Defenses of the Correct and Catholic Dogma of the Latins

and, furthermore, they signify one thing, even if sometimes they differ in their mode of expression. ^A Thus, this argument is not well stated, nor does it contain anything necessary or sound, being consistent with the brothers who came before him and testifying for themselves to the same weakness and nothingness. Indeed, he responds to those same arguments that were his own and those that preceded him, testifying as much to the weakness and vanity of these arguments as to his own.

NOTICE

Cardinal Bessarion, having seen the inscriptions of the Patriarch Veccus and the most inept refutation of them by Gregory Palamas, himself composed another refutation against Palamas, defending Veccus in Greek. All of which, so that they might be made manifest to the learned, he himself rendered into Latin. He also translated into Latin the Greek oration which he had sent to Lascaris Philanthropinus. Likewise, he translated into Latin an exhortatory epistle which he had written in Greek to all the Greeks after being created Patriarch of Constantinople. Since this Latin version was quite unknown to Peter Arcudius, he himself also made Latin versions of the same Greek [writings] of Bessarion. And because the Latin of Bessarion, due to the fault of the copyist, abounds in many errors, as can be seen in the Vatican Library, and Arcudius for the sake of greater clarity converted them almost verbatim, some have judged that both ought to be printed. Let this, therefore, not escape you, benevolent Reader.

BESSARION’S DEFENSES OF THE ORTHODOX AND CATHOLIC DOGMA OF THE LATINS, NAMELY ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AGAINST THAT HERETICAL IMPUGNER, EDITED BY HIM IN BOTH GREEK AND LATIN.

After the Council of Lyons was celebrated in the time of Gregory X, in which the Greeks, through their orators, were united to the Roman Church and professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, just as the Catholic Church believes and professes: a certain Patriarch of Constantinople named Veccus, adhering to this truth, ^B labored with great zeal to refute the adversaries, of whom a great number still remained. Revolving through the volumes of all the Greek doctors, he collected together all their authorities pertaining to this matter into one [work]. To these he prefixed certain headings, just as seemed necessary from the continuous contention that was occurring at that time, such as: that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; that [He is] from the Father through the Son; that [He is] immediately from the Father; and others of a similar nature. To each of these headings he adapted various authorities of different doctors, proving through them what he had set out to prove: for example, in the first chapter he brings forward authorities by which it is proven that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son; then others proving that He is from the Father through the Son; finally, to demonstrate that it is the same thing to say "from the Father and the Son" and "from the Father through the Son," so as to instruct us that when we hear the Greek doctors theologizing that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, we ought to understand them to mean the same thing as if we heard them saying "from the Father and the Son," he brings forward other authorities signifying the equivalence of these prepositions in theology. And for this heading, and for all the others, he prefixed a certain argument of his own, declaring his intention ^C and concluding the understanding of the authorities in the best way for the proposition he had set forth.

After the aforementioned Veccus, some years later, a certain one among the Greeks named Gregory, by surname Palamas, of whom there was great estimation among the Greeks, being contrary to the Catholic truth regarding this article and an open enemy, wishing in a few words to enervate the entire work of the aforesaid Veccus, contradicted his arguments and prologues: wishing to prove that the authorities brought forward had not the intention which he [Veccus] said, but a far different one. If those things were true, the entire labor of the aforementioned patriarch would have vanished. Many men, however, remained in this opinion for many years. But when this work of both had come into the hands of me, Bessarion, Cardinal of the S.R.E., Bishop of Tusculum, then Archbishop of Nicaea, I did not suffer, nor did I bear with an equal mind, that the doctors should suffer common calumny, and that this most wise man, Patriarch Veccus, should be thought to be a convicted and false man by some. ^D Wherefore, I opposed myself against Palamas and his specious and apparent contradictions, proving as much as I could that the authorities brought forward have that intention which Veccus most wisely says, not that which Palamas calumniously explains. This being presupposed, all the authorities contribute most excellently to the proposed matter, and the truth appears to those who observe it clearer than light in all things. First, therefore, are proposed the arguments or prologues of Veccus, then the contradictions to them by Palamas, and finally our defenses.

Veccus' First Argument

Various authorities of different doctors have been collected, by which it is proven that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son. Other authorities are also brought forward after them in this volume to demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is through the Son from the Father. And since those demonstrate the same Spirit to be from the Son, and these [demonstrate him to be] through the Son, in order to prove the equivalence of these prepositions, namely "through" (per) and "from" (ex), other authorities of the doctors are then brought forward, by which the equivalence of these prepositions is demonstrated.

Palamas' Contradiction

Since in theology the prepositions "from" and "by" (or "through") are equivalent to one another, they signify neither any division nor any difference in the Holy Trinity, but [rather] union and immutability, according to His nature and will, of course. For from this it is clearly shown that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same nature, power, operation, and will. But he who here collected and inscribed the sayings of the saints attempts to demonstrate ^A the difference of the divine Persons wickedly and impiously through this equivalence of such prepositions, and [claims] that from two Persons, and from each of them, one of the three divine Persons, namely the Holy Spirit, differently possesses essence. It is therefore clear that the opinions of the saints are sound and pious, but that they are construed wickedly and impiously by him who thus gathered and inscribed them.

Now, that the preposition "through" signifies union and, in general, immutability, when it is equivalent to "from," the divine Maximus shows most clearly when he writes to Marinus about certain people who say that the Spirit is from the Son. For he says that they did not make the Son a cause—for they knew one cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit, namely the Father—but that they wished to show that He proceeds through Him, and to prove by this preposition [both] the conjunction and the immutability of the substance. From these things, therefore, it is clear that this Veccus interprets such sayings faithlessly and impiously. For he does not attempt to adduce the conjunction and immutability from them; nor does he listen to the great Basil, who says in a certain place to Amphilochius, that "the Father creates through the Son," not signifying an imperfect creation by the Father, nor showing a superfluous and empty operation of the Son, but signifying the union of will: thus, this word "through the Son" holds a confession of the first and principal cause; it is not taken to find an efficient cause. Therefore, what he asserts, that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son" and "from the Son" according to a temporal mission, proves the same will of the Father and the Son most excellently; for by the good will of the Father and the Son, with the Spirit also cooperating, the Holy Spirit is given to worthy men.

But those who follow the Latins, thinking that the Holy Spirit possesses essence in some way "through the Son" and "from the Son," impiously assert that He is a work of good pleasure and will, and by necessity a creature, and not a fruit of the divine nature. For the holy Damascene says: "A creature is a work of the divine will, but not of the divinity, God forbid." And again: "Generation, as well as procession, belongs not to the will, but to the divine nature; it is before the ages and is sempiternal."

Nicene Defense

This strenuous man can do nothing at all against those authorities which affirm that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and proceeds through the Son from the Father, and what is gathered from them. For in what way can he [contend] against such and so lucid a truth? But regarding the equivalence of these prepositions, "through" and "from," he clings to nothing well nor with any reason, and pursues his adversary with insults and curses; he thinks he is doing a great deed when he ^B slanders this wise man for having interpreted the mind of the saints perversely and impiously and for having gathered their sayings. He himself, however, cannot render a reason for these things, and he thinks that this preposition "through," even if it signifies union, immutability, and identity of will in the Holy Trinity, when it is known to be equivalent to the preposition "from" in theology, that no one can accept it according to this signification also regarding the Spirit's procession from the Father through the Son, or that we do not understand it in this way, but rather that it induces distinction and division, opposition and discord.

