Treatises against the Nestorians

OF THE MOST WISE MONK LORD LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM, AGAINST THOSE WHO AFFIRM TWO PERSONS IN CHRIST, BUT DO NOT CONFESS ANY CONJUNCTION IN HIM.

BOOK I.

PROOEMIUM.

^A Here there presents itself to us a twofold opinion, or rather a dividing tongue, whose portion shall be placed with the infidels when the Lord and Judge of all shall come to condemn whatever impious sinners have spoken against Himself, as it is written; unless at length they perceive with their heart so as to turn to the Lord, and confess their (doctrinal) error among men. For on this account those who divide the ineffable and divine union of the Word with the flesh accuse us, and speak against us—those who reject His economic dispensation and deny Him who redeemed them.

First, that we do not rightly teach the union of the divine and human nature; second, that whereas there are two hypostases of Christ, we do not speak well when we say that a union occurs according to hypostasis, and that we acknowledge one hypostasis of Him; third, again, that whereas there are two sons, we wrongly confess Christ to be one Son; fourth, that we falsely call the holy Virgin the Mother of God; fifth, that we know Christ to be not only a mere man by nature, but also God; sixth, that we know the Word to be not a God-bearing man, but God become man;^B

^A seventh, that we unlawfully preach that one of the holy Trinity has suffered in the flesh; and eighth, those impious ones, while denying the union according to hypostasis, imagine certain other non-subsistent things. Now, as for those things which those who speak of one nature as also one hypostasis in Christ might not unreasonably question, we shall not defend them; but we shall refute and overthrow everything that is said by them against us, who singly confess one hypostasis and two natures of Christ our Lord, in the power of that same God of ours, Christ, and we shall expose their entire system of doctrine as most impious. ^B Indeed, they reproach us, as has been said before, regarding our confession of the composition of natures in our Lord Jesus Christ, God, and they speak as follows:

CHAPTER ONE

Whatever (they say) is united to another is united either whole to whole, or part to part, or part to whole; for otherwise it is impossible to speak of union. But "whole" and "part" are not spoken of the infinite; therefore, the Word of God, since He is infinite, has not been united to the man from us; but if He is united, He is composite and finite, which is impious. In the first place, then, how do they, who in their own knowledge define every mode of unions brought about by God, say that everything that is united is united either as a whole or as a part? For this entire sensible thing, that is to say, the visible world, exists in union, without a doubt. What then do they say? That its composition exists from certain wholes or parts preexisting it? Or rather that it was put together from things that were not at all? ^C For if they think it was made in the beginning from certain preexisting wholes or parts, let them make their opinion known to us, so that if they speak in this way, we may converse with them as with pagans, and not as with those who merely disagree with us about the manner of the economy. But if, preferring piety to contentiousness, they say the composite world was made from non-entities, they will be compelled to admit that "non-entity" is neither a whole nor a part. How then, when no whole and no part preceded it, was the union of this whole world effected? Since every united thing must needs be united—as you say—as a certain whole to a whole, or part to part, or part to some whole: therefore the demonstration of your first proposition is false.

^D But answer us also as we further inquire: Since every body is said to be composed of "what" (quality) and "how much" (quantity), is their union said to be as of wholes, or as of parts? For if as of wholes, since these are not distinct substances before the body, where and how are they whole entities? And then, how, the totalities of the "what" and the "how much" having been united in the one body, the first of the atoms, after the first body, did a second body still come to be from "what" and "how much"? For nothing remained ununited, the totalities of the "what" and "how much" having been united. But if they are composed as part with part with others, the first whose totality is part, what is as what?

If indeed it is of a homogeneous, it differs from its own totality only in quantity; according to quantity, then, it is also a part. But if it is the case that where it is a part, according to this it is also composed, then according to quantity, and that which is "as what" is composed with that which is "how much" in a body. But if it is of a heterogeneous totality, since the form is not the same for the whole as it is for the part, in cases where the whole is of such and such a quality, part of this will be quantity, or will it be something else? And the whole again being quantity, will the part of this be quality, or something else? And furthermore, if the composition of these is as part to part, the composition of each of their totalities must also be sought, whether it is from wholes or from parts; and this goes to infinity, until we find something that is composite of all things (for only the Divine is entirely simple), having been made neither from wholes nor from parts. And thus it ^A will be absolutely demonstrated that not everything united is composed by some whole being united to a whole, or part to part, or part to whole. These, then, are the inconsistent consequences of your first proposition.

And what of the second proposition, which contends that everything united through any composition whatsoever must necessarily be composite and circumscribed, and that nothing simple can ever be united as a whole? They pass over answering this; for behold, a point is indisputably without parts, yet when united it produces a line. How then was that which was not composite united? For a point, in common parlance, is said to be simple. Similarly also the final moments of time, being indivisible, effect time through union. Furthermore, ^C what do you say to us concerning the soul? Does it seem to you also to coalesce from parts, which is joined to the body? Or is it simple and un-united, standing only by the body, according to your opinion? Since anything that is united is made from parts. If, therefore, you know this to be simple and indefinite, because it is not united to the body, we shall not interrupt you with very lengthy arguments, but applying a flame of fire to your flesh—if it can still be called yours—we shall ask you: Does the soul which is conversing with us concerning these things suffer at all regarding the burning, or not? For we do not make the inquiry of the body. If you say that the soul does not suffer at all from anything burning it, we shall depart in silence, your ignorance concerning these things having been most clearly proven by your lack of feeling. But if you say that it suffers too vehemently, and that you cannot endure to converse concerning these things on account of the burning, you shall hear from us that we will not desist, nor remove the flame, until reason persuades us the cause of this sympathy. A great difficulty ^D arises among us: because we burn a body made of parts, and not you—that is, your simple soul which is not united to the body, with which we are speaking; and yet it says that its natural operation is hindered by this. For if the soul, or any other nature according to you, is truly devoid of parts, in no way will it be composed with anything; and that which is in no way composed with anything, but is always absolute and subsisting of itself, is neither struck along with another, nor

will it be afflicted when one is vexed, nor will it rejoice with one who is rejoicing, or simply participate in all these things. Nor will this same suffering be measured out, according to the number of those things which befall another, in any proportion; surely, when the rich man was feasting sumptuously, Lazarus was not rejoicing; similarly, neither was Lazarus suffering while he was being scorched in the flame ^A in hell. But neither did we, while you state that they suffer from the flame, suffer with you, since all confess that we are not united with you.

If, however, by turning their own craftiness against them, one opposes these same weapons, and fights with sensible things, and since they wish to speak too much about physical matters, they evidently establish this in heavenly things; will they not seize upon the other branch of the distinction, speaking concerning the soul, that it is composite ^B and finite, and therefore that the soul is also subject to a body that is coagulated of parts and circumscribed? If, therefore, you say this, we would say, consider again the consequences: for first, it would grow and diminish and be divided along with the body; but if not, the grown body will not be brought to life, unless it were innate and united with it; nor would it have helped it when weakened, had it not been adapted to it in some way. But then again, what would you say further, since everything which is composed of parts and is circumscribed is in a place? Now that which is in a place, whether it be a body or an accident inseparably attached ^C to a body, it is a necessity that this also be something individual; whence it is no longer to be thought either immortal, or subsisting of itself, nor is the soul to be held a substance, or to be called a body enshrouded by a body. But if the soul is a body, it will not pass through a body without dividing it, or being divided by it, if it is true that a body cannot pass through a body without the division of the other. But even in a greater accumulation, living bodies are seen to be necessary compared to dead ones, if indeed every body added to a body ^D demonstrates this in a greater accumulation; furthermore, if the soul is a body, it has continuous quantity and shape. A body, therefore, having received [it] through its entirety in the union, will also be established in a greater accumulation; for that which one body will cause to another, as a body, this same thing will it also suffer from the other.

But there are also a multitude of other absurdities, which, because we have transgressed into a very long digression from the matters sought, must be overlooked by us for the present, since those things already said demonstrate not inadequately the weakness of your hypothesis; but these things [we said] for the sake of your second declarative proposition, which says that that which is united is necessarily composed of parts, and is circumscribed, from which your entire noble endeavor was constructed.

Since, therefore, the things already said are sufficient for the destruction

of your sandy edifice,

and it is fitting to consider the soul as having parts, since it is an image and likeness of these things; or by asserting that these things are partless, you abandon this very notion of partiality, which belongs to bodies. Whether you wish it or not, you are overlooking the truth; we, in the power of Christ, will demonstrate this to you. For these things which are said by us will be for your edification, if you wish, or for your condemnation.

"The Whole" does not, as you suppose, always signify that which is perfect simply and in every way according to its parts or from its parts. For if that were the case, all things would have to be called either simple or imperfect—those which are partless and do not have their own totality composed of parts—or if they are called whole and perfect, they would be composite and from parts, and no longer simple; so that nothing existing in simplicity would appear perfect or entire. But if this is granted, your own arguments will turn against you, not even conceding simplicity to the Divine itself without a totality derived from parts. For if you necessarily show that even it requires composition and parts for its own perfection and totality, you are forced to abandon one or the other—either the simple or the perfect—at the time when the partlessly super-perfect Divine Whole is being discussed. ^B But it is truly a whole, as these men say, strictly in accordance with its own definition, having been perfected, whether it be simple and partless, or composite and having parts; provided only that it is observed to possess its own definitions without deficiency. For that these things are so, and that the subject being partless does not hinder the definition of the "whole," behold, we say that a point is perfect and a whole, and unity, and the partless and instantaneous "now" of time, and the divine, and all simple things. And it is not because they have their own parts without deficiency that we attribute totality to them—for we have already acknowledged their partlessness—but because they have the definition of the partlessness of their own species whole, intact, and perfect; and each of these, according to its own nature, bears a marker of its species. These things, then, have been demonstrated concerning the whole, that it is possible for a whole to be joined to a whole, and that what is called a whole does not necessarily come from composition at the expense of being partless.

Similarly to the things said about the partless, the infinite whole must also be and be called such. For the definition of the infinite whole, along with all the properties of infinity, is perfect in this way, since otherwise it would not be infinite. For if, according to your hypothesis, "whole" is understood only from the integrity of parts, then since God is partless and infinite, He will not have a "whole." But if, not having a "whole," He is also stripped of union, He will be accused of imperfection. ^C But if He is some sort of "whole," He can also be joined. If, therefore, He also possesses His infinity, and the integrity of the infinite, as of the infinite indeed, as much as is possible in Him and of Him—as their opinion wishes—then in this way something that is a whole exists, perfected by the word of infinity and simplicity. These things have been considered by us because you do not correctly understand the "whole," asserting that it subsists ^D of bodies only, rather

^A than only in the juxtaposition of continuous, discrete, and finite parts joined together and having a position relative to one another. You seem, O noble sirs, to have been dragged down into such great insensibility by a physiology of yours that is excessively preoccupied with the senses. For let us see even more accurately how it is said by you that the infinite cannot be united to that which consists of parts. First, because to be "infinite" is spoken of more superficially in terms of local relation; therefore, is the infinite an impediment to union in place? But this is juxtaposition, and not union. If, then, you think the union of the Word with the flesh is such, because one of the things being joined extends beyond the other—and just as with the double soles of shoes, the things thus joined and placed alongside one another should not have one sole appearing to stick out and be superfluous to the other—you have become manifest, therefore, from this point forward, as imagining both the union and the infinite not as is fitting for the Divinity, but in a corporal way, ^B by calculating that a thing a thousand cubits long, or simply one of infinite dimension, is joined at some position of its parts to another smaller body. Yet even if you do think this, it would not, according to you, be prevented from being a juxtaposition. For you granted that a union of a part to a whole can occur, so that there is a juxtaposition of the small to the large. But if you were to say, "This is not truly a juxtaposition of a whole to a part, but from the part of the whole itself to the whole part," you are looking at one and the same thing; for of those things whose parts are finite, the whole is also finite. So if it happens that it is not juxtaposed to this particular part, but to another larger one, the whole will also be proved to be naturally infinite by the juxtaposition of the divine part (and therefore not at all from local infinity).

It must still be asked of you: Does this infinite, or God, define the world, or not? For if He does not define it, then the world is not in Him, nor will it be necessarily shown to be smaller than Him; and other blasphemies will follow. But if He does define it, since the whole consists of parts—if, however, It is defined, whether part by part, or as whole by whole, or as part by whole, or as whole by part—for we shall use your own terms: God must altogether consist of parts, defining that which consists of parts. But how do you say that these things happen again? If, just as some large body contains a smaller one, and as those who enclose beetles in waxen spheres, God so circumscribes, He will be only a place for those things that are in Him, an ^C extensive quantity, God as a body of bodies, composed of parts, and not only exempted from composition, but even necessarily of a nature to admit composition. But if these foolish things are joined to great impudence, God must be said to circumscribe the world in a way other than how bodies circumscribe. For it must truly be said that He does indeed circumscribe all bodies and incorporeal things, though not as a body; and He is uncircumscribed, not as a body that does not have some larger body by which it might be circumscribed; and as though in a void somewhere

of the universe, holding some parts of Himself suspended, but rather as one who by His power transcends every nature, and extends Himself beyond every place and time. ^A Therefore, He is not being composed as a body or some divisible nature is composed, so that He might be reckoned as a part or a whole composed of parts. But in the way that the definition of a body and of partiality to circumscribe things that consist of parts did not necessarily befall Him, so neither is such a suspicion dragged into the union with man. For otherwise, it would not be a very great thing for the Uncircumscribed if He were not contained by the circumscribed; for this is present even in a body that is uncircumscribed, that is to say, in a heavenly one. But if He could, without hindrance, be contained wholly and uncircumscribed—in nothing straitened—even within one that is lesser and circumscribed, this truly belongs to a natural power, unconstrained by any force and not circumscribed in acting as He wills. For this is also what was said, most wonderfully, by him who asserts concerning Christ according to the flesh: "For in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily."

Wrongly then, O miserable men, do you judge that everything united is, in the case of God, composed—whether as a part or as a whole consisting of parts—in the sense that it is divisible. ^B Indeed, the refutation of even one of your propositions would have sufficed for the destruction of all your arguments, since once one absurdity is granted, all absurdities are conceded. But behold, through all your propositions, even if we have extended the refutation longer, the conclusion of your entire reasoning is shown to be most false. For in the first, you wrongly claimed that everything united is composed as a part or as a divisible whole; for it has been proven that things are not so, since all things that have been ordered by God exist from things that were not. Moreover, bodies are composed substantially from "of what quality" and "of what quantity," in neither of which can one speak of a whole or a part before their union, because of what has been said by us above. Your second proposition, however, errs in asserting that "whole" cannot be said of simple or infinite things. ^C But it has been demonstrated that the point, the unit, the present moment, the soul, all simple things, and the Divinity are described by proper and distinct terms as being wholes and devoid of parts, even if the simplicity of each is not the same.

If, however, it is granted by you that all simple things, of necessity, since they are devoid of parts, can neither be called "wholes" nor ever come into union, I would gladly inquire of you: How, then, would it not be granted that all composite beings are made from composite things? ^D And you would make the ascent to infinity, if composite things are not from simple ones; because, according to you, they cannot be from things devoid of parts—these primary composites, I do not know from where they are composed, unless you wish to demonstrate it to us briefly. But it has been proven that the infinite, by reason of its being infinite, is a whole, just as the finite is by reason of its being finite.

^A And it is able to be united, if indeed this appears to you to be a hindrance to union; and just as the partless is not hindered from circumscribing the part-based, so neither is it hindered from being united—according to what is proper to it, and not in a part-based manner. Therefore, it is clear even to the young that your impious conclusion is weak, which says: "The God Word, therefore, was not united to the man from us." Thus, indeed, like dust before the face of the wind, all your sophistries are poured out and scattered, because they were composed in unbelief and ignorance of the power of the divine purpose.

But, O you men, even if there were no speech to refute your folly, would we not shudder to think in this way—seeing that God, who brought into being all these things that were not and discovered all such unions, and caused them to be, and to be in such a way—that He was unable to show forth and discover for Himself a newer and more necessary union than those known to us, desiring to unite Himself beyond beings to one of the beings, and to reveal this hitherto unheard-of union among beings? How, therefore, if we dwell on this, shall we not also rightly judge all the rest of beings to be from certain things pre-existing? For no union of beings was yet known to anyone when in the beginning God created. And yet, although none of these existed before, we confess that God was later to make all things united. But when and where has another world come to pass, or such a Christ been revealed to the world? It is clear, therefore, ^B that in the beginning, and from things that were not, according to the faith of Christians and the Hebrew opinion, God does what He wills. And since He is himself the Creator of nature, how could He not also be the mysterious renewer of natural things?

CHAPTER II.

Every thing, therefore, that is united to another is finite and part-based, as was taught above; but everything finite and part-based is of a different substance from the simple and infinite. If this is so, the God Word is not united to the man from us, being consubstantial with the simple and infinite Father; or if He is united, He is of a different substance from the simple and infinite Father, which is blasphemy. But it is not, as has been maintained by you, that everything whatsoever united to another according to any union is finite and part-based, ^D as it has been truly demonstrated above by us; and you vainly flatter yourselves about uncertainties. In attempting to establish other things from agreed-upon premises to verify your own positions, you have suffered the same fate as those who wish to build in the air or lean upon papyrus. Since, therefore, the contrary of what you supposed has been demonstrated by us, it is clear that the contrary must also be gathered for your conclusions; for if anything follows from one of the contraries, the contrary of this will most certainly follow from the contrary.

CHAPTER III.

Every thing, therefore, that is united to another is of a different substance

^A from the simple and infinite Father; but whatever is of a different substance from the simple and infinite Father is not properly the Son of the simple and infinite Father: every thing, therefore, that is united to another is not properly the Son of the simple and infinite Father. But if every thing that is united to another is not properly the Son of the simple and infinite Father, God the Word was not united to the man born of us while being properly the Son of the Father; or if he was united, God the Word is not properly the Son of the Father, which is blasphemy. Carried along by your repetitions of the same, we also say: But, O men, not every thing that is united to another is of a different substance from the simple and infinite Father; and so your entire current syllogism is destroyed, its first proposition being overturned; for no part of the building remains firm when the foundations have been razed to the ground. But those who are wise in their own eyes, often relying on uncertain things, seem to do nothing other than to write on water, ^B to attempt to grasp fire, and to beat the air.

CHAPTER IV.

Anything whatsoever that is united to another is said to be so in a catachrestic sense, if indeed it is also said to be the Son of the simple and infinite Father; but every thing that is said catachrestically to be the Son of the simple and infinite Father is properly a creature of the simple and infinite Father. Every thing, therefore, that is united to another is properly a creature of the simple and infinite Father. But if this be so, God was not united to the man born of us, being the Creator of all and not a creature of the Father; or if he is united, he is a creature of the simple and infinite [Father], and not properly the Son, which is blasphemy. ^C To your undemonstrated axioms, those who counter-argue simply affirm a certain negation of them; but to deny the affirmation—this is no labor for the one contradicting. But it was necessary for you to put forward the first principles nobly, so that you might not shamefully introduce the second; for since your [arguments] were pulled up by the roots in the first principles, it would seem foolish to respond to you at length regarding the secondary matters, since all your arguments, even this one, lean upon the power of your first principle. Moreover, since there is only one true Son of the infinite Father, and he is united, how was it to be demonstrated for Catholic doctrine that those who are properly called sons of the infinite, or rather, every Son of the infinite, since he is properly [the Son], is not united? Even if specific things, of which there is neither species nor genus, ought to be demonstrated ^D according to universal principles; since every body is in a place, the heaven therefore is also in a place, and this to infinity. And since no star is visible by day, nor the morning star, although it is seen at certain times. And since there is no point anywhere in the exact middle of a circle, and therefore no center. How, furthermore, would they wish to describe this union with such a marvelous sonfiliation, whether properly so termed, or as a catachresis? For what sort of quality [is united] to what sort? Or how much quantity to how much? Or what quantity is united to a Cyrus, or a stone to wood? Is it because he is the Son by way of catachresis, that he is united to the infinite, or because he is neither by way of catachresis, nor in the proper way? If, therefore

he is not united by any of these means, nor will things not united by these means remain apart, but rather by other appropriate and necessary terms of union.

CHAPTER V

Every essence is infinite everywhere, in each thing and in itself, in the same way and similarly, in an incomprehensible manner as essence, since this is the property of the infinite. But everything that exists in all things in the same way and similarly cannot be in something in one way and in another way ^B as essence; for "similarly" excludes "in one way and in another." Therefore, every infinite essence cannot be in something in one way and another way as essence. If this were the case, it must be asked: Do we say the essence of the Word of God is finite or infinite? And if we should say finite, the blasphemy is evident. But if it is infinite, either the essence of the Word of God is subject to all things, or the essence of the Word of God is subject to nothing; for as essence it cannot be in something in one way and another, since it is also infinite; but it is acknowledged that it is not subject to all things; therefore, it is subject to nothing; and those men blaspheme who say that the essence of the Word of God is subject to the flesh assumed for our sake for the manifestation of himself. Truly the sinner is caught in the works of his own hands, and his labor ^C returns upon his own head. For according to what you now say, if the infinite essence exists everywhere and in each thing—that is, in one and in every finite thing—and in itself—that is, in the infinite—in the same way and similarly, and this is the property, as you say, of an infinite essence, that it is not in one way in a finite thing and in another way in itself (that is, in the infinite), and it cannot be in one way in those things in which it is, even if they are different, as you have already hypothesized; for if it is the same in finite things and in itself, being infinite, how, because it is infinite, is it not possible for it to be in a finite thing both formerly and now? For it will be, according to your own logical ^D consequences, that it is not able to be even in itself, if it is similarly both in itself and in things outside of itself. But it was necessity rather, if indeed it is similarly in all things as it is in itself, that it is in no way prevented from being in a finite thing; but as it is in the infinite, just as it is in itself simply, so indeed, according to your own view, it would also be in a finite thing. Therefore, something other than you desire has been demonstrated, in this and in the preceding arguments—namely, that it is impossible for the infinite to be united to a finite thing. If, therefore, because the infinite cannot be in certain things in one way and another, you contend that it is in Christ just as it is in all things; therefore, that it may appear similarly both in itself, as you say, and as in all things, so it will be in water, and in a stone, and in a plant, and in an ant, and in a fish, and in a horse, and in a man, and in an angel, and in all things as it is in itself. And if it is not similarly in itself and in an ant, the "similarly" is refuted, and it will be in Christ above all other things.

^A When you say that it is not believed to be in all things, it is replied that therefore it is not in any one thing; but when you say that it is in all things just as it is in itself, you will hear the contrary, for the reason that it is even more agreed that in all things it is in itself. It is evident, therefore, that it is truly in all things, for your own words say that it is in all things similarly to how it is in itself. Either, then, it is not even in itself, but is distinguished from itself and apart from itself; or it is in itself, and it is in some thing, and it is in all things, so that there is nothing left to be thought of as existing alone, but everything is attested by you—who wish to abolish the true and most glorious union of the Word with the flesh—to be a synthesis that is uncircumscribed.

CAP. VI.

^A We might speak to you thus: if you were contending only against those who say that one nature is brought to completion out of a synthesis, your argument might have some weight. But since you blush not to bring the same charge against us, who confess that it is the hypostasis—and not the nature—that results from the synthesis, let us first hear: how can you say that every part of the essential hypostasis is synthesized to complete it? For the definition of the hypostasis consists in certain properties, alongside the consubstantial ones, which are in some way essential or quasi-essential, and certain accidents ^B that are either inseparable or supervenient. Nor are the substances of the united things parts of the hypostases; for substances are parts of substances, not of hypostases; nor does any of the accidents that occur, so long as the subject is preserved, exist as a part in a given hypostasis; nor even are the natural properties themselves part of the hypostases of which they are substances, but they are rather specific concepts. For if the properties are parts of the hypostasis, and the whole is akin to and the same as its own parts—and there is no genus beyond all its parts—then the whole hypostasis will also be merely a non-substantial property in terms of genus. And not only this, but since every property is the whole of the ^C hypostasis, therefore a property will be a property of someone else, and this again must be sought *ad infinitum*; or, if it is not of someone else, it will not be a property, and therefore not a hypostasis either. Therefore, neither substances, nor accidents, nor essential properties are, as it were, parts of the essential hypostasis; but from the substance, about the substance, or even from elsewhere, they are certain things considered particularly in this or that subject. But even if we were to concede this to you (for it is not important to contend over this now, and as if God the Word were ^D a part in His own hypostasis), it would follow that each of the three holy persons must be understood as a whole, greater than the entire substance of the Divinity. And so much for this.

But your second proposition, how does it hold: that every part which is called a hypostasis necessarily suffers with the other, and this always and in all things unconditionally? For of the world’s hypostasis and nature, take the horse and the vulture; and not only does one species not suffer with another, but the vulture species thrives even when horses are destroyed. And whence does the leonine existence come if not from the hunting of oxen and suchlike, being as it is wild and carnivorous? And what is one to say that the birds suffer if the foxes, their hunters, were to fall ill? For the opposite is to be seen: as one part of this world suffers, another thrives; and as one flourishes, another wastes away. But even in one individual man, according to what we ourselves experience, while that which is outside is corrupted, that which is inside is renewed day by day. For even in the one numerically same individual, the spirit desires against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit; and many parts of the one, which are of the same nature in every respect, contend with one another; and through the tribulations of one party of the parts, the other performs well.

For when we have reclined upon the right side, we relieve the left; and when the left hand is weary, the right gets rest. But also, within one single hypostasis of some person, flesh ^A that had been melted down is strengthened through exercises. Bones and cartilages, when the skin is stripped away, feel nothing, even though they are in the same composite body. And certain parts of the body, which had previously suffered, when other parts of the same body are suffering, not only do not sympathize, but are even delivered from the passion that previously resided in them, as is the case to be seen with those suffering from headaches or eye infections, if they should get gout; or in the case of those burning their hand because of the passions of the mouth; or the crown of the head for the sake of the ears' passion. For if these things happen by some sympathy, nevertheless the passion that is destructive to one appears to be preservative for the other, just as was said a moment ago concerning carnivorous animals. But for fire to be joined with water into one nature of body and hypostasis—it is a marvel if it sympathizes as a part; and it is not said to grow and increase, but rather to be blunted and unified by its antagonist.

If, however, you say that not the substances themselves, or their parts, are parts of the hypostases, but rather the things which are about the substance, how then could, for instance, a slope sympathize with a blue color, or baldness with leanness? Although we do not cavil, but are trying to be earnest, you provoke much laughter in us, you who are so formidable in speaking and who pursue physical matters so thoroughly; how, therefore, do you simply introduce the notion that every part of a hypostasis sympathizes with the other, so that you might demonstrate that when we say the Word has been united into one hypostasis with the flesh, He sympathizes with it according to nature? These things, in truth, one had to understand: that the passions supervening upon a composite made of diverse things come to be in such a way as befits each part that is within it; for it is not as fire consumes flesh that it also consumes the soul. If, therefore, there were something of the unified things that was entirely incapable of receiving the passion occurring to the composite, it is clear that, being joined to the passible, it will not sympathize. For things that do not mix with grass will not be burned; nor will fire be struck along with iron; which things are indeed seen through the senses and in sensible objects. What then, ^D we might reasonably say concerning the clear impassibility preserved after union by those things that are more immaterial, consider; and thus much for these matters.

But the other thing, you full of all guile, has not escaped our notice; for we do not know whence you have prepared this, unless you have said that the sympathy of one part of the united things toward the other is entirely involuntary, which, according to the sequence of your preceding propositions, is belied by the catholic word. For by the body being passively subject to the delights of sensible things, the soul voluntarily suffers these same passions with the body. Whence it desires, hastens, and does everything to obtain for itself the more wanton passions for the sake of pleasure. Why, therefore, after you have concluded that it is necessary, or easy, or merely possible to solve by necessity, will you demonstrate that God the Word has sympathized with our ensouled flesh, as you seemed to conclude? Although

^A it is permitted to you, who are observing your own affairs and looking upon what has been said by us, to perceive the truth, and to know that every hypostasis, not being redundant in natures but subsisting according to a certain one composite nature from diverse powers, since the natural composition is throughout, shows its natural parts to be sympathizing; but if it were composed of more natures or hypostases, it is necessary, according to the analogy of their similarity to one another, for the sympathies to exist in this way only within it. For in this way it also has their natural unions; for nothing is joined to another, nor does it sympathize with it, completely without some identity and connaturality, not even in the case of inanimate things. ^B Indeed, then, the so-called simple elements, or first qualities, are for this reason not in existence as things subsisting by themselves: because even if they were, they would be useless for the cosmic composition of bodies; for there would be no way for them, being completely different from one another, to be joined; just as with fire and water, and earth and air, which, by means of one of the qualities within them, are mixed with one another when it is necessary, and by means of the other, if it be necessary, are divided. Whence neither is fire directly composed with water, nor earth with air.

Likewise, it is possible to see the unions also of soul and body and of all things, ordained by the Creator Word; for there is in all created things a similarity and difference, which is completely known to Him, but which often eludes us. ^C Since, therefore, God is not united to flesh naturally out of similarity and natural kinship, He does not sympathize by necessity, but by a good and beneficent will, having assumed it according to good pleasure. And in order that the union of Him with it might be firm through similarity, and the beneficence to us through the union might be secure—since He could not turn Himself according to it, nor thus effectively achieve His goal—on the contrary, He assumes it to Himself (the text says: "He rendered it impassible with Himself, he offered himself because he himself willed"), and from its nature makes it mutable according to the better mode and nature, once and for all, that is, into His own immutability. ^D Being immutable by nature, He did not turn and liken Himself to the worse nature; and He has devised a natural composition for Himself eternally, the beginning of this union having come from the good will and good pleasure, but the end and result, and the confirmation of the assimilation to Him, being from the nature that was composed with Him. For by the good pleasure of natural goodness, bestowing Himself wholly in supreme goodness upon those who are dissimilar by nature, He who is the beginning of creation is now united even to that which is altogether opposed to Him, having joined Himself, in the way only He knows, to the existent-one who was in a way non-existent. And having set all things before Himself—how they exist and when—and having now brought them forward into being, and leading them into a higher existence, He made all things subsist in Himself, having embraced and encompassed everything that exists within Himself, so that none of His own may ever return through corruption into non-being; but that all things might remain incorruptible with the Incorruptible, free from all creation.

^A from the slavery of corruption in Christ. For ^B through that which is from the beginning... the species similar to the beginning, then also all things akin to these, and those which were first generated for the need of the appropriate joy of those who were liberated, are enriched by God, and God shall be all in all.

CHAPTER VII

Everything whatsoever that is united to another for the establishing of one living nature and hypostasis is evidently shown to be a part of the nature or hypostasis that has been brought to completion; and every part of a living nature or hypostasis absolutely requires the part to which it is united for the purpose of fulfilling its proper operation. For the soul requires the body, and the body the soul, for the fulfillment of the proper operation of each: the former for knowing the divine commandments and for pleasing God, the latter for life to be preserved with it, and for it to have a better estimation than all visible things. But to suppose that God the Word requires anything for His own proper operation is not right; therefore He was not united to any one of us for the establishing of a single living nature or hypostasis. But if He were united and requires it for His own proper operation—which is blasphemy—since the present argument is ^C an argument of the same power, or rather powerlessness, of the reasoning previously stated by you—or rather, unreasonable, it is clear that it is destined to collapse in the same way; even if, by choosing certain locutions from those which followed the first, you have introduced a second, showing us a multitude and facility of arguments. For whatever is acknowledged to suffer together with something, with that same thing it also rejoices together in some way; therefore this also requires it for its own pleasure. If, therefore, the obtaining of such pleasure is considered a benefit to the one who is pleased, you have rendered the same subject uncertain to us both from the previous sympathy and now from the benefit through both arguments. ^D But in what has preceded, it was shown neither that the things united into a hypostasis are absolutely natural parts, nor that the things united necessarily suffer together, nor that those which suffer together necessarily suffer together involuntarily. What, therefore, remained unshaken in your first argument, such that you dared to come to the other, is not apparent.

How has the example brought forward by you—that the soul requires the body for the knowledge of divine precepts and for pleasing God—been stated by you? For not even this, although it can be said in some way, have you brought forward happily; for it is not only not a guide and aid to the soul for the knowing of true and divine things, but it even harms it most of all, obscuring the spiritual contemplation of intelligible things through the imagination of sensible things; from which passion you also often stumble, investigating some of the divine mysteries; for because the knowledge of crude, corporal, and suchlike sensible things

^A, stones, wood, animals, heaven, the sun, water, and fire are those in which the fall of the ungodly and idolaters—who esteem nothing more than these visible things with regard to piety—has become manifest to all. And that the soul, not relying on the perception through the body alone, discovered by reason, and not by sense, the invisible Creator of this whole universe, even though He is never perceived by the senses nor exists corporally, I do not think that even you yourselves doubt. But how could you rightly say that one who desires according to the Spirit contributes to the learning of divine commandments and to pleasing God, if you do not think that the Spirit is assisted in these things by their opposites? This is not clear. But he who says, "Who will deliver me from the body of this death?" ^B—does he fear to be delivered from what is needed for the learning of divine commandments and for pleasing God? And how is this man esteemed among the holy, God-taught, and God-loving ones? And what shall we say concerning the spiritual learning and actions that are dulled in us daily because of our corporal cares? But in truth, the opposite is to be seen. Or do you wish to show the soul gaining through the body? For by the struggle against it and by the discipline of it, the soul procures for itself a reward, only in so far as it persists in the care of it, lest it cause it pain, or lest, by slowing down its own activities or through its being unprovided for by the soul, it accuse the soul of the autonomy of the release from the bond with the body. For this reason, even while living in the flesh, we are ordered not to walk according to the flesh. ^C

CHAPTER VIII

Everything whatsoever that is united to another of a different substance into one constitution of nature or hypostasis is shown to be a part of the nature formed from them. But every part of a different substance of one nature or hypostasis is not called by the name of that to which it is united. For even in the case of man, although his parts are called by the name of the whole with some addition of "inner" or "outer," or not without such an addition, and even if the whole is sometimes signified by the part, ^D yet the parts are never deemed worthy of the names of the other parts; for neither is the soul called flesh, nor the flesh soul. Therefore, anything united to another of a different substance into the constitution of one nature or hypostasis is not deemed worthy of the name of the other part. If this is so, then either the God Word was not united to the man from us—who is called Son of Man—or, if He was united, He Himself is not called Son of Man, nor is that which is from us called Son of God, which is impious.

Now, as if you were indifferent to investigating the things themselves, you have moved on to an investigation of titles, and you have taught us something marvelous through this whole argument of yours: as if that which is altogether foreign to another could be more correctly called by the name of the other than that which, according to

whatsoever is united to another. Although we do not say that it is called in the same manner, and although one part of a composite may be called by the name of the other, let us look at your argument in order. For you say: "Everything whatsoever that is united to another of a different substance into a single constitution of nature or of hypostasis is shown to be a part of the nature formed from them." Now, it has already been said by us in the preceding pages that those who make one nature out of ^A composition—not we, but those who say that the nature of the Lord is one—would reasonably be confronted with this. But it has been demonstrated that things arising from composition present only that the hypostasis is one, so that one would not strictly call certain properties of substances "parts of a hypostasis," even if these are not considered apart from their proper substances; for the collection of them constitutes the one hypostasis, which, through them, without the natures, can neither exist nor be joined to one another. And whereas there is no specific existence or confluence of these ^B apart from the natures, as they are referred to other things, how could a specific completeness of them be conceived? Even if they are interchanged, yet not all of them at once in the individuals, the hypostasis is said to be the same in number; but one must never consider the whole to be the same in number if it has been changed in some part of itself or in some of its parts.

If, however, you call the natures of the properties pertaining to it parts of the hypostasis, or if you know the whole to be a nature just as the parts, and know every hypostasis to be a certain nature ^C according to a confusion of the natures that have been composed together—and since you assume a generation of another [nature] besides those that have come together in the hypostasis—or if you say that the whole of the hypostasis is not in the same way as its parts, then if you think the parts [of the] substance are something non-substantial, you conclude that something non-existent is composed from the union of existing things; for there is no intermediate state between substances and non-substances. But if you call the substances and its essential properties parts of the hypostasis, and in this way again, since it is impossible for the same thing at once to be substantial and non-substantial, ^D the whole of it will reasonably be likened to one of its parts only, and will differ from the other; and thus there will first be something else that is numerable, and [as it is] from a substance part, how it could be non-substantial is a difficulty; or, [if it is] from an accidental part, how it could be a substance is unclear. Furthermore, if the essentials, just like the substances, are also parts of the whole in the substances, the parts of the whole will exist in its parts unto infinity, and will not seem to exist in the whole simply; moreover, it is necessary that if one part—that is, the substance—perishes, the others also perish in the whole, that is, the essential parts, all the accidental ones; and therefore the whole would also perish together with this one of its own parts. Who could reasonably assert this, the most absurd of all things? For if the substance is a part, and the accidents are a part—and there is nothing more left to the whole than these, and the accidents are substantial—then, if the substance, or one part of the whole, is removed, all the other parts are removed, and therefore the whole perishes from one of its parts. By what right, then, did you see fit to call these parts of a hypostasis to us, if neither the substances, nor the natural properties, nor the accidents...

are parts in a hypostasis? For not everything that is in something is in all respects a part of it; for there are many ways in which things exist in something.

^B Furthermore, if you have spoken against us—we who believe the union of natures exists only in the unity of one hypostasis—by arguing, as you suppose, with such cleverness to deceive us, that the things joined into a hypostasis are parts of a nature, how do you sustain this? For if you say this while regarding nature and hypostasis as the same thing, you have already been refuted by what has been appropriately said regarding this—namely, that these are not the same thing. But if, while holding nature and hypostasis to be different, you nevertheless say that everything which is joined, whether into a totality of nature or into the constitution of the hypostasis of the Word (for not every union and combination is of a natural totality), is shown to be a part of nature, it is clear that you know the parts of human nature to be, for instance, yellowness, whiteness, and blueness; for these, even if they are natural parts of a hypostasis, are nevertheless partial accounts of what is in it. Consequently, gypsum, gold, and the sea would be of the same nature as the human species according to substance, since they have in relation to it such a substantial similarity in these respects.

Moreover, the absurdity is not only in this, but also in that you have stated simply that parts of a whole do not merit the names of the other parts that are with them in the whole; for neither is the soul called flesh, nor is the soul flesh. And yet the Holy Scripture has called the whole "flesh," saying: *My spirit shall not remain in men, because they are flesh*. But in the whole, that is, in the human being, the soul is clearly a part, and it is precisely this that is now being accused of having become flesh. For the flesh did not become flesh out of some malice of its own, nor would it be blamed by God for having become flesh, since it was made so by Him.

How, then, has one part not been deemed worthy of the name of the other part? And this, when it is God who is accustomed to call them so. It might have been said that they are not called [so] in the same way, nor naturally, if you wished to examine it correctly, and we ourselves would have granted you this; for we do not say the same person is naturally the Father of the Word and of the flesh, or that the same person is naturally the mother of the Word and of the flesh, insofar as regards the mode and account of nature. But we know that the same person is the one Father of one of these parts in Christ by nature, and of the other by grace, through which the union to that which is by nature is brought about; and conversely, the same is the one mother of that which is by nature and of that which is by grace, which has wrought the union to that which is by nature. However, your conclusion saying that: "Either the Word of God was not united to the one from us, who is called the Son of Man, since the union is nullified by the appellation; or, if he was united, he is not himself called the Son of Man, nor is the one from you called the Son of God," at least...

^A causes you to fall into the greatest negligence concerning your own concerns. For it is a marvelous thing if you say that the same person is Son of Man and God the Word, and that he who exists again from us is the Son of God (which even to contemplate, you would now proclaim to be impious, if you wished to consult your own interests), attributing the same appellation to each of the two parts with the craftiness of supreme arrogance, and not with faithful prudence; but [you do this] in order to prove from this attribution of the name that these things which have come together as parts—according to the thoughtless assertion previously set before you—do not come into a union as a whole, because "that which is composed into one hypostasis is not entitled to the naming of the part that is united with it," but the flesh is entitled to that of the Word, and the Son of Man to that of the Son of God. For if truly, O you men, it is entitled to the name, there is no need to inquire anything concerning the union; for once one part has been appropriated to the other by nature, it also participates in the natural names. But if it is not truly named, then according to you, there is nothing to prevent union with one another. ^B If God were to pierce your hearts so that you would confess that the same person is truly called both Son of God and Son of Man, we would no longer oppose you, but would embrace you as friends and brothers. But if, on the contrary, because you say the God Word is not united to man, you are therefore free to call either part by the name of the other, because they are not united and are distinct—for if they were united, such that both, coming together, were confirmed by this kind of communication of appellations, it would be evident that what you conclude is this: that all things which are distinct in their totalities, by how much they are separated from one another, by so much the more could they be co-named by each other's names; but that those which meet and are united in their natures into one totality are necessarily not to be coupled by names. ^C What could be more ridiculous than if someone thought that the union of things comes about according to the distinction of their names, and the distinction of things according to the union of their names? And yet we see the contrary. For when iron, heated by fire, is united with it, then it is also called fire; and when a chest is wrought with gold, it is golden; and in other things we see that he who is in white is white. But according to you, when something is burning, it should rather be called water; and when someone is wise, he should be called foolish; and when he acts unjustly, he should be called just. For then these things would differ most from their contraries; and yet every derivative has its name from the taking part in and union of the thing itself. But you truly seem to suffer the delirium of those who are terminally ill, who, often and vehemently striking themselves, do not perceive it. ^D

CAP. IX.

one nature or hypostasis knows not how, or where, or when it was united to that to which it was united; and much less would it learn it afterwards in any obscure way. Every thing, therefore, that is united to another to complete one nature or hypostasis knows not how, or where, or when it was united to that to which it was united, and much less would it learn it afterwards, not even obscurely. But if this be so, then either God the Word is not united to any man from among us, knowing all things and never learning anything, or, being united, He did not know how He was united to our human nature—which is impious. Your first proposition in this argument, being as it were a basis for the preceding and the present syllogism, has already been cast down by the points we have made in our preceding answers. ^B But let it be granted to us, according to hypothesis, that there are parts constitutive of hypostasis, and that they do not know how, or where, or when they were united; but, O you, would no one perceive this whole—however little of the rational nature may be in it—because at that time it must needs happen to them? But when it is acknowledged that the same being is both the agent of the union and the one united, how would He be ignorant of His own union, who is also the author of all union? Moreover, we must say again that every part exists perfect in regard to knowledge, and precedes its own union, even if it is said to be united by another; it ought at all events to know where, and how, and when it was united, unless, because of its own perfect knowledge, it ^C failed either after the union or before the union. Therefore, either God the Word will not be perfect in knowledge, or, according to you, He will not precede His own union, or He will at all events know His own union. What need, then, is there for the chaff of these words to be scattered by us, to teach the safe way of speaking, as if, if God the Word were united, He would not know how or where He was united to one of us?

CAP. X.

If, as they say, Christ the Lord is composite, God the Word is a part, as the law of composite things desires; but every part is, in some respect, less than its own whole; therefore God the Word is, in some respect, less than something; for He would not be a part, if He were not less than the whole. But if this is so, then God the Word is not the true God; ^D for it is impossible to call the true God less than anything; for God is altogether incomparable and incomparable to anything. Therefore, let them either openly confess their opposition to those who know God the Word to be the true God, or let them cease to introduce to us a substance composed of God the Word and our animated flesh. Your general principles, and the proofs derived from them, will now be proved to you to be truly absurd; for we predict that you will be overcome by those very things in which you trusted you were strong; for you are ignorant of the vital point concerning that of which the discourse is; you have not considered its nature. For because it is established that every part is less than its whole, God is not on that account—as being viewed as a part of the Word and of the meaning of the whole—to the...

^A composition according to Him, nor will He be thought to be a composite ^B according to Him, as is named in the whole. On the contrary, since all other things that exist are viewed as parts being composed, and as lesser than their own whole; but God is not one of all things, but is around all things, and surpasses all things in superiority; consequently, He would not have the Word composed according to all other things, nor would He be reckoned as a part of any whole.

