Apology for the Inscriptions of Veccus

themselves were said; nor does it produce ^A itself, nor is the Spirit of another nature. For we have solved these weak arguments as well. And the Son also, being begotten of the Father according to the divine essence, by no means generates himself, nor is he of another nature.

Therefore, since these spiderwebs have been utterly dissolved on every side, the immaculate theology and faith of the Latins—or, which is the same thing to say, of Christians—is clearly proven to stand, superior to any calumny and injury, and consistent with the truth.

OF THE MOST WISE CARDINAL LORD BESSARION AGAINST PALAMAS: APOLOGY FOR THE INSCRIPTIONS OF VECCUS

(Apud Petrum Arcudium, Opuscula aurea, Romae 1670, 4°.)

—

^B Veccus’ first inscription for the first collection.

We have collected various sentiments of the holy Fathers, consigned to writing, by which it is shown that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son: after which, in the present booklet, we provide others to prove that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son; and since these demonstrate that he is from the Son, but those that he is through the Son, in order to declare the equal force of the prepositions *per* (through) and *ex* (from), we immediately append other written sentiments, by which it is shown that these prepositions have the same value.

Gregory Palamas’ refutation of the inscriptions of Veccus.

^C When the prepositions *ex* and *per* agree with one another in theological matters, and are equally powerful in meaning, they do not signify the division or the difference of the most holy Trinity, but rather the conjunction, and the immutability which exists according to nature, and the same will. For from this it is shown that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same nature, and power,

^A operation, and will. But he who has gathered here the sayings of the saints, and has inscribed them thus, attempts—foolishly indeed and impiously—to demonstrate through the equivalence of such prepositions both the distinction of the divine persons, and that one of the three worshipful persons—the Holy Spirit—has His existence differently from the two persons and from each of them. It is manifest, therefore, that while the sayings of the saints are held piously and rightly, they are interpreted by him who has gathered and inscribed them here wrongly and impiously.

That such a usage demonstrates union and immutability in all things—when, that is, it is equivalent to "from"—the divine Maximus clearly indicates when writing to Marinus regarding certain people who said that the Spirit is from the Son, showing that they did not prove themselves to be making the Son a cause; for they know the Father to be the one cause of the Son and of the Spirit; but they do this to declare that He proceeds through Him, and in this way to demonstrate the conjunction of essence and the immutability. From this, therefore, it is manifest that this Veccus impiously interprets such sayings; for he attempts to infer from these not the conjunction and immutability, but the difference of the persons. Nor does he listen to the great Basil. For he too, in one of his chapters to Amphilochius, says: ^B “The phrase ‘through the Son’ does not establish the Father’s creation as imperfect, nor does it betoken an inefficacious operation of the Son; but it sets forth the union of their will.” Thus, the utterance “through the Son” contains a confession of the primordial cause; it is not adopted for the purpose of accusing the effective cause of imperfection. He who asserts that the Spirit proceeds through the Son and from the Son according to the distribution of gifts, expresses excellently the same will of the Father and of the Son. For by the good pleasure of the Father and of the Son, and with the Holy Spirit Himself also consenting, the Holy Spirit is bestowed upon those who are worthy. But these followers and supporters of the Latins, gathering from their drunkenness that He has His existence through the Son and from the Son, impiously show and teach that the Holy Spirit is a work of good pleasure and will, and of necessity a creature, not a fruit of the divine nature; for according to the holy Damascene, a creature is a work ^C of the divine will, but the Godhead is not—away with the thought! For the pre-eternal and everlasting generation and procession are not, once again according to the same, of the divine will, but of the divine nature.

Of the most wise Bessarion, Archbishop of Nicaea, now Cardinal, against the counter-arguments of Palamas to the inscriptions of Veccus

This noble man, regarding the sayings which say both "from the Son" and "through the Son ^D from the Father,"

^A testify that the Holy Spirit proceeds, and [as to] what is gathered from them, he is not even able to glance at it at all. For how could he towards such a great and truly evident truth? But with the equivalent power of "through" and "from," he attacks this—and he does so incorrectly and without any reason—completing his own refutation with insults, and thinks he is doing something of worth; interpreting the mind of the saints poorly and impiously, and slandering the wise man who collected the sayings and inscribed the inscriptions, while being unable to provide any reason. He has supposed that the "through," when it denotes union and unchangeability, and the same and like-minded will in the Holy Trinity, when it is understood in theology as equivalent to "from," cannot be understood by anyone in this sense regarding the procession of the Father through the Son; or that if we do think this, we are not thinking in this sense, but are rather introducing distinction, division, contradiction, and discord. Which he seems in some way to think, even from the things he says, or rather he even clearly claims that by this we wish to signify that the Spirit has existence from the two persons of the Father and the Son in a diverse manner, though I do not know from where or from whom he heard that "diverse" said. Thus, therefore, he thinks we are insulting theology; perhaps he even understands this himself, when he asserts that the world was produced from the Father through the Son. ^B For I do not see the necessity by which, in the case of creation, "through" is equivalent to "from"—representing identity, yet nevertheless showing a distinction of persons (for he himself will not deny this)—but in the case of the Spirit, [he signifies] otherness and total distinction. And he is not even ashamed, bringing forward as a witness against himself the great Basil, who testifies that the expression "through the Son" does not refer to the original cause. But we will indeed most strongly confess and concede that we say the Holy Spirit has existence from the two persons, I mean the Father and the Son; for nothing operates except insofar as it is this something and individual: and in such a way the Father and the Son are two. But that He proceeds from them in a "diverse" way, this we will never concede, so long as we hear the saints saying that the Holy Spirit is the natural operation equally of the Son and of the Father. We constantly believe that the operation of the Father and the Son is one. Unless, perhaps, even he himself, when he says the world was created from the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, or from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, asserts that the world was fabricated not only by three (for he would surely confess that), but also by the three in a diverse manner. But if he wonders how we wish to indicate by the preposition "through," which denotes that they are the same and of one mind, that the Son is the cause of the existence of the Holy Spirit, let him first wonder at himself, how, when saying the world was made through the Son, he then thinks the Son is the cause of the production of the world through the [use of the] "through." Or let him say that the Son is not the cause of existing things, and let him heal the evil with evil. ^C He also introduces the testimony of the divine Maximus, which is of no relevance to the ^D matter. And we indeed would say that "through" signifies that the Son is the cause of the existence of the Holy Spirit, and we believe it very firmly; unless he also says the world was produced from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, or from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, and maintains that it was created not from three persons alone—for he would surely say that—but also from the three in a diverse manner. If he marvels at how this "through" represents the same and like-minded nature, and we wish thereby to show that the Son is the cause of the existence of the Holy Spirit, let him first marvel at himself, how he thinks that by saying the world was made "through the Son," that the Son is the cause of the production of the world, shown through the "through." Or let him say that the Son is not the cause of things that exist, and let him cure the evil with the evil. He also introduces a testimony of the divine Maximus which is nothing to the ^D