This he seems to understand from the ^C aforesaid; or rather, he asserts most clearly that by this [equivalence] we all wish to say that the Holy Spirit possesses essence differently from two Persons, the Father and the Son—I do not know whence or from whom he hears this word "differently" being said. Thus he thinks we are ignorant of theology, though perhaps he himself thinks the same, asserting that the world was created from the Father through the Son. Yet I see no necessity why, regarding a creature, "through" should be equivalent to "from" and signify identity of persons, while regarding the Spirit, [he claims it denotes] diversity and in every way discretion; yet he shows discretion (for he himself will not deny this). Nor is he ashamed to bring against himself the testimony of the great Basil: [that] that expression "through the Son" has a confession of the principal cause. But we say that the Holy Spirit has existence from two Persons indeed, the Father ^D and the Son, and we confess it with our whole heart. For nothing operates unless in so far as it is something individual. But in so far as the Father and the Son are two, we will in no way concede that He proceeds from them "differently." For we hear the saints saying that the Holy Spirit is the natural operation of the Father, as it is of the Son. And we believe that the operation of the Father and the Son is primarily one, unless he says that the world subsists when it is from the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit, or from the Father through the Son in the Spirit.

^A nor will it be considered by us as divine nature and, as it were, not from the three persons only; for he would indeed confess that it is produced, but also differently from the three. But if he wonders how, by this preposition "through," which represents the unity and identity of the will, we wish to demonstrate that the Son is the cause of the existence of the Holy Spirit, let him first wonder at himself, how, when he says that the world is made through the Son, he then thinks that the Son is the cause of the production of the world, shown by this preposition; or let him say that the Son is not the cause of existing things, and evil will hasten to evil. He also brings forward the testimony of the divine Maximus, which hardly makes for his proposal. For we also confess that this preposition, "through," signifies both the unity and the immutability of the substance of the Father and the Son. For we know that by this word "through," a certain order and relationship of that to which it is said, toward that for which we use the word "from," is most clearly demonstrated; nonetheless, the same identical and immutable [nature] is the cause, and [we hold] that the Son can do the same as the Father, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds through him. For according to the divine Cyril, [it proceeds] from both, from the Father through the Son; but according to the same Maximus, it proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son—that is, it has its existence. Since he also asserts that to proceed signifies to have existence, especially according to those who attribute this name only to the existence of the Spirit. But that the holy doctor says that the Son is not the cause of the Holy Spirit, but the Father, you will not wonder at all if you consider the Greek language, and of what it itself is accustomed to use for the word "cause" properly. For it is most well known that the primary and principal cause, and the fountain and root of each thing, is properly called "cause," an office which no one who is called by the Christian name would deny belongs to the Father alone. This is clear from the following: for no one who is called by the Christian name would deny that [the Father] is the cause of creatures and of the Holy Spirit. But "Theologus" Gregory says: God, he says, consists in three greatest [realities]: the Father, certainly, as the cause, the worker, and the perfecter, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But when you hear the Father as the principal cause, do not think we are now saying something different, that the Son produces the Spirit, since he is not the principal cause. For the same thing nevertheless follows regarding the creature, and simply regarding all things—that which the Son has, the Father also has. For the Son is not the principal cause of creatures, since as He who is the Son he has all things that the Father has paternally, and not causally: yet he himself is also a cause, and together with the Father is the cause of things that exist. And he represents their identity, and the unity of their will, and no less the distinction of the persons, through the preposition.

^B or represent the identity of substance through "through"? Indeed, since the opinion of the blessed Maximus, which he himself brought forward for his own side, rather teaches the identity of substance: "For," he says, "in order to show the conjunction of substance, although even if it only showed the identity of the will, it would not follow that there is anything absurd, since the same thing is said of God regarding His essence and His will." For there is no one who does not know that this power is more simple and more sublime than all others. Furthermore, it is evident to all that each power is directed toward more things, the simpler and more sublime it is. Wherefore, also, the will of God does not have itself toward the Son and the Holy Spirit as [it has itself] toward a creature, to have [it] as nature or essence. For it is most well known that every will, even the divine, determines itself toward an end, desiring it, just as nature determines itself toward the one. But the end of the will of God and the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit: toward whom He must necessarily have Himself as [toward] nature. But toward those things which are directed toward the end, and especially toward those without which1 he can reach the end, such as creatures—for these contribute nothing to God, nor to His greater good—toward these, I say, He does not have Himself determinately, and therefore [it acts] as a will; for it is evident that He can both not-will and will. Hence, even the opinion of Damascene is solved, and we are freed from every reproach, since those words which seemed to be against us bring nothing of necessity. Thus, he who seemed to have said something concludes entirely against himself.

^C *Second argument of Veccus.* Since there are some who oppose the opinions of the Scriptures, which therefore indicate that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, these opinions have also been collected, which show that the Son is immediately from the Father, in order to confirm those opinions which demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is through the Son. For unless the Holy Spirit were through the Son, why would He not also be said to be immediately from the Father?

*Contradiction by Palamas.* The Holy Spirit is also said to be immediately from the Father, from which your opinion, and that of all—as Gregory, who is called the Theologian, is interrupted in his poems—says that the Holy Spirit is from the Father, just as the Son is. Nyssen, however, together with many others, says that each has his existence from the one person of the Father in the same way, except for the mode of subsistence. But what about those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and abides in the Son, and penetrates from the Father into the Son, and is from the Father and accompanies the Word? Also, those who assert that the Holy Spirit is the communion and love of the Father and the Son, and furthermore that each person has Himself toward the other no less than toward Himself. What, finally, about him who sings: "Thy hands have made me and fashioned me" ^D

[Ps. CXVIII, 73]? Do not all these, therefore, show that the Holy Spirit is immediately from the Father?

Nicene Defense

Nor do we entirely deny that the Holy Spirit is immediately from the Father, although you have not adduced this as explicitly stated by the doctors. If, therefore, you yourself confess with us that He is also mediately, then the argument is in our favor; but if you avoid this, fearing the consequences, the condemnation of the doctors is at hand for you, who teach that the Son is also immediately from the Father, and that there is nothing intermediate between them, and that the Spirit is through the Son, and that the Son is the intermediate person between the Father and the Holy Spirit.

You are deceived here, ^B however, since you cannot distinguish the manner in which the Spirit is immediately from the Father, and in what manner He is also mediately. For if we confessed that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son by two differing processions—as if He proceeded imperfectly from the Father but perfectly from the Son—or if we posited that He proceeds only from the Son, then he would proceed only mediately from the Father. But as it is, if anyone looks toward a single production and an identity of procession from both, and also that the Father is the cause and fountain of divinity, so that if He did not exist, the Son Himself would not exist, nor would He be the cause of anything, he will find the Spirit immediately from the Father; and the sayings you yourself adduce lead to this. But if one contemplates the order which exists in reality in the Trinity, and does not consist merely in our intention, he will perceive the Son as the medium, and the Spirit as third from the Father, proceeding from the Father through the Son, and having the pre-conceived Son before Him, just as the Son has the Father as pre-conceived before Him. When you do not think of this at all, you conclude incorrectly.

Third Argument of Veccus

These sentences of the Scriptures have also been gathered, which contribute to the mind of the doctors who prove that the Spirit is not immediately, but through the Son, from the Father. For if the Spirit were immediately from the Father, it would not be said that the Son is the image of the Father, and the Spirit the image of the Son; that the Son is the operation of the Father, and the Spirit the operation of the Son; that the Son is the person of the Father, and the Spirit the person of the Son.