For it is for you to consider that all universal declarations of propositions then have the necessity for demonstration when the reason is sought for something of the same genus or of the same species as those things subjected to the definition. For concerning the nature of things of a different species or of a different genus, universal statements would provide nothing useful for demonstration, unless they should include the object of inquiry as being of the same species; and it points out either the subject or that which exceeds the truth of things connatural to it. Just as if it were inquired concerning Paul the man whether he is an animal, the universal affirmation of the species stating that every man is an animal would serve for the proof of what is sought. And likewise, when it is examined by us whether this Paul is an animal in substance, the universal affirmation stating, "Every animal is a substance," would be appropriate. But if the inquiry concerns something of a different genus or of a different species, all affirmations and negations—however many there might be—which would seem to say something of this kind about things that are not of the same species or genus are idle and absurd regarding the question. Just as if, should it be inquired whether Paul is rational, someone hastening to demonstrate this—namely, that he is not rational—were to say that every stone and every blackness is irrational, it would contribute nothing at all to the subject; therefore, he would deservedly be laughed at concerning this, since he affirms in a general way that something is not rational, but [something] not of the same species.

We say, therefore, ourselves also: "Every part is less than its proper whole." If, however, the whole is known to be greater than all the parts that are united, and this God the Word—whom you say is of the same genus and species as those—you [therefore] deservedly impute to Him the same accusation from this universal affirmation, so that as though He had become a part of all things of the same genus and species, He is thought in the same way to conduct Himself toward His own whole. But if you have not dared [to commit] this blasphemy, because the argument of impiety suddenly rushing upon you refutes you, it is manifest that you have not spoken with correct reason; for in other, natural things you think of this universally, and you correctly demonstrate the Word in the word that is above nature and stands above other beings. ^C But thence, pretending to liberate the Divine from composition out of reverence, you have already most lawlessly dishonored It, thinking that Its nature has nothing exceptional beyond the other objects of knowledge; wherefore, according to you, [He], being subjected to the same words as all things, could also arrive at union with another. Where, then, are those to whom you denied union because of His nature being dissimilar and incomparable above all things? ^D But it is manifest, in which things it is said [to be]...

^A that God who is above us acts or suffers, [it is] not regarded in the same way as in us, even if He were to be subjected to the same words as we are, since certain things occur according to His economy for our salvation; for He acts in a different way, but one consistent with His own nature. For just as He is said to be begotten and to be born in a way similar to us, yet not in every way the same, but even above us; so too, being united, He is said [to be so] in a better manner than what concerns us. For not even in corruptible things, even if a union is said to have occurred in the case of all, are the same reason and the same manner of union preserved, but they hold themselves properly in each nature. You, however, now ^B judge God to be of the same substance as created things, and that the same accidents which happen to them also befall Him. According to you, then, the divine beatitude will be nothing other than the deprivation and avoidance of those things which seem viler, more humble, and more ignoble, and not that which has a nature and a power essentially surpassing things of this kind, [conferring] liberty, and which can neither be constituted nor subjected to such lowly things. So now, therefore, you suspect His invisibility not to be from nature, but from the fact of some concealment withdrawing Himself from every gaze; and His purity would not be from within, but from removal from the places that defile us, from passions, from operations, and simply from all the snares prepared against Him. This, therefore, is what you ought to understand, and which is evident even to children, that for those whose natures are different, their unions ^C and what follows from them are also different.

How then, if you do not deny to us the difference of the divine nature, do you demand from us the similarity of His union? But fearing, in truth, that you might be quickly swept into impiety, we wish to remind you, as we grant and concede to those who assert that some meaning is signified by writers in their general canons, while not setting the canon before the usage; for the latter is prior; and indeed the canon of analogy is discovered by them from usage, and usage is not taken from the canon; and we subordinate laws to the king, not the king to the laws. But do we deem that God, the inventor before every creation and every union, cannot be united beyond His customary laws when He has willed it? Or [can you] prescribe against Him something newer and more convenient for union? How also do these [arguments] not cast you back ^D into the atheism which we mentioned above, not believing that the Creator of all things made all things from nothing, and that the Word was incarnate above what can be conceived? But why do you dwell on this divine union alone as worthy of wonder, if perhaps you believe in nothing that is above our reason and nature? For we proclaim to you other wonderful truths also according to this divine union which is above nature, and concerning this very matter; for we speak of the conception without seed of our God, Jesus Christ; whom if you judge to be a mere man, it will turn out to be much more incredible; for speaking naturally, what man has ever been conceived without seed?

^A What then would you say? Since this is not possible by nature, can it not even be brought to pass by God? Or must one, on the contrary, piously consider and see that if it belonged to things which come into being by nature, it would not be the operation of God but of nature, and the thing brought to pass would have been produced from this? But when that which comes into being arises from the thought of the divine nature immediately, and not from any pre-existence but from non-being, it is ranked and acknowledged among existing things as new. And it is not necessary to seek the principles and meaning of errors from things long known, by you who assert that everything which is brought to pass by God is altogether an error; for the laws of nature are easily dissolved by the Legislator in due season. For if you do not admit these things in this way, you would certainly not confess that any body issued from the womb of a virgin, even if, as you wish, someone were to say that a mere man was born from her. For every body passing through another body shows one or the other as divided; but neither has a mortal body the property of walking upon the sea with dry feet, nor even a natural verisimilitude, for lighter things float upon heavier bodies, not heavier upon lighter. Nor, again, could eyes ever have been anointed with clay and spittle, and sight immediately restored to one blind from birth, nor could the dead have risen from the grave, nor could the power of Christ or of the saints be confessed in other similar miracles, if they could not be proven by previously known natural reasons. ^B Now, therefore, you will not justly reproach the divine perfection with partial imperfection on account of its union; for God, who is spoken of as a part of this entire composite, when understood as a whole, will not be conceived as having some greater thing than Himself as a part, since these things surpass the principles that follow upon His nature and the union. For if the principle of the divine union requires the whole to be greater than its part, yet the principle of the divine nature requires that nothing be conceived as greater than it. Which, then, of these two adverse principles shall rather be broken by the other? If, indeed, the union is conquered by nature, and does not itself conquer, how ought the union not to be granted to nature? But if the matter does not stand thus, then truly the union must be considered as above nature. It is evident, therefore, from all that has been proven, that the Word is not spoken of as a part together with partial imperfection; and being united, He is not, as you say, subject to the law of substances united among themselves; nor is He less than that which is called the whole, according to a certain mode of the signification of a composite; nor does He reveal His uncreated substance of infinite perfection according to the mediocrity of creatures and their natural state. ^D Therefore, God the Word is not less than something or in some respect, neither when united, nor when not united; and your indissoluble, as you call them, and inexpugnable sophisms vanish, dissolved like smoke. These things standing thus, we say that the Word, according to His own substance, is united to our substance, and we distinguish Him as a part of the whole composite, which is Christ; but that the composite is one substance, from our own and His, we have never said, God forbid!

^A Every single nature or hypostasis composed of parts of a different kind has certain operations which neither of the things from which it is constituted can perform by itself, apart from the operation of the other, in any way whatsoever. For example, soul and body need one another to finish a larger task, to build a house, to weave a tunic, or anything of that sort; which, as I said, it is impossible for one of them to accomplish in any way without the cooperation of the other. If, therefore, one nature or one hypostasis has been completed by the union, as they say, of the Word of God with the human being from us, there are certain operations of such a nature and hypostasis which the Word of God was unable to fulfill by Himself in any way (and the word "unable" is used in two ways in Holy Scripture and in common parlance: either as it is impossible for God to lie, on account of His infinity; or as gifts and sacrifices which cannot make the worshipper perfect according to the conscience, on account of their weakness and the shadow of the operation, when they are offered), which the Word of God, not being able to fulfill by Himself, accomplished through the operation of the human being. ^B Either they show the Word of God to be weak, or to have done things that are unseemly. And if the former, then even now the Father is powerless to fulfill such operations, not being joined to the human being from us; and according to this, the Son is greater than the Father, which is impious. But if the latter, the blasphemy is evident; for God does nothing that is unseemly, neither by Himself nor with another. But if it is impious to say either, then the union of the Word of God and the human being from us has not taken place.

You seem to us to be suffering something similar to those who ineptly shoot arrows past the target, exhibiting incompetence rather than skill, in that they do not know whither, how much, and how the darts ought to be sent. For while you had dreamt of contradicting those who say there is one nature in this matter—just as in the preceding argument—so now, through a desire for contention, you attack us too, who assert one hypostasis and not one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ. ^C But we shall briefly destroy your structure. For every operation comes from power; and all power of composite things subsists in them either from their component parts or from the union itself. If, therefore, one part of this composite hypostasis is the Word of God Himself, and He is the cause of the other part accompanying Him and of His own union with it, and every cause is greater in power and operation than its effects, how shall Christ, if one were to call Him composite, have any operation greater than the part which is in Him, which is again the cause of the part, that is, the divine Word? But since the overweening absurdity of your follies has brought the discourse to us concerning substances, even with these things being so, it must still be said by us to you that, if you were to look with the eyes of the intellect, you would easily see

^A that there have been very many and manifest operations in the composite, which neither God incarnate nor man without God could have performed as they have now come to pass. For tell us, by what logic do you say that either God, without flesh, could have passed corporally through a pure womb, or that a body without God could have ever passed through a pure womb? Who, after having fasted for forty days, is not hungry as a man? Yet who, before or after forty days, was God fully subject to hunger? And who would say that God, in very truth, ever walked corporally upon the water with his feet? Or that the human nature, without God, could tread with its feet upon the depths of the sea? These and similar mighty works, which neither the divine nature ever performed in a corporal manner, nor human nature ever wrought at all. If, then, you have nothing to say in response to all this, it is well for you, out of knowledge, to choose one of two things: either, seeing things that are truly wonderful and extraordinary, to speak as spectators of great deeds, or, if you see nothing great, not to prattle superfluously.

CHAP. XII.

Anything whatsoever that is joined to another is joined either by itself or by another. It is joined by itself, as the soul is to the body; but by another, as are the parts of a house, which are joined by a man. But God the Word is joined neither by himself—for he has no need of anything—nor by another; for he is inferior to no one. For everything that is joined to another is not joined by itself but by another and is established as inferior to that by which it is joined. If, then, God the Word is joined neither by himself nor by another, he will be uncompounded, and will not coalesce with anyone in any kind of union. ^C All your "stems" sprout from one and the same impious root and possess that same uniformity of absurdity, in that you absurdly confuse the God who is above all things with all other things. For if, as you wish, everything whatsoever that is joined to another is joined either by itself or by another, and if God is indeed ^D of all, as you believe, we shall demonstrate from your own general proposition that you have erred. For we would also say this: since everything that does something does it either by itself or by another, and that which does something by itself is, according to you, in need of that which is produced by it, and that which does something by another is, as you say, inferior to that one; therefore, God, in creating the world, does so either for his own benefit or for the service of another who is better. But if he does it neither by himself nor by another who is greater, he will never create it at all—and how could it be permissible for you to say such things, unless you have chosen the ultimate infamy? Moreover, if anyone provides for something, he does so either for his own sake—as the soul for the body—or for the sake of another—as servants do for the ministry of a house, for the sake of their own master. Thus, then, God, according to all your statements, provides for all things either for his own need—and he will be in need of those for whom he provides—or as a kind of minister, not of one master only, but of all, and he will appear inferior to those who are provided for by him, even the ravens, and the lilies of the field, and the cattle to whom

^A in time he provides food and clothing. But who will endure such blasphemies?

But you have not forgotten—even if you voluntarily disregard it—and you suppress the most principal part of the mystery of the divine incarnation, you who have not brought to mind at all the other mode of what occurred. This is the mode according to the providence of those who are weaker, which comes about through the care proceeding from the goodness of the One who is Better; according to this [mode], the good and all-powerful God, the Cause of all things, is known in a most particular way. For this reason, therefore, it is said that he was also united, as the true goal concerning him is reckoned by the orthodox who have inquired into the truth about him. For the oracles say of him, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." What benefit, then, could come from this, as the end achieved ^B according to the goal of the One who emptied himself? Nothing other than that we, whom he assumed, might be delivered from slavery and become equal to God, according to his original good pleasure concerning us, [that we were] to be according to the image and likeness of God.

And truly, are you so disposed as to think that succor of any kind never comes to the weaker from those who are in no need of it? Or have you yourselves never seen nor heard of anyone who, because a man—or perhaps a dog or some other animal—had fallen into a pit or a ravine, has frequently exposed himself to danger in order to pull it out? If this is what happens every day to those whose intent is not diabolical, and who do not rejoice in the destruction of those who are perishing, what are we to say concerning what is manifestly done [by God]? Is it that he who is in safety put himself in danger for his own sake and was submerged along with the one who was perishing? But tell me, what benefit is that to him? ^C But if he who gives aid has helped as [one being] better to the one being helped, then this argument of yours often shows the man who has saved [the animal] to be worse than a dog; indeed, it would also show the king who happened by and protected a small beast according to his own preference [to be so]. And the Samaritan who treated the man who had fallen among thieves, and placed him upon his mount, and served him, and cared for him in every way, and spent [money] beyond, did he do these things because he himself had suffered them, as you say, and because he was pained by the wounds of that man for his own sake and not for the sake of the other? Or is it said that he does these things like a servant, serving one who is better? And [in that case] he would not have cultivated virtue toward another, nor would he have deserved by right any reward or thanks. Thus, therefore, God would be more than all else the helper of all, [yet] inferior to all, [and] not only, according to you, [subordinate] to any one person or to some, as he helps all, but would be held to be inferior to all. And who will endure such madness? It is clear, therefore, ^D that as it was for our sake, so it was for us that our God was united.

CHAPTER XIII

Everything that is united to another either remains in indissoluble union with that to which it has been united, or it does not remain—

^A it does not remain, for instance, like the parts of irrational animals; but it remains, for instance, like the parts of humans after the resurrection from the dead. And everything that remains indissolubly, or that does not remain, within the composition to which it has been united, does not remain of itself, but is dissolved according to the limit set for nature by the Creator; nor does it remain by its own power, but by the power of something better and surpassing. But to assert that there is any power better than God the Word is not right; therefore, God the Word was not united to the human being from us. But if He was united, He either does not remain indissolubly in the union with him, or, if He remains, He remains by the power of something better, which is impious.

As your wordiness grows dull, it is time for us to say with David: "The enemies have failed forever"^B; for what defense can come to you from such absurdity? On the contrary, we would say: since all united things are preserved by something superior or are dissolved in time, this is the very question that must be most diligently investigated by those who wish to inquire securely: what is it that preserves all united things? If it happens in one way immediately, and in another way mediately—by nature, as some say, or by some other power—nevertheless, the divine Word alone is the preserver and moderator of all things, in that He is also their promoter; so that both the means and the things joined to the means, or those distinguished by order and moderation, are preserved and united by Him. How, therefore, is it not foolish to seek another moderator for His own union while He is present? Or do you even dare to say that He who can preserve things that are further from His own nature is unable to contain that which is united to His own nature? What, then, could be more foolish than this? If, however, you believe that because He is not preserved by another superior being, therefore His union is not preserved indissolubly in any way even by Himself, then likewise you would have to say He was not made by any other superior being; for everything that exists was made by something superior. Would you then not even profess Him to be? For there is nothing more excellent than God; and it would mean that God does not exist, since He did not have a superior by whom He might have been made, or else, according to your wisdom, He must necessarily have been made by someone superior. We leave it to your awakened minds to measure the whole impiety of these things. But let these suffice. In conclusion, ^D we do not know how you conceded the distinction of the Word from that which is united to Him, yet introduced the idea that the union is preserved by a superior being. For at the beginning of your argument, you most expert logicians asserted that everything that does not remain, or that remains in a union, neither remains of itself nor is dissolved of itself.

CHAPTER XIV

^A of God the Word will be performed involuntarily, just as the soul of necessity ceases to act when the body succumbs to sleep. But if God the Word is not united to the animate flesh derived from us in the way the soul is united to our body, but is united totally, let them give us a model of the union according to which they wish God the Word to be united to the human being derived from us. If they are not capable of this, let them confirm what is said by them with scriptural testimony; for this is more credible to us than any natural demonstration. But if besides that demonstration they also lack this, their statement is then without witness and is a mere assertion, and therefore is without proof; for that which is not demonstrated by natural reason nor confirmed by scriptural testimony, must be a fiction of the one asserting it, and is in no way worthy of belief and at the same time is impious.

^B Is it then necessary, O wise men, that whatever is taken for a resemblance in some respect to something else should seem similar to that model in every respect of its own nature? And how would that which is called a model still remain so? For that would then also be a prototype, in no way deficient in comparison; but especially when the comparison is not said to be of substance, or of the properties or accidents of the substance, how then could the properties of one be attributed to the other as being its own? For they would then be common. If you think that things are so, you should perhaps believe the same in cases of this kind: since the blackness in Ethiopians is to be seen just as it is in ravens, it would be necessary that whatever is attested of ravens must also be present in Ethiopians. If, in cases where there is a resemblance in part of the superadded properties, it is necessary to seek all the remaining factors likewise in each of the similar subjects, it is said concerning ravens that they sometimes fly, and sometimes walk on foot, resting from flight; must it therefore be supposed that Ethiopians behave in the same way? But conversely, the properties of Ethiopians must also apply to ravens. It is said that spectators in a theater and the stones in it have a similar arrangement, and it is admitted that they are united to each other by a similar local union. There would therefore belong to the stones ^C the faculty of laughing, and to the men the faculty of being hewn, since in both the same state appears. O what easiness! O what great lack of care!

But that you may not, after having been refuted by the foregoing points, forget your latest absurdities, the rest of the argument must be brought to mind: how do you demonstrate to us that the soul necessarily ceases from its own operations when the body turns toward sleep? For, in the first place, sleep is not even of the body, since you cannot even demonstrate wakefulness, unless you attribute this also to other inanimate things. But it will necessarily be reasoned that this itself is something proper to the soul, or to both together, O you who are most expert in natural things. But let this also be granted to you. Even if many believe that in sleep the activity of the vegetative power of the soul is at its greatest, and that the soul is not idle in this respect, we must put forward that which is irrefutable: that it is not only of the imaginative but also of the mnemonic ^D

and furthermore of the intellectual power of the soul, that a great operation is produced in sleep. ^A Witness to this are the countless dreams we see daily, whether their cause be our way of life, or meditation, or anxiety, or some error, or some other reason. But if they are rare and few in number, nevertheless notable are the apparitions to the saints, the predictions of future events, the healings, and the manifold ways in which Providence cares for those who sleep. Why then do you so thoughtlessly declare that the soul is essentially—and indeed by necessity—inactive in sleep? For the fact that it does not show all its operations in sleep, nor does it do so always, is true; take for example vegetative and local motion, sensation and imagination, memory and intellect, and both appetitive powers. But ^B these are not proven to be active all at once while awake, nor always in the same way. For it cannot always nor fully display all its operations, since it is not of a completely simple nature, such that everything is produced from one single operation; rather, it performs certain operations here and sometimes there. It is the property of God alone to exhibit, simultaneously and without time, His own entire operation, and to do so always.

How then did you correctly choose your example? And to those who say that the union of the soul to the body is the same as the union of the Word to man, why do you add that a similar holy union must consequently occur to God the Word, as happens during sleep? ^C Since the comparison is assumed, it provides no clarification to those investigating through some other means, or merely by selecting other known unions—perhaps a mere habit, or local position, or mutual union, or mixture (for they established this only as a significance of a thing not naturally united, which by becoming mixed, constitutes an immovable union of diverse substances); you are not, therefore, compelled to say of the Word all the things said of those united in such a union. For if this were so, the Word would have suffered as the flesh suffered, would have grown in some way as it grew, would have been extended by its operations, and if it were weakened, would have been diminished and hindered, as happens with the soul and body. You would also say that it was united by another and not by Himself, and that He unwillingly participated, as is just, in whatever belongs to the flesh, whether by necessity ^D or by reward; for these things pertain to the soul and body.

For these reasons, indeed, it has been demonstrated by us above that what is similar in a certain respect is not necessarily so in every respect. If, however, all things that follow the union of soul and body must attend this union of the Word, you would not even admit that He is united; but you demand either that it be said to be similar in every respect, or—if there be some other, according to which the union of the Word appears to you to be demonstrated—that what is to be believed are not those things which follow from a similarity, but those which are viewed in their own proper terms. First of all, we will say to you: Give us some nature among beings to which the nature of the divine Word is similar in every respect, and you will give

^A us also a union that is in every way similar to his union. But if there is no nature similar to this, it is evident that there is no natural union similar to his. For there is no musical instrument among existing things that is just like any other, and it is necessary that the tone of all existing things should differ. It is time for you, since we are unable to point out any other creator who produces things that come to be from non-being, that you should not expect this from God, nor believe that a Father generates God in such a way, or that a Son is generated as God in such a way, nor that Christ was made truly as we are, nor yet as you define him; since we have never had anyone else of this kind to show you, nor you to us; unless you say that he is entirely similar to the prophets according to the current Jewish opinion. And, in short, all things that are rare ^B and transcendent to nature, and the miracles, and those things of which there is not knowledge in all, and those whose science neither a canon nor technical discourse defines, or which experience does not prove—the abolition of all these will be at your hands, or, to put it better, because of you. And what injustice could one lay to your charge more serious than this? But if, having been deemed worthy of the teaching of the written word, you are pricked to the heart to believe, as you have promised us now, and accept the testimony from the inspired oracles, having realized at last that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world, we would have ten thousand proofs to bring to bear upon you, how the natural union of our Lord Jesus Christ, of true God ^C toward true man, has truly come to pass; the union of his holy flesh to the Word not having pre-existed, but being at once nature and a connaturality with him who is above nature.

We must also consider this further regarding what we say: that there are in us certain organic parts of natural and most specific operations; and these are not to be understood as simple instruments operating from without, but as cooperating with those things which operate in them and through them according to nature, and which bring something forth with them; just as in man, the tongue and the palate and the remaining parts related to sound and speech, or even laughter. Since, therefore, the most specific operation of the divine nature is acknowledged to be the creation of things that are not yet even in potency, but which are brought ^D forth from him immediately without any nature, such as the molding of human flesh to life from the earth (which our Lord and God Jesus Christ demonstrated in the man blind from birth, and worked this through his own body, making mud with his fingers and molding his eyes, although he could have done these things by word alone); it is evident that, in order to show that his flesh was united to himself according to nature, he does these things acting in a human way through his body, projecting the things that are most specific to his own nature. Just as, therefore, no one, even if he wished, could speak or laugh or converse through some instrument not united to him according to nature, so neither could God, if he were not united according to nature to his own flesh, exhibit the operations most proper to God through flesh. But in truth it is only the divine power, by means of its own body...

that fashioned from the earth eyes of flesh, and enlightened them, or indeed that raised man from the earth through its own body, and destroyed the power of death; for it is not possible for another to work these things, which God the Word, working through the flesh, was known to us as doing for the manifestation of his own union. ^A

CAP. XV.

CAP. XVI.

^A let the blasphemy stemming from this recoil upon the head of those who say that the Word of God was united to the man from among us. But if he neither acts as in a union, because the Lord's human nature cannot be deprived of reason, nor again is acted upon, because of the blasphemy that by common consent follows from this, then he was not united to the man from among us; for anything whatsoever that is united to another either acts, or is acted upon, or even neither of these, as we have said.

Wondering how you discover such methods of syllogistic arguments, we would wish not to learn the cleverness of such intelligence from you. For we must consider what has been said, in view of your proof that the Word was not united to the flesh; since it is permitted to us, by reversing ^B the argument, to use your own words to prove the union, and to speak as follows: Everything that is not united to another either acts upon that to which it is not united, as the pilot acts upon the ship, or is acted upon by it, as the ship is acted upon by the pilot; or it neither acts nor is acted upon, as Mount Sinai is not acted upon by the sea. Moreover, everything that is in an uncompounded state, and that is either only acted upon, or neither acts nor is acted upon, is irrational and mindless, just like the aforementioned examples. If, then, the Word was not united to the man from among us, he himself either acts or is acted upon, or does neither; and if he acts, the man from among us will be irrational and mindless; but if he is acted upon, let the blasphemy recoil upon the head of the serpent who first whispered such impieties ^C to you.

Understanding then the foolishness of what has thus been said to you, if you were to bethink yourselves and, from your second proposition, were to begin the rest of the syllogism, saying perhaps: "Since we know that all things that are acted upon in a union are irrational, not simply because they are acted upon, but because they are acted upon while in a union," we will respond to this as well: Do you know these things to be irrational because they are acted upon in a union, or because they are acted upon simply, or because they are by their very nature always such? Even if they were said and perceived to be irrational individually or in a union, they would be recognized as such both by those that are united to them and by those that are not, while having the power to act on those that are brought to them. For ^D you will not prove that what is naturally rational becomes irrational in a union, or vice versa; for it is no less rational on account of the union.

Since, therefore, you do not maintain that these things are so, but you judge that the body becomes irrational because it is acted upon in the union, then you obviously know that if it were by itself, it would be rational; and you judge that the body can exist without being joined to a soul, and that in the union it can lose its reason while joined to a rational soul. For who will endure the foolishness of those who think such things? Indeed, since the union is the cause why the body is deprived of reason, if you assume this to be the proper cause of the absence of reason, you would likewise argue that the soul is deprived of reason, since it too is united. If it is deprived of reason, it too is acted upon; and if it were acted upon in the union, and

is agitated; but if it is agitated in union, then it will not be agitated by any other thing, nor by the body united to it. Then it will be incumbent upon you to demonstrate the contrary of what you began to attempt to prove, namely, how union has become the cause for the body to do something—that is, the soul—and not for it to be acted upon. Since, therefore, things are thus, it is in vain to think that the soul—being ^A by nature rational, both in union and without union—is not acted upon by those things it is naturally inclined to activate; rather, we know that it activates them. And we recognize that the body, because it is irrational by nature and inanimate both in union and without union, is rather acted upon and does not act.

Since these things point to the fact that it is not union, but nature—whether it be irrational or rational—that is the cause of it acting or being acted upon, it remains for us to examine, out of an abundance of caution, whether the nature of rational beings is by nature such that it always acts and is never, under any circumstances, acted upon, so that we may know if, provided the Lord’s man is acted upon by the Word, he must necessarily be shown to be mindless and irrational. If, then, no one is ever acted upon at all—neither servants by a master, nor a city by a ruler, nor soldiers by a commander—even if they are seen to be dragged even unto death at his nod; and if neither the souls of the holy, nor angels, nor Powers, nor anything of the host of the angelic orders that is rational or intellectual could ever be acted upon by God in any way, as your sagacity wishes to show—then if it is acted upon, it is shown to be entirely irrational. For you have given this as a proof of being rational: to not be acted upon simply, without properly adding: "not to be acted upon in all things without choice." Thus, indeed, these beautiful arguments of yours, O most excellent ones, by their syllogisms, deliver you up to the laughter of those who truly reason.

CHAPTER XVII.

That which is impassible by nature cannot be united to what is passible; for when things appear to come into union, we must say either that it participates in the impassible, or that it does not suffer the passible, but we might suspect it only appears to. If, therefore, the divine nature was in a suffering body, then either it did not remain impassible itself, or the flesh did not truly suffer. It is to be wondered at if you think as you speak, O most wise, for no one, not even among the utterly foolish, says that when the soul is united to the body, it is cut, heated, and vivified along with it, even though it does not possess the same impassibility as the divinity, but differs infinitely from the impassibility of the divine nature. Not so, however; for since it is not itself cut on account of it, no one would say that its body ^D is truly cut or chilled. Yet the soul experiences the passions that befall it differently; for the soul does not experience the cutting or division of the organ, even if it has suffered pain on account of these things. But above all, we declare this to you: since you say that God the Word is not united to a passible nature because He is impassible, lest the divinity remain in it, subsisting as a subject to some of the passions that befall it, you rather condemn Him than glorify Him. For if that which is not

^A considered to be breakable because it is not present among the materials that are being struck, it does not possess the quality of being unbreakable by nature, but by an accident of avoidance and withdrawal from what breaks it; to him will belong the special quality of unbreakability. And in the same way, it would be possible for glass, and every other of the most fragile bodies, to possess this special quality. But then the impassibility of the one of his nature will be better recognized if he were struck in an uninjured way along with those that are being struck. And thus, once tested, the diamond would reasonably be admired, as it provides a proof of its own nature in the trial of the matter. For in the same way, that which is called asbestos is not attested to as fireproof by not being in contact with the fiery nature (for thus it would be possible to call every material, and hay itself, incombustible); but because, even when mixed in with burning bodies, it is not burned along with them, and for this very reason we reasonably marvel at it. That the flesh of the Lord has suffered, the eye witnesses testify; but that the Word has not suffered, His own power ^B both during the passion and after the passion of His flesh has fully confirmed. For He would not have given life to the dead nature, that is, to the human nature, by suffering and dying Himself, as He truly attested by raising Himself up. According to one part, therefore, that which was in Him has died; but according to another, that which is of Him, Christ living and not having died, has raised Himself up.

CHAPTER XVIII

The joining of God the Word to the man from us, according to you, either benefited Him alone, or the man to whom He was joined, or both together, or neither Himself nor him, but us ourselves alone, or God and us—but in no way the man from us who was joined to Himself—or both Him and us together, or us and the man from us, but God not at all. But if He benefited God, or only the man to whom He was joined, or God and the man commonly, but us no longer, how is it not false that our Lord Jesus Christ was incarnate and died for us and for our salvation? ^C And if us ourselves only, or God and us, but the man from us in no way, how would we not be better off, whereas the man from us was not benefited at all by the economy through him? For the man from us was not in need of nothing at all, since he was also a creature, and moreover, according to the wise, he was also passible and corruptible. But if both God and the man from us and us ourselves, how is God the Word not in need according to us, and according to the man from us joined to Him? And if the joining of God the Word to the man from us benefited both us and the man from us, according to you, but God not at all, since He is entirely ^D without need, let whoever wishes come forward and tell us what the benefit is that has accrued, either to the man from us or to any of the creatures from the union of God the Word and the man from us; which

^A could not pass into him and into us, without his essential union to both reciprocally.

If they have nothing to say—for the intercession of the man assumed from us and the good pleasure of God the Word would have sufficed, even without such a union, for them to be the cause of every benefit of any kind to us, and to show him in turn to be the Excellent One and Lord of the whole of creation, since into the person of God the Word, than which nothing can be more venerable, nothing can pass into a created nature—how will the union of God the Word to the man from us, which is proclaimed, not be superfluous and idle? But if God does nothing in vain or to no purpose, then the Word of God was not united to the man from us.

You who are compressed by your thoughts, as if spinning out threads of wool, now spread yourselves out with phrases. Therefore, bear in mind the saying: "In much speaking you will not escape sin." For tell us, what was the need for this manifold division? For whom, and for what persons, and for what purpose did the benefit of the divine economy come about? For us, who cry out to you plainly and boldly, ^B that the divine nature did not deign to be united to our nature on account of any benefit reaching toward itself—for let it be far from any of the pious to say or think this!—but rather, its incarnation took place solely on account of its greatest benefit toward us. So that it came to be in the Lordly Man, as the first-fruits of the human lump and the firstborn of many brethren and the head of the body of the Church, primarily and as the first recipient and immediately, through the hypostatic union to him, for his own nature, the wealth of deification, from his natural unity with God; but to the rest of the lump of humanity, and the remaining brethren who are from the seed of Abraham, and the body of the Church, secondarily ^C and by participation and mediately, the benefits were transmitted through the union according to nature, which exists to the first-assumed Lordly Man from us, as though from the same lump, even if he be the first-fruits, and as a brother to the only-begotten even if he be the first-born, and of the same body even if he be the head for us, he who became the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus our Lord.

If you further say that the assumed nature provided no work for God, from which nothing benefited him, and from which some disgrace and shame redounded to him, we will say to you: This is the deification of human nature, ^D through which, demonstrating that he himself possesses such goodness and beneficent power to the world, our God who was united to us for our sake is more and more glorified and loved by all; yet this, according to your foolishness, is the reason why he should not have been about to create man himself at the time of the first creation. But just as he decreed to bring forth plants and the herb of grass from the earth or the waters,

and the souls of living reptiles, and the rest; so now it would not entail disgrace, by turning the creation over to another medium, to the detriment of his own work of human making. Nor, further, did it entail disgrace for him to bring man forth into existence according to his own image and likeness, nor to ^A impress his own character upon the earthy mass. Nor further, especially, to breathe into him a living soul and the breath of life by his own infusion, or to dwell from the beginning in the clay, effectively depositing a pledge of the union with himself from his own nature into the flesh taken from the earth; for not for some benefit of his own did he perform these things. But if these things be so, others are indeed greater in power than in deed; for there is no characteristic of the divine nature more evident than the creation of rational animals, since the only Creator of all intellectual and rational beings is distinguished from all created and spiritual things. What seems to you unlikely, then, in the creation of man, if he favored no other being above or below him, and now he himself has performed the work of his restoration? What further can you say, when Moses, ^B even though God offered this, was unwilling to accept an angel as a fellow-traveler and guide to the land of promise when he departed from Egypt? "But if you will travel with us," he said, "otherwise we shall not go up." And the divine benevolence of the God of all, having condescended to act as a minister to this decision of his own servant, is also borne witness to by the prophet who said: *Neither an angel, but the Lord himself saved us* (Isa. LXIII, 9). How then, according to you, does he deem it unworthy to work out, without shame, our salvation by himself—he whom you consider to be in no way bought for his own nature—rather than having used some mediator ^C as a servant for the benefit granted to us by him? For He who despised the shame of the death of the cross was this same one, according to the God-taught Apostle, *who, being in the form of God, emptied himself, and not another* (Philipp. II, 7).

If you piously open your ears to our open lips and inquire otherwise why the grace granted to us—and to the Lordly man—could not in any way pass over to us without his union with the Word, we will answer with God our Savior; and we will say that our restoration is absolutely necessary, and of necessity comes to be through the union with him. For just as if someone, having pressed the impression of a ring into the nature of pure wax, and this ^D having fallen upon the ground and been subsequently covered with dust, if he should see it and find the imprint of the character of the ring, which had been previously pressed into the wax, now become very darkened and unrecognizable on account of the earthy dust that has been plastered onto it; and, desiring to make clear once again and renew the seal that had been previously impressed, which had been covered up by the gathering together of the dust that had happened upon the wax, he takes the ring itself once again, from the point

^A of a clearer, more accurate, and more perfect impression of the iron in which the sign is engraved, and impresses it upon this soiled wax, which is not capable of any other form, yet the prior form is impressed upon it once again: so also God refashioned human nature, which had been created in His image but which, being wrapped in earthly things, had obscured the beauty of the divine image, refashioning it back to its pristine beauty, which is the divine likeness, by means of His own more intense and more effective outpouring, granting to those who live in the flesh His divine outpouring and working in them His spiritual union; for in His omnipotent goodness, the Word Himself called back to Himself ^B rational beings.

CHAPTER XIX

The body, being essentially united to the soul, derives life and sensation from it; but as for the body of the Lord, being essentially united [to the Godhead] according to you, what do you say it has acquired—sensation or movement? But it had these from the soul. Or [do you say it acquired] impassibility and immortality? But you say it had this from the resurrection, just as all men are going to have it. How, then, would the substance of God not be inferior to the substance of the soul, seeing that the one communicates many things to Him, while the other possesses no higher distinguishing mark? Or do you say that it was formed without seed? But this was a sign of the power of the Holy Spirit, not a proof of an essential union with the Word. For, "before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Spirit."* But [what of] wonders and miracles? But the apostles also did greater things than these, according to the Lord's own word to them. But [what of] the dignity, dominion, and the name which is above every name given to Him? To whom was this given on account of an essential union with God the Word unto a better state? And to what better state was the Word united? But [it was united] to flesh, that is, to our human nature. First, therefore, from the fact that you heard the name of dignity given to Him, you substitute "nature"; and second, you oppose those who say that dignity is an indistinct union of our flesh to God the Word, and not a natural conjunction; third, if the dignity and dominion of the man taken from us does not belong to Him from the will of His own substance, then it is necessarily a gift of love and benevolence, not a gift of an essential union; since nothing that is united according to essence grants any dignity or dominion to that to which it is united. But do they not say that the sinlessness of the Lord's humanity is a proof of an essential union with the Word? How, then, does Holy Scripture attribute this to the Holy Spirit, saying: "Who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish to God,"* and "the Spirit of Jesus shall cleanse our conscience from dead works"?* And elsewhere: "He was justified in the Spirit"?* Therefore, in the Spirit in which He was justified,

it is according to substance—and thus will it be not an optional, but an essential achievement. ^B

Just as those who wish to kindle great fires, and are overcome by the all-devouring flame, when after the consumption of the coarser fuel they see the flame already languishing before them, and not having sufficient fuel remaining to sustain the object of their efforts, they exert themselves to feed it in their extremity with bits of straw, so that their lamp may not be extinguished entirely; so too you, now that the entire, most material rubbish-heap of your propositions has been wholly consumed by the truth’s fire that devours falsehood, are merely feeding the strife you have begun against us with certain babblings, that you might weave it around yourselves. For what necessity of universal similarity will your comparison—brought forward by you in the manner of an example—between the soul and the body impose upon us? Shall we again remind you, most wise men, that you have ignored this: that not all things whose compositions are similar in some respect have all their energies or other consequences the same? But I do not think you were entirely ignorant of this. For a man is united to a man locally in the Church, and a stone is likewise united to a stone locally in it; and for the former, the composition or juxtaposition produces conversation, mutual warmth, and other such things for both; but the composition of the stones shows no such thing. And it was your duty to consider this, that where the natures are not the same, neither are the participations; since even the properties are not the same, nor could the powers or the energies be the same, even if the compositions be thought of as in some way the same. Therefore, these things [are said] in response to your demanding that we show vegetative life, sensation, and local motion as having come to the flesh from the Word, because these things naturally come to be from a soul joined to a body. ^C

But since you demand of us that, if we do not acknowledge the things of the soul, we should nevertheless recognize something else that the flesh received from the Word—lest, as you say, the divine union be entirely useless to it, if neither the things of the soul nor anything else superior to them are supplied to the flesh from thence—for this is what your statement intends, claiming that if we ascribe impassibility and incorruptibility to the union as to its cause, we are lying, since it is clearly established that the Lord’s man had these from the resurrection—you shall hear from us, O you who are ignorant of the gifts of God, that there are many and most excellent gifts bestowed by the Word upon the flesh. For if it even received impassibility and incorruptibility from the resurrection, as we all, being men, are destined to have them, still, even before the resurrection, there were bestowed upon all the faithful gifts that are above(human) man, that is, miraculous gifts; and as for sinlessness and great power variously witnessed in Him, whence should we say they accrued to the flesh? For one would not foolishly say that this very thing which is viewed as existing in a subject, and not as something understood to have happened to it—that is, the resurrection—is some nature capable of producing the rising, the impassibility, and the incorruptibility of the body of Christ; for it is only in the substances that we perceive something to be, and it is something supervening...

upon it, just as is also the confinement, the exaltation, the humiliation, and such-like. For these things, while a substance might indeed act, and might be acted upon within a substance, yet they themselves can never, of their own accord, effect anything ^A in substances, neither upon themselves nor upon anything else. For neither did the resurrection of Lazarus, nor of the daughter of Jairus, nor of others, effect anything in them by its own power.

How then do you say that the human nature of the Lord acquired these things from the resurrection? For if it happened to Him from a non-existent thing, then He who exists and is God will not be reckoned as the cause of these things for us and for Himself, nor would God have raised Him. But if it is something that exists, and is a nature that has accomplished these things—and is called the bestower of impassibility and incorruptibility—then there will be no other nature capable of providing these things besides God. For this does not belong to man, as it is written: “What man is there who shall live and not see death, and shall deliver his soul from the hand of ^B Hades?” The true God will be He who does all these things; and from this it will be for you to understand that He Himself was the cause and author of these things—namely, of impassibility and incorruptibility—in that He is said to have truly raised Himself, He who also said: “I am the resurrection and the life” —a word which you have mostly spurned. Yet I tell you what must be shown: but, being instructed by a word that is accidentally sensible, you are voluntarily deaf, together with the sister of Lazarus, to the sensible body. “For as,” He says, “the Father raises the dead, so also the Son has given power to raise the dead.” If, therefore, these things are sufficient for you for belief, at least you shall hear the rest of what has been said by you. For if, just as all men are to rise, so did the Lord rise, why was it necessary for Him to rise first? For if He rose just as we do, and we ourselves are to rise as He did, what need was there for His resurrection to precede ours? If, however, it is not because of it that we ourselves rise, and because it preceded, then even if He had not risen, He who raised Him as He did us would also raise us just as Him, by a power subsisting commonly in all and similar to His own. Thus, therefore, it has been shown ^C that His resurrection is His own self-activity, and that our resurrection is from the union of the flesh with the Word.

Now we must also consider the other thing said by you; for you refer the wonder of His divine birth to the Holy Spirit and think it to be a sign of this, but not a pledge of the substantial union of the Word. Tell us, therefore, truly, O sirs, why this has happened in the case of His birth alone, and why, for His birth of this kind, He ordained such a sign only? For we have it from your own premises that those whose natures are incompatible cannot receive the same composition. Now, therefore, from the principle lately put forward by you, we shall set against the conclusion intended by you this very axiom: that of those whose births are incomparably ^D different, their natures can never be the same.

For that to be conceived in iniquity has an ^A incomparable difference, no one of those who exist would even slightly doubt. And furthermore, we shall say again: If what is from the flesh is flesh, and what is from the spirit is spirit, and flesh and spirit are not of the same essence—and every man is flesh, having been generated consubstantially from flesh—then our Lord Jesus, having been incarnated from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, was generated from different essences. How then is such a birth—in which the symbol of the Holy Spirit, as you imagine, has occurred—not a proof of the substantial union of the Word? And so, to be from the Spirit and to be Spirit together with flesh, this represents Him; for God is Spirit, and the Lord is the Spirit; for He was conceived of the Holy Spirit—it is not stated simply "of spirit." These things, then, are concerning the birth of our Savior. ^B

And concerning the other calumny of yours, in which the manifestations of the Master—as though having nothing whereby they might be marked by their own peculiar signs—are corrupted by you... whence this [is] not from God to you... I would gladly ask this of you: If royal attendants were to wound or even kill someone who had been abused by the king with mere words and threats, would we, because their blows were more severe, say that the attendants were greater than, or at least equal to, the king? And again, seeing these things happen in the case of benefits—when those whom the king has merely deigned to honor with an audience and conversation are heaped with various gifts and honors by the royal ministers—would we judge the ministers to be greater benefactors? Is it not truly necessary for those who wish to judge regarding this to consider whence is the ^C beginning of that which is done, by whose power its origin is brought about, and who of these is the primary efficient cause? For if we do not attend to these things, we would say that the whip excels the charioteer, the arrow the archer, the disciple the teacher, and, to use a saying, we would turn everything upside down. But otherwise, again: If, according to you, His apostles—being of the earth—had recognized Him as their equal, why, when our Lord Himself and theirs had forbidden them to call anyone on earth father, or master, or lord, or teacher, did they call Him Lord and God and Teacher? But He Himself who had so commanded them approved as rightly attributed to Him the things said by them, saying: "You call me the Lord and Teacher, and you speak well, for I am." It is clear, therefore, that even if the same or even greater things were done by them, they were confessed to have been done not from equal power, but by Him as their Lord, and by them as His slaves and ministers. ^D

Furthermore, toward the refutation of the things said by you... we wish also to learn from you where and when these men, even if they... in the same way to Him... or... did not confess that they were made not as equals nor from equal powers.

