistle to Serapion*: 'The Holy Spirit is said to be and is the image of the Son, for *whom he foreknew and predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son* [Rom. 8, 29].' Since, therefore, it is certain by their opinion also that the Son is not a creature, his image will not be a creature either. For such as the image is, such must that be of which it is an image. And further in the same epistle: 'But if creatures have such a nature, and such things are written concerning the angels, ^B how can a changeless ^C imitation exist with him, which [is] an imitation that is changeless with changeable things? It is clear, therefore, that it is neither a creature, nor in any way of the substance of the angels, because they are mutable; but it is the image of the Word and the own property of the Father. Saint Cyril, in the things which he wrote concerning the Holy Spirit, says: 'Paul writes again to some: *As we have borne the image of the earthy, let us bear also the image of the heavenly* [I Cor. 15, 49]; we call the earthy Adam the prince of the human race; whose image we have borne in the likeness of his transgression, having fallen into death and corruption; but we call the heavenly one our Lord Jesus Christ, upon receiving whose image, that is, the holy and life-giving Spirit inhabiting in us, we are reformed to the very living Word of God, again ascending to immortality, and renewed unto eternal life. For it is the Spirit who makes alive, as the Savior said' [John 6, 64]. As therefore, because the Son is the most perfect image of the Father, and he who has received him, has the Father; so by the convenience and likeness of an equal figure, he who has received the image of the Son, that is, the Spirit, through the Spirit himself has the Son fully, and in the Son himself the Father. How, therefore, shall the Holy Spirit be numbered among creatures? Since he is the image of the Son of God without any variation; for they do not proceed to such folly as to dare to say that the image of the Creator shines in creatures without any variation; and that all things naturally carry in themselves whatever that of which it is the image, has. But if the Spirit is called the image of God, he is therefore God; and it is not otherwise. ^D Gregory of Nyssa, in the *Oration to Pulcheria*: 'If anyone,' he says, 'does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his' [Rom. 8, 9]. The Spirit, however, is glory, as it is said elsewhere.

Scholia

^A cit to the Father: *Glorify me with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was* [John xvii, 5]. For God the Word, who had the glory of the Father before the world, because in the last days He was made man, it was necessary that the flesh, on account of its union with the Word, should become that which the Word is; but this happens because it received that which He had before the world; now this was the Holy Spirit, for there is nothing else before the ages besides the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, therefore He says here: *the glory, which thou gavest me, I have given to them, that by it they may be united into one with me, and I with thee* [John xvii, 22]. Again the same author, in the first book *Against Eunomius*: But if the Father, who is before the ages, is always glorious; yet the glory of the Father is the Son, who is before eons, and likewise the glory of the Son is the Spirit of Christ, who is always understood with the Son and the Father; whence does this wise man, and from what discipline, pronounce more anciently upon those things which are naturally honored? From these it is made manifest that in the Trinity, which is above substance, in no way is there another energy, or operation, and hand through which God the Father creates and does all things, except the Son alone and the Holy Spirit, who are the hands of God, above substances, just as it is written somewhere: *Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me* [Ps. cxviii, 73], nor is there another wisdom and power of God, except this very thing above substance. *For by the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power* [Ps. xxxii, 6], nor is there another image and glory coeternal to God, except the Son, who is above the principle, and His Spirit, which is before the ages, ^B and without any variation the image and glory of God the Father, who has no beginning.

Chapter VII

That in the Trinity, which is above substance, there is no other life, or will, or charity, or blessedness, or beauty, or holiness, nor goodness, or form, or kingdom, unless the Son of God Himself, and His Holy Spirit.

Chrysostom, explaining that: *In him was life, and the life was the light of men* [John i, 4-5]. When you hear, he says, *In him was life*, do not think that God is composite: since proceeding from the Father, He says: *As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself* [John v, 26]; for elsewhere He also says that God is light [1 John i, 5]; and again that He *dwells in light inaccessible* [1 Tim. vi, 16]; all these things are said, not that we might suspect composition, but that we might gradually be elevated to the loftiness of the dogmas. For because one from among the common people will not easily have considered how His life exists of itself, first indeed He said that which is more lowly; then He leads those already learned to something higher. For He who said: *He gave to have life*, here again says: *I am the life* [John xiv, 6]. The great Athanasius, in the book *On the Coming of God in the Flesh*: It is manifest, therefore, to those who perceive it, that with the body awakened, the Son is said by Paul to have been raised from the dead [Galat. i, 1]; for the body is said for the person, thus therefore when it is said: *The Father gave life to the Son*, it is necessary to understand the life given to the flesh. For if life is of the flesh itself, how does life receive life? Saint Cyril, in the fifth book of the *Dialogues to Hermias*: If, therefore, he says, the Son is not life according to nature, He will have altogether obtained His life in some proper nature other than what He Himself is. Let those, therefore, who defend such corrupted and depraved dogmas answer, under what genus it will be for us, as they imagine? For it has been demonstrated that it is not a created thing. HERMEIAS: Life, he says, was made by the Father, for John said: *What was made in him, was life* [John i, 3-4]. The Word, whose life it is. CYRIL: Who therefore connected both, and brought into one something of life and of the Son, says that there is nothing else besides the life which is in Him: so that by diverse names the nature of the one who is understood is signified to us, whether He be called the Son, or perhaps the life (a). HERMEIAS: Thus, I say. And again the same author in book VI: They shall be subjected, he says, with us to the sacred and divine scriptures, which openly preach, not that the life from another flowing is a minister, but that it is in reality the life itself, the spirit of life according to nature, vivifying and holy; for so Paul says somewhere: *If the Spirit, that raised Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you* [Rom. viii, 11]. Therefore the Spirit of life according to nature is absolutely nothing else besides life itself according to right reason. And still in the chapters *On the Holy Spirit*: It is written again: *If the Spirit, that raised Jesus Christ from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you*. But if the Holy Spirit were a creature, and made, as heretics insanely claim, how would He have the whole operation of God? For no one, I believe, would fall so far from a sound mind, as to dare even to say that the divine substance is served by certain instruments created from without for an operation naturally passing from itself toward some, who are fit and apt to receive it. But because the Son is life according to nature, and the Spirit given by Him vivifies, it remains necessarily to be confessed that He is of His substance, since He has every power and operation of the Son and of God, just as if vapor ascends from water, and through those things which it operates, it cools those among whom it is, and signifies the nature of the water from where it is emitted. In the same: The law, he says, of the Spirit of life [Rom. viii, 2], lest the Holy Spirit be found only to bring the law, but be found even now also [alt-version omitted]

^A *I am the truth and the life* [John xiv, 6]. Since, therefore, Christ brings the law, His Spirit, as existing naturally from Him and in Him, brings the law. The great Athanasius, in one of the books *Against the Arians*: But the impious, he says, do not grant that the Son is the Word and the living counsel, but they imagine that willing happens to God in a human manner, and that He has wisdom like an attribute; and they set all things in motion and object [by citing] the intelligence and will of Valentinus. Saint Cyril in the *Thesauri*: If, he says, the counsel and will of the Father is the Son, and indeed it is, how does the will precede His essence? And again in the same: For it is necessary for you either to invent another wisdom, in which, when He willed, He begat the Son, as you say; or if there is no other, but He Himself alone is the wisdom of the Father, then He Himself is also the will. And in those things which he wrote concerning the Holy Spirit: The Holy Spirit, he says, who is the mind of Christ, declares to the disciples all things which are in Him, not in a will of His own, nor again in another’s, but as proceeding from His substance, and having His entire will, just as [He has His] operation. And the divine Damascene: O new miracle, [greater] than all miracles of old! For it is the counsel of God, who is carried in the womb, as an infant. And Gregory the Theologian, in the oration in praise of Gregory Nyssen, the beginning of which is, *Faithful friends*: God, he says, of peace, who reconciled us through the cross, who were attacked because of sin; who proclaimed peace to those who were far off and those who were near, to those who were under the law and those who were outside the law; the Father of charity, charity [itself]; for by these names He delights to be called above all others. Gregory Nyssen in the *Commentaries on the Song of Songs*: Since, therefore, the marriage is one, and the bride is one, and the crown is placed on one bridegroom; for there is no difference at all, whether one calls the Son of God the only-begotten Word, or the Son of His love, to use the voice of Paul [Col. i, 13]. And Saint Cyril, when he writes concerning the Holy Spirit: How great is the kindness that the Lord of all has worked in us, Paul teaching that *the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us* [Rom. v, 5]. If, therefore, God is charity, as John speaks [I John iv, 16], and He is not one thing and another thing in Him (for He is simple and devoid of composition), it is poured forth ^D through the Holy Spirit dwelling in us: the Holy Spirit is therefore charity, who dwells in us as God, and therefore [is] clearly God. The same in his first book *To Hermias*: For He who is the incorrupt beauty of God the Father, the supreme blessedness, and the form, and the image; He who is from Him, and in Him, the Word of God, cast Himself down into the emptying [Philipp. ii, 6, 7].

^A Magnus Basilius writing to the Caesareans: If the Holy Spirit, he says, is not simple, He is composed of substance and of holiness: but who is so senseless as to call the Holy Spirit a compound, and not simple? And Gregory the Theologian: For if there is some holiness other than the Holy Spirit, let someone say what this is understood to be. Saint Cyril discussing the Holy Spirit: What need is there of a long circuit of words and multiple notions? For that very sanctifying power proceeding from the Father, which grants perfection to the imperfect, we say is the Holy Spirit. And the great Athanasius, in the *Disputation of Orthodox and Anomoean*, says: Do you thus call the Spirit good as the Father and the Son? ORTH. Greatly so. For the Spirit is good by participation in goodness, but [He is] goodness again, that is, He is goodness itself. Indeed Matthew the evangelist says the Lord said: *If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give good things to those who ask Him?* [Matt. vii, 11]. Do you hear, if you have ears? That the evangelist, when they knew the Spirit to be the same as goodness, and goodness to be the same as the Spirit, he indeed called the Spirit Himself "good things," but the other [called] the Spirit "good things" itself. Magnus Basilius, in the chapters *On the Holy Spirit*: A good Spirit, as a good Father, and good [as] begotten from the Good, having as His substance goodness itself. Saint Cyril writing concerning the Holy Spirit: Someone approaches, he says, in the Gospels, and says to our Lord and God Jesus Christ: *Good Master*. To this Christ replied: *Why do you call me good? No one is good, except one God* [Luke xviii, 18, 19]. Christ therefore saying that one is truly and substantially good, David says: *Your good Spirit will lead me into the right land* [Ps. cxlii, 10]. If, therefore, the Son, who is good, is [the one of whom it is said] "the Spirit is good," it is clear that it belongs to the divine nature, of which it is truly said "good" properly and in a singular mode. The great Apostle: *Who, when He was in the form*, he says, *of God, did not think it robbery to be equal to God* [Philipp. ii, 6]. Magnus Basilius: That *in the form of God*, he says, is of the substance of God; for the form is not one thing, and the substance of God another, lest it be a compound. He who, therefore, is equal according to form, is also equal according to substance. Saint Gregory Nyssen when he explains that: *Thy kingdom come*: A creature, he says, serves, but service is not a kingdom; but the kingdom is the Holy Spirit; but the kingdom clearly reigns, it is not reigned over; if, therefore, the kingdom is the Holy Spirit, how do these insane men count Him among the serving nature? And Gregory the Theologian: To them this light that cannot be expressed succeeds, and the contemplation of the royal Trinity, shining more clearly and purely, and what

[alt-version omitted]

is mixed with the whole, that I deem to be the kingdom of heaven. From these it is manifest that in the ^A Trinity which is above substance, nothing of those things which are enumerated by the theologians escapes, but that it declares these to exist only in God the Father, his true Son who is God, and his holy Spirit; wherefore whoever designated the divine Trinity, which is above principle, has encompassed these and other matters at once.

CHAPTER VIII

Saint Cyril, in *Thesaurus*, book XIX: Not because wisdom and knowledge in us are not in their own hypostasis—that is, do not exist by themselves—does it follow that the wisdom which is in God will suffer the same inconvenience, so as not to exist by itself; but since you confess ^B that there is no God after our fashion, you confess clearly that all things that are his are not as ours are. The same author, in the first of the *Thesauri*: Let the opponents of Christ consider the magnitude of their imprudence; for since they refused to say that the one Son of God is similar to the Father, they posited two; if they say his will is something existing by itself, but it does not exist by itself, it will not be a character, that is, a figure of an existing thing by itself, because it does not exist by itself. The same author, in the same place: It is altogether necessary that what naturally proceeds from something should be similar to it according to substance, although it has its being from that very thing as from a cause. The same author, in the same place: One must inquire, he says, into the mode of the dissimilarity which the will has towards the Father. For if in any respect it were as inferior to him, it would not have his likeness; it would appear openly that something goes forth from the substance of the Father that is worse and less than him, for the will does not approach from the outside, nor is it introduced, but is from him ^C and in him; and to beget something worse, I think, does not happen even to those who have a created nature. Great Athanasius, in book five *Against the Arians*, says: Just as, he says, God is from God, and the wise from the wise, and from the one having reason, the *Logos*—that is, reason, or Word—and the Son from the Father; so too with person, having person; and from substance, substantial, having substance; and from the existing, existing. St. Cyril, book XIV of the *Thesauri*: Paul, he says, when he speaks of natural and substantial properties which are in God the Father, speaks thus: "Who alone has immortality." If therefore no one defines anything else as being immortality except life; and life is the Son, who says: ^D "I am the life"; the Father has life in himself, the Son, that is, and nothing else whatsoever besides him. The same author, in the same place: Whatever things are said to exist in God the Father naturally, and according to substance, all these the Son is. The Father is called the only true God, because he alone has the Son who says: "I am the truth": he is also alone wise and powerful, because Christ is the virtue of God and the wisdom of God, and he is alone said to dwell in light inaccessible; for he has in himself the Son, who says: "I am the light," [and is] alone the fountain of living water; since he alone has the Son who says: "I am the life." If therefore everything proper to the Father is the Son, when the Father is said to have life in himself, he signifies the Son, and nothing else whatsoever besides him; for since he existed himself in the Son according to substance without any variation, and since he was life according to nature, he gave it to himself. Athanasius, in book four *Against the Arians*: Since the whole essence of the Son is proper to the substance of the Father, as radiance from light, and a river from a fountain; so that he who sees the Son, sees what is proper to the Father: and understands that the essence of the Son, which is from the Father, is thus in the Father. But the Father is also in the Son, because what is proper from the Father, this the Son is, just as in the radiance is the sun, and in the reason is the mind, and in the river is the fountain: for thus he who contemplates the Son contemplates the property of the substance of the Father; and understands that the Father is in the Son. For when the species and divinity of the Father is the essence of the Son, it follows that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. St. Cyril, in the chapters *On the Holy Spirit*: It is found written somewhere, indeed the blessed evangelist John says: "In this we know that God is in us, from the Spirit which he gave us"; and again: "In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us, because he gave us of his Spirit." If therefore, the Spirit dwelling in us by participation, God is the one who dwells, and we are in him, and he again in us, because we carry the Spirit, how will the Spirit not be God, since he has in himself according to substance the whole property of God the Father, whose Spirit is bestowed upon the creature through the Son? Great Dionysius, chapter 5 *On the Divine Names*: We call exemplars the reasons of things in God, the producers of substances, and unitively pre-existing, which the divine discourse calls pre-definitions, and divine and good wills, which avail for the distinguishing and effecting of the things that are; according to which he who is above substance pre-defined and produced all things that are. In which place the divine Maximus: Exemplars, he says, which are called [alt-version omitted]