^A point. For we too would admit that the preposition "through" expresses the union and immutability of the essence of the Father and the Son; for we know that by this preposition "through," a certain order and relation is signified, especially of that of which it is predicated, toward Him in whom we use the preposition "from." Yet we say that this very thing—that they are the same and an immutable cause, and that the Son can do the same things as the Father—is the reason why the Holy Spirit proceeds through Him. For according to the divine Cyril, He proceeds from both, namely from the Father through the Son, and according to the same Maximus, from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son; that is to say, He has His existence. For the adversary himself would concede that "to proceed" signifies to have existence, especially among those who adapt this name to signify the existence of the Holy Spirit.

But if this teacher (Maximus) says that he does not make the Son the cause of the Spirit, but the Father, do not marvel if you recall the Greek language, and in what context that language is accustomed to use this name "cause" ^B properly. For it is clear that only that which is the procatarctic and original cause, the fountain, and the root of each thing, is properly called "cause," the kind of cause which everyone would agree only the Father is. And this is clear from what follows: for no one among those who are Christians would deny that the Son and the Spirit are also a cause of creation. But Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, says: "God," he says, "consists in three greatest things: the cause, the creator, and the perfecter—I mean the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." ^C But when you hear the Father called the original cause, do not immediately think that we are unwillingly compelled to confess that the Son produces the Holy Spirit differently, since He is by no means the original cause; for that follows no less in the fabric of the world, and in everything at all that the Son has. For the Son is not the original cause of creation; since He has all things causally and filially, whatever the Father Himself has paternally and without cause. But nevertheless, He is one and the same author, and exists as one cause with the Father of things. And the preposition "through" signifies no less the distinction of persons than it does that they are the same and will the same thing.

What he says regarding the work of the divine will

^D As for what he says, namely that the Holy Spirit is a creature because of the divine will, for the reason that the preposition "through" signifies that same will, I do not know if such reasoning could be approved by anyone other than himself; for if, from the fact that the preposition "through" signifies the same will, it is gathered from his opinion that the Spirit is a creature—by what means, then, will He not rather be of divine nature, and to be venerated and worshipped by us, from the fact that the preposition "through" also denotes the same substance? And indeed that sentiment which he brought forward from the great Maximus teaches us that it signifies the same substance rather: "For," he says, "that they might signify the connection of the essence and its immutability." Although, even if the "through" signified only the sameness of the will, none would...

^A find it absurd from this, since the will and the essence are understood as being the same in God; for there is no one who would not agree that this power is simpler and more exalted than all others. For who is ignorant that every power has a greater reach towards more things, the simpler and more exalted it is? ^B Hence also the will of God relates to the Son and the Holy Spirit as nature, but to the creature as will. For every will, as is known and manifest—even the divine one itself—relates to its end as nature, willing it determinately; and just as nature itself tends toward one determinate end which it has, so too the end of the will of God and the Father is the Son himself and the Holy Spirit, to whom it is necessary that it should relate as nature. But as to those things which are referred to the end, and especially those without which it can attain the end—of which kind are created things, for nothing of them contributes to the being or the better being of God—it behaves not determinately, and for that reason it behaves as will; for it can both not will and will them. Whence both the passages of the Damascene are preserved, and we are beyond all blame, and the very argument brought against us presses us with no necessity. Thus, therefore, while he seems to say something, he concludes against himself.

Of Veccus on the Second

Since there are some who contradict the scriptural ^C testimonies signifying that the Spirit is from the Father through the Son, these present written testimonies have also been collected in proof of the testimonies which signify that the Holy Spirit is through the Son: they indicate that the Son is continuously and immediately from the Father. For if the Holy Spirit were not through the Son, why would he himself not also be said to be immediately from the Father?

Of Palamas

But the Holy Spirit has also been said to be immediately from the Father, and your occasion and persuasion of impiety have been taken away in every way. For Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, ^D says in his poems that the Holy Spirit is from the Father, just as is the Son. Moreover, Gregory of Nyssa, together with many others, asserts that both relate similarly to the one person of the Father, except in the mode of existence. But what do they mean, those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and remains in the Son, and passes from the Father into the Son, and is from the Father and accompanies the Word? And furthermore, those who call the Holy Spirit the communion and love of the Father and the Son? In addition to these, those who say that the individual persons do not relate any less to the other than to themselves? And what of him who sings, *Thy hands have made me and fashioned me*? Do not all these show that the Holy Spirit is immediately from the Father?