For He, indeed, by His own authority and power and His own command, said: "I will, be thou clean"; but they said: "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk," thus clearly confessing that the power was His, while their own was but a ministry; and indeed, whatever was administered by them through miracles was itself a faith in their Master, which was the only thing they strove for. Furthermore, where did they display that which is uniquely characteristic of God—namely, the power to create—as He himself did for the man blind from birth? For He who fashioned the more vital and varied parts of the human body from clay, demonstrated by means of one member that He had fashioned the body of man from clay in the beginning. And which of the apostles or prophets was able to raise others, not to mention himself, from the dead? Whose body among those who are on earth has remained incorrupt in the sepulchre? Or who has been testified to as having the power to lay down his own soul and to take it up again? Will you not at last, even if late, listen to the One saying: "What man is he that shall live and not see death, and shall deliver his soul from the hand of hell?" Or of which of them has it been said that he possessed the power to command unclean spirits, or the winds and the sea? Or whose words did all men marvel at as speaking with power, and not as the others spoke? Or who among the apostles or prophets was there, at whose death heaven and earth, sun and moon, day and night, the living and the dead were shaken and receded from their proper boundaries and places? At whose birth was a birth without seed seen, the course of a star from heaven, the song of a choir of angels? Who of them showed forth spiritual things in a carnal body, not diminishing the integrity of the virgin by his birth, and walking upon the waves; yet in a spiritual body ^C produced the things of the flesh, being handled by tangible hands; and after his resurrection asking for food and eating it, although not for the sake of nourishment: demonstrating through all these things that He is the Maker and Architect of both the carnal and the spiritual nature, creating and transforming all things, always powerful to work miracles in every natural state; for to Him alone who made anything is it easy to change it. And who of them, who were only of human nature, is said to have ascended alone into heaven or to have descended from heaven? Hence, it does not enter our minds to impiously establish that the power of performing miracles is the same for men and for the omnipotent Lord. Thus, your impious view that the wonder-working power of holy men and that of the Lordly power are the same has failed to be established.

The other thing you say is that the dignity and lordship and the name that is above every name, and all other things, were given to the flesh by the Word who is superior to it, and that it is not necessary to ascribe these to the union.

^A when that which lacks them remains separate from the one who possesses them, or when they are joined to him? And why, when there are many things that are naturally incompatible with those who possess them, were they given to this one alone? For we see ^B by example that when fire is joined to iron according to nature, the iron is then called "ignited," having acquired the name and—so to speak—the natural dignity of fire by the power of the conjunction. Likewise, when light is mixed into water and illuminates it by the power of conjunction, it is called "illuminated water." And when a statue is overlaid with gold, it is called "gilded." But when a carpenter uses an axe merely as a tool, not joined to it according to natural conjunction, he then neither imparts his name or his dignity to the tool, nor does the workman receive anything from the tool. Moreover, not even a king or any noble person, if he should load one of his own servants with as many honors as possible—if he is not joined to him by nature—could ever impart his name, or his dignity, or his kingly power, or his nobility to him; for it is not possible, even if he should wish it, as we shall demonstrate, that however much he might deck out one of his own horses, he could truly call him a man, seeing that there is but one name received, and not two for those things that are above all natural names. ^C For if someone says there are three—and not one—most excellent person in the divine, who is this but he who is God and Lord by nature? That which is by adoption neither belongs to one alone, nor is it "above every name," since there are many who are called gods and lords in heaven and on earth according to participation. If, therefore, anyone else besides the true God by nature should usurp that name, it is necessary either that he who gave it should be nameless, or that in one of the two the name should be false. For it is called falsely, either from the one who has recently received it—since he is of a different nature and does not possess it properly—or it is not truly said of the one who had it previously, as he has recently alienated it and has not remained in the proper nature of the name. For every proper and natural name belongs to one nature only, and not to two different natures. Whence it cannot be said to be given to anyone properly and truly, or if it is given properly, it is given only by the conjunction of him who alone is truly so named, with another who is different. For thus it will be ^D both in the same proper name and simultaneously in another, because of the one who is made in him; for that cannot truly be called a name of nature which departs from its own subject; and similarly, one must judge concerning dignity and power and all other such things.

Since, therefore, it seems to us that the name of dignity is given by nature, and that this dignity is a nature from God—for it is not some acquired raiment—but to you, as it appears, it does not seem so, tell us then what you would have us think concerning the true dignity and power of Christ, and concerning the true name; and let us know if that which we say does not surpass by far all that is said by you, since that species does not change. For thus every man from

^A every man would be of a different essence in comparison to every man; to which of the holy men, then, do you suppose Christ—whom we confess to be the true God and Son of the living God—to be similar? It is necessary, therefore, to hear how you argue that this is a dignity and not a natural union in Christ, saying that this dignity is given by will. Since, therefore, the things regarding the dispensation have come to pass by good pleasure, the gift shall by all means be a kind of dignity. But to this we also say: that if you think dignity is a kind of honor because it is given by will, we shall answer you that stripes, chains, and disgraces are also inflicted upon wicked slaves and citizens by the will of their masters and magistrates; hence, according to your own reasoning, since these things proceed from the will, the punishments themselves will be considered dignities and honors. Do not let this, on account of its extreme absurdity, be overlooked by you, especially since, when we posit a natural union, if we were to say it was not from the benevolence and philanthropy of the all-good God, you would not incorrectly affirm that it is not a union, since the incarnation would not proceed from God’s benevolence; now, however, we proclaim more loudly than you yourselves that there is a maximum proof of goodness in the fact that such a union is from benevolence. For we know well that the divine Numen is not envious, which granted to us not only a common or profane dignity, but a natural one and one of immense worth; for it did not grant another good, but itself to us. But if any nature can be conceived that is richer or better than the nature of God, tell us, and we will agree with you.

^C But since, conquered by these things, yet still struggling in the last breath, you do not consent to the discourse of true piety, but affirm to us that the sinlessness in Christ our Lord is no sign of union, we shall also examine this with you. In those in whom there is the power to sin, in them sinlessness is to be wondered at; for it is not to be said simply that sinlessness is worthy of admiration. Let us see, therefore, whence sin comes: is it not evidently from the liberty proper to each individual man, just as justice is? For if sins and justices were not from liberty and choice—to omit all other things—he would be unjust who punished one who had sinned without liberty, or who rewarded one who had not done good of his own accord. If, then, without ^D doubt both sin and justice come from the liberty proper to our nature, but the sinlessness or justice of our Lord Jesus Christ is said to be from the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that you confess that it was in his power to be just, just as it is in our power. But if we know that the Holy Spirit, who is true God, was in the nature of Christ—that which is in the power of our soul and the cause of our justice—how can you not most evidently, even if unwillingly, admit that the divine nature was in Christ through the Holy Spirit? You, who recently perversely posited him to be similar to us, are now convicted face to face by him, since he must be understood to be above us, he who appeared similar to us. For that which is partitioned into

^A parts in us, the divine Word accomplished this wholly in regard to our nature, and in regard to this one and the rest of those ruling in Christ. Whether, therefore, as co-existing with the Holy Spirit, or even as being called Holy Spirit from the nature, and not from the subsistence, ^B he himself is the author of his own righteousness, and no other.

CHAPTER XX

The divine Word is immutable according to his subsistence, just as he is also according to his nature, or is he not? If they say he is not, then according to them he is neither altogether simple, nor incorruptible, nor even God. Moreover, the Father and the Holy Spirit will be subject to the same things, unless the case regarding them is different; for they could be conceived as mutable according to their persons. If, however, because of ^B excessive impiety, every man confesses the Word to be immutable even according to his subsistence, how then will he have a composite subsistence from a simple one? But how is the simplicity of the subsistence understood by you? For subsistences are natures with properties. If, therefore, you think the subsistence is simple by the fact that it has one nature and one simple property, although there may be as many natures as might happen but only one simple property, then no one’s subsistence will be simple, nor will those of the divine Persons themselves. For the Father is the generator of the Word, and is unbegotten, ^C and the spirator of the Holy Spirit; and the Son is begotten, and the Word, and the one through whom the Holy Spirit proceeds. These are many simple properties of the same subsistence, from all of which at once the one composite property of the Father’s or the Son’s subsistence is understood. If, however, you say that by having one nature, but as many simple properties as may happen, the subsistence is simple, tell me in what way a simple subsistence differs from a simple nature. ^D If it differs in no way, it will be necessary, just as we understand an incomposite nature to be that which is joined to no other nature, so also to consider an incomposite subsistence to be that which is joined to no other subsistence. But you, not we, say that subsistence is united to subsistence; so you also speak of a composition of subsistences. For we, just as we do not say that the iron ignited in the furnace extracts any partial subsistence from the nature of the fire, but only receives the nature into its own subsistence—for the subsistence of the fire in the furnace remains likewise ^D unimpaired even after the ignition of the iron—so we say that the Word assumed a nature from our nature into his own subsistence. Therefore, the composition, or rather the union of one to the other, is according to the subsistences in relation to the natures; but neither has a nature become composite from these. For they were not composed by confusion, nor is the subsistence composite, because it is not from subsistences. Rather, a more incomposite property of the Word’s subsistence has come to be, as several simple properties were heaped upon it after the incarnation, which demonstrates that neither his nature nor his subsistence is composite or mutable.

CHAPTER XXI

But, they say, those who... [text continues]

examine all the arguments concerning the incarnation of the divine Word [claim] that every whole that is composed of different parts is seen as something else, and is also named differently from the things of which it consists. If, therefore, Christ is composite from God and man, He is neither truly God nor truly man. First of all, the assertion of this argument is false; for there are cases where a whole that is formed from different parts is not understood or called anything other than the parts themselves, either because of the prevalence of one of the parts in the composition—just as we call the uncooked vegetable a vegetable, and likewise the vegetable when it has been cooked after the addition of many seasonings, and similarly the fine flour and the legumes—or because the whole, consisting of parts that are indeed of a different species but not of a strictly different genus, does not become some entirely different kind. Thus, an even number and an odd number coalescing into one whole—seven, for example, and eight—do not present, in fifteen, a number different from both the odd and the even, but it is called odd just as one of its parts is; hence nothing ^B in it, just as in the seven, exceeds the bounds of an odd number. It is therefore evident that in those instances where, beyond the diversity of the parts, the principle of a different genus appears in the whole, it is necessary to change the notions, the definitions, and the names—a detail that escaped them from the beginning. Therefore, the composite whole, fifteen, is truly called odd, just as the seven is, and within its own totality it contains the seven, truly preserved as an odd number within itself. In this same way, understand for me the Word to be truly God, and the flesh to be truly man, and Christ [to be one] by the Word and not by nature, and [to be] truly both God and man.

CHAPTER XXII

^C If, they say, you also confess a natural union, in what then do you differ from the followers of Severus, who say that there is only one nature of Christ? For every natural union produces a certain nature distinct from the united natures; and if man is one nature, it is because man is not many, nor does he possess the nature of a soul alone, nor the nature of a body alone, nor the separate natural properties of both; for mortality is in a man, but it is not in the soul or in the body individually. Tell me, I ask you, is there no union of natures in iron and fire? And in wool dyed with blood, is there not a conjunction of corporeal substances? Tell me, therefore, what new nature emerges in these cases through their natural composition; for what else is there here, even after the substantial union, if not burning iron and stained wool, and in the same way, two natures? ^D But know—if you can be persuaded to learn—that "natural union" is understood and spoken of in many ways. For one kind of natural union is spoken of not [as being an union] of natures, but as an union of certain other things, according to a certain nature, whose substantial principle produces their union, such as the divine nature of the divine persons, and the nature of the mind in regard to the powers of the soul, and the nature of fire in regard to its substantial properties. Another kind is called natural union, which is a similarity according to the natural form of different substances, such as of an angel to an angel...

or a horse to a horse; another is also natural union—namely, the concurrence of different natures for the production of a certain new nature, just as the nature of the soul and of the body establish the nature of man, and the four elements that of flesh, and several herbs that of a plaster: this union is called constitutive. Another is also called natural union, namely, the concurrence of several ^A natures into one nature according to person; as, for example, the commingling of the natures of light and air on this day to produce the day, and the natural union of fire and iron, so called because it occurs not through any of their accidental properties, but through their very natures. How, therefore, do they—while passing over the fact that they do not understand the natural union of the Word’s incarnation which we assert—misinterpret our words according to that sense which they, in their folly, together with the Severians, concoct? But being thus refuted in these matters, they vent even more terrible shafts of argument against our faith. ^B

CHAPTER XXIII.

That the union according to hypostasis, whether of God with man, is either above the nature of the Godhead, or outside nature, or according to nature, if indeed it truly exists. For if it is above nature, a work of greater power has supervened upon it, and it has been increased beyond itself; hence it is not omnipotent, nor does it exceed all reason. But if it is outside nature, it has become lesser than itself and appears mutable, and has sunk into degradation; but if it is according to nature, then the incarnation of the Word is not by grace, nor of the Son alone, but also of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. But why, if it were according to nature, was it not done before, ^C but now, as if the nature had been imperfect before, and has now passed from potentiality to act? But if all these things are absurd in God, and if natures cannot be united otherwise, then, they say, the divine nature is either absurdly united to another nature, or it is not united at all. Now that would be the case if, once this were simply done, nature were the immediate cause; for in the case of a man not swimming in the water, not tumbling on his head, or walking on a tightrope, how would someone say that these things are above his nature, if another of the same nature does them? Or outside nature? But that he does not do them does not make him any less a man. Or according to ^D nature? But how, for the one who does not swim, nor tumble, nor walk on a rope, will he not still possess the other things which are according to nature? Manifestly, therefore, these things are according to the good pleasure—the nature of the benevolent one does not have them as the primary cause. For the governance and power of contrary things is the will, not nature. But, he says, that union of God with us was perfected by a natural conjunction; yet nature is not subject to one’s own will. For even if many wish for their soul to be joined to an adamantine or ethereal body, it is not in their power; and it is so because the will is lesser than the power of nature. For although we are pedestrians and wish to fly, we cannot by nature equip ourselves with wings. But in God, the will and the nature are of the same

power ^A and in concord. Therefore, the good pleasure which exists in His nature, and the cause of that good pleasure itself—insofar as the nature itself takes pleasure in its own self—this is the cause. Thus, the good pleasure is neither inferior nor superior to the nature in power, in the case of the simple God; for the Lord has done everything whatsoever He willed, and those things which are not done, are not done because it did not please God [to do them]. Therefore, both the divine will and nature can do whatever has pleased them, and the facts simply demonstrate the will of God, even if they are not above nature, nor outside nature, nor according to nature.

Chapter XXIV.

The Word is true God, having a simple substance, according to the substance of the Father. If, therefore, He receives flesh into His substance, as it pleases the Egyptian, ^B He falls away from the true appellation, just as He does from the true nature. But He does not receive flesh into the substance of the Word in such a way, but into one of those things of which His person consists, since Christ is of a double substance. But if on account of this the substance of the Word becomes alien to the simple persons that are consubstantial with Him, because He now appears in a composite person with the substance of the flesh, then certainly the soul of John was of a different substance than the soul of his own brother James, since the latter was killed by the sword by Herod long before the former. For the soul of James was in a simple person after death, whereas the soul of John was still seen in a composite person.

CAP. XXV.

The Word is immense according to person, but the flesh is measurable according to person. Whoever affirms the union of God and flesh according to person, he either lowers God into the measurability of the flesh, ^C or he exalts the flesh to the immensity of God; but if it is not done in this way or that, it is not possible for God to be united with flesh according to person. If you refer the immensity of the Word to continuous quantity in some way, just as you do the measurability of the flesh, you have argued correctly; but if the Word is immense in another way, such for example as by power, while the flesh is measurable, it is not absurd for the superior power to be united with the lesser.

CHAPTER XXVI.

The person of the Word is uncreated, the person of the flesh is created; but neither can the flesh be united to the Word in an uncreated manner, nor the Word to the flesh in a created manner. According to what person, then, ^D was the union made, which was made according to person? The predicaments of the things united are not entirely the same as those of the union itself. The union, therefore, in itself, is neither created nor uncreated; for neither creation nor union are substances; but created and uncreated things being united according to person, these would be substances. Therefore, just as nothing prevents the bodies restored to us in the resurrection from being united to our enduring souls, so too does nothing prevent the flesh, newly created, from being united to the Word who pre-existed as uncreated, simply on account of the pre-existence of the Word.

^A But if you say that because of the difference in nature of the uncreated from the created, this is an impediment, then there will be no person composed of things of a different nature. Yet all union according to person comes about from things that are different, and none from things that are of the same substance, unless it be a collection of similar parts. Hence it is more reasonable to conjecture that the union of the Word and the flesh according to person is made from things that are different.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXIX.

for the sole property of the consubstantial ones differs... it would seem simple... in that he is unbegotten... but also in that he is the begetter of the Word and the breather of the Holy Spirit, himself not proceeding; likewise, there are also many properties of the Spirit. Therefore, a multiplicity of personal properties does not make the simple property composite; but even if one were to suppose that one person is composed of many persons—which God forbid that we should say, for we by no means hold that the flesh was first formed and later assumed by the Word, as is your pleasure, but that from the beginning of its existence it was introduced into the person of the Word, whence Christ, whom you rather fashion from two persons into a double person, or, not joining them, feign a union—from which the nature of Christ has no more relation to God than the nature of other men; nor can you say why He alone is called the one mediator between God and man. ^A

CHAPTER XXX

If the person of the Word were one thing without flesh and another with its own flesh, the Word would necessarily have been one thing at one time and another thing afterwards: for a change in the person necessarily follows that of him who possesses the person. Furthermore, one understands this regarding the change of nature and the acquisition and accession of certain substantial elements. Thus wool is the same and not another, whether it be white, as it is naturally, or it has been dyed purple by the blood of the shellfish... seen... so that according to substance and person... to have toward blood... as every... genus... therefore another... person would be understood as incarnate from non-incarnate: for the incarnation of the Word is not his mutation, but only if the Word were to cease to be; but that he should have ceased not to have flesh... now incarnation... to the Son... would be a divine attribute... but not the not having of flesh... of the person of the Word. For thus the Father, and the Holy Spirit, and the angels, and ^B souls would be words, no differently than the Son; but the negative [non-incarnate] is primarily a predicate of his substance, and secondarily of his person, because of the substance already long since thus predicated; but now it is predicated of the substance, yet not simply and solely of the person, because this person has received into itself another substance which is predicated as carnal; and it itself avails as the nature of the Word; secondarily it caused a proper attribute in his person; so also does the nature of this flesh secondarily affix to it its own proper attribute, that is, the incarnation, as if the person had become its own; but he was not one thing before and another afterwards, but the same, yet the Word appearing in one way and another, inasmuch as formerly the person was only invisible, but now he is visible also on account of that visible thing which he received into himself.

CHAPTER XXXI

If man is both, that is to say God and man, just as the Word of God ^C is both, it is manifest that just as man is not God by nature, so neither ^D

is he God by person. But if something is not the same by nature, is it therefore not the same by person? What then? Since the soul of a horse is not the same by nature as its body, seeing that the one is mobile and the other immobile, is it therefore not the same by person? Nor for that matter are light and air the same by nature, nor are they the same by person; in the daytime they are one, but they are distinguished from each other. ^B

CAP. XXXII. I am, and I have not changed, cries God; the Word is united to flesh according to person, cries the Egyptian; he who accepts that Cyril spoke the truth, makes God a liar. If, therefore, the Word, being united to flesh, remains the Word, they speak absurdities; but if the Word does not remain, even if it were not united to flesh, it is changed. For if union is simply change, every soul united to a body is changed.

CAP. XXXIII. You are the same, cries the prophet, speaking of God; the Egyptian cries back to the prophet with his own doctrines: You are not the same; for you have become, according to person, another than what you were. If, therefore, the bodies of many martyrs having been burned, they revealed themselves by their souls and spirits, and by many miracles showed themselves to us even now as living, should we say to them: You are not the same; for you have become, according to person, devoid of flesh, which you were not before? And he who does not know Christ in the flesh, if he afterwards knows him, does he not know the same one, but another? And who would agree with these people? The Word therefore became flesh, and he is the same, and [he is] in this way. ^C

CAP. XXXIV. If the Word is consubstantial with the Father according to its fleshless person, it is manifest that according to its incarnate person the Word is heterousious [of a different nature] to the Father. If the Word were consubstantial with the Father in person because it did not have flesh united to it in person, then this will be rightly questioned by you. But if the Word is consubstantial with God the Father because it is not flesh by nature, but God in essence, then being united to flesh, it did not turn the nature of God; and it is manifest that the person of the Word has remained consubstantial with the Father, while it has also truly become heterousious to him, by reason, however, of another nature having been generated in it.

CAP. XXXV. If the Word does not have the person which it had, then it is no longer the same [as] what it was. But it still has the same [person], possessed of its earlier properties; yet with the addition of other properties, in this respect also it is distinguished from its peers.

CAP. XXXVI. Man can have the dignity, authority, and power of the Word of God; but it is impossible [for him] to hold the entire person and height of the Word of God, since ^D the creator...

^A is man, while God the Word is uncreated. You propose the more incredible thing, my friend, if you say that man can have the natural, not accidental, dignity and authority and power of the Word, and truly hold the place of the whole divine Word, although his nature is different, and he does not differ in nature from the uncreated God the Word. But could not God the Word take the human nature into his own person? Is it then that man is able to receive divine things, but God is not able to receive human things

CHAPTER XXXVII.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

CAP. XL.

before the consubstantiation the Word was God and Son; and at this stage likewise, both God and Son and Word. For he became Christ, the God-Word and Son of the Father, not by the removal of the things that were his, but by the acquisition of those which he did not possess.

CAP. XLI.

The God-Word can be united to created nature by will, but he cannot by nature; for he did not create his own nature, nor can he transform it into another substance. Is it because his will is more powerful than his nature that he can achieve by will what he cannot by nature, or because it is less powerful? For if it is because it is more powerful, then he who by the more powerful part of himself—that is, by his will—is united to the created nature, will be more easily joined to the lesser, that is, to the nature. But if it is because it is less powerful, ^B it is evident again that he who has most easily accomplished this by the lesser part of himself would accomplish it much more effectively by the more powerful part. And thus, as for these things: God neither created his own nature nor does he transform it; so did he have, or not have, such a will? To have created himself is impossible to conceive; to transform himself is absurd. For where will the will, subsisting, produce a volition? And how will he who rejoices in all felicity have the will to change himself for the worse? For that is not better. Therefore, whatever his will can do, his will has the power to do all these things; and what his will has the power to do, his nature also has the power to do. For in God, who is entirely most simple and immutable, and in God who is most good, will and nature do not contend with one another. ^C Therefore, if he can be united to us by will, much more can he by nature. For our nature, indeed, is good and unblameable, and is from Him; but our will and our sins have separated us from Him. Having, therefore, this will—that is, to join his own nature to another nature—he will not be held by any impossibility; and therefore, we rightly declare his natural union with us to be from his benevolence, that is, from Him who is good by nature.

Chapter XLII.

If, God willing, his nature receives an addition, it can therefore, God willing, also receive a diminution; but if the latter is impossible, then the former is also impossible. But it was not nature, but the person of the Word that received the addition; ^D and this was not of the person, but of the properties of the person—so to speak—of the elements, or rather of the intelligible properties joined to him through the union of substance with another nature. He lost none of his eternal properties, because they were eternal; but there are certain other things which can be increased, but not diminished. For that which is most simple, such as a point, can be increased by addition, but it cannot be diminished, as being the lowest of the things that consist of parts, because it has no parts.

CHAPTER XLIII.

If Christ is at once God and man, it is evident

^A that Christ at once commands and is commanded. But if the distinction between commanding and being commanded does not exist in Christ, then the difference between God and man is also removed. For he is at once commanded and, in the same [state], is commanded according to the natural order until the completion of the humility pertaining to the dispensation; but is he the same in the same parts of himself? For by the nature of his flesh, he is even commanded by Pilate; but by the nature of the Word in him, Christ as the same is the Lord of all, and even of heavenly things; and later, regarding his humanity, he says: "All authority has been given to me in heaven and on earth."

Chapter XLIV.

CAP. XLV.

CHAPTER XLVI.

separated are inscribed, but are contained together in the ark. ^C If, however, we compare inhabitation to substantial union, just as one who speaks of his own soul says, "It went out and departed from me as one who binds up a rolled-up tabernacle," what will prevent the union being conceived according to person in Hezekiah, as the inhabitation of nature in nature? How, by reason of this inhabitation, is the Son and Word of God said simply to be man and flesh? For he who dwells within is not the Lord of the name of that in which he is.

CHAPTER XLVII.

If the omnipotent and impeccable Word by nature had flesh as a companion of his own existence, how shall this [flesh] be said to be impeccable itself? Or what kind of victory over evil is its, which had such a helper who cannot be overcome? To Him, and not to it, would all the praise belong. Do not you, who trust in your power and boast in the multitude of your riches, confess with us that a brother does not redeem, nor will man redeem? And that man is not powerful by his own strength, but the Lord shall make his adversary weak, the Holy Lord? Hear, you who say: "Let not the strong man boast in his strength." And know that to overcome sin by oneself without help belongs only to that impeccable nature, if we had it, it would have been evident long ago that we were gods. ^B But since we are of a failing nature, and hence easily plotted against by him who tempts us and drags us into the activity of sin, we have need of some power that dwells within, assisting the weakness of our nature, so that we might not be overpowered by the hostile power opposed to us, which, pricking us with the sting of death—that is, with sin—made us die and deprived us of immortality. And this was not something outside the substance, nor temporary; for the inventor of evil is immortal, and an invader of our hearts, while the weakness was proper to our nature. Therefore, justly and deservedly, to our nature was united the nature that is mighty in righteousness and saving, taking us into its one person, so that our enemy might not be able to insinuate himself into our nature (already enclosed within that person), ^C dwelling within it personally in some way—as he still does even now in those possessed—nor should he ever find our nature naked, with the person of our guardian dwelling within it, which is by nature impervious to the devil, to sin, and to death. By that supernatural philanthropy, therefore, ^D he made his own flesh impeccable; and to us, who are consubstantial with it, he granted impeccability—here, through the spiritual holiness of the Spirit, and in the future, through the perfect impeccability with him. We therefore glorify the Word of God, who thus found eternal redemption for us.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

And this, perhaps, those who reject the true union of the Word with the flesh according to person will bring against us... [if] the infinite [is] by nature, beyond [the] nature, according to

is impossible to be united according to person. ^A For if she is infinite in both, the person cannot contain the finite—that is, the flesh—entirely within itself; but if she is finite, she cannot contain within herself the whole of the infinite by nature—that is, the Word. We must therefore readily reply to this: first, we say that every person, being defined by its own proper definitions, is altogether finite, distinct from every person either of the same or of a different species; for if anything is not defined by its own proper boundaries, it is not distinguished from the boundaries of others. Therefore, the nature of the Word, infinite in itself, cannot be considered in a person, nor can that of the Father, nor that of the Spirit; but it would be something entirely infinite and impersonal, since a person, defined by its own proper definitions, cannot comprehend a nature that is infinite according to its own proper definitions. ^B Additionally, with God’s help, this question of the infinite must be resolved in another way. We say, therefore, that the infinite is spoken of in many ways. For that which is defined by position is called infinite; as is a circle made from a line, which, having no width, has a length that is not bounded, is invisible to all eyes, and is equally distant throughout its whole course, so that neither its beginning, nor its end, nor its middle can be discerned. Also, that which is always increased when turned into itself is called infinite, as is the multiplication of numbers; for when you have counted thousands, ^C there are still ten thousands to be measured out; and again, ten thousand times ten thousand, and ten thousands to be counted, and so on to infinity. We also call that infinite which is by nature always divisible, as is a point and unity; for we conceive these to be divided into two parts, and their half into the half of a half, and that also into its own half, and so one to infinity, although there is no other kind [of entity] to succeed the genus [of the object] that is required to receive the divided form by the intensity of the division. Just as when a line is divided indefinitely, the end of its division is the arrival at a point; and the end of the division of a number was the arrival at a unity—for there is no longer a number after the division. That is also called infinite ^D which, because of the continuity of its quantity, does not receive a local boundary, just as we call the production of solar rays infinite; for when no denser body stands in the way, they go forth from the furthest east to the furthest west, even if they are intercepted by a translucent body. So also the water of the sea is said to descend into the abysses to infinity. That is also called infinite which is continuous in duration and without end, as is the world to come and the life of the angels. Furthermore, that is called infinite which is only supposed by the mind to have or undergo any-thing without end, just as we speak of a line being produced or divided to infinity. Moreover, that is called infinite which does not have this property by its own nature, but only in relation to us, as is the height of the heavens. It is also called infinite that which, from the consideration of the mind, has no end, as is this: if every body is in a place, and a place is a body, then the place of a body is in a place, and the place of a place [is in a place], which consideration can be extended to infinity; it also seems to be infinite, which, as far as the class of nature...

is concerned, is not defined by measure, but becomes known only in certain actions. ^A For if this man happens to be able to run two stadia, or even ten, but no more, or if one can carry a hundred pounds only, or a thousand, or if another can plough or sail or write or perform some other such tasks—but if none of them can run forever, or carry an immeasurable load, or simply do all things, being able as the same person to wage war and strum the lyre and heal and do everything that happens in the world—if, by hypothesis, such a man were found, we would call him infinite in active power.

These things ^B being thus distinguished, let us ask those who reject the union of the infinite with the finite: how do you understand the infinity of the divine Word, if you do not grant that it can be united to the finite? For if they speak of [union] by position, or multiplication, or division, they will deservedly be seen to rave; but if they say it is by local extension of its own substance, then it is necessary that this divine infinite either be entirely outside this finite world, and have no relation to all things here, they being separated and in no way united to it; and it will be false that "In Him we live and move and are," and "From whom and in whom are all things," and "Him who fills all in all," and that "God may be all in all," and all such things that have been said. If these things have truly been said, even though God is infinite and the world is finite in respect to place, ^C they are needlessly suspicious of the union of the infinite with the finite, since God is all things, with God uniting and filling all things. If they say they understand God not being united by His own person according to duration without end, they are most easily confuted, since their own soul, while having an infinitely enduring perpetuity, inasmuch as it seems to them to be immortal, is nevertheless united to a body that is clearly finite, and [united] according to person.

But if, being pressed on all sides, they say that what is infinite in power must be said of the divine, it must be replied to them that one of the things they say must necessarily be rejected. For either that which is infinite in power and capable of every action could also—with nothing hindering its infinite nature—do all its own works (which is that of one who communicates Himself to another ^D and who, from the union of the two through mutual indwelling, demonstrates one person); or, [they must say] that it could not produce and manifest through a finite [nature] all the things proper to its own power, [which would mean that] if it were entirely with the finite, it would not truly be infinite in active power, being detected as in some way—namely, by the smallness of the other—hindered from bringing forth all its own acts. Just as David, naked and stripped of all armor other than his shepherd's gear, was able to contend with and defeat Goliath, yet when draped in a breastplate and helmet and greaves and shield and sword, and simply burdened with the armor of Saul, he was unable to fight and slay the enemy: either, therefore, the Word of God will not be infinite, or, if it is infinite, it cannot, through a finite nature...

^A always work all its own properties. Wherefore it is impossible from this to demonstrate that the union according to hypostasis is impossible with such a nature.

CHAPTER XLIX.

This composition which you speak of, they say, either produced a new nature—why therefore do you not agree with those who mix natures?—or a new person, and why do you reject us? or neither nature nor person, and then it was made in vain. But not necessarily, my friends, does a composition produce a new nature or a new person. For iron burned in ignited coals provides neither a new nature nor a new person; for the person of the iron and the person of the coals remain; but in the person of the iron, the nature of the fire, being impersonal of itself, is united to the nature of the iron, having become ^B co-hypostatic with it. What, then, did the composition do even in the case of Christ? Nothing other than that things previously separated from one another are now joined according to one person of one of the items joined: which is sufficient for enriching our nature with every divine nature.

CHAPTER L.

Either that union of the Word and flesh which you speak of is natural—and in what do you differ from those who say that the union in Christ and in man is entirely similar?—or it is personal, and why do you not agree with us who say it is similar to the union of one loving with one who is loved? Or it is neither natural nor personal, and then openly show us what it appears to you to be. But, O sophists, according to your words, it is neither natural nor personal; but according to a pious understanding, it may correctly be called both natural and personal at the same time. ^C For since these terms are equivocal, you alternately withdraw from one or the other what is piously understood. Now, that is called natural which is in something according to the properties of nature, such as the death of Lazarus, which was not, as his resurrection was, above his nature. That is also called natural which is simply the union of natures, or of a nature and not of accidents, as is the mixing of oxymel. For it is neither natural nor necessary for both to be joined in the mixture, just as it was not natural for Lazarus to die; this union also we call natural; for honey and vinegar are so disposed, even if they are never mixed into oxymel; but Lazarus, is he not a mortal animal, even if he were never to die? ^D Similarly, that is called a personal union which is of parts that refer to a person, or of persons; but we call the union in Christ natural, because in Him natures are united. But if we were to say it was brought about by reason of nature, things which are of the same nature—the Father, namely, and the Holy Spirit—would be united to the flesh; but also all men, if humanity were united to Christ by reason of nature, would be so many Christs, Pilate also and Herod and Annas and

proceeding from potency to act, the Word will be seen in His natural attributes through the incarnation, and the Father and the Holy Spirit will be judged imperfect. But what is more impious than this? We speak also of a personal union in Christ, though in the contrary sense to that in which we spoke of a natural union: for it is not a union of persons, but one according to the substance of the Word. Just as the generation and the fact of being the Word (autologon) and such things properly distinguish the Son from the Father and the Spirit, who are consubstantial with Him, so His incarnation—and nothing else—distinguishes Him from those consubstantial and incorporeal persons. And this is an acquired property, yet one that is always inseparable and manifested in the hypostasis of the Word. But taking another occasion for impiety, because they contend that one part cannot be equal to the whole, they argue that the union of the Word and flesh in Christ must be rejected; and they bring forward the following for their argument:

CAP. LI.

^A that it is ignorant of nothing even before its fall into the body, as they say; and likewise after its departure from it; whence they also know man to be worse than it; since they even say that it has become worse than itself through the imprisonment in the body, as they say. But when the body is perceived as dead after the parting of the soul, it is evident that man is *better*; since even the body itself is judged to be better than itself before its separation from the soul, as compared to its state after the departure of the soul. Therefore, it has been established that the result of components, viewed in themselves, is either better or worse in some respect; hence it is necessary for them also to say that their Christ is either worse or better in some respect than his components viewed in themselves, if indeed Christ is essentially one living being ^B composed of God and man, according to them. But if they say "better," they have conceded what is impious, imagining something to be more perfect than God, which they must also admit is supreme over the Father and the Spirit. For if that living being, which according to them consists of the Word of God and flesh, is better in some respect than the Word of God considered in himself, then logically this same thing is better than the Father and the Spirit who are not joined to flesh; since the Son is equal to the Father and the Spirit; and whatever is better than him in some respect, it is clear [is better] than the Father and the Holy Spirit as well. But if they say that this living being is *worse* than the Word of God viewed in himself, even so they act impiously; for they show that the Word of God has become worse than himself ^C according to the myth of the Greeks and Manichaeans concerning the soul. For you would not find the living being consisting of God and flesh to be worse than God alone, unless the Word of God himself first became worse than himself. We should say, then, in response to this, that in reality the results arising from parts are viewed as either better or worse than each of the components individually; but it is evident that this is not so in a simple sense, but [only holds true] in cases where the parts, being different by nature, form a whole through transformation, or fusion, or some tempering. But if the composition is not of this kind—that is, if it does not fuse or change the different components, ^D or if the natures cannot be mixed or transformed into one another—how then can the whole be judged worse or better than either of its parts? What we are saying will become clearer from an example. For if someone were to melt together a one-pound silver vessel and a one-pound lead vessel to make a new vessel from both, it is manifest that the resulting object would appear worse than the silver but better than the lead; for there is in these a certain affinity and similarity by which they are transmitted into one another. But if someone were to burn a one-pound gold vessel with a one-pound clay vessel, or by surrounding one with the other were to put them into the fire, since clay is not naturally able to be mixed with gold in a tempering, this result composed of clay and gold will not ever be better than gold according to its substantial quality; for behold, the gold remains pure and incorrupt without any change, even within the clay surrounding and united to it, and we shall say that it is in no way different from bare gold in its nature.

For the application of clay does not persuade a prudent mind that gold has been damaged in its nature, once it is known that its nature is immutable toward the worse. Nor, on the other hand, will anyone consider it better than bare gold because of the application of clay. For that which is once better will never appear better than itself upon the assumption of something worse; for this is even vain to say. But enough of this.

As for your opinion, which holds that the whole is seen to be either better or worse than its own parts, your examples demonstrate something other than what you say. For they assert absolutely that every composite is better than its constituent parts: they say that the house is better than the stones and wood, that the veil is better than the purple, scarlet, and fine linen, and that the human is better than soul and body. This must be conceded to you, and then it must be said that ^B this is indeed true in some cases, but you do not know how, nor do I know how you know it to be true. For the whole is then better than each of its constituent parts when, upon composition, some new ^C figure, quality, or genus accrues to them which was not in any of them, nor is, but appears over and above the kinds of the parts through composition. In this way, the house is superior to the nature of the stones and wood, because it has a figure and a disposition which neither wood nor stone has individually; yet it does not have another nature better than that. Similarly, the veil, through the texture and combination of these colors, is superior to each of those colors taken by themselves and outside the combination; for it is not by the account of color simply that it is better than all the individual colors. And even the human—if it be granted to you that he is better than the soul, since for the sake of establishing your dogmas you profess everything as it occurs—acquires, upon composition, certain natural properties newer than soul and body. If, therefore, when the Word and the flesh have been composed, it is truly possible to see some newer property of nature in Christ beyond the divine and human, should we then deservedly call the result according to Him, following you, better than its parts? But if nothing else is seen besides the actual parts, how can we not glorify what is equally to be honored in them, rather than the superiority of the whole relative to its parts?

CAP. LII.

But, as is our custom, let us refute some other things which might come to the minds of opponents, because it is the love of truth that urges us, and not merely the love of victory. And let us not omit to say this after those things: the whole composed of diverse parts is perhaps something other than its parts, both in that it is more concrete, more varied, and more perfect, and in that it has acquired some diversity from its own parts, by which it excels each simple part, just as we see in a medicine, in a house, in ignited iron, and in a human. For in the composition of cadmia and oil, the power is manifested in nourishing the interior parts of wounds, a power which neither of the parts had in its nature; the house

^A also differs in form and appearance from the stones and wood within it. For in addition to these, the definition of the man is introduced; it shows something more than the definition of the body and of the soul, such as mortality, which is not attributed to any of his parts taken separately; just as neither the capacity for laughter, nor for weeping, nor other such things, are proper to it. It is evident that the definition and rationale of the whole man must of necessity differ from those things that are specifically consubstantial with his parts—that is, the other souls and bodies taken separately. And by necessity, the number also [differs]; for that ^B which is called a "whole" is by all means something numerable. If, therefore, you speak of parts and a whole in Christ, as some among you have been seen to state, one would say: first, that the whole, composed of divinity and humanity as its parts, will be shown to us as something different from them; and second, that it could not, according to the rationale of the whole, be counted together with things consubstantial with its parts, nor would the Lord be similar in nature to the Father or to the Mother according to his whole; nor, indeed, could he be included in the number of the divine Trinity, in the sense of the whole being a numerable thing, without making it a quaternary; and if he is numbered with the Trinity, he will make it no longer consubstantial with himself; but even if he were numbered with the multitude of men, he would not have it as consubstantial with himself for the same reason.

But let them know, if they say these things with us, first that our Fathers used these terms—that is, "parts" and "whole"—concerning ^C our Lord Christ only to establish the fact of composition, and to reject every appearance of any union understood in another way; furthermore, [they used them] because in Christ, by reason of each of those things which are said to be in him, there is a true nature and grace, and they have come together into a natural union, such that both fulfill and cause to subsist the substances in Christ, just as parts naturally complete the whole. Furthermore, [they used them] so that no room be given to anyone to suspect that one of the things in Christ is less than the other, because the whole cannot remain if the parts are separated from one another. Just as they speak of composition, and the whole, and mixture, and the like, only in so far as ^D each name is harmless in its application to Christ, they do not allow one to argue from them about anything that might seem to imply otherwise; for when they say "concretion," they only mean that each of the united things subsists in the other; they do not admit that consequent confusion, or opposition of properties, or alteration, or the permutation of one by the other—and they do not admit these things in Christ, nor in the union of soul and body. For, knowing that no part unites itself, they do not think that the Word was united to the flesh by another; although they name the conjunction of the parts with a single word that does not befit the divine dispensation, they reject only that which is harmful in what is said, for the sake of the whole, applying themselves to the elucidation of the divine mystery, which is extremely difficult to know, in order to describe the image of the incomprehensible Word; lest our weak mind

while fancying about this matter things of its own, should frequently turn aside to things that are altogether absurd regarding the economy, and fashion for itself a cause of impiety. For in more common matters we often call something by some sort of translation, or analogy, or partial likeness; and not for this reason do we accept all the consequences that follow from these; for, because we say that the air, becoming milder from being gloomy, "laughs," we have not therefore learned that the element is "a laughing animal." Nevertheless, even if it were necessary that all the consequences should follow wherever any one of the names is used, yet in the case of Christ these do not necessarily follow; for since the composition of his human nature from the Word of God is acknowledged—if it were granted that ^B it truly consists of such parts—the whole that resides in him and the composite nature will altogether prevent such consequences from following. For the Divine cannot receive anything absurd; and it is acknowledged that in these very same things which are called "according to us," His condition is incomparably superior to ours. For if even "generation" is spoken of in His regard, the things that follow the generations according to us do not [follow in His case]; nor, therefore, is the consubstantiality of the persons, nor the perfect personality of the proper powers, nor the other attributes [of our generation] the same as ours, nor are the remaining things exceptional.

However, even though these things are admitted—as it is not indeed said that Christ is from a whole and parts—it must be considered, in order to deduce what is consequently similar to us, what follows. For, first of all, it is manifest that what is said to happen in the case of a whole consisting of parts, even if the parts are in species dissimilar to the whole, yet they constitute a genus, either proximate or more remote. And so, for the establishment of a common genus, they would not be altogether alien to one another, possessing a certain natural communion in some genus; but the union in our Lord is of things that are altogether dissimilar. For what is properly the genus of substances? And if there is a genus of substance, what will be the common genus of that divine substance and the human substance, which by some natural affinity might commingle them? How, therefore, would they subordinate the conjunction of dissimilar things to the conjunction of parts that are by accident similar? ^C Would they conclude that it is necessary that there follow from the dissimilar parts of Christ that which we see following from similar parts, that is, another whole? But if you are elsewhere already prepared to demonstrate from necessity that a natural conjunction according to person does not occur, we shall answer with the same words: If, however, you grant to us the union of God with some [other nature] hypothetically, and no longer introduce the consequences of the conjunction as necessary—either because it is not the same as that which you know to be made from diverse things, that is, divine and human parts—then you will already overturn that [argument]. For of those things whose natures are not the same in all respects, the conjunction will manifesty not be the same.

It must also be said: If every conjunction, as you have said, brings into the whole a genus other than the genera of the parts, it has already been laid down by us that one part of the whole that we are considering is that divine [part] which every

^A Word, the maker of every species. If, therefore, some other species of a certain whole were to be added to Him and to that which exists with Him as parts, then either it is necessary that this [whole] be proposed as the species-making [principle]—since it is a given, universal, and commonly agreed-upon matter—or [it must be] some other [species]. For it is manifest that everything which comes into being does not make itself while it does not yet exist, but it came into being by something else, if indeed it exists; and if it did not come into being, it does not exist at all. Now it certainly could not have come into being by anything else; for it is agreed by all of us that the [part] subjected as a part to this whole is alone the maker of substances and the natural maker of species. But if this whole has come into being in some way by Him, then the product would exist as coming into being from Him as from its own part. For in this way the cause would exist as a part contained within the whole, [caused] by that which it caused, which is impossible. Since, therefore, these things are impossible, it is manifest that it is not properly said that [the whole is something else]; but that which brought forth the so-called completeness of Christ is either the part itself or is composed together with another—that is, the Word with the flesh—both from His substance and in His person, together with the part that is with Him, that is, the fleshly substance, constituting this completeness, manifesting nothing more or less than Himself and that which is with Him in it. For the species-making power has effectively graced itself, so to speak, not to another but to the part that has been united with it, into a species; and being made man through this, and making this divine of itself by itself, it does not have a species [that is] better than itself and that [part]. How, then, will there be some other whole appearing in Christ according to substance, besides both [parts]? ^B It has therefore become clear from this that, because this divine species-making Word, the composed part, is admitted, the whole which is named "composite" according to a different way of thinking will be the same in nature and in number, even if the Word has been said by the Fathers to be a part within it; and it will be attributed to the same Christ, of whom both the part and the whole are said, as God is understood to be, in both ways, equally perfect; even if sometimes, because of the signification regarding each of the things in the composite, the whole [is said to be] the combination of both, while the part [is said to be] only one of its components.