^A ideas, we have already declared above, how they may be defined; namely, that they call the notion perfect in itself, eternal, of the eternal God, an idea, that is, an exemplar. Yet here Dionysius explains the Scripture, when he calls ideas pre-definitions, hinting darkly at Paul, who in the epistle to the Romans says: *Whom he also pre-defined, or predestinated, them he also called*. And elsewhere: *Who predestinated us in his will*. For he calls the will and the predestination, or pre-definition, ideas and exemplars. And again, the great Dionysius, chap. 7, *On the Divine Names*: The Word of God is praised by the sacred Scriptures, not only because he is the giver of reason and mind and wisdom; but because he has anticipated ^B the causes of all things in himself in one form (a), and because he travels through all things, pervading them, as Scripture says, even unto the end of all things; and most especially because the Word of God is simple above all simplicity, and is absolute from all things and above all substance. Expounding which passage, S. Maximus says: He is named, he says, the Word of God, [G] that is, reason, because he has the causes of all things in himself; for the reasons of every nature are in him as in the cause of all creation; for through him are all things; for ideas and exemplars are in him, not one thing in another; but they are eternal notions, and reasons making all things. From which it becomes manifest that in the Trinity, which is above substance, everything that is not substance by itself, and does not exist by itself, is cast out and excluded; but if anything exists therein, it is substance, and is existing by itself; therefore everything that is natural and substantial to God the Father is the Son, and the Holy Spirit, his lights ^C and all exemplars in God, and the reasons of all things are implicitly one Word of God, which has them in itself as not one thing in another; for the begotten Word of God is one; and the one wisdom of God the Father is His Spirit, who is above holiness.

CHAPTER IX

That in the Trinity besides the three divine persons, which are not reciprocated, because the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, there is nothing that is not the essence of the other. For the life of the Son is nothing else besides the Father; and again, the life of the Father is nothing else besides the Son; similarly in the Holy Spirit; and this is for the deifying persons to go through themselves and into themselves by turns.

The great Dionysius in the second chapter, *On the Divine Names*: In the divine union, he says, that is, in the substance above substance, there is copulated and common in the Trinity—which is the one principle of all things—essence, which is above substance; divinity above divinity (1); goodness above goodness, the same above all things in the whole property, which is above all things (2); unity above the principal unity (3), ineffable, of many words, ignorance (4), intellected from all (5), the positing of all, the taking away of all, above all position, and taking away, the mutual dwelling of the divine persons in themselves, if it is permissible so to speak (6), and collocation, altogether above what is copulated into one, not confused in any part; as the lights of lamps (to use examples that fall under the senses and are familiar) which are in one house; and they are wholly in themselves wholly by turns, not mixed; and exist by themselves (7).

Scholia.

(1) Divinity above divinity, namely, created; I mean those of whom it is written: *I have said, You are gods*, (Ps. LXXXI. 6.) For it is God who sanctifies them, and makes them gods by participation: whence the divine persons are called by Dionysius and the Fathers *thearchic*, that is, deifying; and the Holy Spirit is called Spirit above gods, that is, the Spirit above those whom He makes gods by sanctifying them, whether in heaven or on earth.

(2) The same above all things in the whole property is above all things. Substantial properties are the same in creatures of any species, as a rational nature is a substantial property in man; in the angels are their substantial properties of the same kind; in other living creatures their own substantial properties are likewise; and in other natures similarly: but the ratio of the property, and the ratio of the same property in creatures cannot be compared with the properties of the divine substance, and with their identity: for these are without difference in the divine substance itself: whence the divine persons are called by Dionysius *uniform*, that is, uniform.

(3) Unity above the principal unity. Because in creatures there is found one thing that has the ratio of a principle, as in fire there is one principle of heat; in the sun one principle of light, but in these neither the unity, nor the ratio of the principle can be compared with those properties of the divine principle.

(a) That is, without any composition.

(4) Ignorance. He calls ignorance a certain nescience, which is a certain darkness of the soul; but having left behind all thought of external things, with all intelligence alien to the purpose, to be united in a certain silence according to the better part with God, who is unknown as to what he is, who is above all thought, and by knowing and contemplating nothing else, to know and contemplate above the mind, as Dionysius, in *Mystical Theology*, chap. 1, teaches. ^D This ignorance is called in Exodus the thick darkness, into which Moses is said to have entered, as Saint Maximus noted. This union Dionysius desires for Timothy in the beginning of *Mystical Theology*, whence it is better to understand it. But the union is above the mind, when the mind leaves itself; but it leaves itself when it is entirely vacant of its own proper motion, and has nothing of its own, neither is it of itself, but is wholly in the contemplation of God.

(5) From all things intellected, and His providences, with which the universe is full.

(6) And collocation. Because the distinction seems to be brought in with it, and referred to a place (for what remains and is collocated in something, does not seem to be the same as that which is that in which something remains as in a place, and in which it is collocated), therefore Dionysius applied a correction, saying: If it is permissible so to speak.

(7) And as they exist by themselves. Dionysius did not use this example, as some have thought according to opinion.

DECADE IX. — OF INFINITY IN GOD.

Perfectly distinct from one another individually, and conjunct in one, discretely; and conjunctly in one, ^A discretely. Concerning this, Saint Maximus notes: "One must note," he says, "that the existence in themselves interchangeably is according to the in-dwelling and collocation of the divine persons, as when Scripture says: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in me*; so too the Apostle says concerning the Holy Spirit." Saint John Damascene, in the chapter *On the Trinity*: "For creatures differ in place, and differ in time, and are divided in will, and in powers, and in form, that is, in figure, and in habit, and in mixture, and in dignity, and in pursuit, and in all designating properties; and most especially they differ in this, that they are not in themselves interchangeably, but separately: whence they are also called two, and three, and many; ^B but on the contrary in the holy Trinity, which is above substance, and beyond all things, incomprehensible; for there is one endeavor, or impetus of motion, and one substance, one goodness, one virtue, one will, one operation, one power, one, I say, and the same; and not three similar among themselves; but one and the same motion of the three persons, for each of them holds one thing in common with the other, no less than with itself: that is, they are one according to all things, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit."

Great Athanasius, in his epistle *To Serapion*: "Next, since the Father is, as Paul said, the only wise God, the Son is His wisdom; for Christ is the virtue of God and the wisdom of God. And since the Son is wisdom, receiving the Spirit, we have the Son; and in Him we are wise, for thus it is written: *The Lord looses those who are bound. The Lord illuminates the blind*; and when the Spirit is given to us (*Receive the Holy Spirit*, said the Savior), God is in us; for thus John wrote: *If we love one another, God is in us: since we remain in Him, and He in us; since He gave us of His Spirit.* Moreover, when God is in us, the Son is also in us; for the Son Himself says: *I, and the Father will come, and we will make our abode with him.* Next, since the Son is life in other respects: *I*, He says, *am the life*; yet we are said to be vivified in the Holy Spirit: *For He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead, will also raise our mortal bodies by His Spirit dwelling in us.* ^C But we who are vivified in the Spirit, Christ Himself is said to live in us. For Christ, he says, *I have been crucified: yet I live, not I now, but Christ lives in me.* And again: *As the Father did the works, He said the Father was doing them: For the Father, He says, remaining in me, He Himself does the works: do you not believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me? Otherwise believe me for the works themselves*; so the things which Paul was working in the power of the Father, he used to say were of Christ: *For I will not dare to speak anything of those which Christ did not work through me for the obedience of the Gentiles in word and deed, in the power of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Spirit.*

Such conjunction and unity being in the Trinity, who then later will separate the Son from the Father, or the Holy Spirit from the Son, or from the Father Himself? Or who will be so bold as to say that the Trinity is dissimilar, and of another nature in itself? Or that the Son is of a substance foreign to the Father? Or the Holy Spirit foreign to the Son? If any one should again inquire, how are these things? And should ask how, when the Holy Spirit is in us, the Father is said to be in us, and when the Son is in us, the Father is said to be in us; or how, when the Trinity is, the Trinity is signified in one; or how, when one is in us, the Trinity is said to be: or let them separate the splendor from the light, or the wisdom from the wise, or let them say how these things shall be; but if they cannot do this, much more is it the boldness of those who are insane to ask these things about God. For the Divinity has not been handed down in the demonstration of words, as we have said, but in faith, and pious reasoning with reverence."

And again the same author in book IV *Against the Arians*: "Since therefore the Son is the image of the Father, it is necessary to understand that the divinity and property of the Father is the essence of the Son, and this is that which is said: *Who when He was in the form of God*; and: *The Father in me.* But the form of the divinity is not in part, but the fullness of the paternal divinity is the essence of the Son, and the Word-God is the Son, therefore the equal God did not count it robbery to be equal to God. And again, because the Son's divinity and species is not of another than the Father's; this is what we said: *I in the Father*; thus God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself."

Scholia.

^D the opinion of those who handed down that light is a corporeal substance, and not a quality; for what Dionysius posited, that the lights of lamps exist of themselves; he did not refer it to the lights, but to the lamps which exist of themselves, such as torches and tapers. Therefore he compares burning torches, or lamps ignited by lights, which are united into one and exist of themselves through the hypostatic properties subsisting of themselves, being discretely united and unitely discrete in the suprasubstantial light of the Trinity; and what follows in Dionysius: "And if anyone should lead one luminary, that is, one ignited torch, out of a house, the whole proper light will depart at once, without taking anything of the other lights into itself at the same time, nor leaving anything of its own to them"; he referred to the mystery of the incarnation, as Pachymeres noted, and interpreted that: *I went out from the Father.* For the Son having been made man, who was a certain torch of humanity ignited by the light of the divinity, did not drag the Father with Him, nor the Holy Spirit, nor did He leave anything proper to the divinity to them; but rather He carried the same whole divinity which is in them, remaining in them. Leontius the monk, a most erudite author, in the book which he wrote against the Nestorians and Eutychians, referred this example to the same mystery of the incarnation. For he teaches that substances can be united in this way without mixture, just as here the qualities of lights are united without mixture, and the splendors of stars are united, saving the property of the "how much" in the "what kind" in that which the Son alone remains.

reconciling. For the Son indeed is the property of the substance of the Father, in whom the creature has been reconciled to God; thus the works which the Son wrought are the works of the Father, for the Son is the form of the divinity of the Father; and the paternal form in Him demonstrates the Father in Him. And thus the Father is in the Son, and the property and divinity from the Father in the Son demonstrates the Son to be inseparable from Him in the Father. From these things it is clear that in the Trinity, which is above substance, with the exception of the three deifying persons, which are not reciprocated, while the others return, that which is one person is this very thing which is another; because they are one and the sole essence of the three persons: and what belongs to one, this same thing belongs to the other persons without any variation, as has been demonstrated. Wherefore if the essence of the Son is life, necessarily the life of the Father and of the Holy Spirit is the same, which was the essence of the Son. He who further asks whether the Son has the Father as wisdom, and where this Son's wisdom is, is clearly foolish and mindless, since he hears that the life which the Father has is no other than the Son, and the life in the Son is no other than the Father, and that he speaks the truth who says: *I am in the Father, and the Father in me.* For single, as we have said, is the essence of the Trinity, and only ever one. This most singular essence of the three, therefore, assuming ineffably the name of Father, which is above substance, manifests only the Father generating the Son; again, assuming above what can be understood the name of Son, which is above substance, it demonstrates only the Son generated by the Father; again, this same essence assuming the name of Spirit, which is above substance, declares only the Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son, as if for example, and indeed that we may speak modestly, the nature of men, which is one, in which it only assumes the power of begetting, declares only fathers; in which, however, it assumes that which is begotten, it declares only sons; yet it is nonetheless one human nature of fathers and sons. Since, therefore, we say there is a Son, in the fact that He remains only the Son, there is at the same time introduced the existence of the Father and of the Holy Spirit; because their essence is one; similarly, let whichever of the other persons be posited, it necessarily follows that the other two exist; for what is the essence of anyone, this ^D is seen to be that which defines it. For since the essence of anyone is demonstrated, the properties that pertain to it are simultaneously disclosed: as that which has three angles equal to two right angles necessarily shows the nature of every triangle. Unless one should rightly say this, it completely disagrees with the image and likeness of the one and same nature of the Trinity, which is above nature, and is the same above all things. Through themselves, therefore, and within themselves in turn the ^B divine persons move, and with one being posited, necessarily the whole Trinity is declared, just as with only the ray being shown, the sun and light are tacitly both shown: or just as, charity being demonstrated, he who loves and that which is loved are simultaneously demonstrated: or as, with the fountain posited, the river and the water, and whatever other sacred images and likenesses of this matter are symbolically expressed from the sacred Scriptures.

CAPUT X.

OR THUS: That in the Trinity, which is above substance, its essence is not defined according to the deifying persons; but is such that it can be comprehended by reason to be above all, the one essence of the three.

