BESSARION PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, BISHOP OF TUSCULUM, CARDINAL OF THE HOLY ROMAN CHURCH, NICENE, ON THE SUCCESS OF THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE, AND ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, FIRST BOOK EDITED IN GREEK, THEN RENDERED INTO LATIN LETTERS BY THE SAME.
Bessarion, Cardinal of Nicaea, to the great and most clement man, Alexios Laskaris Philanthropenos, greetings.
You, indeed, being engaged in your highest study with not only human but also divine matters, and delighting yourself in the meditation of the Scriptures, do not cease both to search for the truth of the faith for yourself and to urge us that, as far as we are able, we should provide you with aid to investigate and find it. As for me, moved by a certain laziness, and especially because I have willingly laid aside similar labors, because I have often held discourse on this matter with our own people, who value their own superstition and ignorance more than the truth, I unwillingly undergo this contest again, although I am writing to you, who, adorned with wisdom and humility, seek these things from me not for the sake of tempting but of investigating the truth. I also believe the authority of the sacred council itself is quite simply sufficient for convincing anyone and for leading them to embrace its conclusion with a humble heart, and to believe it without any contradiction or ambiguity. For where a convention of so many men, who were endowed with wisdom, knowledge, and every virtue, has gathered—in the midst of whom it is necessary to believe the Holy Spirit was present—it is by no means to be believed that the truth could have remained hidden from them. Furthermore, I remember that I gave you a long letter at another time, and touched sufficiently upon all the things you are now seeking; and indeed, I proved the question itself through itself, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, A and I rendered an account—as well as [concerning] all other matters that you asked for at that time—of those things which seemed to follow as inconveniences, which I solved; so that there is no need for many words, especially for you, who have such experience in such matters that, even with small principles given, you can perceive many great things by yourself. But since you demand something more from us, not perhaps for your own sake—since you think the same as we do—but on account of the contentious and the adversaries of the truth, and because we ought to be ready to provide satisfaction to everyone who asks us an account of the faith that is in us, according to the Apostle, and also in order to satisfy our friendship—guided also by the hope of the usefulness of some who will read these things—we have proposed to comply with your wish. Therefore, first we send you the authorities of the holy Fathers and Western doctors, by whom it is most apertly affirmed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, B and that both the Father and the Son have their own origin, and that both are one origin of Him. Since these are very numerous, and scattered throughout all their books, we send you only a few for now, by which, however, you may know that all others like them exist. Next, we judged that we should send you a certain discourse of ours, to which we have given the title *Dogmatic*, or *On the Union*, which we published shortly before the sacred union as the final declaration of our opinion and judgment, and which I gave to our most mild emperor and to the most reverend patriarch to be read by all our people who were present, when we were ultimately considering among ourselves what ought to be done and were investigating the opinions of others concerning the matter of the union. In that [work], having passed over the Westerners entirely, I declared and proved the proposed question as much as I could from the Oriental Fathers and our own doctors themselves; I send this now to your nobility—most clement and splendid man—as something that will be most profitable to you in particular, and to anyone else who hears and reads it without contention. C But since we have applied no labor to these things at present (for they were already edited), and yet for love of you we have proposed to undertake some lucubration now as well, we shall write to you something more for your sake beyond these things. Therefore, I will narrate to you as briefly as possible the whole process of the sacred council and the way of the union, and I will bring forward some arguments by which the proposed dogma will be proven, and thus I will impose an end. But before I speak of these things, I will add to these proems a small matter, not, however, to be thought small, but rather a very great one; I will supply what is missing from the aforementioned *Dogmatic* discourse, compensating for the multitude of words with future utility. In that *Dogmatic* discourse, intending to prove the truth of this question from Oriental doctors alone, I omitted one certain authority of Blessed Basil, which alone surpasses all others in showing what was proposed, because it was doubted by some whether it was truly by Basil. Not because I myself also had any doubt about it—not at all—but because it was doubted by others, I did not wish to use that which is dubious. This, however, is what the blessed man used in the third of his books *Against Eunomius*. For why is it necessary (he says), if in order [D ]
A to distinguish the Spirit as third, and as third also in dignity, to assume that it is third by nature? For the reason of piety teaches that, in dignity, he is second after the Son, since he has his being from him, and receives from him, and declares him to us, and depends entirely upon that cause. "Cause" is taken for the principle, while "caused" is taken for that which is from a principle, and not as though cause and caused imply limitation, as the Latins understand them when they remove such things from divine matters, as sounding of imperfection. To "depend" is also taken for "receiving being," and not as though it denotes an essential distinction as the Latins understand it, when they say that no dependence is to be posited in God because of the supreme unity of the divine essence. This, therefore, we have omitted from our dogmatic discourse.
Yet I certainly hold this to be the authority of St. Basil, as also his other books *Against Eunomius*, and you may hear the reasons for this as well. When in this our synod we had six volumes of this work *Against Eunomius* between us, four were on very ancient parchment; of these, three belonged to the Archbishop of Mitylene, and the fourth to the Latins. Two were in papyrus, one of which belonged to the most serene emperor, the other to the most reverend patriarch, which he had received for his own convenience from the monastery of the Xanthopouloi and brought with him. I say that five of these six volumes had this authority, just as I have now alleged: namely, that the Spirit has his being from him, that is, the Son, and depends on him as on a cause. Only one, however—that which was with the patriarch—lacked this authority; it was diminished in some parts and superabundant in others, according to the whim and hand of the corrupter, whoever that may have been. Finally, after the holy council was celebrated and we had returned to the city of Constantinople, when we had proposed to search through all the libraries of those holy places, both for the sake of this book of St. Basil and others, C all the new volumes I found written after this contention held the aforesaid authority. But whatever was older, and written before this war arose, remains sound and whole with the aforesaid authority—and such books are no fewer than those that had suffered corruption.
In those, I also found something which is at once to be lamented and wondered at. It is to be wondered at, indeed, if anyone—wishing to adhere to [a falsehood]—invents it himself, and especially by hiding the truth, since the intellect naturally has the truth as its object. It is to be lamented, however, that there are some who so belittle the truth of the faith, without which it is impossible for a man to be saved, that they not only despise its investigation, but even when it clearly appears, they strive to hide, suppress, and pervert it.
Such a thing was this: along with others, I also stumbled upon two books of St. Basil at the monastery of Christ the Savior Pantepoptes. One was on parchment, very ancient, though I do not know of what time, for no year was inscribed, D nor was the date marked at the end, from which time one could certainly know how much of it had passed since its beginning; and the books still survive, unless they were removed from the midst by those who devise everything against their own salvation—books that would have had the authority of the holy doctors inscribed, just as we have alleged. Yet some man of bold spirit, and even bolder hand, erased the truth from the parchment with iron, although his rashness profited him nothing, since the remaining empty space, and the half-letters still existing, both accuse his boldness and nevertheless show the truth. In the papyrus volume, he covered with ink that entire part which says that he [the Spirit] depends on him as on a cause. But after some years, when this book fell into the hands of that most wise man, Demetrios Kydones, the aforementioned statement was restored. For he wrote it in the margin of that book with his own hand, and worthily rebuked the audacity of the corrupter. To such madness, darkness, and ignorance did their contention drive our people!
Then they dare to say that the Latins, and our own Bekkos and others who followed the Latins, corrupted the books, especially since this authority shows forth such adornment, such grace, and such Attic eloquence that not only can the Latins not compose anything similar with such grace in a foreign and Greek tongue, but neither can the Greeks themselves, aside from Basil himself. For to the Latins, their own language and styles of speaking, being different from ours, are an impediment to their writing anything as ornately in our language, just as it is also impossible for our people to write anything with equal grace and ornament in the Latin language, however much either the Greeks have progressed in Latin or the Latins in the Greek tongue. Of this matter, both I and others of ours are worthy witnesses, who understand the Latin language only moderately, yet I could not write anything that was ornate and composed in Latin. It is clearly evident, therefore, that those who know how to identify modes of speaking, style, eloquence, and other things, know that this authority belongs to Basil himself and his polished tongue, and no one else's. Furthermore, since Bekkos lived only a few years ago, while the aforementioned books are much older than he, they prove this accusation to be false and a vain refuge.
This same thing is also proven from another source. A certain man among the Latins of the greatest reputation, Hugo by name, an ancient, lived long before our times—for almost 300 years have passed since his time. When writing about the procession of the Holy Spirit, he also cites this authority of St. Basil to prove this conclusion. I say this, seeing it written not in Latin, but in Greek at Constantinople in a certain Greek book—not that of Hugo himself, but of a certain Niketas, Archbishop of Thessaloniki, who contradicts Hugo himself, although the Thessalonian himself thought the same as the Latins. For that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son,
he believed, but he contended, as the saying goes, about the shadow of an ass, not asserting that it was permitted to add this to the Creed—a matter of truly great devotion and wisdom—as if he meant to say that the truth ought not to be preached publicly. I have recounted these things at length, wanting to prove that there was indeed a corruption in the books, but not by the Latins and their followers, but on the contrary by those contending against the Latins; and that the corruption took place not only by addition, but sometimes by subtraction. So that no one can accuse Veccus and those like him anymore, since the books proved the truth clearly long before Veccus existed. And these signs are indeed so undoubted and true from that time; from the very manner of the speaking and the most smooth and ornate style, it is clear that this authority ought to be believed to be none other than Basil's. Nevertheless, from the very sentiment, and the connection of what follows to what precedes, the same thing will clearly appear, if anyone considers it attentively. When Eunomius, from the fact that the Holy Spirit was called third in order and dignity by certain teachers, inferred that He was also third in nature, Saint Basil, taking this conclusion indignantly, yet not denying the middle points—namely, that the Holy Spirit was third in dignity and order—for even if, crying out against Eunomius, he says, "he does not dare to say who those holy men were, and in whose writings they taught this," he does not say this because they deny that the Holy Spirit is third in order, or that He is called so by the saints, as ours correctly think (for thus he would be speaking against himself and the truth), but being indignant at his A rashness, and rejecting this conclusion, that is to say, that the Holy Spirit was also third in nature, he exclaimed saying: "he does not dare to say who those holy men were, and in whose writings they taught this"; not because there were no men who said this, but because if he had expressly alleged their authority, it would have clearly appeared that this absurd conclusion could not follow from their sayings. For we know that from even a single word or expression being removed, added, or transposed, the entire intention and meaning of a writer is changed; and conversely, when it is faithfully alleged, his mind is clearly proved, so that it is not permitted for wicked men to draw a conclusion which does not conform to the preceding. Therefore, if Eunomius had even alleged the authority of the saints, it would not have been permitted to him to conclude what he had concluded; for even if the teachers concede that the Holy Spirit is third, they nevertheless expressly deny that He is third in nature; wherefore, detesting his malignity, he infers: "Was there ever anyone so rash as to pervert and innovate upon divine dogmas?" And it is clear that he here labels as an innovation [the claim that] the Holy Spirit is third in nature, but not in order and dignity. Truly, for he would have called himself the author of new things, and would be speaking things contrary to himself. He himself is the one who principally handed down to us to believe that the Holy Spirit is third in order and dignity, and he taught us this consistent chain of order. For in those matters against Eunomius in his discourses, he says that in dignity He is second from the Son, namely, the Holy Spirit, since He has His being from Him, and receives from Him, and announces to us, and depends entirely upon that cause, as the standard of piety teaches. For our people admit a part, though not the whole, of this authority, cutting off the rest, and alleging it thus: "for the standard of piety teaches that in dignity He is second from the Son," adding "perhaps" in order to render the statement doubtful; which doubt will be proven by us to be altogether foreign to the mind of Saint Basil. For that holy doctor does not put forward these things as impossible, as has seemed to some through ignorance, namely, [by interpreting him as] expounding his own opinion, as he considers the true Holy Scripture, but he clearly posits that the Spirit is third in order, while he rejects as impious [the claim that He is] third in nature. For hear what he says for the proof of the same: "For just as," he says, "the Son in order is indeed second from the Father, since He is from Him; and in dignity, since He is the origin; and the cause of His being, since He is His Father; but in nature is by no means second, since in both there is one Godhead: so likewise, even if in dignity and order He is second from the Son, it will not follow from thence that He is of an alien nature." To these words also, some have added "although it is not to be granted": to which nothing is more contrary to the intention of B. Basil, who in his Epistle to the canonesses says, "The most clear Holy Spirit is numbered with the Father and the Son, since He is above every creature; but in order He is third, as the Gospels teach us, the Lord saying: 'Go into all the world, baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit'; he, however, who puts Him before the Son, or calls Him greater than the Father, this one contradicts the tradition of God, and is a stranger to the sound faith, not keeping the form of praise which he received." And after a few words: "Wherefore if anyone perverts this order, he denies the very existence of the persons and the whole faith." If, therefore, these words are of one hesitating and doubting about the order, and of one who brings forth his own sentiment under doubts, and with "perhaps," and "although it is not to be granted," let it be your judgment, and that of others, who are upright judges, and to some extent understand the force of arguments and the truth of dogmas. Furthermore, are they not ashamed to accuse the holy doctor of such great contradiction, nay rather of ignorance, if indeed he says that He is third, so that it is not permitted without the crime of impiety and the perversion of the whole faith to change this order, [while] in another way he perhaps says that He is second from the Son, and other things of this kind? But I, with God as my witness, grieve for the plight of those who maintain these things, and I am ashamed for them. But if they do not feel it themselves, it is truly a wonder. But what unnerves all their impudence is this, that in these arguments against Eunomius, after many things, this doctor concludes and infers: "So also the Holy Spirit in dignity and order is second after the Son; for we have received Him to be third, numbered from the Father and the Son."