You wrongly, therefore, hold against us that the whole is of a different genus from the parts because of the composition, and you introduce a new number. For even if this whole is enumerably spoken of as the whole of the entire composition, as being called a whole by some, it does not add to the number of the consubstantial and existing parts. For just as, when a manifold of names happens to be applied to one and the same thing according to different points of view—and the appellations of one and the same thing are more numerous; for example, Simon, Peter, Cephas, Bar-Jona, ^C apostle, disciple of the Lord, and teacher of the holy Church of God—it is not for this reason to be thought that the substances and persons of that subject and one man so named are multiplied in number, nor that he is different from himself in number according to nature and person; so therefore, just as the signification of the names of the disciple and teacher differs in the different subjects taken together, so likewise is it with his. Besides these things, we say, and so that the part...

composed, that is, the divine Word; since it is granted that he is most supreme in perfection, those who would wish that a whole greater or more perfect than himself should be composed of him could never establish this, if he is indeed truly testified to be absolutely perfect, according to the principle of his own nature. But he will not cause the whole which is proper to him to be less than himself on account of the principle of all composition; for, in their case, the proper wholes are not shown to be in any way less than their parts. If, then, the whole of the Word is neither greater than he is, due to the nature of this part, nor is it right for it to be less, due to the principle of composition simply, then indeed the whole made whole will have itself as its own part, and by necessity it will be equal to its own part and be called his own whole. ^A How then could it be argued that there is a difference of a whole from the parts in the mystery of our Lord Christ? And furthermore, we say that if every simple thing must be in the composite, and every part must be in its own proper whole; and everything that is generated exists in this part, that is, in the divine Word; how will there be something else, composite and a whole, more universal than he is, so that the Word himself, who contains all things, would be contained by this? For he himself is the fullness that fills all things in all. ^B

BOOK II.

"Persona," they say, "signifies something substantial, as in: *Remember me, O Lord, in the persona* [i.e., favor/remembrance], and: *The figure of his substance* [Gk. *hypostasis*]; ^C but at other times it signifies something not substantial, as in: *In this persona of my boasting*; and at other times it signifies a gathering of like-minded men, as in: *Men went out from the persona of the foreigners*." If, therefore, they say "person" in this last sense, that is, to signify the agreement and concord of the natures, they clearly concede that we speak of the persons of the two natures according to the first two senses. But if they mean the second sense, wishing to show that what consists of two natures is something not substantial, they are not worthy of an answer. But if they mean the first, let them say to whom it is consubstantial: either to David, of whom he said: *Remember me, persona*; or to the Father, of whom it is said: *The figure of his substance*? But if to the Father, how has it consisted of two natures, ^D since the Father’s *hypostasis* is simple? For it is necessary that there be the same principle of substance, and also the same will, when substances...

are called *hypostases*; otherwise, let them declare what "consubstantial" means. But if it is not of the Father, but of David, how—when they say it consists of two natures—do they not wish it to consist of soul and body? For such was the nature of David. If, however, it is neither this nor that, the Son whom you introduce is of a different kind from all others, and is consubstantial neither with us nor with the holy Trinity. But if you say he is consubstantial in part with both, know that things which are consubstantial do not permit of being consubstantial in part; for by that reasoning they are consubstantial in every respect. Indeed, that which is consubstantial in part with this one and that one cannot be the Son of either; for show me something that, being consubstantial in part with different things, becomes the Son of this one and that one.

^B Your former argument having now been crushed, it would be superfluous for us to respond to what follows. For if truly, as has been shown, the conjunction was of natures and according to *person*, not a union of *persons*, in Christ our Lord, just as you yourselves now suppose concerning the soul and body of David, it is manifest that it is necessary for the composite *person* to be one, and not two. But so that we might not appear to be avoiding your syllogisms as if they were stronger in the second argument, with God’s help we shall also duly respond to all these for you. For those who sincerely inquire after the truth do not use for its investigation instruments that lead into error, as you do. Since, indeed, the indiscriminate use of names that offer no definitions always produces the greatest error in the investigation of things, behold, you have fallen into this from the very beginning, even though you seemed to want to avoid it—I mean, in inquiring about substance; and you seemed to define it in part, but you did not completely explain the signification of the name *person* according to each of the things of which it is spoken. We must, therefore—with the preposition changed or properly accepted—first determine in how many ways and in what diverse senses the name *person* is spoken of, and diligently distinguish the sense appropriate to the argument, so that we may not fall into one signification instead of another; which having done, we shall subsequently refute your absurdities.

^{C D} We say, therefore, that *hypostasis* is spoken of by some, according to the ancient language of the Greeks, as the dregs and must of wine and similar liquids, because by subsiding it indicates its place beneath the liquid floating above, as we say "subsiding woods." *Hypostasis* is also spoken of as the motion or transmutation of something that previously existed, as if it were a disposition outside of or without stability—the preposition in the name having once been changed, or transposed, just as those in the wrestling school who pushed one another called it. *Hypostasis* is also called the acquisition of riches or earnings made by someone from certain funds, as if it were something saved and established, so that we say this man does not "have" or "possess" much *hypostasis*. It is also called *hypostasis*, the fortitude which does not easily falter, but

is patient towards those things which befall it, as it is said in Holy Scripture: "And now what is my patience? Is it not the Lord? And is my *hypostasis* not with Thee?" ^A *Hypostasis* is also said of the beginning of any narrative, or simply of a discourse, taken separately and not in its entirety, as is said: "in this *hypostasis* of boasting." Furthermore, *hypostasis* is called faith, as it were a knowledge and understanding of some comprehension, as it is written: "Now faith is the *hypostasis* of things hoped for." *Hypostasis* is also used for a promise, as a hope given and established by someone to another, as it is written: "Lest by any means if the Macedonians come with me and find you unprepared, we should be ashamed, that we do not say, in this *hypostasis*"—and what was it, he says, that was promised in their blessing? *Hypostasis* is also called the base supporting someone's standing, as it is said: "I am stuck in the depth of the abyss, and there is no *hypostasis*." *Hypostasis* is also called opposition, as it is said in Deuteronomy by Moses concerning the people: "How shall I be able to bear your *hypostasis* and contradiction?" ^B *Hypostasis* is also called settlement; as that which is said in Ezekiel concerning the temple: "And you shall describe the house and its preparation, and its entrances and its exits, and its *hypostasis*." *Hypostasis* is also termed the gathering of certain persons—whether consubstantial or heterousian—coming together with one another; as that which is said: "Men went out from the *hypostasis* of the Philistines"—moreover, the very word which you now passed over, whether knowingly or in ignorance, pertains to almost the same idea. *Hypostasis* is also spoken of when, according to the same principle, a gathering of several different individual natures—together with the properties surrounding them, though not of persons—becomes by union the concrete existence of some one single atom. It is also said of different natures not coming together, but of only many particular properties, which from all things constitute a universal property in some one subject, or in one single nature—the *hypostasis* acknowledged by all. Whether therefore in a simple, or a composite, or an individual, or a common nature, such as the divine, or in one nature only, or in many united, provided that they stand in existence, this state of a common property or this composition of partial properties, considered as in some subject, is called *hypostasis*. ^C But *hypostasis* is most properly and appropriately called that which, in addition to the gathering [of properties], shows the subject to be an atom—individual, separate from all others both of the same kind and of different kinds according to its individual mark of recognition—being a kind of "this-something" standing for itself and a determination of indeterminate substances into the numerical count per person of each one; for which reason the Fathers also conceive and name this "person." *Hypostasis* is also called essence and nature, ^D designated by many names because it receives many things, and not because it is thought to be and to exist in accidents themselves which do not exist, but because it subsists in itself, as it is written: "Remember what my *hypostasis* is." For in what way is it said of the character of the Father

's *hypostasis*, which you also brought forward, requires a greater exposition and not a digressive inquiry at this time; however, it contributes nothing to you for the proposition at hand.

^A Therefore, these matters concerning *hypostasis* having been rightly determined by us, if indeed you say two *hypostases* instead of essences, we accept this completely; but we add to these that there is also one person of Christ emerging from them, so that we may avoid the homonymy of persons—signifying by this that we have accepted these in place of natures; and yet, the person is already counted by us to you as *hypostasis*. For the *hypostasis* signifies, along with both person and nature, the underlying subject for each of the different names. But we say this with God. As for you, it is necessary, since you know the same thing (as you often say, for you declare both nature and *hypostasis*, since alongside the two natures you also say there are two ^B *hypostases* of the Lord), that you either also introduce one or two persons; or, remaining silent, acknowledge that there are four natures but no *hypostasis*—that is, no person—in Christ. If you speak of two natures and are not satisfied, but also add the two *hypostases* of the Lord, then you must speak of four persons in the Lord, through the two natures and two *hypostases*, though obviously no essence of them; but if not for the sake of an argument regarding essence, then the name of *hypostases* is spoken by you only for the sake of the person. For regarding the other significations, I do not believe that a rational man searching for such things wanders so far—what necessity do you create for us by demanding to whom we say this belongs, the God and Father, or David, to be of the same essence? For first, *hypostases* are not known from the identity of essences; nor is the same account of *hypostasis* applicable as if it had the nature of things of the same essence; on the contrary, therefore, if it does not have some things similar to itself in essence. For it is most proper to *hypostasis* to distinguish entities that are similar according to nature, separately from one another, and to indicate them individually.

^C Furthermore, we say that if by chance one man or one horse should exist in the world alone, and there were no one else of the same essence, such as Adam, the first man, his *hypostasis* could still be distinguished from entities of another essence as a *hypostasis*. For because there is not something of the same essence from which it might be distinguished in *hypostasis*, it is not therefore necessary that the discourse concerning his *hypostasis* should be invalid, unless there were other things of the same essence for him. For reason holds the opposite: that things of the same essence which do not have *hypostasis* are not distinguished, not, as you collect, that those which do not have some identity of essence are not distinguished in *hypostases*. For indeed, the *hypostases* of entities of another essence—nay, even their natures—are distinguished; but for entities of the same essence, there is no need ^D for them to be distinguished from similar things, neither by nature nor by *hypostasis*. Therefore, the heaven is one, the earth is one, and the ether is one; and one should not say that these have no *hypostasis* just because there are no other things of the same essence as them. Similarly,

^A regarding the world as a whole, it is one; and the fact that there are no other worlds of the same essence as this one does not mean its structure is without *hypostasis*. What, then, persuades you regarding the *hypostasis* of Christ—unless there be some other *hypostasis* in every respect of the same essence as this one, and which neither exceeds nor falls short by any natural principle of those things within it—that one should not accept the *hypostasis* of this life-giving, composite, and most unique being? Moreover, no one seeking a certain likeness of some things to others in one respect would compare, by a different principle, the relation of one thing to another, but rather by that very principle by which the likeness was being sought. Therefore, you ought not to say or ask, "To what is this *hypostasis* of the same essence?"—as if you knew of one *hypostasis* as a person and another as an essence; rather, you should ask, "To whom is Christ of the same essence by essence?" or "To whom is he of the same *hypostasis* [consubstantial/co-subsistent]?" when you were seeking the likeness of Christ—not according to essence, but according to *hypostasis*—to the Father and to David.

And we would have answered you rightly, had you asked about this, that Christ is of the same essence both with the Father and with David, and indeed according to ^B both of his natures. But the Word was not *co-subsistent* with the Father before the flesh, nor with David before the divine incarnation from the seed of David; therefore, neither after the holy incarnation will the *hypostasis* of the Word be rightly said to be similar to the *hypostasis* of God the Father or of the man David. It has been said by you wrongly, then, that the *hypostases* which are of the same essence must have the same principle of essence and the same meaning. For you ought to have said "essences of the same essence." But if, since the *hypostasis* of the Lord is not similar, being composite, to the simple *hypostasis* of the Father or to the *hypostasis* of David, which is composed of inferior natures, you necessarily say that it follows that it is of a different essence, according to the essences of the *hypostases* that are not similar to it, just as your conclusion wishes to demonstrate—then it will necessarily follow, since the *hypostasis* of Paul is not similar to Peter regarding the principle of *hypostasis*, that they are also of different essences. Then again, according to you, since they are of the same essence, they must have one *hypostasis* for both; and the person of Peter must be the same as the person of Paul, and, in a word, the person ^C of all humanity—since it is all of the same essence—must be one; and even for the divine nature, since the holy Trinity is the same essence, it must be said that the person is one and not three: the absurdity of which not only we, but even the stones, so to speak, will cry out, reproaching you.

But as for the fact that the *hypostasis* of our Lord Jesus Christ, from the natures of which it consists, is of the same essence with the Father according to the one, and of the same essence with David according to the other, how will you prevent us from saying this, by objecting that things of the same essence are not accustomed to be of the same essence in part? For to those who say that his nature—that is, his essence—is one, you would have rightly said this: that [it is] in part of the one ^D essence, as they would say, [which is] called by them "composite" of the same-essence; but for those who say two

^A natures in the one subsistences of Christ, how do you reasonably object to this? Behold, for one subsistence, being a garment woven of wool and flax, in accordance with the reason of either of the natures in it, is of the same essence as the wool which is from animals, and as the linen which is from plants. We will ask you, however, this as well: Is the soul of Abel the just, after it has put off the flesh, truly said to be of the same essence as the soul of Enoch the just who has not yet put off the flesh, or of some other person still living in the flesh? And is the flesh of the just man living in the flesh of the same essence as the flesh of any of the saints who have fallen asleep, or not? If no one contradicts this, it is evident that in part, from its own parts, the subsistence of Enoch, or of any other still living in the flesh, is similar in essence to the whole subsistence of the soul of Abel, and to the whole subsistence of the flesh of this saint who has fallen asleep. And in vain is this denied to you; for if the essence exists absolutely in part, they are not called "same-essence," nor if, perhaps, a subsistence is composed of several natures or essences. For that in accordance with which their similarity is considered, whether it be something perfect and universal in both—that is, the essence—does not at all affect the notion of the being of the same essence. And these things, therefore, are regarding that argument. But as to your final absurdity, in which you think that nothing from the part of the subsistence of Christ is similar in essence to *both*, we shall very easily demonstrate to you that he can be the son of both. For one man is the son of his mother and father, and now certainly ^B of Abraham the father—of those who adhere to the footsteps of his faith—and of the Spirit who generates the spirit, in part of his own subsistence; and in part of the one subsistence in which all these things are present, he is similar in essence to all of these. It would therefore have been superfluous for us to have given an answer now to your caviling about this. For it has been shown in the following points how, according to the different ways of generations, many sonships and fatherhoods are conferred upon the same subjects. Nevertheless, your headlong argumentation against these things has anticipated the proper order.

CHAPTER II.

^A

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

since an aquatic animal is spoken of, then this animal would be a part of the water.

CAP. V.

^A If it is from a part of the same essence as the Father, and from a part of the same essence as David, tell us what this subsistentia is, according to you, which indicates these parts through which the essence is similar to the Father and to David—is it God and man, or something else? But if it is something else, say what this is. If it is God and man, then man will not have his own proper subsistentia according to David, to whom the essence is similar; just as God the Word has his own proper subsistentia according to the Father, to whom his essence is similar. For an insubsistent entity is never said to be of the same essence as a subsistent one. If, therefore, there is one subsistentia of God the Word, and that is perfect and of similar essence to the Father, then the man who is from us is either insubsistent and spoken of only in the mere word, or he is subsistent, and thus has a perfect subsistentia just as he is man. But if he is insubsistent, it is superfluous to say that he is of similar essence to David; for nothing insubsistent can be of similar essence to a subsistent thing. If, however, he is subsistent, he will rightly be said to be of similar essence to David; for a subsistentia is called of similar essence to a subsistentia. And your sophism will vanish, by which, not wishing to speak of two subsistentiae, you speak of the two natures of God the Word and of the man who arises from us.

^B But, O adversaries, if it is once granted that this one subsistentia is, according to us, the natures of which God and man consist, how will the man belonging to it have his own proper subsistentia, or the God belonging to it have his? For this man is not given to us who is not also God, nor is he spoken of anywhere in such a way that the subsistentia of man and of God should be sought as separate. For behold, you yourselves have said that we speak of man and God as if they were parts of this subsistentia. Yet a part is nothing that is properly subsistent; how, therefore, do you think to argue against us from our own propositions? For, saying that we assert that divinity and humanity are parts of this subsistentia, how do you consequently add that it is necessary for the part—that is, the humanity—to have its own proper subsistentia? For a part is considered in no way in its own subsistentia, but in that of the whole; so that even if these things to you were conceded, and even if it were necessary that some subsistentia be called similar in essence to David and also similar in essence to the subsistent Father, how is it to be said from this that there are multiple subsistentiae in Christ? For behold, in one and the same whole, there is this subsistentia of Christ, mediating between the divine and the human nature, taking the identity of essence from both sides. And not only this, but it is also possible to see the diversity of essence with respect to either of its species, according to each of the reasons that is in it, and the diversity of that essence, which, in relation to all things that pertain to it, can be seen in one and the same total reason of the one subsistentia. For it is not necessary, as you wish, to say according to

^A every essential differentiation of any subsistentia from another, and to bring another subsistentia for each of the things that differ by their very essences. For it is possible for one and the same natural compound to possess in many things an essential similarity and dissimilarity, but to have a subsistential dissimilarity in unity from all things. For if, according to you, it is absolutely necessary to apply a subsistentia—one to David to show the diversity from him of the essence of the Word, and one to the Father to declare its essential difference from the essence of man, and if it is not possible in one and the same subsistentia to show the difference and similarity of the natures that are in it in relation to another—then it is time for you to say that there are ten thousand subsistentiae for every individual human being, so that we might establish in order the difference, for example, of the essence of Solomon from this horse that is of a different essence from him, and this eagle, and this gnat, and this elephant, and the remaining essences. And I believe it is a necessary consequence, in order to show the similarity of his ^B essence to each individual man of those who have the same essence as him, to demand a number of subsistentiae equal to the number of essences, so that Solomon might be manifested; and that there must necessarily be as many subsistentiae as there are essences that happen to be similar and dissimilar to his essence. Thus, by the juxtaposition of his every subsistentia to every subsistentia of him that is similar and dissimilar, one might judge every individual to be both of the same and of a different essence, and that he is not defined by one and the same subsistentia from different essences and persons.

But how long will you hinder us with such excessively admitted ^C premises? Do you truly know in this way the conjunctions of things that differ, and for which one thing there is need of several subsistentiae in number, so that it may differ from several? And who will tolerate your saying this? For it will be demonstrated from this, how the wood that is by measure equal to some one thing or several, and another that is less or greater than each of the others by reason of inferiority, superiority, and equality, would absolutely require analogous subsistentiae; so that you would have to compare one to such an inferiority, one to such another, and thousands to thousands; and again one to this superiority, and one to such another, and one to this different superiority, and in a word, to every one of the things that differ and are equal, a proper subsistentia pertains if it is compared; so that ^D finally the measures are always compared as different, and it is impossible for one thing to be compared with several. Similarly, the dusky color is different from white, black, yellow, red, blue, and green, and from a thousand others; and when it is similar to another dusky color, it will necessarily be required to show two, or a thousand, dusky colors in number, so that one may be compared with white, and one with black; but for one veil of another dusky color, woven from linen and wool, there is need of two subsistentiae to compare the similarity of the wool with the wool, and the linen with the linen; and two houses are necessary to know the essential similarity of the woods and stones of which they consist, and in a word, all such things are the same. But if it is unpardonable even for youths to say these things, one must hear correctly what is said piously, that since there is one and the same subsistentia of our Lord Jesus Christ in that [he is] God the Word perfec

perfect, and the one from us in respect to us, he is known as man perfect according to nature, there being two of his essences. Therefore, a comparison of this one made with the subsistentia of David, not according to subsistentia but according to essence, shows it to be different and similar, just as it is with either of the two natures. But according to the reason of the subsistentia, it is evident that the comparison proves it to be always and by common consent unlike the Father and David; just as every subsistentia distinguishes itself in its unity from all in all. Therefore, the subsistentia of the natures of Christ demonstrates him to be in part unlike in essence, and in essence similar to these; but it makes him different in subsistentia throughout the whole of his reason from all beings. For the same and one person of his, being subsistent, can proclaim him similar in essence according to one or the other reason to two subsistent persons, and unlike in essence. For there is no subsistentia of a subsistentia, but it is called essential to those to whom the essence is similar or dissimilar; nor does the unity of the subsistentia hinder us from showing two natures; nor does the duality of natures stand in the way of our saying one subsistentia; nor is it found to be insubsistent, which in one subsistentia is similar in essence to those who differ from it, but not necessarily existing doubly, because of the similarity to two in essence, if it is not individually similar in essence, or rather, if it is dissimilar in essence of one nature only, or when there are more natures in the person, there is need of an equal number of subsistentiae.

CHAPTER VI.

We ask again, judge what we have said; tell us what is meant by you through each nature of him whom you call God and man: to be man and God the Word, or man in general; the holy Triad, or man in general; God the Word, or some particular man, the holy Triad; but because you do not wish to signify the Triad through man, nor indeed have you clearly declared it through some particular man by saying one from the holy Triad was crucified and suffered, it remains therefore that you say whether you wish to signify God the Word, or man taken in general, or some particular man through one nature and not every man. Tell us, therefore, in what a particular man differs from all man? Is it not evidently in subsistentia and person alone? How then do you not say two persons and subsistentiae, when you say two natures by designating God the Word one particular man? But if you wish to speak of man in general, either you fashion him by thought, whom you have stripped by reason of the essence taken in individuals, and establish him by imagination, when you say that God was made man without the essence underlying him: or you gather all those particulars into a particular existence, when you teach that one of the holy Triad was incarnate in all. Truly, if the former, how do you not say that it has come to pass by mere ima-

- ^A gination and not by essential existence? But if the latter, how will God the Word not have been incarnate in the impious, in sinners, and in those who have already died or are yet to be born? This is impious, and worthy of your wisdom.

If, however, you wish to hypothesize the "universal man" in another way, according to those who introduce the so-called "forms," even in that case the incarnation will have no place. For, to pass over other things, it cannot rightly be said that the body born of Mary is a part of that; and how will you not be most evidently shown to be fighting against the Scripture, which teaches that the Lord’s own man is one of us? For it says, "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham"; and it is evident that the Lord has sprung from Judah; and, "The man of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ"; and, ^B "Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested to you by God, with deeds of power, wonders, and signs that God did through him in your midst, as you yourselves know."

"God, therefore, having overlooked the times of ignorance, now commands all people everywhere to repent; because he has fixed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed, providing assurance to all by raising him from the dead"; and, "As by one man came death, so also by a man has come the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive"; and, "There is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus"; and, "And Jesus increased in age and wisdom and in favor with God and men"; and, "The child grew and became strong, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon him"; and, "The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet from among your brothers, like me"; and, "You are a priest forever, according to the order of Melchizedek."

Can you then say that all these things, and those that are like them, being numberless, have been spoken by Holy Scripture about every man of the particulars? And how is it possible to say that all men are from the seed of Abraham? And not of all, but of the tribe of Judah; and not of all of that, but from the house of David; and not of all of that, but of Mary the Virgin? Perhaps, then, you would say that Caiaphas was also born of Mary the Virgin? For he also is one of the men taken individually. ^C Would you say that Mary is a man, or not a man? But if she is not a man, tell us in what essence she exists; but if you say she is a man, how did she give birth to the "universal man," having many generations of men before her, and many also after her? Or how could that which is universal give birth to something from among those that are in the universal? But you cannot name the entire nature "man," nor "woman," because "man" is common to both of them, while "male" and "female" have been established as the specific differences in the common nature.

How, then, is this other point not clear, that just as one of the ^D

all and the beginning of the mortal constitution was Adam, through whom we all have been made alike mortal by nature, so also Christ according to the flesh is one of all, and the author of the transition to immortality, through whom we all, after his likeness, arrive at the possession of immortal life? And that he is the one mediator of men and God? For how could all be mediators for themselves? Or how could all progress among themselves in grace and wisdom? For many die as youths, not progressing to full maturity; and others again are very many, filled with madness and impiety, and not with wisdom and the grace of God upon them. But neither, of course, are all prophets according to Moses, nor priests according to Melchizedek; since it would be necessary for you to call the priesthood of those sacrificing to idols and the oracles of the Greeks, Mosaic prophecies and Christian priesthoods, which is impious. But why do I bring forward my own discourse regarding these things? For this does not seem so to all of them. For one of the proponents of this dogma, having been asked by a man not unskilled in logic what those are which they call natures, whether they are total or partial, replied that they could be both, yet according to one reason and another. For, he says, by having in themselves the account of the common essence, they could be called common; since the account of man in general is a rational mortal animal, and the one from us evidently had this. And we would say the same, he says, regarding the God Word. But by the fact that the entire holy Trinity did not become incarnate, nor did it become so to all beings subject to human nature, they would be particular and not common. And hearing from the questioner what particular natures or a subsistent could be, he called this a problem of Nestorius, and it would have sufficed for their apologia to have overthrown their own dogma. ^C There is no need for more propositions, nor distinctions, nor arguments, nor harangues. For let it be granted to you that the two natures you speak of are particular; even if we say nothing of the sort regarding the divine nature. But we know it to be similarly common, and to exist in the particular subsistence of the Word, having become incarnate in a particular way; for by properly speaking, having indivisibility, as being without parts, it preserves its community inviolate, even while being distinct. Furthermore, what has been gathered and attempted by you with such great labors is this: that subsistences are nothing other than particular natures. And it behooves you, saying that there are two natures, and that these are particular, to see—either as to one of them alone, namely the human, or as to both—that there are two subsistences; for it is acknowledged that the subsistence of the divine nature pre-existed. But, O wise men, you are greatly deceived in this way, not first considering the account of the matter being investigated, but deviating toward certain consequences, or toward a reason that does not tend to the question without reason. For it is not the case that, because a human being endowed with a soul is not without the respiration of air, we must therefore imagine the inhaled air to be the soul; nor because it happens to those breathed...

upon ^A to be heavier, ^A must one reasonably believe that death is the weight of a load. But it is necessary to consider the whole matter of which the argument treats, so that the line of reasoning regarding these things may be observed. For even if something is an essence and has some accidental property in addition to it, it must not be thought to be an accident; and even if something is an accident and has an essence as if placed alongside it, those things must be called not essence primarily and properly, but accident, and the essence rendered as if by accident. But since you have not surrendered yourselves to us for the learning of such things, neither will we rush into such instruction for you. Of these things, then, enough.

Other matters, being very evident, will expose the belief that you hold as being for the greatest part absurd. For if the subsistences are nothing else ^B but particular essences, ^B by saying that there are three subsistences of the Holy Trinity, you clearly say that there are also three essences; and behold, you have slipped into tritheism along with your blasphemy concerning the dispensation. Furthermore, your absurdity is made manifest in another way. For if the particular essence of Matthew, for instance, does not differ from the particular essence of Mark (for each admits of the same rationale and definition), then the subsistence—that is, the person—of Matthew will not differ from the subsistence, or person, of Mark; but each subsistence will admit of the same definition and rationale—or, description. And in these, not only these two, but every human being ^C will be known by the same ^C properties and through the subsistences that pertain to them; if indeed the particular essence of the individuals is the same as the subsistence. Furthermore, O sirs, be ashamed to remember your own words; for it was said by you a moment ago that a subsistence does not consist of essential properties. If therefore it is the same as the particular essence, then clearly the particular essence also does not consist of essential properties; but, as you yourselves said in that context, from snub-nosedness and whiteness and such things, the particular existence—or essence—will be subsisting. Thus, the essence will be from things not essential, and existence from things that do not exist. But if the foolishness of these things is most evident even to youths, then having spent in vain such a rhapsody of syllogisms, you have gained nothing for yourselves.

CAP. VII.

If, since the human element subsisted in God the Word, ^D the human being ^D does not have a subsistence of its own, how is it that, if he is in Him, the human being has a nature of its own? And if the human being has a nature of its own, how will he not also have a subsistence? Or, let him exist somewhere outside of God the Word; and then, having subsisted later in Him, how is it that the nature of the man who comes from us precedes his own proper subsistence? Being accustomed to reveal to us, in the case of natures—whether similar or dissimilar, distinguishing and uniting—not by reason, but by number of nature (that is, as if each numerable nature were distinguished from another similar or dissimilar one), the conjunction of dissimilar things and the distinction of similar things among entities, a subsistence is by nature a determination, being properly a separation of one thing from another; and even if

these entities happen to be dissimilar, they are distinguished from one another in their natures, not by definition only, but by their very existence. For subsistences, preserved according to that by which they are distinguished, cannot be unified in that same respect. If, therefore, there were a particular subsistence for a man, how is the man in the Word of God through union, if he in reality possesses that which separates him from Him? For just as a man is separated from all other men existing outside him—that is, by his subsistence—yet natures can indeed be united to each other without confusion in a certain subsistence, without destroying their proper definitions by one another. For this is not the definition of a nature—to exist distinctly and separately from every nature, as subsistences do. How, then, would the human nature not be consistently united to the nature of the Word of God, while remaining such a nature, and showing what it is even in the union? ^A For it cannot be that one is united to another as subsistence to subsistence, while both subsistences (or separations) are preserved—this being the very thing that signifies the distinction from others through the most particular property in individuals. For if we mean that which is distinct, rather than that which is taken selectively and united to something, we cannot speak thus; for one or the other will necessarily be destroyed: either they will not be united, or they will not be distinguished one from the other. Nor is it possible to speak of this subsistence in that one, if we establish a union while the properties distinguishing them from each other are preserved. How, then, shall we say that a human subsistence has come together in the subsistence of the Word? For if it ever had, it would have come together in its totality, and not by partiality or by juxtaposition, as stones in a house or youths in a dance ^B, and it would not have remained separated such that it would still be a subsistence thereafter. Only in bodies is this partial union of subsistence seen as mere, and not strictly existing; not according to the totality of the subsistence, but according to the juxtaposition of surfaces, or of the finest particles, or a mingling of parts, or by bringing the atoms together locally at their extremities; for it is in this way that stone is united to stone, oil to water, and thread to thread. And this is all concerning this argument.

The question of how a nature could exist before its proper subsistence was, as we told you, ^C superfluous to ask of us. For we did not say to you that the particular human nature of the Lord pre-existed its subsistence, but on the contrary, that it simultaneously came into being and subsisted. But we do not recognize it in some particular subsistence of human nature alone—that is, in a mere man—but in the pre-existing subsistence of the Word; in which, uniting the proper and particular characteristics of human nature, and in the concurrence of both natures, showing Himself as the one from the holy Trinity—who is in reality one subsistence only, and that not human; for He has divine nature and properties, nor does He enjoy divine properties alone, for He has added ^D to the collection of divine characteristics the assumption

of the more recent nature. ^A This must be demonstrated clearly also in the case of white-hot iron: for the mass of iron pre-existing according to its own subsistence, then being introduced into the furnace, the nature of fire is born in it, which neither previously existed nor subsisted separately, but [subsisted] in it; for it was produced from the furnace, but outside of it, in its true form, it possesses the subsistence of fire, and the fire in the furnace is not diminished.

CHAPTER VIII.

If the man who is from us has in any way subsisted in God, how is it not said, nor is it even the case, that the subsistence of the man from us is in the subsistence of God the Word? And if the subsistence of the man from us is not said to be, and is not, in God the Word, how has it not perished when it was placed under God, or did it not subsist at all from the beginning? For does everyone who might say that something exists and subsists straightaway also say that it exists individually? Therefore, since we say that a hand and a foot and a nail and a liver exist and subsist in a man, shall we straightaway judge that these exist ^B individually, and that each of these has a distinct subsistence? And we say that there is a mind in the soul, and that color subsists in the body; shall we therefore also look for their subsistences? And perhaps you will explain to us how "being in something" is understood here; but to say such things, and immediately to contradict such things, testifies to much foolishness and sophistry.

CAP. IX.

If you say that the man from us subsists in God the Word, how do you not, by the very fact of his subsisting, show that the one who subsists has a subsistence? That the man has subsisted in God the Word, we cry out more than you; but, as it appears, you do not grasp that in which you differ from us, and you now object to something else. For we do not admit that the man, having been united, subsists individually, as you wish, lest, by defining that both of the elements ^C that have come together are preserved as keeping their own proper subsistence, we overturn the union from the foundations. For if you say that each of the things in Christ subsists individually, do you say that some union is possible between them? Or do you say they were united in the same way in which David was united to his enemy Goliath through the conflict of battle and the force of that encounter? Or in the way that Joseph in Egypt was united to Benjamin? Or in the way that the artist’s energy is in his cithara? Or do you maintain that the one who subsists in some such way [is united] in all respects? But we consider the Word and the flesh together in a common and one subsistence; but you, even if not by our own principles, yet by your own, how are you not perplexed when you yourselves say that the man is in the Word? For if it is said that something is in someone, the union of both is signified; ^D but if it is said that the subsistence of each of the subjects exists individually, the distinction between them is clearly admitted; yet to say or to think these same things at the same time about the same subject seems too absurd.

^A If the man born of us subsists, yet does not possess a subsistentia, how do you not teach contradictories, by calling him who subsists insubsistent? You neither remember what you say, nor do you preserve what we say. We surely do not wish to show you that the Lord's man is insubsistent; far from it! But that he is not properly subsistent, that is, distinct from the Word. But who would doubt that the same being is both non-insubsistent and properly subsistent, if the "way of being" in relation to others, and not "being at all," cannot be confused, O most wise men?

CAP. XI.

witnessed by the Father, since there are two and they are different, you will reasonably write off one of the Sons or Christs among you; for you must either relinquish the one who is baptized and visible at that time, or the one begotten from the Father before the ages, who is invisible. ^A For the Father declares that He has only one Son, in the singular. Furthermore, the Father also indicated His beloved Son to our eyes perceptibly and demonstrably, who is also confessed to be the invisible Word. Therefore, either the testimony of the Father is false, or ^B the glory from the divine oracle is fearful, or both: the one being witnessed, the Son, was the same, both sensible and invisible.

CHAPTER XII.

If the body of Peter does not differ from the body of Paul according to nature, how would it not differ according to subsistence? But if it does not differ even according to subsistence, and that which differs in neither nature nor subsistence is the same in all respects, how will the body of Peter and Paul not be one and the same in all respects, which is impossible? But first of all, body also differs from body according to its own particular nature, to which you now add for us the "common nature," you who a little while ago ^C poured so much scorn on those who introduce a common nature in the case of man. For not every body is the same, neither in number nor in any natural quality; if indeed it is not the case that even every stone and plant and the rest are the same by nature. For many plants and stones are destructive to each other, and yet they are stones and plants. For "not all flesh is the same flesh, but there is one of birds, and another of fish and of serpents," and "there are earthly bodies and celestial bodies." Therefore, it is not the case that because of the difference of nature, a difference of subsistence is necessary for them for the sake of distinction. Furthermore, if this is the cause for the necessity of subsistences in Christ, because the natures are different, ^D then necessarily there will not be a difference of subsistences. Nevertheless, let it be granted to you that they differ entirely according to subsistence, whether or not all bodies differ according to nature; but it is clear that they are not united to one another—for in glowing iron, different subsistences are not seen. Therefore, in the case of the Lord too, if we speak of His properties without union, in actual fact we must recognize the difference of natures and subsistences, or entirely of subsistences; and this is clear, were there not a transmutation of natures. But if we admit a union of certain things that are different in Him, even if it is an unconfused one, what is the necessity for two subsistences? But thus much for these matters. Yet, where is it granted to anyone that the body of Paul is united to that of Peter, so that it might have something similar to the Lord’s union, when the one was living among those of the circumcision in Judæa and Palestine, and the other among the gentiles in Corinth, Achaia, and Macedonia? For we do not say that the Word gave to the flesh such a covenant of communion as that which Peter, set apart for the circumcision, gave to Paul, who was sent to the gentiles. But we believe in a true union, and their co-existence in the ages to follow, a natural one through a hypostatic union; even if you have clearly denied this, and have left yourselves no remnant of the Christians—

and their piety regarding the doctrine of the economy. ^B

CAP. XIII.

After they had chattered and seemed to say something to those standing by, when asked to demonstrate the insubsistent nature, they turn their backs on the inquirer, saying that by reality nature is not insubsistent; for "we too," they say, "call essences subsistent." But if something is subsistent, it does not follow that it is a subsistence; just as, without doubt, if something is essential, it is not therefore an essence, since we say that the subsistences of the holy Trinity are three, and that they are essential; yet we do not say that there are three essences alongside the three subsistences, even though we acknowledge each of the subsistences to be essential. If, therefore, we say, it is possible to speak of three essential subsistences in one essence, it evidently follows that we must also speak of two subsistent natures in one subsistence; and thus we neither call the nature insubsistent, nor do we teach that two subsistences are two natures; just as we do not call the subsistences of the holy Trinity non-essential, nor do we divide the three subsistences into three essences. Yet, they say, when we speak otherwise of a colored body, we do not know the body to be the same thing as the color; for if something is colored, it is not therefore a color: thus, therefore, if something is subsistent, this is not yet a subsistence; it is therefore superfluous, they say, what has been said; and it is not necessary by speaking of two natures to assert either that both are insubsistent, or one of them, or entirely that there are two subsistences, since what is subsistent is not a subsistence, as we have shown. These things, therefore, they said, deluding the bystanders, carrying their eyebrows high, and on account of such wonders numbering themselves ^C among the Cherubim. But see yourself how, by these things which they have said, they have destroyed their own position; either not knowing, through their own ignorance, or mocking their listeners, who were unskilled in such matters, deceiving them by the similarity of terms. For if nature has a certain analogy with a body, and subsistence with color, and they call natures subsistent as they do colored bodies, it is necessary from that ground that a subsistent nature should be a subsistence, just as color is also [the ground] whence a body is called colored; for it is impossible to conceive of a subsistent nature without a subsistence. If, therefore, there is necessarily some difference between nature and subsistence, let them demonstrate to me wherein that which differs by nature does not differ by subsistence; and let them not deceive the simpler folk, beguiling them with a similarity of phrases by saying: If it is a subsistence, it is indeed essential, but not of a different essence; it is also a nature, indeed subsistent, but not of a different subsistence. For the latter is false, since if anything is of a different essence, it is altogether of a different subsistence. If, therefore, natures differ from one another, they differ according to nature; they differ also, evidently, according to subsistence. And if a difference of natures is impossible to be stated within one [nature], ^D it is therefore impossible that a difference of subsistences should exist within one and the same subsistence.

^A Indeed, the arguments put forward by us are truly in accordance with the truth. For by not meeting them appropriately, you have only persuaded yourselves regarding your own opinion. For if, since [the concept of] subsistence has an analogy with color in that example of a fortuitous similarity of names, you say that it is necessary for there to be a body—and for there to be a color—and that from this there are two subsistences because there are two natures, know that we also say this: where a body is called colored, it is necessary for color to exist; just as, therefore, it is necessary for there to be a subsistence where [a nature] is called a "subsistent nature." But you have not yet demonstrated the point under investigation, and you disagree with us: namely, that where multiple colored bodies are said to be joined together, the colors must be equal in number to them; and it is not possible for multiple bodies to be colored by one and the same color—as when white, snow, milk, and white lead are mixed, and when wool, linen, and silk are woven into one white veil—or for multiple bodies to be blended into one other color, as white lead, ochre, vitriol, and gum in a dark eye-salve. For we say that the two natures subsist in one and the same subsistence; not as though one or the other could be insubsistent within it, but in the sense that both are able to subsist in one common subsistence; and thus, according to one and the same subsistence, each is subsistent. For it is not necessary that because something must exist, it must exist absolutely and properly; for of the houses in a city, none is without an owner, yet it is not necessary that every one which has an owner should have one [sole] owner; for there are many in the city that have common owners. ^B Thus, therefore, since there are natures, it is necessary that they exist and be subsistent; but since they are not proper to one another, union having openly taken place between them, it is not necessary that each one also subsist properly. It is evident, therefore, that it is not a matter of a different subsistence, but that the subsistent [quality] of both must be considered to be in one and the same subsistence. ^C For this reason, we also reject what was said by you in the end, that it is impossible that a difference of subsistence should be stated within one and the same subsistence. For we do not say at all that there is a difference of subsistences in the one subsistence of the Lord—God forbid! Even if we know a difference of particular hypostatic properties; for we do not say that there is a union of distinct or different subsistences in the Lord; for this has been demonstrated to be impossible, since no one would say there is a union in the same thing in which he sees a distinction; but we know a conjunction of different natures according to the one primary [subsistence] of the Word, which has existed from the beginning, and that there is not a second subsistence, or one [derived] from a subsistence. But so much for these things.

^D As to the other point, again, which you have asserted—that since the natures are different in the incarnation, it is necessary that the subsistences should also be different; but that in the divine essence, even if the subsistences are different, it is not necessary that the natures should also be different—how is this demonstrated? For first, in what has been said above, the similarity of natures necessarily requires...

according to you, a similarity of subsistences. How, therefore, do we believe that the nature of the holy Trinity is one and similar, but that its subsistences are different? For it would follow that, just as those whose natures are different are said by you also to have different subsistences, so those whose natures are similar must also have similar subsistences. Moreover, behold, according to you, the natures and subsistences must also be perfectly equal in number. Since, therefore, the nature of the holy Trinity is not only similar but also one, let its subsistence also be one and similar. But if you say that, if there is a difference of nature, there is always a difference of subsistence, but that if there is a difference of subsistence, there is not always a difference of nature—in that subsistence, being less than essence, cannot be converted to it by the same terms—first, individual natures are evidently considered to have not a greater, but in a certain way a smaller extension than subsistences; for that which is one is greater than that which is common. Let this, therefore, be granted to you as well. Thus, it is necessary that there be many subsistences, even when there is only one nature; for the number of those things which are less extended is necessarily more abundant than the number of those things which are more general. And there will be, in the final analysis, either two, or more, or one, when the numerical particles of subsistence exist according to one nature. ^B Such being the case, since the Lord has two natures, they will possess four, or three, or two and a half subsistences, or something of the sort, according to your authentic law. And it will not only poorly suffice for you to divide the composite person into subsistences, but also to divide every simple and individual nature of His, and of any other being, into a greater number of subsistences; to show that the individual nature of Paul alone consists of two parts from the nature of the soul, and perhaps three from the nature of the body. And this argument indeed refutes you for having proposed this inconsiderately; but this whole world, and most of the things that are in it, clearly condemn the discordance of your opinion by the reality itself. For if there were not one hypostasis, or person, of any body—for instance of a tree composed from the natures of the four elements—and one hypostasis of glowing iron, composed from various united natures, and one hypostasis ^C of man, from various united natures, and one hypostasis of this temple, and one hypostasis of a remedy, and one hypostasis of this whole world, consisting of various elements—we would undeservedly call a man, or a tree, or the world, or anything aforementioned, 'one'; or else we must deny that these are—according to their natures—one hypostasis, one person,

^A nor can we find how to multiply the number of persons. By one word we signify those things which are in some way united by nature; hereafter it will be entirely impossible, especially since you have often said that nature and person are the same. If you distinguish the persons of the Holy Trinity, their natures must also be distinguished, and if you multiply the former, you must necessarily multiply the latter as well. ^B

CHAPTER XIV.