^A Nor do we altogether deny that the Spirit is also immediately from the Father, even if you have nowhere produced it as being explicitly stated in these words by the teachers. If, therefore, you also confess with us that He is also mediately, then this reasoning works with us; but if you shrink from this, fearing what follows, the teachers are not far off who might refute you, who teach that the Son is immediately from the Father, and that there is nothing between them, and that the Spirit is through the Son, and who posit the Son as a medium between the Father and the Spirit. You are deceived here, however, because you are unable to distinguish how the Spirit might be immediately from the Father, and in what way also mediately. For if we said that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son by two distinct and different ^B productions, as if He proceeded from the Father imperfectly but from the Son perfectly, and had His perfection from the Father through the Son Himself, or if we posited that He proceeded from the Son alone, then He would proceed from the Father only mediately. But now, if one looks to the single and same production which is from both—and furthermore to this, that the Father is the cause and fountain of the Godhead, such that if He did not exist, neither would the Son be the cause, nor would anything exist at all—he will find the Spirit to be immediately from the Father; and the sayings of the saints which you yourself have introduced point to this. But if he considers the order, which in reality exists in the Trinity and does not consist merely in our own conception, it is necessary to admit—and he will see the Son as a medium, and the Spirit as third from the Father, and proceeding from the Father through the Son, and having the Son pre-conceived in Himself, just as the Son has the Father. Because you have not reckoned this, you draw conclusions that are by no means necessary.

Of Beccus on the third

The present Scriptural sayings have also been set out to strengthen the sense of those statements which signify that the Spirit is not immediately, but through the Son, from the Father. For if the Spirit were immediately from the Father, it would not have been said that the Son is the image of the Father, and the Spirit the image of the Son; ^C and that the Son is the operation of the Father, and the Spirit the operation of the Son; and that the Son is the person of the Father, and the Spirit the person of the Son.

Of Palamas

Most demented man, you who wickedly attribute here what has been piously said by the saints; how do you not perceive that common and natural things in the most holy Trinity have no difference? For there is one God, one image, one will, one operation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore, besides other things, when one is called the person of another of these, it is taken naturally, not hypostatically. ^D

Away with such notions! But you, by not speaking of one person as another in a hypostatic sense, no longer possess the status of being a mystic of the Trinity. For if the Son is the person of the Father, as being from Him, and the Spirit ^A of the Son, then the Father will no longer be a person other than the Son, nor the Son other than the Spirit. You see how the sayings of the saints are held piously and well, but by you they are taken impiously and wrongly.

Of the Wise Nicene.

Indeed, you would also hear the blessed Paul, asserting the Son to be the image of the invisible God and the character of His substance and the radiance of His glory, ^B as if he were stating that He is of the same substance as the Father, and indicating only the identity of nature, and not the distinction of the persons. But we, using reason as an arbiter, religiously understand in these very terms both the identity of nature, image, person, and operation, insomuch that we could even say there is one image and Deity of the most holy Trinity, receiving the image in place of an exemplar; similarly, if we speak of the person of the Father, we denote the substance of the Father, inasmuch as in God the substance is the same as His person; nevertheless, we signify the distinction of the persons, since we confess that there are three persons in the most holy Trinity. It is certain that by this way of speaking we do not hold that the persons are the same among themselves, but we teach and explain their distinction. An image, too, is clearly not spoken of in relation to itself, but to that of which it is the image; therefore, it also denotes a person, being a relative term, such that it admits of a person. But you—I know not what you are thinking—affirm that it is spoken of naturally, not hypostatically, when one person is said to be of another. And you think it absurd to gather what manifestly works against you. If, however, this were true, it would be possible to observe. For you suppose that those who assert the Son is the person of the Father, as one who proceeds from Him, and in turn the Spirit of the Son, as one who is from Him, must consequently not confess that the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another. But I, if I understand your argument at all well, would say that by your thesis this absurdity certainly follows; but by our view, exactly the opposite. For if saying that one person is of another signifies only identity and unchangeable likeness, as you yourself posit, and the Son is the person of the Father, as being the same as Him according to substance, and the Spirit is of the Son, inasmuch as He is of the same substance as He is; then without controversy, the Father would not be a different person from the Son and the Spirit, nor they from each other, for they are not of a different substance. But when we hear the person of the Father, or the person ^D of the Son, and further of the Spirit, we shall understand the identity of the essence; as, according to you, the Trinity is abolished, passing into a single God. But if, as we say, saying one person is of another signifies that He is from Him, of whom He is also said to be...

since that which is from another is clearly distinct, at least in hypostasis and person, from Him of whom it is said to be—how shall the Father, the Son, and the Spirit ^A not be distinct persons? Thus, we, in saying these things, preserve the Trinity very well; but you, beware lest by doing the opposite you unjustly accuse others, attributing your own disgraces to us.