Palamite Contradiction

Most foolish one, who here impiously describe what is said correctly and piously by the saints, how do you not perceive that what is common and natural to the holy Trinity has no difference? Since God is one, and there is one image, one will, and finally one operation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; therefore, when one is said to be "of another" alongside others, this is natural and not personal, and an indication of immutable similarity, but it does not, far be it, demonstrate a mode of subsisting. But you, however, not speaking of one person as "of another" in this way, but understanding these things hypostatically, cannot subsequently be a preacher of the Trinity. For if the Son is the person of the Father, as [proceeding] from Him, and the Spirit [the person] of the Son, then from this point on, the Father will not be one person other than the Son, nor the Son [one] other than the Holy Spirit. Do you see how the sayings of the saints are held piously and correctly, but are received by you impiously and perversely?

Nicene Defense

Do you thus disparage the blessed Paul ^C himself, who affirms that the Son is the image of the invisible God, and whom you hear calling Him the effulgence of His person and the effulgence of His glory; as if he were saying that He is of the same person as the Father, and were showing only the identity of nature, and not also the distinction of persons? But we, who are led by faith and reason, and who understand both the identity of nature through these names—namely "image," "person," and "operation"—are also able to say that ^D the image and the divinity of the Holy Trinity are one, receiving "image" as an exemplar in the same way, and saying "the person of the Father," we demonstrate the substance of the Father, since in God substance is the same as His person, nor do we any less demonstrate the distinction of the persons. For we confess three persons in the holy Trinity, demonstrating not identity through this, but distinction; and the image is certainly referred not to itself, but to that of which it is the image; and therefore it signifies a hypostasis, since it is a relative name and constitutes a person. But I do not know how you understand this, since you affirm that it is said naturally, not hypostatically, when one is said to be the person of another, and you think you bring forward some inconsistency against us, which is clearly against you. For if we say that the Son is the person of the Father, as proceeding from Him, and [that] the Holy Spirit [is the person] of the Son, as proceeding from Him, you think it follows from this that we do not say the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another. I, however, if I understand your reasoning well, would assert that this most absurd consequence follows from this position of yours, but from ours, exactly the contrary. For if saying one person is "of another" shows only identity and immutable similarity, as you yourself posit—and the Son is the person of the Father, as being the same as Him in substance, and likewise the Spirit of the Son, as being of the same substance only with Him—then indeed there will be no person of the Father other than the Son and the Holy Spirit, nor will they be other than one another. For they are not of another substance, but when we hear "the person of the Father" or "the person of the Son," and likewise of the Holy Spirit, we will understand identity of substance; so that according to you, the Trinity is destroyed, circumscribed to a single God. But if, as we confess, the saying that one person is "of another" signifies that it is from that one of whom it is said to be, and at the same time [that it is] of the same substance—since whatever is from something is clearly another [thing], at least in substance and person than that from which it is said to be—how will the Father not be one person, and the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another? Therefore, asserting these things, we indeed preserve the Trinity most highly; but you, take heed lest you contra-

- ^A dict this, and assert that the Son is the medium, so that by placing the Spirit immediately you are forced to opine that He is begotten, and thus you appear to establish order in the divine Trinity not in reality, but by conceiving it as if conceding it as a gift, and by thinking that it exists in you whenever you wish to postpone it by changing the order of the names. For if, because of the name of the Father (for this I think is what you call the confession), you do not mention the Holy Spirit immediately, lest He be thought to be begotten, although if we name Him the Spirator, we immediately introduce the Spirit, and through the Spirit the Son exists from the Spirator, and the Son exists of Himself from the Father, but through accident from the Spirator; yet the Holy Spirit is of Himself from the Spirator, but from the Father by accident—and thus you alter the order among ^B us. Sometimes you declare the Son to be the medium of the Father and the Spirit, when we call the Father the first cause; but indeed at other times you declare the Spirit to be the medium of the Father and the Son, when we affirm that He is the Spirator. All these things are indeed absurd, and they induce disorder rather than order. But we deny such order as this. Nor should you think that we hold that order together with Eunomius, and that we think the Spirit is from the Father by necessity. For we do indeed most strongly believe that He is third, and this by necessity. Provided that this word "by necessity" does not mean to you the same thing as "by nature," since we believe Him who handed down to us that He is third in the tradition of saving baptism. "Go," He says, "and baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." We never, however, say that He is third by nature, nor shall we ever ^C fall into one of the two extremes while fleeing the other, as you yourself do. For, in fleeing from the idea that He is third by nature, you yourself also deny the very order that distinguishes the persons; nor can you remain in the middle: how much better it would have been for you to flee both extremes and stand in the middle, as is our view: for we neither deny entirely that He is third, nor do we concede that He is third by nature, but while positing that He is indeed third, not only in word but also in being, and while accepting an order that distinguishes the persons, not the natures, who could contradict that this itself exists by necessity? Although you yourself do not concede that every order that in any way demonstrates [itself] by necessity is this kind of "third," nor do you listen to our Father Chrysostom when he says: "The order that distinguishes the divine persons is known to the saints, but the order that distinguishes the nature in the holy Trinity must be rejected." For anyone of sound mind would concede that the order ^D of persons is indeed not a distinction of nature, and yet in nature it exists, and according to this principle it is also natural, not in the way that it distinguishes nature, but in the way that nature is not of our own positing. And the leading doctors of the Church, Athanasius and Basil, affirm this—the former hand down the major proposition, Athanasius inducing the minor, and both of them embracing one syllogism demonstrating that by nature the Holy Spirit is ordered to the Son; for [they show] the Son is by nature to the Father.

Fourth argument of Veccus.

Contradiction of Palamas.

Defense of Nicaea.

of the cause and that which is produced from fire, as Basil teaches, Athanasius committed to writing that the Holy Spirit has such a nature and order toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father, this, being natural, does not discern [it] as a nature. For it is often said so that the mouths of those who slander may be stopped, but because nature is not ours by position; it is in being by reality and not by our intention, nor is it in us, as you yourself suppose, when we wish to change [it], and sometimes to order it thus, sometimes otherwise: there is no one who would not admit it. If, therefore, you yourself admit such an order, we do not pervert the sentiments of the Scriptures; nor will it seem so to any who have understanding: but he who collected them did well and rightly, and these reasons are in our favor. But if you deny this, he who says that you deny it speaks the truth, and he does not lie, but he rightly wounds you with the collected words of the doctors. You surely act vilely here, when you yourself collect the cited authorities to a different sentiment, and through them think to refute this indissoluble golden chain of order. For the Spirit is said to be medium between the Son and the Father as unbegotten and begotten, ^B when He Himself is neither begotten nor unbegotten according to Gregory Nazianzen: but the Father is the nexus of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as being their fountain, so that they may be, and may be one. Which things, since they are produced by you as superfluous and not to the point, have a demonstration of both [your] reproof and ignorance, no less against the producer than against those against whom they were brought forward.

The Fifth Argument of Veccus

Since there are some who do not concede that the statement of the Gospel, which names the Holy Spirit the Spirit of truth, holds the same value as the statement that He proceeds from the Father. Likewise, they also assert that it is not equivalent [to say] that He proceeds from the Father and that He receives from the Son the Holy Spirit. Those authorities of the doctors have been collected to show the equivalence of these kinds of evangelical statements.

A contradiction of the Palama

O the madness of the man! For when these statements are equivalent, they represent the unity or consubstantiality of the divine Spirit; they differ, however, as if they did not demonstrate the subsistence of the Spirit from both, namely from the Father and the Son. Which indeed is known from the same sentiments of the Scriptures. But he who aggregated these sentiments has become as one deaf to the difference of these statements.