But, they say, does not a man have two natures and one person? And does not this demonstrate that it is possible for two natures to exist in one person? These are once again astounding arguments, once again contradictory dogmas, once again opposing words, and sophistries that prove a deranged mind. They represent the same man now as having two natures and one person, and now as having no person at all. Formerly we were happy to hear of two natures and one person, but now we are taught to believe in two natures and no person. For behold, again they attribute to Christ three natures and two natures; and not persisting rightly in the confession of one person, they now dogmatize three natures in one person. Let them be heard: since a man consists of two natures and one person, how is it—after he has been assumed and united to the Word of God—that there are not three natures, two that are assumed and one which assumes? How are there not two persons, one assuming and one assumed? Or if Christ consists of two natures and one person, does he not have one nature of man, and is he not impersonal, he who we just said has two natures? Who would endure to profess such a discrepancy? ^C

We have, with God’s help, refuted those who admit only one [nature] by proving that one and two natures inhere in man, though not in the same manner. And lest we repeat the same things, being long-winded, whoever wishes may become certain of this elsewhere. Therefore, when we said that our Lord Jesus Christ has two natures, it is clear that human nature was taken as one, as if a novel form had arisen from the union of natures within him; and in the same sense and with the same language by which his nature was shown to be one, it is now said to be one nature. As for the person of man, you yourselves, in the first chapter of the present treatise, confessed it to be one and from two natures, you who, when we said that the person of the Lord was consubstantial—if not with the Father, at least with David—and composed of two natures, asked why we denied that it was composed of soul and body. For such was David. ^D Yet even this may be conceded to you, although it is often said for the sake of dispensation and some providence, rather than by intent, by those who do not remember their previous falsehoods, so that they might have their own refutation following them. We, for our part, even if we acknowledge one hypostasis for each man and for every individual among distinct natures, nevertheless, if the matter concerns not a mere man, but the Lord, who is never separated from the person of the Word, we believe that the person of this one is not particular:

^A for we do not say that the human nature of the Savior subsisted at the beginning in a separate person, but rather that it subsisted in the person of the Word. Nor do we now understand the person of the Word simply as being the person of the Word alone; since, after His ineffable union, the Word exists in it together with the human nature. We acknowledge, therefore, one and the same person common to both, which previously was a human substance, and before that was proper to the Word in the common essence of the divinity; and the nature of the Lord’s humanity, having created itself and wrapped itself around and joined itself to its own nature within [the Word], began at the same time to be the person of the bodily nature, and to become common from being proper, and it has come to consist in a manifold way. For the person of the Word is not distinguished today as it was before, solely by the property of being begotten from the Father and the Spirit, but also by the fact that it consists of more natures and natural properties, and, indeed, personal ones as well. How, then, will the person of one who never once subsisted outside of the person of the divine Word be reckoned apart from it? If, moreover, there were a person to the flesh before its conception—which no pious person will say—how, after it had been taken, that is, when that which was taken and the One who took it remain within one another, can the distinction of each from the other be preserved and saved, in which the distinction consists?

Therefore, one must rightly understand the nature of the Word to be common with the Father and the Spirit, but its person to be particular in relation to the Father, the Spirit, and all men who were not born of the blessed Virgin, and common to that one flesh which was assumed by the Word from the Mother of God. And conversely, this flesh from the blessed Virgin, in its nature, as it is in our communion, is common to all the sons of Adam, while its person is particular in relation to us, the Father, and the Spirit, but common solely to the Word. ^B This is the rule of orthodoxy that has been handed down to us by the theologians.

That you, however, who say that there is one person but two natures in man and in Christ, represent this in a way that is highly inconsistent with yourselves, shall be demonstrated with God’s help, after replying to all your fabrications on this subject. But first, it must be shown to us for the moment that you, too, according to this argument, ascribe not only one person to the man, but also one nature, like those who follow Eutyches. For if you say that there are two natures in Christ in the same way as you do for the persons, and seeing nothing more in either of them, you acknowledge Christ as God and man; [if] you know the human nature in Him as having two natures and two persons, yet you say that the Word has no nature or person at all, but describe Him as substanceless and without a person; or, [if] you acknowledge in the Word one person and one nature, and in the man not only one person but also one nature: where then is your stupendous discourse, the conflict of your words, and the contradiction, and all those things which you declaimed with such emphasis? And I do not know how many things you introduce as a preamble with your grandiloquent speeches.

CHAPTER XV.

of Peter, as Peter’s, has a person and a nature, and the body of Peter, because it is Peter’s, has a person and a nature; if Peter has two natures, those of the body and of the soul, will he not have two persons, those of the body and of the soul? And if there are two natures, the soul of Peter and the body; and if there are two persons, those of the soul and the body, does not he lie who says that a man is one person and two natures? You are caught in your own nets, and you cause that saying of David to be used against you: "In the works of his own hands the sinner is caught," and, "His pain shall return upon his own head." You ought to remember what you were just saying, when you proposed that, to establish two persons in man, we should confess three natures in the Savior. First of all, we do not know how the persons of the soul and the body could be distinct in one and the same living human being in the flesh; for if, while the composite animal is alive and preserved, you know two persons to be within it, what will happen when it is dissolved by death? Either you will have to admit in him not only two natures and persons, but more, by reason of the dissolution and division of the subject, since everything divided is multiplied in number, and there will be four or eight natures and persons belonging to him; or, if you know the same natures and persons of his to remain even after the dissolution of the living being, knowing the same account to hold for the existence of both the living and the dead, and for the parts of the composite man both joined and separated—then on this view of yours, you must speak of contraries in the same way ^B and it will be the same account that applies to your problems regarding Him.

Nevertheless, let this too be conceded to you, among the rest. But now receive from us the other thing, which was but a moment ago offered to us by you: namely, what your view is regarding the person of the body, and how you admit two persons in it, just as you admit two natures, on account of which you do not wish to hear us when we prove that there are two natures and one person in the Lord. Moreover, once you have confessed Christ as God and man, you yourselves openly admit two persons of the man and another of the Word in Him, and thus you truly believe in three persons of Christ, not just two, namely one on the part of the man and another on the part of God, as you have hitherto been accustomed to say; but in truth you accept two from the man and one from the Word. And likewise, you are compelled to admit three of His natures, since a person is not without a substance (your arguments being mutually contradictory), and because you say in the same place that there are two natures of the man and one of the Word. To this point, therefore, has your faith arrived, O most wise men, that you count six in Christ—namely, three natures and three persons. And if this is not the same as that, you speak now of three ^C and now of two things regarding Christ. Why do you hide the middle part of your dogma? But if nature is the same as person, which is often posited by you, six persons are asserted in Him by you, with the natures added to the persons.

And this leads to a dilemma: either all are substances, and no person is left remaining to Him; or all are taken for persons, and no substance remains for the six persons of Christ. If these things excite both laughter and groans in the hearer, it is very clear that you ought to be persuaded that you must quickly and resolutely cast out the evil limb from the truth of religion, and from the rock of the sound faith being crushed, so that what was said may be fulfilled: "Their sword shall enter into their own heart, and their bow shall be broken," according to the oracle. ^A

CAP. XVI. KΕΦΑΛ. ις'.

Since it is agreed that there are three divine persons, they say, "Tell us, which face was smitten?" For if it were the face of the Word, because He is consubstantial with the Father, then the Father and the Spirit also would be visible, tangible, smittable, temporal, and passible in the simple sense, and they would differ in no way from us in nature; for such was the face that was struck. But if it was another that was beaten—namely, the face of Christ—apart from the three divine ones, do you not yourselves teach that there will be two faces or persons, namely one of the Word, as one of the Trinity, and another of Christ? But their sophism, arising from the ambiguity of the name, is clearer than light. For the face that was smitten was not that which is taken for a "person," but rather the visage and form of the parts of the human body near the eyes, ^B as it is said in that passage. We shall diligently show that this is what is understood by "person." For the one is said of the whole person of Christ, but the other is said only of a part of His body. With this personal face, no living individual and no inanimate accident has a double person; for nothing of those things which are one in number has a double person. Yet by this face, there are many animals endowed with two, three, or more figures, such as the two-headed hydras and the rest; such were also the miraculous Cherubim with four faces, and as many forms, thus and otherwise depicted in different forms, and yet we do not call them four persons. According to the former, the specific nature is distinguished in individual beings; according to the latter, however, the particular nature is divided into one member and another. ^C The former is said of rational and irrational, of material and immaterial, of living and dead things, inasmuch as it is taken for "person," and because there is a person for everything that exists personally. The latter is said only of bodies governed by a soul, for most things that lack a soul are known only by word. The former is often said of intellectual substances, as "Father" is said of the unbegotten; the latter is ascribed only to sensible things. Therefore, "person" and "face"— ^D [This is because our author is perpetually playing on the word *prosopon*, which in Greek signifies "person" and "face" equally, an ambiguity the Latins do not have. Therefore, by this word we understand now "face," now "person".]

".] ^A Its indication is always unique and belongs to every face, whether the countenance is sensible or not; but a face, just like a look, is not always double nor given to every individual. Therefore, two persons of the Word and of his incarnate form are not clearly deduced from this, and for that reason there was one person of Christ the incarnate Word, and another member of visible flesh, called a face. And if you wish to hear, he who was seen by you had a person which is called a face; in another sense, he is an intelligible person and face, or in this sense he had two persons. And again, since every personal face embraces the entire soul and all bodily members, of which the eye is one, your one face will be embraced by the other: but the thing embraced is never the same as the thing that embraces; therefore, there will not be one and the same face for each of you, but there will be two, one major and the other minor. But where have you seen a major and a minor person, and those in one thing? And further, would there perhaps be ten persons for an animal with many heads, if, not dividing the names of the proper flesh, you are divided yourselves because of the names?

These are, O men, the sophistries which the theologian uses deceitfully to induce error. And we will deal with you thus: Since Christ ^B is said to have worked by the divine Word according to the things said or done by him, what do you say? Was the Word who said to the leper, "I will, be thou made clean," yesterday, the day before, and before the ages, or not? If the latter, how is this crucifix considered God, even though he worked the greatest miracles through Christ or any other man? If the former, why did he not cleanse the leper whom he had long since willed to cleanse, until that time? Just as it is therefore clear in this case that the Word of God, living and always active, is before the ages, and at that time manifests his will for the occasion and necessity through his spoken word, so it is clear that his impassible and invisible person, through the sensible face that was a part of his body, received contumelious stripes from unbridled men. ^C Or again, O sophists, since there are three consubstantial persons of the holy Trinity, do you say that that face of Christ, similar to ours and altogether distinct from the others, is divine, or not? If it is not divine, then by the same reasoning you cannot say that Christ himself is God, nor that there was given to him the name above every name, that is, divinity, nor that such is his great dignity and reward for the hypostatic union with God. But if you say it is divine, yet of a different nature from the other three consubstantial divine persons, then since there are three consubstantial ones and one other unlike them, are you not led to confess four divine persons? ^D

CHAPTER XVII.

^A even after this he is circumscribed by places, as we read: “He ascended into heaven,” and, “Whom heaven must receive,” and, “He shall so come in the way you saw him going into heaven.” How, then, is not one person visible and circumscribed, while the other is invisible and uncircumscribed? But if every definition of a person is by local limits, then the person of the Word would be distinguished locally from the Father and the Holy Spirit. And since you also say that the Word is locally in all things, it follows that either of the other two persons of the Godhead would be in another universe, and not in this one, or else in none at all; for in this one there is no room for it to exist distinctly, since the Word fills all things here. How, then, is the divine person of Him who fills all things in all, as it is written, also in all things? For it is not the same thing to be a place of certain things, and as it were to be in them as in a place; it is impossible. If, therefore, these things are not said of the person of the Word according to local circumscription, what prevents Him, remaining the divine Word and assuming the nature of flesh, from having in His one person a divine definition, and from having acquired a carnal one? ^B For just as the Word does not make more persons unto Himself by the fact that He is begotten and does not beget, that He is in the Father as the wisdom of the wise and the word of the speaker, that He does not proceed because He does not proceed from Himself to other things, that He has His own operations, and by all the other properties by which the Son is distinguished from the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit; so neither do many and opposite properties added to Him multiply His person. For this reason alone, that He is unbegotten, the person of the Father is perfectly distinguished from that of the Son and the Holy Spirit; and then by the generation of the Son He is distinguished again, yet He is not a more perfect person, nor would He truly be said to be of two persons. Indeed, what would you say regarding the person of a lone and simple man, for example Paul? Is his whole person known by all visible and local characters? By soul and body together? Or is it manifest that they are distinct? And yet, ^C not by this are there distinct persons of him; for even if he was caught up out of the body to the third heaven and heard ineffable words in his mind, he had the same local and visible limits of the body, and spiritual limits of the soul, which Peter and the rest of men have; he had no other privilege, but remained in the same person, and was of one.

CHAP. XVIII.

^A If, however, He is God also by subsistence—and that in some way entirely and perfectly—then behold, there are two of His subsistences, just as there are two of His natures. But since His humanity is not impersonal, nor is it a part of His one subsistence, if He is God also in subsistence, then Christ will either be imperfect in his divinity according to the way that human subsistence is considered, or the subsistence of Christ will be more than perfect and above-God, being thought of as above the Father and the Spirit and the Word. For since He was perfect God in that which is the proper part, the totality is greater than it according to subsistence.

But he, having said these things and having disturbed us with the puzzle, departed, having wrapped us in giddiness. ^B But we, looking toward the true light to see what might be granted and what might be added against the deceitful tongue, were considering that the name "God" is primarily a natural name, signifying an essence first and not a person. Just as the word "man" does not label the person of Paul, but speaks of his nature, and is able to be applied to one, to any, to each individual, and to all men in common—which is not the case for such names as "Peter" or "Paul," which have the name of a subsistence. How, then, is it possible for the same thing to be predicated of this same subject in different ways, both from the principle of nature and from the principle of subsistence? Moreover, according to the natural name, there is sometimes a resemblance of one thing to another; but according to the subsistent, there is difference alone. ^C If, therefore, "God" is both a natural and a personal name for Christ, then according to the same name there is thought to be in Him both resemblance and difference with respect to the other two divine Persons. Furthermore, if He is God not only because of His nature but also because of His own principle of subsistence, Christ is God by two divinities; and the same must be said of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, if the essence itself and the three subsistences of the Holy Trinity are each called God of themselves, then we clearly have four gods gathered for us. ^D In addition to this, since nature is more comprehensive and more common than the subsistences, the divinity according to the natural principle will be greater. Will Christ, therefore, be thought of as a greater God from His nature, and a lesser God from His subsistence, being greater than Himself? And above all, if the Word, that is, the subsistence of Christ, even insofar as He is Word and Son, were thought of simply as God, and not by the essence contemplated in Him, does He appropriate such a name alone? Since the Father is clearly not the Word nor the Son, He would, therefore, not be God, or not such a one, and likewise for the Holy Spirit. Thus, there would be one common and three different divinities; and each divine person would be composite, consisting of two different divinities—one common, and another particular. If all these things are absurd, it is clear that the Word, that is, Christ, and the Father, and the Holy Spirit are called God from nature alone, just as David and Solomon are called men. For neither is Christ, or David, or a prophet [defined] by nature, nor [is] man [defined] by the principle of subsistence.

CAP. XIX.

individual. If, therefore, you know the two natures of Christ, it is clear that you have known their ^A subsistences beforehand. Shall we say, then: Since, seeing the works of Phidias, we understand his nature—for his works are neither those of an angel nor of an irrational animal—if we also acknowledge his subsistence, Oh, the logomachers are more to be admired than the fashioner of men! But because we know Enoch and Noah from their substance, shall we assert that we also know their persons? But you might perhaps say that we do not know even the specific nature of Noah itself, but that we conjecture it from certain similar things that we do know. Let this, then, be granted. How, then, if we have conjectured the nature by having recourse to similar things, do we not recognize the subsistence by [having recourse to] a similar subsistence? For there is no ^B subsistence at any time perfectly similar to another subsistence, because of the subsistence that is not [the same] and has no similarity to his own, as you say. Do we understand the nature of Noah? And if we have understood it, is it possible to know a nature even without a subsistence, and without knowing its subsistence as well? What then? he says; do you conceive of the nature of Noah as being without a subsistence? Not at all; we did not say this, but that there is no necessity, as you say, for a nature to be known always and in every case through a subsistence; so that he who does not obtain knowledge of the subsistence first, would not [obtain it] of the nature either. But where, even if knowledge of the nature is entirely through a subsistence, what prevents one from observing more than one nature of things previously known from a single subsistence? For seeing Andrew, we do not see distinct subsistences of his soul and of his body, but we know the one subsistence of Andrew as a whole; and yet we understand two natures in him, of the soul and of the body. ^C

CAP. XX.

endowed with a rational and thinking soul ^A (for the Omnipotent does not require time to fulfill the counsels of His charity); and that the conception of the Word by faith, and finally the birth of the blessed Virgin who believed that the things spoken to her by the Lord would be fulfilled, cannot be described, being above all hope and thought and nature, in the same way that it provides for the operation of corporal seed. For the sowing into flesh is flesh emitted by the desire of the flesh via natural power; but faith into the soul is wisdom from the charity of God, sparkling and communicated through the Word of the living and abiding God, making those who have been judged according to His own inward decision partakers of the wisdom that is proper and innate to the Father, who says to His Word, "In Thee I am well-pleased." Through this spiritual regeneration from water and Spirit, whoever believes in Christ incarnate changes the nature of the flesh into Spirit without time; for the soul that is in the flesh, and receives this spiritual seed spiritually, is united to wisdom, is judged worthy of a spiritual nature, and therefore is also united to nature. ^B For "Thy word, O Lord," or "the fear, we have conceived in the womb, and have travailed in faith and works, and have brought forth the spirit of Thy salvation, which we have brought upon the earth." For he who exists in the flesh, and does not set his mind on things that appear according to the flesh, but on those according to the Spirit, in some way changes his own condition. Far from gathering temporal things for the flesh, he denies himself, and becomes a companion to the spiritual Church which tends toward the Spirit, or the Word of God. He, therefore, who is thus glued to the Lord is one spirit with Him.

CAP. XXI.

^C And again they say: If the Word of God is immediately understood as a person by His notions, being distinguished from the Father and the Spirit who are consubstantial with Him, then by its own properties—namely, its immaculate birth from the Virgin and other similar things—His flesh, being distinguished from men of the same nature, should be considered a person. Since, therefore, the properties of the Word and of the flesh are not the same, nor are the persons the same; whence, then, is one person assigned by you, which consists of two natures ^D and is twofold and differently distinguished from the nature of the same species? But to one attending more carefully, it is manifest that all the properties of the Lord's flesh are incumbent upon one more universal property, the cause of all the others, which is this: the flesh never subsisted without God and in its own natural person. And therefore, whatever other properties are found properly in the Lord, and are lacking in other men, these are divine: such as the immaculate birth, the holiness of the whole life, the goodness of counsel, omnipotence in miracles, the wisdom of doctrine, perfect and supernatural virtue, and other divine things. If divine works are never exercised without a divine nature, and the properties themselves are properly to be attributed to the whole person—for those things that are of one person, or are seen in one, are to another person

these one might list as properties of another person. It is necessary, therefore, that the properties of the flesh of the Lord ^A themselves, and these being divine, should not be testified to be without a divine nature for this very hypostasis. But since the divine nature is not anhypostatic, it is clear that it also testifies to a divine hypostasis for this hypostasis of the flesh, whose god-befitting properties distinguished it from the consubstantial men. But if the divine nature of the Word did not divide itself into two hypostases—that nature which had its own filial properties, distinguishing itself from the consubstantial persons before the incarnation, and which retains in the flesh those divine properties distinguishing it from men of the same nature—of necessity, one must understand there to be only one hypostasis of the Word even after his incarnation, with both natures united in one hypostasis in Christ.

CHAPTER XXII

But since the human nature of Christ, they say, possesses nothing less than the nature of any individual man, for that reason you add it to the nature of the divinity; why, I ask, since the human person of each man lacks nothing, do you not join that to the person of the Word, and confess that there are two persons of him? We will readily reply that it lacks the distinction from every [other] person, by which alone persons are constituted. ^B That the matter is so, we establish thus. When a woman brings forth some unformed flesh, or a monstrous, inanimate body, as happens in abortions and in fetuses brought forth prematurely from the womb, we say this fetus is a person of a body, even if not animated, as if it were a body of this abortive birth according to nature. If to one of these bodies, or to persons already born, there should be added some flesh growing upon it, either of a head, or a large sarcomatous growth, or a visible abscess, as is often seen in boils, or of a size equal to the abortive flesh, and referring to its form, color, and everything else: to this, therefore, we do not grant its own person, but we reckon one [person] both for the body growing according to nature and for the excrescence itself. Similarly, since in Christ whatever is human has never by nature subsisted in itself, but has subsisted in the pre-existing person of the Word, with the Word assuming to himself flesh from the substance of the holy Virgin, from the very beginning, ^C where do you see a distinction between the Word and the flesh, such that you say there are two persons, just as there are two natures? For by the distinction of natures, the difference of person is not necessarily split into two.

CHAPTER XXIII

A temporal nature, they say, will not have an eternal person, nor vice versa: either therefore one must say that the human nature of Christ was impersonal, or that it had a temporal person; and therefore that there are altogether two persons, namely, the eternal [person] of the Word and the temporal [person] of the man. ^D And on the contrary, though an eternal person...

cannot have a temporal nature, it can acquire it, and thus the temporal nature subsists in the eternal person. The difficulty is therefore solved; just as when it is said that the whole world, which was created, subsists in God the unbegotten creator.

CHAPTER XXIV.

^A They press the point: either there is nothing composite in Christ, or [both] nature and person [are composite]; either the nature is simple and the person composite, or again, the nature is composite and the person simple. If, therefore, all things in him are simple, your naming of a composition in him is false; but if both his nature and his person are composite, why then do you reject Severus? But if the natures appear to you to be simple, and the person composite, since it is confessed that the person of the Word is simple, and it is said to you that the person of Christ is composite, then clearly there will be two persons, one of the Word and another of Christ. But, O you men, first it must be noticed that simple things are contained within composite ones, so that the person of the Word itself must be understood to have been simple before, and to be composite now in Christ. ^B Nevertheless, the sense in which "composition" is predicated of the person of Christ must be clarified. For sometimes a composition appears more simple precisely because it is formed from several words regarding one and the same composite thing; sometimes it is made from different things: just as we see a more varied remedy made from simpler remedies, one body from other bodies, and a composite word from simple words. ^C It is therefore possible to conceive of one composite person [resulting] from several persons, as is the case with a chorus, a house, and other things of this kind; and it is also possible for the person of Christ to consist of several joined properties, not only of the Word but also of the flesh. If you say that it is composite from natures, we agree; but if you say it is as if from persons, God forbid! And notice that the Word's person possessed this composition of properties even before the flesh, even if not from so many. For it is not only the case that to exist by generation is a property of the Son, but also that he does not beget a consubstantial Word, that the Spirit does not primarily proceed from him, that he himself does not proceed as the Holy Spirit does, and other properties pertaining to him. In the same way, the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit is composite, not only that of the Word. ^D Why, therefore, must an enumeration of things in Christ be brought forward to us from this, as if referring to a simple and a composite person? For it is one and the same [person], consisting of several properties, existing with the Word in his person.

CHAPTER XXV.

He who does not distinguish the persons of Christ cannot, in speaking of Christ, attribute these things to the divinity and those to the body; everything would belong to the flesh. Furthermore, when the natures are distinguished, it is possible for what is proper to each of these to be restored to it. For we do not understand distinct persons when we speak of the thief crucified at the right hand, and one composite [being] in terms of natures, [which they were] forming into a person.

^A Indeed, we understand that the soul emigrated to life through repentance, but the body suffered toward death—though its legs were not broken, nor its head crushed, nor its skin torn away, nor its substance divided. But because this happened to one or the other nature, to one member or another, to this or that, we do not therefore understand that there are two persons of the Crucified.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CAP. XXX.

o man, it was necessary to conclude. For if you add something to the simple, you do not take away its half, but rather you increase it by that addition. We therefore correctly confess the Trinity, being of one and simple nature. For the three persons of this [nature] have until now preserved this most simple nature in themselves without mixture or addition; and now one of them has been seen to have this simple nature of her own divinity, united to our nature. For the Divinity, which had created us through the Word of truth, or the Son, so that it might lead back its own creatures which had wandered far away to itself, through the same person of the three through whom it had cast beings into existence, led them back again to itself, so that those aspiring to life should not fall into eternal death. Therefore, this does not degrade the one nature or person, but on the contrary, if you inspect it diligently, it greatly honors it. For just as they were conscious that the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding [persons] could exist in the simple persons, so through the hypostatic union they manifested and proved that all the powers of generation, procession, and action are participated in by beings from them, and that all lower things are subject both to this unbegotten person, who is greater than the others, and to the simplicity of the substantial nature of the three persons. ^{A B}

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

is it said to be one of the divine persons, by way of distinction, as though the other two consubstantial divine persons were visible, while He alone who is named is invisible; but it is that the contemplation of His nature is indicated through the face, and the natural form of God, which is not understood as the same as the hypostasis. Moreover, it is not the same as His hypostasis, nor is the face of Christ which was spat upon; for it ^B is a part of that, not only of Christ, but also of the man in Him, and again one member of His body, the head; and indeed, not the whole head, but its anterior part, and finally that which surrounds the eyes. If, therefore, the person of Christ is signified by this one word, and not by that which surrounds the chest, nor the hands, nor the feet, nor the other members of His body—whether it be the person and face of a mere man or of God—it will necessarily have to be said that the rest of His members, which are not circumscribed by the eyes or the mouth, are extraneous to the person. This statement is manifestly puerile or sophistic.

CHAPTER XXXIV

The person of the Word of God is one not from union, but from nature; the person of Christ is one from union. But if, just as Christ’s, so also the Word’s person were one from union, it would be certain that before the Word of God had one person, He did not have it, no differently than Christ. But that one natural person of the one nature of the Word of God, even after the incarnation, with the nature of the flesh united to the Word in Him, remains the one person of the two natures of Christ: from the union of natures, therefore, not of persons, one person of Christ is made, ^C which still retains one nature, and is the unique person of Christ. What then? Did Christ receive a person from nature, besides another from union, or not? If He did not receive it, the union did not make the person; but, as we have said, the union of natures was made in the natural person of the Word. If, however, Christ had a natural person, besides another from union—just as the Word, since you say the Word has a person from nature, and another from union—then the Word and the flesh will have two persons. To which then of the four persons is that union of natures and persons in one person to be referred? If to the person of Christ taken from union, the person of the Word is useless; if to that of the Word, the person of Christ is vain. How then does it subsist? Where is that person from union? If it is outside ^D the natural persons, it has its own nativity, lineaments, and movement; if it is in one or the other, it will not be one person in the other; if it is in both, it must have been divided into distinct and separate persons, or into a half-portion, or into any visible member whatsoever; for example, one foot to be understood as being in the Word and in the flesh; in the invisible person an invisible foot, and in the visible one a visible foot. According to your opinion, therefore, three feet are seen in the visible Christ, and the same for the rest of the members. Since these things are absurd, beyond old wives' tales; since it is neither outside the two natural persons, nor in both, ne

nor do you say that they subsist in either one of them alone ^A that the person from the union subsists at all, it is manifest that you are teaching a non-subsistent thing, a figment, and that you dogmatize that there is only one person in the Word from an union of natural persons. Tell us, if it is like neither the natural person of Christ, to whom will it be like, even if it be granted, by concession, to subsist? But if perchance you were to say that the natural person of Christ is that which we said came from the union, if it truly came from the union of the two natural persons, who is the man whose natural person has been united with itself? A man, on the contrary... And thus did the same person exist, and was born thereafter, because it existed before as natural, and was born from the union after the junction of the natures?

CHAPTER XXXV.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

^A are taken from one thing and another. Thus, therefore, the same Timothy in his one hypostasis was a son of Paul and a son of a Greek; yet these names designate the person differently, but with regard to the natures and origin.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Or does that name, Word, name two persons, the one that is not created, Lord, and the one that is created; or two halves of one person and one Lord? And no one becomes by grace what he is by nature. If that word "Lord" names the person of the Word and not the nature, then the Father and the Spirit are not Lords, since they are not of the same person. But if it is of the nature, it is clear that the human nature has acquired by grace that which the Godhead has by nature, namely to be called Lord; as you yourselves have said, because of the excessive love of the Godhead in lending to the humanity its own proper riches in its own person.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

If the Word is God by divinity, and the Word is man by humanity, then the Word is in two persons, the Son of God and the Son of Man, just as he is God and man in two natures. If by two natures, as you say, divinity and humanity, God and man is the same Son of God, it will necessarily be considered that he has two natures, and not two persons.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

If the Word is one of an uncreated person and another of a created one, he who removes the number of persons removes the person of the Word, whether the uncreated or the created. But no religious person confesses that there are two persons of the Word; rather, they believe his single person to be wholly apparent before from the uncreated attributes, but now to manifest ^C new characters through the words and acts of his person.

CAP. XL.

If it pertains not only to the Word of God, but also to the flesh, not to be generated from another substance and person than that of the Father, then the flesh will be from the substance of the Father alone, just as the Word is God. This is truly proper to the Word himself, before the flesh was assumed in the incarnation, and the character is proper to the person of that simple and one person; but when his natural name had a new reception, then it was proper to the things conjoined in the person; it designates one part properly, not the whole person ^D that today enjoys this name. In the same way, the indication of intellect and science belongs to the soul alone, yet it does not therefore place it beyond humanity; it is of the taste alone to apprehend juices, but from this it does not have a proper person.

CAP. XLI.

When the divine Scriptures call Christ one man, if they understand him with God by this name, it seems that God is half of the man. And

it does not have a proper person. ^A When man is called flesh, as in this place: "To you all flesh shall come," he is called flesh together with the soul, and yet the soul is not considered a partial half of the flesh.

Chapter XLII.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Chapter XLIV.

CAP. XLV.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CHAPTER XLVII.

of the Gospel, we must say to them that every individual ^A thing, which is either monoideic or is ordered under one species only, has no union of natures in itself that is more foreign than all other existing things. If, therefore, you know this individual—namely, the person of Christ—to be truly something common and one, while not understanding in it the union of several natures that is more foreign ^B, you have reasoned well. But if you also confess that the union of natures has taken place in the Mediator of God and men with respect to all existing things, then you immediately destroy what you have granted, since you recognize it to be such in accordance with one of those things which are indivisible in the universe. Otherwise, we shall establish for you an illegitimate conclusion in Christ, saying that the Word is inaccessible to every thought and indemonstrable by reasoning. For a prodigy that is impervious to common intellects, and placed above natural things, is unintelligible. By necessity, therefore, you will either grant that this indivisible thing is also of the same form as all others, and you will seek in it the same reason that flourishes in all, or you will not subject it to the reason of things that are unlike; and so much for this. But nevertheless, you must demonstrate those indivisibles which are neither simply of one species, nor under one species only, but are brought under diverse species. For the individual singular of pheasants and such things can neither be called of one species, nor under one species; and it is never numbered among either clean or unclean species. And in another way: Every species subsists in itself and not in other species; therefore, if the species of the pheasant is taken away according to subsistence, the composite is taken away at the same time; it is clear, therefore, that indivisibles are more foreign, one and many alike, ^C since the natural species does not subsist more foreign in them. But concerning the Mosaic rod turned into a serpent, we shall hear what you will say was the indivisible thing. For if it was of one species, what sort was that species of the single rod, which can be posited as neither rod nor serpent? But if it was under one species only, what sort is that? For whichever one you say, you are convicted of having destroyed the other. Therefore, the prodigy of the incarnation of the Word does not seem to you to be equal to the Mosaic rod, but that [the rod] is not [a prodigy] at all. O impiety!

CHAPTER XLVIII

If Christ himself, they say, is the one who raised himself from the dead, and was raised, he ought to have said: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will rebuild it." ^D Why, then, not perceiving the contrary, do you pretend to have perfect piety with one eye? For if another rebuilds what was destroyed—which was a part [of him], namely his body—he who was speaking to them ought to have said, "Destroy this temple" (that is, his body evidently), and "in three days he will rebuild it," or

God, or someone else entirely, yet certainly not I who am speaking to you, who is evidently spirit and body. It is evident, therefore, that the same person signified by this designation "I" embraces the body that is destroyed, and the soul speaking through the body, and God who raised up what was destroyed.

CHAPTER XLIX.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

But we do not think that the Word is incomplete in being the Son of God alone: God forbid! Nor do we think the flesh is incomplete in being the Son of Man alone; but we assert that both are truly incomplete regarding the ineffable union of natures, ^B so that the divine might be esteemed Son of Man according to its proper appearance, and the human might appear as Son of God, and that they might have need of the ineffable union according to their natures. This is so that, in one and the same person, the natures meeting—from which the sonships exist—one might not see one perfect sonship without knowing the composition of the other nature; just as one can view here not two sons underlying, but one Christ in two natures and sonships. For this ineffable gift of union is realized, if we do not say it is the union of the divine and human nature by name only. ^C For if things are truly united immutably and integrally, all things which are affirmed of each are also affirmed of the compound resulting from them. Since, therefore, the Son of God and the Son of Man—even if that which is united does not exist through the union—are joined, and the whole flowing from the union is the Son of God and the Son of Man; and since the Word and the flesh come together into one, the same is one perfect God and perfect man. For something is not on that account perfect, just because it does not receive any other perfection according to something else. Certainly, ^D the lawyer (of whom the Gospel speaks) was perfect according to the physical definition of a man, and yet he was still learning the perfection of Christ’s spiritual doctrine, which teaches: "If you wish to be perfect, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and take up your cross, and come follow me."

^A Furthermore, Nicodemus was a perfect son according to the flesh, and a man born long ago; but to be not simply a man, but a spiritual man, he required regeneration and perfection through the Spirit. Thus also, nothing was ever lacking to the Word, that He might be Son of God and God; but for the completion of His own manifestation in the forthcoming times, according to which, not counting it a prize to be equal to God, He desired and foreordained for Himself before the ages to take the form of a servant; and before He made all things, the recapitulation of all things in Christ and the deification in Himself of non-divine natures, as the Apostle says, was still lacking for the manifestation of the mystery of His own incarnation, which had been hidden and foreordained for Him. There is, therefore, from this no argument for imperfection, although the sonship of each nature is considered separately; but there was only need for the completion of the union, according to God’s gracious will toward men, whereby one nature might be joined to the other for the effect of being seen distinctly in diverse hypostases—natures and perfect sonships—to be gathered together into one and the same person; and so much for this. ^B If, therefore, because both parts are spoken of as toward the whole end, that is to say, Christ, you assert that these parts are for this reason simply imperfect and of equal honor, then certainly the same must be said of a leader who leads a soldier to the end—who is a part, and whose weapon is a part, and both are likewise imperfect; for neither would the leader be reckoned among men, nor the weapon counted as a weapon. The leader will not differ from the arms, since part does not truly differ from part in so far as it is a part; and simply, according to you, these too will be of equal honor, O most sagacious ones. But since it has been manifestly proved that the arguments they allege to defend their superstition are vain, they seize upon other pretexts to make the necessity of their impiety appear persuasive. These, therefore, is what they say:

CHAPTER II

He who is properly a son is the whole son of him who begot him; for there is no part which is called his son. But a father cannot be the author of a part without being the author of the whole; let the example be the whole which consists of a rational soul and a living body, and which is called the son of man: if it should happen that one part of this whole should come forth from the womb without the other, we are accustomed to call it an abortion and not a son, and we add that it was an abortion, not a birth. If, therefore, you call Christ the son of man from only a part, it is manifest that He is the son neither of the father nor of the mother properly. Whose son, therefore, is He by nature? Tell us. What then, O you men, does all Holy Scripture lie, which calls the same Christ now the Son of God, now the son of man? And who will prefer your trifles to the divine words? And what are we to say concerning Christ, and concerning the Son? For if, just as you also have often used this manner of speaking in your own writings, the holy Scrip- ^D tures call the man himself, in his entirety, from a part—as in, "To you shall flesh come" (Ps. CXVII, 20), and, "And Jacob went into"

^A Egypt with the souls of his house. But they also call only a part from the whole, as in, "There they buried Abraham, and Sarah his wife." For only the body of Abraham was buried there. How then do you now legislate against calling someone a son from a part of one of those who beget? And yet, if, as you yourselves stated, the fathers of our flesh are authors only of the body, and it is manifestly conceded, according to the Apostle, that there is another Father of spirits, how is it that all men are not evidently called sons from a part, and fathers from a part? Furthermore, if the cause of the body itself is not entirely from the male, but the female also contributes something—one, as some say, providing the more solid parts to the begotten, the other the more fluid—how would they not both appear to be particular parents, each of them being authors of a part from a part? But if, according to the laws established by your dialectics, it is not permitted to call them truly fathers from a part, then surely no one is truly a father of any of the men who have entered life. For by this logic, no one would be properly called a father of flesh alone, nor mother, nor son; hence we who are born would all be products of chance. Could an argument be presented to you more clearly than this?

^B Regarding the example of the aborted fetus, what do you say? Is it not called a son because it is simply a part and imperfect, or because it has not yet lived? If it is because it is imperfect and simply a part, how is it that those who are born truncated and monstrous, often without hands and feet and other countless members, are called sons, even though they exist in such partial imperfection? And what would you say regarding Abraham, who, having departed many years ago, is called the father of the Israelite people, and David, who is called the father of the Lord after his death? It is manifest that the part of him which is preserved—namely, the soul—is what is henceforth named father. If, therefore, it is permitted for a living part alone to be named son and father, what prevents the son from being named from the part that lives? It is clear, then, that it is not because it is a part, but because it is lifeless, that it is not called a son. Furthermore, the granddaughter of the synagogue official, and the widow’s son, and those who died before their living parents—if they seem to you rightly to be still called daughter and son in the Gospel on account of their living souls, behold, it is confessed by you that a part is a son and a daughter.

^C It is therefore clear that the aborted fetus is not called a son because it does not live, not because it is simply a part. For if many misshapen bodies of aborted fetuses were gifted with a soul, they would be born and called sons. Wherefore, against all, we do not even say that every part is a son, but that it seemed wrongly to you that a son is never properly named from a part, or that a father is never from a part.

But beyond these points, we shall say, as a work of supererogation, that we assert Christ to be not simply from a part, but from the whole of each, even if there are diverse filiations of the parts that are in Him. For the cause of Christ's body is the holy Virgin, from whom something of this body ^D

^A received a source from parents, and another thing He specifically formed from the Holy Spirit; she is also the mother of His soul, which indeed was led forth adorned as a bride to the natural union of its own garment, and was ordained by God to proceed into being as if from the barrier of some holy nuptial bed, by the generation received from her. And of His divinity, she is the true mother, of the Word who was from the ages without flesh and simple, who through her began the ensouled co-existence with flesh, through the hypostatic union, for the fulfillment of His own good pleasure. Therefore, even if not in the same manner, yet nevertheless the holy Virgin is the mother of all the parts of Christ, and indeed of the whole; for ^B the one who is said in any way to have truly begotten someone is entirely the cause of some origin for the one being begotten, though not entirely the cause of his coming into being from non-being; for if this were so, not even the Word Himself would be by nature the Son of the Father; for the co-eternal has not been begotten by Him into being from non-beings.

CHAPTER III

Furthermore they say, if Christ is your Son of God in part, and obviously God in part, it is manifest that He is not whole, but semi-divine. But to us, the one Christ is whole God and adorable; for on one side, within Him, as the one whole, are the parts which according to essence are perfect God, and on the other, the divine part ^C is united to Him by participation according to essence. But if you, because He has only one part that is divine by nature, argue against us that Christ is semi-divine, you yourselves, seeing neither the whole nor a part as divine by nature in Him at all, clearly must admit that you do not hold Him to be God at all, but a mere man in every way, according to us.

CHAPTER IV

But, having rolled over into other auxiliary arguments of their impiety, they say that it is not said that one and the same living being, and one total ^D of the Son, consists of both divine and human nature at once, because every son must be seen as consubstantial with those who beget him; and he must have an unlacking and immoderate resemblance of substance to those who brought him forth; but your Christ is the Son of God and of man, and has something more than God, and something superior to man; how then will He be truly the Son of these, who is not in every way like them in nature? But, O you, first of all Christ does have a similar substance, if He is compared simultaneously with the two who begat Him; for each one of us, when compared to both parents at once, would suitably be judged to be of the same nature as his own authors, since he also has certain maternal traits which are not to be seen in the father, and certain paternal traits which are often lacking in the mother. And if, when judged part by part, a human is shown to be similar to each, it appears easily that he was formed from both of the same species; for it is not similarly evident in the case of one who is born of authors of a different species. For how, for example, would it be judged to be of the same nature

^A that was begotten? Yet you tell us, ^A O physiologists: do you call this little thing the son of these, and recognize it as one animal totality, or not? For if it is impossible for you to deny this, how do you speak of things that are as if they were not? But, he says, of such things there is a mingling and confusion of species according to generation, so that it is not judged that this in them is a part of a horse, and that a part of a donkey, but all their members are other and indistinguishable. If, therefore, you likewise assert such a mingling of substances in Christ, then tell us what you mean. But we have not accepted these points for the demonstration of a similar union, but for the refutation, for the present, of only your own oracular pronouncements, which proclaim that the begotten thing must be perfectly similar in substance to each of the begetters, or else not be called a Son. That mingled and indistinguishable [nature] of the species, therefore, will refute your proposition all the more in these cases. For if, even in cases where not even a partial similarity is preserved in regard to either of the begetters, the mules are called sons of horses and the semi-horses are called children of donkeys, how is it that you have stated, on account of a partial dissimilarity, that one cannot call a son that which is not entirely similar to those who begat it? You might perhaps say this to those who believe that Christ is similar in substance to both of his parents, but not to us, who confess that his person has been constituted from diverse natures.

^B It must also be examined more accurately concerning this: for either the similarity of the whole seems to you to be the indicator of sonship in every way, or not. If, then, it is not, you seek in vain from us that which is not the cause of sonship for the sake of its demonstration; for you are only persuaded that this sonship is constituted by causes through [such] proofs. If, therefore, Abel was similar to Cain in regard to the whole of his substance, and was his son, he was therefore a son-slayer, and not a brother-slayer? But since the relation of similar things is equal, Cain will therefore similarly be a son of Abel; ^C therefore he will be even more of a father-slayer; thus, in the same man, Cain who killed him was both son and father and brother, and Abel was killed by him, and Cain was the killer of his son and father and brother—and who would not laugh at these subtle doctrines of yours? ^D It must be clearly observed, therefore, that Luke the Evangelist perceived only this partial cause and partial similarity in Adam with respect to God, the Father of spirits. For according to the soul only was God the immediate cause for him, since He breathed into him the breath of life for a living soul, after He had previously formed his body from the dust; and according to the soul alone did he remain preserving the "image and likeness" of God in man. Knowing him, by force of the partial cause and similarity, to be evidently the Son of God, the Father of spirits, he also genealogized Adam in this way, setting it out and saying he was "of Adam, of God," just as he said: "Of Seth, of Adam," namely, the one from the

^A Adam: and just as he said, "Of Isaac," which Matthew translated: "Abraham begat Isaac," so he said, "Of Adam, of God." Let these things be so; but the rest must be heard.

CAP. V.

It is clear, therefore, that all the things you have said are spoken concerning a part of the human, Christ. For one of the natures that are in him is, and is named, God and the Son of God by essential word; but the other has been deemed worthy, by grace truly and by the gift of divine honor and naming—which are not simply a bare name, ^D but a reality underlying the name.