That the being called a person, or power, or operation of such a one, signifies not only another hypostasis, but also that it is from Him of whom it is said to be, hear those who state this (and these are all the doctors): they call Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God, and again they call the Son the living and subsistent ^B operation of the Father; and again, they say the Holy Spirit is not foreign to the Son, but is in Him and from Him, and is as it were a natural operation. For it is surely clear that the Son, being the subsistent power of the Father, differs from Him insofar as He is a hypostasis, and in accordance with this also exists from Him; and the Spirit, being the natural operation of the Son, and this too not unsubstantial, both exists from Him and is thereby distinguished from Him. So these names signify not only identity of nature and that this is said to be of that—the point on which you yourself insist—but also the distinction of hypostases. But once this argument is shaken, all that follows collapses with it.

Of Beccus on the Fourth

Since some, not accepting the mediation of the Son in the Trinity which is clearly taught by the holy theologians, also refuse to speak at all of the name of order in the Trinity, the present sententiae handed down to memory have been collected in declaration of the fact that the Spirit is conjoined with the Father through the Son, and in demonstration of the fact that order is clearly spoken of in the Trinity.

Of Palamas

You lie against the pious, you wretched man. For we acknowledge an order in the Holy Trinity, but a pious one. ^C But that order which of necessity shows the Holy Spirit to be third from the Father, as you—together with Eunomius—hold, we do not accept, as it is impious. You also lie concerning the recorded sententiae of the saints; for they do not call only the Son, but sometimes even the Father, the conjunction of the Son and the Spirit, while at other times they call the Spirit the medium common to the Son and the Father. And the order you claim is clearly spoken of, it is evident is not that of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Those who are skilled in divine matters also prove that the Son is the medium, not in terms of the existence of the Spirit, but in terms of the ^D confession.

^A These things, therefore, are well stated by the saints. But he who has gathered them and set them forth here, drawing them to his own perverse opinion, uses them ineptly and impiously.

Of Nicaea.

But, my good man, whoever you may be who assert these things, this order which you yourself establish and teach to those who are led to believe you, might more justly be called not an order, but a disturbance and confusion of order. For if, as you say, you approve of the order on account of the convenience of the name, and confess that the Son is in the middle, so that you do not place the Spirit continuously—lest you be forced to affirm that He is begotten—you seem neither to believe in an order in the most holy Trinity in reality, but rather to devise it yourself in order to please yourself. And you even seem to think that it is in your power to change the order of the names as you like. For if, because of the name of the Father (for this I think you call the convenience of the name), you do not immediately introduce the Holy Spirit so that He might not appear begotten, it is permitted to us to call the producer Himself, and to name the Spirit immediately, AND to state that the Son exists from the Father through the producer. And we shall say that the Son is from the Father by Himself, but by accident from the producer; and that the Holy Spirit is from the producer by Himself, but from the Father by accident. And it will be within our power, having removed the order, at one time to place the Son as the medium between the Father and the Spirit, calling the Father the first cause, and at another time to place the Spirit as the medium between the Father and the Son, calling the Father the producer. All of ^B which are both absurd, and produce confusion rather than order. But we do not speak of such an order, nor do we think as you imagine us to think with Eunomius, that the Spirit is necessarily third from the Father. For we strongly believe Him to be third, and this of necessity—if "of necessity" to you does not signify nature—trusting in Him who delivered Him as third in the rite of saving baptism, saying: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." But we will never say that He is third by nature, nor will we ever proceed into the other of the two extremes, fleeing the one, which is what happens to you. For in fleeing the "third by nature," you do not call Him third at all, and you deny the order that distinguishes the hypostases, and you cannot remain in the middle. Yet it were better, avoiding both extremes, to stand in the middle. ^C This, therefore, is our position: we do not deny that He is third, nor do we accept that He is third by nature. But we maintain that it is not only said that He is third, but that He really is; and we accept that order which distinguishes the persons, not the natures. Who will contradict that this order exists of necessity? Even if you yourself do not like to show that He is third of necessity in any way, nor do you listen to Basil the Father teaching it. Therefore, the order distinguishing the divine hypostases is well known to the saints, but the order of nature in the Holy Trinity is rejected. But the distinction of the

^A persons by order, they acknowledge; however, they reject that which would separate the nature in the most holy Trinity; for an order that would disjoin the persons belongs not to nature. Yet, that it exists by nature, everyone would concede, and is in this respect also natural—not in so far as it distinguishes the nature, but in so far as it is nature, and is not [something] by our thesis and position. This, moreover, the leaders of the Church, the doctors Athanasius and Basil, would not deny, since the latter transmits to us the major proposition, while Athanasius introduces the minor, and together both construct one syllogism which shows that the Holy Spirit has an order to the Son by nature. For Basil teaches that the Son has an order to the Father by nature, and thus by nature, just as every caused thing is accustomed to have to its own cause, and as that which comes from fire [is related] to the fire. And Athanasius is the one who hands down that the Spirit has such a nature and order to the Son as the Son has to the Father; which order [is] natural, not in so far as it distinguishes the nature (for let this be said often, stopping the mouths of slanderers), but in so far as it is nature, and consists not in our thesis, but exists in the thing itself, and by no means consists in the sense of the mind and in thought. And that it is not permitted to anyone, as you yourself arbitrate, to change it by determining it now in this way, now in another, no one would not admit. If, therefore, you yourself concede such an order, we do not falsify the sayings of Scripture, nor will it seem so to those who understand them. But he who collected them understands them best, and the arguments go for us: if, however, you deny this order, you speak truly that we reject that order, and he does not lie, but indeed, by the collected arguments of the doctors, he inflicts a lethal wound. You show yourself to be very sluggish also in this, when you collect sentences spoken in a different sense. And ^C by these you think you can overturn that golden and truly indissoluble chain. For the Spirit has been said to be intermediate between the Father and the Son, as between the unbegotten and the begotten, existing himself neither as begotten nor unbegotten, and the Father has also been called the conjunction of the Son and the Spirit. Indeed, because he himself is the fountain for them, both that they may be and that they may be conjoined among themselves. Since these things have nothing to do with the matter, they convict him who produces them of ignorance, rather than those against whom they are objected.