Saint Maximus in Century IV, cap. 1, says: The one is the good which is above all, without beginning, and above substance, the holy unity of the three persons, to wit, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of the three who are immense, the immense association of nature, which makes the rationale of its essence, and how, and what, and of what kind it is, totally inaccessible to any, since it flees every notion of those who understand, in no way departing from the hidden and inward part of its nature, and it infinitely surpasses all highest and most excellent knowledge. The same in the same century, cap. 4: One God the begetter of the one Son, the Father, and the fountain of the one Holy Spirit, a unity without confusion, and a Trinity without division, the mind without beginning, of the Word alone.

Scholia (1) It is induced that the Father is, and the Spirit ^D holy. This is not to be accepted as being said according to relation; for thus the Son is not referred to the Holy Spirit, but to the Father only, but is to be accepted as being said according to circumincession, which is called *perichoresis* by the Greek Fathers, because the Father and the Holy Spirit are in the Son; and the Son is in the Father and in the Holy Spirit; and the Spirit is in the Father and in the Son, and finally each person is in the others in turn. (2) That which is the essence of anyone demonstrates the animal, demonstrates the rational animal, because the essence of man is rational animal; thus he who demonstrates one divine person, shows the other two; because the figure which has three angles equal to two right angles, demonstrates the nature of every triangle, because one and the same nature of the triangle is in all triangles; thus one person demonstrates the others, because one and the same nature is in the three; although these examples are absent by an infinite interval from the divine persons, which cannot be defined, because they are infinite and the nature in them is not divided by hypostatic properties, as in creatures, but is *panton epekeina tautotes*, that is, it is the same above all the same. (3) Not according to deifying persons is the essence of the Trinity defined; but were it to be defined, if because it is one and the same, and total in each, it were not the same total in the three simultaneously; or if, because it is one, the same and total in the three, it were not the same total without any variation and difference in the individuals. He calls them deifying persons, that is, divine, because a person who makes gods cannot be anything but God.

^A without beginning according to substance, the begetter, and the fountain of eternal life, as it were, of the Holy Spirit. Likewise in the second century, chapter 1: One God, since he is divinity; unity without beginning, and simple, and above substance, and devoid of parts, and individual, the same unity, and Trinity, the whole the same unity, and the whole the same Trinity; the unity the whole the same according to substance, and the whole the same Trinity according to persons; for the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit are divinity; and in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is divinity; the whole the same in the whole Father, and in the same whole the whole Father; and the whole the same in the whole Son, and in the same whole the whole Son; and the whole the same in the whole Holy Spirit, and in the same whole the whole Holy Spirit, the whole Father, and in the whole Father; and the whole in the whole Father, and the whole the whole Father; and the whole the same the whole Son, and the whole the same in the whole Son, and the whole the whole, and in the same whole the Son. And the whole the same the Holy Spirit, and in the whole Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit the whole, and the whole in the whole same Holy Spirit. For divinity is not in the Father by part, nor is God the Father by part, nor is divinity in the Holy Spirit by part, nor God the Holy Spirit by part: for divinity is not divisible, nor is God the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit imperfect; but rather it is the whole the same, perfect, perfectly in the perfect Father; and the whole perfect, perfectly the same in the perfect Son; and the whole perfect, the same in the perfect Holy Spirit, for the Son is the whole in the whole Father and Holy Spirit perfectly; and the Holy Spirit is the whole, perfectly, in the whole Father and Son; wherefore ^B and the one God, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, for the substance, and virtue, and operation of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is one and the same, since no one is, or is understood, without the other. Great Athanasius, in his letter to Serapion: "Let us see, however, furthermore, the very tradition and doctrine and faith of the Catholic Church from the beginning; which the Lord indeed gave, the apostles preached, and the Fathers kept. For in this faith the Church is founded, and whoever shall have departed from this, he will not be, nor will he be called, a Christian." Therefore, the holy and perfect Trinity in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, having nothing alien, nor gathered from without, nor consisting of a creator, but [is] the whole creator and effector; similar to itself, and individual according to nature, and the operation of this is one. ^C For the Father, through the Word, in the Holy Spirit, does all things, and thus the unity of the Trinity is preserved; and thus one God is preached in the Church, who is over all, and through all, and in all; over all indeed, as Father, as principle, as fountain; through all truly, through the Word; in all, however, in the Holy Spirit. But the Trinity is a Trinity not only in name and by the fiction of a word, but in truth and existence. For as He who is, is the Father; so He who is, is God over all, who is His Word; and the Holy Spirit is not non-existent, but rather truly exists and subsists. Nor does the Catholic Church think less than these things, lest it fall into the error of those who, with Caiaphas, and the Jews, and Sabellius, think ^D and think no more than these, lest it be rolled among the gentiles toward a multitude of gods. And that this is the faith of the Church, let them understand how the Lord, when He sent the apostles, commanded them to lay this foundation of the Church: "Go," he says, "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."* The apostles, however, having departed, taught thus. And this is the preaching in the universal Church which is under heaven; and this is the foundation of the faith of the Church. From these it becomes plain that the whole plenitude of divinity is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for the whole and sole divinity is preached about each of the three persons without any difference, and the preaching of the same is reciprocated about the same; and it is not varied in any matter, unless in the hypostatic ones: and this is that thing, marvelous in fashion and arcane and hidden, and which happens to no nature in any matter, how of three persons, and (if it is permitted to say) three subjects, the essence is one in act, alone and whole in each person, as if one person absolutely existed: I say one essence in act, more one than that which is most singular of all. But that by repeating it summarily, the material exposition which is contained in this decade may become manifest, it is demonstrated by affirmative propositions that there is not another, and sole non-created nature, except the Father alone, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; nor is there another divinity, and virtue, and operation, except the same Father alone, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; nor is there another unity above the divine, except the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: nor is there another distinction in the Trinity, except in that which is: to be the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; nor is there in the Trinity another fountain and principle of the whole divinity, except the Father alone; and that the natural and substantial operations proceeding from Him are the Son, and His Holy Spirit; nor is the operation, and hand, and finger of Him who is above the good through whom God works all things, anything other than His Son, the principle of deifying us, and the Holy Spirit: nor are whatever natural and substantial energies are called individually, or operations of God, others [existing] besides the Son, and His holy Spirit; nor are whatever things are called natural and substantial of God in one word, others besides the Son and the Holy Spirit; nor are whatever things are reciprocated in the Trinity, is it pious to say that anything is in them and is said of one person, which is not also and is not said to be the essence of another: nor is it pious to say that, of the things which are deifying persons and the essence of the Trinity, one is not the essence of the other; but above every mind and reason in three persons, or subjects, is one and whole, and alone, the essence of the triune above nature, and infinite unity above the divine. Therefore, the things which are woven and set forth in this decade are perfect, so that nothing is missing. The decade is inscribed, "On Infinity in God," because all infinity in God is Trinity, which is above nature, and above all unknown.

and it alone is He who is over all, and through all, and in all, praised and glorified as one and triune God; and His being is substance, and the substance of all things; and there is in Him no privation, nor any thing not subsisting: nor is there in Him any more or less, except that which from Him, outside Himself, by the will of the superabundance of His goodness, has been produced.

TENTH DECADE. — ON DIVINE SIMPLICITY.

CAPUT I.

That one ought not to seek in the Trinity, which is above substance, habits and dispositions, nor are there any things about It which complete Its substance.

Saint Maximus, in the fourth century, chapter eight: Do not, he says, seek habits and aptitudes in the simple and infinite substance of the holy Trinity, lest you make It composite, like creatures; for that, indeed, to think in God is absurd and impious. ^B Divine Damascene: The will, and wisdom, and virtue of the Father is the Son; for we ought not to speak of a quality in God, lest we say He is composed of substance and quality. Great Athanasius in the *Apologetic for the Nicene Synod*, whose beginning is, "You did well to declare to me." If anyone, therefore, he says, thinks that God is composite, as that which is composed of substance and accident; or that He has some covering from the outside, and a veil; or that there are certain things about Him which complete His substance, so that when we say "God," or name the "Father," we do not signify His very inaspectable and incomprehensible substance, but rather something about Him, they accuse the synod, which wrote that the Son is from the substance of the Father. Let them consider that they utter two things that are blasphemous and contumelious toward God, when they think thus: they introduce a certain corporeal God, and they lie, saying that the Lord is not from the Father Himself, but from those things which are about Him. But if God is something simple, as indeed He is, it becomes manifest that when we say "God," and name the "Father," we signify nothing as if about Him, but His very substance. And again the same author in the discourse, whose beginning is, "To all of you who have gathered together," concerning the fact that the Fathers of the Nicene synod rightly used the word *homousios*: "Since therefore," he says, "the excuse concerning those who are scandalized has been shown to be unacceptable, say then yourselves, how does the name of substance not please you? For this is necessary first to examine: and yet you too wrote that the Son was begotten from the Father. If therefore when you name the Father, or say the name of God, you do not signify substance, nor understand Him, who is that which is according to substance; but some other thing about Him, or something worse (lest I should express it) [these] names..."

Scholia.

Nothing as if about Him, but His very substance we signify. Saint John Damascene does not contradict this, when he says in book one of the *Theology*, chapter 9: "Good, and just, and holy, and other things of this sort follow the nature, but do not declare the substance itself." And chapter 10: "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not declare the substance, but the relation." And a little later: "From these, led to the divine substance, we do not comprehend the substance itself, but those things which are about the substance; for this is what Damascene said, namely that the names of God do not signify His substance, because no name expresses perfectly what God is; but they signify Him imperfectly, just as creatures represent Him imperfectly; for thus Saint Thomas has interpreted Damascene, p. 1, q. 13, art. 2, in resp. ad 1: Furthermore, this Damascene spoke according to the custom of our understanding: for because names were imposed to signify things, in so far as they fall into our understanding; but our understanding falls short, so that we might understand those things which are specific to some nature to be the very nature itself subsisting by itself; which in God only happens; therefore concerning those things which are proper to the divine substance, as if of a created nature, which are not substance, but are about the substance, and follow and complete it, we speak; so, I say, Damascene speaks of the perfections of the divine substance, as we are accustomed to speak of proper accidents, which we contemplate about the substance, which follow the nature; likewise the name of "Father," which sooner belongs to God than to a creature, and the name of "Son," and the name of "Holy Spirit," is said to signify the relation, and not the substance; this he also says according to the custom of our understanding, not as to the person, but as to the relation, which does not subsist by itself, as indeed it subsists in the divine; and therefore it cannot signify the relation, without it signifying the substance of the person, because the relation itself subsists by itself: but because this surpasses our understanding, therefore according to the custom of understanding, and according to our mode of signifying, Damascene said that the name of the Father does not signify the substance of the person of the Father, but the relation, following Gregory Nazianzen, who also said this in the first discourse on the Son, although in that same place he concedes to him, against whom he disputes, that it also signifies the substance. For if Damascene had thought that it does not signify the substance in the divine, as if the relation did not exist by itself, it would have plainly been an error, as Saint Thomas, 1 p. q. 33, art. 2, in resp. ad 1 noted: for Damascene seems to have noted, although not by name, out of the modesty for which he was known, when he says: "As some have falsely opined." Likewise Anastasius of Antioch in the first discourse on the right dogmas of the truth: "The names," he says, "of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, do not signify the being, but the mode of being; for neither did he who said 'Father' signify the substance, but entirely the manner."

(2) But some other thing about him. Namely the individual accident, which follows the ultimate matter. For that which is about the substance is an accident by itself, and substantial, which follows the whole species, which is made from the principles of the subject; which in God cannot be, in whom nothing is "made"; and much less a material accident.

(3) Or some thing even worse, that is, something not in Him as an accident, nor about Him

as something completing His substance, but something extrinsic around Him, like a garment, as the same Athanasius said a little above.

CAPUT II.

That one must not seek any accidents in the Trinity that exist in His substance: nor understand substantial differences within It, since even in incorporeal things, which are produced by Him, one ought not to seek a difference between substance and energy, nor that these exist as though one thing in another, to befall it.

Saint Cyril, book XXXI of the *Thesaurus*: "If therefore not everything that is said to be in God according to nature will entirely be His substance, it remains that we say these are accidents of the substance, understood thus only by word (a). For human nature cannot state anything greater (b) in God than according to itself (2); therefore we use our own custom, when we make examples of greater things out of those that suit our nature, as those who depict the sphere of the heaven on a small table." The same in the same book: "It is the part of a wise man to say that nothing happens to the substance of God, because it has its perfection from itself, but we see that reason often compels us to understand in God as accidents those things that are of this kind, even if they have not happened at all." And the same further: "If, therefore, certain things are understood as accidents to God, why do you contend in vain that it should not be said that 'unbegotten' has happened to God, when certain things of this kind appear, which are according to His substance?" And again the same: "For 'unbegotten,' or 'incorruptible,' or 'immortal,' or 'invisible' is not the substance of God; for if each of these signifies (3) a substance, God will be composed of as many substances as there are these things that are found to belong to Him naturally." He says this disputing against Eunomius; for the latter, because "unbegotten" is said of God the Father and "unbegotten" is another name from "begotten," argued that "unbegotten" signifies another substance, and "begotten" another, as if one substance could not be affected by diverse names. Thus indeed Saint Maximus, in that place of the first oration of Gregory Nazianzen concerning the Son, where Eunomius asks what "Father" signifies, explaining him: "The heretics asked," he says, "is 'Father' the name of a substance or of an energy? So that if we said it is the name of a substance, they might conclude from this that the Son is a different substance from the substance of the Father: ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας δύο μὴ ἐπιδεχομένης καὶ διάφορα κυρίως ὀνόματα, that is, as if one substance could not receive two and diverse proper names; for if 'father' is the name of a substance, 'Son' will never be the name of the same substance." Thus far Saint Maximus, and blessed Basil in book II *Against Eunomius*: "How therefore," he says, "O most wise one, if diverse...