The Nicene Defense

In these, he does not even bring forward an apparent argumentation, which he alone uses in other matters, negligent of the truth, or even unskilled in those things in which it might happen to find that. In these, also, even if he had vehemently sought, he would not have found [it], but he afflicts the author with contumelies, just as he also does in other matters: he even places a ^C certain necessity. ^D Since that authority, which confesses the Holy Spirit to be the Spirit of truth, is equal to that which posits that He proceeds from the Father, or receives from the Son, as we say: It means, he says, the unity and consubstantiality of the Spirit; but not, however, their procession from the Father and the Son, for in this, he says, they differ: but he does not demonstrate how, but testifies to those authorities and statements which nevertheless lead clearly to the contrary of what he himself wants. For that they signify a certain community and consubstantiality toward each other and are equivalent, this is most true. But that they do not show the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, this certainly you bring from yourself, fighting against all truth. For that very consubstantiality is the cause, so that the Spirit is produced from the Son, or from the Father through the Son; just as the divine Cyril clearly shows: The Holy Spirit, he says, is proper to the Father and the Son, and is one from the Father through the Son because of the identity of substance, either of the Father and the Son, or also of these toward the Spirit. For in this way or that, these reasons work for us. For the consubstantiality of the Spirit toward the Father and the Son, and that He is said to be proper to them, does not exclude Him from being from the Son, or through the Son from the Father; but rather concludes and proves [it]: which the same [Cyril] also says elsewhere: that the Holy Spirit is of God the Father also, and of the Son, who is poured forth consubstantially from both, namely from the Father through the Son. For if consubstantiality alone were simply the cause that the Holy Spirit is said to be proper to the Son, then the Son would also be said to be proper to the Holy Spirit, since He is consubstantial to Him, which no one has ever dared to affirm. But if because of that, since the Son is referred to the Father, he says that the Son cannot be called proper to the Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit seem to be the Father of Him: they testify to us of necessity that the Son is breathing or producing, for the reason that since Spirit is a relative name, it must be referred to the breather, and to be breathed from Him whose [Spirit] He is also said to be. And thus they will be found boasting such things against themselves, when they think they are attacking their adversaries. But that ^D not only is it said that the Spirit is proper to the Son in the same sense, and proceeds from the Father, but nevertheless also receives from the Son, this also Cyril himself again bears witness, together with many other doctors: For as proceeding through Him naturally as His own, he says, [He is said] with all things, which He has, fully to receive whatever things are His.

The Sixth Argument of Veccus

Since there are some who affirm that these words differ from each other, namely "to go forth," "to flow forth," and "to proceed," the sentiments of Saint Cyril have been collected for an irrefragable demonstration of their equivalence: then the statements of other Fathers, who treated of the holy Trinity, affirming that the Spirit goes forth, and is sent, and flows forth from the Father

^A.

*Palamite contradiction.* O dementia! For who is so ignorant that he does not know that it is said that this Word proceeds from the Son, but that it is never said to "go forth" or "flow forth" from him personally? Just as it is said properly regarding the temporal mission of the Spirit, and sometimes also regarding the procession. Yet this Veccus, and those who follow him, affirm that these terms differ in nothing from each other, impiously and impudently alike. For the sayings of the saints collected in this place, even if they show that these words sometimes overlap in their usage, do not in the least destroy the difference between them.

*Nicene defense.* But if you had read the blessed Cyril attentively, you would have discovered that he also used this expression "to proceed" regarding the Son in the treatise which he wrote on John, specifically in the part concerning when the Paraclete shall come. For if, he says, he does not proceed from the Father—that is, from his substance—then the Son is [not] according to us. But if he is not said to "flow forth" from the Son, even though it is said regarding the Spirit, it is not in the least to be wondered at; since this expression is accommodated to the figure of the name of the Spirit, but not to the Son; just as the expression "generation" is accommodated to the name of the Son, but does not befit the name of the Spirit. Yet no one, for that reason, would justly say that, although it [generation] signifies to be generated from a cause, and the Spirit is not generated from the Father but proceeds, the word "proceed" does not signify being from a cause from the one from whom he proceeds. To say this is indeed foolish. Therefore, you can in no way prove the difference between these expressions from this. But since these things are said equally regarding the Son and the Holy Spirit: likewise, when the emanation of the Spirit is called a procession, and a flowing forth, and a progress, as if these all signified the same thing, these names appear to differ in nothing at all from each other. But if they do not differ, they must therefore be heard in the same way when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed with the Son, or through the Son, as when they are said regarding the Father. But when they are said regarding the Father, we understand through them the procession of the Holy Spirit from him; therefore, the same must be understood as being from the Son, that is, through the Son. For the Holy Spirit flows forth, as Cyril confesses, from the Son, just as he also does from God and Father, leaving no trace of doubt. But if you were to demonstrate that these names either do not signify the same thing, or if they do [signify the same], that they must nevertheless be understood differently regarding the Son than regarding the Father—although our doctor clamors that to flow forth from the Son is understood exactly as it is understood from God and Father Himself—we will acquit you of this unjust blasphemy against Veccus, and of the madness of which you, not considering him rightly, accuse him.

*The seventh argument of Veccus.* When certain people, hearing that the Holy Spirit also emanates and goes forth from the Son, foolishly concede that he does not flow forth from the divine substance and nature of the Son, but [as] some kind of spiritual gift supervening upon those who are worthy, and because of this, that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit of the omnipresent divinity, which happens in them, takes place habitually: they thus understand such a gift as if it were understood as disconnected and separated from the divine substance of the Spirit. But those authorities from which this can be understood have been collected. That the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which happens to the faithful and worthy, although it is habitual ^B ineffably and is above reason; yet because these gifts of the Spirit flow forth from the place where His divine nature will habitually dwell, the Holy Spirit Himself, who is in the Trinity both one person and its completive, and is, as is shown, the divine nature and perfect God just as the Father and the Son, [is understood] when someone states that the Holy Spirit emanates, goes forth, and is from the Son.

*Palamite contradiction.* He surely does not know what he is saying, nor what he wishes to affirm, who composed this writing. For no one who understands what has been said in a pious manner would judge that the divine grace and operation is separate from the divine nature. And not for that reason—because the divine operation is inseparable from the divine nature—is the nature also an operation that differs in nothing from it. For the divine operation is from the nature, and exists in it, as the theologians affirm, but it is not of itself. But the divine nature is not from the operation; it exists of itself, and is the locus of the divine operations; but we in no way affirm the Holy Spirit to be from the person of the Son. But this man, when he says that he is from the nature of the Son, thinks that he is contradicting and opposing us; he seems to think that nature does not differ from subsistence ^C, or he brings in an unwise distinction of nature in the Holy Trinity, because the distinction is of persons.

*Nicene defense.* If, therefore, you do not judge the divine grace of the Spirit to be separate from His nature and person: what do you understand when you hear that the Holy Spirit is sent from the Son? It is evident that you are acknowledging, whether you wish it or not, His person; since grace is not sent without a person; because, as is agreeable to Cyril, we do not participate in a non-subsistent grace. But this is what is sent: the divine nature, and the subsistent thing, which is the completive of the Trinity, namely the person of the Holy Spirit. In what manner, then, will you understand that the Son sends Him? For surely not in any other way than the Father; for it would be of another power; it is manifest, therefore, that it is as the Father [sends]. But the Father sends while producing the person Himself; therefore, the Son also, when He sends Him, sends while producing the person Himself, unless you say that the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, is sent afterward as a minister. Which, as it is absurd, so is it also impious. For let it be conceded that the divine operation is not the same as the divine substance; ^D

what, then, are you trying to conclude from this, if ^A when these names are not converted? Since if the Holy Spirit is sent, not as a non-subsistent grace, but the divine subsistent nature itself is sent, and you yourself concede this, it is manifest—even if you pretend to be ignorant—that the Holy Spirit’s divine hypostasis is from the Son, emanates, and is sent, just as it is also from the Father, which he who collected the sentences of the doctors proposed to show. But if you wonder in what manner we, by asserting that the Holy Spirit arises and emanates from the nature of the Son, and is from his person, introduce an alterity of nature as if we were positing an identity of person because of the identity of nature, or because of their difference—we, in truth, wonder much more at your perfidy. If, when you hear the nature of the Son with this addition "of the Son," you understand it as something simply and absolutely taken, and not with the property of the Son, you could not even comprehend that a nature taken in itself, absolutely and commonly, can neither send nor produce anything, nor be at all a cause of being, which is not taken with some property that constitutes a person. For all philosophy shouts that operations are of individuals.