^A For it has no object belonging to this name, as they say of "a deer-goat" and the like; but through the hypostatic union with Him who is God by nature, the honor of the name of the Son of God and God is imparted to it. For in this way are the gifts, the honor, and the great naming of the one deified by the true God—who truly deified him—really demonstrated as the gift of Himself, unless the name of the One who grants it, which is properly given to him, were falsely applied. ^B He did not, then, take this honor for Himself—that is, of His own accord—nor did Christ glorify Himself, which now signifies the man according to Him, but God spoke to Him in reality and said, in the very act by which He is made Son, and not by a bare word: "You are My Son, today I have begotten You," by grace, that is, from the moment I united you to My Son by nature according to one hypostasis. For we have learned from Him that whatever He said also came to pass, and that it is impossible for God to lie. This indicates, therefore, that the Son of man does not boast that He has God as Father of his own accord, but has been called by God to the dignity of this divine sonship and to His eternal priesthood, which is understood not by name only, but in reality. ^C For the Lord who swore and did not repent, "You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek," is the same One concerning whom it was said: "The Lord said to Me, You are My Son." Therefore, just as Aaron signifies a similar manner of the giving of gifts from God and of calling, effectively both in Aaron and in Christ, yet the gifts signify things not identical—for surely it would have been said to Aaron also, "You are My Son," and the rest. For that Aaron has a reason to be compared to Christ in regard to the equality of priesthood is evident; ^D since Christ has been deemed worthy of so much more glory than Moses, who was greater than him, by as much as the one who built the house has more honor than the house. Furthermore, to speak apostolically: "If there were perfection through a similar priesthood, what need was there that another priest should rise to be called according to the order of Aaron?" Otherwise, if the priesthood had not been transferred, there would also not have been a necessity for a change of the law, as the same apostle Paul says, but only a succession. So understand also in this way the words: "He shall be called the Son of God," and "He shall be called the Son of the Highest," and the rest. For that which was born was holy, and not only sanctified by the unbegotten Holy Spirit that was with Him—which is also the Word born of the Virgin. For what was conceived in her, says the angel, is of the Holy Spirit, and is Holy Spirit; just as what is of the flesh is said to be flesh. But God is Spirit, and Christ was God. This which was conceived is the same as that which was born. The gifts on Christ are not therefore empty names, namely, God and Son of God and Only-Begotten and Lord of glory and the rest, but are real: for if these were not so, the gift of the naming by God would be false in Christ.

^A This gift, idols and heroes and demons held of old; for the destruction of which the true Son of God truly arrived, and having arrived, He disposed of many things. And no one would say that He heals evil with evil; but both angels and men have been called sons of God and sons of the Most High many times. What, then, is something more in this Christ, the Only-Begotten Son of God? And how is He also Only-Begotten, if, according to them, the grace of deification or of sonship in Him is the same? Therefore, by the grace that is through the hypostatic union with the Son in nature, the Only-Begotten is clearly called Son of the living God.

CAP. VI.

^B But, they say, if it is not said in an [i]oikonomia[/i]—as one might say, you who avoid the exact examination of what is signified—and if the aforementioned things do not have a primary reference, or allegory, or imagination, or appearance, and the things said are cast in vain, as though only to trick the hearers, who is the Son who learned obedience from the things which He suffered? Who also offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears, and was heard because of His godly fear, and was perfected, and crucified, and buried; and whom God raised from the dead, and who was exalted and glorified, and the rest? For no one, unless he be mad, will dare to affirm that these are proper to the Word, nor even if the Word were with another. But it has already been said to you many times, that the whole is often designated by the part, both by common dialectical law and by the proper usage of Holy Scripture. ^C These things, therefore, do not consist in appearance or allegory or in any such trope; but one must interpret them in truth, yet with the appropriate intellectual qualifications. But you yourselves, simply say: if the Word of God, who is Son by nature, is not conceived by you as being in this very Christ who is spoken of, existing impassibly, yet being subject to these things in His nature through the medium of the Word of His own hypostasis, where are we to seek the other Son of God, concerning whom it is said: "Who, existing in the form of God, emptied Himself, and despised the shame of the death of the cross"? And where will the Only-Begotten Son of God be, He who was given for us by the Father? "For God so loved the world," it says, "that He gave His only-begotten Son."

^D Who then is the Only-Begotten Son of the Lord of the vineyard, who was sent after all the slaves who had preceded Him to the wicked husbandmen, to see if they would respect Him? And who is He whose glory the disciples beheld, as it were of the Only-Begotten from the Father? Furthermore, who is He who was defined as Son of God according to the spirit of holiness? And who is He who descended and penetrated like rain upon a fleece? Whose name remains before the sun, and whose throne is before the moon? And who is He who says, "A body did You prepare for me"? Unless you are perhaps dreaming of a pre-existence of Jesus' soul: how is He Himself in whom all things were created, and the firstborn from the dead

^A said to be "preeminent in all things," and "the firstborn of all creation"? Who, moreover, is the second man and Lord from heaven? And who is He of whom John speaks: "He who comes from above is above all"? And who is He who says that He had glory with the Father before the world was made, and confesses Himself to be one with the Father? And who is it that has the power to lay down His own soul and to take it up again, and is able to rebuild His own temple—called divine and not a private house—in three days? And how does the righteousness that comes from faith say: "Do not say in your heart, 'Who will ascend into heaven?'—that is, to bring Christ down" (Rom. X, 6), if it does not say that He is also heavenly and not merely a mortal man? And who is the Lord of glory, whom they crucified when they did not know Him (I Cor. II, 8)? And how do you yourselves, not rejecting the faith of Nicaea, confess Christ, who was begotten of the Father before all ages, the same who descended from heaven and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin, and was made man? And how, furthermore, do you understand all the other things that have been aforementioned by us from the sacred Oracles concerning Christ, as Son of God, presenting Him as Son of God both by grace and by nature? For if these things were not said in sacred Scripture by way of mere semblance or imagination or illusion, or on account of any of the things you have asserted, nor has He been called God and Son of God and the same Christ by a fictitious name, how will the two not be the same, since both things are told of the same one, and how will it not be considered that He is one and the same—Son of God by nature and Son of God by grace, impassible and passible, exalting and exalted, and the rest?

^C For you are truly not reasonable, O wordy men, who, because of a regard for semblance and imagination, accept the passions and the names of the one who is passible properly, and by nature, and in reality; but you hold that the impassibility and glory and honor, and the name of deification and divine sonship, are not in Christ by nature at all, nor in facts, nor in truth, but are a false name and a semblance and an imagination and an empty title. For if, even if the human things are truly said and done by Him, look with a love for the truth: for a king to say to his own subjects, "I am one of you, and like you," and to perform the duties of a soldier at a time of battle, for the sake of the salvation of his own commonweal, is not only not blameworthy, but even highly glorious; but for a soldier, if he should command or be named ^D as a king, he incurs no small accusation. If, therefore, He who is the Son of man and man only, consents to be called the only-begotten Son of God, and the firstborn of all creation (Coloss. I, 15), and God over all (Rom. IX, 5), and the rest, and commands with authority as Lord, he is convicted of conspiring against God; but if, being indeed the Son of God and God, He sometimes uses human words and actions, it is evident that, in addition to His natural majesty, He also shows a condescension out of love.

If, however, you do not conceive of these diverse things concerning the same Son or Person, but of one son and another, how can you not clearly be judged to be holding the view of two sons? And how is it that you do not say that the one is God, who was not at all humbled in His substance among men, but only provided for our salvation through the other according to His providential energy from the ages? So that, according to your view, it is no longer true that “not an ambassador, nor an angel, but the Lord Himself saved us,” but rather you consider the other son to be a mere man, not sharing or united with God in any way, neither by nature nor by hypostasis; unless you say, as you do, that this is the case only by name, according to the principle of homonyms, where the name is common, but the definition of the substance corresponding to the name is always different—as, for instance, a human being in truth, and one in Scripture both ^A indiscriminately called human by some. Thus, then, these points have been demonstrated by us; but in order that we may drag them to the refutation of the rest of their impiety, let them say to us: To whom do they say that the other of the sons, according to them, that is, Christ, who is uncompounded with the Word, is consubstantial? For if to no one, then one might ask, how can they call him a Son at all? For he would be non-consubstantial with his parents; nor, therefore, would it even be possible to conceive him as begotten or living, just as they themselves have conceded in what was previously said. But if they say he is consubstantial only to God, then there are indeed two divine sons, and the Holy Trinity is a Quaternity. And by saying this, they either say that he who is from the Virgin is not this one, or they also acknowledge the Virgin as being God by nature, since he who is consubstantial to God is also consubstantial to her; and for that reason, they would consistently call all of us who are consubstantial with her, gods as well; and thus they introduce a plurality of gods most ^B plainly. But if they say that Christ, who is called the Son of God, is consubstantial to us alone, let them say how he differs from the rest of the sons of God mentioned, of whom it is said by God: "And they shall be to me for sons and daughters," and "I said: You are gods and all of you sons of the Most High," and things of that sort.

CHAPTER VII

The Son of God, he says, we affirm to be by nature only the God Word, who is consubstantial with the Father; but Christ we say is called the Son of God by grace, and that he is similar by nature. However, we do not on that account put him forward as a Son equal in honor to us; for we too have received the gift of adoption from God, and by grace we are children of God, and heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ himself. ^C For in those things which are often spoken of in a similar way, an unspeakable difference is found; for properly both the gnat and the angel are called creatures, and yet they are not alike for that reason, for there is a great difference between them. Thus, therefore, it must be understood regarding the sons of God by appointment and grace; for Christ has been deemed worthy of greater honor even than Moses, the great one among the prophets, to the extent that he who built the house has greater honor than the house. If, therefore, you do not reject even these things, but truly acknowledge the pre-eminence of honor and dignity in Christ

^A above the rest of men, though not in substance, how is it that a little while ago you asserted that his calling and the honor he received from God were similar to the calling and honor of Aaron, because it was said, "so also Christ"? But let that pass for now.

However, we shall speak regarding your example, as if you realize, O sophists, that creation brings forth and creates things different according to substance; and furthermore, it makes them to be from what is not, as you said, both the angel and the gnat, things which differ in nature and were thus brought into being by divine creation. What then do you say? Has the grace given to Christ made a difference for him in some respect according to substance, or not? For if not, how is the difference in grace perceived, like the difference between created things? Since the latter indeed makes differences in substance, but the former does not—for this is truly very different from things that are different. But if it has made [it], it is evident that it renders the one to whom grace is given better according to his nature. Since, therefore, it was given to something existing according to substance (for grace is not given to what does not exist, nor does it make what is entirely non-existent to be from things that do not exist; for in that way even it would be creation and not grace), what was this grace given to in Christ, when he was previously something according to substance? And what has it made him to be by becoming inherent in his nature, and by having rendered him superior according to substance? For if it was given to a mere man, first of all, tell me where and when he was; then secondly, this grace, if it is truly grace and renders him to whom it is given better according to nature, if he was a man, it clearly proves that he was an angel or something else of that nature, or by necessity God. For there is nothing else besides these that is superior to man in substance. But if this grace made him better according to substance as a man, it is evident that the one to whom it was given was some fluttering creature, or a beast, or a swimming thing, or a reptile before the grace. Does it, therefore, seem to say these things about Christ? Otherwise, all men will be participants of the same grace, both before him, and with him, and after him; and indeed, even more so than he, since they possess from their first nature the dignity of humanity, of which he was deemed worthy by grace through natural improvement.

Chapter VIII

What then, one says, is there not a difference in consubstantial things—perhaps of gold metal from lead or earthenware, and of John the Baptist from the traitor Judas? But the difference of these, ^B my excellent friends, is, on the one hand, according to an inseparable accident—for instance, color and other qualities of which account must be taken—and it does not simply or always or in all respects surpass the other. For gold is not considered more powerful than a bull, nor more precious than God. Furthermore, one can find instances in which lead and earthenware are more necessary and useful, and when, and for what, and where. The other difference, again, is according to virtue, and is discerned from the deed and judgment of one towards another. How then will there be a difference of grace in Christ, if his pre-eminence over us is only according to one of these things? ^D

^A For to the one who works, wages are given, not according to grace, but according to debt. "But if by grace, it is no longer by works; otherwise grace is no longer grace," as it has been said. But if this grace and honor, of which Christ has been deemed worthy, makes a difference also in comparison to Moses, who is distinguished among the prophets, inasmuch as he who has constructed the house has more honor than the house, it is manifest that, as between Creator and creature, such is the difference arising from it for those who partake of it, in comparison with those who were previously their equals. Therefore, the natural distinction between an angel and a gnat, or gold and a potsherd, even though both are created things and one may exceed the other in some way, does not suffice as an example of the grace that differs in Christ from our own. For if the honor and grace that come from God to us do not produce things that are not similar, but rather a difference—such as that between Creator and creature—is maintained between us and Him regarding the divine graces, the grace bestowed upon Him shows Him to be truly Creator and not a creature. Thus, it does not show Him to be merely one of us, or only great like Moses, ^B but clearly God; for it belongs to God alone to create and construct all things from non-being. And it is the property of all things that are after God to be created: some by God immediately, others by means of some of those who were created by God. Therefore, clearly, He who has been deemed worthy of such grace and honor is both Creator and God, and the Christ of all, even if you do not wish it. But you do not see the power or the purpose of the scriptural passages of which you speak, although you seem to yourselves to be accurate discerners of intelligible things.

^C But now, these clever men, just as they wish to show a difference of grace and honor, so also do they wish to show from the holy Scripture a difference of adoptions, so that, even if they say the same things concerning Christ as they do about us, they might seem to grant Him something more than us, and not to consider Him entirely and in all respects like to all. We, however, do not deny that there are differences among things that are named in the same way. But if the difference spoken of concerning Christ in comparison to us does not present itself as that between Creator and His creature according to the scriptural passage, it is not truly that according to which He has been deemed worthy of honor above Moses; for we establish that as a sort of standard and rule, ^D indicative of His pre-eminence over us. But since, with sophistical cleverness, they have tangled the propositions of the present argument in a very dense style so that its impiety might not be evident to the listeners, nor its refutation easy for those who speak against it, and since they interrupt the arguments for which they are challenged and argue them in a veiled and confused manner, we, having gathered the entire purpose of their argument, have set it forth in order and have further established what difference they wish there to be between the adoptions in the holy Scripture, as we proceed to read. For "they were called," they say, "sons of God, all men," in the passage: "I said, You are gods, and sons of the Most High all."

^A Likewise, the Jews were also called sons of God, according to the words: "I have begotten and exalted sons, but they set me at nought." They were called to the acknowledgement of God and, in comparison with other nations, were schooled in sinlessness and taught religion; for to this end were the oracles entrusted to them. "For his covenant," he says, "to declare to them; and," "Thy law is a lamp to my feet," and, "He declares his word to Jacob, his statutes and his judgments to Israel: he has not done so to any other nation." ^B Therefore, although they practiced righteousness by the fear of the law and not by free choice, they nevertheless enjoyed the assistance due to those who lived righteously. And, simply, for as long as they sought to imitate God on earth, they were called sons of God because of their just and innocent life. But equally, they also began to sin again, having a nature that was still mutable; a fact which was proven many times by their deeds, according to the saying: "But they set me at nought." And consequently they were subject to death, and to blows, and to punishments. "For the sting of death is sin," and, "Many are the scourges of the sinner." ^C So it was for them. We Christians have indeed also been called sons of God, according to the words, "For you are all sons of God, through faith in Christ Jesus." We, therefore, are not merely formed to innocence by words, but are taught by the Spirit of God the righteousness of God which is superior to the letter. And we have been called to freedom and immortality, and to immutability through the resurrection of the dead; no longer fearing punishment, nor any change to the blessed life that succeeds this, being free from pains and from those who rule over the aeon of darkness, and being destined to live in the heavenly commonwealth. For we were predestined to be holy and blameless before him in love, unto the adoption as children of God, and that we might have a likeness to our Father who is in heaven, in the reception of the adoption of children which we await: namely, the redemption of our body, having no longer in any way the capacity to sin. Therefore, we are not destined to die in the future, but are raised above the evils by which it is given to nature to be affected. ^D How much, then, we are likened to God in these respects—more than Israel, who was also called a son—is evident.

Yet our adoption of children so excels their adoption, and in such respects, that their spirit is called a spirit of slavery unto fear and the bond of the yoke of servitude, while this one is called a spirit of adoption of children in which we cry, "Abba, Father," which that one never dared to say. For this is properly called the freedom with which Christ has set us free; thus it is indeed so. The Lordly man was also called, he says, Son of God, according to the words, "And he shall be called the Son of the Most High." But he, in addition to all our special attributes—in which he is and is said to be like us—is the firstborn among many brethren to the one God who is the common Father of all; and he has other [attributes].

from which he is also called the Only-Begotten by the Father. These are: first, that he was separated and chosen from all visible and invisible creatures as soon as he existed, and by grace received the dignity of being the Son—much like a king’s son born in purple, or one crowned while still in his mother’s womb, taking the crown of his mother, as happens often. ^B And thus he was united to God the Word from his very first creation, and was named Son not because of the adoption of sons [as it is] with us, but as one united to the Word for his manifestation and as one holding his person, bearing his honor, bearing his dignity. And he "sat at the right hand of God, in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority and power, having received a name greater than every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in the one to come; ^C so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven and those on earth and those under the earth," for he subjected "all things simply under his feet; and through him to the divine Word, whose person he holds; and through him to the Father who is inseparable from him, together with the Holy Spirit; and thus he is the mediator between God and men. Yet those who say that Christ has subsisted by a composition of the Word and a man will never grant him anything more than this. If the comparison of these adoptions is incomparable, how do they say that we speak of Christ as being of equal honor with us? Because we suppose him to be an adopted son not by nature, nor even as the Son of God himself, but by grace. For it has been shown that to be called sons, and to be adopted by grace—whether for all men, or for Jews, or for Christians, or for Christ—does not have a difference of "more or less" in a small respect. ^D

Therefore, in addition to all these things, we say with God that there is truly a difference between these adoptions given by grace. What then do you say? Does the adoption of sons among us Christians—which makes us spiritual instead of carnal by nature in the future, and shows us to be immortal instead of mortal, and free by nature instead of slaves, and fearless in our whole lives instead of always laboring in affliction and pain, and in tranquility instead of those who were in distress, and innocent instead of sinners, and immutable in substance instead of mutable, so that from then on nothing dangerous can occur because it is subject to no punishments—does it make those who share in it different in substance from those who share in the Jewish adoption, which shows those who are adopted among them to be still mortal, and prone to error, and slaves, and fearful, and punished, and in stripes? Or does it not? If indeed the totally immortal, living, and immutable [being], and the rest, is of a different substance from that which is shown to be mortal and mutable and such like, then the adoption of sons in Christ must be considered. Would you not say that it itself also exceeds the adoption of us other Christian men as much as ours

^A exceeds the Jewish, not to say anything more? For if it does not excel, lo, among us Christ is a Christian in dignity alone; but if you say that it does excel, as you have already conceded, then it has surely rendered Him as much superior to our substance as our adoption of sons will render us, the faithful, superior to the unbelievers.

Since, therefore, Christ is superior in substance to us men, and even to those spiritual Christians of whom Christ is the head, what then will He be in nature? For He must necessarily be either a Cherub, or an angel, or one of the intermediate orders, or truly God. Since, therefore, it is altogether unacceptable to all—and even to you yourselves—that He should be an angel in substance (for then the incarnation of the Word, the deification of the flesh, and all the rest of the discourses ^B concerning the economy would be false), it is necessary that He be God in substance, having been made God by the grace of this adoption of which you speak. But everything that makes something is greater than that which is made by it; therefore this grace is also greater than the divine substance which it has produced. Consequently, it is also greater than the divine substance that bestowed that grace, if indeed it was bestowed by God. For that which is seen to be superior and greater than one of two similar and equal things is, by a kind of linear necessity, so in relation to the other as well. Thus, we too, being sons of God by grace and not by nature, would be greater in substance than God, on account of the grace that is greater than the substance. Why, then, do you fear to call Christ a participant of the divine substance? You grant Him, without hesitation, the grace of adoption—which, according to you, is the creator of the divine substance and superadded to natures—as the creator of that very substance, its cause, and something greater than it. ^C You have been caught, in truth, in the worst of evils and are contriving what is most base. For you seek only not to appear impious, though you are willingly impious; for you do not at all know in what Christ truly excels you, since you consider Him to be merely a naked man, even though you attribute grace, honor, and glory to Him in name only. You glorify the Word in vain, above the union of the divine and human nature, and therefore above the incarnation of the Word and the deification of His flesh.

For let us now also examine this: How do you say that this union, which you pretend to acknowledge, of the Word with Christ—who seems to you to be a man—takes place for all things immediately from the beginning of His conception, declaring it with a show of piety, ^D while yet denying that the composition of the Word with the flesh takes place? For a union, unless it comes to be by way of composition, is seen to be either by local apposition, as of a stone and gold in a ring, or of the boundaries of the territory of Judea to the boundaries of the territory of Samaria that borders upon it, and such like; or by a voluntarily chosen disposition, as is the case for the lover of gold toward gold, for the lover of horses toward horses, for the lover of pleasure toward pleasure, for the friend of God toward God, and similar things; or by a certain natural disposition, such as that of parents toward children of the same nature; or of men, or horses, or eagles, of the same substance, all...

^A of which the Word of the eagle-kind makes into one individual under the definition of species, by natural similarity; or again, as the likeness of an image to its archetype, it joins that which is the species in each. If, therefore, you say that the union of the Word with Christ happens according to local apposition, the divine Word is a body, and it can be seen and touched, and it exists in a place, and is limited, and other absurdities follow. But if it is according to a disposition chosen by the will, the union with God will not be of Christ alone, but also of Abel and Enoch and Noah and Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, of Moses and Samuel and David and Jeremiah, and of the rest of the Fathers and patriarchs and all the prophets up to John the Baptist, and of those who from John until the present time have been well-pleasing to God. For it is not said concerning one alone, but that: “The Lord is well-pleased with those who fear Him, and with those who hope in His mercy.” ^B And: “There is no respect of persons with God, but in every nation he who fears Him and does righteousness is accepted by Him.” It is manifest, therefore, that neither from this union will Christ be anything greater than those who from every age have feared God and the angels; you cannot, therefore, say that He alone was chosen from all visible and invisible things, and that He was deemed worthy, beyond all others, of some honor or union or sonship or grace from such a union.

But if you are not suggesting that, but rather a union of the Word with Christ according to a natural disposition, since this is seen in consubstantial things—for every animal loves what is like to itself, not what is unlike—or according to certain accidental similarities of some things, it is clear that you are saying the Word is like Christ in some accidental way, and the Word will not be God, subsisting in His own person, composed of substance ^C and accidents; or [you mean] according to substance, and it is clear that you think the Word’s flesh is of the same nature as our flesh, and the divine Trinity fails you in person, or that you think the flesh is God, consubstantial with the Word, and the holy Trinity is redundant for you in one hypostasis; of necessity, therefore, you worship a dyad or a tetrad, and you utterly corrupt the holy Trinity. But if you do not admit any of these unions because of the absurdities, nor the union according to composition because of your own dogmas—yet, as you profess, how do you seem to speak of a union of the Word and flesh, while rejecting every mode of union in yourselves? Therefore it has become manifest that you merely feign the form of piety, while denying its power altogether; for indeed, in what follows, you are convicted of saying that this is a union for the manifestation of the Word, and of calling it, I know not how, into a person. For it says that Christ holds the person of the Word; that is what we know. But, O sophists and not wise men, and perhaps for this reason also reprobate, it is not ^D thus in person

^A For just as a union into a mixture produces a mixture (for example, that of vinegar and water), and as a union into a constitution produces a constitution (for example, that of a choir), and as a union into a juxtaposition produces a juxtaposition (for example, that of a house), and as a union into a certain nature produces a nature (for example, that of a body from its elements): so too, union into a person will show some person as new or in a newer way. And yet, this union into a person is not, as you say, the showing of some other person in place of oneself, or the manifestation of another unknown person; but, on the contrary, it is the concealment of a person by an anti-person, and merely the declaration of a name—which could have been announced by a prophet even without a person. For by what is it joined? Or in what does it participate? Or with what are such things united to one another? For if by likeness—then again God is flesh, or flesh is the Word. What need was there of likeness when, if the principal person was not in truth to be manifested, the one that was not to be hidden anymore would be shown instead? But if they are unlike, in what does the union of the persons consist? And how will the investigation not induce only error, when one thing is shown as another, and not as what it really is? "Indeed," he says, "both are united by the divine name; for that which was not divine by nature has been deemed worthy of the divine name." Is it not to be seen, then, clearly, that those great dignities of Christ have arrived for you, after a long separation, at a vain naming? For since there is no other thing in Him by which He participates in God, except for the name alone, how shall Christ not have a participation with God that is according to the union of homonyms—that which is based solely on the name—rather than according to the reality underlying the name? ^B Yet of this, as has been said before, even angels and holy men have long been deemed worthy by God, and even demons and idols and birds and reptiles and stones have been deemed worthy by men to be called gods and lords and sons of God and of the gods. Is the beatification of Christ above all others to be found in these things, then? Is this His "gift of exceeding exaltation," this misnamed "god-calling"? O the shame of such dogmas! O the nonsense of such propositions!

^D Let them tell us further, then: since homonyms are either those of the same substance, having the same name from a special name (like Judas Iscariot and Judas the brother of the Lord); or they are things of different substance that have the same name from a common name (like the star of the sea and the star of heaven—heteroousios indeed; and of these, one has the name from a common name and the other from a special name, like "angel" meaning both a spirit and the prophet called Malachi; or one is a substance and the other lacks substance, like a wolf as the animal and a wolf as the affection of the soul): according to which of these, among those united by name, does the union of the name of Christ with the name of God and the Word and the Son of God exist, that it would make Him either better, or exalt Him, or benefit Him in any way? For none of those things that are homonymous will enjoy anything of that which is similarly named—unless, indeed, they say that what is meant is this: that by the false naming…

^A nor through the mere sharing of homonyms that one is broken off from those who are homonymous; unless indeed they choose to say that this very thing is to plunder divine glory by false nomination, and to boast before those who are ignorant of the distinction between that which is by nature and that which is by a nominal title of God. But if this is the great glory of Christ, then much earlier than Christ, the devil and the demons desired it and enjoyed it; indeed, even animals and reptiles were deemed worthy of it, as it is written. From all this, therefore, it is shown clearly that Christ was not truly and in reality deemed worthy of honor, or of glory, or of any other of those high and divine things; or, if he truly is in the participation of the divine appellations, this consists in the fact that he has first within himself the Word of God, truly claiming these things by nature; for it is for this reason that he is enriched with all the things that are special to God and pertain only to Him, and Christ truly exhibits these in himself.

^B Furthermore, let those who say that he has participated in some most great dignity answer us: What kind of dignity is this? Is it a natural one, such as is the preeminence of man over the animals according to substance, as it has been said: "Thou hast put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen"? Or is it an accidental one, such as the exaltation of Saul above his fellow tribesmen? For if it is an accidental one, then it is not divine ^C nor worth mentioning; but if it is a natural one, it is manifest that he who was not previously of that nature which consists of it did not participate in it truly and without fiction. If, therefore, Christ has participated in the natural dignity of God, and the name "God" is properly of nature, it is evident that he, having first acquired that very divine nature whose own proper dignity and name it is, has also obtained these as well. We therefore rightly maintain the union of the divine and human nature. Or, if the matter is not so, the man himself, having been changed into such a divine nature, has obtained the dignity of the divine nature along with the name. And from this it will result that neither does he who merited the dignity remain, nor does he who received the grace continue, nor are there fully two natures present, nor is that which is human in Christ preserved at all—although, on the contrary, they strive rather to take away from him that which is divine.

^D I would gladly ask them this also: Do they name the Word Christ in some way? Or do they say that Christ, besides being Son and God, is also the Word, or not? If they do not, then behold, they have overturned everything conceded by them for the honor of Christ, and they do not even offer that simple communion according to name which they pretend to have; for if he is not the Word, neither is he the natural Son of God, nor even nominally so. But if, having perceived these things, they name Christ the Word, and the Word Christ, then for the manifestation of person and for the sake of antonomasia, they say that the flesh has taken the name of the Word itself. In whatever way, therefore, the flesh wishes to occupy the same proper person and to manifest this, it will be found that it itself occupies that which belongs to the other; but this will be

^A or name, according to any certain dispensation. For if it is truly fitting only to exalt the lesser person with the greater name, what need is there to lower the greater person with the lesser name? For there is no profit for the one glorified from the ignobility of the one glorifying him. But neither did the Word himself, glorifying the flesh with his own name and seeking glory from its name, receive it from that source. What then, they might say, is the cause of this exchange of parts, if it is not the rationale of the union of the whole? But in their saying, "Yes, all that God the Word is, the man united to him is also," while attributing nothing of the Word to Christ as separated from him, how will they not be put to shame? For if God the Word is something in addition to his essence which he communicates to Christ, that is merely an accident according to that aspect—and I do not say this of my own accord; but if something is thought to be an accident in him at all, he will no longer be God. But if the Word is nothing but the hypostasis of God in addition to his essence—and let them say this—since the man Christ is now with the Word, how is he not clearly united to him according to hypostasis? For either they say that there exists another similar hypostasis of the man, given to him in addition to the Word, and there would be two Words, and these would be two gods, and two sons, and the holy Trinity a quaternity; or if this one is communicated to the human nature—that is, assuming it into itself—it is the common hypostasis of the Word and of the flesh of Christ, and we rightly venerate in Christ the union of the Word and flesh according to hypostasis. But truly, it is so.

^B But even if there were no refutation of those arguments brought forward by them for the sake of their own impiety, how would that absurdity which follows from their propositions not alone suffice to repel their superstition? For since there is but one Son by propriety, as they say, and he is entirely by nature the Son of God, understood without flesh before Christ and after Christ—that is, one hypostasis—and since there is another hypostasis of Christ, and he is entirely by nature the Son of man and known as incarnate, but called Son of God only by grace and pure and simple condescension, how would these two hypostases not be two sons, being distinct by distinct filiations and distinct fathers, and always discrete in their mode of subsistence and place? ^C Of these, if they worship the one as by nature divine, but deny the other to be consubstantial with themselves, they would be manifest Jews, the adversaries of Christ, saying themselves: "For a good work we do not stone you, but because you, being a man, make yourself the Son of God." But if they also worship this one as God, which they acknowledge to be only a human nature, they are revealed as Greeks, worshipping the creature in place of the Creator, and truly anthropolaters, constituting a quaternion of divine hypostases from three consubstantial ones and one of a different substance. And let them not say: "By the will of God we worship the man Christ." For where did the divine oracles teach us to worship a man as God? ^D Nay, there is no place where divine Scripture does not refute such men; and it testifies that, "You shall worship the Lord your God, and him

^A And let us see in order what these most reverend men allege in response to these things.

CHAPTER IX-X

If we were to say, they say, that two sons are from God, either according to nature or both according to grace, you would rightly deduce that we are saying there are two sons of God. For the Holy Scripture signifies two or more sons, when all those who are being numbered together are from the same, and according to the same word and manner—whether therefore both have been generated by Him by nature or by adoption, so that they can even be called brothers of one another. Thus, for instance, it is said: "The mother of the two sons of Zebedee." And in Genesis: "Joseph had two sons." And: "Ruben said to his father: Deliver my two sons to death, if I do not bring him back to you, that is, Benjamin." And again it is written by the Apostle: "That Abraham had two sons." There, therefore, are two or more sons, and they are called brothers, and a first-born and a later-born are mentioned, as in [the case of] Esau and Jacob. If, therefore, we were to say that the Word and Christ are from God by nature, or both by grace, you would ^B rightly blame us; for it would have been necessary that they, being two, be called brothers, and that one be the first-born and the elder, unless they were twins. But if this one is by adoption, and that one by nature, and Christ is the Son—one, indeed, by nature, and the other by adoption—it is clear that the counting together of two sons has no place.

These, then, are the statements of those who are truly the fabricators and inventors of paradoxical dogmas, who do not approve of two natures, to wit, the divine and the human, coming together into one Son and one hypostasis, as though it were an impossible mode; and who firmly stipulate that two persons and two perfect sons, distinct in their own properties, are joined together into one Son. Let us, therefore, say to them: Do not be unstable in your thoughts like drunken men, O most excellent ones. For either the varied mode of generation is the cause of numbering two as one son, even if they are of the same father, or else the procreation of each son from different parents, or both—that is to say, the difference of sonship and of the progenitors—are simultaneously the causes why the dual number of sons is removed. If, therefore, the diverse mode of generation is that which causes one to be numbered for two sons, primarily, how did you say that he also, the one Son, has a double ^D and diverse generation, while not bearing for us to call the holy Virgin Theotokos? For if he were generated by another generation, you would say that he did not remain the same eternal Son of God, the Word; for you were affirming in every way that whatever is generated in any manner is other than that which already existed. Otherwise, if the diverse mode simply removed the number of sons, yet also added a newer sonship—[as] John the Evangelist, who became a son of the Lady by adoption, through that which was said by the Lord on the cross: "Behold, thy mother," and "Behold, thy son,"—while the Lord, being her son by nature, was one son...

^A both, due to the different manner of sonship. But if it is not the difference of generation, but of the procreators, that shows those born to be one and many, is it then the case that because Simon is generated of Jonas, and John of Zebedee, the two of them were one son? And if it is because the manner of generation is different, and the persons who procreated are different, yet these—having come together in a different way, and presenting those born in different ways as being different—are one son, does it follow that John, being a son of the Lady by adoption, and Simon, being a son of Jonas by nature, were one son because of the different manner and the diversity of their parents? But if all these things are manifestly false, it is evident that in those cases in which only one hypostasis lies underneath, this is true: for John, being the same person, was in reality the one and only son of Zebedee by nature and of the Lady by adoption, because one hypostasis can be subject to two sonships.

But you shout out unambiguously that there are two hypostases and two perfect persons of Christ and of the Word. How then, O you who speak wonders, will the Son be Christ and the Word due to a different generation? Thus, for you, difference would be the cause of union, and similarity the principle of separation in things—things which have been revealed to no one from eternity before you. Certainly, if they say that one is generated by reason of the diversity of the parents, these are laughable absurdities; for if they were to claim that those from similar parents are two, but that those from different parents are one son, they would be representing all who are born in this way. Are Ophni and Phinees, therefore, two sons, since they are from the same Heli? And are Jonathan and David—since the one is from Saul and the other from Jesse—not two sons, but only one? But if this ^B be the case, then not even those from Cain and Seth, though they sprang from different sources, are two sons, but all men are one son. If truly the simple disparity of the species of the parents were the cause of this, then horses and fish would all be one son. Who will endure these absurdities? For this is plainly gathered thus: that if the parents are different, the many are one son; and if they are not different, they are many sons. Therefore, diversity will be the cause of union and unity, but similarity the cause of separation and multiplicity: which are inverted.

CAP. XI.

Nevertheless, they say, concerning those two causes, that the natural sons of Bala, the handmaid of Rachel, are also sons of Rachel by adoption, and they are not multiplied in number, just as it was said by her to Jacob: "Go in unto my handmaid, and she shall bear upon my knees, and I shall receive offspring ^C from her." And again: "God judged for me, and heard my voice, and gave me a son; therefore she called his name Dan." But she herself also brought forth by nature Joseph and Benjamin; and not for that reason are there four sons of Rachel out of the twelve patriarchs; for the sons of adoption are not numbered. We could, however, say: If they are not numbered at all, how then, if Dan and Nephthali are not counted, are there twelve patriarchs? But it is manifest that they are not numbered with the sons by nature. Furthermore, if not as sons of Rachel, yet at least as sons of Bala, who is another, behold they are numbered; ^D of the other...

they are children, not because they are from different mothers, but because they are sons from an undifferentiated father; so that both those who are from different [mothers] and those who are from an undifferentiated [father], if they are plural in their hypostases, are numbered as sons. Only then are multiple sons not numbered, when there are multiple modes of filiation for the same hypostases; for this reason, since the sons of Bala are sons of her by nature and sons of Rachel by adoption, they are these same persons, and not counted as two sons each on account of the two filiations—for in that way the patriarchs would have been fourteen—but each one, having a different relationship to his parents through different filiations, is not measured by different numbers and hypostases. ^A Since it is said by them that if, because the man is the Son of God by adoption, ^B it does not compel Christ to be computed into a duality of sons together with the Word who is Son of God by nature—for the number pertains to those who are such by nature—this is thereby demonstrated: that he who is such by adoption will not enter into the number of sons, either as one excelling or as one who is nothing at all. For if he enters as one excelling, then John is greater than the Lord among the sons of the Lady, and the man is absolutely better than the Word with God the Father; but if he is worse, how is the worse [son] one son with the better? For they would not call different things one.

But if they say that he is as one who is nothing, their opinion concerning the filiation of Christ is refuted. But in order that they may be shown to be liars in this regard as well, behold, in the genealogy of the Lord, Joseph, the spouse of the Lady, is called the son of Heli, although by nature he was the firstborn of Jacob, his brother, but according to the law he was declared the seed of that brother who had died beforehand without children. Furthermore, in order to reveal more openly their double impiety, we shall say this: If, according to you, Christ is the Son of God by adoption, and for that reason is not joined in number to the Son by nature and word of God, are you not thereby convicted of asserting two sons? But truly, since he himself is clearly the son of someone by nature, and according to you, of a man—for he was not generated spontaneously—it is evident that he is, even according to you, if not the son of God, at any rate necessarily the son by nature of some person. Therefore, you are calling two sons: this one, who is not God nor the natural Son of God, but according to you the natural son of a man, and the Word of God who is the natural Son of God; or [otherwise] you would also call Seth the son of Adam and the Word of God two sons, as being sons of one and the other. ^C But if this is so, it is manifest that you acknowledge two sons, the Word and Christ, just as in reality you speak of two persons; and [you say that] Christ is neither God nor the Son of God, but only a bare son of a man, after the manner of us humans. These were the very things for which you were long ago accused by us, while you, fleeing now here and now there, plotted to remain hidden; and behold, by another [heresy] you have proved your other perverted doctrine. This is often to be seen in the demoniacs, when the divine power reveals and compels, through the holy ones, the demons themselves, however unwillingly, to speak of their own machinations, stratagems, and wickednesses against the possessed. ^D

But since they are unable to demonstrate, either by syllogism or by the explanation of principles, how they say that the different persons are not two sons, they now wish to demonstrate this to us by examples, and they say:

Chapter XII.

Chapter XIII.

is naturally flesh. But the Word, even though He is naturally God, is not the Son of the Father by nature, but combined with the flesh, He is Son by grace. The Father, therefore, is not God, whether these sons be similar or dissimilar, since seals and their archetypes have a diversity in number, even if they do not differ in species. And these, being different in number, could be and could be counted into a duality of sons, just as Paul and Peter, or a ring and wax, or clay and lead marked by an impression. But again, they foolishly say that the different material removes the number of the seals and causes many to be considered as one. Therefore, we would say, that which differs in matter brings it about: for when contraries are proven by contraries, if all the seals had been impressed in wax, they would be more numerous; but since they are impressed in different materials, according to you, they are one. But such things must happen, and yet they wring laughter from us. ^B

CAP. XIV.

What then, they say, are there two words, the spoken and the heard? But besides these, first there is one that is internal to the mind, and another in thought; another that is uttered by the mouth, and another that depends upon it, written; and after these comes the heard. But even of these, as in the case of the seals, there is something common and one, consisting in the fact that the same thing is signified. Just as if a word were to signify many things or bear a double sense, even if it be spoken to or heard by only one person, it is not yet called one word; and although it be announced in a single utterance, it is nevertheless admitted by all dialecticians to be several words. It is evident, therefore, that the unity of the word properly consists in its signification. ^C But if someone should say that because it happens that the same word, one in number, is to be spoken by the speaker and heard by the one standing by, that it is therefore one, he would not have a parallel for your example. For there do not underlie this two things in number, which two words might be called by one name, in the way that you are pleased to call the person of Christ and of the Word two numerically distinct hypostases, yet one Son. But you wish to show the contrary; here there is one subject in number, called by two names from a different relation. For the word itself is one in number only: by the relation to the one uttering it, it is called "said"; by the relation to the hearer, it is called "heard." Therefore, your own spittle again falls back into your own mouths. ^D

LIBER IV.

CHAPTER FIRST.

^A hidden in those who say there is one hypostasis of Christ, and a synthesis of God the Word with the flesh. For what is there to be found in the word "Theotokos," especially when they add "properly and in truth," other than this same thing which we find separated in the synthesis: that the name "Theotokos" is used indefinitely, just as the name "God" is used in various ways, and in some sense has a relationship [to the object in view] which suggests piety? But now, since "properly and in truth" has been attached to the word, they have filled it with all impiety and open blasphemy. Nevertheless, one must ask them: what does such a denomination mean to them, and according to what conception has it been accepted by them? Is it, as we say "male-bearing" or "female-bearing" of a woman who is accustomed to bear males or females, so do they call the holy Mary "Theotokos," signifying by this word that she was born to bring forth gods? And if so, let them say which gods she bore, and let them teach us that which is currently unknown. Or is it that she bore God? If they desire to signify this even once by naming the Virgin in such a way, yet we do not know if such a form of a name is able to signify this.

"The Lord shall destroy all deceitful lips, the boastful tongue, those who say: 'Our tongue will we magnify; our lips are our own; who is our Lord?'" ^B Tell us, you who set down the law with such authority, that she who gives birth receives a name not from one, but from many births. Is it therefore the case—since Isaac was the only-begotten to Sarah, Samuel to Hannah, John to Elizabeth, Mary to Anna, and simply all those, men and women alike, who are recorded as having had only one son or one daughter—that if anyone wished to name them, calling them by the nature and generation of their offspring, he would dare to call them "male-bearers" or "female-bearers"? And who, on hearing such things, does not spit upon your sophistries, O wretches? But if things are as you assert, you who say you do not know if it is possible for this to be demonstrated by such a form of the name, how do you conceive to call her "Christotokos" and "anthropotokos" who is in reality "Theotokos"? For if it is not possible for one who gives birth to receive a name from a single birth, then you must think that the holy Virgin brought forth either multiple Christs ^C or mere men, or else you have no ground for applying such names to her, O most miserable ones. But it follows logically from your supposition that not even the Father of His only Son and Word of God can be called his begetter, since He begat one and not multiple Gods; and how then do you say He is properly the begetter of God? But you are rightly told: "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and their foolish heart was darkened." For a plurality contributes to the denomination of the thing named only when the things themselves are numerically many, and they are signified by a singular character of the name used as a collective. For in this way, one vine will not constitute a vineyard; nor would anyone describe a region as "vine-bearing" or "fruit-bearing" or "fish-bearing" ^D [the water]. But these...

are the first of your censures against us. Now, however, let the following blasphemies of yours also be examined, and let it not remain hidden from any that they are condemned. ^A

Chapter II.

Now, you have dared to overturn the notion of the term "Theotokos"—which is properly and truly spoken concerning the holy Virgin—not because there are not many gods, but because [you claim] He who was born is not Himself, properly, God. For by introducing the name "God," ^D which is used homonymously for certain things that differ in nature, you wish in this and the following argument to show, as also throughout your entire thesis, that it is not God by nature that is signified when spoken of Christ, nor yet any of those falsely called gods—for you have confessed that this is something to be avoided even by devils—but that it is "God by adoption" that is signified by such a name concerning Christ. Yet God by adoption, as you yourselves say, has not been called such in Holy Scripture, neither an angel, nor any animal other than man. Therefore, by necessity according to your opinion, the one born will be called a man, and she who bore him will be called the "birth-giver of a man." But if the one born is a man, he is God by adoption. Moreover, He who is God by nature commands all men not to serve those who are not gods by nature; but he cries out explicitly, "To the Lord thy God thou shalt..."

^A worship, and Him only shalt thou serve." Whence it follows that you neither worship nor serve Christ, since, according to your error, He is God by adoption and not by nature; but rather that you are openly some kind of Antichrists, and not seen to be Christians. Or, if you fear this, by worshipping Him and serving Him, you will be caught by us as being, in the proper sense, worshippers of a creature and followers of a man. Do not, therefore, be angry henceforth at being called such, and do not attempt to shake off such an opinion of you; nor mix everything together to demonstrate that you do not appear to be such, as you have already strained to prove through your many long-winded orations.

CHAP. III.