A And it is clear that the Spirit is by nature second in order from the Son, for there is nothing in the holy Trinity beyond nature, nor by accident. And take care lest this term "nature" scandalize you, when you hear that the Spirit is by nature second to the Son. For we do not say He is second according to nature in such a way as to suggest that He is of a different nature, as Eunomius did; but we say it regarding nature while excluding accident and that which is beyond nature. St. Athanasius also testifies to this, teaching that the Spirit has the same order B and nature toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father. For these two things are proved by this authority: both that the Holy Spirit is third in order from the Father and second from the Son, and that this order is by nature. But these things have indeed been proved more clearly than light by the authorities of St. Basil, which I have deliberately explained at great length; since no small utility follows for us from this, nay, the very words themselves can do all of this. For Basil alone is sufficient for teaching us the truth of the faith. But now I will turn myself to the promises, and I will briefly narrate to you the whole process of the holy council; then I will bring forward some demonstrations of this truth, and thus I will make an end.
A Narrative of Those Things Which Were Done in the Council
Those things, therefore, concerning which at Ferrara, where—as is known to you—we first arrived, we disputed privately before the commencement of the council, I shall omit as unnecessary, since they were proposed for the sake of passing the time and awaiting those who were to come to the council, rather than because they were necessary. But when the time arrived, it seemed good to our people to divide the proposed question into two parts: one, that it was not lawful to add even the truth itself to the Creed of the Fathers; the other, that it is not true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. And when this had been agreed upon, it was finally asked from where we ought to begin, and by the common opinion of the others it seemed best to begin from this: that nothing should be added to the Creed, although I myself clearly contradicted it. For I said that either this was more provable C than the other, or conversely; and if indeed it were less provable, it did not befit us to begin with the weaker ones, so that, having been defeated and routed in the first engagement, we might perhaps not be deterred, and then undergo the second, lest this rout should become the cause of us losing the second part also. But if we considered that part to be the more provable, it was necessary to save it for later. For if we were to win in the first question, they would also approach the second with a stronger spirit; but if we were to lose the first, namely that which posits that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, then at least we might win in the second, showing that it was not lawful to add even that truth. Besides, since in nature also what can be done by fewer things is not done by more—for it would be in vain, and God and nature do nothing in vain—I said that that should be proposed and that we should dispute about it first, after which D
A another place would be left. If, therefore, we were to prove that the dogma itself is false, it would be manifest that it is not permitted to add it, and there would be no need to prove that it is not permitted to add it. Wherefore, I said, we shall accomplish the whole thing in one struggle if we begin with the dogma, for we shall also be able to prove that it is false. But since it had been proven that it was not permitted to add even the truth itself, it would still remain to prove whether the dogma itself is true or false. Yet when I had not been able to persuade our people by saying this—for they wished to dispute above all about the former thing, because they thought this part the more probable—wishing to dissuade them, I said in opposition to this, in the presence of our most wise Emperor, only four reasons, which the Latins also brought forward afterward, and which you shall hear among the reasons introduced by the Latins. By these I proved the falsehood of this matter and how ridiculous it is to think that it is not permitted to add the truth; and even if no one of those present could solve them, yet they determined to do what they wanted, and I followed, to say indeed those things that were advantageous to the nation and to its honor, thinking that I owed it to God and to the nation itself, but then to follow the greater part and to undergo the struggle together with them. The most serene Emperor also followed, although this counsel did not please him, fearing nevertheless that one of the ignorant might think he was bringing some force to bear upon them. We began, therefore, to dispute with the Latins, wishing to prove that it is permitted to add nothing, not even the truth itself, to the Symbol of the Fathers; but our whole strength consisted in the decrees of the holy and ecumenical councils, in which, toward the end, they say that it is not permitted to write, or to think, or to teach any other faith besides these, and other things of this sort. What a ridiculous thing, and worthy of great reproach, the whole nation would have suffered, and all of us through the prudence of the good Ephesian, had I not sensed it and prevented it! For along with the decrees of the Fathers, he also wanted to allege that saying of the Apostle to the Galatians: If anyone has preached to you anything other than what I have delivered to you, let him be anathema. Likewise the authority of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite from *On the Divine Names*, saying: "Therefore, nothing at all should be dared, either to say or to think, beyond those things which have been delivered to us from divine and sacred oracles." He wanted, therefore, by these also to prove that it is not permitted to add even the truth itself to the Symbol. D You will sense from this how much mockery this would have caused us, and that we would have been convinced and defeated at the very beginning. Our whole argument, by which we believed this matter could be proven, consisted in the sayings of the third ecumenical council of Ephesus; for we asserted that it was the first to issue this prohibition at the end of its decree regarding any addition whatsoever. For even if it is not true that that council made such a prohibition, those who wish to contend otherwise can nevertheless find some assistance from this, because of the equivocation and ambiguity of the words. The reason, however, why we say that the third council was the first to make this prohibition is, first, because the Acts of the first council are nowhere found; second, since C one would have to know B that it had altered the Nicene Symbol in many things, by partly taking away and partly adding, it was not permitted to say that this prohibition had been made before the second council; for indeed we would have made the holy Fathers of the second council themselves liable to anathema, who partly added to and partly diminished the Nicene Symbol. With these things thus declared, consider what inconveniences would have followed from those things which the Ephesian was going to propose. For since the holy Apostle, and also the blessed Dionysius, were much earlier than not only the second, but even the first synod, if those authorities inhibit even the truth itself, so that no one may teach it or add it to the Symbol under anathema, then the Fathers of the second council would be included, who altered the Symbol of the Nicene council with so many additions and subtractions, and the Fathers of the Nicene council themselves, who changed the Symbol in many parts that the Church was using before them. If, however, this opinion is to be regarded as impious, it is clear that what the Apostle and Dionysius prohibited was to teach, to think, to evangelize, and to conceive those things which are false and contrary to the Catholic faith; because if it prohibits the false—and we on our part were producing their authorities as equivalent to the decrees of councils—it is clear that the decrees of the Fathers also prohibit the false from being added to the Symbol, but not those things which are true. And so, in the very first assembly and on the first day, we would have been convinced and defeated. But when I had sensed these things, I hardly persuaded him by the aforesaid reasons not to propose those authorities. From these things, therefore, one may judge the nature of that man and the subtlety of his mind, and what his judgment on higher matters is, if this thing was so hidden from him. I say these things, however, not for the sake of reproving him—for I am far from this—but so that I might admonish my hearers to beware of his sermons. Discussing this question, therefore, and publicly debating it with the Latins, while we were at the principles and about the introductions, we seemed to be winning; for nothing worthy of the proposed matter had yet been said by the Latins. When (although it is said without arrogance) the stronger reasons for this matter were produced on our side, having been found and said by me, there are witnesses who were present. But when that excellent man, Julian, the most worthy Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church of Saint Angelo, succeeded in speaking, he brought forward many things, and indeed the strongest ones, by which he so clearly and sufficiently proved the proposed question, by demonstrating that it is always permitted to add the truth to the Symbol of faith, especially when necessity compels and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff is joined, that we, although we thought long and hard, could dispute nothing. And although these were many, I will set forth here those which I hold in my memory, so that you may also understand the truth of this matter. But before these, hear the summary of our reasons, and the most important one; for at the end of the decrees of each holy ecumenical council, beginning from the third, it has exactly word for word: "These having been read, the holy synod determines,"
A that it is permitted to no one to set forth or to compose or to hold or to teach any other faith. If any shall dare to do this, let the clerics be deprived, and the laity be struck with anathema." All other prohibitions are of this meaning and almost of these same words. We relied upon these authorities as upon things irrefragable, saying that it is not permitted to add even the truth itself, since it has been forbidden by the statements of the holy Fathers, nor is it permitted to do so. Against our position, among the many arguments introduced by the Latins, these also were present:
Arguments of the Latins, proving that it is permitted to add the truth to the Creed
Every council not only forbids the setting forth of another faith but also its composition. If, therefore, B by the words "another faith" it understands a faith composed with other words, yet of the same meaning, or a Creed, it will happen that because all the holy doctors, who teach the Catholic faith, have composed a Creed with different words, yet of the same meaning, they will be under anathema. But this is not only false, but it is blasphemy to say. Therefore, it is not forbidden to explain the same faith with other words consonant to the truth, but it is forbidden to compose one that is contrary and diverse. Item, the fourth council subjects to anathema even the mere holding or teaching of "otherwise." If, therefore, it forbids holding or teaching in words that are different, yet consonant to the truth, then all who have taught the orthodox faith in whatever words each was able, are under C anathema. For every one of the saints has preached the same faith in different words. But since it is inconvenient to say this, it does not forbid the diversity of words, but the contrariety of meanings, especially since "to hold" refers to the meanings, not to the vocabulary.
Furthermore, the sixth council says the same things that the fourth does, and in addition forbids that anyone introduce any empty or vain sound or the invention of any diction to pervert those things which have been determined by itself. From which it clearly appears that those words are forbidden which are introduced to pervert the dogmas of the Fathers, not those which are introduced to corroborate them. Furthermore, the third council established that it was not permitted to set forth any other faith beyond that which was published at the Council of Nicaea, D and it subjected to anathema those who dared to do this. Concerning the Creed published by the second council, which the whole Church uses, it makes no mention. If, therefore, they failed to make mention of it because they thought it was another and different faith from the faith of the Council of Nicaea: we sin, and indeed mortally, who, having completely omitted the Nicene Creed, beyond which the Fathers decreed no other faith should be set forth, use the Creed of the second council, reading it, teaching it, and declaring it both privately and publicly, and by this reasoning we are under anathema. But if they passed over it in silence because it is the same as that contained in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea, and of the same faith; unless it clearly appears that they are not the same in words. For as for these, it differs most, having many additions and also many subtractions. Therefore, it is the same in meaning, for which cause the Fathers of the third council thought the Creed of the first and second councils to be as one: wherefore every Creed, composed in whatever words, if it contains the same meaning that the Nicene does, is the same as it: and nothing stands against this when it is said, "not to dare to hand over another Creed," for by "another" it should be understood as one that contains a meaning contrary to the truth. Indeed, the Creed of the second council, differing only from the Nicene as to words, was nevertheless judged by the Fathers to be the same with the first, and not another.
