On the Procession of the Holy Spirit

OF THE MOST WISE CARDINAL LORD BESSARION TO ALEXIOS LASCARIS PHILANTHROPINOS CONCERNING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

^A You indeed, being well-versed not only in human affairs but also in divine, and taking great delight in learning, and above all in the study and practice of the Holy Scriptures, do not cease to search out by yourself the truth in faith, and to exhort us to this same end, taking us as partners and helpers in this inquiry and holy investigation. I, however, being held back by sloth, and having gladly freed myself from the labor concerning these matters—because I have often dealt with those who cultivate their own contentiousness and ignorance rather than the truth—am unwillingly descending again into the struggle concerning these things; although I am about to address my words to you, a candid and learned auditor, who I persuade myself seeks these things from me not for the sake of testing, but rather out of a love for the truth. For I think that the authority of the holy synod itself is simply enough for persuasion, and that what was concluded by it will be received by you with a calm mind, without any contention or ambiguity; knowing for certain that it is impossible that the truth should remain hidden in an assembly of so many men, così ^B adorned with wisdom and virtue and knowledge, in the midst of whom it is necessary to believe that God Himself is present.

^C Furthermore, I remember also having written you another letter, not small, which sufficiently touched upon all these things, and established the problem itself by itself—that the Holy Spirit indeed proceeds from the Father and the Son—and dissolved the absurdities which seem to follow from this conclusion. So that there is no need for more words, especially for you, best of men, who have such experience in such matters that you can understand many and great things from even a slight occasion.

^A However, since you ask something more of us—perhaps not for your own sake, but for the sake of those who pertinaciously oppose the truth—we, on the one hand, because we are bound according to the divine Apostle to give a reason for the faith that is in us to everyone who asks, and on the other hand, yielding to friendly duties and complying with your directions, have complied with your wishes. First, we send you the statements of the holy Fathers and Doctors of the West, by which it is clearly shown in these very words that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that the Father and the Son are one principle and one cause of Him. Although these statements are numerous and dispersed throughout all their books, we send you a few, being of the same form and the same kind as all the others that exist.

^B Furthermore, we have decided that a certain discourse of ours, which bears the inscription *Dogmatic*, or *On Concord*, should be sent to you; which we published a little before the most holy union, as it were the final judgment of our mind and opinion. We offered this, as we were finally examining and investigating the opinions of individuals by ourselves, to be read before our unconquered emperor and our holy patriarch. In this discourse, as far as possible, I demonstrate the proposed question from the Eastern Fathers themselves, using nothing further from the Westerns. I have sent it to you, most distinguished, magnanimous, and in all things most excellent man, as it is a work that will bring the greatest utility to you above all others, and to any other person who hears it with a good mind.

^C And because we have labored on nothing new in these matters at the present time—for they were already written for us previously—we have now, however, applied our mind to labor a little beyond these things, and have judged it right to produce something more for your sake. Therefore, I will tell you, most distinguished man, cursorily and quickly, how the affairs of our synod and the most holy concord stood; adding also certain reasons by which someone might be further persuaded to believe in this dogma, and thus I shall finally bring an end to the discourse.

^D But before we speak of these matters, I shall add to the introduction a small and insignificant matter, yet one worthy of no small consideration, which is indeed missing from the aforementioned dogmatic discourse: I shall make up for it here. For although in that discourse I had proposed to demonstrate the truth of this question solely from the holy Oriental Fathers, nonetheless I omitted a certain saying of our divine father Basil, which is worth all the others, because it was somehow considered ambiguous—not that I myself had any doubt about it, certainly not—but because many called it into controversy, and I did not wish to make use of a matter that was in dispute. But this is the saying which that blessed man utilized in the third of his books written against Eunomius, saying:

For what necessity is there, if the Spirit exists ^A third in order and dignity, that He should also be third in nature? For the word of piety hands down that He is second to the Son in dignity, having His being from Him, receiving from Him and announcing it to us, and being altogether dependent upon that cause. This, therefore, I have left aside in the discourse. But thus I believe this to be genuine to the blessed Basil, just as his other discourses against Eunomius. And the reasons by which I myself have been persuaded, you shall also hear.

First, in this synod, five books ^B were found, or rather six: four of them were written on parchment, being very ancient, while two were of cotton paper. Of these, three belonged to the Archbishop of Mitylene, and the fourth to the Latins; and of the two cotton paper ones, one belonged to our invincible emperor, and the other to the holy patriarch, which he had taken from the Monastery of the Xanthopouloi and brought with him. Of these six books, then, five had the passage as I have now set it forth: namely, that the Holy Spirit has His being from Him, and is dependent upon that cause, that is to say, from the Son. But one book alone, namely that of the patriarch, had it otherwise, as someone had cut away the text, and had partly added things and partly removed them.

Then ^C, after the holy synod had taken place and we had returned to Constantinople, proposing to track down almost all the books of those holy monasteries, I found that all the more recent ones, and those written after the great contention, contained the passage in a truncated form. But all those in an older hand, and which were from before the battle among one another, these remained sound and entire, being no fewer in number than the corrupted ones.

In these I found something worthy of both tears and wonder: worthy of wonder, if anyone of his own free will embraces a lie, himself crafting it, and this while destroying the truth itself, even though the human mind has the truth as its object. Worthy of tears, however, because there are some who so neglect the truth of the faith, without which ^D it is impossible for a man to be saved, that they are not only lazy in investigating and finding it, but even attempt to cover, confuse, and subvert it when it is manifestly set forth.

This, therefore, was of such a kind. Among other books, I also found in the monastery of Christ the Savior Pantepoptes (that is, the Savior who beholds all things) two books of the thrice-blessed Basil. One was on parchment, appearing very ancient by its appearance—but how many years old it was, I do not know, because the year was not written there; and the other was on cotton paper, written some three hundred years ago. O, how did the hands of that unscrupulous and audacious man not wither away!

^A For the year was written at the end, from which it is very easy to calculate. And the books still remain, unless they have perhaps vanished, after they were shown to me, through the works of those who easily contrive every evil against their own salvation. Both, as we have explained, had the Doctor’s sentence written within, but a certain man, audacious in spirit, but in hand much more audacious, using iron against the parchment, scraped away the truth. Yet less progress did he make. For since the space is vacant, and the halves of the syllables still appear, they both convict that man’s audacity and nonetheless clearly express the truth itself. In the other book, an erasure obliterated that whole part of the sentence which says: "having its being from Him, and entirely dependent upon that cause." But afterward, as time went on, when that learned man Cydones took the book into his hands, the sentence was restored to health. For he himself with his own hand wrote the sentence back in full in the book, and worthily pursued with reproaches him who had dared to do such a thing.

^B Into such madness, darkness, and ignorance has contention pushed our people! They then dare to say that the Latins and Veccus corrupted the books; even though this saying has such beauty, and is delivered with such eloquence, fluency, and Attic grace, that not only could the Latins never manage to write something like this with such grace in Greek—to whom their native tongue, and its various figures and differing rules of discourse, are a hindrance to producing anything with grace in our tongue—but, on the contrary, it is in no way possible for the Greeks themselves to compose something in Latin with the equal grace of the Latins, however much each might exercise themselves in the other’s language. I myself can be a most reliable witness to this fact, I who understand the Latin language as well as almost any other among the Latins who has labored much in it, yet I have absolutely no power to write anything worthy even of moderate praise. Not only, therefore, as has been said, could the Latins not have produced this sentence with such grace, but neither could any of the Greeks, except Basil himself; for it is his image, it is his type of writing. Whoever is skilled at judging the forms of orations knows what I say; moreover, since Veccus was a figure of yesterday or the day before, while the books, being much older than these, prove this reasoning to be empty words and a vain refuge.

^C Furthermore, one might be able to confirm this same thing from another source. There was a certain man among the Latins, along with many others of great wisdom, called Hugh, a most ancient author who preceded us by a long time; for nearly three hundred years have elapsed since he lived. ^D When he writes about the procession of the Holy Spirit, he uses this saying of the great Basil for proof. This, indeed, I have not only seen written in Latin

^A but also here in Constantinople, written in Greek. I have read not the book of Hugo himself, but an antilogical work—that is, a work of disputation concerning controversial matters—by a certain Nicetas, the Bishop of Thessalonica, as I believe, who lived two hundred and fifty years ago, in which it is evident that Hugo made use of this statement. Yet this Thessalonian held to the dogma of the Latins; for he believed the conclusion to be true, but contended with what is said in the proverb about "the ass's shadow," saying that one ought not to add anything, not even the truth, to the Creed. This is a matter of great religious caution and wisdom, just as if someone were to say that the truth ought not to be freely professed. ^B I have recounted and expanded upon these things, wishing to show that corruption has indeed occurred in the books, but that it was done not by the Latins and their supporters, but rather, on the contrary, by those who contend against the Latins; and this corruption occurred not by way of addition, but by way of subtraction; so that no one may now justly accuse Veccus or those like him, since the books themselves screamed the truth long before Veccus. Thus, let no one in the future falsely accuse Veccus, when the books themselves cry out the truth.

And these are signs taken from time, so wondrous and manifest, that they can in no way be refuted. Moreover, from the very style and the beauty of the writing, it is said that one ought not to believe these words to be of anyone other than the blessed Basil. Nevertheless, ^C from the intelligence of the passage itself and the context of what precedes and follows, if one diligently weighs the scope, this same thing will appear. Since Eunomius, from the fact that the Holy Spirit is called third in order and dignity by the saints, inferred that He was also third in nature, the divine Basil, while annoyed at the conclusion, does not deny the premises—namely, that the Holy Spirit is third in order and dignity. Although he shouts, as though displeased, against Eunomius: "He cannot say who these saints are, or in what discourses they have made this teaching," yet he does not say this urging that point, nor does he deny that the Spirit is called third in order by the saints, as our people wrongly think—for so he would be opposing both himself and the truth. ^D Rather, he was vehemently abhorrent of the madness of Eunomius, and indignant at the conclusion—that the Spirit is third also in his nature—and, accusing his silence because he kept quiet and failed to indicate the saints who assert this, he erupted into this voice: "He cannot say who these saints are, or in what discourses they have made this teaching." For it is clear that if he had set forth the testimonies of the saints, he would perhaps not have been able to introduce an absurd conclusion. We know, indeed, that often from a single word or expression the whole scope and mind of a writer appears, such that it is not permitted for anyone to act maliciously by adding something of his own, and to introduce a conclusion not at all consistent with their words. Hence, if Eunomius...

had cited the saints who affirm this, and had added their authorities, he surely would not have been able to conclude what he concluded; for although the saints truly believe the Spirit to be third, yet they firmly deny that He is third in nature. Therefore, deploring his malice, he [Basil] adds: "Has man become so bold as to introduce innovations concerning divine dogmas?" And it is manifest that here he calls an innovation ^A the belief that the Spirit is third in nature, not that He is third in order and dignity; otherwise, he would have called himself an innovator, and would have contradicted himself even more. For he himself is the one who most of all delivered for us to believe that the Spirit is third in order and dignity, and he taught us this golden and indissoluble chain of order. Indeed, in these very words against Eunomius he immediately adds: "For the word of piety delivers that He is second to the Son in dignity, having existence from Him, receiving from Him, and announcing to us, and being entirely dependent on that cause."