Every generation known from divine Scripture either ^B constitutes the cause of the existence of him who is said to be begotten, as "Abraham begat Isaac," or it does not constitute the cause of his existence, just as the Apostle begat the Corinthians, according to what was said: "For in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the Gospel." Now, of the generation which is the cause of being, one sort causes the begotten to exist simultaneously with the begetter, while another causes it to exist later: the God-Word exists simultaneously with the Father, having been begotten of Him; but Isaac exists after Abraham, and anyone such as he. ^C But of the generation which is not the cause of the existence of the begotten, one sort shows the begotten to be better than he was, another worse; better, for instance: "As many as received Him, to them He gave the power to become children of God, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God"; worse, for instance: "Generation of vipers, who showed you to flee from the wrath to come?" According to what generation, then, do they say the God-Word was born of a woman? Is it according to the one that gives existence to the begotten? Therefore the God-Word is not eternal. For no such generation knows the begotten to pre-exist the begetter; and that which does not pre-exist the non-eternal is not eternal—which it is ^D impious to say of the God-Word. But they say He was born according to that generation which does not give existence to the begotten. Therefore the God-Word is variable and not immutable, since any such generation renders the begotten either better or worse. But he who becomes better or worse than himself is evidently proven by this change to be mutable and variable. If, however, the God-Word is not mutable and not non-eternal, therefore He was not begotten of a woman properly and according to truth, nor can a generation from a woman be predicated of Him at all, according to the sense of Scripture.

While trying by many substitutions of words and changes of meaning to lie hidden, you are nevertheless easily caught as guilty of impiety. For let there be, as you have said, other modes of these generations and other consequences thereof; but that which we now seek from you...

^A in demonstration, it is this: namely, whether it is truly impossible for one and the same person, as we say, to undergo two different generations, so that by these various generations both may be distinguished in their consequences. For it must be observed that most of the Gentiles, who were begotten in Christ Jesus through the Gospel by Paul, did clearly exist before him according to the carnal generation. Would one not, therefore, say that the same person—any of his disciples—pre-existed his own father and teacher Paul, and at the same time was also later than he, according to his testimony? There is certainly none, I believe, who would not admit this; but with respect to different things he will say that the same person both pre-existed and was posterior to the same man, that is to say, according to the generation of existence, he is pre-existent, but according to the generation into the Gospel, he is posterior. Similarly, even the brood of vipers, those who are of the race of Abraham according to the flesh, being instructed by their own sons, namely the apostles—the Lord turning the hearts of the fathers to the children—how would they not be said at once to pre-exist their children according to the carnal generation, yet be later than them according to the spiritual regeneration? If, however, these things are so, what do you find incredible regarding the Word, that according to one of his generations he is truly eternal and simple, while according to the other he has a beginning and is composite? For by a certain addition he is recognized by a new name, and at length is called not only simple Word, but composite Christ. ^B These things being granted as they are, she who brought forth the composite has by all means also brought forth the simple; for in the composite is that [simple] existence. But he who begat the simple has not thereby begat the composite; for the composite is not in the simple. Therefore, according to that generation which grants to the ^C Word simply begotten an existence—and indeed an eternal existence—we do not term the Virgin "Mother." But according to that generation which grants him such an existence—namely, incarnate, so that he has his existence in time in the flesh, in such a way that he has his composition contemporaneously with that very flesh, being begotten together with it from her, existing in time according to his being—we do truly call her Mother of the simple thing as well; yet we know that she, through this composition, remains undefiled. For our Lord Jesus Christ consists entirely of the eternal Word and temporary flesh, the Word being twice begotten—without flesh from the Father, and with flesh from the Mother—while the flesh was begotten but once and only from the Mother without seed. Since, therefore, the true God is the Word both without flesh and with flesh, those who have begotten this Word are truly parents according to both generations. ^D These, then, are the matters concerning the diverse procession of the Word according to his generations. But those productions of generations according to "progress" and other such things are vainly brought forward by you regarding Christ; for by no such mode has any discourse ever called the undefiled one "Theotokos," nor have these things entered into the imagination of any of those who are even highly irrational.

CHAPTER IV

the generation, then that generation of the Word of God from a woman, which is so called, is not such, since they are not similar; but if the former be true, the latter is not. But if you say that the generation according to cause alone, both timeless and coeternal with the Father of the Word of God, is the proper and unique generation, because it shows that the begotten coexists with the begetter, then you do not acknowledge that generation which is not similar to this as a proper generation. It remains, therefore, that you do not acknowledge as a proper generation the generation of Isaac from Abraham, or of any other man from a man, or of an animal from an animal, or that which occurs from a plant; for neither are these timeless, nor coeternal, nor do they simply coexist with those that bring them forth, nor are they in every way similar, as God the Father begat the Word. But if the generation of Isaac from Abraham is true, ^B as even you have said elsewhere, as is the case of the remaining animals and plants—which is temporal and shows the begotten to have a later existence, and in general bears the infinite and almost all the reasons of generations of the divine nature—then the generation of the Word from God the Father, understood as eternal, will not be the only generation properly and in truth according to you. If, therefore, both that and these are true, and are called generations, then those who are called begetters are true as well, according to the different reason for these generations. Therefore, Paul through the Gospel, and the Spirit through baptism, and Abraham from the loin, and Rachel from the womb, and the Father from Himself and in Himself begetting, are all truly begetters and are so called; if, therefore, there were several begetters of this same one individual according to several of these modes, the same one Son will truly be the son of them all. As to the cause, however, the Word was begotten from the Father; as to composition and conception, from the Mother. For what conceives does not beget the whole from itself, as the very name of conception indicates. ^C

CHAPTER V

^A acknowledges Paul as a father—those who are fathers of the flesh, those who are the Father of spirits, those who are said to be born of the devil, and those born of vipers—although each has been born according to a different generation, yet all belong to the same, that is, a similar human substance. Blessed Timothy, who was the son of Paul and a Gentile father, though one in number, yet acknowledged these as multiple fathers. How, then, will these things serve as testimony for your claims? And this is so, in this way: for Adam was born in one way, Eve in another, and Seth in another, yet who would deny that they have one and the same nature? Hence, it does not follow that those whose generations are different have different substances. Especially if they were taken from one person or another, perhaps they might indicate a difference regarding substance; but in the same subject, even when endowed with different generations, how could the same being be different? Therefore, since you have not first demonstrated that it is impossible for one and the same subject to exist, or for a certain consubstantiality to be understood, under two different generations, why do you simply infer from the difference of the generations alone that the same generated subject is also different? For we shall say the opposite to you: if those whose generations differ also have differing substances, then those whose generation is not different must likewise not have a different substance. If, therefore, the generation of donkeys, and dogs, and humans, and pigs, and apes—being temporal, and from seed, and through a womb, and occurring in a similar manner—constitutes a similar substance for them, why do I need other ^B or different generations to demonstrate whether there is a difference or similarity of substances based on the mode of generation? For although it is one and the same human being, his generation is one in number and the same, as is evident; but soul and body, the natures born together in him, are different. Therefore, according to your view, we would either have to say that their substance is not different, since we would not even say their generation is, or, by asserting that their substance is different, we would have to believe that the two generations of the single human being are different and in the same subject. And such are your sophistries. Yet no one has ever told you that he considers the Word to be simple; but rather that a second birth brought Him forth with a carnal substance from a mother, according to His second generation—oh, you who are falsely held to be wise! ^C

CHAPTER VI

If that which is begotten, insofar as it is begotten, is impossible to be begotten again, then in like manner that which is eternal is impossible to be born again from a woman: but the former is true, therefore so is the latter. If you utterly remove every birth from the eternal Word, as if it bestows existence upon the begotten, you will surely also remove from Him the first birth ^D which is from the Father, as [He is] eternal. For you affirm that it is impossible for that which is eternal to be born; whence it follows that He is not the Son of the Father—for there is no Son without generation—and that the Father is not Father—for there is no Father without a Son. Or, if you acknowledge His generation from the Father, you will then finally show that He is not eternal, inasmuch as that which is from eternity is...

^A by the fact that it always exists, but by the fact that it simply already existed and was generated at some point, how do you say that it is even once, or entirely, or in any way whatsoever, or in any other manner, possible for anything to be born? For this is what your "again" implied, and let us examine this detail by detail. Was Timothy not yet born by any generation, and did he not come forth from other parents, when Paul, who is called his father, begot him as a true son in the faith in Christ Jesus through the Gospel? And who among you does not shudder at this manifest falsehood? Thus, O you, understand this too: for we say that one of the parts of Christ was born both according to His first generation and according to the second; but the other, it is manifest, was not pre-existent, nor generated before by another generation. We confess that by one generation, they came forth together at the same time into the whole of the one hypothesis. For in one generation, namely from the Virgin, the second [generation] of one of Christ's parts is considered, but the first and only one for the other. ^B

CHAPTER VII

If the substance of the Word of God was born in truth from the substance of the Virgin, and it is necessary that things begotten in this way be similar in substance to those who beget them, then either the Word of God is man in substance, or the Virgin is God in substance; but either is equally impious and impossible. Therefore, the substance of the Word of God was not born in truth from the substance of the Virgin. But first, indeed, it is one thing to be born into a substance, and another to be born according to substance. Furthermore, among those things begotten from a substance, there are many differences of similarity and dissimilarity, as you yourselves were saying lately to those examining precisely; for [nature] begets sometimes similar things, sometimes dissimilar, according to ^C the difference, clearly, of the diverse generations. For if Paul, who worked the generation of Timothy, was a substance, and he himself was also a substance, and was being improved and begotten according to substance unto incorruption through faith (for our spiritual regeneration did not happen according to any accident), and his father according to the flesh was also a substance, and begot according to substance; and, moreover, [there is] the Cause of all substances, He who is without cause, the Father of all. But one begot him similar to his faith, another to his body, and another to his image. Therefore, even if the Father eternally begets the Word from His own substance, and Salomon is said to beget Jeroboam from his substance, the son does not therefore hold the same relation to each father regarding similarity. For when the manner of generations according to substance differs, and is understood in things of diverse nature, even if the generation were similar according to this very point, ^D nevertheless, the difference of the generation from the substance reasonably shows that the similarity also differs. For look, regarding one and the same man, it is said that a son is begotten from his substance, and a thought, and a word, and hair, and scars, and an operation, and many other things; shall we therefore think that all these are similar in substance to the man? Since for the substance and according to a certain substance of these...

^A things that are begotten, is it not necessary that they differ in relation to the begetter? And these are the only things begotten.

Consequently, if God the Word is begotten from the holy Virgin with the flesh, not being merely simple in nature, nor having a simple existence from her, what necessity is there to demand a similarity of the whole substance of the begotten to him who in whatever way begat? Since it is admitted that this generation is not that of the Father, ^B which alone shows the immutability of the similarity of the substance of the offspring to the one who begat it, that is, of the Father to His own Word without flesh. For the flesh and the Word, who pre-exists, were begotten from the holy Lady; and neither was it the Word alone, nor from the substance of the holy Virgin alone, as from the Father. For this was never said to you by us, namely that the Word alone was begotten from her alone, or that the Word did not pre-exist, but we say He was incarnate from her substance. Whence the Word begotten, according to both His parts, is called Christ, as being both anointing and anointed. But if you compel us to say that he is absolutely consubstantial with one and not with two things of a different substance, it is time for you not to say either that Adam, who was created from earth and the divine breath, is consubstantial with one or the other of the substances constituting him, according to one or the other account of the parts of which he consists, but rather ^C to hold that the divine is also earthly, or that the earthly is divine. But if these things contain a manifest error, then truly our one Christ, according to either part of Him, can be and is said to be similar to both those who begat Him.

CHAPTER VIII.

If the Mother of God is truly a Virgin, the Son of the Virgin is truly God. If the Son of the Virgin is truly God, He is either similar to the Mother, or not similar; and if He is similar, He is not God; but if He is not similar, He is not the Son. But it has already been said by us that a true son is not similar to his begetter in all respects. For there is light from fire, and yet it is not in all things similar to fire; and a thought from the soul, and yet it is not a soul; and fishes from water, and yet they are not water. In ^D these things, therefore, one must observe the difference of the things begotten in relation to the things that beget. If, however, Christ is partially dissimilar to the Mother and yet also similar, what is absurd in that? If, therefore, because the chick of a partridge and of a pheasant is not in all respects similar to a partridge, it is not for that reason a chick of a partridge, does it follow, O physiologists?

CAP. IX.

The generation of God the Word from the Virgin according to truth, is it His passion, or an action, or passion and action, or neither passion nor action? But if it appears to be a passion, the impiety is evident; for passion pertains to the begotten; but, according to you, the substance of God is begotten; therefore, passion is attributed to the substance of God. But if it is an action, and God acts not by His existence,

^A but only by His will, then the generation of the substance of God is through an act of will. But if there is both passion and action, God being passive by His substance and acting by His will, then both the substance and the will of God are begotten, the one suffering and the other acting. If, however, there is neither passion nor action, and neither the substance nor the will of God is begotten, tell me then what of God is begotten—that which being begotten, God may be called begotten in the proper and true sense? Alas for your unwise wisdom! May God leave not even a shadow of such eloquence in the world! For what is more miserable than this pursuit, which borrows this entire inconvenient etiology in order to reconcile, by an empty falsehood, an opinion of truth to the substance? And this for no other gain than to construct for itself a foundation of blasphemy. ^B Therefore, it must first be heard from you what consensus exists between what you have felt up to this point regarding generation and things generated, and what you have just said. For you previously distinguished generation properly so-called—that is, that which is from non-existents, or that which simply gives existence to the begotten. For this you introduced without intermission, on every given occasion. But now, how do you say that generation is the consideration of the generated as either passion or action, or both together? For if, according to you, generation is the action of him who is to come into being—whether this generation happens by will or in any other way—and the begotten has its being from Him whose will the generation is, then before it exists, it both wills and will act for its own being; and it will possess its own being and will while it does not yet exist. But if you also say that the generation of this ^C is passion, then in the same way, before it exists, it will be found to be a sufferer; yet I know not in whom it suffers, just as I know not in whom it acts, to put forward its own being, he who does not exist, whoever he may be. But if you say that the generation of the begotten proceeds according to these two dispositions together, all the absurdities of the supposition will follow you twofold, in addition to the fact that they will coexist at the same time and in the same thing, and grant opposite results.

But I am mistaken: for you suppose these to be in the non-existent, and they do not coexist. For those things which are supposed to be in the non-existent do not exist. I do not know, therefore, how those things could be existences in the non-existent, which, even in things that do exist, are not properly existences when they are present. Nor must attention be paid to this, ^D namely, that if the generation of the begotten is an action or a passion, according to these insane modes which you have described as necessary, either the begotten will suffer something in itself from itself, or from the begetter, or from some other; and again, it will either act upon itself, or upon the begetter, or upon some other; and it will be brought about in this way: either it will itself be begetting itself into itself, or into the begetter, or into another; or it will be begotten from itself into itself, or from the Father, or from another. Spare us, O unspeakable ones, from hearing such things and from answering them! We confess that we cannot bear them without anger. Be silent, therefore, that we may speak. For the destruction of one is said to be the accomplishment of another’s generation, with one acting and another suffering, and another begotten one proceeding, just as

we see in the case of bodies according to the diverse modes of those begotten. For by the physical and skilled action of the carpenter, and the suffering of the wood, the form of the bed proceeds. And again, as fire acts by its nature and destroys, and the tallow suffers and is destroyed, the form of smoke is born in the air. For those who think and posit differently what nature and matter are, nevertheless agree that the forms generated from these result from one acting and the other suffering. According to your decrees, however, that which does not exist begets something—and especially its own being—through suffering or action: a thing which no one ever said, nor has anyone recognized action or suffering at all in that which does not yet exist. How, then, do you reason against us with such physical distinctions?

^B But we, confessing that by the grace of God we neither know nor have learned such things hitherto, orthodoxly profess the piety taught to us by the holy Fathers: that the only Son from the only Father, having proceeded before the ages as God the Word by His one, unique, and proper generation, in later times, by His own philanthropic benevolence, we confess that He again wrought His second most proper generation in the embrace of our humanity, and was born of the holy Virgin by carnal outcoming, in a likeness of generation; yet, neither according to the first nor according to the second generation does He have anything in common with all others. For nothing else was generated according to the eternal, and unchangeable, and perfect, and immutable, and indivisible, and complete, and unmoved generation of His—that is, the first; and according to the second, nothing else was generated in such a way, without seed, and without corruption, and supernaturally, and conceived of the Holy Spirit, and perfected without time, and formed, and organized, and completed in the pure womb of the undefiled (mother) into a temple and a tabernacle for the Word, with human flesh perfected from her alone and joined to Him in an instant. Furthermore, we believe that, with the virginal gate truly kept closed, His body—which was truly and naturally the flesh of God—passed through the intact womb of the Virgin by the supernatural power of the Spirit of the Word dwelling in her.

^D How then, for these reasons, shall we not—recognizing her more and more—truly salute this Virgin as *Theotokos*, in whom and from whom, having betrothed the flesh to Himself, the Word proceeded like a bridegroom from His holy bridal chamber? Through whom also Wisdom hewed out her own house and built it for herself? And the wonderful thing is that He did not draw Himself out from the Virgin’s womb according to the natural property of the house; but on the contrary, by the natural property of Himself—that is, of the Word indwelling in her—He spiritually drew forth the house from her who had borne Him. For with Him, the Word granted power to His own flesh to go forth spiritually and pass through the intact body of the Virgin; just as He Himself, being without flesh, was not constricted while entering through her. For since, by His own benevolence, He poured Himself into the Virgin, He who was without flesh formed Himself carnally from her in a divine manner.

Let your profane mouth therefore be silenced until your eyes are opened, so that, when you have seen the light of the mystery, you may then be able to speak not the empty fantasies of the shadows of earthly wisdom, but the great works of God. ^A

CHAPTER X

If God the Word was generated from the Virgin properly and according to truth, and the mortal and corruptible flesh—animated by a rational and intellectual soul—was likewise generated from her properly and according to truth, then either the flesh pre-exists the Virgin, or God the Word is posterior to the Virgin; both of which are absurd. But it has been frequently stated by us, O naturalists, that the generation from the Virgin of both parts of the one Son does not occur according to one and the same definition of generation. Yet she is truly a mother according to both definitions: both in that He has His being from her carnally, and in that He has His being simply as flesh. For in this way, one mother of the one, of both together, has been demonstrated. If, therefore, Zebedee's sons were generated from him in flesh properly and according to truth, and were regenerated first through the Gospel properly and according to truth, they either pre-exist him simply, or he is posterior to them; for if one thing pre-exists, another is posterior, O falsely-called wise men! And it is not as you say, either this or that; for by natural disposition, these things are altogether simultaneous and follow one another. For that which pre-exists, pre-exists relative to that which is posterior. But it is clear that the same person, relative to his sons and his fathers, has both a previous and a subsequent generation under a different respect. ^B

CHAPTER XI

If the offspring of the flesh is the offspring of God according to truth, then "being" is also "being" for God according to truth; but if "being" and "being such" is at once impious and impossible, then the offspring of the flesh is not the offspring of God according to truth. But the word "likewise" is missing from your first proposition; and this was overlooked by you in your reasoning, whether through malice or ignorance. For if the offspring of the flesh is "likewise" the offspring of God—that is, according to the same definition of offspring by which He is from the Father—you will truly concede the same thing to both. But if there are many definitions of offspring stated according to truth, it does not follow from every definition of offspring that one must think the same things regarding those which are said to be generated in any manner whatsoever; nor has anyone conceded to you that the birth of simple and naked flesh is also the birth of God; ^C nor, on the other hand, that when God is conjoined with flesh, the birth of God from the Virgin is the same in definition as the birth of the flesh. Rather, it is the same in number, though it truly consists according to different definitions of generation for both generated natures. For the name of generation, as you yourselves have introduced, is homonymous; and in homonymous things, there is no "more or less"; ^D

"; neither the first nor the second, O you who reason. ^A Therefore, all generations are true, but not similar; for it is acknowledged that the birth of the divine flesh is also the birth of God incarnate, but as is fitting to each. For neither flesh nor birth can change the nature of God. On the contrary, God is able to change the nature of flesh and the natural birth according to the limits, times, and modes of His own dispensation, whenever He wills. Therefore, the birth is of God as having begun the incarnation, and of the flesh as having begun existence.

CHAPTER XII

you should look at this differentiation of substance, not within the physical simplicity of the Word itself, but outside of it, namely in the composite of the person; ^A so that he who wishes to consider the preserved likeness of the substance of the first generation in relation to the begetter, must see it as in a part of the whole from the second generation. And conversely, the addition of the Word from the second generation is to be considered in the likeness of His Virgin mother, with the difference of the two substances of the composite possessing both likenesses regarding substance. And thus, no one would say that the Word has changed His own substance, nor would anyone believe that the composite our Lord Jesus Christ has left behind any difference of His procreative natures. For we do not say, as you arrange it, that the Word simply and alone was begotten by both His ^B begetters; but we sense that the Father begat the Word simply, and the Mother begat the same along with the flesh in the composite Christ.

CHAPTER XIII.

^C If the substance of the Word of God is begotten from the substance of the Father properly and according to truth, and is consubstantial with Him, then the substance of the Word of God is begotten from a woman precisely and according to truth, and it is entirely dissimilar to Him regarding substance. From the fact that the substance is born of the substance properly and according to truth, it does not therefore follow that they must be entirely similar to their begetters as regards substance, but [something] else which cannot even be conceived. The substance of the Word of God is indeed properly and according to truth begotten both from the substance of the Father and from the substance of the holy Virgin, but not by a similar generation, nor by receiving and possessing the same thing from both. For from His first generation from the Father, He has His being solely from the Sole One, wholly from the Whole One, and that without beginning, ^D without time, from eternity, and the other things that are of God. From the second, however, He has His being carnally, and having begun in time by reason of the composite, and the other things according to our likeness. How then, since He was not begotten into the same [state] nor according to the same mode of generation, do you seek in Him the same signs of either origin for the true demonstration of His first and second generation, and in both entirely a likeness? For it is permitted that though the same things do not follow from generations that are not the same, it does not follow that they are not true and properly called generations. For a terrestrial horse, because it is not a hippopotamus, is not therefore not a horse: for both are truly horses. Nor is a terrestrial animal, because it is not marine, therefore not an animal. Therefore, to have been begotten properly and according to truth will not be sufficient to demonstrate the likeness of substance, which you have introduced into the argument of likeness, unless also according to this [mode], from true generations which indeed demonstrate that the begotten are similar, something has been begotten entirely. For you yourselves also granted that in the first place, namely, some begetters establish things that are worse, some better, and some truly similar to those begotten. The Word who--

^A possesses, as God, an integral likeness, ^B as well as a special kind of likeness, whether of the whole or of a part of those things which are considered in generations. But Christ, being begotten and now not simply the Word, has toward the Mother a physical likeness in part, and is in part similar. Whence, being one and the same, according to either of these [aspects] in himself, he possesses both likeness and difference toward both the Father and the Mother. But let us likewise, by bringing forward [these points] against you, demonstrate our own teaching. For if Jonathan was begotten of Saul properly and in accordance with truth, he is similar to him in substance. But the Word was begotten of Him also properly and in accordance with truth, and is most dissimilar to Him in substance. Clearly, therefore, being properly begotten is not the cause of likeness, but a certain kind of relationship of the whole or the part [as] is understood in generations.

CHAPTER XIV

If the Son was begotten of the Father according to divinity, and preserves with Him the likeness in substance—and the Son was begotten, according to you, in like manner from the Virgin according to divinity—it is necessary that He preserve with her the likeness in substance according to divinity; but if this is so, the Virgin will also have, in every respect, a likeness in substance with God the Father; for those things which are similar to the same thing are also similar to each other. But neither is it necessary that everything, nor [that it happen] in every generation, nor that what is begotten of something should in its whole self preserve the reason of the nature of the begetter without change; this has been stated and demonstrated many times. ^C For behold, both "children of wrath," and "sons of disobedience and iniquity," and "sons of darkness," and "children of the evil one," and "sons of this age," and "children of the devil," but also "children of God" and "born of the will of God," and "sons of light," and "sons of day," and "sons of power," and "sons of the Most High," are mentioned in the holy Scripture, according to generations that are different in their own proper reason, and according to the manner of each generation. And no one would say that any of these begotten things is by necessity consubstantial with the begetter. For the children of wrath are not wrath itself, nor are the children of the age the age itself; nor are all the children of God gods in substance, nor are the sons of the Most High consubstantial with the Most High. Therefore, in the first place, it is not necessary that if something is from something, it must be entirely similar to it in the whole reason of its substance. Again, then, we shall say that your difficulty ^D would have some plausibility if we had said that Christ came forth in the same way and in the same manner from both. For if, because He was begotten of the Father according to divinity, and the same [Christ] was begotten of the Mother according to divinity—yet in a different way, namely, by incarnation—you contend that He has the same relationship relative to both begetters concerning substance, it must be said to you that Peter, because he was begotten of Jonas according to substance, and according to substance was breathed upon and super-clothed by the Holy Spirit, being begotten as spiritual, must preserve likeness in substance—according to the whole and not in part—toward both Jonas and the Holy Spirit. And if this is so, then surely Jonas, his father, will have toward the Holy Spirit a likeness in substance

^A: for things similar to the same ^B thing are also similar to each other, as is agreed. If, then, this is not hindered by these things, but is consubstantial to each from the part of his person, why should we not choose to think of Christ in this way?

CAP. XV.

CAP. XVI.

know? For if you acknowledge that these have their sonship solely from the cause of their being, you must of necessity hold that both Judas and the devil, since they are called sons of perdition, have also received their being from that same source. But if you say—as you do—that Judas and those like him had their being from God, but did not have their “being such” from God (insofar as they are called sons of darkness and of the curse), you have recognized that they are called sons by equivocal sonship, according to both meanings. Yet in equivocal things, neither is more properly named than the other. For those who are reborn through repentance unto virtue and through faith in the Holy Spirit are also acknowledged by you to be sons of the Bridegroom, and children of the kingdom, and so forth.

^B And how have you not granted what we ask? For look, to be “such,” and to have participated in something of the sort—often indeed in something substantial, and often in something non-substantial—is what causes one to be and to be called truly the son of that person; for, as has been said, in equivocal things, one is not called something more or more properly than another. Even if an animal seems to be called something more or more properly than another that is written of, it is not then as an equivocal term, but as one properly named, while the other is not properly named. Therefore, the equivocation of two things properly named will never have “more” or “less.” For a land dog is not more a dog than a sea dog, nor is one less an animal than another. Therefore, the named thing is so called as from a cause or an exemplar or something similar. ^C Especially if one must hold that the cause of its existence is He who is said to have begotten all things; no man is the father of a man, nor has any animal begotten another animal. For seeds do not possess an intellectual or sensitive soul, but after the formation and complete arrangement of the inanimate fetus, the animal is enlivened, and especially man, by God, who breathes the spirit of man into him. For this reason, the divine law judges as a murderer of an animal the person who procures an abortion after formation. Are, then, the fathers only, and especially, begetters of flesh? But according to you, no one is the begetter of a man. But in that way, since the body flows and changes daily, and no part of the parents remains in the body over time, they would not even be parents of the flesh. But even the old Isaac would have completely ceased to be the son of Abraham, and the others likewise. And how, then, was it said by God: ^D “But you shall go to your fathers, having been buried in a good old age”? But these things are clearly absurd. For the Apostle himself, while saying that there are fathers of the flesh, whom we have had as instructors, and saying that God is the only Father of spirits, himself calls Eunice the mother of Timothy, and not only the mother of the flesh of Timothy. It is manifest, therefore, that the Word, although He received from the holy Virgin not, indeed, to be simply, but to be incarnate, is nevertheless truly her Son; and she will appear younger in that respect, namely, as the composite from the simple, and as the embodied from the incorporeal.

^A

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

^A And how, a moment ago, were you saying that essence, and not likeness, is the cause? If, therefore, the true generation of someone is in every respect of being and from the whole of being, then of necessity the likeness of the whole of the begetter to the whole of the begotten will also exist. But if the generation of a certain composite being is only according to a certain way of being and from a part, then the likeness of the begotten to the begetter will not be in every respect of being. Nevertheless, the begetter might truly be the begetter of the one same person, both from the part that concerns being and from the part that concerns such a manner of being. Just as we see in the case of man: he has the generation of his body from his parents for his being, but as for the soul, it is not for its being simply (for this it has from God, as also the first-formed Adam), but for its being joined with the body that has been formed—without which it can exist. For it receives this from those who are, so to speak, the causes of the body, but are only the sponsors of the soul itself. And yet, of both natures, as of one man, the same persons are called parents, properly and in truth. Why, then, do the murmurs arising from your unbelief silence you, not to call the Word that was born and incarnate correctly God? Since you acknowledge without doubt that even the soul, which was incarnate, was generated from those who are the causes of the existence of the flesh, and you call the same persons parents of both its body and itself.

CHAPTER XX

CHAPTER XXI

CHAPTER XXII

^A But, O wise men, not even the soul simply requires time for perfection, but its natural instrument and substantial habitation does. Whence, even after the youth of the animal, and as time passes, after the instrument has become less apt for it for operation (for those things which have flourished in time, also wither in time), contrary to what you say, its virtue and perfection remit in time; nor does it see or hear at a hundred years old in the same way as at thirty. And thus it clearly demonstrates that it is not of itself, but depends upon the instrument, whether it be apt or useless for perfection; or if it is from itself, it is nevertheless through that medium. How then do you so inconsiderately affirm that everything that is born in time requires time for its own perfection, and do not notice—as you often do—that it does not require it primarily, but [requires it] from some of the things that are adapted and naturally co-existent to the thing being born in time? If indeed not even the soul admits this reasoning of yours, how much more certainly does God, who did not begin to exist, but only admitted to exist in time in such a manner! By muttering these things to us out of sheer loquacity, you will wear yourselves out, and you are not led by a sound mind.

CHAPTER XXIII

If where God the Word is, there the Father and the Holy Spirit are, because of the indivisibility of the substance (and God the Word was in the womb of the Virgin according to you, ^B according to substance), therefore the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin. O you who gather up the seeds of every impiety, to nourish your own blasphemy, what are you saying? For it behooves you, since you are perverse, to pervert, according to the Psalmist [y]. Since the Son is in the bosom of the Father, he has the Father in whom he is, and from there he is himself, according to you. But otherwise, because where the Father is, there the Son and the Holy Spirit are, and the Son is in the bosom of the Father, therefore the Son is in his own bosom, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit. And since the Holy Spirit flew down like a dove upon the Lord who was being baptized in the Jordan, therefore the Father also flew down. But if the discourse of piety does not permit transferring this from one person to the other consubstantial hypostases, you are compelled either to think the same regarding the holy birth of the Word, or to exhibit a rationale for your present error, ^D since there is a similarity to be recognized between these things; and thus it will be sufficient for your mouths to be checked concerning this. For it behooves you—who act perversely and put forward the inventions of other heresies and make them your own (an asp borrows poison from a viper), as if your own sophisms were not sufficient for you for a complete evil doctrine—to confirm error with error, according to the Lord’s method of responding to the malicious questioning of the Pharisees by a reciprocal interrogation to them regarding the baptism of John.

^A If the Trinity is in the womb of the Virgin according to substance, and God the Word was born according to substance from the Virgin, then the Trinity was born from the Virgin. Since, therefore, the Son has been begotten from the Father, but the substance of the holy Trinity is indivisible, it follows that, according to you, the Father himself and the Holy Spirit have also been begotten. Furthermore, since the Father is not begotten by anyone, nor does He proceed, then according to you, neither the Son nor the Spirit are from the Father; for the substance is indivisible for them. We refuse, however, to be drawn further into your blasphemies, lest, intent upon refuting you, we ourselves become accustomed to unlawful language. But for the present, let us allow you to persist in your error. What, however, ought to be said or thought about these matters, the truth has demonstrated through its own prophets, in whom it confutes those who wrongly divide or perversely confound the logic of the holy supersubstantial Trinity.

CHAPTER XXV

Every birth acknowledged by divine Scripture, bringing forth dissimilar things from those that are altogether dissimilar, shows the one who brings forth to be worthy of praise or blame; of praise, as in: "For thy fear, O Lord, we have been with child and have brought forth"; of blame, as in: "Behold, he hath been in labor with injustice, he hath conceived sorrow, and hath brought forth iniquity." Whatever is praised or blamed in the act of bringing forth brings forth what it brings forth by will and not by substance. Therefore, every birth acknowledged by divine Scripture, bringing forth dissimilar things from those that are altogether dissimilar, brings forth what it brings forth by will and not by substance. We must therefore inquire what kind of dissimilarity you posit—whether according to substance or according to some accident—and how that which you say can be true. ^B For if you speak of it according to substantial difference, as in a physical quality, behold, fire is generated from stones and iron and wood that catches fire, being dissimilar from dissimilar things according to substance, and it shows the one giving birth to be worthy of neither praise nor blame. And from legumes of the field, worms; and from mice, larvae; the things giving birth being dissimilar to them according to substance; and there is no room for either blame or praise. But nevertheless, having considered your examples, we shall judge that rather the dissimilarity according to existence is what you mean to say: that the dissimilar thing is praised or blamed, as for instance the dissimilarity from a human being, or the spirit of salvation being brought forth. Since, therefore, you judge the one bringing forth from altogether dissimilar things to be worthy of praise or blame, and from there you conclude that the birth is from will; so also you infer, O vain talkers, that the birth of the Lord from the Lady is said to be from will, because of the dissimilarity ^C in His case. First, remember that, on the contrary, we have testified to a likeness of Christ to His mother, even if not according to the whole; for dissimilar things have no substantial likeness to a dissimilar thing according to substance; and second, that the thing which is dissimilar in part to her is not seen to be of such dissimilarity as that which you have now posited in your examples.

that is, of a relative entity to a non-entity, but rather of such a substance to such a substance. But that we may be carried away by your ridiculous cunning, if you think that all things in Divine Scripture that are begotten from things dissimilar according to existence confer praise or blame upon the begetter, what say you, when one is called son of sorrow, Benjamin, and another son of consolation, Barnabas, and Heli is called a man of years? It is necessary, therefore, that the years be the progenitors of Heli, and that they be worthy of praise or blame; and that sorrow and consolation be the same. But if anyone should grant you even these vain things, how would he not hear the following things from you with tears, when he learned that the years bring forth from will, and beget sorrow and consolation according to will; and when he knew from you that the existence of Heli, and Barnabas, and Benjamin proceeded from a non-existent thing, and from progenitors according to will? ^B

CAP. XXVI

If God the Word was born of the Virgin, and everything that is begotten is begotten either from the substance of the begetter or from will; and that which is begotten from substance has its being entirely from the begetter, but that which is from will has its being from the begetter, and has its being in such a mode, tell us from whence you wish God to have been born, whether from the substance of the Virgin, or from will? For whichever of these you say, the conclusion is manifest. Late at last and unwillingly you acknowledge with us that a birth is both that which produces something into being, and likewise that which produces into such a being only. But if you say that he who is from substance is the cause of existence alone, and not of such an existence—namely, of the physical difference of the begotten—since a pine is generated from a pine cone, is it generated from the will, and not from the substance of the cone, into the being of this very thing, a pine, or is it generated from the substance of the cone itself? And it is simply an existent, but not a pine nor any other special kind; unless it also be subjected to a certain generation by another begetter who begets according to will. What is more foolish than these things? ^C

Chapter XXVII

If God the Word is begotten properly and in truth from the Father, and is like to Him according to substance; and if the same is begotten from a mother properly and in truth, and she is dissimilar according to substance, it makes no difference whether one is begotten by likes or by unlikes. But if this is so, even things that are dissimilar will not differ from one another according to substance; and it would have to be admitted that God the Word, begotten from the Father in truth, is dissimilar to Him according to substance. But all these things are impossible and worthy of their supposition. They were troubled, they were shaken as a drunken man, and all their wisdom was swallowed up. For with justice are these things sung against you by us, the divine power demonstrating even in you the efficacy of the ancient rebuke of the ^D

those who had undertaken a proposal of warring against God and had set up the building of a tower ^A in Babylon. For he said even then concerning them: "Come, let us go down and let us confuse their languages." Since that time, therefore, in reality there are for you now both confused subtleties and involved sutures of words, constructed to conceal the shame of impiety. First of all, then, let us know: how is the generation from like or unlike things spoken of by you? How is the similarity or dissimilarity of those born, relative to those who beget, understood? For it shall not be said that that which does not subsist, and is spoken of as being, has generation from like or unlike things; for similarity or dissimilarity is, according to your own definition, posterior to their generation. Let this, however, be granted to you; for perhaps you have said these things knowing them from the end. But what then? Is it impossible that he who is begotten according to different generations, and from begetters different in nature, being different in natures, and truly so, should be begotten according to each generation? And that he should be shown to be like one of those who bear him according to some of his own characteristics, but unlike the other, because of the difference of the generations of this one and the substances of those who begat him? For it was demonstrated to us in the first part [of this work] that even from the same substance, and in every genus and species and all number, of an undifferentiated substance, through a different mode of generation, that which is born often becomes both like and unlike to those who beget. Therefore, they who say that the Word was truly begotten from the Father, according to the proper generation and substance of the Father alone, and is like to Him according to substance—namely, the substance of the God Word—are correctly and truly thinking; and [they further say] that He was also truly begotten from the Mother, according to her own proper generation, which came to be from her alone, and is like to the Mother herself according to His substance—that is, the human substance—but unlike to her according to the substance which He has as Word. Thus, indeed, the Word is truly the Son, like to the Father, and a Son also of the Mother, unlike to the Father. For each of the modes of His births was shown to be true—both that of [His] being, and that of [His] being such. For similarity does not establish the status of sonship simply, as has been frequently said; for otherwise all men, being like to one another in substance, would be thought to be sons and fathers at the same time, and begetters would be the children of their children, and brothers would be thought to be sons of their own brothers, on account of the similarity of substance relative to them. ^{C D}

CHAPTER XXVIII

If that which exists eternally is born later according to truth, it is also true that that which in no way exists—being non-existent in act—comes to be according to truth. But if the second is impossible, then the first is as well. But if it is not the case that what exists comes to be, but rather that what exists in a certain way comes to be in a way that is otherwise—if not by change, but by a newer acquisition—it is possible to be born; for no one has ever said to you that something is both eternally and begins from time. Therefore, what prevents him who is conceived as being without beginning according to his existence, from having begun to be according to his existing otherwise—namely, having become incarnate? For to be otherwise, not by way of

substitution or of the flow of his proper being, but, as we say, by the assumption and substantial union of another thing that was previously separated from him. ^A

CHAPTER XXIX.

If it is impossible for the heaven and the earth and all that is in them—which already exist—to be brought into being, then it is most impossible for the Author of these things, who was begotten from the Father before the ages, to have been begotten in these last times. For no one, O you men, affirms that things which simply exist come into being, nor that the heaven is generated in the order of existence simply. That something new, however, comes to be from something old, and is transformed, and is clothed with incorruptibility along with the rest of the other creation, and is liberated from the bondage of corruption—just as our own bodies, when they are clothed with life over their mortality and rise again incorruptible—this all who are nurtured in piety acknowledge. Therefore, according to you, since the world already is in some way, namely, corruptible, we shall no longer say that it is brought into being or regenerated according to incorruptibility. For that which exists, you say, does not come into being—not adding that what is [at present] does not come into being, but also not even allowing that which is not [yet] comes into being for that which exists in any way whatsoever. But according to these oracular statements of yours, it is not permitted for anyone to say that any corruptible thing becomes incorruptible according to our saving hope: namely, for because man, having put on the corruptible, was born, we are regenerated having put on the incorruptible. ^B

CAP. XXX.

If it is admitted that yesterday can become tomorrow, then let it also be admitted that that which exists from eternity can be begotten in the last times; but the first is impossible, therefore the second is so as well, by extension. If we had said that the Eternal becomes temporal through mutation, you would indeed have spoken well. But if, while that which he was is preserved, something that was not supervenes upon him through assumption, it is clear that both, when considered in the composite, have become the same one subject, after it has been brought about by the addition of something new, not having been understood as it is now. How, then, do you rightly object to us? For even this day of yesterday, which you speak of, never becomes tomorrow—that is, the following day—by way of mutation, by ceasing to be yesterday in order to become today; except that, with today and then tomorrow supervening upon it, the state of having been the day before yesterday befalls it, although it remains in its state of being yesterday, that is, next in relation to the day following it, just as the day before yesterday is a day relative to the third day from it. ^C

CHAPTER XXXI.

If it is admitted that something which was not before can be afterward without having been begotten or made, let it also be admitted that that which exists from eternity can afterward, in truth, be begotten; but the first is impossible, and therefore the second is as well. Behold, then, we say that what the Word was—namely, without flesh—this does not come into being; but that which he was not—namely, flesh and incarnate—this we believe comes into being. For up to this point we have wrapped ourselves in your tautologies

^A and what crime is this for us?

CHAPTER XXXII.

That which is born from above, that is to say by a second generation, is born of water and the Spirit, or through instruction. But that which is thus born, is born into adoption; and that which is born into adoption is not born of the substance of the one who begets. Therefore, that which is born from above is not born of the substance of the one who begets. How, then, do you explain to us this birth from above? If you understand it according to place, as if being above the earth and those who are from the earth, and simply as some heavenly thing—to pass over very many things that could be said against you—it is necessary, since the generation of the Word from the Father is supercelestial more than any other generation, ^B because His life is removed from the earth, that you consider this to be, more than any other, the birth from above. Therefore, it is necessary to consider Him who is born according to this, namely the bare Word, as being born into adoption; and so, according to you, He will not be the Son by nature, this only-begotten Son and Word of the Father. For the consequence of your proposition is more evidently impious. For that which is thus begotten is concluded not to have been begotten from the substance; therefore, according to you, the Son is not from the substance of the Father. But you confirm the error of Arius, having added thereto your own depraved doctrine.

But if you do not admit that these things are so, but think that the generation from above is as it were a repetition of the first generation, and say by the term "from above" that it is the same subject receiving double the same birth—with the meaning "from the beginning"—and simply understand this as regeneration or a second birth; in this too you have alike strayed far from right doctrine, falsely attributing regeneration to Christ and inventing it. ^C For those things are said to be regenerated whose subject of the first generation, which had once been unstained, became in some way corrupted, destroyed, or withered by certain old age, or stain, or disease; just as we, who were made according to the image of God by our first origin, were corrupted both by the first transgression and by subsequent additions towards evil. But no one—not even among the most impious—ever imagined that God the Word, according to His first generation, had become old through sin, whether through imprudence or intent, and now stood in need of a regeneration that would renew Him, and that for this reason He underwent a second birth. How then, when no one attributes or understands regeneration or the generation from above in relation to Him, yet all the holy ones confess His second generation after the first, have you introduced regeneration in place of a true generation, ^D second in order, into God the Word, so as to infer your own dogmas to us from this?

Moreover, we have not understood that which you claim—that that which is born of the Spirit is not considered to be born from the substance; for it is either as the power from the nature of the craftsman into the wood, or as fire from fire in the wood, it exists from the substance. But if it is the first, it is clear that the generated thing cannot perform an action, just as the power itself cannot [...]

case, a participation in the substance which produced it has occurred for the thing generated: for this, quite clearly, is testified by its natural power, which follows the generated thing. But if a participation in substance has occurred, if the generation is not from substance, but from an insubstantial power, then things without substance will be dominating substance and will be the cause of substances, which is impossible.