Item, every council, after the reading of its whole decree—not of the Creed alone, but of the whole decree—says: "These having been read, the holy synod determines that it is permitted to no one to set forth another faith"; but it is clear that when it says, "these having been read," it understands the whole decree. Therefore, that which follows, that it is not permitted to set forth another faith, also refers to the whole decree itself, namely, that it is not permitted to set forth another faith beyond that which is contained in the whole decree, and not only in the Creed. But as for words, the fourth council wrote differently than the third, the fifth differently than the fourth, and so on for the rest. Therefore, the concern here is regarding the whole faith and the meanings, not the words.
Item, the seventh council makes no mention at all of any Creed, neither the first nor the second, but simply, its decree having been issued, adds at the end: "To these nothing is to be added, nothing taken away from them; and if anyone either adds or takes away anything from this faith, let him be anathema." Therefore, it is manifest that it forbids only a contrary and false faith; for it does not forbid that the Church, when the occasion demands, should be able to issue decrees.
Furthermore, we ought to confess with the mouth unto salvation what we believe with the heart unto justice; otherwise our faith would be imperfect for us. For faith must be confessed before men, if we desire the promised rewards. But it is necessary to hold the truth; therefore it is also necessary to confess the same.
Furthermore, in the acts of the fourth council, in the first session, Eutyches first read the Nicene Creed; then the same heretic introduces that which the Ephesian synod decreed regarding this Nicene faith, namely, that he who adds, considers, or teaches anything beyond this [Creed] lies under the penalties that are contained therein. But Eusebius, bishop of Dorylaeum, who had constituted himself the accuser of this heretic out of zeal for the faith, when he had heard these things, cried out saying, "There is no such decree, there is no canon which commands this; he has lied." But the Fathers of the council, being six hundred and thirty in number, having heard these things, condemned Eutyches, who would not hold and believe anything other than those things which are contained in the Nicene Creed.
A They do not hold them explicitly. But when I say another in number, I do not mean contradictory or contrary, which is why they might have thought that those additions should be forbidden which are contrary and opposed to the truth, not those which are in agreement. For that Christ remained in two and from two natures without confusion after the assumption of flesh, which Eutyches denied—although it was something other than the Nicene Creed, and something other not in meaning, but in words—they still forced Eutyches to believe this. Therefore, it clearly appears that the holy doctors did not forbid simply another [faith], but a contrary one. For mark how the very words of the third council, which we bring forward—namely, that it is permitted to no one to bring forward another faith—Eutyches himself was producing for his own sake. But the Bishop of Dorylaeum, and the whole council, cried out, "There is no such canon that commands this," and condemned him as one not correctly understanding this canon. For he was explaining it just as our people [do], as any other thing whatever, even if there were a verbal difference, thinking it to be forbidden. This exposition the synod refutes, not by denying that these words are contained in the Ephesian canon, but by thinking of another faith which is contrary to the truth, not one which differs in words but is concordant and in agreement in its meanings.
Likewise, in the book of the canons of the councils, which our Zonaras explains, in that, I say, book is this prohibition of the third council, namely, upon reading these things the holy synod determined, and it is the seventh in number among the canons of the same council. Before this is another canon of the same council, sixth in number, which deprives of communion those who would dare to change anything of those things which were done by the synod. But in the seventh canon, namely, of the prohibition, those are anathematized who transgress the canon and preach another faith. Zonaras therefore asks why the holy Fathers in the sixth canon only deprive the transgressors of communion, but in the seventh subject them to anathema; this question, however, he resolves in these words: "It makes a great difference," he says, "between contradicting and doubting about some matter; therefore, he who doubts about those things which have already been rightly established by the Fathers is entangled in excommunication and is deprived of communion; but he who contradicts them as holding them to be contrary is anathematized." Wherefore this commentator also most openly and clearly names another faith here as contradictory and contrary.
Also, the council celebrated in Trullo in its first canon says: "We decree that the faith delivered to us by the very ministers of the Word who saw it with their eyes, namely, the holy apostles, and by the 318 holy Fathers gathered in Nicaea, should be kept immutable and without any innovation," and consistently it enumerates all the councils and commands the faith delivered by all of them to be kept immutable. Then it brings in that if anyone does not hold these afore-mentioned dogmas of piety, and consent to them, and think thus, and preach them, but attempts to be contrary to them, let him be anathema according to the canons B already published by the aforementioned holy Fathers, and by the Christian fellowship as alien let him be driven out and cast away. For we do not think or have the power, in any way at all, either to add or to subtract from the following aforementioned canons. This canon clearly declares the decree of the third council, and of the others, which forbid that anyone prefer another faith, when it says that if anyone attempts to be contrary to the dogmas of the Fathers, let him be anathema according to the canons already published by them, namely, those which forbid another faith. These decrees therefore forbid a contrary faith, and what they infer—"for we neither add nor subtract anything"—they understand in the faith, not in the Creed; for this synod did not insert the Creed in its decree, but, explaining the faith, it brings in the dogmas of the holy Fathers and of all the councils, [saying] "We do not think to add or subtract anything." And the reason is because we follow the aforementioned canons; so that it may be clearly evident that when it says it is not permitted to the Fathers to add or to subtract, it forbids not verbal additions and subtractions, but those of contrary meaning and false sense. Through this one canon alone, therefore, which not our reason induces, nor some private man invents simply, but which one synod, a gathering of so many Fathers, composed, by which they also explain the mind of other similar Fathers, the question is most openly and most manifestly solved for those not wishing to contend. I would have wanted it to be permitted to wander longer; you would have surely seen many similar arguments, and those indeed most powerful. But since even the things that have been said decide this question so clearly that they are enough and more than enough for him who loves the truth and hears what has been said without contention, but to one who wishes to contend not even many more would suffice, with one sole argument of the Latins now added, I shall cease to say more about this matter. It is, however, this one especially, and the only one which is sufficient to refute the error of our people. We assert that first the third council decreed this prohibition, as I said a little earlier; when I also made clear the cause, why we say this, which is: that since the second synod had added more things and had taken away more from the Nicene Creed, if we were to assert that this prohibition existed before the second council, one of two things would necessarily follow: either it would be necessary to accuse the holy Fathers of the second council of transgression of the canons and of having been under anathema, or, since this is not only absurd but also blasphemy to say, [one would have to say] that it forbade not every verbal addition, but [only] false and contrary meanings. Wherefore we are forced to say that this prohibition was made after the second synod, not before. Therefore if anyone on the contrary shows that this prohibition was before the second synod, and in almost the same words as the third council used, it will be concluded [that one must choose] one of the two aforementioned things, and since it is blasphemy to call the Fathers of the second council transgressors of the canons, it remains D
A that we must understand, when it decrees this prohibition, that it is forbidding a contrary faith, and not what our people think. The Latins showed this to us. For it was proven by them that the first Nicene synod made this prohibition in those very same words in which the third and other councils also wrote. But they proved this in this way: for the Latins are studious and diligent in all their actions, as your nobility has experienced in many matters of their wisdom, so that not only in divine, but also in human and civil affairs, nothing of ancient deeds or writings escapes them; wherefore, even in every city, you will find in their archives many things written concerning their most ancient deeds. This is also observed in the Catholic Church and other pious places. For many acts of the popes, and many epistles and canons of the councils exist. B Therefore, they brought forth for us in a most ancient parchment book the epistle of Pope Liberius to Blessed Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, which begins: "From the beginning we have received so much from the most blessed Peter, the prince of the apostles." In which, after a few words, he says that he had received the epistle of Saint Athanasius and had read it. Then he adds: "But when we had found the faith of the Nicene council in it to be correct, we rendered great thanks to you, for which not only are we prepared to suffer with you and to endure persecution, but when necessity demands it, we shall not delay even dying for the name of Christ, however weak we may be." For as we read, the holy Nicene synod decreed the aforementioned as follows: that it is not lawful for anyone to bring forth another faith, or to write down, or to compose, or to conceive, or to teach otherwise, nor to understand or to bring forth anything in the faith C that is contrary to the decrees of these Fathers. But whoever would dare to bring forth another faith, or to teach, or to hand over another Symbol to those who desire to be converted from any heresy whatsoever to the way of truth, whether from Judaism or from paganism, if he is a bishop or a cleric, let the bishop be deprived of his episcopal dignity and the cleric of his clerical state; but if he is a monk or a layman, let him be anathematized. Now, these things are indeed unknown to us, as the acts of the first council have been lost; but then, when they were still extant, Pope Liberius and Saint Athanasius knew them. Moreover, these things are altogether similar to the words of the third council. What, therefore, shall we say concerning the second synod and Blessed Gregory Nazianzen, who, when he presided over this council D as one excelling others in wisdom, is said to have written this Symbol which the whole Church now uses, changing the Nicene [Symbol] in many respects, if this prohibition has that meaning which our people claim? For the holy Fathers and doctors, alas! have become seducers and deceivers, both the Fathers of the second council and Blessed Gregory Nazianzen, to whom the title "Theologian" was given by way of excellence. But far be it from us even to think such blasphemy. Therefore, neither the first, nor the third, nor any other synod A understands it when it decrees this prohibition, but rather forbids a contrary faith.
Conclusion that under the urgency of necessity, and by the judgment of the Church, and with the authority of the supreme pontiff intervening, it is lawful and necessary to add a word to the Symbol.
By all these things, most clement man, it has been proved more clearly than light that it is not forbidden to add the truth to the Symbol of the faith, but rather indeed to declare it. For there is no dogma of truth that is not contained, at least explicitly, in the Symbol and in the simple tradition of the apostles; but to declare, and to repeat, and to add to the Symbol is not always, of course—nor for everyone who wishes—but when great necessity compels, and when the judgment of the Church and the authority of the supreme pontiff are added, it is not only not prohibited but even necessary.
Continuation of the narrative of those things which were done in the council.