For our people accept this statement, if not in its entirety, at least a part of it, cutting away the rest and saying thus: "Perhaps the word of piety delivers that He is second to the Son in dignity." By adding "perhaps," they render the statement ambiguous, which we shall show is altogether alien to the mind of the Great Basil. ^B

Therefore, the great Basil does not introduce these things through a figure of rhetoricians, which they call *antiparatasis* (that is, a concession, or as they say in the schools, *given and not conceded*), as it has appeared to some most ignorantly. But, positing a certain and indubitable thesis, he considers the consequence: while indeed granting that He is third in order, he rejects as impious that He is third in nature. Hear, therefore, what he says, establishing his reasoning: "For as the Son is second to the Father in order." Then he introduces the reason why: "Because," he says, "He is from Him; and in dignity, because," he says, "the Father is the principle and cause of His existence; but in nature, He is no longer second." So also the Holy Spirit, even if He is ranked after the Son in order and dignity, would not reasonably be considered of an alien nature. And here some have added, so that we might concede it altogether, saying: "Even if He is ranked after the Son in order and dignity, so that we may concede it entirely." But nothing is more contrary to the intention of that ^C [passage] than this; for in his letter to the *canonicae* [canonical women] (2) he clearly says: "But the Holy Spirit is conumerated with the Father and the Son, because He is also above creation. But He is placed third, as we have been taught in the Gospel by Him who said: Go, make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." ^D

He who places Him before the Son, or calls Him older than the Father, resists the commandment of God and is a stranger to the sound faith, not keeping the form of the doxology which he received, but devising for himself a novelty of words to curry favor with men. And a little later: Therefore, the novelty concerning the order carries with it a rejection of His very existence, and is a denial of the entire faith.

Whether these words, then, are those of one doubting about the order, and hesitating, and—to concede things for the sake of argument—expressing his own reasons with those expressions "perhaps" and [the like], you yourself shall judge, as well as all others who are fair and upright men, who understand even a little of the power of arguments and the truth of doctrines.

^A Furthermore, are they not ashamed of branding the saint with such a mark of contradiction—I would even add, of madness—if he affirms that the Spirit is the third in such a way that it is not lawful to change the order (for he says he who does this acts impiously), but then says: "For the word of piety perhaps hands down that He is second to the Son in dignity"? For my part, I call God to witness that I feel ashamed for those who say such things; if they themselves do not perceive their own absurdity, it is a marvel.

^B But that which stops all their impudence is what the Teacher adds, after concluding many things in his work against Eunomius: "Thus, evidently, the Holy Spirit is second in dignity and order, for we have received Him numbered third from the Father and the Son, the Lord Himself having handed down this order in the tradition of saving baptism, in which He said: 'Go, baptize,' and the rest."

^C Consider, then, that the same words which he uses in the letter to the canonesses for the demonstration of the order—namely, the saving tradition of baptism—he uses also here for the same order. But indeed, in the letter to the canonesses he brings forth the discourse with such certainty and faith that it is not permitted to say that he spoke otherwise, or that anyone who does so acts impiously. How, therefore, here, where he uses the same force of argument—neither greater nor lesser—should he have been expected to bring forth the discourse with hesitation and ambiguity?

But these things belong to men of perverse character, who fabricate all evils for their own head, and not to the mind of that divine man. Thus, no one ought to doubt that this statement is genuine to that great Father, namely, that the Holy Spirit is second to the Son in order and dignity, and that He has His existence from Him, and depends upon His Cause.

^D Since this statement is genuine, what else would one seek, I ask you, for the sake of the truth itself? Is not the great Basil sufficient to teach us the truth? Is he not the equal of all others combined? Has he not attained such grace and wisdom that he alone can be the most worthy teacher for the whole Church? For my part, I would rather prefer, if it were lawful for me to say...

to err with him than to be truthful with all others. ^A

From these very words, therefore, the truth of this problem is confirmed, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Since we are at this point, it will not be amiss, by reasoning from his subsequent words, to demonstrate the same truth to you. He says, therefore, that the Son is second to the Father in order and dignity, which also seems correct to us. But consider carefully how the Son is second to the Father in order and dignity; for he himself adds: "Because," he says, "he is from Him, and because the Father is his principle and cause." Wherefore, that which is second to another in the divine persons is for this reason second, because it is from him; and this is manifest even in natural things. For everything that is second by nature to something else is also from it. But the same author also confesses that the Holy Spirit is second to the Son in order and dignity. That he does not propose this doubtfully, as some dream, but asserts it vehemently, is most clearly shown in the epistle *To the Canonesses*. So, therefore, reason thus: Everything that exists as second to another in the divine persons is also from it; but the Holy Spirit exists as second to the Son; therefore, he is from the Son. ^B And if it pleases you to repeat the reasoning from a slightly higher standpoint and more universally, it must be said otherwise: Everything that is second to something by nature is also from it; but the Holy Spirit is naturally second to the Son in order and dignity; wherefore the Spirit is from the Son. ^C And that the Spirit is naturally second in order to the Son is clear; for there is nothing in the Trinity contrary to nature, nor according to accident, nor adventitious.

But let not that word "nature" offend you when you hear that the Holy Spirit is by nature second to the Son. For we do not say he is second according to his being, according to nature, lest we show him to be of an alien nature, as Eunomius did; but we say "by nature" to exclude that which is "contrary to nature." This is also attested by the great Athanasius, teaching that the Spirit has the same order and nature in relation to the Son that the Son has in relation to the Father. For from this, these two things are shown: namely, that the Spirit is third in order from the Father and second from the Son; and that this order is nature (that is, natural). ^D Furthermore, let us set forth the reasoning in another way: If anything is naturally second to something, it also exists from it; but the Spirit is naturally second to the Son; therefore, he also exists from the Son.

But these things that have been shown to us from the sayings of the great Basil, about which I have used many words—though I could have said many more than these, which I have omitted for the sake of brevity—these indeed I have said, and I have drawn them out longer than I intended, because not a little help for investigating the truth comes to us from here, or rather, the sum of the matter consists in these words; for the great Basil alone is sufficiently fit to teach us the truth.

^A Now I shall proceed to the things previously promised, and having briefly narrated for you the progress of our synod, and having set forth a few small proofs concerning the conclusion, I shall bring my discourse to an end.

The beginning of the account of the proceedings in the synod.

As you know, then, we who had arrived at Ferrara together with our mighty Emperor and the holy Patriarch and our whole synod—the things we discussed in private before the synod began—I shall pass over as not strictly necessary; for those things were of no practical use to us either, but we were purposely wasting time, waiting for those who needed to be present at the synod to assemble. ^B When the time arrived, it seemed good to us to divide the question into two parts: namely, that one ought not to add even the truth itself to the Creed, and second, that this conclusion is not even true, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. This point, then, having been decided, it was asked which of these two we ought to discuss first. And the opinion prevailed that we should discuss the question of not making any addition at all, although I myself did not wish it, but was openly arguing against it. For I said that "this problem is either stronger in our favor than the second one, or it is weaker. If it is weaker, there is no need, having begun with the weaker, to be defeated and, having lost the victory right at the beginning of the contest, to enter upon the second ^C in a state of agitation and fear. For there is a danger that the defeat in the first question might become the cause of a defeat for us in the second. But if it is strong, it is necessary to save that which is strong for later; for if we win in the first, we shall thereafter, with even greater abundance, route and put them to flight in the second case as well. If, however, we should be defeated in that dogma, then at least we could win on the second point by teaching that it ought not to be added to the Creed."

Moreover, since that which is done by fewer means—for the reason that it is done by larger means—is always essentially better, I said that this should be given preference, and that we should first discuss that point, after which the rest has no place. ^D For when the dogma has been shown to be false, the argument about not adding it will have no further standing. Therefore, if we begin with the dogma, we shall completely route the opponents in one contest. But if it is shown that it ought not to be added, there still remains the need to examine the dogma to see if it is true.

While I was saying these things, I could not persuade our party; but they contended that we must by all means and in every way discuss this point first. I was saying these things, with God and my conscience as my witnesses, always looking toward the honor of our race, and in every way seeking its glory. For I desired that we should either be honorably separated from the Latins, and with the reputation of victory, or be honorably united with them, and without appearing to have been defeated and to have failed in our proofs. Both of these outcomes would have followed from the things I was proposing, but from the things we actually did, the exact opposite followed. Hence, not a few, and especially the wise, came to regret this plan.

But what will you say? Truly, I did not remain silent at once; but when I saw them desiring this and nothing else (this was happening to them because they obviously imagined we could accomplish more in this area than in the dogma itself), wishing to turn them away from their purpose, I spoke arguments to the contrary, in the hearing of our most wise Emperor, pointing out the weakness of the problem, and that it is ridiculous to think that one ought not to add the truth to the Creed. The arguments, however, were so solid that no one among those present was able to refute them. Nevertheless, what they wanted, they decreed, and I followed them, since I thought I owed it to God and to our race to say what appeared useful to me, but afterwards to follow the majority and to strive in association with them. And so, we descended into the struggle of this matter, and began to dispute with the Latins, showing them that one ought not to add anything, not even the truth itself, to the Creed. ^B Our entire demonstration was taken from the definitions of the holy councils, in which they indeed say toward the end that it is not permitted to write another faith, or to think, or to teach, besides these, and things of that kind.

Truly, our whole race would have endured something ridiculous on account of that good man of Ephesus, had I not sensed it beforehand and hindered him. For along with authorities of that kind taken from the definitions, he also wished to bring forward a certain saying of the Apostle, who declares to the Galatians: "If anyone shall preach to you a gospel other than that which you have received, let him be anathema"; and another of Saint Dionysius, who universally affirms that one must not dare to say, nor even to think, anything beyond what has divinely been revealed to us from the sacred oracles. He wished, therefore, to bring these forward into the midst as well, as things proving that it is not even permitted to add the truth itself. How much opportunity for ridicule of us this would have given to everyone—besides the fact that we would have been defeated on that very first day of the ^C disputation—you will surely understand in this way. We were insisting upon the third council, which was held at Ephesus, saying that it was the first to make this prohibition forbidding additions. This matter, even if it is not so in reality, nevertheless provides some shadow of support to those wishing to contend, because of the equivocality and ambiguity of the words.

Furthermore, the reason for thinking that the third council was the first to make this prohibition is, first and foremost, that the acts of the second or [the] first council do not exist at all; and the second reason is that the second ecumenical council changed the Creed of the Nicaean council in many respects, indeed taking away many things, but also adding many more. Wherefore we could not say that the prohibition was made before the second council. For we would certainly be subjecting the holy Fathers of the second council themselves to anathema. ^D Since these things have been clarified, observe what absurdity followed from the testimonies that the Ephesian wished to bring forward.

^A For since the divine Apostle and the holy Dionysius flourished long before the second, and indeed even the first synod, these sayings of theirs either forbid the teaching of what is false and contrary to the faith, or they are altogether true. But if they are true, the Fathers of the second synod, who altered the Creed of the first with so many additions and subtractions, would be under anathema; and the Fathers of the first would likewise be under anathema for having changed in many respects the Creed that existed before the first synod. But if it is entirely impious even to think this, then the divine Apostle and the sacred Dionysius must be forbidding the teaching of things that are false and contrary to the faith. If, therefore, they forbid what is false, and we take their statements to have the same meaning as our definitions, then the definitions also must forbid the addition of what is false, but not of what is true. And thus, we would have been defeated on that very first day.

I, however, having observed this and having disclosed these arguments to him, with difficulty persuaded him—having taken on other associates and helpers for myself to assist in persuading him—that he should omit these things, which, once persuaded, he did not bring forward. ^B From these things, therefore, one may understand the sharpness of that man, and what judgment it is likely he possesses in more difficult and sublime theorems—I mean those concerning dogma—if this matter of such a kind escaped him.

But I say these things not wishing to disparage him—for I am very far from such things; whence I have never spoken against him, nor will I say more than what has been said here—but wishing to teach the listeners to be on guard against his arguments.

As we went forward into this question, while we were still at the threshold and the preliminaries, we seemed to be prevailing, and indeed we were prevailing. For nothing of any significance or relevance to the matter itself had yet been brought against us by the Latins; they were speaking outside the subject, and we were resisting their objections in abundance—at a time when, I venture to say, I was the one who had discovered and stated the stronger arguments from among those said by the Greeks. ^C Until at last the word was taken up by the excellent and ^D admirable man, the ornament of the Latin race and the pride of nature, Julian, most worthy Cardinal of the holy Roman Church. He, having said many things, and those excellent ones, relevant to the matter at hand, rendered the inquiry perfect and absolute with such strong and irrefutable proofs, showing that it is always permitted to add something true to the divine Creed synodically and when necessity compels, that even though we pondered it for many days, we were unable to oppose him in this.

Since these things are many, I shall endeavor to set out here for you only as much as comes to my memory, so that you might also hear the truth pertaining to this part in some measure.