^A names are found to agree with Him naturally?" Gregory the Theologian in his first *On the Son*: "Both immortal, and devoid of malice, and invariable is the substance of God." But if this is true, there will be many substances of God, and not one; or God will be composed from these, for these things will not exist without composition if they are substances. Saint Basil: "How is it not ridiculous to call substance a power of creating? Item, [to call] substance a power of providing? And similarly [to call] substance a power of foreknowing? And, to say it once, to posit every energy as substance?" Saint Damascene: "God," he says, "is simple, and not composite; but that which consists of many and diverse things is composite. If, therefore, being unbegotten, being without beginning, and incorporeal, and immortal, and eternal, and good, and the power of creating, and other things of this sort, we call substantial differences in God, then from these [He] will be composite, and will not be simple, but composite." Magnus Dionysius, chap. 11 *On the Celestial Hierarchy*: "But because all minds, by a certain excellent reason, are fittingly divided into their own nature into three: into substance, and virtue, and energy or operation, when we call all, or some of them indifferently, celestial substances or celestial virtues, we must believe that we are declaring them in a circumlocution—the celestial beings, namely, of whom the discourse is—from the substance and virtue of each one of them." Saint Maximus in the annotations to the seventh chapter of the same *Hierarchy*: "Because," he says, "in divine minds he spoke of deiform ^B habits, one ought not to think—as if the great Dionysius said it—that these virtues of divine minds come upon them as accidents in them, as in us, just as one thing comes upon another subject as an adventitious quality. For that, as an accident (2) and as a subject, has no place there; for all composition...

Scholia.

...of names necessarily follows a variety of substance: for we remember that you explained these things in the previous oration, etc. When therefore the Fathers—I mean Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, and Cyril—refute this impious opinion of Eunomius, they argue that God would be composite if the names which agree with God according to nature signify the substance of God; that is, if each one of God's names signifies a different substance, as Eunomius wanted. Which indeed was nothing other than to say that each different name of God signifies a part of God's substance, from which the one substance of God would be composed. But this does not follow if the diverse names, which are indeed asserted absolutely about God, signify one and the same—and [the] whole—substance of God, as we say, even if not perfectly, and as He is in Himself—because we know God from creatures, not now perfectly; and as we know [Him], so the names signify. Thus the same Basil responds to the same Eunomius, who objected to us that God is composite unless it were granted that the "unbegotten" and the "light" which is spoken of God are the same; for he argued thus: "If the light which is spoken of God signifies one thing, and the unbegotten another, that which consists of one thing and another will be composite; but that which is composite is not unbegotten. If, however, it is the same and each name signifies the same, the light, or life, or good which is said of the unbegotten will differ from the light, or life, or good which is said of the begotten only as much as the unbegotten differs from the begotten." In such a way Eunomius separates the substance of the unbegotten from the substance of the begotten. Basil responds: "But indeed, regarding that which Eunomius says—that God is shown to be composite unless 'light' and 'unbegotten' are taken for the same—we can say that if we were to take the 'unbegotten' as a part of the substance, that argument ^C by which it is said that what consists of diverse things is composite would have a place; but if we posit the substance of God as light, or life, or good, the whole of what is [is] good; the whole of what is [is] life; the whole of what is [is] light—but following life, and light, and good is *agenesias*, that is, unbegottenness, that is, for life, light, and good to exist not from another—how will He not be devoid of composition, who is simple according to substance? For the modes of existence, which indicate properties—namely, to be unbegotten and to be begotten—do not harm the reason for simplicity." Thus far Basil.

It is to be understood that these things are said against Eunomius, who made the different properties of God into different substances of God, so that [the] "unbegotten," which is a property of God and merely declares a negation, would introduce a substance different from the substance of the begotten. Besides, the power of creating, the power of providing, the power of foreknowing, and finally every energy of the divine nature are not parts of substance, but, as Dionysius says, the whole of that which God is, who is entirely simple and *monoeides*, that is, uniform in the three persons.

(2) "For that, as an accident and as a subject, has no place there." What the holy Maximus says—that habits in angels are not as an accident in a subject—is not only true of material habits, as St. Thomas interpreted in I, II, q. 50, in the response to 1, because such habits, as he also says, are dispositions toward natural being; which sort of habits have no place in angels, because they lack matter, such as are certain natural properties which are found in animate and inanimate things, and pertain to the second species of quality, which are also called natural powers; not only, I say, is this true of such habits and accidents, but also of habits which are qualities and pertain to the first species in the predicament of quality, which the same St. Thomas says are excluded by St. Maximus in angels. That this is not so, however, can be perceived from the scholia of the same St. Maximus on the same Dionysius. For where Dionysius—whom St. Thomas cites—says in *Celestial Hierarchy*, chap. 7, that there are deiform (a) habits in angels, that is, by which they are assimilated to God, he wrote a scholium in these words (I shall translate word for word): "Note," he says, "that the divine powers (he says angels) have the likeness of God according to habit: a habit is a stable and fixed quality: hence therefore it is clear, just as they are of [the] free will; so they have virtues according to acquired habits." Which Hammon of Adrianople teaches more fully in those things which he wrote against Origen, *On the Resurrection*. Thus far St. Maximus. These habits, therefore, St. Maximus said are not as an accident in a subject, as in us; and he gave the reason, because angels lack matter and all material composition. It must be said, therefore, in summary, how habits of knowledge and virtues are in us as accidents in a subject—and this on account of matter—so that from that we might understand that habits are not so in angels as...

(a) He calls them deiform habits, by which angels are assimilated to God as much as is possible.

if indeed it were one thing in another, as it were an accident in a subject, that substance would not live of itself; nor could it be deified of itself, as far as its powers can attain, on account of the mere order which is preserved in placing one thing in another. The habits therefore which we have called those in them are bestowed upon their very substances, not, however, as an accident in a subject, because they are devoid of matter: hence the great Dionysius in the book *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, chapter 4, calls them substantial habits, which are in them. Further, the same Maximus, in *Adnotationes*, chapter 4, *De divinis nominibus*: "On account of these, namely, the rays of divine goodness, all intelligible and intelligent minds have existed, and substances, and virtues, and energies: for they themselves also understand; because all are minds, and substances of life, created by the supreme mind; nay, even energies are subsistent therein of themselves, and substances." For every ^B accident in a subject, as St. Maximus rightly said.

*Scholia.* The habit of knowledge in us is acquired at the beginning by conversion toward phantasms, which are in the material powers of the senses, whence materially and dispositive, as St. Thomas says, acts, from which a habit is generated, are in sensitive powers. Therefore, the habit of knowledge can be corrupted in the intellect through oblivion on the part of the memory, in which are kept the phantasms of sensible things, from which intelligible species are abstracted; and through the deception of a false argumentation, by which the contrary of what was previously known is urged: but neither of these can happen to an angel, who can neither forget nor be deceived, because he is free from all matter through the species of things divinely imparted and congenital, by which habitually, as St. Thomas says, he is perfected, and can know all the natures of things. Wherefore a habit of this kind is not in him such an accident as it is in us, as St. Maximus said; nor is the angel himself a subject of such a habit, but rather a habit of this kind is in him like the power of heating in fire, as St. Maximus and Pachymeres, the paraphrast of Dionysius, says. Similarly the habit of virtues, which we attain through sense, as St. Diadochus says in the book *De perfectione spirituali*, that is, through the just use of the senses and of those things which fall under the senses—which Isaac Syrus calls ^C *exteriores ordinis*—can in us be present and absent as accidents, because they are materially in the sensitive powers, and as it were in a subject in the appetites, to which it happens to obey or not to obey reason, whence we are said to be just in hearing and in sight, and similarly in others; just as blessed Peter said of holy Lot: *For he was righteous in sight and hearing* (II Pet. II, 8); and the composition from the subject of these virtues and from the virtues themselves is a material composition on account of the bodily organs; those virtues also of the interior order, which are called theological—faith, hope, charity—are also accidents in us, because they can be present and be absent on account of the flesh, which can be subjected and not subjected to the law of the spirit; for one thing is the flesh, another the wisdom of the flesh, which the Apostle says is not subject to the law of God (Rom. VIII, 8), nor can it be: but in angels, virtues are not as mutable qualities, which are called and are accidents, as they would indeed be if there were matter in angels, and a composition from matter as in us, but rather they become as it were ^D of their nature: for thus, says the holy Diadochus, bishop of Photice in Epirus, whom St. Maximus is wont to cherish and follow, in the *Golden Book* of certain *Questions concerning the Separate Soul and Angels*, which he entitled *Apocalypsis*: "For in incorporeal natures, whatever the energy acquires, this becomes as it were of the nature on account of the great, as I have said, subtlety," that is, vacation from matter. The intention, therefore, of St. Maximus was to interpret how one should understand what Dionysius said, that there are deiform habits in angels, lest anyone should err if he suspected that the virtues of angels were as certain mutable qualities, as in us after the manner of accidents; for these, because they can be present and absent apart from the corruption of the subject, are properly called and are accidents, which the ancient Latins called "conjuncts" as being adventitious; for thus Lucretius calls them; the Greek word, as it seems to me, is interpreted as *συμβεβηκός*. For it is not regrettable to observe here that the same St. Maximus, *De divinis nominibus*, chap. 8, calls these habits *ἐπιτηδειότητας*, we interpret them as "habilitates" or "aptitudes," St. Thomas says they are participations of divine wisdom and goodness, when he says in 1 p., q. 3, art. 6, in the response to the second, because to attain God through intellect and will they need to participate in something from the outside, namely divine wisdom and goodness, as he says in the same place: Therefore, he says, it is necessary to posit habits in them; Dionysius says these habits, in chapter 4 *De divinis nominibus*, were corrupted by the angels who fell, insofar as they departed from the operation congruent to these habits, which Judah the Apostle in his epistle says did not keep their beginning, or, as the old interpreter renders, *τὴν ἀρχὴν*, their principate; for they were created, as St. Maximus says, for good works; for he called their creation a beginning; thus Dionysius interpreted the passage of Jude, as St. Maximus observed. Furthermore, that Dionysius said the angels corrupted their beginning is taken from Ezechiel, chapter XXVIII, when he speaks of the devil: *Thy knowledge was corrupted with thy beauty*. So much for the habits in angels, which in common parlance are also wont to be called by Dionysius *δυνάμεις*, that is, powers, as holy Maximus noted in chapter 5, *De divinis nominibus*, because through them we can operate promptly. We must speak now of their powers which are thus properly called *δυνάμεις*, which the same St. Maximus also excludes from the category of accidents. For if, he says, that "being another in another" as an accident in a subject had a place in the powers of an angel, it would follow that the angel would not live of itself, but per accidens; and the *τὸ ζωτικὸν*, that is, the vital power through which he lives, would not be substantial in the angel but accidental; nor would he be deified of himself as far as can be, if the intellective power of the angel were an accident, as in us, and did not rather pertain to the substance of the angel: but now, since the power of the angel to live or understand is not an accident—as it is in us an accident of the individual, which follows matter, which is the principle of individuation—but rather an accident per se, and peculiar to the species, which St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 54, art. 3, in the response to the second, says pertains to the form, speaking of the power of the angel, it does not follow that the angel lives per accidens, or is beatified per accidens: because to operate through one's own power, which pertains to the form itself and to the substance of the thing, whence it is wont to be called *οὐσιώδης*, that is, substantial by philosophers, is not to operate per accidens: because, as the same St. Maximus noted in chapter 5, *De divinis nominibus*, as I said before: "Philosophers," he says, "reduced the properties of each substance, whether living or lacking life, to the predicament of substance, and comprehend them by this name of substance, otherwise not with the proper notions of substances and properties confused."

^A And what then shall we say of the divine state or seat? What, indeed, is it, except that God remains in Himself, and is firmly fixed in the same immovable state and established beyond foundation, and that He acts according to the same, and around the same, and in a similar way; and that, in any case, He is immutable from Himself, and cannot be moved, and is entirely immovable—and these things, indeed, are above substance? The same Author, in the *Amatorian Hymns*, from Saint Hierotheus, says: "The Producing [Power], he says, is one simple virtue, moving of itself toward a certain amatory mixture from the Good even to the extremity of those things which exist, and from it, in turn, consequently through all things back to the Good, revolving itself from itself, through itself, and in itself, and always returning to itself in the same ^B way." The same Author, in his letter to Titus: "For thus, contemplating the mysteries naked of veils, we shall be able to venerate the fountain of life, seeing it poured out into itself, and remaining in itself, and one certain simple virtue, moving of itself, acting of itself, never abandoning itself, but surpassing the cognition of all cognitions, and always seeing itself by itself." Still the same Author, chapter 4, *On the Divine Names*: "And they call God Love and Charity, inasmuch as He has the power of leading [all things] unto Himself; who alone is beautiful and good on account of Himself, and who is the manifestation of Himself by Himself, and the good emanation of an excellent union into one, and an amatory motion, simple, of itself movable, of itself acting,"

CHAPTER III.