Therefore, after these and other similar things had been said by the Latins, most clement man, since we had nothing to respond to these things—for what indeed could anyone shamelessly say against such truth?—we were silent. But the Latins, having proven that it is permitted to add truth to the Symbol, consequently promised that they would also prove that the dogma added to the Symbol is true, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But our people, having been refuted in the first encounter, were fearful of undergoing a second conflict, and that happened to them which I had already foreseen from the beginning would happen, when I was preventing us from beginning with this question. They feared, therefore, and in no way wished to remain any longer; but everyone desired to depart and to return to their own lands, and they shouted nothing else but that one must return to one's homeland; and when they were asked the reason why they wished to do so, they did not wish to give one. What, therefore, shall we say to the Latins when questioned, as to what reason there was to return in the middle of a struggle, or rather still at the very beginning—for the things said up to now about its not being lawful to add [to the creed] have nothing to do with the matter? Therefore, they had no reason to give as to why, without having even made a start, departure was necessary; but without any reason, they were shouting: "Let us return, let us return." They were, however, also saying among themselves that it had reached their ears that the Latins could bring forth many authorities of many western saints, by which it is openly proven that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. What, therefore, shall we answer to these? "Let us depart, let us return, let us leave." Do you hear the opinion of the Fathers and doctors? Because, they say, the Latins have many authorities of the saints to bring forward, to which we have nothing to answer, let us depart from them. Yet, scarcely sensing the absurdity of their opinion, and persuaded by the most serene emperor, they yielded and decided to remain. In the meantime, the very circumstances necessitated the arrival of the supreme pontiff from Ferrara to Florence, and thereupon the translation of the council,
and then, when we had all arrived in Florence, the day was decreed upon which the council was to begin and continue. As the deadline approached, we again began to accuse the Latins. For just as in that question of whether it is permissible to add anything, we held the place of the accusers and the Latins that of the respondents—and they responded in such a way that we were unable to reply to them—so also in the dogma itself, we indeed put ourselves forward as if accusing, while they responded. For we were at liberty to act in all things according to our own inclination, as we wished; and yet some are not ashamed to say that force was applied to us—a thing which, with Truth, who is God, as witness, never happened. We therefore proposed B starting from the apostles themselves and the holy synods, and using the authorities of their and all eastern doctors, by which it is proved that the Holy Spirit is not indeed not proceeding from the Son, for we have no such authority; as you also know, except for that of John of Damascus, who says, "We speak of the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say from the Son." All other authorities, however, prove this, provided that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. We, therefore, bringing these forward, thought we had proved it false that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son. The Latins, however, to all these authorities gave this one common answer: that they are all, of course, true, and that they also appeared so to them; but they also believed the same thing, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, yet this not as something contrary or contradictory to the position of the authorities saying that He proceeds also from the Son. For if it were posited against them in either of those ways, then with one thing laid down, the other would be entirely destroyed; but now nothing prevents both from being true, namely, that He proceeds from the Father and that He proceeds from the Son. Just as if we say that the Holy Spirit is sent from the Father, and another says that He is sent from the Father and the Son. Both will be said to be true, and one does not contradict the other. If, therefore, the holy Fathers were to say either that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or that He does not proceed from the Son, then our faith would be false. But since no saint has yet said either of these things, what they say—that He proceeds from the Father—does not eliminate what we say—that He also proceeds from the Son. And these things they answered to our authorities. But as to that authority of John of Damascus, they answered nothing, since we did not even propose it. However, at the end of this work, I will also append its solution for your grace; then the Latins, beginning as if from the beginning, in many sessions spoke many and varied arguments from Holy Scripture and the doctors of the Church, having for the most part minor propositions, by which they proved that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. And finally they brought forward authorities of the Fathers, by which the truth of this dogma is clearly and openly A apparent. Indeed, they brought forward not only the testimonies of western but also of eastern Fathers, some of which—those that seemed to me to make more for our purpose—I am sending to you with this at present, so that you may understand what even the western doctors themselves think about this matter. To these we had nothing to answer, except that they were corrupted, and had been corrupted by the Latins. They produced our Epiphany saying clearly in many places that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; we said it had been corrupted. They alleged some things from Cyril, and others; the same we said. They brought forward the authorities of western doctors; our every response was the same and none other. Since, therefore, for many days we were deliberating among ourselves what ought to be answered to these things, we could find no other answer than the aforementioned; but that one seemed to be light and not to be brought forward, as it was to be mocked by all. First, because from what precedes and follows, this opinion seemed to be the mind of the saints. Second, because of very many books and the most ancient ones having the same things, it was not easy to slander them; especially since we had no other book, written neither in Latin nor in Greek, which had the aforementioned authorities written otherwise than the Latins said. Furthermore, we had no other doctors to bring forward who said the contrary; we could in no way prove that the same westerners said otherwise elsewhere; to show them to be saying false things by natural reason, was in no way possible. Since, therefore, we saw that no answer was left to us that was worthy, we were silent, and for many days we did not meet with the Latins. But there were those who, by subtlety of mind, found another answer: that it was not to be wondered at, of course, if in one thing or another the saints had erred as men; and that therefore the western doctors also had erred in this article concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, and had lied. But that this overturns our entire faith is clearly patent. For if our faith hangs from the said teachings of the saints, and those men err concerning the truth, our entire faith is overturned. Because of all these things, the union deservedly followed, and all, without any violence, freely and voluntarily conceded to this matter. But those who did not wish to concede (there were two, and no more), with all freedom, left to their own judgment without any oppression, departed for their own lands with honor and charity, at the expense of the Roman Church. Whether the union followed justly and rightly, once you have seen and read through the authorities of the saints, which I am now sending to you, you yourself shall judge. For who, signed with the name of Christian, would not follow them, and believe their words as if set forth by the Holy Spirit? I mean as much the western as the eastern Fathers, whose words must be firmly held to say consonant things and to express the same truth in different words, just as I have sufficiently proved in the dogmatic section. Therefore, these authorities alone C D
will be sufficient for you and for others, most gentle man, to remove every ambiguity and to take away every doubt from any soul that is not contentious. For not even the necessity of syllogisms or of demonstrations, nor the force of arguments, but the plain authorities of the doctors themselves have induced me to believe this truth. For when I had seen and heard them, immediately, all contention and contradiction being set aside, I acquiesced in the authority of those who spoke. For I judged that the holy Fathers, speaking by the Holy Spirit, could not have departed from the truth. Wherefore, I not only acquiesced, but I also gave thanks to our Savior, who granted me both to hear and to understand what I had never heard before. For no one of us ever believed that the question proposed could be proved by so many authorities of the doctors. And so, for you, whose heart is humble and whose soul is desirous of truth, these authorities alone, as I said a little earlier, will be sufficient, as they will also be for other Christians like you. But when you ask for some reasons and proofs from me, for your sake I will do this as well, as briefly as I can, arguing from Holy Scripture and the authorities of the doctors, which, even though it may have been done in the discourse which we published concerning the union, I will nevertheless do the same here as well, and bring forward some reasons. But before I descend to them, I think it is necessary to presuppose some things, so that those things which follow may be more clearly understood.
Presuppositions for the arguments proving that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son. And first, as to what is the constitutive of the paternal person.
Since for every being there is a certain common form, there is also another, a proper one, by which we are constituted, and this is a "this-something" [hoc aliquid], as, for example, of this man, say Peter, along with the common form which is humanity, according to which he is called man, there is also another proper form by which he is called "this man," namely, Peter or Paul, which is also incommunicable to another—on account of the various opinions about the principles of individuation, various things are posited here; and when we say either that the body is the proper form of someone, we do not understand this simply, but only according to a certain C similitude. But this is his soul, or body, or something else, which is his principle of individuation. It is the same regarding God and the Father: what is his proper form constituting his person? For he has a divine and essential form common to him with the Son and the Spirit, which is one and the same in number in them, namely, the Godhead, according to which he is one God with them: nevertheless, he has another form, proper to him as well, incommunicable to the other persons, according to which he is a "this-something" and a person in the Holy Trinity: what, therefore, this is, must be sought. And first, whether it is "being unbegotten" [ingenitum esse]; but this does not seem so; for this is a negation, and nothing of what exists is a "this-something" according to a negation: but it is his property, which follows his already constituted person. Secondly, whether it is what is called cause or principle. But neither is this true. For if this were his constitutive form, he would be called cause or principle rather than Father. But he is commonly called Father by all the doctors. Also, since "cause" or "principle" is something universal, this was said according to those philosophers who hold that universality exists through the intellect: if, however, universals were said in no way to depend on the intellect, it still would not be said that that common principle would be the formally constitutive of any person, since nothing communicable gives formal incommunicable existence, which makes the formal constitutive for the person, and it is predicated as much of the Father as of the spirator; it is a certain intention, not a thing: but that which is, is such a non-being; and non-being is not the constitutive of Him who is above all being. It remains, therefore, that either paternity alone, or spiration alone, or both are the D constitutivaries of the paternal person. But it is impossible that both are, for these reasons. For if both constituted the person of the Father, either they would do so both together, and if each by itself were to constitute it, the Father would have two forms, and consequently there would be two persons. This which we have said is clear; for since those are distinct reasons [rationales], if either of them were constitutive of the person, since the constitutivaries are formally diverse with respect to different things constituted, it follows that what we have said, as having two personal forms; just as if some man had two souls, which is absurd. But if not each by itself, but both together, then neither would he who says "Father" alone signify the paternal person, nor would he who says "spirator" signify it; however, the whole contrary of this is in use; for all the doctors, and all of Scripture, when they say "Father," signify his divine person; and ours too, when they say "spirator," think they signify the Father himself alone. Therefore, nor are they thus both together constitutive of the person, that by neither in any way, but both together constitute, nor as if each by itself were to constitute. But necessarily the one alone constitutes the person, while the other follows the already constituted person. Therefore, it remains that either paternity is the constitutive and proper form of the Father, and spiration follows him now constituted; or conversely, that spiration is the constitutive of the paternal person, and paternity follows the already constituted person. But if "to breathe" [spirare] indeed constitutes, and paternity and "to beget" [generare] follow, it follows that something is absurd, and contrary to the tradition of all the doctors: for such a thing is this, that the principles and the immediate operation of each proceed from its constitutive form; but all other operations proceed through this primary operation, as for example from the soul, which is the constitutive form of Peter, its first and immediate operation proceeds, which is to live: then through it, namely, as through a cause
without which all other operations do not proceed, namely, to speculate, to teach, to weave, etc. For through living, which is its first and immediate operation, all others are effected. If, therefore, to breathe were also the constitutive form of the paternal person, breathing would indeed be its first and immediate operation; and through this the Son would be generated, which would result in the Spirit not proceeding through the Son, as the theologians assert, but the Son being generated through the Spirit. All of which is contrary to the truth, and to the traditions of the Fathers, and to their common usage. And since these things are absurd, it remains that paternity constitutes the paternal person, and that this is its incommunicable form, and that breathing follows upon its already constituted person.
This is not to be understood here as an accident in the proper sense, which is really distinguished from that to which it happens as an accident, since nothing in the Trinity is an accident. But it is understood according to nature, and essentially—that is, necessarily—and of itself, as something that necessarily follows its nature and essence in Him, and that indeed to generate is the first and immediate operation of the paternal person, but that to breathe occurs through generating, not as through a principle, but through a necessary something which is pre-required. And let these things spoken above be as prerequisites for what follows. B Item, these things also are to be presupposed as common: of those things which are said in God, some are common to all persons, as "good," "wise," and all absolute things; likewise all negations, which are said of Him by way of excellence in respect to the creature, such as "invisible," "incomprehensible," and the like. Item, whatsoever signifies a relation to the creature, such as "creator," "judge," and the like: these things, therefore, are common to all persons. But some are proper, and of these some are proper to two persons in comparison to the remaining one, as "to be from a principle" is for the Son and the Spirit, and "to send the Spirit" is for the Father and the Son: here "to send" is taken as it imports a relation of origin between the sender and the sent, and consequently a real distinction; or that the Spirit is said to be of the Father and of the Son. Some things are proper to one person, and of these, again, some are so personally proper that they are even constitutive, as paternity, filiation, passive spiration. C Some things, even if they are in one alone, are nevertheless not constitutive of the persons, but are certain notions, just as "to be unbegotten" is notional to the Father—"unbegotten" being taken here as unproduced. These things, therefore, are common personal attributes of the three persons, nor are those things which are proper to two in comparison to the third, nor those which are proper to one alone, but proper in such a way as to be notional and consequential; but those alone are personal and proper constitutive attributes of the persons: to wit, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration; whereas those things which are proper to two in comparison to the third, these are notional attributes of the two persons. These things having been presupposed, we shall prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, with His help, and from the Father and the Son.
Arguments proving the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, and from the Father and the Son proceeds.