^A Before these objections and counter-arguments of ours, hear the head and most powerful point of all. At the end of the definitions of each of the synods, beginning from the third, these words are laid down verbatim: “After these were read, the holy synod decreed that it is permitted to no one to proffer, or to compose, or to hold, or to teach otherwise; and those who dare to do so, if they be clerics, are to be deposed, and if laics, to be anathematized.” The meaning of this, and the sense of these words, constitute the sum of all the prohibitions. Relying on these as most firm and irrefutable, we insist, saying that it is not permitted to add even the truth to the Creed, since by the aforementioned words this is forbidden, and in no way permitted. To which, since very many arguments have been brought forth by the Latins, among those were also these:

Demonstrations that it is permitted to add the truth to the Creed.

^B The Council, or the synods, forbid not only the proffering of another faith, but also the composing of one. Now, if they understand by “compounding another faith” the fact that the Creed is enunciated in other words, it follows that all are subject to anathema who have edited the same Creed in different words but with the same meaning. Which almost all the saints have done (for each of them, or the majority of them, have made their own expositions of faith). But this is false and blasphemous. Therefore, it is not forbidden to set forth the same faith in other words that agree with the truth, but it is the writing of a contrary faith that is forbidden.

^C Secondly. The Fourth Synod also subjects “to hold or to teach otherwise” to the same anathema. But if it forbids holding or teaching in other words, provided they are in agreement with the truth, then those who taught their own faith in whatever words they individually attained would be under anathema. For each of the saints taught the same faith in different words. But this is absurd; therefore, it is not the words that are forbidden, but opposite meanings; especially since “to hold” refers to meanings, not to words.

Thirdly. The Sixth Synod has these same things that the Fourth has. And furthermore, it inhibits those who introduce any novelty of words, that is, the invention of a word, for the subversion of those things that were decreed by them. From which it appears that only those words are forbidden which are introduced for the subversion of those things which were decreed by them: and not those which are introduced not for subversion, but which preserve the same understanding.

^D Furthermore. The Third Synod decrees that it is not permitted to proffer another faith besides that of Nicaea: otherwise, those who do so are to be under anathema. Yet it made no mention of the Creed of the Second Synod, which we now use. If, therefore, the Creed of the Second Synod, as if it were distinct and existing as another from

the ^A Creed of the First, for that reason it did not receive mention by the Third Synod, we are now committing an inexpiable sin by not using that of the First, which the Fathers decreed should remain immutable; while all, both in Church and in private, recite only that of the Second. And we are under anathema according to this argument. But if it has been passed over in silence as being the same, it appears to be the same, ^B if not in these terms—for it differs therefrom very greatly, having many additions and subtractions—yet it is the same in meaning. Therefore, both the Creed of the First and that of the Second were considered by the Fathers of the Third Synod as one. And so, every creed preserving the same meaning as that of the First would be the same to them. And it is of no consequence to the argument when it is said that one must not dare to deliver another creed. For by "another" one must understand one of a contrary meaning, and not one that differs in words; since, as it has been said, that of the Second, though differing very much in words from that of the First, was not considered to be "another." So it is concluded that those which preserve the same meaning are the same, even if they differ in words, just as that of the Second is the same as that of the First.

^C Furthermore, every synod, after the reading of its entire Definition—not only of the Creed, but of the entire Definition—says: "These having been read, the holy synod decreed that it is permitted to no one to proffer another faith." So the phrase "These having been read" refers to the whole Definition; therefore, what follows next, that it is not permitted to proffer another faith, applies to the whole Definition—that is, it is not permitted to proffer another faith beyond that which is contained in the universal Definition, not only in the Creed. But as far as the words are concerned, the Fourth Synod wrote things different from the Third, and the Fifth from the Fourth, and so on. Wherefore, the discourse is about the universal faith, and about the same sentiments, not about the words themselves.

^D Furthermore, the Seventh Synod makes no mention of a creed at all, neither of the First nor of the Second, but simply having set forth its own Definition, it says at the end: "To these it is not permitted to add, and from these it is not permitted to take away. But if anyone should add or take away from this faith, let him be anathema." So it is clear that it speaks of the faith, and of contrariety regarding dogmas. For it certainly did not forbid the Church from writing down definitions.

Furthermore, "what we believe with the heart unto righteousness," these things we are bound to confess also with the mouth unto salvation; if not, it will be imperfect for us, and the faith half-complete. For it is necessary to confess the faith before men, if we also wish to receive a proclamation by the Savior before the heavenly Father, according to his word. But it is necessary to think things true; therefore, it is also necessary to confess them. So, those things that must necessarily be believed, it is not only permissible but also necessary to confess.

Furthermore, in the Acts of the Fourth Synod, in the first session,

the Symbol of those in Nicaea was first set forth ^A by Eutyches. Then the same heretic Eutyches adds that, upon this faith—that is, the faith of those in Nicaea—the Synod of Ephesus entirely brought forth [the decree]: that whoever adds anything contrary to this, or conceives of it, or teaches it, is subject to the penalties enacted at that time. But Eusebius, Bishop of Dorylaeum, who was the accuser of the heretic Eutyches, hearing these things, shouted: "There is no such definition, there is no canon decreeing this; he has lied." And the six hundred and thirty Fathers who were at Chalcedon, hearing this, kept silent, and they condemned Eutyches, as one who did not allow there to be anything thought or understood other than what was in the Nicene Symbol—other, that is, in number, [but] not as things opposed. Wherefore they showed that those additions were forbidden which are contrary and opposed, but by no means those which are in agreement. For behold, the phrase "out of two natures and in two unconfused natures [the fact] that Christ, after the assumption [of humanity], remained"—this is something other than the Nicene Symbol; other, I say, in words, but not in understanding; yet they forced Eutyches to think it. Wherefore it appears that the Fathers did not simply prohibit anything "other," but rather things that were opposed. ^B Diligently consider the following: these very words of the Third Synod which we bring forward—namely, that it is permitted to no one to set forth another faith—these very words Eutyches was bringing forward in his own behalf. But the Bishop of Dorylaeum and the whole synod said, "There is no such canon decreeing this"; but they condemned him because he was interpreting the canon perversely. For Eutyches was explaining that very canon, just as our own people [do], indeed thinking that everything is simply prohibited which, even by the mere variety of words, was "other." This, however, by no means pleased the council, and for that reason they condemned him, since they considered "another faith" to be one that is contrary, not one that differs in words but is in agreement in its understanding. ^C Furthermore, I also remember having seen something like this in the explanation of the Nomocanon, which is made by Zonaras. For in that Nomocanon this prohibition of the Third Synod—namely, "When these things were read, the holy synod decreed," etc.—is contained among the other canons of the Third Synod, and it is numbered as the seventh. But before this there is another, the sixth canon of the same Third Synod, which makes those excommunicate who dare to unsettle anything from the statutes and decrees of the synod. In this seventh one, however—that is, "When these things were read, the holy synod decreed that it is permitted to no one to set forth another faith"—those who transgress the canon are struck with anathema. Zonaras therefore raises the question ^D: why does the synod in the sixth canon make [them] excommunicate, [but] in the seventh strike them with anathema? And solving the difficulty, he has it word for word: "Great is the difference between [the situation where] someone speaks against a certain thing and [that where] someone is in doubt..."

^A For if one is in doubt regarding matters already well ordained, he will be excommunicated, which is what the sixth canon plainly demands; but he who speaks against these [doctrines], as one who thinks contrary things, will be anathematized, which is what the seventh canon demands—that is to say, this very definition of the prohibition. Wherefore, this interpreter too explicitly and without any doubt calls "another faith" that which is to be against [the truth] and to think contrary things.

Finally, the Trullan synod in its first canon says: "We define that the faith delivered to us by those who were eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word, the apostles chosen by God, and furthermore by the three hundred and eighteen holy and blessed Fathers who gathered at Nicaea, must be kept invulnerable and inviolate, without any innovation." ^B And thereupon it enumerates all the synods, and ordains that we should keep whole the faith delivered by all the synods. At the very end it adds: "But if anyone at all does not hold and embrace the aforementioned dogmas of piety, nor thinks and preaches in this way, but attempts to go in a direction contrary to them, let him be anathema, in accordance with the definition already set forth by the aforementioned holy and blessed Fathers; and let him be thrust out and fall away from the Christian roll as a stranger. For we do not intend to add anything, nor on the other hand to remove anything, contrary to those things which have been defined, nor in any way whatever."

^C This canon is clearly an interpretation of the definition of the third synod and the others, which prescribes that it is not permitted for anyone to bring forward another faith. For it says: "Let him be anathema, if anyone attempts to go against the paternal dogmas in accordance with the definition already set forth"—this one, namely, of the prohibition. Hence, this definition forbids the thinking of contrary things. And the phrase, "We neither add nor remove anything," means in the faith—not to add to it, and not to remove from it, not from the Creed. For the synod did not here read the Creed. But when it had spoken about the dogmas of the synods, it adds: "We do not intend to add or remove anything," and it subjoins: "According to the things which were before defined," namely, by the Fathers. ^D Therefore, even the Fathers who preceded them, when they say that one must not add or remove, do not forbid the additions and subtractions of words, but the addition of contrary meanings in the faith. By this single point, therefore, the question is solved most clearly and purely for those who do not wish to contend.

I would have wished to be able to write down, or have ready at hand, all the arguments which the Latins have brought forward in opposition to us on this question; for you would have seen both a great abundance of arguments and those possessing great force and truth. But since the things already said resolve the question so clearly that they are enough for one who looks upon the truth, and who listens to what is said without contention and preoccupation; yet for him who is prepared for strife and word-battles, not even...

ten thousand times so much, though I were to add but one more argument of the Latins, would suffice. With that, I shall make an end to the discussion regarding these matters.

^A But there is also this other point, most grave and most powerful, which overturns the fallacy of our people in this question; consider it, I pray you, diligently. We contend that this inhibition was first devised by the third synod, as I said before. I stated then, too, the reason: namely, that we see the second synod had subtracted many things from the Creed of the first synod, and had added many more. Wherefore we did not dare to say that this inhibition had been made before the second synod. For if we were to say this, it would be necessary for one of two things to follow: either that the Fathers of the second synod acted against the laws and are under anathema; or, if it is a sacrilege to say this, that it was not the addition of words, but rather contrary meanings, that they prohibited. For this reason we were saying that this obstacle was created after the second synod, which did not exist before it. Wherefore, if anyone were to show, on the contrary, that the same interdict which the third synod spoke of, and in almost the same words, had been made before the second synod, then one of the aforementioned two things is inferred. And since we do not dare to say that they are under anathema or that they acted wrongly, there remains the second possibility—namely, that this obstacle does not have the meaning our people think it has, but rather forbids the contrary faith.

This, then, the Latins proved to us; for it has been shown by them that the first synod at Nicaea first made this inhibition in the same words as the third and those that subsequently followed it. And they showed this in such a way as you too, most illustrious man, who enjoy the familiarity of these men, know well. They are so studious and diligent in their records that not only in divine matters, but even in worldly and political affairs, nothing of antiquity escapes them. Wherefore you will find in their cities, among their archives, every deed—which they performed from time immemorial—written down and stored there. This, therefore, is observed most diligently of all in the Catholic Church as well; for all the acts and almost all the letters of the ancient supreme pontiffs are preserved to this very day.

^C Accordingly, they brought forth to us, in a most ancient book written on parchment, a letter of Pope Liberius written to Athanasius of Alexandria, the beginning of which is: "Long since and from the beginning we have received such great things from the blessed Peter, prince of the apostles," etc. Then, proceeding further, he says that he had received a letter from Saint Athanasius, and had read it. Finally, he adds: "Having found the faith of the Nicene council in the same letter to be correct, we rendered great thanks to God; for which we are prepared not only to suffer with you and to endure persecution, but if necessity should demand, we would not refuse even to die for the name of Christ, however weak we may be. For the aforementioned holy Nicene synod, as we read, defined that it is permitted to no one to [produce] another faith...

to offer, or to write down, or to compose, or to think, or to teach otherwise; nor to conceive or to offer anything in the faith ^A which could be contrary to the definitions of these Fathers. But he who dares to compose, or to offer, or to teach, or to deliver another Symbol to those who wish to return to the way of truth from any heresy whatsoever, or from Judaism, or from Hellenism, if such a person be a bishop or a cleric, let the bishop be alienated from the episcopate, and the cleric from the clergy; but if he be a monk or a layman, let him be struck with anathema.