^A proceeding in goodness, and flowing from goodness into creatures, and returning again into the good, in which to lack an end and a beginning the divine love excellently demonstrates, like some perpetual and everlasting orb, by reason of its goodness, revolving itself in unerring conversion, and in the same, and according to the same, always both proceeding, and remaining, and reverting. Saint Maximus in the scholia on Dionysius, c. 1, *On the Divine Names*: "Therefore, in general, one must not dare to speak or think concerning the Divinity, which is above substance, and hidden. For the Divinity is the hidden power of God alone, ^B the deifying [θεαρχική] power of those who are called gods, both angels and men, insofar as it is the maker of those who by participation are made gods; itself, which truly is from itself and without cause, is the Divinity *per se*." Gregory the Theologian: "And to the one, of those who are from him, consent." When Saint Maximus explains this passage, he says: "If I mistake not, he speaks of one Divinity; but from this one, three persons." The divine Damascene: "The Divinity shining in three, the one splendor from one Divinity beaming forth with three persons. The Father without beginning; the Word of the Father of the same nature; and the Spirit, of the same substance, reigning together." Saint Theophanes: "The one splendor of the three, subsisting from the one Divinity going forth, the same resplendent with three splendors from the one Divinity going forth." And again: "For as from one sun, the Trinity shines." In the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Synod: "Of both natures," it says, "we know both operations, I mean natural and substantial, ^C and appropriate without division (1), proceeding from each substance and nature according to operation and the quality naturally implanted (a); and at the same time, producing neither a divisible nor a confused operation of either substance, but rather, one brought in conjunctively; it makes a difference of operations in Christ, just as [it makes] a difference of natures." From which it is made manifest that, in the unity which is above substance, one ought not to consider that which is said to exist from itself, or the operation that proceeds from itself, or that which evolves from itself, through itself, into itself, and therefore that a difference of cause and of that which has a cause follows; nay, rather it is manifest and without division; as if it were a certain absolute power, and simple motion: self-moved, operating *per se*, from itself, through itself, turning back to itself and always revolving around itself in the same way, and encompassing with unerring conversion. ^D Yet at the same time it has been demonstrated that one ought not, whenever anything is said to be "from something," to seek a difference of cause and of that which proceeds from a cause; it is demonstrated, I say, not only from those things which we have said before, but also from those which have just been laid down, by which it is shown that one must confess three persons to proceed from one Divinity. If, therefore, to be said "from something" were everywhere to introduce a difference of cause and of that which has a cause, necessarily the whole Trinity would have a cause; from which it would result that the Father in the Trinity would have proceeded from a cause; but this is absurd. Therefore, it is no longer the case that wherever "from something" is said in divine matters, a difference of cause and of that which proceeds from a cause is indicated; and moreover, to proceed in divine matters "without division" is as much as to be without distance, or difference, and without cause, since as regards the Trinity, which is above substance, insofar as it is worshiped as Trinity, it has no place in it for indivisibility [τό ἀδιαίρετον], that is, that which is without division, but rather it is divided by the divine and deifying persons: and it will be, insofar as it is Trinity, a truly discrete Trinity, but wherever the Trinity is said to be "not divided," it is not said insofar as it is Trinity, but insofar as that Trinity itself is unity; therefore, that there is no division in the divine unity means that there is no difference in it, nor is there a cause for it.

CAPUT IV.

Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Book IX *Against Eunomius*: "Who is, tell me, God? Who rules, who is anything else beyond power? If he rules, and power is a different thing, then power is conquered by that which is not power; for that which is something other than power (3), is not power at all."

Scholia.

(a) He calls natural quality the property of either nature.

^A And so it is found, insofar as it is not potency, to dominate potency. Justin Martyr, in those things which Photius the patriarch recites from him, says, "Some things are sometimes potency and act; but God," as the clear-sighted mind can understand, "is always energy, that is, act; for he does not proceed from imperfect to perfect; nor is there anything else besides him that is of itself act, which is itself in itself substance." Theodore, surnamed Graptos, in his treatise *Against the Oppugners of Icons*: "Not," he says, "as some once trifled, that when he assumed flesh he wished the heavens to be empty of his person, and to be with us according to substance, but according to energy and dignity to be with God the Father; because they would have it that substance is one thing, and energy another, as in those things which are thought to be corporeal; which is what the pious deny. For they know that in simple and incorporeal things [(1)] these things differ in no way: because these things are not to be discerned from one another, lest that which is above all simplicity be understood as composite." Saint Maximus, in a note placed externally on the second chapter of the first century: "The Good," he says, "properly according to substance is known from those things that are as the effector of creatures, which is not what is according to nature; for it differs greatly to believe that something is, from knowing, since this is what it is, what that thing is. From goodness, therefore, and energy, and ^B from the proper works of providence, God is known, but not from substance. We call works here energy, but not potency or virtue of operation; for this is nothing else but the substance of God, lest composition be thought to exist in God." Great Athanasius, in the first book *Against the Arians*: "Let them ask," he says, "the Greeks, so that when they have heard how many meanings a word has, they may learn that they do not well know of what they speak." And in his letter to Serapion: "Since these things are so, and so great a difference of spirits is shown, you would be better if, hearing of a created spirit, you perceived one of those things said." And Saint Maximus, in the *Disputation Against Pyrrhus*: "To speak," he says, "and not first to distinguish the meanings of a word, is nothing other than entirely to pour forth and leave obscure those things of which the question is, which indeed is alien to a man who is a participant of reason." The same, in the same place: "It has also been said above, that it behooves him who discourses about the truth to distinguish the significations of those things which are said, because of the error proceeding from homonymy." Saint Anastasius of Antioch, in the book which is inscribed, *That God is Incircumscript*: "Triply," he says, "energy is spoken of: power or force, according to which it is natural to God to operate; and the habit of the operator toward the work made; and that very work made itself." Furthermore, Saint John Damascene, in the sermon inscribed, *On the Properties of Christ*: "Energy," he says, "sometimes signifies the virtue of operating, sometimes operating, sometimes the work effected." Great Basil in the fifth book of the *Antirrhetica*: "That is accepted from something," he says, "either insofar as it pertains to creation, as when we say 'all things from God'; or to generation, as that: 'From the womb before the morning star I have begotten thee' [*]; or that: 'For I came forth from God' [†]; or naturally, as when we say, 'Our energy is from us [(a)], the splendor of the sun from itself.' If, therefore, the divine body of Christ is from the Holy Spirit, it cannot be from him genitally, because what is born of flesh is flesh; but what is from the Spirit is spirit, nor again naturally from him, as his energy, since in a simple [(2)] and incorporeal nature substance and its energy undergo the same reason; it remains, therefore, that it is from him as his creature." The same, in the second book: "If indeed virtue has nothing in common with substance, how from creatures, which are effects of virtue, has a way been made to the knowledge of him? But if substance and virtue are the same thing, that which signifies virtue will plainly also signify substance." Divine Theodore, surnamed Graptos, treating the saying of Basil: "Thus," he says, "let divine energy or eternal operation be piously understood: nay rather, the energy itself of itself, so that it is not distinguished from substance, but rather has the same reason because of the property of simplicity and of the incorporeal nature." Great Athanasius, in the *Disputation Against an Anomoean* [(3)], in the person of the adversary: "Say," they say, "the image of the energy [(4)]."

[*] Ps. cix, 3. [†] Joan. xvi, 27.

Scholia. [(1)] In simple and incorporeal things this differs in no way. He speaks of simple and incorporeal things, which are their own being, of which kind are the divine persons; for each of them is its own being, and pure act, and therefore God cannot be the subject of an accident; for a subject is compared to an accident, as potency to act. [(2)] In a simple and incorporeal nature substance and energy undergo the same reason. That is, his essence and his virtue of operating are the same; concerning simple substance, which is pure act, which alone is God, it must be understood as it must be understood that which Boethius said, that a simple form cannot be a subject; thus it has been interpreted by S. Thom. p. 54. For in an angel it is not the same, his essence and his intellective virtue; but rather this is an accident free from matter received in the essence of an angel as in a subject. [(3)] In the *Disputation Against an Anomoean*, which treats of the unbegotten and the begotten; Athanasius calls the Anomoean Eunomius, and Aetius, who made the Son unlike the Father, for this is what 'Avóμοιος, or Anomoean, signifies. [(4)] Say, they say, the image of the energy. Insofar as energy is the constructive virtue of God, it is the same as the substance of God; and the Son is the image of the energy of God. Just as he is the invariable image of the substance, of the counsel, of the will, of the virtue, or of the potency, and of glory, as the same Athanasius says in the same *Disputation Against an Anomoean*.

[(a)] Our energy is from us, as respiration, the digestion of food, and similar operations.

If, however, energy and substance are identical, then the Son will be the image of the substance. Gregory of Nyssa, in his twelfth book *Against Eunomius*, explains and distinguishes this principle more clearly: "For Eunomius," he says, "proceeding as though his reasoning were correctly concluded, brings charges against us for things far more difficult than the former, as he calls them. He is greatly indignant and slanders the reasoning, and having vehemently irritated the listener regarding the things to be said, in which he accuses us of impiety, as if we not only accommodated the names attributed to God to our own thoughts—silently passing over when and how this attribution of names was made—but as if we confused all things, and brought together into one and the same reality the substance and energy of the Only-Begotten, without any dispute having been held on this very matter, nor it having been demonstrated how it is maintained by us that energy and substance are one and the same." It appears, however, from the words of Eunomius, that it was the dogma of the Arians to separate His energy from the substance of God. Eunomius declares this in those things which he writes against Basil the Great. He says, therefore: "It does not behoove those who believe in the truth, following the opinions of others that are unexamined and thoughtless, to say that energy and substance are one." Further, the same man: "If reasoning has concluded that will is energy, but not energy as substance, and yet the only-begotten Son came into existence by the will of the Father, not toward substance, but toward energy, which is also will, it is necessary to preserve the likeness for the Son; and again, the image will bear the likeness not with the substance, but with the energy." Against this, however, Basil objects in his second book *Against Eunomius*: "If the Only-Begotten is the image of the energy, and the energy is of the dignity, but the dignity is of the substance, then the Only-Begotten will be the image of the substance." And Gregory of Nyssa in the first book *Against Eunomius*: "If, he says, the energy which follows God indeed, but operates the Son, does not exist in its own substance, who is so blind that he does not see the blasphemy that has been constructed?" From which it is made manifest ^B that in the unity which is above substance, one must not seek one thing as substance and another as energy; nor should one be ruled by the multiple significance of the word "energy"; for energy here is to be celebrated as the power of operating the whole, which is the principle of all things, and whose substance is energy; but that energy which a habit contains, or the effect of a habit, is not to be praised here; for both these are imperfect, and fall far short of the most perfect principle, to which, whoever adds—being otherwise in need of nothing—diminishes by adding. Nor will it be pious to think that substance and energy are not the same, not only because of those things which the Arians blasphemously say against the Son of God, but because to attribute something imperfect to the most perfect unity of all is most foul and most alien to reason.

CAPUT V.

Basil the Great in the fourth book of his *Against Eunomius*, ch. 31: "If anyone said a person without substance, he has also denied the existence of substance; for that which does not have substance, and does not exist in itself, signifies a nature which does not exist, nor is it anything at all." Gregory of Nyssa in the first book *Against Eunomius*: "For if, he says, the natural energy of God does not exist in itself, and the work brought forth from non-existence is included in it, the work done is clearly understood to be of such a nature as the nature of its cause which produced the work; for it is a fictitious thought; for that which is made from non-existence, and is contained in it, is manifest to all not to exist." The same author in the same place: "For this necessary consequence demonstrates not a little that the effect is from what does not exist; nay rather, it demonstrates that it is not free from danger to speak even by way of predication. Just as it is necessary to confess that what is born takes its origin from that which is; so on the contrary, it will be necessary to confess it not to be, ^C if it is not born from that which is."

Scholia

^A it is that which is born from that which is not. For if the very thing itself does not exist, how will anything else exist from it of itself? For if the energy, which indeed follows God, but makes the Son, does not exist in its own substance, who is so blind as not to see what blasphemy is brought about? [A(a)] Furthermore, the same person ^B says in the same place: For if he who avoids these absurdities says that energy is a certain thing not existing of itself, whose product he decides the Son to be, let him say again how that which is, follows from that which is not? How does that which does not exist of itself operate those things which are of themselves? For in these things it will be found that while the things which are not follow God, yet those things which are not are the cause of those which are; and those which do not exist by their own nature will define and circumscribe the nature of those things which are: and the power which makes and creates every creature will be contained in that which, according to its own reason, does not exist. The same person ^B furthermore says in the same place: Thus far, however, it is worthy of consideration how energies follow substances; and what they are according to their own nature, and whether they are something else besides the substances which they follow, or a part of them, and of the same nature? But if they are something else, how, and by what are they produced? But if they are the same thing, how, being separated, since they ought to have existed together with them, do they follow them extrinsically? Does some natural necessity force the energy, whatever it may be, to follow the substance involuntarily, just as burning follows fire, and vapors and breaths follow those bodies from which they arise? But I do not think that he himself says this, so as to esteem that the substance of God is some varied and composite thing, which has an energy inseparably and thought of together with it, so that it might be demonstrated as an accident in a subject; but rather, he says that energies, as it seems, are things that act by themselves, being excited voluntarily and freely. Who would say that that which is done voluntarily by providence follows as something of those things which follow from without? For we do not know that this word is trite in such matters according to common custom, so that energy—that is, the operation of one working in something—should be said to follow the worker; nor can it happen that one who has separated one from the other can understand what remains as per se: rather, he who has said "energy"—that is, operation—simultaneously comprehends in his reasoning that which is according to the energy, that is, the operation, and he who remembers the agent, has tacitly signified the energy, that is, the operation, together with him; but the thing we are saying will be made clearer by examples. We say that someone works, or builds, or does any other of those things which are of such a kind; therefore, in one utterance, the discourse has represented both the energy—that is, the operation—and he who exercised the craft per se: so that if the one is separated, the other does not subsist. Saint Cyril, in book VII, *Ad Hermiam*: God is understood to be simple and not composite, properly and primarily, O friend! Not compounded of nature and energy, as of things other than Himself, but rather that He is one whole thing. And Saint Maximus, discoursing on this reasoning, says: Everything, says he, which has something thought of at the same time for the declaration of its own existence, is composite, and not simple, properly speaking. From these it is made manifest that in the unity which is above substance, it is altogether absurd to posit that the energy of Him who is the most efficacious of all, and of power more than infinite, does not exist of itself according to its own reason. But if it truly exists of itself, it appears a still greater absurdity, and more impious, to think of the unity—which transcends all simplicity—together with it, or entirely to distinguish this from that, and to imagine that His substance is one thing, and His energy—that is, His own proper power of acting—is another.

CAPUT VI.

Scholia.