The Eighth Argument of Veccus

Palamas' Contradiction

The Ninth Argument of Veccus

C Sentences of the writers collected here show, through certain examples as far as it is possible, that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial to the Father and the Son. For no one can find an example that has complete likeness. And while sometimes the Holy Spirit is called living water according to grace and operation, both the Father and the Son are called the fountain of this water. Sometimes also the same Holy Spirit. But he who brought such sayings here passed over some of them and abused others. And in this way he thinks he can entice and draw listeners to his perverse sense.

Nicene Defense

Palamas' Contradiction

^A they who deny that the Father is the Son, likewise deny the community of the Son with the Father according to the processive property.

Defense of the Nicene Faith

Do not consider that wise man so ignorant of theology as to think that the things which are proper to the paternal substance must necessarily pass into the Son. Now, that the Father produces the Holy Spirit, he possesses not in that He is Father, but in that He is the spirator. This name, however, "spirator," is by no means a constitutive name of a person. For which reason it is not impossible for this to be common also to the Son; if the most holy Father Cyril is to be believed, who feels much better than we do concerning theology. Everything, he says, is the Son, whatever the Father is, except for that sole thing: that He is not the Father. Then he adds, possessing the Holy Spirit as [his] own, both from Him and in Him, in nature. Nor did he think these things to be contradictory: that the Son is not the Father, and yet the Spirit is from Him. He thought, of course, that one thing is meant in so far as He is Father, and another in so far as He is spirator, and that the former is indeed incommunicable to the Son, but the latter is fitting in the highest degree. Explaining this more clearly elsewhere, he says, not only that He is not the Father, but furthermore that He does not beget. Manifestly taking away from Him only the paternity and the power of begetting alone, not of spirating. But whether you are trying to deceive us or yourself, I do not know, by that saying of the divine Cyril. Which, even if it seems to have something similar to the matters proposed, we shall find, if well attended to, to differ by a great deal. For it differs in the highest degree to say that someone has the natural property of someone, or his properties naturally. For the former refers solely to the identity of substance: the latter signifies a community of certain personal notions, which is natural and substantial, so that no place is given to any accident or participation. But as for all the things—namely, those that belong to the Father—that the Spirit also possesses, except for the being unbegotten; and whatsoever things belong to the Son, that the Spirit also possesses, except for the filiation—I know not for what reason he has added. For we understand all these things happily and piously. ^D But if anyone either does not think well himself, or tries to deceive others, the crime is his. For if anyone were to take away from the Spirit the property of the Father, which is the "being unbegotten"—and the cause or principle of the other persons—what further personal property of the Father would he leave to Him? Similarly, if anyone, comparing the Son and the Spirit—and these alone—with one another, were to deny that the Spirit is the Son, but believed that in all other things He is entirely similar to the Son, what personal property would he attribute to Him? For he would not attribute the paternal. For there was no discourse about the Father, nor was that comparison towards Him, nor, had it been towards Him, would he have left to Him any of the Father's property. Since, except for being the Son, all other things are according to the Son, and ^A it is altogether just as the Son—so also He is caused by the Father: but neither is it filial, for whose indeed? Since it is personal to the Son to be the Son. Which we have already obtained from the Spirit; but concerning that which, if anyone hears "from the substance of the Son" the Spirit, he will also understand Him from His person, that it is not to be wondered at, has been said sufficiently before. But this man, he says, is of great madness, not to observe that when the Spirit is said to be from the Father and out of the Father, those who deny that the Son is the Father, at the same time also deny that the power of spirating is common to the Son with the Father. Perhaps accusing himself of the same madness, and perhaps of a greater one, while understanding this absurdity, nevertheless he does not escape it, when he calls the Spirit the Spirit of the Son. For if He is called the Spirit of the Father, and from the Father, as this man admits: those who deny that the Son is the Father, not only deny that the power of spirating is common to the Son with the Father, but also that He is called the Spirit of the Son. But if he well escapes this madness, he falls into another, far more detestable: if—to be sure—he does not say, nor think, that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son; which, in short, who would not say is opposed to all Scripture? Therefore this discourse also is most manifestly detected to be full of ignorance on every side.

The tenth argument of Veccus

These sentences of the Scriptures, in which the Fathers, discussing the divinity, assert that the Son is the property of the Father, as existing from His essence, and from that being as the property of His substance, have been collected here, so that there may be the ability for anyone who wishes to be able from this source to know manifestly that the Spirit is also therefore called the property of the Son, because He is from His substance. And also for the same reason He is said to be from the substance of the Son, because He is the proper good of such a substance. Which also shows the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son. For if according to some other manner of consubstantiality—such as that which is said of two consubstantialities, in which the one is not through the other—the Spirit were the property of the Son, and were from the substance of the Son, then the Son would also be the proper Spirit of the Holy Spirit, and from His substance on account of the conversion of such consubstantiality, which none of the holy Fathers ever said, nor will it be said by anyone who thinks rightly and piously concerning the faith. But such consubstantiality is not properly consubstantiality; but rather that which couples one to the other as if existing from him through him, naturally and substantially. Which, indeed, this adduced sentence of the great Basil will prove, who manifestly asserts that brothers are not said to be properly mutually consubstantial. Moreover, other sentences are added to such-like sentences, which on account of this show that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, because He is from His substance, so that all who wish may be able from this to understand that the Holy Spirit is therefore consubstantial with the Son, because He is from His substance. Also, to strengthen these sentences, other sayings of the Fathers will be brought forward, which [declare] the consubstantiality

^A of the Spirit with the Father and the Son, and that He is from the Father through the Son.

Palamas' contradiction

The Son is proper to the Father as being begotten from Him, and in the same way the Holy Spirit is, as proceeding from the Father. Just as the great Basil commanded in his writings against the Eunomians: "I acknowledge the property of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Father, because He proceeds from the Father." Yet He is called the Spirit of the Son, as the same saint asserts in the eighth chapter to Amphilochius, so that He is conjoined to Him according to nature; for it is by no means possible that those things which are the same in nature should not be conjoined to one another. However, the Son is not called the [Spirit] of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit should appear to be the Father, since the Son is referred to the Father, whose Son He is said to be. But this Veccus draws nothing healthy from the sentences collected here; yet he is refuted by himself, when he says that the Spirit is called [the Spirit] of the Son on account of consubstantiality. For He would not for that cause be also from the person of the Son; for it will follow that these things are from one another. Therefore no one has ever asserted that the Spirit is from the person of the Son, but from the person of the Father.