These things, now that the Acts of the first synod have perished, are unknown to us; but at that time when they existed, Pope Liberius knew of them, as did Saint Athanasius.

These words are now similar to the words of the third synod, and of the others. What then shall we say regarding the second synod, and regarding Gregory the Theologian, who, as he presided over this second synod, is himself said to have composed—with the Symbol of the first ^B changed in many respects—the Symbol which we now use? If that prohibition has this meaning, which our people profess, alas! in the place of holy Fathers and doctors, the Fathers of the second synod, and the great Gregory in theology, have occupied the place of pestiferous and fraudulent men. But far be it from us even to think such an insult. Therefore, neither the first, nor the third, nor any other synod speaks as if contrary to these; this is not the meaning, but it manifestly forbids a contradictory faith.

But this has been shown more clearly than light and demonstrated with clarity, that nothing prevents true things from being added to the faith and to the Symbol; nay, it is rather to be unfolded. For there is no dogma of truth that is not contained in the Symbol and in the simple ^C tradition of the apostles; but things are to be unfolded and connected to the Symbol not always, of course, nor by just anyone, but when great necessity urges, and the Church judges thus.

Regarding these things, O man of God, and very many others of the same kind said by the Latins on this question, we indeed, having nothing to answer to them (for what could anyone say to such great truth already imprudently?), kept silent; but they, having proved this, that we are by no means prohibited from thinking true things and adding them to the Symbol; that which follows, and the other point, that which they had added to the Symbol—namely, that they wished to show to be true that the Holy Spirit ^D proceeds from the Father and the Son—they promised to demonstrate, and challenged us to the contest. But our people, having been overcome and put to flight in this, feared to undergo the second contest; and that which I told them at the beginning, when I forbade them to take the start of this question, came to pass. Therefore, they were urged on by the anxiety of their souls and trembled, and by no means wished to remain any longer, but all shouted that it was necessary to be separated from the Latins and to return to their fatherland. And when asked the reason, they had none to give. What then shall we say to the Latins?

By what reasonable argument, in the midst of the contest—or rather, not even at the beginning, for the question of "not adding" had nothing to do with the matter—what reason, I ask, did we have to turn back when we had not yet begun? We could not say; but they cried out rashly and without reason, ^A "Let us return to our homeland." They said among themselves, as it reached our ears, that the Latins were able to show very many sayings of many holy doctors, in which it is stated explicitly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. What then shall anyone answer to these things? "Let us be separated, let us be unyoked, let us depart." Do you hear the judgment of the doctors and Fathers? "Because," they say, "they have many sayings of many doctors to show, to which we have nothing to answer, let us divide ourselves from the Latins." Nevertheless, having finally, though with difficulty, perceived the rashness of their plan, and having been reasonably persuaded by the mighty Emperor, they desisted from that absurd undertaking and endeavor.

Meanwhile, the situation forced the journey of the most blessed Pope from Ferrara to Florence, and the transfer of the ^B council there. He departed, and we departed also. And once everything was prepared in Florence, the day on which we were to begin was appointed, and the set day arrived. Again, therefore, we began to accuse. For just as in the question regarding "not adding" — in which we played the role of accuser, and the Latins responded to our objections in such a way that we were in no position to say anything further—so also in this dogma, we indeed, as those who were accusing, raised the question; while they, taking the second place in the argument, responded. For in all things, we were arranging the cause according to our own judgment and whim.

And so, we began by introducing the question [starting] from the apostles themselves and all the holy councils, and their sayings, and furthermore we used the [words] of all the Oriental saints, by which it is shown ^C that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son—we have no such statement, as you yourself know very well, except for the saying of the Damascene, which says: "We call the Spirit the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say [He proceeds] from the Son." In all other sayings, it is shown only that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, not that He does not proceed from the Son. By bringing these forward, therefore, we thought we would show it to be false that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

But the Latins gave one common answer to all these sayings of the saints: that they are all true, and that they themselves think the same; for they themselves also believe ^D that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; yet this is not contrary to their own dogma. For that statement which says He proceeds from the Father is neither contradictory nor contrary to the other, which is that He proceeds from the Son. For if one of these were the alternative of the other, then, with one being stated, the other would necessarily be destroyed. But as it is, nothing prevents that which is from the Father from being true,

and that which is from the Son also from being true. ^A Just as if we were to say that the Holy Spirit is sent from the Father, and someone else says that the Spirit is sent from the Father and the Son, both are true, and the one does not at all conflict with the other. If, therefore, the saints said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or that He does not proceed from the Son, it would be logical for us to say they hold a false opinion. But since no one—neither then nor even now—has said either of these things, the statement that He proceeds from the Father does not destroy the statement that He proceeds from the Son.

These things they answered against our stated arguments; but as for that of Damascenus, since we did not put it forward ourselves, neither did they answer it. I, however, shall later provide you with a solution for this as well.

^B Afterward, they began from another starting point; relying and depending on the Holy Scripture, and having an abundance of minor propositions from that source, they proceeded to set forth, over the course of many days, many and various arguments showing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Finally, they brought forward the testimonies of the Fathers, in which the truth of this dogma appears clearly and explicitly. They brought forward [testimonies] not only of Western, but also of Eastern doctors. I have now sent you those among them that seemed most necessary to me, together with the others, so that you might hear even the Western Fathers themselves and what they think and teach regarding this dogma.

To these we had no reply to give, except that they were spurious and had been corrupted by the Latins. They brought forward our own Epiphanius, ^C in many places clearly theologizing that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son; we said his passages were adulterated. They read the aforementioned statement of the great Basil in his books *Against Eunomius*; to us it seemed to be an interpolation. They brought forward the sayings of the Western saints; our entire defense was that they were spurious, and nothing else.

For many days, therefore, considering and consulting among ourselves as to what we might answer to these points, we could find no defense other than this. But to bring this forward again seemed to us not a good thing, as it was highly absurd. First, because from what follows and what precedes, it was evident that ^D this was the mind of the saints. Second, because since very many and very ancient books contained this, we could not reject and refute them as being depraved. Especially since we had no book—neither Greek nor Latin—to show that it existed otherwise than as the Latins had presented it; how then could we reasonably characterize their books as corrupted? For certainly, anyone who wishes to proscribe another and exclude him as being vitiated and corrupted cannot do so in the least without proper justifications and firm reasons. We were unable to show other saints affirming the contrary; we could in no way demonstrate that these same Westerners spoke otherwise elsewhere; we were less able than anyone to prove them to be lying by means of physical arguments. Therefore, since we saw no reasonable cause left to us, for this reason we remained silent.

^A Still, there were not wanting those who abounded in another answer, namely that the Western saints had erred and were deceived in this. But it is manifest that this overturns our catholic faith. For if our faith hangs upon the saints, and they are deceived concerning the truth of the faith, the faith is overturned.

Therefore, for this reason, the union with the Latins followed and was confirmed with very good right, and all consented without any force, God being witness. But as many as would not consent (and these were two, and no more), they remained unforced and masters of themselves and their own opinion. Whether with right or merit, you yourself will judge, after you have seen and read the authorities of the saints which I now send to you. For who, set among Christians, would not follow these men, and stand with the company of these teachers, and likewise of the Orientals? For it is necessary to judge that they speak consonantly with one another, just as in the discourse written by me I show at length.

^B These sayings of the saints, then, are of themselves sufficient to resolve every ambiguity and to persuade every soul. For not even to me did syllogisms, or probabilities and demonstrations, but the very naked sayings of the saints, bring persuasion. For as soon as I saw and heard them, I immediately ceased from all contention and strife, although I had previously been contending not a little. For I judged that the saints, having spoken by the Holy Spirit, could not deviate from the truth, and I was vexed that I had not heard their words before. For no one among us ever used to think that the Latins would have such strength from the sayings of the saints. As soon, however, as I saw and heard them then, I departed from every contention and controversy, and gave thanks to God, that I had received such utility from thence. Therefore, to you also, as a candid listener and one having a soul desirous of the truth, and to every Christian like you, these alone will suffice.

^C But since you also ask for some proofs sought from reasoning, for your sake we shall perform this also in a moderate way, as far as it is possible, relying and leaning on the reasonings of the saints and the divine Scripture. This indeed we have also performed in the discourse which is inscribed *On Concord*. Nevertheless, we shall perform it here as well, touching upon certain arguments. But before we speak of these one by one, in order that our subsequent discourse may become easier, it is necessary to premise certain things.

Assumptions, and first, what would be the constitutive of the Person of the Father.

^D Since for each of beings, in addition to the common species, there is also another peculiar species, by which it is constituted and exists, and according to which it is called "this certain thing" and "a being"—just as of this human, suppose Peter, in addition to the common species, which is the common humanity, there is also another peculiar species, according to which this human is Peter, for example

his soul, obviously, or his body, or something else, which is for him the principle of being an individual; it must be sought in God and in the Father, too, what on earth is the peculiar species for him that constitutes his person. For there is a common species for him, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and an essential species, one and the same in number, namely the Godhead, according to which with them He is one God; yet He also has another peculiar species, not shared with the other persons, according to which He is this something and a person in the most holy Trinity. What this is, therefore, must be sought. ^A

That the unbegotten is not constitutive of Him.

That the cause is not constitutive of Him either.

That production is not constitutive of Him.

and proper species of the Father, and that the ^A procession follows Him once He is already constituted, or conversely, that the procession constitutes the paternal person, while the paternity and the begetting follow upon Him once He is already constituted. But if, on the one hand, to produce constitutes, while to beget follows, something absurd will ensue, and one that is contrary to the common teaching of the Fathers; and this is of such a kind. The primary and immediate operation of each person proceeds from its constitutive species, while all other operations [proceed] through this primary one, that is to say, through the operation; just as from the soul, which is the constitutive species of Peter, his primary and immediate operation proceeds, which is to live, while the rest are through this, such as to contemplate, to teach, to weave, to build, and the rest. For it is through living, which is his primary and immediate operation, ^B that all these and the remaining ones are brought to completion. If, therefore, to produce is the constitutive species of the person of the Father, spiration or procession will be His primary and immediate operation. And through that breathing and producing, the Son will be begotten, and the Spirit will no longer be through the Son, as the theologians say, but the Son will proceed through the Spirit; all of which is contrary to the truth, and to the traditions of the Fathers, and to their common usage.

Paternity is the constitutive property of the person of the Father.

But since these things are absurd, it remains that the paternity constitutes the paternal person, and that this is His incommunicable species, but the production follows His person once it is already constituted—not indeed as an accident or something adventitious, for there is no accident in the Trinity, but all things are according to nature and substance—and that to beget is the first ^C and immediate operation of the person of the Father, while to produce is brought to completion through the begetting. Let these points, therefore, be assumed as necessary for the whole argument of what is to be said.

Assumption 2.

Furthermore, let these points also be stated first as common ones. Of those things which are spoken of in God, some are common to all the persons, such as "good," and "wise," and all absolute attributes. Likewise also those negations regarding beings by way of supereminence, such as "invisible," and "incomprehensible," and those of that kind. Furthermore, as many as denote a relationship to creation, such as to be "creator," and "judge," and others of that sort. Such things, therefore, are common to all the persons. Some, however, are proper. And of that which is proper, some is common to two persons in a certain ^D relationship to the remaining person, just as it is proper to the Son and the Spirit to be caused, or proper to the Father and the Son to send the Holy Spirit, or for it to be called the Spirit of them both. Some, however, are proper to one person. Again, of those that are proper to one person, some are so personally proper that they are also hypostatic, as is the paternity, the sonship, and the procession; others, even if they attach to one alone, do not constitute the person but only distinguish it, as in the case of the Father, the "unbegotten." Neither, therefore, the common

to the three persons hypostatic properties, nor those things which are specific to two persons in relation to the third. But neither are those things which are proper to one person in such a way proper that they make that person noted and manifest and follow the person; rather, those alone are personal properties—paternity, to wit, and filiation and procession—inasmuch as these alone constitute the persons. Those things, however, which are proper to two persons in relation to the third exist as notions or properties of two persons. And these things are indeed thus.