Of Veccus on the Fifth

^D Since some deny that that evangelical saying, in which the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Truth, means what it actually signifies, and [that it signifies the same as] the other saying, in which it is said that he proceeds from the Father. Furthermore, because they resist those who think that to proceed from the Father and to receive from the Son are said with an equal and equivalent sense, we have subjoined the present sentences, attested by the authority of the Fathers, in demonstration of the fact that such evangelical sayings have the same force, and are equivalent.

^A *Of Palamas.* O the stupidity of the man! For since these sentences have the same value, they signify connection, that is to say, the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit. Yet they differ in that the existence of the Spirit from both, Father and Son, is not in the least shown, and this is evident from these very sentences that have been handed down to memory. But he who collected them has become as one deaf in discerning the distinction between them.

*Of the Wise Nicene.*

^A this again, among many others, Cyril will testify. For as the Spirit proceeds through Him naturally, as being His own, he says that He receives His own perfectly, together with all that He possesses.

Of Veccus on the Sixth [Point]

Since there are some who say that the terms "proceeds forth" (πρόεισι), "flows forth" (προχεῖται), and "issues forth" (ἐκπορεύεται) ^B differ from one another, we have selected for an irrefutable demonstration of their equivalent force and nature the preceding sayings of Saint Cyril, and after them we append other sayings of the other Fathers who theologize that the Spirit proceeds and is sent forth and flows forth from the Father, in those passages in which they were about to say that He issues forth (ἐκπορεύεται) from the Father.

Of Palamas

O the stupidity of the man! For who does not know that "proceeds forth" (πρόεισι) is said also of the Son? But "issues forth" (ἐκπορεύεται) or "flows forth" (προχεῖται) — never. Just as "flows forth" is used properly concerning the distribution of gifts, ^C though there are times when it is also said concerning the procession. But this Veccus and his followers contend, impiously and shamelessly, that these things do not differ from one another at all. For the sayings of the saints collected here, in which these terms sometimes coincide, do not in any way abolish the difference that exists between them.

Of the Wise [Bishop] of Nicaea

But if you had attended more accurately to the blessed Cyril, you would have found that he also says "to issue forth" (ἐκπορεύεσθαι) of the Son, in his treatise on the Gospel according to John, on the passage: "When the Paraclete comes." For if he does not issue forth from the Father, he says, that is, from His substance, according to us—and before this, ^D the Savior himself says of Himself: "I came forth from the Father, and I am come." Whence Cyril, being taught, says that the Son issues forth (ἐκπορεύεσθαι) from the Father. And if "to flow forth" (προχεῖσθαι) is not said of the Son, though it is said of the Spirit, it is no wonder, since this term is suited to the imagery of the Name of the Spirit, but not indeed of the Son; just as, I think, the name of "generation" is highly appropriate to the Son, but not at all applicable to the Spirit. Yet, because of this, no one will justly say that since "to be begotten" signifies being from a cause, and because the Spirit is not begotten from the Father but proceeds, "to proceed" does not signify having existence from the cause from which He proceeds. For this is to say things that are unthinkable. So that it is impossible for you from this to demonstrate/diffuse the difference of these terms. But since these things are said similarly of both the Son and the Spirit, and furthermore the going-forth of the Spirit is called "procession" (ἐκπόρευσις), and "effusion" (πρόχυσις), and "going-forth" (πρόοδος), as if all these meant the same thing, they do not seem to differ from one another

^A in the procession of the Spirit from the Son, or through the Son, regarding what we must understand in the same way as in the procession from the Father. But in the case of the Father, we understand, clearly, the procession from Him. Therefore, one must think the same in the case of the procession from the Son, or through the Son. For the Spirit flows from the Son, as Cyril would say, just as indeed it is understood also in the case of God and Father Himself, leaving behind no trace of ambiguity. Or else, you must show that these names do not signify the same thing, or if they do signify the same thing, that they are understood differently in the case of the Son and differently in the case of the Father—even though the Teacher cries out, as we have said, that He thus flows from the Son, just as He is understood in the case of God and Father Himself—and may this blasphemy, which is unjustly spoken against Veccus, fall upon you with impunity: for you do not at all perceive the stupidity of what you charge him with.

Veccus on the Seventh [Argument]

Since some, when they hear that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, and flows, and proceeds, do not describe the divine nature of the Spirit as spring- ^B -ing forth and flowing from the divine essence and nature of the Son, as if from a fountain, but rather describe it monstrously as a spiritual gift which comes to the just, because the indwelling of the Godhead, which is present everywhere, takes place in the just comparatively and relatively; and, receiving such a gift, they understand the Spirit as if He were divided and torn away from the divine essence—for this reason, these present testimonies were collected, sealed by the monuments of the Fathers, from which one may discern that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which takes place in the just, is relative in an ineffable manner and beyond reason. But since the gifts of the Spirit are poured out into that place where His divine nature has indwelt, when someone says that the Holy Spirit proceeds, and flows, and is from the Son, the Holy Spirit Himself—who is one Person of the Trinity, who ^C completes and perfects It, and who is divine nature and perfect God, just as the Father and the Son are—is signified.