^A [Christ], He says, "thought it not robbery to be equal with God." Divine Chrysostom, in his sixth homily *On the Incomprehensible*, says: "When, he says, one speaks of being of the same form and of the same figure, what else is declared than one substance without any variety?" For there is no form or face around God. Saint Cyril: "Form, he says, is accepted in God by the Fathers, just as by the Apostle; for it is wicked and impious to call 'form' that which is a species, in God, who does not fall under visual inspection." The Lord in the Gospel: "I, he says, am the resurrection and the life." Saint Cyril in the acts of the sixth holy and ecumenical synod: "As unity, he says, cannot be divided into two unities (since unity divided into these would not be unity, but two), so that which is one by supreme conjunction cannot be divided into two; otherwise, God, the nature of the universe, would no longer be simple, if indeed there is something other than Him, which is life within Him." And again the same: "First, God of the universe is not a simple nature, but rather composite, and consisting of two things; if indeed there is something other than Him which is life in Him." Gregory of Nyssa in the *Life of Moses*: "Being of beings is true life; but this cannot be known; because therefore life-giving life transcends knowledge, everything which is known is not life." Divine Apostle: "Christ, he says, [is] God's power and God's wisdom." Saint Gregory of Nyssa in book VII *On the Canticle of Canticles*: "The Lord, he says, in His own nature is the very thing that is, the substance of truth, and of wisdom, and of virtue; therefore what David said, 'You have made all things in wisdom,' the Apostle interpreted, saying that all things were created in Him, as if the Prophet had signified this by the word 'wisdom'." The same Gregory in the same work: "He who has the knowledge of all things comprehended in Himself, whose wisdom is infinite, or rather whose essence is wisdom." Cyril in the *Thesaurus*: "Not because wisdom in us and science do not exist per se, is it therefore that the wisdom which is in God does not exist per se; but if you confess that God is not of our nature, you clearly confess that all things which are His are not from our things, but rather surpass ours, and surpass them as much as they also surpass and differ according to the account of substance." From which it becomes manifest that in the unity which is above substance, neither goodness ^B nor His form, nor His life, nor His wisdom, nor His virtue are things other than His substance: rather, these all are His unique substance.

CAPUT VII.

Saint Cyril, in *Thesaurus*, book XXXIV: All will admit that God is simple and devoid of composition; it is therefore absurd to say that He has such a knowledge of Himself as we do; for if He Himself is one thing, and the knowledge in Him is something other than Him, He is composite and not simple; but because by the confession of all He is simple, knowledge in Him is not something other than Him. But we are not so; for we are something properly according to substance; but in substance we have knowledge placed, like color in a body. Saint Maximus, in the third century, chapter 5: "All knowledge, he says, of the things that are, is a habit which gathers certain extremes together; I mean those who know and those things which are known; but this is not known by those who know, nor is it known simultaneously with the things known; for knowledge is not by its own nature suited in any part to be itself known: but God, according to His own essence, whatever He is according to substance, is ineffable knowledge, which exists by itself in Mind and Word and Spirit." God therefore is entirely unknown to creatures, inasmuch as He is knowledge itself by Himself, unless it pleases one to say that God also exists above this immensely. And again Cyril in the chapters *On the Holy Spirit*: "God, he says, is charity, as John says; and He is not one thing Himself, and another thing which is in Him; for He is simple and without composition." The same, again, book XXXIII of the *Thesauri*: "All things have been delivered to me by my Father, and no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son"; because, namely, no created mind can in any way embrace the divine substance, because it conquers every mind: and His beauty, which is above nature, is borne above every notion, and cannot be destroyed: and it is known by itself alone what it is according to nature. Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in the *Commentaries*

[Scholia] It is not understood. What God is by nature cannot be understood; nor does this Gregory contradict, who in the same book says: "What it is necessary to know about God only, namely that there is none of those things which the human mind can know." Therefore, this Gregory signifies that God is understood from creatures, which we understand, that He is, and that those things are according to cause, it is certain that the perfections which are signified by the names of God pertain to God properly, and primarily, and essentially, and are shared by creatures, and in that excellence in which they pertain to God, they cannot be understood by us by human knowledge, because the first object of our intellect in the present state is being and truth considered in material things; but knowledge is immaterial, and therefore it is known after the material object already known; nor is it known simultaneously with the object known, as the knowledge of a stone is not known simultaneously with the stone, because to know a stone is not the perfection of the known stone; otherwise it would be known in one act, just as a thing is known in one act with its perfection; just as an angel in one act understands his own essence, and his own understanding, which is the perfection of his essence, from St. Thomas, 1st part, q. 87, art. 3.

[C87] in the Canticles: "What is truly blessed is God himself," whatever we may posit him to be; blessedness is that immortal life, and that immortal good, and that which cannot be understood; beauty which is not expressed, and it is itself by itself grace, and wisdom, and virtue. And the great Athanasius in a certain disputation with the Orthodox and the Anomoeans: ORTH. We have one person and another; but we do not have one immortality and another, which we received through one baptism; for it is not another immortality, and another a different baptism, and another a different faith: there is not one Christ, one faith, one baptism. ANOM. But our person is other than immortality and baptism. Therefore the person of Christ is another person than immortality. ORTHOD. By no means; rather this very person is also immortality; and not only immortality, but also incorruption, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, and lordship, and virtue. From which it is made clear that in the unity above substance it is not necessary to inquire that to know it is one thing, because it is said to have it, or similarly that to be its charity, or beauty, or immortality, or another thing is something else; but rather its singular substance and existence; but rather when this is abundantly present, it is as it possesses itself.

CHAPTER VIII.

St. Maximus in that book which is inscribed: *That which is in Christ the true, that is, the difference of substances*: Every difference, he says, which declares the dissimilarity, or diversity of things from one another according to the mode of existing in any way, naturally introduces with itself the quantity of the differing things, whether of substances, or qualities, or properties; what is, however, utterly simple does not admit of difference, since it is utterly the same to itself and singular, and a whole from a whole without relation, just as a genus in so far as it does not have that which is predicated of it; and for that reason it is not numbered at all, nor divided. The same in the fiftieth chapter, concerning energies and wills: With every difference, he says, quality is introduced at the same time, and with every quality is joined the number which declares it; for it cannot be that difference exists without quantity, or quantity without a number that declares it ^D can be known. The same in chapter 5 of the century: That which is utterly one properly, does not have a difference; but that which does not have a difference, is also outside every relation; but that which has no relation, is also not constrained; but that which is not constrained, lacks a beginning; but that which truly lacks a beginning, is also infinite; God alone therefore is without beginning, and infinite, and without relation, and without difference; because he is properly most singular by nature, and simple, and not circumscribed, that is, infinite. The same in chapter 4 of the same century: Nothing of those things which exist is not circumscribed, since it is not even free from a category: God alone is outside a category, and for that reason is free from every circumscription, inasmuch as he is infinitely higher than every substance, and mind, and reason, and intelligence.

St. Athanasius, in the oration which he wrote *keryktikon* on the Annunciation of our most holy Lady, Mother of God: Wherefore, he says, the Only-begotten God himself says: "All things that the Father has, are mine" (Joan. xvi, 15); and to the Father he says: "All things that are mine, are yours, and yours are mine, and I am glorified in them" (Joan. xvii, 10). For in all things in which the Father is glorified, when discourse is made concerning God, the Son is also glorified, and the Holy Spirit; hence God the Father is called perfect, God the Son perfect, God the Holy Spirit perfect: because nothing of the fullness of divinity is lacking to any person; but rather he has the *totan*, that is, the quality of all properties; in whose equality the fullness of divinity is discerned; for from *totan*, that is, from the equal, the feminine noun *tota* is derived, that is, equality, which is a comprehension constituting the equality of many; for of whom some substance is the equal of differing properties, it is called *tota*, as if *hagia kai ola*, that is, holy and whole; and in that *tota* is called according to etymology by mutation into *o*, and by the accession of the letter *v*, it is made by interpreting, *ousia*, that is, substance, as if a certain essence conflated from many gathered into one; thus far Athanasius.

Gregory of Nyssa in the catechetical sermon: If, he says, it is called good, and just, and wise, and powerful similarly, likewise immortality, and sempiternity, and every mind *pia* in the same mode confesses with every reason of difference taken away: of necessity at the same time the multiplication of gods is taken away from the dogma, when the same being in all things turns faith into unity. The same in the same: For not outside composition will such opinion be, which says one thing is in another, but rather it is necessary altogether, with simplicity placed outside controversy and doubt, that it itself is by itself the Word of God. The same: Everything, he says, which is understood concerning God (1), that was before the foundation of the world; but nevertheless

^A that which is above substance, and in it consists that which named it. And the divine Maximus, in his Scholia on Dionysius, ch. 5, *On the Divine Names*: "Because," he says, "some have stated that ideas and exemplars exist outwardly by themselves, he now strikes at these Gentiles and says: If ideas were not simply and singularly notions beyond the simple notions of God who is beyond the simple, God would be composed of an exemplar and of himself, whereas Dionysius said that he rejects all duplication." The same Maximus, in the same Scholia, ch. 7, explaining what Dionysius says: *Images of a certain likeness of divine exemplars*. "These," he says, "are species and individual creatures; for all the orders of angels and all things that fall under the senses are images and likenesses of the divine ideas," that is, of the exemplars which are in God. Which, indeed, the exemplars are the eternal notions of God, through which and according to which all things were in him, being naught else than himself; and they were produced, just as John says in the Apocalypse 81, that someone among the most ancient angels said to him that all things were, and were made; he said that there were ideas; and that all things which were produced were images and likenesses of the ideas, that is, of the exemplars. ^B Blessed Chrysostom, in his homily on the Cross, whose beginning is: *What shall I say? What shall I speak? By what name shall I call you?* "When I say that God is sitting in the heavens, I do not say merely in one place, but everywhere; for he has no distance of place, he who is his own place, who himself contains all things, but no one contains him. For who can grasp a nature that is incorporeal, and void of matter, and infinite, and which can neither be investigated, nor corrupted, nor grasped by intelligence, which is God? For among the pious it is necessary to understand God in this way: for he himself is all things, he himself is our hope, as I said before, ^C as it is written: *This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and whom you have sent, Jesus Christ* 82." Great Dionysius, ch. 5 *On the Divine Names*, says: "From that unity itself are the principles of things, and all things whatsoever that are, and in whatever way they are: and this without relationship, and collectively, and unitedly, inasmuch as in the unity all number uniformly pre-existed; and the unity has in itself singularly every number, and every number is copulated into one, and is in the unity; and the farther it proceeds from the unity, the more it is divided and multiplied; and in the center all the lines of a circle exist simultaneously in one copulation; and the point holds all straight lines uniformly copulated among themselves, and with the one principle from which they went forth; and in the center itself they are altogether copulated; and those a little distant from it are a little divided; but those more distant, more, and, if I may say so, ^D the more they are near to the center, the more they are copulated with it and among themselves; and the more they are distant from the center, the more they are distant from one another; indeed, even in the whole nature of the universe, the reasons of each individual nature are collected by one non-confused copulation, and in the soul powers are copulated uniformly, which provide for all parts of the body; it is not, therefore, absurd, ascending from small and minute images and examples to the cause of all things, to contemplate with the eyes all things in the cause of all things, even those which are contrary between themselves, uniformly and copulatedly." To this saint Maximus adds: "That, in it, and from it, is thus to be understood: it itself by itself is above-goodness, which is mind, and is altogether act, converted to itself in act, not previously in potentiality without mind, and afterwards mind in act: whence even the mind is purely alone, which does not understand by an intelligence introduced from without: but from itself completely it understands. For if its substance is one thing, and that which understands (1) is another thing from it, he himself will not be understood, that is, his substance; but if he has anything from himself, he does not have it from another; if, however, from himself and ex himself he understands, he himself is those things which he understands; therefore he who is his intellect (2), which is, understands the things that are, even as he who is."

Scholia. Since St. Thomas said that names of this kind are not only said of God causally, as some have posited, he did not criticize Dionysius, as some suspect. I warn the reader of this, lest this be falsely attributed to so great an author; indeed, the same St. Thomas himself interpreted Dionysius ch. 5, when he says: *And nothing of things existing eternally or temporarily converges to him at all, but he is separated from time, and from the aeon, and from those things which are in the aeon, and from all those things which are in time.* "Universally," says St. Thomas, "not anything from the number of creatures belongs to him, but he is separated by a certain eminence." And again: *Even,* says he, *he is separated from those things which are in the aeon and in time by a certain eminence.* Therefore what St. Thomas said, that these names of God, "good," and "wise," and the like, signify that these things are in God eminently, he took from Dionysius, whom he interpreted, finally in the same q. 13, p. 2, art. 2, what Dionysius said in ch. 1 of *On the Divine Names*: *You will find the hymn of all theologians dividing the names of divine processions;* thus he interprets, as if Dionysius wished to signify that the names of God, "good," "living," "wise," and others of this kind, were indeed imposed from the processions, or providences of God flowing into creatures, but they signify the principle of things itself, in that there is in him prior goodness, and life, and wisdom, and indeed more excellently than it is understood and signified by us: for it is one thing from which the name is imposed, and another thing in which it is imposed; thus the names of God are imposed from the providences, which some call processions, to signify the substance of God, although they do not signify it perfectly; just as this name "man" perfectly signifies the substance or essence of man, because what God is cannot be comprehended by intelligence, as can be comprehended what man is, for he is a rational animal, which is the perfect essence of man, which "man" signifies. Indeed, this also is to be noted, the word itself, "eminence," and "eminently," which St. Thomas is accustomed to use when he speaks of the names of God, and explains what they signify in God, he took from Dionysius, who is accustomed to say *ἐξῃρημένως*, as I noted a little before, which can be interpreted in various ways, highly, transcendently, eminently, eximiously, excellently, separately. (1) But what he understands, is other than him, etc., and a little later (2): Therefore he who is his intellect, which is, understands the things that are, even as he who is. These do not tend to prove that God does not know things other than himself, or does not know them by his own proper knowledge, but universally, which was the error of certain ones, noted and refuted by St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 14.

^A For if when he understands himself, he understands what things are, then he is the things that are; for either he will understand the things that are elsewhere, or those that are in himself as his own; he cannot possibly understand what things are elsewhere; for where could they be? Perhaps in the things that fall under sense? But the things that fall under sense are not, since they are mutable, and take on birth and destruction. Therefore, he understands himself and those things in himself; but because God is the author of the things that are, if he does not understand them in himself, he understands them in that which is not yet. But he himself is the archetype, that is, the first exemplar of the universe, and the things he understands, he does not receive their types, that is, their species or forms from others, but rather he himself is the exemplar of things. Wherefore neither is he himself in a place, nor are the things that are in him as if in a place, but he has them as having himself, and existing in them; they all existing together indeed, and in the impartible existing impartibly in him, but distinguished impartibly in the impartible. Therefore his notions are things, but things are forms, yet notions are not to be taken as if, because he understood this, this came to be; for it is necessary for such a notion that there should have preceded something which is understood, which caused him to understand; but rather he understands the things that are, namely by understanding himself, and by being conjoined with those things that are in him. From these it is clear that in the unity, which is above substance, it is not necessary to seek many and diverse things, which are looked upon in it: first indeed, because the nature of things that differ induces quantity and number into that which is simple, and into that which, without confusion and division, is one and whole; second, because all things that are said of it are its divine and blessed substance, as it is an essence gathered from many into one unity, with all difference removed in every way among the things gathered: and that which is in these exists without relationship, and singularly, and not as one thing in another, but most of all supra-copulately, with no duplication set down; for the unity above substance does not possess the exemplars of things as if in a place, nor does it become their place, but rather it possesses them as it possesses itself; and it is in them as substance and essence, of which it is the substance and essence, and alone the most pure, and without any subject of action.