These things having been said, the Holy Spirit is proven to proceed from the Father through the Son, in this manner. By the first and immediate operation of each, all other operations are brought to completion. The first and immediate operation of the Father is to generate; therefore, through the act of generating, the operation of spirating is brought to completion. And thus the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. As to what force this "through the Son" has, and what this preposition "through" signifies here—namely, an intervening and mediating cause—it is sufficiently demonstrated in the discourse *On Concord*.

Furthermore, the Holy Spirit proceeds either from the Father alone, or not from the Father alone; for there is no middle ground in a contradiction. ^B But indeed, it does not proceed from the Father alone; if, however, it is not from the Father alone, it is therefore from the Son also. That it does not proceed from the Father alone is shown thus: First, nowhere is it found stated either in the divine Scripture or among the teachers; and what has been said by none of these, no one should dare to say. Next, the act of producing, since it is an essential operation of the Father, is neither primary nor immediate; it is brought to completion through the primary one, which has been shown to be the act of generating and birth; so that it is necessary that the Son also be a participant in this operation, and that the Holy Spirit proceed through Him. Besides, since the Son is a partaker of all things with the Father, except for the constitutive properties, He will also have a common power of producing, which is indeed natural to the Father, but not ^C constitutive of His person, as has been said. So that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son. For it makes no difference in theology between "from" and "through."

If, however, anyone should say that the power of producing ought to be common also to the Holy Spirit, as being essential—for the Spirit Himself is also a partaker of all essential things—let such a person learn that this is impossible, because it conflicts with His own property. For the same thing cannot be the cause of itself. ^D For each of the divine persons...

communicates all essential attributes to the others, while remaining in that which they are, and preserving their own properties. For the great Basil says: "Remaining in that which He is, the Son has all that is the Father's." Therefore, the Spirit also, remaining in that which He is, the Spirit, has all that is the Father's and the Son's. By His own ^A argument, then, as has been said, it is contrary [to His nature] to be His own cause; and for this reason He cannot possess the active procession.

If, however, someone should say again: "But if the Spirit is devoid of the operation of producing, at least He will be a participant in generating, just as the Son participates in the power of producing," let him not overlook the fact that this, too, cannot be done in any way. First, because the operation of generating has been shown to be an operation of the constitutive character of the Father's person, which is incommunicable to another person; and for this reason, it is impossible for another person to participate in it. ^B Second, because it contains a contradiction within itself; for if the Spirit Himself generates the Son, yet proceeds from Him, He would be, in respect to the same person, both cause and caused. But this is a contradiction.

Yet perhaps someone will say that this absurdity follows from the fact that we presuppose that the Son produces the Spirit; but if this be not presupposed, but only that the Spirit together with the Father generates the Son, this absurdity will no longer follow. For why should the Spirit not rather generate the Son with the Father, instead of the Son producing the Spirit with the Father?

If anyone therefore should say these things, let him first know that he is seeking that which no one else has ever dared even to conceive. ^C Then, that the power of generating is conceived before the power of producing, as the first and immediate operation of the Father, as has been demonstrated; and for this reason the Spirit cannot participate in this. But the power of producing, since it is understood after the generation of the Son, and is brought about through the generation of His, as has been shown, it is not impossible, but rather even necessary, that it be communicated to Him.

If, however, someone for these reasons should say again: "Therefore the Spirit is less than the Father and the Son, since the Father both generates the Son and produces the Spirit, and the Son, together with the Father, likewise produces the Spirit; but the Spirit neither generates the Son, nor produces Himself, nor produces another spirit," ^D this reasoning is vain, and it concludes more against the one who says this. For if one must think that [not being] the cause of any person is a sign of imperfection and diminution in the Trinity, then that which produces fewer persons [(1)] will be more imperfect than that which produces more. But since the Son, being the cause of only one person, the Spirit, along with the Father, will be less than the Father, who is the cause both of the Son Himself and of the Spirit. But this is absurd even to conceive; therefore that other [claim] is also of the same absurdity. For to be a cause or caused in the Trinity is not to be something that marks a person as either greater or lesser than other persons.

^A Furthermore, if both the power of begetting and the power of putting forth are constitutive of the Father’s person individually and in part, and if the species of each operation is a principle, then there will be two species of these two operations. But each constitutive species constitutes a person. And thus the Father will be possessed of two persons. This, however, is absurd. Therefore, the power of putting forth does not constitute the Person of the Father. But if it does not constitute it, it is therefore common also to the Son. And thus the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

^B Furthermore, it is confessed in common by all the teachers that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. If, therefore, He proceeds from Him, He proceeds altogether naturally. For there is nothing in God that is against nature, nor anything acquired. For it is proper to creatures that they do not proceed from God by nature. If, therefore, the Spirit proceeds from the Son according to nature, and if such a procession according to nature among divine things admits of two modes, either by generation or by procession; and since He does not proceed from Him by generation—for then the Spirit would be a son of the Son—He therefore proceeds by procession. So that the procession of the Spirit from the Son would be as of one proceeding from Him.

But if anyone should say that this procession signifies the operation toward us and grace, ^C this refuge would be in vain. For although we participate in some grace, and not in the substance of the Spirit—for the substance is unparticipable—yet it is not a grace without subsistence that proceeds from the Son, but the very divine hypostasis of the Spirit. And it is manifest from other, more emphatic words regarding this that the teachers use—I mean "gushing forth," and "springing forth like a fountain," and "shining forth." To whom, if he be not blind, are these not an argument that they signify the existence of the Spirit, not a communication nor any bestowal of gifts? Such, therefore, is the hypostatic production of the Spirit from the Son, either servile or natural. But since it is not servile, it is necessarily natural. And as for a natural production of the person of the Spirit from the Son, what else could it be but His procession? It is not even easy to imagine.

^D Furthermore, all the Fathers, both Eastern and Western, proclaim in common that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and of the Son, and exists from their substance. But whatever is from the substance of someone in the Trinity is also from his person. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, when He is said to be from the substance of the Son, will also be from His hypostasis. But that in the Trinity, what is from the substance of someone is also from his hypostasis, is manifest from this: substance and hypostasis in each of the divine persons are one thing, and so one that they are distinguished from one another only by the mind and by reason. For if they were distinguished from one another in reality...

^A in the way that hypostasis and essence differ, there would be three essences just as there are three persons in reality. But this is contrary to the faith. Therefore, the distinction between hypostasis and essence exists by way of mental conception, but in reality [it is] a union; this is the opposite of how it is among us humans. For among us, the union of nature, that is to say of humanity, with each individual person makes them one by mental conception, but in reality they are two. For the common humanity is one thing, and the individuality of this particular person is another. Hence, just as we are many persons, so we are also many humans. And therefore, it is not necessarily the case that what is from the nature of anyone is also from his person. But in the most holy Trinity, as has been said, the exact opposite occurs: namely, that the union of nature and person is a reality, while the distinction is a matter of mental conception. Whence, what belongs to the nature of anyone of the persons also belongs of necessity to his hypostasis. If, therefore, the Spirit is from the nature of the Son—of which all the writings of Cyril are full—then it is also from his hypostasis.

Our people say that these things are said on account of consubstantiality, and in order that the Spirit be shown to be of the same substance as the Father and the Son. The Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son, but not conversely. That is indeed true; but the truer it is, the more it favors the Latins. For in this way the Spirit is all the more consubstantial ^B with the Father and the Son, inasmuch as he proceeds—that is, issues forth—from their substance and from them themselves. Let us speak somewhat more clearly for the sake of those whom words offend. For if [this phrase] signifies only consubstantiality in a simple sense, as our people suppose, then it ought also to be said that the Father is from the substance of the Son and of the Spirit. But no one has yet dared, nor will anyone dare, to say this, as long as he considers it worthwhile to be numbered among pious men, especially since—according to the opinion of theologians and also of the philosophers themselves—substance neither begets nor produces; for they themselves also shout everywhere throughout the whole of philosophy that operations belong to individuals, not to universals. For it was not "man" in the simple sense that begot me, but a certain individual man. If, therefore, as has been said, operations belong to individuals and not to universals, nor to substance in the simple sense, what else ought we to understand when we hear of the "substance of the Son" and that the Spirit proceeds from it, other than his divine hypostasis?

Nor should it escape us ^C that the saints who say these things were speaking in opposition to the Arians and Eunomians, who indeed confessed that the Son was from the Father and the Spirit from the Son, but denied that this was "from the substance," asserting that the Son was from the Father indeed, but not substantially, having been begotten by the will of the Father; and that the Spirit was likewise from the Son, but not substantially, only by will. Therefore ^D [they asserted that] the Son was less than the Father and of another substance

^A so as to make three substances in the deity.

The Fathers and doctors, therefore, fighting against them, contended to show that the Holy Spirit is not only from the Son, but also from his substance: and likewise that the Son is not only from the Father, but also from his substance. ^B See then, I pray, how the doctors responded to the claim that the Spirit is from the will of the Son and not from his substance, crying out that he is from the substance of the Son; but against the statement that he is from the Son, no one opposed, nor said that he is not from the Son, as if they themselves thought this, and understood him to be from the substance of the Son, just as from his hypostasis and his substance, and taught us who understand them.

Furthermore, the great Basil, in the first book *Against Eunomius*, says that the Son has a natural order toward the Father, and such as that which what proceeds from fire has toward the fire, and the caused toward the cause. ^C The same saint also contends that the Spirit has an order toward the Son according to the things aforementioned. Moreover, the great Athanasius says even more clearly: "The order and nature that the Son has toward the Father, such an order and nature has the Spirit toward the Son." Reason thus, then: The Spirit has such an order and nature toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father; but the Son has a natural order toward the Father, who is cause to the caused; thus also the Son is the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit.

Furthermore, since in human and natural things every cause precedes the caused in time, and the caused is later than its cause; ^D for this reason some who hear of "cause" and "caused" in the Trinity, and especially the Arians and Eunomians, have attempted from human examples to remove the coeternity of the Trinity, and to show the Son as later in time than the Father, inasmuch as he is caused by him. To these the divine Gregory of Nyssa, opposing them and proposing to demonstrate the coeternity of the three hypostases, in the first of his books in which he refutes Eunomius, makes a certain analogy of the Son to the Father and the Spirit to the Son, asserting that the Father is indeed pre-understood before the Son solely by the reason of cause, yet not according to the designation of time, and therefore the reason of coeternity is in no way endangered; and again, that the Son himself is also pre-understood before the person of the Holy Spirit solely by mind and thought, according to the reason of cause.

So that it may appear clearly that this doctor is of the opinion that the Son is the cause of the Spirit. For just as the Son is joined to the Father, so too, he says, the Spirit is joined to the Son; and again, as the Father is pre-understood before the Son, not by any interval of time, nor by thing, but by thought

according to the principle of cause. ^B

Furthermore, even if in human affairs and according to us, not every exemplar of something is also its cause—for the exemplars of craftsmen are not also the efficient causes of those things whereof they are the exemplars, namely of their images—nevertheless, that which exists as an exemplar by nature is, even in these human things, the cause of the image of which it is the exemplar. Much more, therefore, in divine matters, where all other things as well as the exemplar itself are taken by nature (for nothing there is contrary to nature), will this proposition be true, namely: that which in the divine persons is the exemplar of some thing is also the cause of that of which it is the exemplar. But Gregory Thaumaturgus asserts the Son to be the exemplar of the Spirit: wherefore he thought the Son also to exist as the cause of the Spirit. Moreover, this will be shown from the similar. For Basil the Great calls the Father the exemplar of the Son in the fourth book *Against Eunomius*; but Gregory Thaumaturgus, as has been said, teaches that the Son is the exemplar of the Spirit in the discourse the beginning of which is: "Most hostile and alien to the apostolic confession are they who assert the Son to be from non-entities." But Basil says the Father, as the cause of the Son, is the exemplar of the Son: therefore Gregory also contends strongly that the Son, as the cause of the Spirit, is the exemplar of the Spirit.