Palamas

He truly does not know what he is saying, nor about what he asserts, he who composed this writing. For no one among those who wish to be pious considers divine grace and operation to be torn away from the divine nature. Yet, because the divine operation is inseparable from the divine nature, it does not follow that nature is therefore operation, differing from it in no way: since the divine operation proceeds from the nature, and according to the theologians is contemplated in it, but is not distinct from it. But the nature is not from the operation, and is distinct from it, and is the fountain of divine operations. But we by no means say that the Holy Spirit is from the Person of the Son. This man, however, when he says that He is from the nature (of the Son), ^D thinks that he is contradicting us and establishing things contrary to us, thinking, as it appears, that there is no difference between nature and person, or even the distinction

^A of nature in the Holy Trinity, since there is a difference of persons.

Of Nicaea. If, therefore, you do not think that the divine grace of the Spirit is separated from His nature and person, what then do you understand when you hear that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son? For it is clear that, even if you are unwilling, you must acknowledge His person. For grace which does not subsist is not sent. Moreover, according to Cyril, we do not partake of grace that is insubstantial; but that which is sent is this very thing: the divine and subsistent nature, the person of the Spirit who completes the Trinity. But how, then, will you understand the Son to be sending this? For it cannot be otherwise than the Father does, since otherwise it would be of another power; it is clear, therefore, that it is just as the Father does. But the Father sends while also producing the very person. Therefore, the Son also sends while producing Him; unless you were to say that He fulfills some servile function, sending Him after He proceeds from the Father. For let it be granted that the divine operation is not the same as the divine essence. What, then, do you conclude from this? Since, when the Spirit is sent, you yourself concede that it is not grace lacking subsistence that is sent, but the divine nature itself, which has subsistence. It is clear that, even if you pretend to be ignorant, you are concluding that the person of the Spirit is from the Son and bubbles forth and is sent, just as He is from the Father—which is what was set before him who compiled ^B the opinions of the doctors. But if you are amazed that, when we say the Spirit bubbles forth and flows from the nature of the Son, we think He is also from His person—as if we were positing an identity of persons because of the identity of nature, or introducing a difference of nature because of the difference between these—we will be much more amazed at you if, when you hear "nature of the Son," you then understand it as something absolute and not at all with the property of the Son, and are unable to perceive even this: that nature, taken by itself absolutely and commonly, can neither send, nor be produced, nor be the cause of existence at all, unless it is taken with some property ^C that constitutes a person. For we hear from all philosophy that the operations belong to individuals.

Of Veccus on the eighth. In demonstration of the fact that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, there have also been collected these present scriptural sayings, which indicate that He is a quality of the essence of the Father and the Son; and furthermore a fragrance, a breath, and a scent. And near to such sayings, other sayings are arranged which contribute to the same concept, which also theologically declare both the Father and the Son to be the fount ^D of the Spirit.

^A

Of Palamas.

Of Nicaea.

Of Veccus on the ninth.

substance, and which will also gush forth and flow from the non-begetting substance of the Son. ^A

Of Palamas.

Impiety is truly irrational and senseless. For when this man Veccus hears that the properties of the Father pass over to the Son naturally and essentially, he thinks of the properties of the paternal hypostasis, not those of the nature. Therefore, according to his own discernment, which he possesses in the theologies of the God-bearing Fathers, since divine Cyril writes in his *Thesaurus*: "How shall the Spirit not be God, having the whole essential property of the Father and of the Son?" The Spirit will have the property of the Father and of the Son, and the Son will be both begetter and begotten, and the Father of lights, having [the power] to beget and to proceed, than which nothing more impious and novel could be heard. ^B And the same man will suffer nearly the same thing again, when he hears the holy Damascene saying in the eighth [chapter] of the *Dogmatics*: "Everything that the Father has, the Spirit also has, except for innascibility"; and Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, writing in the oration to those who sailed to Egypt: "Everything that is the Son's, is also the Spirit's, except for sonship." But what great folly it is, again, to hear "from the substance" and to imagine "from the hypostasis of the Son"? As if there were one hypostasis in God just as there is one substance. Further, [he fails] to perceive that since the Spirit is said to be of the Father and from the Father, those who deny that the Son is the Father, at the same time deny that there is a communion between the Son and the Father regarding the productive property. ^C

Of Nicaea.

Do not think that that learned man is so rude and ignorant regarding theological matters as to think that the hypostatic properties of the Father pass over to the Son. However, [he has] the Father's having of producing the Holy Spirit, not in that he is Father—for in that respect he is related to the Son—but in that he is a producer. Now, the name "producer" is not a hypostatic name of the Father, and for this reason it is not impossible for it to concur with the Son as well—if indeed we must believe Cyril, who theologized better than we do. For having said, "The Son is everything that the Father is, with the sole exception of being Father," he then adds: "having as his own the Holy Spirit, who is implanted and innate in him and from him." And ^D he did not think it contradictory that the Son is not the Father, and [yet] the Spirit is from him; clearly, he thought it one thing to be Father in that the Father is Father, and another thing in that he is producer, and that the former cannot be common to the Son and the Father, but the latter very much can. Elsewhere, he makes this even clearer; he does not say "with the sole exception of being Father," but "with the sole exception of begetting"—clearly excluding only begetting and paternity, but not producing. But you, I know not whether you are trying to deceive us or yourself with some saying of divine Cyril, which indeed seems to have something similar to the matter proposed, but yet contains in itself much dissimilarity. For it makes a great difference to say the natural property of this or that...