Nicene defense

It is not enough merely to have spoken, one must also add the reason. What is this arbitrary position of yours, [calling] the Son or the Holy Spirit the property of the Father, saying that they have their essence from the Father: yet saying the Spirit of the Son not in the same way, as if He had his essence from the Son—which indeed you devise in your sleep as you please? For what you bring forward from the saying of the great Basil makes more for us than against you. For the most holy doctor, seeking proofs for one and the same thing—that the Holy Spirit is naturally conjoined to the Father and the Son—brings forward this as the most powerful [proof], namely that He proceeds from the Father and is called the Son's, and [is], thinking that he is referring to the same thing and that both these things can be one and the same. For whose Spirit He is called, from him He is finally breathed. But you, while you strive to escape the absurdity of the thing and its necessary conversion, which follows from your words, favor your adversaries even against your will. For it is not said (you say) "the Son of the Holy Spirit," lest the Father should seem to be the Son, asserting, as you do, that relatives must necessarily be converted towards one another, as when the name "Spirit" also is relative—as you admit, whether you will or not—and must be referred to the breather, and must be breathed from him whose Spirit He is called. But the fact that even if the Holy Spirit is said to be from the substance of the Son, yet it is not therefore thought necessary that He should also be from his person, occurs to me as something absurd; whence I truly do not know [why] you strive to collect [data] to demonstrate this. For you say thus: that they are from one another, as if it were possible, namely, that the Son should also be said to be from the substance of the Spirit, and therefore also from his person. If I perceive you well, you say nothing clear yourself; but our reasoning is strengthened most firmly therefrom; for never will you find that it has been said—either of the Son or of the Father, neither in the sacred Scriptures nor among the doctors—that ^B they are from the substance of the Holy Spirit. But if this expression, namely that this substance is of the Son or of the Father, signified only consubstantiality, as you wish, that [expression] also ought to have been spoken perfectly. But if no one of the saints has preached that the Spirit is from the person of the Son, yet they have affirmed that He is from the Son and exists from the Son, which most of all signify the existence of the Spirit; and the Western Fathers and doctors even assert that He proceeds from the Son. But unless you understand the name of Son to mean the person of the Son, it would be a wonder, [and] you would not have said that the Spirit is from the person of the Father—unless only Gregory of Nyssa, and he indeed once in his discourses, had said that the Spirit proceeds from the paternal person—but when you heard "from the Father" (in which opinion all Scripture is full), you would understand anything rather than the person of the Father. But this is childish in the extreme. Which, therefore, of you concludes nothing healthy—you, or Veccus—our discourse has clearly demonstrated.

The eleventh argument of Veccus

When some, hearing that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Son, say that it is one thing to be from the substance, and another to be from the person; and they cannot grasp that this word "Son" is a personal name, and that he who says "from the substance of the Son" shows the whole Son, that is, the subsistent one. Therefore, to refute their inept and absurd senses, those sentences of the Scriptures have been collected which show that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father. For if we confess that the birth of the Son from the Father is one, in what way can those [concepts] differ, namely, to be from the substance and to be from the person? Unless someone were most manifestly blaspheming and dared to say that there is one birth of the Son from the substance of the Father, and another from the person. Added also to those sentences are other sayings of the Fathers, which show the perfect substance, and God the perfect Father, and the perfect substance the Son, and the perfect substance the Holy Spirit.

Palamas' contradiction

When something belongs to one substance and person, then that which naturally has its essence from that substance also has it from that same person, and conversely. For that which has existed from that person also is from that substance. But concerning many persons, that which is from that one substance is not from all the other persons, but is from one certain one of them. Since, therefore, the supreme and venerable Trinity is one nature in three persons, not everything that has existence from the Father is also from all the persons, but from one certain one of them, namely the first. For it can in no way not be from this one. Not therefore from another, but from this one

alone, inasmuch as it is one. And this is indeed evident in man. For each one of us is indeed from the substance of Adam, but not from his person, since there is one substance of humans, but many ^A persons: yet in the beginning, while there was human substance, and Adam’s person was indeed one, and Eve was his substance, she was also formed from his person. And before Cain existed with one singular male substance and person, Cain was begotten from the one male substance and person of Adam. But with two men already existing in accordance with personhood, Enoch was indeed from the substance of Adam, though not from his person, but was begotten from the person of Cain alone. Now this Veccus, asserting in this place that the Spirit is from the person of the Son, because it is said by the theologians to be from his substance, posits the Son as one person in God just as He is a substance, or, wretchedly, altogether denies the Father. And likewise, he shows the essence of the Holy Spirit to be from the Son alone. And from the words of those who affirm that in the divine [Trinity] the Father is a perfect substance, and the Son likewise, and the Holy Spirit similarly, he understands not the unity of substance and the incommutability of the three persons, but foolishly attempts to speculate a certain multiplicity and difference in the same Trinity.

Defense of the Nicene Faith

The Twelfth Argument of Veccus

Contradiction of Palamas

^A He also puts forward a necessity, assigning as a reason for the procession of the Spirit from the Son that all these terms are equivalent: namely, to be generated, to proceed, to issue forth, to emanate, to arise, and the like. But regarding the production of the Spirit from the Son, that it is not the same as to arise, and the rest of such terms along with "to proceed." Or what is the cause that what proceeds also emanates, and yet not conversely? Do not conclude so simply and without reason, as if requesting that the hearers acknowledge whatever you wish out of favor. But if you think that by speaking without demonstration you have done something strenuous, we shall contradict you in the same simple manner; and perhaps we shall be more readily believed, in proportion as we speak more effectively and more truly. For as regards creatures, perhaps this will be found: that is, that what proceeds from something also has its essence from ^B it, in which it is one thing to have being, another to be sent: although this cannot be said universally of these things, nor of all these terms openly. Indeed, since something arises or emanates from a certain thing, it is necessary that it also be from it. But regarding the Holy Trinity, what is the reason why what has its being from something must also arise and emanate from it? Yet that which arises and emanates does not also have to be from it, especially since in it these names—namely, to arise, to issue forth, and to proceed, and likewise to be sent—signify one thing, even if they sometimes differ in reason. Wherefore it is manifest that this discourse is neither well spoken, nor does it bring anything necessary, nor finally anything true. Since it is similar to the foregoing, it testifies to a weakness and error in itself and in them.

OF THE MOST WISE CARDINAL LORD BESSARION, REFUTATION OF THE SYLLOGISMS OF MAXIMUS PLANUDES CONCERNING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AGAINST THE LATINS.

Of Maximus Planudes the monk concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit against the Latins.

^C It must be asked whether the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is diverse, or one and the same. If, then, it is diverse, the procession will be twofold, and the Spirit will be twofold, which is absurd. But if it is one and the same, how can it be that from an immaterial duality one existence arises? For unity is the beginning and cause, not only of duality, but also of all other numbers. But that duality should be the beginning and cause of unity, or of the one, this cannot be. For the generations of numbers are not by way of reversion, but by way of progression. For unity moves toward duality, and from there to trinity, and so forth. For to say that from the trinity, with the monad subtracted, ^D duality comes to be, and from duality likewise the monad—but the cause in this case is the subtracted monad. But it is not some other number; it remains, therefore, that the two are not the causes of the one, but the one is the cause of the two; and thus, indeed, in other things, which it is likely to be fitting also in the Godhead, which transcends all matter.

^A But truly in material things, one is indeed formed from two, whether by way of union—as offspring from man and woman, and fire from iron and stone—or by way of composition, as clay from earth and water. Moreover, it must be said here also: first, that in the divine hypostases neither is any such union conceived, nor indeed composition; second, that in these cases the two precede the one in time, whereas the persons of the Trinity are coeternal; third, that in most of these things the one differs in species not only from the two, but those two also differ from each other in species, whereas the hypostases of the Trinity are of the same nature. Therefore, they are not based on material things; they are immaterial. Thus, the Spirit is not from the Father and the Son.

Demetrius Cydonius against Planudes, written in his own hand.