Furthermore, both by Basil the Great and by most of the saints, the Son is called the image of the Father, and the Spirit the image of the Son; the Son is the operation of the Father, the Spirit the operation of the Son; the Son is the Word of the Father, the Spirit the word of the Son; the Son is the fragrance of the Father, the Spirit the fragrance of the Son. But all those things the Son is called in relation to the Father, inasmuch as he exists from the Father. Therefore, the Holy Spirit also is called the same in relation to the Son, inasmuch as he exists from the Son.

Furthermore, if the Spirit were not from the Son, he would not be personally distinguished from him. But to say this is absurd; for thus the Trinity would be limited to a duality. Therefore, the Spirit is from the Son, if he is to be personally distinguished. Moreover, that if he were not from him, he would not be personally distinguished from him, is manifest from this. Every cause of any thing is said to be its principle and cause in two ways: in one way, as that "from which" or "by which," and in general the principle whence a thing has its being; but in the second way, as that "by which," such as is the species which is in the mind of the craftsman, by which he produces every effect similar to it. Wherefore, everything acting produces something similar to itself according to the species by which it acts. As for example, the cause of this image is both the painter himself, as that whence the principle is, and the species of the image formed in the soul of the painter, as that by which the painter makes the image similar. Thus, therefore, in the divine persons, the Father is the cause as the "from which," that is, His own divine hypostasis, but as the "by which," it is His divine essence; for this

^A is the species by which the things that are produced from Him become similar. And therefore both the Son and the Spirit are consubstantial with Him, because every producer produces that which is similar in species to that by which it produces; and God and the Father produce both the Son and the Spirit by His own divine essence, and for this reason He produces them consubstantial with Himself. If, therefore, the Father alone produces the Spirit, according to those who speak thus, then there will be no distinction between the Son and the Spirit, there being no difference either in the producer—for it is the same Father—or in the species by which He produces—for it is the same divine essence—or in the products themselves—for they are of the same species of the one and common divinity—nor indeed is any matter discerned there from which a distinction might arise. And thus, according to this argument, their distinction would be entirely abolished. It remains, therefore, either that the Spirit is the cause of the Son, or the Son is the cause of the Spirit, if they are to be distinguished from one another. But the first is not the case; therefore, the latter.

Furthermore, to be sent, in God, signifies to be from a cause. And the divine Chrysostom is our witness, against the Arians who were questioning how the sender and the one sent are of the same substance, in the thirty-ninth homily of the discourses on John: "Again you turn the discourse to human things, and you humble it, and you do not understand that all these things were said for no other reason than that we might recognize the cause, and not fall into the disease of Sabellius; but the Spirit is sent by the Son; therefore, He is also from Him." ^B

Furthermore, this power of sending, existing in the Father and the Son, according to which both send the Holy Spirit—as is also acknowledged by our own people—is either the same in the Father and the Son, or it is one thing and another. But if it is one thing and another, there will clearly also be a greater and a lesser, and consequently the missions will also be different. Therefore, there will not be one power and one operation for them; and consequently, they will be of different essences; for those whose powers are unequal, their essences are also unequal, since power flows from essence. But these things are both absurd and blasphemous and detestable. Therefore, the power is not one thing and another; therefore, it is the same. But in the Father, the power to send the Spirit is conjoined with the power to produce Him; for the Father always breathes the Holy Spirit, and, breathing Him, He sends Him. Therefore, the Son also, along with the power of breathing, produces and sends Him; and so the Son is also a producer of the divine Spirit. ^C

But as for what some say about a second and temporal mission or procession here, it is nothing, and it is resolved from the same argument already mentioned. For besides the fact that this duplication of the processions is nowhere to be found in Scripture, if we were even to grant that there is some second procession, which the Son shares with the Father, then He will certainly possess it also in the same way as the Father. For nothing is dissimilar to those...

^A that are common to the Father and the Son. But the Father possesses the power of sending along with that of producing, as has been said. Therefore, the Son also will possess it along with the act of producing.

Furthermore, whatever is of someone by nature is also from him in the sense that it is said to be his. Now the Holy Spirit is of the Son, and indeed entirely by nature; for it is not contrary to nature, nor as a slave. The Holy Spirit, therefore, insofar as He is the Holy Spirit—that is, insofar as He is a divine person in the Trinity—is from the Son.

Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is a relative term, and it is manifest that He is called the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son; for if He were absolute, He would not be called the [Spirit] of anyone. Nor is it ^B the property of absolute things, according to the meaning underlying the name, to be called another’s, unless indeed it be according to some other relation; just as a man, though he is an absolute thing, is not called a man “of someone,” but rather a slave “of someone.” But the Spirit, according to the meaning underlying the name itself, is called the Spirit of the Son, just as He is of the Father; He is therefore something relative, and consequently is referred back to the one who breathes [Him] forth. He is therefore the Spirit of the Father and the Son, as of those who breathe Him forth and produce Him.

Furthermore, it is proper to the Holy Spirit, Himself one person of the Trinity, to be called Holy Spirit. It is also peculiar to Him to be called a production, or that which is produced. Therefore, to be called produced and the Spirit are the same thing. Thus, of whom He is the Spirit, of him also is He that which is ^C produced. But He is and is called the Spirit of the Son, just as [He is of] the Father: therefore, He is also the produced [Spirit] of the Son, just as [He is of] the Father.

But if anyone should say that the Spirit is called of the Son for the reason that He is sent by Him, he is mistaken. For the contrary is rather the case; for causes are always prior to their effects. Now, to be the Spirit of the Son is prior, while to be sent is posterior. For whether you take this mission that occurs in time, it is without doubt posterior to that which is existing as the Spirit of the Son, which is eternal; or whether you understand an eternal mission, even in this way, to exist as the Spirit of the Son precedes in mind and thought. Because to be the Spirit of the Son is understood as having, while to send ^D is understood as giving. But to have is envisioned before that which is to give. Therefore, this argument is rather in our favor. For because He is His Spirit by nature, He sends Him by nature. And since a natural production in divine things exists either by way of generation or by way of procession, and since this is not by way of generation, it is therefore by way of procession. And thus the mission of the Spirit from the Son is His procession from Him.

Furthermore, the Holy Spirit receives from the Son: “For He,” He says, “shall receive of mine.” Now, that which He receives is His essence. For His essence is not one thing, and that which He receives another, for in that case He would be composite. But surely, in the highest eminence of simplicity...

He and those things which are His are one thing; therefore, He receives His essence from Him. ^A His essence, therefore, and His being, He receives from the Son. For the text, *He shall receive of mine*, is not to be understood, as some falsely think, as *of my Father*.

First, because this is not a Greek expression. For if it were intended that *of my Father* be understood from the phrase *of mine*, then *my* (ἐμοῦ) would be a masculine pronoun. But no one versed in the Greek language would use a masculine or feminine pronoun without an adjunct, but always with an appendix: saying, *my brother* or *my friend*, and *my house* or *my city*. To say *my* simply, however, signifies a father no more than it signifies an enemy.

Next, from the aim and structure of the discourse, and from the composition of the Savior Himself, this answering is shown to be vain. For, He says, *all things that the Father hath are mine; therefore said I unto you, that He shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you*. ^B So that the reasoning is as follows: The Spirit receives from the things of the Father; all things of the Father are mine; therefore the Spirit receives from my things, or from *mine*. But He and His own are one thing on account of [His] utter simplicity; therefore He receives His essence from Him. Furthermore, the great Athanasius expounds it in this way, saying: For the Word does not receive from the Spirit, but the Spirit from the Word. What, then, does He receive from the Son? Clearly, wisdom and knowledge: *For of mine*, He says, *He shall take, and shall show it unto you*. For to show is to teach and to illuminate the apostles; but this is the work of wisdom. Therefore, the Spirit receives wisdom from the Son. What then? Was He, once produced by the Father, without wisdom, and was it then necessary for Him to receive wisdom from the Son? ^C Or is His wisdom something different, and His essence something different? But it is absurd to say these things. For His wisdom is the same as His being; and from Him from whom He had His being, from Him He also received His wisdom; and in the very act of being produced, and receiving His being, He also received His subsistence and His wisdom. Therefore, in receiving wisdom from the Son, by this very same act He received His being and His essence from Him. The Son is therefore truly the cause of His existence.

Furthermore, if the Spirit receives from the Son, the Son gives to Him; but "to give" in the divine persons signifies to produce Him, and nothing else. For indeed Chrysostom, explaining the passage, *He hath given all judgment unto the Son*, says thus: ^D "And that you may learn that this word 'gave' stands in place of 'begat,' hear this signified from another passage. For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. What then? Did He beget Him first, and then give Him life? Therefore He was begotten without life. But not even demons would say this. For besides the fact that it is impious, it is also foolish. As, therefore, the phrase 'He gave Him life' means 'He begat Him life,' so also 'He gave Him judgment' means 'He begat Him judge.'" Therefore, according to these things, the Son also, in giving wisdom to the Spirit, produces Him

^A and imparts to Him essence and being, which the Spirit receives as He proceeds from Him. Therefore, the Son is also a cause of the procession of the Spirit.

Moreover, the Son says concerning Himself: "What I have heard from My Father, I have announced to you"; but concerning the Holy Spirit: "He will not speak from Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak." What, therefore, "to hear from the Father" signifies in the Son, this will also signify the "hearing" in the Spirit. But in the Son, to hear signifies to be from a cause, and to be begotten; for to hear is to receive wisdom and knowledge. Now the Son was not begotten first and then later received knowledge or wisdom; but He was begotten as Wisdom, having received in the very act of being begotten both knowledge and wisdom, and all other things which are identical with His essence. Hearing this, therefore, from the Father, He receives it from Him; and for Him, to hear is to be begotten. Therefore, for the Spirit, to hear signifies that He is from a cause and that He is produced. Consequently, from Him whom He hears, from Him He also proceeds. But He hears not only from the Father, but no less also from the Son; therefore, He also proceeds from the Son. ^B That He also hears from the Son is clear from the words of the Savior, where He says: "He will take from what is Mine, and will announce it to you." For of the "announcing," the cause is clearly the "hearing." Again, of this same "announcing," the cause is the "taking from the Son." Thus, "to take from the Son" and "to hear" are causes of the same and one thing, clearly of the "announcing." Therefore, in divine matters, to hear is the same as to take from the Son. Therefore, He hears. But also the great Basil, in his *Ascetica*, in the discourse which begins, "By the grace of the good God," says concerning the Holy Spirit: "And (He is) the One who teaches and suggests all things whatsoever He might hear from the Son." Hearing from the Son, He also proceeds from Him, because His hearing is nothing other than proceeding, as has been said.

Furthermore, to be the Father, or to beget, does not contain within itself the rationale of producing—for otherwise the Spirit would be the Son. But the Son possesses simply all that is the Father's, except to beget or to be the Father. For Saint Cyril says, in the second dialogue *Ad Hermiam*: "We believe the Son to be coeternal with the Father, and possessing everything else equal to Him, except only begetting; for this belongs solely to God and Father." The same author in his discourse *De Trinitate*: ^C "In the only-begotten Son, in all things like and equal to the Father, without paternity." Therefore, the Son possesses the power to produce; since this is beyond the rationale of paternity, yet the Son possesses all things of the Father, except for paternity, that is, except to beget, as it seems to Cyril.