to have the natural property of someone, or his proper characteristics naturally. For the former refers only to identity of substance; whereas the latter signifies a communion of certain personal characteristics, yet in a natural and essential way, so that no place is given to an accident or to anything by participation. But why those claims—that all things which are the Father’s are also the Spirit’s, except for ingenerateness, or that all things which are the Son’s are also the Spirit’s, except for filiation—have been rashly injected by you into the discussion, I do not know. For we, indeed, understand these things piously; but if someone does not rightly grasp the mind of the saints, or slanders others, the blame is his. For if one takes away from the Spirit the ingenerate property of the Father—and this is to be without cause, and himself to be the cause of the other persons—what hypostatic property of the Father will he ^B still leave to Him? Likewise, if someone, comparing the Son with the Spirit, and setting these alone against each other, should deny that the Spirit is the Son, while believing that in all other respects He is the same as the Son, what hypostatic property will he then impart to Him? For he would not impart the paternal one. For the subject was not the Father, nor was the comparison made with Him; and even if it were made with Him, not even so would any property of the Father be left to the Spirit, except that He is the Son, being in all other things the same as the Son, and being by all means caused by the Father as He is the Son. But surely, he will not impart to Him a filial property either; for what would it be, if this is the hypostatic property of the Son, that He is the Son? Which we previously remove from the Spirit. Further, that it is no wonder [for those] hearing of “what is from the substance of the Son” to ^C understand [it] from His hypostasis, has been sufficiently stated before. But the claim he makes—that it is a sign of great madness not to notice that when the Spirit is said to be the Spirit of the Father and from the Father, those who deny that the Son is the Father at the same time also deny that there is a common power of producing with the Father—perhaps imputes to himself an equal madness, or even a greater one, in that while understanding the absurdity, he yet accepts it, because the Spirit is said to be the Spirit of the Son. For if, according to his own opinion, the Spirit is said to be of the Father and from the Father, then those who deny that the Son is the Father do not only deny the communion of the power to produce which the Son has with the Father, but they also deny that the Spirit is said to be of the Son. Or if he wishes to avoid this madness, he will fall into another, far greater one: namely, not to say ^D nor to think that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son. And thus he will say things contrary to the whole of Holy Scripture. In this way we have also refuted this argument, since it contains much thoughtlessness in itself.

Of Veccus on the tenth

The present sentences, which the Fathers have handed down in writing, in which they have theologically asserted that the Son is the property of the Father, inasmuch as He is from His very essence, and is from Him—inasmuch as He exists as the property of His essence—we have here subjoined, so that from this it may be permitted to one who wishes to recognize that the Spirit is for this reason said to be the property of the Son

because He is of His essence. ^A And again, for this reason He is said to be of the essence of the Son, because He is the proper good of such an essence. This also indicates the consubstantiality of the Spirit toward the Son. For if He were the property of the Son and of the essence of the Son according to some other mode of consubstantiality—such as that which is spoken of regarding two consubstantial things, in which the one is not through the other—then the Son would also be the property of the Spirit and of the essence of the Spirit, because of the reciprocal nature of such consubstantiality. This is something that has not been said by any of the saints, nor will it ever be said by anyone who chooses to follow piety and orthodoxy. ^B Such consubstantiality is not strictly consubstantiality at all, but rather that which joins one to the other, inasmuch as it exists naturally and substantially through Him or from Him. And this will be attested to by the opinion of Basil the Great, which is set down here, which clearly indicates that things that are of the same kind are not at all joined by [a mere] consubstantiality. To these sayings of the saints, we add other opinions which signify that the Son is consubstantial with the Father precisely because He is of His essence. Thus, it is permitted to one who wishes to acknowledge that the Spirit is also for this reason consubstantial with the Son, because He is of His essence. Furthermore, other opinions are linked to these, which declare the consubstantiality of the Spirit toward the Father and the Son, because He is from the Father through the Son.

Of Palamas

^C The Son is the property of the Father, as having been begotten of Him; likewise the Holy Spirit is also proper [to Him], inasmuch as He proceeds from Him; just as the great Basil says in his chapters against Eunomius, writing: "I understand the property of the Spirit toward the Father, since He proceeds from the Father." But He is called the Spirit of the Son, just as the same Basil affirms in the eighth chapter to Amphilochius, inasmuch as He is joined to Him by nature. It is among the impossibilities that things which are the same in nature should not also be conjoined with one another. But the Son is not called the Spirit of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit seem to be the Father, since those who would call the Son the Son of any would be pointing to the Father. ^D Now this Veccus draws nothing sound from the writings he has set down here. He is refuted, however, even by himself, when he says that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son because of consubstantiality. For He will not for this reason exist from [His] hypostasis. For it would follow that these things would exist from one another. Therefore, none of all the fathers has ever said that the Holy Spirit is from the hypostasis of the Son, but from the Father.

Of Nicaea

It is not enough merely to state this; it is necessary also to add the reason. For what is the justification, when we say the Spirit is the property of the Father, to understand that He is also from the Father, but when we hear that the Spirit is the property of the Son, not to interpret it in the same way, as clearly having His existence from the Son, but rather to invent some other way?