One would marvel at this man, who attempts to overturn the book of Saint Augustine—on which he labored greatly in translating it into the Greek language—by means of these few and feeble arguments. For if he undertook that labor wishing to harm those who would read it, he is truly absurd and deserves much reproach among the pious, as one who harms the souls of others; but if, knowing that the book would be useful to those who encountered it, and wishing to gratify his own countrymen, he chose to translate it, why does he again, as if led by repentance, advise that they beware of them as harmful, those same things which he translated for the usefulness of the readers? But the cause of this absurdity is the terror of him who was ruling at the time, ^B whom he knew would be inexorable to those who assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and by these arguments he wished to free himself from prison and chains.

Bessarion’s response to the aforementioned chapters of Planudes.

We respond that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is not one and then another, but one and the same; and yet no absurdity follows from this. For He proceeds from them not as they are two, and a duality, but as they are both one. For the Father and the Son are no less two persons than they are one substance and one God. Hence, also by one operation, as one God, both produce the Holy Spirit, existing as one and the same and simple [Spirit]. For the operation of one is one, and the work and the effect are one. Therefore, the Father and the Son do not produce the Spirit by two operations, nor is the Spirit Himself double; ^C but since there is one God, one substance of the Father and the Son, their operation is also one, not only proceeding outward, but also remaining within them; and consequently, the Holy Spirit is one, as proceeding by this one operation. Moreover, the Holy Spirit would also be a participant in this operation, if it were not contrary to His nature to be at once both the producer and the produced. Now, however, for this reason He cannot participate in it; but the Son truly can, since He does not act contrary to His own nature. For every one of the divine persons participates in all those things that do not act contrary to the nature of their property, and possesses all of…

those things which the Father possesses, except for those which act contrary to Him, as has been said. Since, therefore, the Father has the power to produce the Holy Spirit, and this is not contrary to the Word of the Son, in begetting Him He grants Him that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, and proceed from both as from one God and one fountain and principle.

Response of Petrus Arcudius

We could also respond with Augustine in Sermon 11 on the words of the Lord, tom. 10, c. 20, at the end. The society of the unity of the Church of God, outside of which the remission of sins itself does not occur, is as it were the proper work of the Holy Spirit, with the Father and the Son cooperating; for the Holy Spirit himself is in a certain way the society of the Father and the Son. For the Father is not commonly held as Father by the Son and the Holy Spirit, because He is not the Father of both. And the Son is not commonly held as Son by the Father and the Holy Spirit, because He is not the Son of both. But the Holy Spirit is commonly held by the Father and the Son, because the Spirit is the one Spirit of both.

^B Maximi syllogismus secundus. ^B

Maximus’s Second Syllogism

Furthermore, unity is indeed the cause of identity, but duality of diversity. Wherefore the Son and the Holy Spirit, existing from one Father, have an identity of nature with one another and with the Father. But as they are again two, they are diverse toward one another and toward the Father according to their hypostases, not according to their nature. For it was not possible, since they were of the same nature, for them to be other again according to nature. If, therefore, the Spirit proceeds from one—that is, from the Father alone—He will be one and the same to Himself. But if from two—that is, from the Father and the Son—He will be other to Himself; as if He were something else from the Father, and something else from the Son. For since the Father is one, and the Son is another, it would be necessary for the Spirit of the Son also to be one thing and another; but this is absurd. But if anyone should say, “How is a son who is from a father and a mother not one thing and another, but one?” we reply that he is not simply one, but is a composite, made from the seed of the father and the blood of the mother.

Second Response

It has been said that in so far as there is unity, and God is one, the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit; and for this reason the Holy Spirit cannot be both the same as Himself and another, but it is rather necessary that He be the same as Himself, in that He proceeds from them as from a monad. To imagine the Holy Spirit as other than Himself and composite, because He must be one thing from the Father and another from the Son, belongs to men who think of things that are very bodily and altogether material and carnal, and who are foolish regarding celestial things and labor under a defect. For the operation of the Father is not divided from the operation of the Son in the way that mine is from yours, nor are they "one and another" in the way that I and you are; for only then would composition have a place in the effects. ^D For although they are one and another in their persons, they are nonetheless one and the same in deity, and one in number, so that their operation is also one in number. But if their operation is one, how can that which is produced from it not be one and simple, and altogether devoid of composition, and by necessity the same as itself?

^A

Third Syllogism

Furthermore, while they are being refuted, in that one must not confess things beyond what are found in Holy Scripture, they respond: "By what reason, then, did the Fathers place the term 'consubstantial' in the Creed, which was not found in Holy Scripture?" We say that if this had not been stated there, there was a danger that the Son might be thought inferior to the Father; although, even if this term itself does not lie in Scripture, yet the saying, *I and the Father are one* (John X, 30), is equivalent to it. But here, what is the necessity to say that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, not being found in Holy Scripture? And what danger threatens the theology delivered to us on account of this? Absolutely none. Rather, indeed, from such an addition many absurdities arise, such as a dual monarchy, and that the Spirit appears to be composite, and myriad other things.

Third Response

This is not the Latins' defense concerning that of Saint Dionysius: "Generally, therefore, one must not dare to speak, nor even to think, etc." Thus they respond to this argument: that the saint forbids speaking contrary to what has been defined by divine inspiration from the holy oracles, either in meaning or in word. But rather, according to meaning, it agrees with "proceeding from the Father," and thus we do nothing contrary to the canon. But if you propose ^C an argument with which he himself also deals, they provide an answer, and it too is well said. For it is not equal to say that there was some danger there, but here none; for this is said gratuitously and is not demonstrated. For there was also some danger here, the Latins say; otherwise it would not have been added. For if the necessity had not arisen, no account would have been taken of this. But if you say that from such an addition many absurdities follow, one will reply in turn that even from the term "consubstantial" greater absurdities arise for those who understand ill, such as the confusion of persons and Sabellianism. Nevertheless, there is no need to be concerned about the perverse mind of the wicked, but for those investigating the sound sense in a time of necessity, one must not retreat from explaining and declaring the faith, once heresies have been rejected, even if again some wicked persons might waver on account of it.

Fourth Syllogism

That the Trinity is considered even in all beings. ^D For everything whatever of those things that fall under observation, even if you remove other categories, yet possesses substance, quantity, and quality. By quantity I mean the very bulk it possesses, and by quality, its color. Just as, therefore, these have their existence in substance, so also the Son and the Holy Spirit have their existence from the Father; and just as the substance of gold, for example, and its quality, that is, its color, remain immutable as long as it is gold, but the shape from the quantity is changed from one into another — the same bulk being preserved — so also the Father and the Holy Spirit participate in nothing from without, but the Son assumed the human nature, of the same...

^A substance remaining. Hence also the Latins are refuted, not safely dogmatizing concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. For just as color is not from substance together with figure, but only from substance, while figure and color are in the substance, so also the Holy Spirit is said to proceed not from the Father and the Son, but from the Father alone. Color, therefore, is an object of sight alone, for sight alone discerns it; but figure regards both sight and touch. For it is grasped by both, while substance would be the object of touch alone.

Fourth Response.