Furthermore, Gregory of Nyssa, in his homily on the *Pater Noster*, the beginning of which is: "When the great Moses was teaching the Israelite people the mysteries near the mountain, handing down the distinction of the Holy Trinity, he separates the Father from the Son and the Spirit in that He Himself is the cause, while they are caused." But the Son, on the other hand...

the Son, and [the] Spirit, who share with one another in that both are caused, he distinguishes one from the other by the fact that the One is from the Father—and here he stops—while the Spirit is from the Father and from the Son. For so do the older manuscripts have it. Wherefore, ^A according to the opinion of this doctor as well, the Spirit is from the Son. But if some, following the more recent manuscripts, should say that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, but not that He is from the Son, even then, this will be of no advantage to them, for the same conclusion will be drawn from this, whether they will it or not. For it is evident that, having found the Son and the Spirit to be such that they are caused, and that both share with one another, he asks by what they might be distinguished from one another; and he states that, even if it is common to both that they are caused, yet the Son is ^B called from the Father, and in this his property stands; but the Spirit is said to be from the Father, and is testified to be of the Son. Therefore, the Spirit is also the Spirit of Christ, but the Son is not, nor is He called, the Spirit of the holy [Spirit]; nor is this relative sequence reciprocal, he says. And the doctor thinks this suffices for a distinction: that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, whereas the Son is not called the Spirit of the Spirit. If, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son distinguishes Him from the Son, and yet, according to our side, nothing else distinguishes Him from the Son but the different manner of procession—that is to say, to proceed—then it is the same thing for the Spirit to be of the Son as it is to proceed [from Him]. And thus, from whom He is said to be the Spirit, from Him He also proceeds. But He is said to be the Spirit of the Son, just as He is of the Father; therefore, ^C He proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father.

And at the same time, it must be noted that the interpretation of some is overturned—those saying that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son because of consubstantiality. For look: the doctor takes it as something that distinguishes them. But things taken because of consubstantiality rather unite than distinguish. If, therefore, the Spirit is not called the Spirit of the Son because of consubstantiality, all the demonstrations of the Latins remain indissoluble, by which, arguing from the fact that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, they prove that He also proceeds from Him. For some thought that they could overturn those things brought forward ^D by the Latins through this perverse interpretation, supposing that He is called the Spirit of the Son on account of consubstantiality. But Gregory of Nyssa openly contradicts this understanding, since he has adopted it as something that distinguishes.

But to show the truth of this conclusion, and to conclude that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, while there are many things one might use and from which one might argue, these shall suffice for the present.

Since, however, some absurdities are brought against those who hold this truth by those who do not apply their minds to it, I have, so far as it was possible, concisely refuted in the arguments themselves what they object against the proofs that demonstrate this problem; but concerning those things which they bring against the conclusion itself, the matters that are most urgent and ma—

^Agni, and seem to have more force, I shall select them and provide you with solutions, briefly and as fully as the nature of the matter permits, so that our discourse may be as complete as possible. Although these absurdities are not brought against us, nor are we beholden to render an account of them; rather, it is the saints who must be blamed long beforehand, they who have stood as our leaders in this dogma—and I do not say only the Latins, who most clearly confess this, but the Easterners no less—and from them the solutions must be sought. Which, indeed, they have already gone ahead and done. Even if it is not the act of a sound mind not to rest content with what has been said by them, since one must believe that they spoke by the Divine Spirit, nevertheless, as far as we are able, and being enlightened by what we have learned from them and other blessed men who have labored in these matters, we shall apply ourselves moderately to these things.

They imagine, therefore, that if anyone says the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, either the Father and the Son are merged into one person, so that they make one person out of two, or if not this, then at least two principles and two causes must follow, which in itself is no less absurd than the former.

Solution of the absurdity arising from the merging of persons.

^BWe respond thus to that charge of the merging of persons: If we were to posit that the operation of ‘producing’ were the personal or hypostatic property of the person of the Father, then that absurdity would indeed follow, and the Son would truly be one person with the Father, if he were a participant in the constitutive property of the Father. But since it has been stated that the paternity and the begetting are what constitute the property of the person of the Father, while ‘producing’ is a property or notion that follows the person already constituted, what necessity is there that he who participates in this property—which is by no means constitutive of the person himself—should be one person with him? For just as the Son participates with the Father in the fact that the Spirit is His Spirit, just as He is of the Father, and that He is sent by Him just as He is sent by the Father, yet He does not thereby participate in His person, because the fact that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father, or is sent by Him, is not that which constitutes the person of the Father; in this way, neither does He, by becoming a participant and partner in the ‘producing,’ merge with Him into one person. Because ‘producing’ is not constitutive of the person of the Father. So, as long as one cannot show that ‘producing’ is constitutive of the person of the Father, he will not be able to prove a merging of ^C persons either. But one cannot prove that ‘producing’ is constitutive of the person of the Father. For in this way he would show the Father to be endued with a dual personhood and having two hypostases, as was stated in the beginning, which is absurd. Furthermore, that ‘producing’ is constitutive of the Father and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone are one and the same thing; wherefore, he who says this begs the question. ^D

^A

It was also said in the beginning of this inquiry what things are said of God commonly, and what things distinctly. And of the distinct things, which are proper to two persons, and which to one alone. And of the things proper to one alone, which are so proper as to be hypostatic, and which so proper as to be distinctive, but not hypostatic. Of this kind was what was said earlier regarding ‘producing’, so that from both the things now said and those assumed earlier, the solution to this absurdity is manifest. Nor can we justly accuse the Latins as if they were making a confusion of the divine persons.

^B

Solution of the absurdity regarding the dual principle.

But regarding the dual principle, and the objection that two causes are thereby concluded to exist in the Godhead—which our [countrymen] are accustomed to think the Latins follow more than shadows—what might one say? What indeed, other than that we should simply be content with the authority of the saints themselves who deny this, having set it forth? For the Father and the Son, says Augustine, are not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but one principle of Him, and both of them together; just as, also regarding creation, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three principles, but the Trinity, God, is the one principle of it.

For what clearer solution could one seek than that which the Holy Spirit utters through this Father and doctor? For let it not escape us that this same absurdity, namely of a plurality of principles and a plurality of gods, would also follow in the production of creation, if one does not pay heed. Which is indeed alien to the Christian religion, but consonant with the Gentiles. For that which we most strongly reproach the Gentiles for, this is it: that they introduced many makers of the world and many gods. If, therefore, we also say that the three hypostases are causes of creation, this absurdity will follow for us, and there will be many principles and [many] deities.

But listen to how the teachers wisely dissolve this. For although we say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are equally causes of creation, nevertheless, because the principle of created things is referred to the Father, and from Him both the Son and the Spirit have their very being and the power to create—for the Father not existing, neither would the Son nor the Spirit exist, nor would they have the power to create; and furthermore, because they create by one and the same numerical power, proceeding from the one and same common Godhead—for this reason, he is rightly called one God, and one Maker of the world. Therefore, this is also sufficiently apt for those who are hesitant and searching regarding the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. For that which is on this account truly and properly one

cause and one principle of the procession of the Spirit, this is sufficiently demonstrated, as has been said. Yet, this same thing is also shown by reason. For since there are two things, as has been said, to which everything that is produced is referred—namely, the species according to which it is produced, and the subject or person from whom it is produced—if the Father and the Son were two ^A in their species according to which they bring forth the Spirit, just as they are two in their hypostases, and were entirely split and divided into two parts, then it would indeed not be surprising—nay, it would even be necessary—to speak of two principles of the Holy Spirit. But now, although it is agreed among all that they are two by their hypostases, yet because they are one in number according to the species by which they bring forth [the Spirit], and are completely indivisible (for the divine essence, according to which both bring forth the Holy Spirit, is one and the same in number, existing as common to both), it is not necessary—and indeed it is in no way possible—that they be called two principles. For there is one essential and common productive force and power of theirs. And while this is doubtless granted to be essential, it cannot, however, be common to the Holy Spirit, because, as has often been said, it is contrary to His property. For all things that the Son and the Holy Spirit have in common with the Father, as this too has not been said rarely, are held with their own properties preserved; for the Son is all things that the Father is, according to the great Basil and the other teachers, ^B while remaining in that which He is as Son, that is, preserving His own property. For although He is as equal and similar as possible to the Father, He cannot, however, beget Himself, because it would be contrary to His property. Therefore, the Holy Spirit also has all things in common with the Father and the Son, while remaining in that which He is as Spirit, that is, preserving His own property. Whence He cannot bring forth Himself, although He is a participant in all things, because that would be contrary to His own person. Wherefore, in no part is the argumentation of those who charge the Latins with a "duarchy" just or rational.

Solution of the absurdity deduced from imperfection

But they say: "Either the production from the Father is perfect, and that from the Son is vain, or if the production from the Son is necessary, that from the Father is imperfect." This, however, is absurd: to call the operation of the Father imperfect and to say that it needs the Son for its perfection. ^D We, however, say to these men that those who say such things seem in all matters to split and divide the Father and the Son and their operations, relying entirely upon human examples. And because they see the operations of two men—two in number, and separated from one another, even if they tend toward one result—they imagine that the same thing applies to God and the divine persons. And thence they bring forth such doubts. But to think this is absurd. For the Father and the Son, being distinguished by their persons alone, are in all other respects one and the selfsame.

And therefore, also regarding this productive power, not less, nor separately does each one—whether one indeed prior, the other subsequent, or one by a different production, the other by another—produce the Spirit, as one of those who exist in all things as gross and corporeal might suppose; but simultaneously, and before time, and by one and the selfsame power, both producing him perfectly and more than perfectly, they leave no place for these futile arguments.

But if not, let those who say these things be asked in turn: is the creation of the world from the Father perfect, or imperfect? If it is perfect, why are the Son and the Spirit [also] causes? If it is imperfect, and for this reason the Son and the Spirit are joined as if they were associates, let them observe for themselves what they are saying. ^B But I know for certain that the production of beings from the Father is indeed perfect, and that the operation of the Son and of the Spirit into the same production is one in number, and not one different for Him and another for them. For then, these puerile questions would have a place. Thus, therefore, in the matter proposed, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is perfect indeed, and more than perfect; and it is the same and one in number; and that which is from the Son is a procession of the same, not one different from another, nor somehow one thing and somehow another, nor at one time from the Father and at another time from the Son, but simultaneously and the same; and similarly, both produce him by one and the selfsame power.

And let no one here insult the argument, hearing us drawing evidence from creation, saying, "Therefore, the Latins think the Holy Spirit is a creature." For there are some who have reached such a pitch of madness, and have dared to oppose this to the Latins. ^C For these things are either of those who are trifling or of those who are ignorant of the holy Fathers and teachers, who often, to show what may be in divine matters from human things, make use of those that have even a faint trace of divine likeness to establish and confirm those things. Straightway, they deem it sufficient to set forth the third of the hypostases by "mind, word, and spirit," and further by "eye, source, and river," and again by "sun, ray, and light"—although each of these examples, even if they are three in conception and in name, belong to one hypostasis and nature. ^D Yet, nevertheless, the Fathers did not think that the truth proposed to them was damaged by these examples; but taking as much as was consistent with their aim, they rejected the remainder, and what did not fit. And no one has reproached them, nor would they reproach them—if they were of a sound mind—for the sake of the use of these examples.

How then, again, could anyone justly accuse the Latins for using the one and same creative act of the Trinity, which proceeds to beings, to show that the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is one and the same in number? Or for what reason could anyone dare on account of this to say that they rank the Holy Spirit among the creatures? Especially since none of the Latins who are now, nor those who [lived] after the disjunction...

^A first said this, but it was said by the ancient saints themselves. For Augustine, who surpassed all in the depth of his wisdom, he who was seen to be inferior to no one in holiness and love towards God, is the one who says this—that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle of the procession of beings. Let them also accuse the divine Athanasius, who says: "The nature of God is the cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and of all creation," in the disputation he published against the Anomoeans and the Orthodox.

But as for the absurdities that some are accustomed to bring forward from [their] reasoning as logical consequences against our most true conclusion, even if there are many others, yet they all essentially return to these; and once these have been sufficiently refuted, those others also rest upon very weak foundations, and strike those who throw them rather than those against whom they are cast. Therefore, what has been said will be sufficient for all of them.

Solution of the sayings that seem to oppose the Latins.