CAPUT IX.

That in the unity, which is above substance, it is not permitted to find its beginning, nor middle, nor end; nor is it any whole, because in each of those things that are understood, it is whole and alone; nor is it any of the things that are, because it itself is all things; nor is it permitted to encompass it with one name.

The Great Dionysius, in the fifth book ^B *De divinis nominibus*, says: "For in the One, as has been said many times, it pre-exists all things that are, and made them to exist, being present to all everywhere according to one and the same, and according to the same, it is all; it goes into all, and remains in itself, and stands, and moves itself; and it is neither standing, nor moving; nor has it a beginning, or end, or middle, nor is it in any of the things that are; nor is it anything of them; nor does anything of those things that exist in eternity or in time befit it at all; but rather it is beyond time, and the age or eternity, and beyond all that are in the age or in time; because the age itself by itself, and time itself by itself, and the things that are, and the things that measure those that are, are all through it and from it."

St. Maximus, in *Centuria prima*, cap. 7, says: "Every beginning, middle, and end do not altogether deny that they are predicated according to relationship, but God, since he is infinitely superior in every way to every relationship, it is consistent that he should not have a beginning, nor a middle, nor an end; nor does he have anything at all of those things in which nature can be discerned according to relationship predicated towards something." The same in the same centuria, cap. 82: "Every cognition has the signification of a multitude as of at least two; for the relationship is the medium between two extremes, which joins together the one who understands and the thing understood: for neither can maintain simplicity throughout, because with him who is, understanding some subject thing, it is simultaneously thought to have the power of understanding: and that which is understood is a certain subject, or in a subject, with which it is simultaneously thought that it is able to be understood, or it is thought at the same time as a pre-subjected substance, whose is the power; for there is no thing at all which itself by itself is a simple substance, or cognition, where unity might also be indivisible."

But God, whether we call him substance, does not have the power of understanding, which may be naturally understood with him; lest he be considered composite, or if we call him cognition, he does not have a subject substance, ^C which might naturally receive cognition, but that very thing which is according to substance is cognition; God is, and all God, and alone; and this cognition is substance, and all substance, and alone; and beyond substance, all, and beyond cognition alone; because the unity is indivisible, devoid of parts, and simple. And the same again: "God in both is entirely simple, substance without a subject, and cognition having no subject at all."

St. Cyril, in *Thesauris*, book III, cap. 4: "First indeed," he says, "it is necessary to say that God is composite out of diverse things, and things which are very much in conflict with one another, namely things like and unlike; which indeed cannot be mixed and cohere with one another in one subject, and if it is in one part like, in another part it will not be like, it will not be all light, nor all truth, nor by nature God. Furthermore, a grave blasphemy will also flow to him who begat: for the Father will be composite out of substance and a concept of the mind."

The Great Basil, in the second book ^D *Τῶν ἀντιρρητικῶν*, says: "If indeed, as they are most perfectly, or rather, he himself is those very things themselves as the efficient and exemplary cause; and this divine essence is the proper reason of every creature, which participates in God in any way whatsoever."

^A If we were to take the unbegotten part of the substance, what place would this discourse have, when it says that it is a composite which consists of diverse things? But if we posit the substance of God as light itself, or life, or the whole good—which indeed is altogether life, altogether light, and altogether good—yet life has an unbegotten consequence; how is He not incomposite, who is simple according to substance? For we do not, by demonstrating the property of His mode, harm the logic of simplicity. Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book *Against Eunomius*, chapter 41, says: "For simplicity, as it were, lays the foundation of the dogmas of truth, that God, as to what He is, can be comprehended neither by name nor by any other thought or intelligence." Saint Epiphanius, in the heresy against the Ptolemaeans, says: "What boldness of his can be spoken of by anyone, such as he has vomited forth concerning the Lord of the universe? Who, as soon as he understood, he performed that which he indeed willed; understanding that which he wills, and then willing when he understands; all intelligence, all will, all mind, all light." From which it becomes manifest that in the unity of the Trinity there is found neither beginning, nor middle, nor end. If, however, anyone seeks any of these, many things will be found, and not unity; for the beginning, middle, and end are clearly those things which can be divided; but unity is indivisible. Similarly, that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end is some whole co-adapted from these; but that which is a whole in this way is also a whole from parts, and the parts are many; therefore it is a whole from many things, but unity has no parts and is not a whole from many things or from parts. ^B Furthermore, that which has neither beginning nor end, nor has a limit in either, is therefore infinite unity. For, he says, when we contemplate the infinite in two ways—namely, according to beginning and end, which is not in these, but is above them—it is called infinite. But the divine unity has neither form, nor figure, nor species, nor color; for thus the great Basil, in book V *Against Eunomius*, says: "If the Son is truly the image of the Father, and every image is an image of either substance, or form, or figure, or species, or color; and God is in none of these, but in substance alone; therefore, since the Son is the image of the substance, it follows that He is *homousios*, that is, of the same substance as the Father; and it remains that He is a unity devoid of form, figure, species, and color; therefore He is devoid of form, because the form and substance of God are the same." For this has been conceded by all theologians. Therefore God is in substance alone; He is not, therefore, in a form around the substance, for this form is not the substance alone; it is also without figure, because it has been demonstrated that it does not have a middle. If, however, it does not have a middle, it is a participant in neither the round nor the straight; because where there is no middle, the extremes will not be equidistant from the middle, which indeed is what happens in the round: nor again does the line proceed equally from extreme to extreme, which is found in straight things. If, however, it is neither this nor that, divine unity therefore lacks figure. Furthermore, it is devoid of species, because species are contained in genera; but the divine unity is neither in another nor in itself. If indeed it were in another, it would happen to it just as if it were comprehended in the middle, which occurs in the center of a circle. But it has been demonstrated that it does not have parts, nor figure. It is not, therefore, in another, nay, not even in itself; otherwise the same thing that is in a circle would happen to it, if it were to embrace and contain itself; for something cannot be in itself without being contained by itself. Even if God is from Himself, and He Himself contains Himself, nevertheless it cannot come to pass that the same thing contains and is contained by itself; but if it is contained by another, this is what we were saying pertains to figures. It also lacks color, because it is a substance which is not in a subject. How will it receive colors, which cannot fall under the sight that discerns colors? Therefore, just as the divine unity is not all these things, so it does not have universality or a universe, because it receives parts, otherwise it would fall into either one of the things we have said. For all speech is either brought forth universally in universals (a), or in universals not universally, but particularly, and this is what Dionysius says: "Wherefore the good God is first said to be the author of them, then of them universally, afterwards of their parts, then of those participating in them universally, then those participating in part, or particularly," which are as if he were saying: Genera and species at the same time have God as their author; then the parts subject to them, and whatsoever universalities one might name; afterwards God produces these as absolute and abstract, then as of some things, and as the universalities of those very things. God is not a universality according to these universalities—that is, in the likeness of these—but He is the only universality itself, which is in no universality; the universal itself and the only universality, producing all universalities from Himself, and is restrained by no universality; for neither is He Himself in anything, nor is anything in Him; for the substance is nothing having that which is in a subject, and knowledge is nothing at all having a subject; therefore He is all things, and He is not anything of all things, He who is contained by none of the things which are; nor is His name that by which He is named through any thing of those which are; for whence would He be named if He is nothing of those things which are? Furthermore, He represents the whole and only in unity, the essence that is surpassing, and not any position of things whatsoever; for it is the same to say, "The whole is substance, and it is only God, and He is in substance alone," as it is to say, "He is above every substance," and He is not numbered among any substance of those which He produced, but He alone is exempt from others, and is first, and whose substance is act.

(a) Universe universally is all life; universe not universally, but in part, or particularly, as life.

Chapter X. That the unity of the Trinity is above all substance, and above all unity and the Trinity known to us; and that it is neither substance, nor unity, nor Trinity known by anyone; nor infinite, nor numbered among many.

Great Dionysius, ch. 13, *On the Divine Names*: "It is necessary," he says, "that we, having been converted from many things to the one by the power of the divine unity, singularly praise the whole and one Divinity, the one who is the cause of all things, before every one, and multitude, and part, and whole, definition and infinity, end and infinity? That He is the one cause of all things which are, and terminates existence itself, and of all, and of all totalities, and before all things, and above all things, and that He determines the one which is about Him—that which is—inasmuch as the one which is, is numbered among those things which are; for number is a participant of essence, but that which is one above substance, and which defines the one and every number, is itself the principle, and cause, and number, and order of the one, and of number, and of all things." Wherefore, also the unity which is praised, and the Trinity which is the Divinity above all things, is neither unity, nor Trinity, either by us, or by anyone else of those who are, known as something of those things which are; but as that which is in Him above that which is coupled into one, and we truly praise the fecundity, and name Him the triune and one God, who is above every name; ^A but no unity, or Trinity, nor number, nor unity, nor fecundity, nor any other of those things which are, or which are known by any of those things which are, known as the Spirit; nor is He the Son, nor the Father, nor anything else of those things which to us, or to any of those who are, are known, nor anything of those things which are not, nor which are; nor do those which are know Him, inasmuch as He is, nor does He Himself know those which are, inasmuch as they are (1); nor is there for Him reason, nor name, nor cognition, nor is He darkness, nor light, nor error, nor truth; nor is there in any way position or negation of Him. Nay, when we perform positions and negations of those things which are after Him, we neither position nor negate Him: because He is the perfect and singular cause of all things above every position, and the surpassing of all things simply abstracted above every negation, and beyond all things. ^B Saint Maximus noted these things, saying: Note that the divinity of God is not substance, just as neither is one any of those things which are said, nor their contraries: wherefore nothing of them is He, for these are not substance, but glory around Him (2). Thus Sextus, the ecclesiastical philosopher, said, and Gregory the Theologian in book III of his *Theology*, that neither divinity (3), nor unbegottenness, nor paternity signify the substance of God. Observe besides, that He is not the Spirit, as we know the Spirit, nor is He the Son, nor the Father, as we know the Father and the Son; for take the phrase "As we know" in every negation of the superior things; but it declares what is accustomed to be said, according to our cognition. ^C Nor let this chapter move you, so that you might think to say something blasphemous about this divine author; for his proposition is to demonstrate that God is none of those things which are, but is above all things; for if He produced all things, how can He be any of those which are? He said, however, that not even those which are know God, the cause of all things; but not to know God is clearly death. But immediately the same person explained what he had said, when he subjoined: "Inasmuch as He is," which is the same as if it were said: Nothing of those things which are knows God, inasmuch as He is, that is, His substance, which is above substance, and which cannot be understood, or the existence according to which He exists. For it has been said that "No one knows the Son, except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father, except the Son" (Matt. xi, 27). ^D And again the great Dionysius subjoins, and says: "No one knows the Son, inasmuch as He is, and God Himself does not know those things which are, inasmuch as they are," that is, He does not know how to direct His mind according to sense to those things which are sensible.

It is indeed possible that while finite things may surpass what is infinite, although the mind finds many infinites and reflects upon them, it nonetheless fails in regard to the true infinity, and is convicted of struggling, as it were, with a shadow while reaching out; just as those who are enveloped in the thickest darkness, and stumble in them. For this reason, it has been demonstrated that theology according to the negative way is in many respects more powerful than theology by affirmation; not indeed that theology attains to and reaches God more through negations (for both equally err from the conjecture concerning God), but because the negative theology professes more not to know. For he who said that God is not even unity, approached nearer to the incomprehensible unity than he who posited that God is unity according to the manner of the unities which are known to us.

^B Therefore, to repeat the summation of what has been set forth in this Decade, it has been demonstrated by the theologians that one ought not to seek in the unity which is above substance, habits and dispositions, or other things surrounding it which would complete its substance; nor any accidents in it, nor differences pertaining to its substance; nor, because it is said to exist from itself, is it therefore necessary to constitute it as its own cause, nor to posit that there is substance in it, and energy or operation elsewhere: nor to imagine that its creative operation is lacking in substance in itself, and does not exist through itself; nor that its substance is one thing, and its goodness another, and similarly in other things of this kind; nor that its substance is one thing, and the knowledge of itself another, and similarly in other remaining likenesses; and all things which are in it do not differ from itself; nor can a beginning, middle, and end be found in it, nor can the divine unity, ^C which is ὑπέρθεος, that is, above those who are called gods, be substance; nor can the unity which is called [unity], nor the Trinity, be understood by anyone; but rather that it is above substance, and above every truth, and above every Trinity imagined or assimilated, and above every such a one as abstract, and that one cannot approach unto it. Rightly, therefore, and those things which are in ^D this Decade are in accordance with the exposition...

Scholia.