Through the first and immediate operation of each, all its other operations occur, but the first and immediate operation of the Father is to generate: therefore, through to generate the action of breathing comes to be, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. But as to what he means by this, which we say, "through the Son," and that it signifies Him as a causing or mediating principle, we do not understand by this that the Son is a mediating principle in regard to breathing, in such a way that the Father does not immediately breathe the Holy Spirit, but breathes Him through the Son as a secondary cause, just as God moves the heaven through the mediation of the intelligence. For we hold with Augustine that the Spirit proceeds immediately from both: but we understand that the Son, who is the principle of the Spirit, is mediating in regard to existence between the Father and the Holy Spirit, since He is naturally understood to be produced by the Father before the Holy Spirit is produced by both, as we have sufficiently proved in the discourse concerning union.
Item, the Holy Spirit either proceeds from the Father alone, or not from the Father alone: for between contradictories there is no middle ground. But it cannot be said that He proceeds from the Father alone: therefore, not from the Father alone. But if not from the Father alone, therefore also from the Son. Moreover, that He does not proceed from the Father alone is proved first indeed: this saying is nowhere found, neither in the canonical scripture nor among the doctors. But what was not said by any of these, one ought not to dare to say. Furthermore, since to breathe is not the first and immediate essential action of the Father, it is [performed] through the first, as has been said. Here "through" is taken as it imports the condition of a cause without which not: because to breathe necessarily presupposes to generate, not as it imports the condition of a principle; because generation is not the principle of spiration; since spiration belongs to the Son, to whom the actual generation (which is the very to beget, and the generation itself) does not belong: wherefore it is necessary that the Son participate in this operation, and that the Holy Spirit proceed through Him; for since all things are common to the Father and the Son except the constitutive properties of the persons, the power of breathing will also be common to Him, which is indeed natural to the Father, but yet not constitutive of His person, as has been said. Wherefore the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son. For in theology "and" and "through" do not differ. But if anyone says that it is common, therefore it is permitted also for the Holy Spirit to have this power of breathing—the power of breathing, that is, active spiration, or the divine nature joined to active spiration as essential and natural. For all essential things are common to Him as well. Let him learn that this is impossible, for the reason that it is opposed to His property; for the same cannot be the principle of itself. For each of the divine persons, remaining in what It is, and keeping Its own personal property, has all common things in common.
A For, as the blessed Basil says, the Son, remaining in that which is Son, has all things whatsoever that the Father has; therefore the Spirit also, remaining in that which is Spirit, has all things whatsoever that both the Father and the Son have. Therefore, for It to be the principle of Itself counteracts Its own property: and for that reason It cannot have an active spiration. But perhaps someone will say that if the power of spirating is not common to It, at least the generative power will be common to It, just as the spirative power is common to the Son: but let it not escape him that this also is impossible. Since the principle which, with the power of generating—that is, actual constitutive generation—is the paternal person, and is incommunicable to another, as has been proven, it is impossible for it to be common to another person, in the way that the spirative power is common to the Son. B Furthermore, because it implies a contradiction; for if the same were to generate the Son and proceed from Him, it would be both the principle and that which is from the principle to the same, which is a contradiction. But someone will say that this inconvenient consequence follows, because it is presupposed that the Son spirates the Spirit. But if this were not presupposed, although it is admitted only that the Spirit generates the Son with the Father, no place would be left for this inconvenience. For why does the Spirit not rather generate the Son with the Father, than the Son spirate the Spirit with the Father? If anyone says these things, first he should know that he is inquiring about what no one has ever dared even to think; next, that power—that is, actual generation—the generative [power] precedes the spirative power as the first and immediate operation of the Father, as has been proven; and for that reason it cannot be common to the Spirit. The power of spirating, however, as it follows the generation of the Son and happens through His generation, as has been proven, it is not impossible, but rather necessary, that it be common to Him with the Father. But if anyone says again on account of these things, "therefore the Holy Spirit is inferior to both the Father and the Son, since the Father generates the Son and spirates the Spirit; the Son also Himself spirates the Spirit with the Father; but the Spirit neither generates the Son, nor spirates Himself, nor spirates another Spirit," his reasoning is vain, and he concludes against himself whoever says these things. For if to be the principle of no person were to be considered a sign of imperfection and diminution in the Trinity, then to be the cause of fewer persons would also be a sign of imperfection: therefore the Son, since He is the principle of only one person, namely the Spirit, would be inferior by this reasoning to the Father, who is the principle of both persons. But it is inconvenient even to think this. Therefore that [proposition] also is simply absurd. For the principle, insofar as it is joined to the act, or being from a principle when it concerns personal properties, makes one thing neither greater nor lesser than another to be or to be called.
Item, if the actual power of generating and spirating—that is, the actual spiration—were so proper to the paternal person that both by themselves constituted His person, and the principle of each operation is the form; two forms (by the forms we C understand the principles of these two operations) would be principles D and Father; therefore the Spirit also, remaining in that which is Spirit, has all things whatsoever that both the Father and the Son have. Therefore, for It to be the principle of Itself counteracts Its own property: and for that reason It cannot have an active spiration. But perhaps someone will say that if the power of spirating is not common to It, at least the generative power will be common to It, just as the spirative power is common to the Son: but let it not escape him that this also is impossible. Since the principle which, with the power of generating—that is, actual constitutive generation—is the paternal person, and is incommunicable to another, as has been proven, it is impossible for it to be common to another person, in the way that the spirative power is common to the Son. Therefore, each form, that is, every principle of constitutive operation, constitutes some person with that operation; just as the essence, which is the principle of active generation, constitutes the Father with that same generation, and thus the Father would be two persons. But this is inconvenient. Therefore, the power of spirating, that is, the active spiration, does not constitute the person of the Father. But if it does not constitute it, it is therefore common also to other persons, or to some one of them: not to both simultaneously, nor to the Spirit alone, since He cannot spirate Himself. It is therefore common to the Son. Therefore, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.
Item, all doctors commonly confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: but this must be understood naturally; for there is nothing in God besides nature, nor by accident. If, therefore, naturally and according to nature the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and in divine things something can proceed according to nature in a twofold way, either by generation or by spiration: but He does not proceed from Him by generation, for the Spirit would be the Son of the Son; therefore He proceeds by spiration, and comes forth from Him.
But if anyone says that to say He proceeds from the Son signifies His grace and operation in us, this is his one refuge. For even if we partake of a certain grace, and not the substance of the Spirit (for the substance of God is unparticipatable), yet grace does not proceed from the Son as that which does not subsist, but the very divine person of the Spirit. Which is clear from other clearer and more open words of the doctors, when they say that He emanates, arises, springs forth, and shines out from the Son. Which, to anyone not blinded, signifies the very substance of the Spirit, not a participation, nor merely a temporal mission. Such therefore is the personal progress of the Spirit from the Son, either natural or servile; and since it is not servile, it is necessarily natural. And it is not easy to imagine what a natural progress of the Holy Spirit from the substance of the Son could be other than His procession.
Item, all Eastern and Western Fathers proclaim that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son, and that He is from their substance commonly. But in the holy Trinity, whatever is from the substance of anyone, it is necessary that it be also from His person: therefore the Spirit, since He is said by all doctors to be from the substance of the Son, is also from His person. But that that which is in the Trinity from anyone’s substance is also from His hypostasis or person, is evident from this: substance, or essence, and hypostasis, or person, in each of the divine persons are one in reality, and so one, that they are distinguished only by reason. For if substance and persons were really distinguished, there would certainly be three essences or substances just as there are three persons in reality, or a quaternity of things would be posited in the Trinity. Namely, three persons really distinct, and therefore three things, and the essence, which is a fourth.
However, both of these are contrary to the faith. Wherefore, the distinction between hypostasis and essence is one of reason, but the unity is real; this is contrary to what we find in us humans. Indeed, in us, the unity of nature or humanity with the person of each individual is a matter of reason, while the distinction is real. For one thing is the humanity itself, and another is the individuation of this person. Therefore, just as we are many persons, so too we are many humans. From this it follows that what pertains to the nature of some human does not necessarily pertain also to his person; but in the holy Trinity, it is the reverse, as has been said. The unity of essence and person is real, while the distinction is one of reason; therefore, that which comes from the essence of any of the persons necessarily also comes from his person. If, therefore, the Spirit is from the nature and essence of the Son—as both other doctors and especially Cyril prove in many places—then He is also from His person. But our people say: "These things are said by the doctors so that the consubstantiality may be proven, and to show that the Spirit is of the same substance as the Son." Yet, how much truer this is, so much the more does it favor the Latins. For then the Spirit is even more of the same substance with the Father and the Son when He proceeds—that is, issues—from their substance and their persons. Let it be said more clearly for the sake of those who are ignorant of the force of words. For if this signified only consubstantiality, as our people think, one would also have to say that the Father is from the substance of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or that the Son is from the substance of the Spirit. But no one has dared, nor will anyone dare, to say this. A Furthermore, since essence neither generates nor breathes according to the theologians—and also according to the philosophers, for they too say everywhere that operations are of individuals, not of universals and genera—for it was not humanity simply, but a certain human who begat me. If, therefore, operations are of individuals and not of universals, and not of substances simply, what else can be understood when we hear of the essence of the Son, and that the Spirit proceeds from it, if not His divine person?
Moreover, let this not escape us: that the holy doctors who said these things were opposing the Arians and Eunomians. Those who said the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son, nevertheless denied that they were from their substance; when they said that the Son, though from the Father, was not born from His essence or nature, but by will. And the Spirit Himself [they also said was] from the Son, but not essentially or naturally, but voluntarily. Therefore, they asserted that the Son was lesser than the Father and of another substance, and the Spirit lesser than the Son and of another essence; and they posited three essences in the Godhead. The Fathers and holy doctors, therefore, refuting their opinion as false, endeavored to prove that the Holy Spirit is not only from the Son, but from His substance. Likewise [they proved] that the Son is not only from the Father, but also from His essence. Consider, therefore, B how the doctors opposed them on this point: that the heretics said the Spirit was from the Son by will, not by essence, whereas the doctors asserted He was from the essence of the Son. Furthermore, as to the fact that they said He is from the Son, no one contradicted this, nor said that He is not from the Son, as if they themselves felt the same thing and were saying that He is from the essence of the Son: for they themselves understood the same thing, as if they were saying "from His essence and person"; and we say this same thing.
Likewise, blessed Basil, in the first book against Eunomius, says that the Son has a natural order to the Father, such as that of a flame to the fire from which it is, and of a caused thing to its cause. He also asserts that the Spirit has a similar order to the Son; the great Athanasius says even more openly: "Whatever order and nature the Son has to the Father, the Spirit has the same order and nature to the Son." From these, such a syllogism is formed: the Spirit has the same order and nature to the Son as the Son has to the Father; but the Son has a natural order to the Father, such as that of a caused thing to its cause; therefore, the Holy Spirit also has a natural order to the Son, such as that of a caused thing to its cause; therefore, the Son is also the cause or principle of the person of the Holy Spirit.
Likewise, since in natural things every cause precedes that which is caused in time, and that which is caused is later than its cause, therefore some, hearing of "cause" and "caused" in the Trinity—and especially the Arians and Eunomians, arguing from human and natural examples against the coeternity of the Trinity—willing to prove the Son is posterior to the Father as a thing caused by Him, and the Spirit posterior to the Son as a thing caused by him. The illustrious Nyssen, opposing them and proposing to prove the coeternity of the three persons in the first of his books against Eunomius, makes a certain proportion of the Son to the Father and of the Spirit to the Son, saying indeed that the Father is only thought of as prior to the Son by the reason of causality, not in time, and therefore it cannot follow that they are not coeternal, and that the Son himself is thought of as prior to the Spirit by the reason of causality, and in no other way. So that it clearly appears through this holy doctor that the Son is the cause of the Spirit. D For just as, he says, the Son is joined to the Father, so the Spirit is joined to the Son; and again, just as the Father is thought of as prior to the Son, not by any distance of time, nor really, but by intention, by the reason of causality; so too the Son is thought of as prior to the Spirit, likewise by intention, by the reason of causality.