It remains to consider what they attempt [to argue] from certain sayings of the saints, assuming that they oppose the Latins and the truth of the dogma, imagining that they conclude a contradiction from them. One of these is that of the divine Damascene in his ^B *Theological* [works], saying: "We say the Spirit is of the Son, but we do not say [he is] from the Son." Another is that of the blessed Dionysius, saying: "The Father is the sole fount of the supersubstantial deity; for if there is also something else [said] in the sayings of the saints, it is of the same meaning and refers to the same thought"—since these are the strongest of those that appear to be set against the Latins.

Solution of the saying of the Damascene

Hear, then, how simple, clear, and just is the reply that the Latins and the defenders of the Latin position possess regarding the statement of the Damascene, which should be sufficient to persuade everyone.

No single name, they say, is sufficient to explain the things concerning God and divine matters; rather, it is through many and various [terms]—one thing explained by one name, another by another—that we are able to signify them, though not perfectly. For these names and words invented by us—who, guided by nature, arrange things and impose names upon natural objects to which they correspond—are powerless to signify ^C and make plain in a perfect way those things which are beyond nature. Whence, fair judges of things should not apply the imperfection of names to divine matters; for that would be neither just nor yet pious.

But since we are unable to explain divine things with other names—for it is utterly impossible for us, being mortals—we must use these human names, and use them insofar as it is ^D proper, fitting each one of them through these words to the task at hand, while rejecting as incomplete and absurd anything that is not fitting.

^A Igitur, in the present matter regarding the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, two things are sought: the first is that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit equally and alike, not one more perfectly and the other less perfectly, for this would be contrary to the truth of the faith. The second is that the Son has a relation and order in producing [the Spirit] toward the Father. For both of these are truly present to the Son and to the Father. Indeed, there is in them an extreme equality of power, or rather identity, and an extreme order; for all that the Son has, He has by having received it from the Father, and this very [power] to produce the Spirit as well. ^B If, therefore, it were possible to find some one word that would be apt to declare at once both the extreme identity of their power and also the extreme order by which they look to each other, we would certainly use that before all else. But as it is, not only is this in no way possible, and it is necessary to indicate one of these things by one name and the other by another, but also in each of these names, in addition to indicating only one of the things meant, there resides a not insignificant defect. Wherefore we, acting rightly and piously, take what is fitting from these and reject what is discordant. Such are these prepositions, I say: *ex* (from) and *per* (through). For the preposition *ex* signifies equality very strongly in the matters in which it is used, but an order of one toward another, not at all. If anything is said to be from two things—for example, if some weight is pulled by two—it is signified that it is pulled equally and in the same way from both, as far as the force of the preposition is concerned; but by this, no order of one toward the other is understood. ^C The preposition *per*, however, signifies the exact opposite: order, and very strongly, but equality not at all. For if anything is said to be or to be made from this through that, it is clearly indicated that the one of whom the preposition *per* is spoken has an order toward the one of whom the preposition *ex* is predicated, and that the former is able to receive from the latter; but the equality which they have between themselves is by no means indicated. For he of whom the preposition *per* is said is shown to be of lesser power and authority. ^D For this reason, the doctors and Fathers, both Eastern and Western, looking toward the equality or rather the identity of power of the Father and the Son, state that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that He is and proceeds from the Father and the Son, wishing to show the identity of their power in producing [the Spirit], and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both by one and the same production. But when it was proposed to them to show more the order by which they look to each other, they lay down that the Spirit Himself proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that He is from the Father through the Son, and from God through the Son. All of which shows most clearly His procession into being and His hypostatic existence.

^A There are some among the saints, however, who have looked either to order alone, as do the majority of the Orientals, or to equality alone, as do most of the Westerners. Wherefore, just as the Westerners, valuing equality and identity more highly, use the preposition “from” everywhere, so the Orientals—among whom is numbered also the divine Damascene—preferring order, use “through” for the most part, and only rarely adopt “from,” not indeed by stating contrary opinions to one another, but by signifying different meanings through different words.

For this reason, even in the creation of the world, although all things are clearly produced from the Son just as they are from the Father, you will nonetheless find it very rarely among the saints, and especially among the Orientals, that they say the world is produced “from the Son,” but always “through the Son,” following that saying, *All things were made through Him*. Thus the Orientals looked rather to order, and for this reason they use the preposition “through,” which can signify order alone. Especially since the preposition “from” in the Greek language signifies a procatarctic (that is, original, receiving its power of causation from no other, and, as the theologians assert, a principle of origin without beginning) cause. The Son, however, cannot be said to be such a cause, either of the world or of the Holy Spirit. On this account, the Fathers avoid using the preposition “from” in [speaking of] Him, lest someone might suspect a procatarctic cause in Him. And why do I say “from,” when they even decline to use the very name of “cause” regarding the Son or the Spirit, as far as possible? And yet, they are clearly causes of creation, or rather, they are one cause along with the Father. And you would very rarely find them using this term, because they fear that He might seem to some to be the original cause—which they certainly would not wish. For they acknowledge the Father alone as the original cause of divinity and creation.

^D If, therefore, the Latins, with the Western saints—and not a few of the Orientals—affirming the Holy Spirit [to be] from the Father and the Son, do not say that the Son is the original cause, but declare and express the identity of their power; and if the Damascene, denying the original cause—which is accustomed to be signified by that preposition “from”—looked rather to order, and for this reason uses the preposition “through,” conceding that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, by which manner of speech the order of the Son to the Father is declared, while he himself does not even reject the equality or identity of their power—how could they speak in a way more in agreement with one another? For he himself is the one who said concerning the Father: “He is therefore the abyss of Mind, the begetter of the Word, and through the Word the producer of the manifesting Spirit.” And again: “The Holy Spirit is the manifesting power of the hidden divinity of the Father, proceeding from the Father through the Son.” But that by this preposition “through,” both the Son and the Father are declared by this doctor and the other Fathers to be the cause of—

^A the subsistence of the Spirit is shown sufficiently in the discourse concerning union which I have written, and especially with the term “proceeding” added, which, even according to our own people, signifies nothing other than the existence of the Spirit. These things, then, are for what is objected against us from the writings of Damascene.

Solution of the dictum of Saint Dionysius.

But regarding the dictum of Saint Dionysius, in order that it may be demonstrated more clearly ^B and purely that it does not have the meaning which our opponents suppose, we must first hear the teachers who concede that the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, not of certain non-subsistent gifts (for many are accustomed to use and apply this frequently to every statement), but of the very hypostasis of the Spirit. First, therefore, Athanasius, in his discourse against the Arians, explaining that psalm verse, “For with Thee is the fountain of life” (Ps. XXXV, 10), says: “He knew, he said—the Father, that is—that He had with Himself the Son, the fountain of the Holy Spirit.”

Certainly, then, he signifies the hypostasis here, not some unsubstantiated gift. For we have a rule delivered to us by the great Basil, ^C that whenever we hear “Holy Spirit” with the addition of “holy,” we must understand nothing other than the hypostasis of the Spirit. Here, therefore, the Son being called the fountain of the Holy Spirit with the addition of “holy,” it is said, clearly, to be the fountain of His hypostasis.

Then, too, the great Basil himself, who delivered this rule to us, calls the Son the fountain of the Holy Spirit, saying thus: “The Son is the fountain of life.” For David says to the Father, “For with Thee is the fountain of life.” And again, another prophet says concerning the Jews: “They abandoned Me, the fountain of living water” (Jer. II, 13). Now, living water is the name given to the Holy Spirit.

^D And note that he says “Holy Spirit,” signifying the hypostasis and person; but the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is God. The Son, therefore, being the fountain of the Holy Spirit, is clearly the fountain of Godhead. Wherefore the dictum of divine Dionysius, asserting that the Father alone is the fountain of the supersubstantial Godhead, since it does not oppose the aforementioned saints (for it is not right to imagine that the teachers are contrary to one another), has some other meaning than that which appears to many; and he does not deny that the Son is the fountain of the Spirit when he says these things, but he himself would also say, along with these teachers, that the Son is the fountain of the Spirit—that is, of His hypostasis.

These things being first clarified, we say next that it was not the intention of this doctor to provide here a perfect and full distinction, in every respect, of the divine persons of the Trinity. And it is clear that he delivered no distinction between the Son and the Spirit themselves in this discourse. Therefore, he does not teach the distinction of all the persons from one another, but only of the Father from those who have their being from Him. The Father, therefore, toward [the Son]—

^A regarding the Father’s contemplation of the Son in this respect, and in handing down their distinction from one another, he calls the Father the sole fountain, inasmuch as the Father is the fountain of the Son, but the Son is by no means the fountain of the Father. And that he speaks only of the Father and the Son is also clear from what follows. For he says that the relations of the supersubstantial divine generation do not reciprocate toward one another. For that term, "theogony"—that is, divine birth—is derived from begetting and generation. This relationship, certainly, is fitting between the Father and the Son, the one begetting, the other being begotten. And going further, the teacher makes this even clearer, saying: "The Father not existing because of the Son, nor the Son because of the Father." So, by attributing begetting and fatherhood to the Father alone, he affirms Him to be the sole fountain of deity, as if he were saying: "The Father alone and the one who alone begets," neither having himself received the rank of being begotten, nor the Son having received the rank of begetting; and for this reason the relations of the supersubstantial divine generation do not reciprocate toward one another.

But truly, if someone should say that the Father alone is the fountain of the supersubstantial deity, inasmuch as He alone is the Cause of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, he would not err from the truth. For He alone is the cause of both, and He alone is a fountain not from a fountain; whereas the Son is indeed a fountain, as the saints assert, but a fountain from a fountain.

Augustine

Whom other than him, then, shall we seek as a more trustworthy interpreter of the mind of Dionysius? Who more than he grasped that man's intellect, who was worthy of the same theological grace as he, and who bore God speaking within himself? For behold, what he had called the sole fountain of the supersubstantial deity, this man has called the principle of the whole deity; meaning, clearly, that although the Father has no cause of Himself, He exists as the cause of both the Son and the Spirit; and the Son both is caused, and is the cause of the Spirit alone.

^D And do not be offended, again, here by the name of the "whole deity," by contrasting a part with the whole, as if the Son were a part of the cause; for the deity is not divided. But this inconvenience and defect arises from the deficiency and feebleness of names, which you will not be right to transfer to the things themselves. But since there are many other things also, by which someone...

^A explaining the sentiment of Dionysius as he might, let the things already said nonetheless suffice, since they are clear and cannot be gainsaid by anyone. For when it has been demonstrated according to the teachers, to whom the holy Dionysius is not contrary, that it is also correct to say that the Son is the source of the deity—if indeed the Spirit is God, and the Son is the source of the Spirit—it remains that the saying, "The Father alone is the source of the supersubstantial deity," must be understood in one of the previously mentioned ways, and not otherwise.

Epilogue

I, therefore, satisfying you, O excellent of men, have already completed what you asked for; I have touched in part upon what was done in the synod, and have briefly rendered the arguments of each side of the question, and have dissolved the absurdities brought forward, and have shown from every side the truth of the conclusion. I have preferred, even in phrasing and elocution, a style that is plain and relaxed rather than elevated, so that, as far as possible, the discourse might be clear and easy for all who read it.

Although, however, the diction is plain, the magnitude of the thoughts and of the underlying subject matter nevertheless causes no small difficulty. Whence I ask both you and anyone else who may happen upon these writings, to read them with attention and without prejudice of an anticipated opinion, and to read the same things many times without flagging in the investigation. For perhaps you will carry away fruits not unworthy of your labor, perceiving the utility from those things from which it is necessary for you to derive benefit.

But before all things, read with attention and diligence the authorities of the saints and teachers of the West ^C which I send to you along with these; from these, gather the most manifest truth of the question; and if there are any who out of a desire for contention rather than for truth bring forward certain objections either to my discourse or to the conclusion of the Latins, mock them and easily refute them by means of the sayings of the saints. For it is clear that every argument that opposes these must be rejected, as opposing the truth, since the Fathers spoke the truth.

But you, besides the authorities of the Westerners, receive also from us certain sayings of the Easterners that have been set forth for you, so that you may recognize them also as saying the same things as the Fathers of the West, and as agreeing not only in intelligence ^D but also in words.