ἐνθύμησις

in this Decade are, according to the exposition of the material, explained, and nothing is lacking to the divine simplicity. But consistently with this inscription regarding the divine simplicity, the entire Decade is woven together from the divine simplicity, fittingly following the two preceding decades, moving toward the infinity of God through propositions stating it: since no infinity from among those things which are spoken of will be equated with the infinity of God, for neither does the infinity of matter, and its lacking of form and species, need to be compared with the infinity of God (for matter is finished and terminated by species, and the form of the species, and these—namely, species and their forms—are the boundaries and ends of matter), nor does the infinity of body, because body can be divided into infinity, mark off the infinity of God, since indeed dimension and division fall upon a body first; nor is the infinity of God to be compared according to the primary ^B qualities that are present in the infinite, because in them "more" and "less" are seen first; nor again does the infinite according to generation, and the perpetuity of generation, Blunt the infinity of God, who moves simply and uncircumscribedly, and does not have a motion after the likeness of a circle, which is only when it is; nor does anything that happens in the heavens and in its round motion (for this motion has infinity because of the infinite power of the moving God) exclude the immovable infinity of God: nor does the infinity of universal time, because its act, by which it measures the periods of those things which are in time, never ceases and is infinite in number, restrain the infinity of God, which is above every number ^C and every period. Likewise, that the mind and soul (namely, from the freedom of the will) are immutable, and [yet] entirely together in all their bodily parts, so as to govern the motion of the body with infinite faculty, will not proceed to the infinity of God, who has implanted these faculties of the soul, nor will the innumerability of the angels (for thousands of thousands, and ten thousand times ten thousand stand before the throne of his magnificence [* Dan. vii, 10]), nor perpetuity without dimension, and consequently the infinity of their life and immortality, pass beyond the infinity of God, which surpasses every number and every thought of continuous life: nor will the age itself, and its infinity known and common to all, which contains the whole infinity of intelligible things, be stretched out equally to the infinity of God, who produced it; for it is known that what is created is surpassed by the Creator by infinite measures. If, therefore, the infinity of God is seen to be unlike any of those infinities, being as it is more than infinite, He alone is therefore infinite, the source and effector of infinity, who is the one solitary good and infinite according to substance, who made every infinity out of nothing. For even if those are called infinities after God, they are not, however, infinities according to substance, but only according to measure, and participation, and infinite multitude, and according to life lacking dimension, and according to the whole of His presence in all things, and in the way that they have this indeed by an effector cause alone, and not in any other way. Consequently, it has been said that God is beyond every infinity; for God alone is infinite in essence, and the essence, or substance, of God alone is simple, and uniform [(a)], and devoid of quality, and quiet, and lacking sedition, and undying, omnipotent, and the effector of all things; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.

[(a)] Because He is immutable according to being and according to affections and operations, as angels are not, though they may have them.

INDEX OF WRITERS CITED IN THE DECADES OF CYPARISSIOTES

Abucara or Bishop of Carræ. See below, the synod against the Manichæans. Anastasius the Sinaite, oration on the Transfiguration, VI, 4, 5, 7. Anastasius of Antioch, in the book *That God is uncircumscribed*, X, 4. In the first book *On our dogmas of truth*, VII, 9; IX, 4; *Against the Monophysites*, VIII, 10. *Confuting the opinion of the Manichæans*, he cites Dionysius of Alexandria, id. Andreas of Crete, in the Great Canon, VI, 6. Athanasius, I, 8 (Questions to Antiochus, VIII, 8); II, 8; IX, 1, 2. *Against the Arians*, VII, 1; IX, 7; book one, X, 4; book two, VI, 8; VII, 5; IX, 6; book three, III, 6, 7; VII, 4; book four, IX, 8, 9; book five, IX, 6, 8. *Nicene Disputation against the Arians*, III, 6. *On the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin*, X, 8. *In an oration, the beginning of which is: "To all of you who have assembled together"*, where the Nicene Fathers rightly used the word *homousios*, X, 1. *In the Apology for the Nicene Synod*, IV, 8; X, 1. *On the coming of God in the flesh*, IX, 7. *On the Incarnation of the Word*, V, 9; IX, 3. *Epistle to Serapion*, VII, 3, 4, 9; VIII, 2; IX, 5, 6, 9. *In the Dialogue of the Orthodox and the Anomæan*, IX, 4, 7; X, 4, 7; in the *Exposition of faith in the first synod* (he means the creed), IX, 3. *Disputation against the Arians*, IX, 6. *Against those who serve words and not the names of the sacred scriptures*, IX, 6.

INDEX OF WRITERS CITED IN THE DECADES OF CYPARISSIOTA

^ABartholomew, apostle, VI, 10, from Dionysius c. 4, *On Mystical Theology*. Basil, II, 3; III, 4; IV, 8; V, 10; VI, 6; IX, 2; X, 2. *On the Holy Spirit*, VII, 5. *Chapters on the Holy Spirit*, IX, 7. *Against Eunomius*, second [book], III, 5; IX, 5; X, 5; third, VII, 5; fourth, III, 5; IV, 4, 5, 6; IX, 5; fourth, X, 9, chapter 31; X, 5; fifth, X, 4. *In Hexaemeron*, VI, 1; VII, 8. *Sermon on Faith*, IX, 4. *On Psalm XLIV*, VI, 4. *Oration on the beginning of Proverbs*, III, 4. *In Morals*, III, 7. *Epistle to Eustathius*, IV, 7. *To Gregory the brother*, VII, 4, 5. *On Psalm XXVII*, in the homily of the *Morals*, VII, 8. *On Psalm XXII*, VII, 5; fifth book to Amphilochus, VII, 9. *On the text: "Attend to thyself"*, VIII, 8. *Epistle to Terentius the Count*, IX, 4. *To the Caesareans*, IX, 7. Chrysostom, I, 3; III, 4; VI, 6, 9; VII, 1. *Homily 64 on Matthew*, III, 4. *Homily 56*, VI, 4. *On the text: "In Him was life"*, IX, 7. *Homily 15 on John*, VIII, 8. *Homily 42*, VI, 5, 6. *Homily 29 on the Epistle to the Corinthians*, VII, 5. *Homily 13 on Ephesians*, VII, 5. *Homily on Eutropius*, I, 6. *To Theodore who had fallen*, VI, 4, 5; VIII, 8. *Homily on the Cross*, whose beginning is "What shall I say?", X, 8. *Explaining the text: "We beheld His glory"*, VI, 6. *Oration on the Incomprehensible*, VIII, 8. *On the Transfiguration*, VI, 6. *Oration against heretics and on the petition of the sons of Zebedee*, VI, 8. *On the text: "Of His fullness have we all received"*, VII, 4. *Oration in praise of St. John the Theologian*, VIII, 6. Clement the philosopher, V, 4. Divine Cosmas, VI, 4. *Canon of the Feast of the Transfiguration*, VI, 6, 7. *On those things chanted in Mid-Pentecost*, VI, 6. Cyril of Alexandria, III, 3; VIII, 10. *In the Thesaurus*, IV, 9; VII, 2, 3; IX, 6. *Book I*, IX, 8; *Book III, chapter IV*, X, 9; *Book XIV*, IX, 6, 8, 10; *Book XV*, IX, 6; *Book XIX*, IX, 8; *Book XXXI*, X, 2; *Book XXXII*, X, 7, chapter 33, IX, 5, 7; *Book XXXIV*, X, 7. *Discourses on the Holy Spirit*, VII, 2, 3, 5; IX, 6, 7. *Explanation on Luke*, VI, 4. *Book I to Hermias*, IX, 7. *Book V of the Dialogues to Hermias*, IX, 7. *Book VII of those he wrote in the manner of a dialogue*, VI, 7. *Book VII of the Dialogues to Hermias*, VII, 4; IX, 6; X, 5. Cyril of Jerusalem, in the *Catecheses*, VII, 1, tenth Catechesis, VI, 4. Divine Diadochus and master of silence, VIII, 8. (The *Book on Spiritual Perfection* is cited by Turrianus in the notes to X, 2. Bishop of Photice in Epirus, whom St. Maximus is accustomed to cite and follow, in the golden book of questions *on the separated soul and the angels*, which he titled *Apocalypse*, ibid.). Dionysius the Areopagite, throughout the whole work. *The Theologian*, VIII, 10. Dionysius of Alexandria, in the scholia to Dionysius the Areopagite, I, 1; II, 2. Blessed Ephrem, in his *Oration on the Transfiguration*, VI, 4. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion*, III, 4; V, 2; *Against the heresy of the Marcionites*, VIII, 10; *On the heresy against the Ptolemaeans*, X, 9. Eunomius, in those things he writes against Basil the Great, X, 4. Eusebius of Caesarea, III, 4. Euthymius, *Dogmatic Panoply*, III, 2. Saint and divine Germanus, in *Exposition of the Faith*, VIII, 10. Gregory the Theologian, I, 3; IV, 8; VI, 7, 9. *Book I on the Son*, VIII, 4; IX, 5; X, 2, 3. *Book II*, VI, 6. *Oration on the Holy Spirit*, III, 4; VII, 5. *Second book on Theology*, I, 6; II, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9; IV, 4; VI, 6, 9; VIII, 8; IX, 3. *Book III of his Theology*, X, 10. *Disputing against Eunomius*, III, 1. *On Divinity, to Evagrius the Monk*, IV, 8; VII, 4. *Oration when he was made presbyter*, V, 9. *On Baptism*, VI, 3, 10; IX, 3. *To Heron*, VI, 5. *In the Sermon of the Epiphany*, IV, 1. *Book on the state of bishops*, III, 6. *On the appointing of bishops*, IX, 2, 5. *On the Nativity of the Lord*, VI, 7; VIII. *Oration on the good order of disputing*, VI, 5, 6. *Second Oration on Peace*, VII, 9. *Third*, IX, 3. *On Pentecost*, VII, 9. *In praise of Gregory of Nyssa*, IX, 7. Gregory of Nyssa, II, 5; IV, 8, 9; VII, 8, 10; IX, 1, 2, 4, 5. *Oration to Pulcheria*, IX, 6. *Against Eunomius*, IV, 5; V, 9; VIII, 6. *Book which begins "Prima quidem"*, I, 6. *Book I*, V, 9; VII, 8; IX, 3, 6; X, 4, 5; *Chapter XLI*, X, 9; *Book II*, III, 5; V, 9. *Against Eunomius, book nine*, IX, 4; *thirteenth*, IV, 6; X, 4. *Book on Abraham*, IX, 3. *On the life of Moses*, II, 8; VIII, 8. *Explanation of the Canticle of Canticles*, IV, 3; VII, 4; IX, 7, X, 7. *On the text: "Thy kingdom come"*, IX, 7, 9. *Epistle to Theophilus of Alexandria against Apollinaris*, VI, 6. *Book I on Ecclesiastes*, VI, 7. *Explanation of the Beatitudes*, VIII, 8. Hierotheus, *Divine Principles*, VII, 2 (from Dionysius the Areopagite); *Amatory Hymns*, VIII, 1. John Damascene, III, 3; V, 9; VI, 6; VII, 1; VIII, 10; IX, 1; X, 1, 2, 3. *The Theologian*, III, 7; IV, 8; VIII, 2. *Most divine*, VI, 4. *On the Transfiguration*, VI, 4. *Chapter on the Trinity*, IX, 9. *Books I on the Orthodox Faith*, chapter 12, V, 9; chapter 62, III, 4; chapter 63, IX, 4. *Canon on the Transfiguration*, VI, 7. *Sermon titled On the properties of Christ*, X, 4. St. Justin, philosopher and martyr, VIII, 10. *In his Oration on right confession*, VIII, 1, 8. *In those things which Photius the Patriarch recites from him*, IX, 4. Saint Justus, V, 8. *From Dionysius c. 11, On the Divine Names*.

Index of Authors in the Decades of Cyparissiota

(Leontius of Byzantium against the Aphthartodocetae, is cited in the scholia of Turrianus at VIII, 9; he is a most erudite author of the book *Against Nestorius and Eutyches*, at IX, 9.) (Manuel Calecas, in his book *On the Trinity*, is cited in Turrianus’ scholia at X, 10.) St. Maximus to Dionysius the Areopagite, I, 1; III, 8, 9, etc. In his subtle explanation of the prayer, *Our Father*, IX, 3. In the *Theological Chapters*, II, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9; VI, 9. Century 1, chapter 7, X, 9. Chapters 38 and 39 of the fifth century, VII, 5. Dispute against Pyrrhus, III, 3; V, 9; X, 4. In the *Sentences of Gregory the Theologian*, III, 2; VIII, 1. In his more expanded speculation on the Transfiguration, VI, 5. Basil, with annotations by St. Maximus on energy, against the Monothelites, III, 4. In his book, *On the difference of things, that is, of substances, which is in Christ*, X, 8. Chapter 9 of the fourth century *On Charity*, VII, 9. In the *Theological Centuries*, century 1, chapter 3, X, 8; chapter 4, X, 7; chapter 7, VII, 10; chapter 42, ibid.; century 1, chapter 2, VIII, 1; chapter 35, VIII, 4; chapter 6 of the third century, VIII, 2. Eighth century, chapter 88, VIII, 4; chapter 87, VIII, 5. Century *On Charity*, chapter 24, VIII, 5; chapter 27, VIII, 7; chapter 29, VIII, 9. Century 6, chapter 84, VIII, 6. Century 4, chapters 4 and 4, IX, 10; chapter 8, X, 1; in an annotation placed externally at chapter 2 of the first century, X, 4. Phaedo the philosopher, below under Synod. Photius the Patriarch, in his *Questions to Amphilochius*, question 75, VII, 1. Turrianus cites the same in his scholia at VIII, 4. Sadducees, X, 1. Sextus the Ecclesiastical Philosopher, X, 10. Sophronius of Jerusalem, IX, 2. First Oecumenical Synod, from the response of the Fathers to the philosopher, which Eusebius committed to writing, III, 4. Synod held against the Manichaeans by Abucara, or the bishop of Carrhae (St. Archelaus), from the *Panarion* (of St. Epiphanius), III, 4; V, 2. Synod held by Theodore Abucara against the Manichaeans, which is reported in those things written against all heresies, III, 5. I suspect that the name of Theodore was added by an alien hand, and that the same Archelaus and the *Panarion* of Epiphanius are to be understood. Edition of the holy and oecumenical third synod, IX, 2. Confession of the holy and oecumenical sixth synod, IX, 2. Teuthes, the most ancient, who imposed names upon things, IV, 6. Theodore Abucara, above under Synod against the Manichaeans. Theodore Graptus, III, 7. In his *Oration against Eusebius*, VI, 4. *Against the Iconoclasts*, VI, 5; X, 4. Handling the saying of Basil, X, 4. It is said by the theologians in the fifth and fourth decades of the initiatory exposition of the divine names, VII, 6. The divine Theophanes, X, 3. In his *Canticles*, VII, 2. Valentinus the heretic, IX, 7.