Likewise, although in human, sensible things not every exemplar of something is also its cause—for in artificial things, the exemplars of them are not also the effective cause of them—yet that which is naturally an exemplar of something is also, even in human affairs, the cause of the image of which it is the exemplar; therefore, much more so in divine things, where both all other things, and the exemplar itself, is naturally accepted (for nothing...
A there is contrary to nature), this proposition is verified, that is to say, that in divine persons the exemplar of something is also the cause of that of which it is the exemplar. Now that great Gregory, author of miracles, and named for that reason, calls the Son the exemplar of the Spirit. It is clear, therefore, that he also considered him to be his cause. This same thing can be proved by a similarity. For the great Basil places the Father as the exemplar of the Son in the fourth book *Contra Eunomium*; but Gregory, in the aforementioned oration which begins, "They are enemies and aliens to the catholic faith who say that the Son is from non-being," teaches that the Son is the exemplar of the Spirit. But Basil places the Father as the cause of the Son as his exemplar; therefore, Gregory also asserts the Son to be the exemplar of the Spirit as his cause.
Likewise, Saint Basil and very many other doctors call the Son the image of the Father, and the Spirit the image of the Son. Likewise, they call the Son the operation of the Father, and the Spirit the operation of the Son; the Son the word of the Father, and the Spirit the word of the Son; the Son the fragrance of the Father, and the Spirit the fragrance of the Son. But according to all these, the Son is said to be of the Father as if from the Father; therefore, the Holy Spirit is also said, according to the same reasoning, to be of the Son as if from the Son.
Likewise, if the Spirit were not from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him personally; and since this is false and absurd, it remains that he is from the Son.
Moreover, that he would not be distinguished from him personally if he were not from him, is clear from this. Every cause or principle of something is called its principle and cause in two ways: in one way as that "which," and in another as that "by which," for example, the form which is in the soul of the maker, by which he makes the effect similar to that which he is making. Wherefore every agent acts similar to itself according to the form by which it acts; for example, of this image the cause is both the painter himself as the "which," and the form of the painter as the "by which," to which the painter makes the image similar. In a similar way also in the divine persons, the Father—that is, his divine person—is the B cause as the "which," and his divine essence as the "by which": for this is the form to which those things which proceed from him are made similar. Wherefore the Son also and the Holy Spirit are consubstantial with him, for the reason that every producer produces something similar to the form by which it produces. But God and the Father produces the Son and the Spirit by his divine essence, and therefore he produces what is consubstantial to him. If, therefore, the Father alone produced the Spirit, according to those who assert this, then there would be no distinction of the Son from the Holy Spirit, since there is no difference, neither in the producer (for the Father is the same), nor in the form by which he produces (for it is the same divine essence), nor in the things produced themselves; for they are of the same form, namely, of one and common divinity: especially since there is no matter there from which a distinction might be made. From which it would follow that there is no distinction of them one from the other: it remains, therefore, that either the Spirit is the cause of the Son, or the Son of the Spirit, in order that there may be a distinction. But the first is not true, therefore the second is true.
Item, that to be sent in things divine signifies to be from a cause, is attested by blessed John Chrysostom to the Arians seeking how he could be of the same essence, who sends, and who is sent, in the thirty-ninth homily on John, answering in this way: "Again you adapt your discourses to human things, and do not consider that these things are spoken so that we may also know the cause, and not fall into the heresy of Sabellius; but the Spirit is sent from the Son; therefore he is from him."
Item, this power of sending, since it is in both the Father and the Son, according to which both send the Holy Spirit, which our side also concedes, is either the same in the Father C and the Son, or it is different; but if it were different, there would be both a greater and a lesser, and consequently diverse missions: wherefore there would be neither one power, nor one operation of them. And those whose powers are diverse, their essences also would be diverse, and the Father and the Son would be of different essences; but all these things are absurd, and contrary to the catholic faith; therefore there is not a different power, therefore it is the same. But in the Father, the power of sending the Holy Spirit is the same as the power of spirating him, for the Father always spirates the Holy Spirit, and in spirating him, he sends him. Therefore also the Son, together with the power of spirating, sends him as he spirates; therefore the Son is also productive of the Holy Spirit. As for that which some call a second and temporal mission, since it is nothing, it is also solved by the aforementioned reason: for although this duality of processions is nowhere found, yet even granting that there were some second mission, which might be common to the Father and the Son according to the Father, he would have it as similar to him. For nothing of those things which are common to the Father and the Son is dissimilar in either of them. But the Father has the power of sending, together with the power of spirating: therefore the Son also will have the power of sending, together with the power of spirating.
Item, that which is of anyone’s nature is also from him, according to which it is said to be his: but the Holy Spirit is of the Son, and it is clear that this is by nature, for it is not beyond nature, nor as a servant. The Holy Spirit is, therefore, as Holy Spirit—namely, as a divine person in the Trinity—from the Son.
Item, the Holy Spirit is a relative name. For he is called the Spirit of the Father, and the Spirit of the Son; for if he were absolute, he would not be called the Spirit of anyone. For nothing absolute, D according to what is signified by a name, is called another's, but only according to some other relation: just as man, since he is absolute, is not called a man of anyone, but as a servant, or a Son: but the Spirit, according to the meaning of this name "Spirit," is called the Spirit of the Son, just as he is of the Father. He is therefore relative, and consequently is referred to the spirator. The Spirit is, therefore, of the Father and of the Son as from those who spirate and produce him. But if anyone says, "He is therefore called the Spirit of the Son because he is sent from him," this is a false argument, for it is the contrary: because he is his, he is sent from him, for things which are prior are the cause of things which are posterior. But it is prior that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son,
for to understand the Spirit to be the Spirit of the Son is to have, whereas to send is to give; yet it is understood that having is prior to giving. Wherefore this reasoning operates for us. For since by nature he is his Spirit, by nature he sends him; but since natural procession in divine matters happens either by generation or by spiration, and since this is not by generation, it remains that it is by spiration. The mission of the Spirit from the Son, therefore, is his spiration from him. C
Furthermore, the Holy Spirit receives from the Son. For he says, "He shall receive of mine." Now, what he receives is his essence; for he is not one thing and his essence another, for then he would be composite. Since, therefore, he is supremely simple, he receives his essence and being from the Son. For that which he says, "He shall receive of mine," is not to be understood, as some think, as "of my Father"; first, because this phrasing is neither Greek nor Latin. For if, when "of mine" is said, "Father" were to be understood, this "mine" would be a pronoun of the masculine gender; but no one trained in the Greek or Latin language utters a pronoun of the masculine or feminine gender unless with an addition, saying: "My brother," "My friend," "My city," or "My house." For "mine," simply and without addition, signifies no more the Father than it does an enemy. Furthermore, this reasoning is proven empty by the very intention of the Savior. "All things," he says, "whatsoever the Father hath are mine. Therefore I said, he shall receive of mine, and shall declare it unto you." So that such an argument may be made from these words: the Spirit receives from those things which are the Father's; therefore, the Spirit receives from those that are mine, or from what is mine. And since he, and his own, are one and the same on account of his supreme simplicity, by receiving of his own, he receives from him.
The saintly Athanasius is also of this opinion, for he says: "For the Word does not receive from the Spirit, but the Spirit from the Word." What, then, he receives from the Son must be considered; it is clear that it is wisdom and knowledge: "For of mine," he says, "he shall receive, and shall declare it unto you." For to declare is nothing else than to teach and illuminate the apostles. But this is the work of wisdom; therefore, the Spirit receives wisdom from the Son. What, then, was the Spirit without wisdom from the Father, and therefore was it necessary for him to receive wisdom from the Son? Or is his being one thing and his wisdom another? But these things are absurd. For his wisdom and his being are the same, and from whom he receives his being, from the same he receives wisdom: and when he is breathed forth, he receives both being and subsistence, and likewise receives wisdom. Since, therefore, he also receives wisdom from the Son, he receives his very being and subsistence at the same time from him: therefore the Son is also a cause of being for him, just as the Father is. D
Item, if the Spirit receives from the Son, then the Son gives the same thing that is to produce. For Chrysostom, explaining that evangelical passage, "He hath given all judgment unto the Son," says: "And that you may learn that to give is the same as to beget, hear other authorities by which he signifies this: 'As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself.' What then, he first begat him, and then gave him life? Therefore he was begotten without life? But not even the demons themselves would say this, for it would be an act of great ignorance, along with impiety, to say this. Just as, therefore, 'He gave him life' is to be understood as meaning that he begat him as Life; so also that expression, 'He gave him judgment,' is to be understood as meaning that he begat him as Judge. In like manner, therefore, when the Son gives wisdom to the Spirit, he acts as producer of that wisdom, giving him, that is to say, the being and subsistence which he receives when he is breathed forth from him. Therefore, of the spiration also, the Son is the cause or principle.
Item, the Son indeed says of himself: "What I have heard of my Father, I have declared unto you"; but of the Spirit: "For he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak." Therefore, whatever "he shall hear from the Father" signifies regarding the Son, the same does "the hearing of the Spirit" signify for him; but in the case of the Son, "to hear" signifies being from a cause and being begotten. For to hear is nothing else than to receive wisdom and knowledge. But the Son was not first born and then afterwards received knowledge or wisdom; rather, he was born as Wisdom; in his being begotten, he receives knowledge and wisdom, and all other things which are the same as his essence: this, therefore, he receives from the Father when he hears from him, and his hearing is his being begotten. Therefore, the hearing of the Holy Spirit also signifies nothing but that he is from a cause and from his spiration. Wherefore, from whom he hears, from him he also proceeds: but he hears not only from the Father but also from the Son, which is apparent from the very words of the Savior, where he says: "He shall receive of mine, and shall declare it unto you." For the cause of the declaring is the Spirit's hearing; and the cause of this same declaring is also the fact that he receives from the Son. Wherefore to receive from the Son, or to hear, is the cause of one and the same thing, namely, of declaring. Therefore in divine matters, hearing and receiving are the same; and since he receives from the Son, therefore he also hears from him. The saintly Basil is of the same opinion in his Monastic Rule, saying of the Holy Spirit that he teaches and suggests all things whatsoever he hears from the Son, and is also produced from him; for the reason that his hearing is the same as his proceeding, as has been said.
Item, that being Father or begetting does not contain within itself the notion of spirating, for then the Spirit would be the Son, but the Son possesses all things simply, which the Father also has, except that he begets or is the Father. For the saintly Cyril says in the second book to Hermias: "We believe the Son to be coeternal with the Father, and to have all things whatsoever in equal measure, except the begetting itself: for this is attributed to God and the Father alone." The same in his sermon on the Trinity: "In the only-begotten Son, in all things similar and equal to the Father, except for the paternal...
A status. The Son, therefore, possesses the power of breathing, since this is outside the concept of paternity; and indeed, He possesses everything of the Father, except for paternity or the power of begetting, as is agreeable to Cyril.
Likewise, the Holy Spirit is called the gift of the Father, and so also of the Son: therefore, He is from both. The antecedent is pleasing to all doctors, and the consequent is proven: for a gift is of the one giving, and something is someone else’s either by identity, or as a possession of his, or as a servant, or by origin; and since none of the prior modes applies, when we say the Holy Spirit is the gift of the Son, it remains that it is according to the third mode, that of origin, namely, that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of the Son: therefore, the Son is His origin and cause.
Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa in the homily on the Lord’s Prayer, which begins, "When Moses led the Israelite people to the mountain for the sake of learning," while handing down the distinction of the divine Trinity, distinguishes the Father from the Son and the Holy Spirit, in that He himself is without cause, while they are from a cause; but the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom it is common that they are from a cause, he distinguishes from one another, in that the former is from the Father, while the latter is from the Father and the Son: for so it is written in the older codices. Wherefore, manifestly, even according to this doctor, the Spirit is from the Son. And if any say that, according to more modern books, it is written "Spirit of the Son" and not "from the Son," not even in this way will they have anything more. For the same is concluded even from this. For it is evident that when it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they are "originated" (we have said many times how the holy Greek doctors understand "caused" and "originated" in divine matters, namely, as meaning that which is from a principle or created being), he asks how they should be distinguished from one another, and he asserts that, although they have this in common, that both are caused or originated, yet the Son is said to be from the Father, and His property does not proceed further; but the Spirit is said both to be from the Father, and together with this, the Scriptures testify that He is also the Son’s. Wherefore, the Spirit is also called the Spirit of Christ, while the Son is not, nor is He called the Spirit of the Spirit. And this holy doctor thinks this is enough for distinguishing, that the Spirit should be called the Spirit of the Son, while the Son is not called the Son of the Spirit. If, therefore, that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son distinguishes Him from the Son; and according to our side, nothing else distinguishes Him from the Son except the diverse mode of procession, namely, being breathed. Therefore, it is the same thing for the Spirit to be the Spirit of the Son, and to proceed from the Son. Whose Spirit, therefore, He is called, from him He also proceeds: but He is called the Spirit of the Son just as He is the Father’s; therefore, He proceeds from the Son just as He proceeds from the Father. And it should be noted that the explanation of some is vain, who say that He is called the Spirit of the Son on account of consubstantiality: since this holy doctor accepts this as a distinctive mark. But things that are said on account of consubstantiality unite, they do not distinguish. If, therefore, it is not said on account of consubstantiality that he is the Spirit of the Son, all the demonstrations of the Latins remain most A powerful, and without any contradiction: whereby they prove that from the fact that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, He also proceeds from the Son. For through this false interpretation, some attempt to overturn them on account of consubstantiality, thinking that it is said "Spirit of the Son." Gregory of Nyssa manifests this opinion as false, taking that word as a differentiator. But since there are many arguments, many authorities, and many reasons to show the truth of this conclusion and to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, I think I have already done enough for you from what has been said.
Solutions to the dilemmas which are proposed by the Greeks against the Latins and others who think correctly.
But when certain dilemmas are brought against us who confess the truth by those who neither know what they are saying nor of what they assert, those things which are opposed against the arguments proving the truth, we solved briefly within the arguments themselves, as you have seen. But of those which are brought against the conclusion itself, choosing the stronger ones, and those which seem more plausible, I shall insert the solutions here as far as I am able, briefly and sufficiently; so that this discourse of yours may be as complete as possible, and sufficient for all things. Although these dilemmas are not brought against us, nor are we obliged to render an account: but against the holy doctors who were the leaders and authors of this dogma and of this conclusion for us; and not only against the Westerners, who most openly teach the conclusion, but no less against the Easterners. Therefore, solutions are to be sought from them, not from us, which they also did, the Holy Spirit foreseeing all heresies that were about to rise. Nevertheless, we also, illuminated by them and other blessed men, who left their very copious works on this subject to us, will set ourselves against them. They think, therefore, that the Father and the Son are either merged into one person, if one says the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, or that it is necessary to posit two causes and two principles; but either of these is most absurd. We, however, regarding the confusion of persons, say this: that if we were to posit the operation of breathing as constitutive D of the paternal person, then this inconvenience would follow, that the Son would be one and the same person with the Father. But since the paternity of the paternal person and the begetting itself have been proven to be constitutive, while "to breathe" is a certain property following upon His person already constituted; why would He, to whom a property that is not constitutive is common with the Father, be one and the same person with Him? For just as it is common to the Son with the Father that the Spirit is called His Spirit, just as He is the Father’s, and also that He is sent by Him just as He is by the Father, nevertheless He is not the same person with the Father, seeing that it is not constitutive, neither that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father, nor that He is sent by the Father. Likewise, and if He has in common with the Father the power of breathing
and not for that reason is he confused in the same persona with him, since to breathe forth is not a constitutive property of the paternal person. Wherefore, until it is proven that the power of breathing forth is constitutive of the paternal person, no confusion of persons can be proved from it. But that the power of breathing forth is constitutive, cannot be proven: because it would follow that the Father would have two persons and two hypostases, as was proven in the beginning, and this is inconvenient; and also because this would be a begging of the question. For to posit that the power of breathing forth is constitutive of the person of the Father, and that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, is one and the same thing. Wherefore he who says this, begs the question. But since this is not proven, neither does a confusion of persons follow, although there are those who believe it. It has been said in the preceding A what things among those spoken of God are common; what are proper, and of the proper ones which are proper to two persons; which indeed to one alone, of those which are to one alone; which are so proper that they are also personal or hypostatic; and which are so proper that they are notions and not hypostatic; such as it has also been said that breathing forth itself is not. Therefore, from those things which have now been said, and from those which were presupposed in the preceding, the solution to this inconvenience is clear. Nor has anyone any longer the right to accuse the Latins of introducing a confusion of persons. But regarding the two causes, or two principles, which some imagine the Latins introduce into theology, and [think] that this inconvenience follows them more than shadows follow bodies: what shall we say? Indeed, this must be said in the first place, that the authority of the saints alone must needs suffice for the faithful: who said both that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, and as from one principle. For the Father and the Son are not two principles of the Spirit, says Augustine, but both are one principle of him; just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the Trinity itself, are not three principles of the creature, but one, [and] God. Therefore, how could anyone seek a more open solution than this, which the Holy Spirit has spoken through the mouth of this most holy Father and doctor? For let it not escape us that the same inconvenience, namely, of many principles and many gods, would follow even in the production of the creature. If one were not D to consider it piously, [which] is alien to the Christian faith and befitting the Gentiles. For this is that for which the Gentiles most of all accuse us, namely, that they introduced many gods and many creators. Since, therefore, we also believe the three divine persons to be the cause and principle of the creature, this same inconvenience would follow for us, and we would seem to posit many principles and many divinities, if one does not understand correctly. But hear how the holy doctors most wisely solve this. For even if we believe the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be the cause of the creature: since, however, all things are referred to the Father, and because from him the Son and Holy Spirit have both their being and the power of creating, A nor did they have the power of creating, nor would they be at all; likewise, since it is one and the same in number, and proceeds by a common divinity, or divine essence: therefore, they are deservedly one God and one Creator.
Similarly, since the power was one and the same in number with the Father; [and] the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from one and the same in number and common divinity, or divine essence: therefore, they are deservedly one God and one Creator. Let this same thing, then, regarding the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, be sufficient for those who inquire about this. For since it is one and the same power of breathing forth proceeding from one and the same essence [by which] the Father and the Son breathe forth the Holy Spirit; and since the Son has this power of breathing forth from the Father, therefore they are both one breather, one cause, and one principle of the procession of the Spirit. These things, then, as was said, would suffice for those not contentious on account of the authority of the doctors; yet the same is also proven by reason; for since there are two things to which every product is referred, namely, the form according to which it is produced, and the subject or person from whom, if the Father and the Son—just as they are two according to persons—were also two according to the form according to which they produce, then necessarily there would be two principles of the Spirit; but since, although we confess them to be two in persons, yet the form by which they produce is one in number and entirely B indistinct (for the divine essence itself is one and the same in number, common to both, according to which both produce the Spirit), it is not necessary—nay, it is impossible—to call them two principles. For there is one, in number, essential active spiration, which, while it is proper to them, cannot however be common to the Holy Spirit, in that, as has been said more often, it is opposed to his property. For all essential things are common to the Son and the Holy Spirit with the Father, saving, however, their properties. For all that the Father is, the Son is, Basil and the other doctors say, remaining in that which is the Son, namely, in his property. For although he is equal and similar to the Father, yet he cannot generate himself, since that is repugnant to his property. In the same way, the Spirit also, even though he has all things in common with the Father and the Son, yet it is necessary that he preserve his own property: because he cannot breathe himself forth, since this opposes his property. From these things, therefore, it is most clearly evident that the Latins are falsely accused of positing two principles in divinity. Also, if the procession from the Father is perfect, they say, the one from the Son is superfluous; or if this is necessary, it proceeds imperfectly from the Father. But this is an inconvenience, to call the operation of the Father imperfect, and [to say it] stands in need of the Son for its perfection. To which we reply that those who say these things err because they think the Father and the Son are entirely two, and their operations as well, clinging to human examples because they see the operations of two men are two in number, even if they tend toward one effect.
A Likewise, they believe the same happens in God. But this is most absurd. For while the Father and the Son are distinct only in persons, in all other things they are one and the same; whence it follows that they possess the power of spiration one and the same in number, and they do not breathe the Spirit separately, nor does this one first and the other afterward, nor does one breathe in one way and the other in another, as those who are carnal in all things suppose; but together and without time, they both breathe Him by one and the same spiration in number, and above all perfection. For it is necessary that the same things be said as many times to those who, hearing them so often, do not understand; or what will those men say, if one should ask them in return whether they believe the creation of the world from the Father is perfect, or not? For if it is perfect, why do they name the Son and the Spirit as creators also? But if it is imperfect, and for this reason they associate the Son and the Spirit with the Father, let them consider what they are saying. Now the creation of the world from the Father is indeed perfect, and the operation of the Son and of the Spirit for its creation is one and the same in number, and it is not one operation of the Father and another of them; for then these childish doubts would have a place. Therefore, in our proposed subject as well, the procession of the Spirit from the Father is perfect, and superabundant beyond all perfection: but the spiration of this same Spirit from the Son is also one and the same in number, not different, nor in a different manner, nor prior and posterior, but simultaneously the same; and they both breathe the Spirit with one and the same power of spiration in number. And let no one again accuse this of blasphemy, hearing us arguing from creation. And for that reason let no one think that the Latins place the Holy Spirit among the creatures; for there have been, and still are, those who have fallen into even this insolence and insanity, so that they dared to impute this also to the Latins. For these are either the words of fools, or of those wishing to jest; or of those who are ignorant that the holy Fathers and doctors B frequently lead us by the hand from creation and sensible examples to the belief in intellectual, invisible, and divine things, proving those things as best they can from those that have even a faint vestige of the divine likeness. For the Orientals, indeed, attempt to show the Trinity of persons by intellect, word, and spirit; likewise by eye, fountain, and river; again by sun, ray, and light: the Occidentals, however, attempt to show it by other similar examples. Although each of these examples, even if in reason they are three, is in reality one hypostasis or substance, yet the Fathers did not think for that reason that they were offending the proposed truth, but accepted from those examples what was fitting for their intention, and rejected the rest as alien to the truth. And no one has accused them, nor shall any one accused them, so long as he is in his right mind, for having used such examples. How then will anyone rightly accuse the Latins, if, to show that the spirative power in the Father and the Son is one and the same in number, they use an example granted by all, that the creation of things from the Trinity is one and the same in number? Or how will anyone dare to slander them for this reason, that they number the Holy Spirit among the creatures? C Especially since no one among those who now live, the Latins, nor those who have existed after the division and that ill-fated and unhappy schism, was the first to say this; but those holy men of old, those ancient doctors, those great luminaries, whose sound has gone out into all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world, and who are deservedly celebrated by us and ours as preeminent doctors and saints, both discovered these examples and spoke them. For Augustine, who transcends all in depth of knowledge, and yields to none in holiness and the fervor of charity toward God—Augustine, I say, is the one who says these things in the very same words, that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit. Just as the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit must be believed to be one principle of creation. Let those who easily dare everything accuse also the blessed Athanasius, who in his *Dialogue with an Arian* against the one who posited the Son as unlike the Father, and the Spirit as unlike the Son and the Father, says thus: "The nature of God is the cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as it is of all creation"; and let them, with similar audacity, either place the Son and the Spirit with creation, or honor the creature with the Son and the Holy Spirit as God, if the holy doctor has taught that the cause of God, namely, and of the creature, is one and the same in number. But these are the things of impudent and ignorant men. For since the incongruities which some are wont to infer against our true conclusion with their reasonings are mainly these; and if there are any others, they are referred to these: it is clear that, with these being sufficiently solved by the favor of God, the rest also fall together, and what has been said in regard to these is also sufficient for all those others.