How appropriate are the examples you introduce into the Church, most excellent and wisest of men! And you thus liken divine things with fitting comparisons, placing that immaterial, and quantity-less, and figure-less, and untouchable nature under—and comparing it with—matter, ^B and quantity, and quality. What then, shall we seek all these things that are in these comparisons of yours also in the archetypes? Then it is time to believe (may they be propitious to us) that both the Son and the Spirit exist in another, not subsisting by themselves; furthermore, to transfer to those things [the divine] whatever belongs to things that have parts, and dimensions, and all that concerns corporeal and material things. But just as this is absurd, so also to think it necessary to conclude anything from this is vain and foolish. And yet, this image of yours contributes ^C more to the Latins than to you yourself. For quality, to which you wished to liken the Spirit, could not be, were the substance not preserved, nor would it have existence unless in a substance that is extended and possesses quantity. Since we could not see a substance without quantity, even if we were to behold its color. If, therefore, quality subsists not in substance simply, but in a substance that has extension, then quantity also contributes to the being of quality. And thus, most excellent and wise of men, you have come to advocate for the Latins, or rather to refute them. For I would not judge the contrary of you, who are so ^D thoroughly trained in all education, who have advanced so far in philosophy and contemplation, and having traversed the curricula of all liberal arts, have attained splendor in all; and beyond the Greek language, you have also most excellently attained the Latin, and with great ease have translated into our tongue many other things worthy of admiration, and notably the great work *On the Trinity* of the great and admirable Augustine, in which among other things the divine procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is most excellently, wisely, and divinely—most theologically—demonstrated. To him, indeed, and to such arguments of his, how could you yourself stand opposed, being his student and devotee, especially with these arguments, or wordlets, which even a boy would refute? But I believe that, wishing to gratify the anger of some, or wishing to avoid it, you hit upon and followed this path, that you might both avoid him and more especially assist the truth by laying bare its excessive force to those unable to discern it, by the feebleness of your arguments.

319 BESSARIONIS S. R. E. CARDINALIS 320

ARGUMENT of the Opusculum on the PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Bessarion, requested by Alexios Laskaris Philanthropenos, who traced his lineage from the Caesarean race of the emperors, to inform him about the events of the Council of Florence, to narrate diligently how they transpired, to teach him the truth of the matter, and to instruct him in confirming it and overturning the fallacies of his adversaries, wrote this present book in clear language, which he dedicated to the Supreme Pontiff Paul II.

In this work, he maintains the role equally of a historian, whose goal is truth, and of a theologian; besides other private and particular matters, which he touches upon cursorily and quickly, he recounts for him the manner and method that the Greek bishops maintained in their disputations with the Latins—namely, that they divided the question into two parts: the first, that it is not permitted to add anything, even the truth itself, to the Creed, which the Greeks first called into doubt (Bessarion being otherwise unwilling and contradicting it, as he wished for a better order and arrangement of the disputations); the second, that the conclusion is false, namely, that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son. Regarding these, Bessarion reports the arguments of both sides for each dogma and what they replied to one another in turn; he adds many arguments of his own to confirm and prove the truth, and he discourses excellently on the whole of the controversy.

Therefore, he affirms with full right, by his own will, coerced by no force, that the East, with the bond of the ancient religion confirmed, has renewed its old friendships and even joined hands, with God as witness.

Furthermore, our Bessarion, always consistent with himself, as in his other works, is also in this one solidly learned and truly pious; and since he surpasses others, he contends with himself. For whether you look at his singular piety in defending the Catholic faith, or his varied and manifold erudition, you will not justly deny that he is to be placed far ahead of later Greeks and to be made equal to those ancient and most holy Fathers.

PROLOGUE of Bessarion, Bishop of Sabina, Cardinal of Nicaea, Patriarch of Constantinople, to his books ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, addressed to the Supreme Pontiff Paul II.

(Zanetti, Catalog. biblioth. S. Marci Venet., p 76)

Eugenius IV, your uncle, Supreme Pontiff, a man most distinguished in religion, virtue, and deeds, among many things which he was accustomed most wisely to contemplate or most diligently to complete for the benefit, dignity, and splendor of the Christian commonwealth, applied his whole mind, care, and study first of all to this: that he might illuminate with the light of truth the minds of mortals, obscured by errors and blocked by the darkness of blindness. O mercy, worthy of a Roman Pontiff! O wondrous wisdom of a prince! He who devoted himself, his studies, and all his fortunes to the concord and safety of the Christian people. For what could he do more useful, more excellent, or more pleasing to the immortal God than, like a vigilant farmer, to shake out and purge the bad seed, and like a solicitous pastor, to care for the diseased sheep, lest, while the evil festered, not only they should perish, but they should contaminate and infect the whole flock? The most wise Pontiff surely knew how great a danger, how many discords, how many seditions, and how many wars had been produced by the struggle arisen from the ignorance of truth, especially in those matters which pertained to faith and religion. Furthermore, he had seen, heard, and read how a small spark of error had sometimes infected not only one church or city, but even many and the greatest provinces, like the contagion of some disease.

Hence, after his other ^A excellent works, he assembled the general council of Christians, first at Ferrara, then at Florence, in the most renowned cities of Italy, with such great labor, study, vigils, and expense, that he might remove from the midst that pestiferous disagreement between the Eastern and Western Churches, which had been inveterate for so many years, and might lead those who thought poorly of the faith to grasp the truth; which he eventually attained, by admonishing the brothers, by preaching, by instructing, by exhorting, and sometimes even by felling them with the goads of disputations, with the favor of God, whose cause was being handled.

Therefore, when I, Supreme Pontiff, attended this council along with the other bishops of the East, summoned by our virtuous emperor, and it did not escape me that the holy Roman Church, which has always been the pillar and foundation of the Christian faith, held the right view, but that most of our own were more desirous of contention than of truth; I thought it my duty to labor with all my strength so that all, having embraced the true opinion, might lay aside the filth and stains of ancient errors. I indeed loved our people ^B as was right, and I wished our cause, if it could have been so, to be the better; but piety, first and foremost, required truth to be preferred, and whatever was said rightly, to be embraced without envy. Therefore, I held various orations among us at the council, in which I discoursed at length on other matters, but especially on the procession of the Holy Spirit, of which there was the greatest question then; and I demonstrated most openly that He proceeds from the Father and the Son,, not only by the arguments of the Latins, but also by the authority of the Greek doctors; finally exhorting all that, having left behind the darkness of errors, they should turn themselves, as if illuminated by the rays of the true light, to the light and splendor of the Roman Church.

These orations, although I was often requested by friends, I never wanted to publish, conscious of my own weakness; thinking that there was nothing in them that could appear worthy of learned ears. However, when my books were recently being examined by me, and had fallen by chance into the hands of some of our friends, and I had been unable to prevent them from reading them more ^C carefully; they not only did not cease to exhort me afterwards, but even vehemently pleaded that I should publish both them and certain other small works, which I was compelled to write after the dissolution of the council to some who were still deviating from the right path, for the common benefit of men; saying that there were many things in them gathered from Greek authors, which, since they were nowhere to be found among the Latins, would bring no small utility to the readers. Therefore, I was like a pauper, hesitant for a long time, and I doubted what I ought to do. On one side, the authority of my friends urged me to publish; on the other, my own weakness exhorted me to suppress them.

At length, however, the thought occurred to me to dedicate my labors to your most sacred name, divine Pontiff Paul. For to whom rather should those things which were written by us on religion under your uncle, the divine Eugenius, be given, donated, and consecrated than to you, whom divine Providence willed to be not only the successor of his blood, but also of his pontificate, as well as the prince and teacher of religion? You, who by divine counsel, singular wisdom, and incredible greatness of soul, ^D have so governed the empire committed to your shoulders that you not only uproot and pull out heresies occasionally budding in the provinces near the Roman Church, but even those inveterate ones from the most remote and powerful kingdoms; by whom the empire of the Church and the majesty of this holy see have been so increased in such a short time, that all men—which rarely happens to humans—equally fear and love you; and the Roman Church has never had such power nor such authority.

It will therefore be the task of your clemency, Supreme Pontiff, to grant this token of my loyalty towards you, that you may gladly accept this book, and finally, according to your supreme judgment, either publish it or suppress it. But if you judge it to be published, it will certainly seem to have attained most of the authority through your grace.