^A You speak as if in a dream, at your own discretion. For the saying of the great Basil which you bring forward counts rather for us; and you, unthinking, bring it forward against yourself. For when the teacher requires demonstrations of one and the same thing—namely, of this, that the holy Spirit is by nature joined with the Father and the Son—he brings forward that He proceeds from the Father, and that He is said to be and is of the Son, thinking that they pertain to the same thing, and have the same value, and that both signify the same. For of whom He is called Spirit, from him surely He is also spirated. But you, while you attempt to flee from the absurdity which follows, and that which is necessarily reciprocal and is consistent with your own statements, even though you very much do not wish to, you act as an advocate for your adversaries. For you say, "The Son is not called the Spirit's, so that the Spirit may not appear to be His Father," even you yourself conceding that relative terms are reciprocal; just as the name "Spirit," since it is a relative, as you will—willingly or unwillingly—confess, is referred to the one who spirates, and is spirated from Him of whom He is also called Spirit. But you think that when we say the Spirit is of the substance of the Son, we are not in the least compelled to confess that He is of His person; and to prove this, I know not whence you seem to deduce some absurdity. For thus you say: "One will be from the other; as if it could happen that the Son could also be said to be from the substance of the Spirit, and therefore also from His hypostasis," as far as I can perceive by conjecture, and from your mind I understand; for you yourself clarify nothing. And yet this very thing is a great argument for our opinion: since you will never find anywhere, neither in the sacred Scriptures nor among the doctors, the Son or the Father said to be from the substance of the Spirit, because surely neither are they from His hypostasis. But if "of the substance" meant only consubstantiality, as you wish, this expression—to be from the substance of the Son or the Father—would signify, nothing would prevent this also being said of them. But if no one of the Saints has declared the Spirit to be from the hypostasis of the Son, but they have said that He is from the Son, and exists from the Son—which words most especially signify the subsistence of the Spirit—the Western Fathers and teachers also affirm that He proceeds from the Son. But when you hear "from the Son," if you do not understand the hypostasis of the Son, it would indeed be a wonder. Otherwise, you would not even say that the Spirit is from the hypostasis of the Father, if only Gregory of Nyssa, and he only once in his orations, had not said that the Spirit proceeds from the paternal hypostasis. But hearing "from the Father," of which the whole Scripture is full, you would understand everything else before the hypostasis of the Father—how thoroughly puerile such a mind is. Which of you, therefore, you or Veccus, gathers nothing sound, has been sufficiently demonstrated by reason itself. ^D

Of Veccus on the eleventh [argument]

^A that is to say, the subsistent substance, for the clear refutation of their absurd opinion, the present patristic testimonies in writing have been collected, which indicate that the Son is begotten from the substance of the Father. For, since it is admitted that there is one generation of the Son from the Father, how can "from the substance" and "from the hypostasis" differ from one another? Unless someone, clearly blaspheming, should wish to say that there is one generation of the Son from the substance of the Father, and another from the hypostasis. And along with such testimonies, for the support of such an understanding, other testimonies are added, indicating that the Father is called perfect substance and perfect God, and the Son perfect substance, and the Holy Spirit perfect substance.

Of Palamas.

Of the Wise Nicene.

^Aror, because you think human thoughts regarding divine things, and you draw all that is understood here to that level. But it is not permitted to think such things about that ineffable Trinity. For one must preserve for it both the unity and the singularity of the Godhead alongside the Trinity of persons, and not fall into three gods. This is what you build up with these arguments. For just as three men do not share their common substance, humanity, among themselves, so too do the divine persons of the Trinity not share the divine essence; but rather, for them, humanity is the same not in number, but in species; for this reason, they stand as three in number. But in the most holy Trinity, the divine essence ^B is the same in number, and God is one in number; and this essence truly subsists in the divine persons, and it is a single subsisting reality along with the individual persons. Humanity, however, is neither a subsisting reality in particular men, nor does it constitute one subsisting reality along with the individual persons. From this it follows that what is from their substance is not also from the person of all. For Cain, while being from the substance or nature of Adam and Abel—being from Adam, he would be from his substance and person, not because he is from his [Adam's] substance, but because he is altogether from his person, having discovered him to be his cause; but being from the substance of Abel, he is not also from his person, since the person of Abel shares the substance with Adam not in number, but only in species. ^C Nor does he possess his substance as a subsisting reality within himself, nor does it constitute one subsisting reality along with his own person. But that which is from the substance of the Father and the Son, and from their person, encounters no such obstacle. Rather, it is a matter of strict necessity that this substance, being the same in number and common to the Father and the Son—and not only in species, according to the example of men—also subsists in these divine hypostases, I mean in the paternity and the filiation. So the Holy Spirit would also be from His own substance and hypostasis, were it not that His own proper property stood in the way, with the same substance being predicated of Him in number and subsisting likewise in Him as well. I therefore do not know what these unlike examples are intended to mean, or what one can draw as a conclusion from them. ^D But perhaps such is the mind that has once determined to contend; it opposes plain and evident things and shrinks from the truth, so that it does not fear to cast itself onto rugged and horrific crags, provided that it believes it can harm those whom it considers its adversaries. Such is the present argument, with which he acts in this place, openly falling into a ternary number of gods. And he is not ashamed to ascribe his own crime to others. And those men, indeed, who formerly fought against the Holy Spirit, when they heard that He was from the Father or the Son, would admit that it was from the hypostasis, but would reject that it was from their nature. Now, however, they wage another war with him, for they praise and approve that it is from the substance, but reject that it is from their hypostasis. Thus the enemy of the Church never ceases to stir up scandals: which must indeed come, alas, however, for him from whom they proceed! Although for them

^A there might perhaps exist some pardon, or rather a trace of pardon, in that they have something to bring forward as testimony, being from the divine hypostases, though not also from the substance; yet for these men what excuse will there be, if they confess [it is] from the substance, but deny that it is from the hypostasis, while they hold that it is one and the same substance in number? Thus they speak things incompatible both with themselves and with the truth.

Of Veccus on the Twelfth [Article]

Of Palamas

Of Nicaea