An exposition of the authorities of certain doctors, which seem to be contrary to the Latins.
Furthermore, it remains to consider the things that are argued by certain authorities of doctors—opposed, as they think, to the Latins and the truth of this dogma—believing they can conclude a contradiction from them: of which one is that which the blessed John of Damascus says in his *Theological* works: "We say the Spirit is of the Son, but we do not say [He is] from the Son." The other is that of the most holy Dionysius the Areopagite, in his book *On the Divine Names*, saying: "The Father is the sole fountain of divinity, who is above all substance." For even if some D other things are found, they are yet of the same opinion, and they refer to these as the most important, and those which seem to be expressly contrary to the Latins. Therefore, only these two must be considered. As to that, therefore, which John of Damascus says, hear how simply, how justly, and how sufficiently we shall answer for the sake of the Latins and the confirmation of their opinion. We say that no name is so sufficient that it can precisely signify one thing alone, which we wish to express in divine matters, whence it happens that by many and diverse words we do not signify completely one thing, then another. For since these names and words have been invented by us, and we who are governed by nature, and who apply them to signifying natural things, do not know the intent of the inventor, nor of those who...
A assign them, can exceed their nature, and therefore can by no means signify divine things completely. Wherefore, every right-thinking person affirms that the imperfection of names is not to be attributed to divine things. But since we cannot express divine things with other names, we must indeed use these customary terms. We must, however, use them only insofar as they are suitable to the things signified, while rejecting their imperfection and any inconvenience they might carry with them, and by using another term to supply the deficiency of the first. In the question thus proposed, namely, concerning the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, two things are necessarily required: one, that the Father and the Son equally and simply breathe forth the Holy Spirit—not one perfectly and the other imperfectly; for this is contrary to the truth of the faith. The second, that the Son, B as in other things, so also in the act of breathing, should have relation and an order to the Father. For both of these belong to the Father and the Son. For there is in them an equality of power—nay, identity—and the highest order. For whatever the Son has, including the breathing forth of the Spirit, he has from the Father. If, therefore, one word were sufficient to signify at once both the supreme identity of their power and their supreme order to one another, that word would certainly have to be used, all others being set aside. But now, not only is it impossible to find such a word—and thus it is necessary to express one of these with one word, and the other with another—but even these diverse names, for the fact that each of them signifies only one of the aforementioned things by itself, signify that one thing even imperfectly. Wherefore, we rightly and piously receive what is suitable for the object being signified, while rejecting the remainder, which is of the nature of imperfection. Such are the prepositions *ex* (from) and *per* (through). For the preposition *ex*, when it is applied to two or more things, signifies equality, but it does not in the least signify an order of one to the other. For if we say that something is made from two things—for instance, if some weight is drawn from two things—we signify indeed that their force is, in like manner and equally, drawn from each, as far as the force of the preposition goes. But the order of one to the other is not shown thereby. But the preposition *per*, conversely, signifies order indeed, but by no means equality. For if anything is said to be or to be made from something *through* someone, it will clearly appear that the one concerning whom *per* is said has a certain order to the one concerning whom the preposition *ex* is predicated, and that he has received from him that which is done through him. C But the equality of these to one another is not signified in the least. For he concerning whom the preposition *per* is predicated is always of lesser power and authority. Whence the holy Fathers and doctors, both Eastern and Western, when they turn their attention to the equality—nay, the identity—of the power of the Father and the Son, say that the Holy Spirit proceeds and exists from the Father and the Son. When, however, they wish to show their order to one another, they say that He proceeds from the Father *through* the Son, and from the Father *through* the Son, or from God *through* the Son, when they wish to show that He exists. D Some among the saints, however, have held an order of priority, as the greater part of the Orientals; others have held equality, or identity, as most of the Occidentals. And just as the Westerners, valuing equality more, use *ex* more often, so the Orientals, who consider the order as more important—among whom even the blessed John Damascene is numbered—use *per* for the most part, rarely admitting the preposition *ex*: not contradicting one another, but expressing diverse meanings with diverse names. Wherefore, concerning the creation of the world, even though without any ambiguity all things were produced *from* the Son just as they were from the Father, you will nonetheless very rarely find among the doctors, especially the Orientals, that the world was produced *from* the Son, but always *through* the Son, on account of that word of John: "All things were made through him." Thus the Eastern Fathers have adhered more to order; and for this reason they use *per*, which alone signifies order. Furthermore, the Greek language signifies, by this preposition *ex*, a principal cause, such as no one at all would concede the Son to be, whether of the Spirit or of the world. Wherefore, the doctors avoid using the very word *ex* regarding the Son, lest anyone should think Him the principal cause; and they avoid not only the word *ex* itself, but even the name of "cause" regarding the Son in respect to the creature, although both the Son and the Spirit are believed by all the faithful to be the cause of the world everywhere, and together with the Father, the cause: fearing lest anyone on that account should think Him the principal cause; against which they guard themselves as against a falsehood. For they know that the Father alone is the one principal cause of both the Godhead and the creature. If, therefore, the Latins, saying that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son along with the Western saints, do not posit the Son as the principal cause, but through this express the identity and equality of their power: and the Damascene, denying the principal cause, which is wont to be signified by *ex*, had regard to order, and for that reason uses *per*, asserting that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, through whom the order of the Son to the Father is manifested, without himself denying the equality or identity of their power, how could they be said to be more in harmony with one another? For he himself is the one who is from the Father, he himself is the intellect, the abyss of the Word, the begetter of the Word, and through the Word the breather forth of the declarative Spirit. And again: "But the Holy Spirit is the declarative power of the hidden divinity of the Father, proceeding from the Father through the Son." That by this preposition *per*, both through this and through other doctors, the Son is also shown to be with the Father the cause of the substance of the Spirit, has been sufficiently proven by us in the oration *De Unione* (On Union), especially when this word "proceed" is added, which also, according to our side, signifies nothing other than the very personal existence of the Holy Spirit. And these things may suffice for the authority of the Damascene. But as for those words of the holy Dionysius, who says that the Father is the sole fountain of the Divinity, in order that it may appear more clearly that that authority does not have the meaning that our people think, one must first hear those doctors,
who even call the Son the fountain of the Holy Spirit—not speaking of A the grace of the Spirit which is not subsistent, for they abuse this to counter all responses of this kind, but of the very person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in the first place, Athanasius, in his oration against the Arians, expounding that verse of the Psalm: "For with thee is the fountain of life," says, "For the Father knew, having the Son with Him, that He was the fountain of the Holy Spirit." It is clear, therefore, that he here speaks of the person of the Spirit, not of grace which is not subsistent; for we have the rule handed down by Saint Basil, that when we hear "Spirit" with the addition of "holy," we ought to understand nothing other than the person of the Spirit. Since, therefore, the Son is here spoken of as the fountain of the Spirit with the addition of "holy," it is clear that He is called the fountain of His person. Then, too, the great Basil himself, who handed down this rule to us, calls the Son the fountain of the Holy Spirit, saying: "The Son is the fountain of life; for David says to the Father: 'For with thee is the fountain of life'; and again another prophet says of the Jews: 'They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water.'" Now, the Holy Spirit is called living water. And it is to be noted that he says "Holy Spirit," signifying His very person; but the person of the Holy Spirit is God; therefore, since the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, He is most manifestly the fountain of Divinity. Wherefore, since that authority of Saint Dionysius, which calls the Father the sole fountain of Divinity, does not contradict the aforementioned authorities of the saints (for it is impious even to think that the holy doctors contradict one another), it must be understood in a sense other than what the vulgar think; nor for that reason does that doctor speak B as if denying that the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, but he himself also, together with the aforementioned doctors, says that He is the fountain of the Holy Spirit—that is, of His person. These things, therefore, having been declared, we answer that the holy doctor did not purpose here to transmit a total distinction of the divine persons from one another, as our people falsely judge; and it is evident that he did not transmit any distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, he does not transmit a distinction of all three persons from one another, but only of the Father in relation to the others. Therefore, comparing the Father in part to the Son, and transmitting their distinction from one another, he calls the Father the sole fountain, as if he were saying that the Father is indeed the fountain of the Son, but the Son is not at all the fountain of the Father. And that he speculates here only about the Father and the Son is manifested by what follows. For he says that those things which are of the divine generation, which is above every substance, are not convertible. For this name of divine generation regards only the Father and the Son, since the one generates, and the other is generated. But this appears more manifest when he subjoins: "Since the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father." It is clear, therefore, that by attributing generation and paternity itself only to the Father, he calls Him the sole fountain of Divinity, as if he said: "The Father alone is the sole generator, nor is He Himself generated, nor is the Son a generator, since those things which are of the divine generation are not convertible" one with another. And this is indeed C the true exposition and solution of his authority. But if anyone were to say that the Father is the sole fountain of divine generation, which is above every substance, as being the one who is at once the principle of the Son and of the Spirit, and the sole fountain not from a fountain, while the Son is indeed a fountain, as the doctors thus teach, but a fountain from a fountain—the blessed Augustine is of this opinion also in the fourth book *De Trinitate*; for he says: "And what the Lord says: 'Whom I will send to you from the Father,' proves that the Holy Spirit is both of the Father and of the Son." For when He had said: "Whom the Father will send," He added: "In my name"; yet He did not say: "Whom the Father will send from me," just as He said: "Whom I will send to you from the Father," showing clearly that the Father is the principle of the whole Divinity, or, as it is better said, of the Deity. Since we have this most blessed doctor, whom better can we ask for D as an expositor of the mind of Dionysius? Who has understood this better? In whom as in him has the Holy Spirit spoken? For what he said as "the sole fountain of the Divinity, which is above every substance," this one calls "the principle of the whole Deity"—since, namely, the Father is from no principle, but He Himself is the principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, while the Son, having the Father as His principle, is Himself also the principle of the Holy Spirit. But let not the name of the "whole Deity" offend you again, nor oppose the part to the whole, as if the Son were the principle of a part; for the Deity is not partible. Here, indeed, is the defect of the weakness of names, which he who transfers to the things signified acts neither rightly nor piously. To expound, therefore, the aforementioned authority, and to solve the opposition raised from thence, although there might be many other modes, yet the things that have been said are so manifest and clear that they alone suffice. For it having been proven that the Son is also the fountain of the Deity—since it is the sentiment of the holy Fathers that He is the fountain of the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is God (which no believer will say that blessed Dionysius contradicts)—it remains that what Dionysius says, that the Father is the sole fountain of the Deity, he stated according to the aforementioned modes, or one of them, and not otherwise.