Chapter XXXIII

Chapter XXXIV

^Agelical word it is said, "I have begotten you": but it is lesser, as is the generation of the faithful from God. Yet no generation is better. If, then, God is equal in substance to the Virgin, or inferior, and both are impious, it follows that God was not truly begotten of the Virgin. Truly, every generation that is not blameworthy shows either equality or inferiority of the begotten to the begetter. But, O you who are insensible to the greatness of the divine economy, observe how every generation possesses this—not only that which is not blameworthy, but also that which is not to be marveled at as a miracle. But in the case of the divine and fitting Word of the economy—for this indeed is the mystery of the supernatural goodness, and the proof of the divine philanthropy—that the Creator of every creature, and the Author of every generation, and the Lord of every nature, and the Lord of the entire world, above the world, accepted birth, and this from a nature that is perishable, corrupt, and subject to injury; and for our sake, being rich, He became poor, that we by His poverty might become rich. If, therefore, it were truly among those generations not to be marveled at, it would have been necessary for this generation also to possess this quality, not being blameworthy; but if it must also be marveled at, it must necessarily have something beyond the common generation of all, since otherwise it would not effortlessly be shown to you as divine. But if you must reason from ^B general principles, O wise men, and from those things that are everywhere similar—how many generations are thus to be marveled at, and how many are similar to this one, in that the offspring possesses something inferior or equal to the parent—show this. And who among you would not weep at such blindness? That through the very things by which you ought to be convinced concerning the divine Birth—that is, from the marvelous and supernatural reasons, and those contrary to custom—you hasten to contrive that it is not a generation of God, because it does not possess similarity to our corrupt and natural generations. As if you were to say: "If it had been begotten by a generation similar to yours, then it would be worthy of belief that He who was born is above us." But if not even then, tell me, from whence ought we to be convinced by God concerning this His own generation? Since it is neither like those according to us, nor above us, O you senseless ones!

CHAPTER XXXV.

If a birth from things that are in all ways similar is true, in which the one bearing is truly similar in substance to the parents, then this birth, in which the one bearing is entirely dissimilar in substance, is not truly from similar things. For ^C opposites are never true at the same time; but the former is true, therefore the latter is not true. That both the birth from similar things and that from dissimilar things—both that which is to existence and that which is to such-and-such a state—and if there is any other mode of birth, is a birth and is truly called such by divine Scripture according to its own reason, you yourselves have said many times until now. But if, while granting that it is a birth, you say that this which is not produced from things similar in substance is not properly and truly a birth, it is necessary that you acknowledge the true generation because of the similarity of the parents, and not because of the reason of the birth. Now, indeed, this was already spoken to you appropriately a little further up. For how would a frog, which is dissimilar to others, be begotten from a similar ^D frog?

Yet not even a frog is begotten at all from a frog ever. But since you tumble back into these same difficulties, you shall now hear these things in addition to what we have said previously: if the torch is from the substance of fire, and the berry from the substance of the berry, and the human from the substance of the human, and God from the substance of God, all are indeed acknowledged to be from substance, but the begotten do not possess the pure similarity ^A to their begetters in all cases, but God alone possesses that which is absolutely unchangeable. How then is it possible that the birth of each of these is spoken of in the same way, properly and strictly according to truth, if it is from a substance? For it is necessary, according to you, since the similarity—which you attest to in the birth properly and in accordance with truth—is different, for you to know that the propriety of the birth is also different; which is obviously ridiculous. For what is proper is not different, and what is different is never proper in reference to the same thing. ^B Suppose, however, O physicists, or rather subverters of physics, that stones, iron, and wood generate fire, and that, although they are not fire, they do not generate it in the same manner as fire; and yet no one could say to you that the generation which proceeds from natures dissimilar to it is not the generation of true fire; therefore, all that confusion of such babbling of yours tends to nothing.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Moreover, one must also hear this from them: If the Word is incorporeal and immutable, they say, according to its own nature, how will it be incarnate and yet remain the same immutable being? For in this way, even though changed, it would be said to remain immutable. Therefore, either God did not become flesh, and she who gave birth to the flesh is not the Theotokos; or if He did become, then He who is not immutable is no longer God, and therefore she who gave birth ^C to the mutable is by no means the mother of God. Why then, when you have become so extremely deaf, does not even the son of thunder sound in your ears at all, saying, "And the Word became flesh"? But, O senseless ones, if you understand the incarnate Word according to a change of nature, as we say that the coral plant is made stone, and that which once lived has died, you might rightly think that the immutable is dissolved. But if, just as we speak of gilded wood and an armed man, we contemplate the assumption of the flesh in the Word according to the union of the wood with the gold, and the taking up and putting on of the armor, how do we introduce ^D a change of nature? For if the wood still remains wood in its nature without the gold, even when it has been gilded according to its subsistential nature; and the man still remains without iron—or, to speak better, when he is naked and remains adorned only according to his nature—if he becomes a soldier armed with iron according to his natural subsistential nature, or is hairy in the flower of youth; so too the Word remains without flesh according to nature, that is, according to the substantial reason, when He puts on flesh attached to His subsistence. For by the substantial reason, it is perceived

^A

CHAPTER XXXVII.

^A epithet, it must be referred back to the underlying subject of the names. For so it is even in the case of those with two names, when two names are strictly established for one person, as the sun, which is also Hyperion, and the full moon, which is the moon; for it is not the case for others that these epithets should be taken as common. To speak more clearly, "man-bearer" (anthropotokos) and "God-bearer" (Theotokos) are names that are epithets of persons; but epithets are either common, as "Philopator" [was] Ptolemy, and another [was] "Philadelphus"—for others, similar to them, have been and would be philopators and philadelphs, and almost all are—or they are proper, as Adam alone is "born without a mother," and Samson alone is "mighty in hair," unlike all others of the same nature. But the epithet "man-bearer," as a proper name, would not be applied to the immaculate Virgin, since there are, of course, thousands of other women who are mothers of men; but if one calls it common, and applies it to her just as to others, if it is truly common, it must be named in the same way in all in whom it is placed, and it must signify the same thing in exactly the same way and always. For they would not be synonyms if there were no sharing in the name and the thing which is the cause of the name. Therefore, either one must say that all the other women, who are called mothers of men along with her, also necessarily bear some God-men according to Christ, just as she does in part, and that they are not called so from the whole; or that not even she bore a man in this way, nor from a part, but that they are called so from the whole, that is, "man-bearer." But if neither she [is called so] from the whole, nor those [are called so] from a part; but since she did not bear a mere man, nor did the others ever bear a God-man, how can the name "man-bearer" be applied to them in common? Therefore, since it is appropriate for this name to be applied neither properly to the Queen nor commonly, it is acknowledged that the holy Theotokos could not in any reason be truly called "man-bearer"; [but] since the name which is from a part is not forbidden for her alone particularly, how or whence would it fall into any homonymy with another of the women, not being excluded according to this, as was shown in the case of "man-bearer"? ^C But this, at least, must also be considered: that if the names of persons, signifying some individual subsistence of someone, are not taken from things that are common to this person and to others, but are intended to be understood from those that are proper only to the very person named; since women are said to be countless, and mothers of men numerous, and virgins many, and there are very many Marys; and the name "God-bearer" is the only one most individual, most proper, and most significant for the holy, immaculate, and ever-virgin Virgin; which those who contradict might learn for themselves, if they were not devoted to contention alone. For if they heard simply the word "woman" or "the holy Virgin," they would not yet be fixing their imagination upon one person in particular. But if they heard "Theotokos," since there is no other like her, they immediately, without doubt, look to this Mother of God, persuaded that what is said is of her; and thus ^D

^A let them explain how they themselves wish to call her "Mother of Man" only in part. If she is not truly "Mother of God" in part, since the Scriptures called "man" only according to soul or only according to flesh; and in the common usage of all, until now, should she be called neither Mother of Man nor Mother of God in part, she will be without birth or without a name according to the natural name of the one born from her. For the name "Christ" is personal, not natural, nor is it the name of the species, so that one might be called "Christotokos" [Christ-bearer]; rather, it is the name of the person, just as if Elizabeth were called "John-bearer," which is not the question before us now, but rather how she should be called from the nature of the one born.

If, moreover, to these points someone should say that the name "Deiparens" [Mother of God] is a common name imposed from the nature of the one born, belonging ^B both to the Father and to the Mother of the Lord, and it is necessary either to recognize his generation as similar in both, or for the name to be assigned more properly to the generation—since therefore the Father alone produces the Son, who is God and who is, even if eternally and always, how would he not rather and more properly be called "Deiparens" alone, and no one else with him? But it is clear that the Father cannot be called parent from essence; for the divine essence did not beget another essence different in number—for that would be a "trideity"—but in the same essence one is the cause of the other, by reason of the diverse particularities of that same one essence. For what contained in David the essence of mind and knowledge, this was the cause of his musical particularity, not indeed an essence of music other than his [human] essence; for even those who are not musical have that essence. ^C If, therefore, you should call her either "Mother of Man" or even "Christ-bearer," being not yet far from impiety, we will not even then say that she is signified by a name most proper to her. For she will not be distinguished in this way from the mothers of the kings of Israel, who were called many "christs" [anointed ones] by the sensible oil, and of the many priests who were called "christs" or anointed, and of those prophets anointed by divine inspiration, or those whom God led by his hand, such as Cyrus the king of the Persians, who had many mothers. For with all of them, the name will be one and a common appellation along with her, by the same epithet. For the name "Christ" is a signifier of a composite thing, both of the anointing and of the anointed; yet it is not of the nature of the anointing or of the anointed. ^D Therefore, it is not possible to address her by such a name if we wish to distinguish her from those who obtained a synonym or a similar name, by that which is her own proper and particular name. It is necessary, therefore, that she be named the immaculate Virgin by that which, among all other women, truly and uniquely belongs to her: and this is that she truly gave birth to the one who is God by nature, by a generation that is not natural, which belongs to God, but by way of grace.

Wherefore, we truly say that this Virgin is the Theotokos, adding to these points that the one birth was not from seed, not according to nature, not like anyone of men, but appeared divinely through the incorrupt womb in a virginal manner. How could she not be properly called Theotokos, even from this mode of being brought forth? In addition to these points, let it be said by us and more often

^A that the appellation of epithets has frequently occurred to many of those who have brought forth children, due to the end which their children attained. For thus we call a woman "mother of a glorious child," "mother of a king," and "mother of a beautiful child"—and that not from the beginning, when there was no virtue or worthy activity present with the infant, but because it appeared later and conferred the appellation upon the parents. Since, therefore, we too, even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, now know him no longer so—for the Word of God that is in him is God by nature, and that flesh which is by nature has been altogether divinized after the resurrection—we have nothing, either in part or according to any reasoning, to consider empty of divinity in him or concerning him. And since the blessed one, not indeed by this divinity which dwelt in him by nature, became the name that is above every name, and that Jesus whom the Jews crucified became Lord and God, of necessity we do not call her just a mother of a man, but with reason we call and venerate the all-venerable one only as Mother of God. For recognizing both in substance and in union the Divinity of him who came forth from her, we glorify and adore him as entirely perfect God; even though we recognize that part which was divinized from humanity in the Christ born of her, and that which was ineffably clothed in flesh, is preserved. For it was by a more excellent assumption, not by destruction, that it became divine, and by benevolence, not by a change, that the other was made flesh.

^B If they say, "As if names are spoken in part," we do not name Christ as if he were a part, but we name God. For if the Divinity is called a part of Christ for the clearer signification of his composition, the Word is understood to be more perfect than any part and the whole. For we do not say the Word is inferior to Christ, but rather simpler; for that which is called a part, in conjunction with the part joined to it, is seen to be the principle, the cohesive element, and the authority regarding that very union and the mode of his composition. And because that which acts as the proper whole is greater than what is acted upon—as a part of a proper whole, like nature in other composites—how would it not, more properly and truly, make the appellation of the person and of the entire composition subsisting in it from the other part and from that which is understood according to it as a whole? Finally, it must be said by you that if, in naming Christ, you know that the Lord and God himself is signified, and you judge that there is nothing inferior in the Divinity through either name, what is the trouble that the word "Mother of God" brings to you, as opposed to the word "Mother of Christ"? And why do you prefer to call her "Mother of Christ" from the whole? For if Christ is the same as God, and the appellation of "Mother of Christ" is the same as "Mother of God," but if you know God to be something else than Christ, you confess your former blasphemy the same; and we no longer converse further as Christians with you, as if you were altogether like the unbelieving and impious Jews. But since these things have been well confessed and demonstrated by you with God, ^D it is holy and just and true that the holy Virgin Mary is truly the Mother of God, in hea-

to be celebrated by the heavens, and to be adored on earth, with wise reflection and undefiled thought, and pure lips, and by all to be proclaimed blessed, now and into all generations of ages. Amen. ^A These things, therefore, have been spoken by us to you, as we request the true, proper, and most appropriate title of the holy Virgin, the Theotokos. ^B

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

That Christ is not truly called God, as those who dare to assert it [claim].

The Word was God, [and] became man. If the Virgin is the Theotokos, it is clear that the Virgin is the Mother of Him whose Word He was, not of [that which] He became. But if He has a mother on account of man, while the man has no mother, then in that case the Word cannot have a mother. But the Virgin is Mother of Him whose Word He was and [whose Word] He became; and this is both at once, yet not in the same manner. For [she is Mother] of the Word, in that from her He began His incarnation; and of the flesh, in that from her it began its subsistence. ^C

CHAPTER XXXIX.

According to the prophet, the name Emmanuel is the name of the sign brought forth from the Virgin and given to the house of David; but according to the Egyptian, the name Emmanuel is of God who gives the sign. But Emmanuel is not a sign, since it is a name signifying a certain hypostasis, according to which God has come to be with us human beings. But how has He come to be with us, unless it is evident that He was formerly absent from us? God was absent from us, not in power, not in habit, and never in place; but He was [absent] in nature, so that He has now united His nature to our nature, and is truly with us. But a sign does not come to be with us; for if one were by chance to speak of a sign "in us," it would not be a sign "with us." As for *Emmanu*, which according to the Hebrews signifies [that which is] commonly [understood as] "with us," and *El*—where has it ever been heard that [the latter part] signifies a sign, and does not clearly tell of God? ^D

CAP. XL.

The nature of those who are born is nowhere designated by imposed names, for imposed names are significant of the accidents of a nature. The name Emmanuel is of this kind, inasmuch as it is an imposed name. The appellation "Emmanuel," therefore, according to the Egyptian, does not designate the nature of the one receiving it, but rather the union of God as a sign of that [union] with the accidents. But no other specific name—which some, therefore, call "Lord," laid down under the image of a single hypostasis—simply designates nature. For it does not point the understanding toward the essence, neither definitively nor significantly, as do the common and appellative names used of some; nor does it [point] in any way to [what is predicated] of many. For when we hear "yellow" (*xanthos*), we can imagine some horse, or a river, or a person. Since, then, personal names always designate hypostases by means of certain additions and accidents of substances, therefore the name Emmanuel is attributed to the person through whom it happens that we have communion with God; since He is the mediator of God and

^A of men. But if the name is applied with reference to that communion, and the thing named is the communion itself which also underlies Emmanuel, then if indeed the Virgin shall give birth to him whom they shall call by the name Emmanuel according to the prophet, the young woman who conceived in her womb has brought forth a communion and not a nature, not a hypostasis. But if this thought appears absurd because of that which is signified nominatively in the prophecy, we shall understand it as some self-subsistent existence.

CHAPTER XLI

If, therefore, the Virgin is the Mother of God because she gave birth to the true God, then is the true God also, for that reason, a true God because He is born of a Virgin? But not everything that is named derivatively or significatively necessarily possesses the truth of the participation or relation of the naming cause; ^B nor, if a thing should have an assigned name—whether in itself or in relation to another—a name from which there is a participation or derivation to the participant or the derivative itself, is it necessary that this name, borrowed from elsewhere, should revert to the name assigned in itself or in relation to another. For although a lover of justice is truly named a lover of justice, it does not follow from this that justice itself is called justice because it is loved by man, since injustice is also at times loved by man. Therefore, by one term we must express the just or justice in itself and in particular, and by another the lover of justice who stands in some relation to something—that is, to justice. The Mother of God, therefore, is called so derivatively, as one who has given birth to God; but God is not called so derivatively, nor does He have His name from another, but from His own nature. ^C

CHAPTER XLII

If according to this figure the Word became flesh by a change, it is evident that the Word has a creator and a mother; but if the Word became flesh without change, how could the Word not be figurative, as acting and being generated figuratively? He is generated by a certain generation, not transformed; yet He does not remain altogether naked, neither in being, nor remaining just as He was to be described, but [He remains] with the flesh. And likewise, the hypostasis is positioned in a certain different way, so to speak—as I dare to say—not by a change of the properties of the Word, nor of those belonging to Him as God, but by the reception and assumption of others, namely the properties of Jesus and those of a man, according to that one and same hypostasis of the Word, ^D which has been increased and made to abound in physical and hypostatic properties, beyond all the persons similar to Him on either side. And so He is fashioned, yet by no means as the Word, but as the Word who is also Christ; and this is according to a part of Him, namely according to the flesh only.

CHAPTER XLIII

Things which are not to be said of the divinity of the Word are not to be said of the Word Himself. How, therefore, does the Egyptian not attribute to the divinity of the Word a second principle of generation, yet attribute it to the Word God? For His hypostasis, according to which the Word is known as God in His nature, has a second principle, [if it is] no longer recognized as simple and of one nature among the divine persons, but as composite and twofold and

worshipping Him as the incarnate Word of God in human guise. ^A

CHAPTER XLIV.

CHAPTER XLV.

CHAPTER XLVI.

to it. But if, as a human child, He were in need of these things—that is, of circumcision, and of the baptism of repentance of John, and of the rest—if, therefore, He needed the baptism that is truly for repentance, then He would certainly be a sinner; for repentance is not for just men who are to be praised. But if Christ ^A fulfills the law while not needing it, it is clear that He does so in order to fulfill all the righteousness of the law according to the flesh, and by fulfilling the law, to show forth His own divinity, and that every weak carnal nature is completed in Him, with the divine substance alone perfecting it.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Everywhere, conception and birth bring that which does not yet exist into generation. But if, according to the Egyptian, the Virgin did not bear a man, but the true God, it is evident that she brought forth Him who did not yet exist. And if this same person—newly fashioned, newly born, and newly called—is God, then of necessity He is a "new God." But the divine Scripture cries out: "Let there be no new God for you." The Egyptian, however, cries out: "Let there be," and anathemitizes those who do not say that there is a new God. Therefore, he who celebrates the "pains" until Christ is formed in us, and [says], "Through the Gospel I have begotten you," and [speaks of] "the testament from Mount Sinai, begetting into bondage"—these things do not indicate that anyone is being generated or coming to be in another way, [that is, to be generated] in order to be in a different manner; rather, it indicates not by substance, but by the super-substantiality of the Spirit. If this is so, it is clear that not every generation simply leads that which is not into existence, but it is also possible for some to be generated into a "how it is" to be. ^B

CHAPTER XLVIII.

He who does not confess that the Virgin is the Mother of Christ does not confess Christ as He is; for the beginning of the discourses concerning Christ is His generation from the Virgin. But the title "Mother of Christ" is not specifically significant of the holy Virgin, for the mothers of David and of Samuel and of the priests could rightly be called mothers of Christ, as could the mothers of all the prophets, especially Jeremiah; for it was said to him: "Before thou camest out of the womb, I sanctified thee." And John, in the womb of Elizabeth, leaped for joy in the Lord; and it is clear that they were in the anointing and participation of the sanctifying Spirit, even while they were still in the womb; and these were prophets of the Christ of the Lord from the time they were conceived and brought to light. But the Theotokos is alone and specifically she whom the Spirit Himself overshadowed and inhabited, and in the flesh taken from her, He begat the person of this unique Son. For she brought forth not only the sanctified, but that which is born of her is holy and sanctifying; therefore, He is called the Son not only of her, but also of God. ^C

CHAPTER XLIX.

We shall not presume to call the Mother of Jesus the Theotokos, since the holy Scripture nowhere ^D

so addresses her; nor yet by any of the Fathers, but according to the voice of the angel saying to the shepherds: «Born to you this day is Christ the Lord;» and according to the saying: «The book of the generation of Jesus Christ;» and also: «But now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you.» ^A We call her mother of a man by nature, but Mother of God by dignity, a thing which we have not received and which we do not rashly impose upon you. If, however, when the oracles speak of Christ as God in plain terms, you explain them away and interpret them differently than as strictly stated, but when it is a matter of drawing a conclusion from an idea, which is not stated word-for-word—as in the case of the Theotokos—you then demand a strict literal sense, it is evident that you are in every way fleeing from orthodoxy alone. For if, indeed, that which is not expressly set down in the oracles is not to be spoken by you either, then you should not say that the Father begat the Word without flow, nor that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, nor that God created fire, or air, nor that He did not create darkness, nor that the souls of the bloodless ants and crabs and wasps and the rest are mortal, and ten thousand other things, O you men! But to leave all these aside for your sake, even those who prophetically called her mother of a man or Mother of Christ, where will you show us this statement occurring in Holy Scripture concerning the holy Virgin? If it is nowhere, it is clear that those whom you pretend to flee, you have been caught pursuing; but if you do not desire to address her by this or any other name derived from the birth, or if you have no opinion regarding the maternity, how is it that you dogmatize about things you do not know? ^B Or is it that you know them, but are ashamed to proclaim your own opinions regarding the spoken Word triumphantly to us—is that what you are suffering? As for us, according to the Apostle, we pray to God to speak boldly in the Gospel, as we ought to speak; for we are not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone who believes.

BOOK V

CHAPTER I

^A divinity of Christ and his humanity we know through the Word from himself, and we know simply the Word alone, always fully God as the Word. But when do they themselves think that Christ, whom they call man by nature, received glory, and grace, and adoption worthy of divine honor, and the name that is above every name? For they confess these things to be his from the beginning, straight from his conception. And what is the benefit of these great gifts, if they exempt him neither from passion, nor from disgrace, nor from death? For he would still be passible, if he had not acquired something more now, or if he had not become free from sufferings by having suffered at that time through another and by another. Who, then, would say that he suffered for Christ and for us? If these things occurred after the resurrection, then there was a time when he was not, nor was he in the adoption according to grace, nor in the honor, nor in the indignity ^B of which they speak; and then truly at that time they show him to be a man among us in all respects. Therefore, they do not trace back to the Word the things that happened to him at that time, even according to any appropriation or reference; and how is it said that the Word "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant," and despised a shameful death? And how is it also said, "For if they had known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory"? And how then was it confessed by Peter: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God"? And how was he testified to by the Father: "You are my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased"? Therefore, they are not themselves free from their own difficulty. We, however, say that from the time when the union of the Word and the flesh began in the holy womb of the Virgin, the ^C will of the Word itself was to allow his own natural greatness to share in poverty throughout the whole life of the flesh, so that the Word, who makes all things by a word, and who counted it not as robbery or injustice in judgment, might himself, through the whole of his immaculate life, raise up the humanity united to him, so that after the death of the flesh, it might be the beginning of spiritual immortality and eternal honor and blessedness. For thus, requesting glory from the Father through the form of his humanity, and saying according to his divine person that he possesses the whole glory that he had before the foundation of the world, he, proclaiming himself at once glorious and inglorious, heard: "I have already glorified," that is, through the strange generation from the Virgin ^D and the other divine signs, "and I will glorify again," that is, through the resurrection after death, and immortality, and the judgment of the world, and through the elevation and preeminence in all things, and simply through a similar deification and the antemundane glory of the Word dwelling in him.

CAP. II.

But they say again: And how, if the living Word of God is in Christ, does the Apostle say concerning Christ that he both died and was buried, and that he rose again on the third day, according to the Scriptures? And how does he exhibit him to us again in the passage: "If the dead do not rise, then Christ is not risen"? For it is evident that he himself was found to be dead among us, and the rest...

^A of their definitions—of which they are now willfully forgetful—are known even to them: for the Holy Scripture often designates the part by the whole, as in the passage: "There they buried Abraham," for it truly means not the soul of Abraham, but only the body. The same may therefore be said wisely concerning the human Christ. Furthermore, how would it have any place to say of him: "Free among the dead," and how, if he was found dead among us without any difference, did he himself raise up his own temple in three days, both in body and mind, having become—as they say—entirely impassible, like every man after death? For they did not even grant to men, according to their previous arguments, any activity of the soul after death until the resurrection—how much more, then, a divine action? How, if he himself has the power to lay down his own soul and to take it again, has he become dead like us? For who of such authority—not to speak of dignity—has ever existed among men? Moreover, if God is not in Christ, reconciling the world to himself through death, passion, and the rest, as it is written, ^B how did he who exists in the form of God—he himself, and no other, nor through another—humble himself even unto death? And how did they truly crucify the Lord of Glory? And how is it said, "God both raised up the Lord, and will raise us up through his power," that is, through the power of him who has been raised, as is acknowledged? For it is evident that, since the power of the Lord is a power that raises the dead and other bodies, how much more did it raise his own body, to which that same life-giving and resurrecting power was more intimately united hypostatically; and no other power will raise it. How, then, is it said that the Father did not spare his own Son, but delivered him up for us all? For if he delivered him up as a mere person, it is not truly said that he did this for the sake of his love toward us. It is therefore manifest ^C that both life-giving and death are spoken of Christ in part; for the two are not said in the same way of the whole, since opposite things are never equally true of the same subject. If, therefore, those who hung Christ upon the wood truly crucified the Lord of Glory, it is evident that he is the same who, from the divine Word, possessed the being "Lord of Glory," but from the human flesh, possessed the true suffering of crucifixion. For as God he is owed glory from all, and he exercises power over it, glorifying whom he wills; but he alone, as a man by nature, ^D underwent the passion.

CAP. III.

What then, they say, are not those things most clearly stated concerning Christ, that he was raised by God, and not by himself? And that by the operation of the Holy Spirit he rose from the dead and was constituted Son of God? How then is it said, "He whom God raised did not see corruption," and "constituted [as] Son of God according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection from the dead"? But let the "searchers" of the Scriptures, as they think themselves to be, tell us this: if the resurrection from the dead through the divine Spirit simply confers the glory of the Son of God upon the one who is raised, how is it that the son of the widow under Elijah, and the son of the Shunammite under Elisha, and Tabitha under Peter, and the rest who rose from the dead, are not constituted sons of

^A God? For it is clear that they also were raised by the power of God and through the Spirit of holiness who worked in those who raised them; since there is no one who has the power of life and death, except the Lord, who alone is by nature the life-giving Spirit. For in that only God there was life, and He Himself puts to death and makes alive, kills and makes to live, brings down to Hades and raises up. It is clear, therefore, that in raising Himself, the Lord presented Himself as the Son of God; not dying alongside His human part, because He was the immortal God, but working from His own part in a divine action, and vivifying His own dead part. And this is the "exceeding greatness of the power of God" toward us who believe, "according to the energy of the might of His power, which He energized in Christ, raising Him from the dead." For being infused also into us through the participation of His holy body, it vivifies even our mortal bodies after death, through the indwelling of His divine Spirit in us. Therefore, it is manifest that it is not because He simply rose again that the Lord was glorified as the Son of God, but because He rose by His own power. Since the Spirit of holiness had already raised many dead, both before and after Christ, in whom the exceeding greatness of His power is not said to have been manifested in the same way as in this ^B might. Not irrationally, then, nor by an accidental glory, nor from some word of those standing around, was Christ determined to be the Son of God, but from the energy during the resurrection of His body, having presented His power as truly divine, and from that power, His essence. For definitions, or determinations, of underlying things are taken from essential meanings, O ye wise in your own eyes; and the whole of this should not have escaped your ignorant erudition. Therefore, this itself loudly proclaims Him to be the Son of David, Christ, and the Son of God; because from that very energy during His resurrection, He is shown to be similar to God in essence. And we have this as proof concerning Him, that He is the most genuine Son by nature of God and the Father. Thus, therefore, was He determined to be the Son of God, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead.

CHAPTER IV

But you who do not understand the apostle and high priest ^C of our faith, as Paul commands you, say: what priest have you ever known who is of the same nature as the victim? Or what apostle is there who is not inferior to the one who sent him? If, then, the Word, of whom these things are said, is inferior in nature and order to God, as it seems to Arius, and if He is not the Word, it will be necessary that some other be over the Word Himself, understood as the minister and deacon of God by the energy of the Word. But why, setting aside the greater words of divinity, and the lower ones of humanity, do you produce only these for us? For we say that the same Christ of God is a creature, whom we also know to be the Creator of all things; but we do not, by glorifying what are truly unequal things from the same things that are in Him, judge them to be ^D equal in the same way. For we know that the same Christ is God and priest and victim; and not, in fact, because as priest He is called…

^A a worshiper and sacrificer of God alone, as He might appear to you—for the Word is to be understood as above every priest—but listen to the Apostle himself speaking again concerning the same priest: "Having such a high priest, who has sat at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens." Reflect on this very thing which you evade among yourselves: that it is not the role of a priest to be on a throne with his God, nor in the same honor and the same glory, but rather it belongs to one of the same nature and same power as the glorious God. Therefore, the one who became the priest of God on earth sits as priest with God in the heavens, having sacrificed his own flesh to God and having brought it to God, ^B but as being truly God himself.

CHAPTER V

The argument of those who maintain their position obscurely and doubtfully among many must also be strictly examined. For let it be granted, they say, that according to you, by concurrence, the same Christ is also God. But Jesus, what does He seem to you to be? For you will certainly not say that He is the Word Himself and flesh. For if He, too, is likewise God, it is manifest that Christ was not always God. For it has been clearly said that God made Him, the very Jesus whom you call God, both Lord and Christ. Therefore, it is not that which Jesus, or the Lord, was, that He became when He was made Christ and Lord; for no one becomes what he already is. Therefore, Jesus is not always God, since He is not even always Lord. But if Jesus is understood by you to be man, and Christ to be God, either He will be only God, just as the Word is, and the Word was Christ even before the incarnation; or there is some other God and man besides Jesus, and thus there will be two men appearing in Him after the transition ^C of Jesus into Christ, the hypostasis of whom is composed, as you say, by Jesus being made Christ. But if Christ is truly understood as God and man, and thus Jesus, having taken on an acquired humanity and the divinity of Christ, shows Himself to be three men and two gods when He becomes Christ, or else Jesus will be considered as having been divided into God and man when he is made Christ.

We say, therefore, along with the theologian concerning these things, that every spirit that does not confess that Jesus has come in the flesh is not from God. ^D But if he proclaims nothing else than that the Word became flesh and that Jesus has come in the flesh, it is evident that he knows the same Jesus to be in Christ and Christ himself to be in the Word. For Christ is not called such from anything else than because the flesh of the Word was anointed, as it were, and increased by the divinity; and Jesus, which is "Savior," is not named from anything else than because He possesses a natural power for salvation. For thus His angel also explained this name, saying: "And thou shalt call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their sins." He, therefore, who possesses the power not only of not sinning, but also of redeeming from sins, of what nature would He be if not God? For even the Jews did not fail to recognize this, saying that "No one can remit sins except God alone"; and Jesus is called [that], as Himself saying that He is God:

^A "There is no righteous and saving [God] besides me; for the salvation is of the Lord"; and "Neither an elder, nor an angel, but the Lord Himself saved us." If, however, some other person is called Jesus—just as the son of Nave [Joshua], or the one called Justus—it is manifest that this homonymy is either by way of partial spiritual participation, or by chance, or is a type; just as is the case with those called christs [anointed ones] among prophets, priests, and kings. But to say that Jesus was not always Christ, because Peter said that "God has made this Jesus both Lord and Christ," is exceedingly foolish. For if "has made" necessarily signifies a change or a progress from a pre-existing state, then the one who says, "Did not this Father of yours acquire you, and make you, and fashion you, to be the first possession of God, and then to become His handiwork?" ^B also signifies His people; and he who said, "Against You only have I sinned, and done this evil before You," did not, by having done evil, simultaneously become a sinner, but he sinned first, and then he did the evil. And who, having given these [interpretations], will not be convicted of playing sophistical trifles throughout the entire sacred Scripture? And as it is said that God made man in the image of God, we understand that he first became man, and then the image of God.

CAP. VI.

The divine Scriptures call Christ one God, and one man, and one Christ. But the one who is God ^C is [God] by nature; and likewise the one who is man. But the one who is Christ is one Christ by the voluntary union of God with man. Therefore, the one God differs from the one Christ. But it is not in that He is not God, but in that He is also man, that Christ differs from Him who is God alone. And according to this syllogism, if Christ differs from man by nature, what do you say is [different] by nature? But if, by these arguments, you say that Christ does not necessarily differ at all from man by nature, then it is also not necessary that He differ from God by these same arguments.

CAP. VII.

God made Jesus Lord and Christ; where do you place God the Word, O Egyptian? Is He making [Him] Lord, or is He being made Lord? Do not offer special distinctions; answer the question. He is indeed making [Him Lord], but by the condescension of His own nature into the nature of man, and by the union into one special ^D hypostasis of long ago.

CHAPTER VIII.

Similarly, if Christ has become a participant of flesh and blood with us, it is evident that the nature which He has among us is that of Christ the man. If He participates in any of these, or even participates [in them] equally, it is entirely the same nature in its entirety, and the unique nature of the others who share in it with Him. Therefore, since the ant, and the partridge, and the shrimp, and the panther participate in the four elements, are they all of the same nature in every way? Consider, therefore, O man, that while they all belong to the same [elements] to the children…

^A of the communion, Scripture says the Son is a participant, namely of flesh and blood; yet it does not say that He who participates in these among us is simply similar to us, such that He consists of what is similar and what is dissimilar to us. How, therefore, will He be a man in the same way as we are?

CAP. IX

CAP. X

CAP. XI

CAP. XII

nature of the whole body of which, if it does not participate, it is not even the head, as it is no longer the governing principle in itself. But if it participates in the one moving and leading the body, it is then no longer the one being governed, but the commanding one. Therefore, as the Word is Lord of our members and of his own flesh, even if this is understood as our head, it is still said to be directed by the Word. God is not called the head of Christ, but rather of the whole Christ, for his own proper head, that is, the Word, is of the whole, and he does not command himself. But if, as you say, the one who commands the rest also commands the head, since God is said to be the head of Christ, then God commands God. For if the body is subject to God—that is, the whole Christ, as you say—then its head, that is, God, must also be subject to the same God. ^B

CHAPTER XIII.

CAP. XIV.

^A a Lord and being existent. Lord Jesus, how could he, as one made by him, be a slave of him who made him Lord, as if he were a creature? For if it is removed that he is Lord, then that he was made is also removed; for he made him Lord. But if he is both a creature and Lord, and he was made Lord no otherwise than through the substantial state of this very one who made him, then he who is Lord by nature will either lord it over himself, or he will set free for himself the created Lord—that is, his human element—and will have power over all. Since you say in your custom that this one or that one made someone free, we shall therefore reason that he who was made free has become a slave from this very same one.

CHAPTER XV

^B To fulfill obedience without being governed by God, or to become sinless by the keeping of the law, is impossible for man. If, therefore, simple governance is the cause of these things, we have need only of obedience and not of the economy of Christ for our justification; for we are all, and the devil himself, governed by God; all things, therefore, would be sinless and would have been ordered under the guardianship of the law even without Christ. And after the incarnation of the Word, the one who does not obey him alone is never justified. The opposite, therefore, is shown, O you men: that since flesh is by nature sinful, it could not be justified and be in subjection to the law of God, nor could it be justified and fulfill all obedience, except through the participation of a sinless substance, which is the divine alone.

CHAPTER XVI

This word, "God has anointed you, your God," ^C if it does not speak of the man honored by the anointing of the Spirit, but of God the Word, it says that he who anointed him anointed him to his degradation, for through the anointing he received greater things than those which belong to his own nature; for everyone who is anointed is anointed in order to receive certain things that he cannot have by his own nature. But that this one who is anointed has been made something by the anointing of nature, as the Psalmist proclaims, must be added to this. For he calls even the one who is anointed God, for it is not in the nature of anything to make someone truly God, neither sensible nor intelligible, except true divinity. It is necessary, therefore, that the divinity be the one anointing, because of the "your God," and that the divinity be the anointing, because of the deifying; and to show that the one anointed is God, and not so called equivocally. For indeed, both are written similarly in the Hebrew text ^D of the passage "God" through the ineffable characters. Thus, the anointed one must be considered to be both God and man; for as he is something underlying the anointing, he is man, in accordance with which it is said "your God," but in that he is in participation of the divine anointing—one that is both subsistent in itself and substantially existing in him—he has been perfected as God.

CHAPTER XVII

Truly, according to that which is said, "The impious, when he comes into the depth of impiety, shows contempt," ^D those who say that God the Word is God or the Master of Christ do not have of themselves

but they speak according to the teaching of the Holy Spirit through the prophets and the apostles; furthermore, being persuaded by Christ himself. For David, they say, and the Apostle Peter have said, "I foresaw the Lord always before my face," and the Savior himself: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me." And the Prophet: "God, thy God, hath anointed thee." But who is ignorant of the many statements of this kind in Holy Scripture? How is it said by those prepared for piety? And when speaking: "My soul magnifies the Lord," although it is the whole [person] who is speaking, yet he exhorts his own soul as if from part of himself alone; and when he says, "I am earth and ashes," although it is the whole who is speaking, yet he speaks only regarding a part of himself, namely the body. And indeed, "I foresaw the Lord before me," ^A and, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me," even if they are said of the whole Christ, yet they must be understood specifically regarding his humanity, which is as it were that which the Spirit anointed, and it pointed out Christ upon his anointing. And the words, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"—let us not think, through a superfluous doubling, that they have a double, unclear relation regarding the anointed one if we consider them more fearfully; rather, it hints at what has been somewhat separated from that which was forsaken. The first, "My God," is as if the creature is speaking to the owner of the creature, such as "O Lord my God." The second is as if the owner is crying out to his own property, such as, "Why art thou sad, O my soul?" Moreover, this too must be discussed: if death is the separation of those substantially united, and at the time of death, as you say, this was spoken by the man to God, then was the one who is said at that time to have forsaken him substantially united to him? Therefore, he was one and the same person, God and man; and he was the one dying and suffering the separation of those in him who were by nature inseparable from the separating death. If, however, you say the separation was made by the power of God from the holy man, we see the opposite occurring in all the saints. Indeed, we know that God is present and strengthens the God-bearers in their agonies and ^B sufferings, rather than forsaking them in the circumstances surrounding death. And these things are thus. Regarding "God, thy God, hath anointed thee," there is no need for outside explanation; these are the words of David, who sees God as the one anointing, and immediately confesses the one truly anointed to be God as well.

CHAPTER XVIII

^A his would not remain in men, because they were flesh. Therefore, by the knowledge of the Word of the Father, who is consubstantial with Him, he attained to his own; for the consubstantial is not a glory to the consubstantial. Jesus himself, therefore, was made Lord through the divine Word, and Christ through the anointing of the Spirit; for God made this Jesus, whom the Jews crucified, Lord through the Word, and Christ through the Spirit; and through the imparting of his Word and the bestowing of his Spirit, the Father adorned this holy ark both within and without with divine brilliance. And if even from his birth he is immediately called Christ and Lord in the city of David by the angel who foretold it—for even Samuel, before he anointed one of the sons of Jesse, said, "Is this the Lord’s anointed?" ^B

CAP. XIX.

If, therefore, Jesus did not receive from the Spirit, according to the doctrine of the Egyptian, the ability to work, for what reason did the Father give him the Spirit? "For not by measure," he says, "does God give the Spirit. For the Father loves the Son and has given all things into his hand." How then, if it is not by measure but according to dignity, is the Spirit given to him by God the Father? Jesus did not receive the Spirit as a weak man does for a divine work; for if it is not of the measure of another nature to receive the Spirit who proceeds from the Father, but it is given only to a nature that is similar and loved by him, and only the Son is consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, it is evident that because of natural love the Father gave his consubstantial Spirit to his consubstantial Son; for the Father has given all things into his hand, so that the Son says, "All things that the Father has are mine." ^C

CAP. XX.

The flesh of the Lord is life-giving, when we believe that it was made life-giving by God the Word; for otherwise it is not life-giving. Yet it was not simply made life-giving now by the operation of the living Word, as in the creation of Adam; for whatever corruption man might have again in potentiality, but it united to its own nature a life-giving nature, through the union of two substances, exhibiting one hypostasis, so that the corruption which was potentially inherent in human nature might never again be able to enter into operation; just as, with the human hypostasis being stored up together with it in the force of that which effects incorruptibility—the life that is in itself by nature—and keeping together the human nature in the same divine hypostasis, so too do some healthy mortals, when applying stomach-corrupting juices or plants, or some other utility, mixing them with certain astringent substances, compound a single medicine which they thereafter use without fear, no longer fearing the corruption of the stomach because of the blending of the astringent in the same medicine. ^D

CAP. XXI.

There is no man who is not a certain man; and receiving

are sanctified are all from one, namely, from God. For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brothers, saying: "I will proclaim your name to my brothers,"[b] and again: "Since therefore the children have shared in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same."[c] But although all are from one, it is not in the same way; for the one is from Him by an immaculate and beginningless generation, while the others are so only by creation; for the potter's son and the vessel are not of the same nature, although both come from him. Furthermore, if the creator and the created differ from one another in nature, how can the one who sanctifies by nature and those who are sanctified by nature be of the same nature? If, indeed, even the creator and the created are not. Why then is he not ashamed to call them brothers? For what shame or estimation is there among those who are thoroughly of the same nature and dignity? Or what praise of humility is ^C there for one who calls himself what he is entirely by nature, having nothing more than this? For one who exists only by nature in the form of a servant is not to be considered free from vainglory by calling himself a servant. What spiritual sympathy caused him who is by nature absolutely similar to the children who shared in the nature of flesh and blood, and who himself in like manner shared by nature in flesh and blood, to participate? Even if he had not wished it, or rather, even if they had not participated, they would not have become these infants wholly consubstantial with Him, if the Word’s own nature had not become a participant of flesh, and not just anyone else. Absolutely alone did He participate in them. Surely, therefore, in these He who is above our nature accepted the same nature of God becoming man, and deifying man, who are His own infants according to the flesh, calling them brothers, saying: "Behold I and the children whom God has given me."[d] And since, even though he is brother to them according to fleshly generation, having come forth from Adam the first parent into this present age, nevertheless, having made His own body after the resurrection spiritual, and providing this for us as food, in order to implant in us through it the power for an active resurrection after death into a spiritual revival of the bodies, He is for us clearly the author of such a thing in the

^A future age, of a spiritual nature and an unending and incorruptible state of the bodies which are now corruptible in us. Therefore, He whose children we are is also called the Father of the age to come, because of us, whom He will raise up incorruptible in spiritual bodies; and He has re-established as incorruptible the places and all things surrounding us, suitable for those who dwell and walk and live and simply live as citizens in them, with the body in an incorruptible union. For the creation itself will be set free from the bondage of corruption into the glory of the liberty of the children of God, of Him who is called both the brother of man and Father, saying: "Behold I and the children whom God has given me."

CHAPTER XXIII

CHAPTER XXIV

CHAPTER XXV

^A Yet all things are appropriated to the person of his own flesh, whether they be physical sufferings, or external outrages, or whatever else has happened to it; for having assumed it into his own hypostasis, he made it his own. The nature of the Word, however, does not appropriate the definitions of the nature of the flesh. For when the Godhead willed, even later, to take to itself the humanity, in the hypostasis of the divine natural properties, it is likewise of itself alone, according to certain physical specialities of the Godhead; for the one [the Godhead] divinized as a divinizing nature, while this other [the humanity] was divinized as being made divine; and the one was an exalted nature, while the other was not; and the one gave its own, while the other received natural gifts. Therefore, none of these things, for us, infects the distinction of the natures through the union of the person.

CHAPTER XXVI.

If Christ is God by nature, why does he say on the cross: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" For he is not understood to be God by nature to God; rather, it is he who is man by nature who clearly calls the God [the Father] his own God. Since therefore we also call the God who is in heaven our Father, are we on that account also sons of God by nature according to the flesh, or certainly not? For if we do not show that he whom we call father is the father of our whole nature by nature, then it is not necessarily the case that God is of that nature which Christ calls his God.

CHAPTER XXVII.

If the demons saw that Jesus was God by nature, he says, how did they say: "I adjure you, O God, that you do not torment us?" Let it be, then, that the unclean spirits did not know him to be God; for no one among men can call Jesus Lord and God unless he speaks in the Holy Spirit, as it is written. What, then, seems to you worthy of belief when said by the constant enemies of the truth, the demons, those sole teachers of lies?

CHAPTER XXVIII.

If flesh is flesh and not Godhead, since the Godhead was not changed into flesh nor again does it fill up the substance of the flesh, why, for the same reason, is he not also man and not Godhead? For truly the nature of flesh is carnal, and the nature of humanity is human as it pertains to humanity; but these are not proper hypostases, nor is any one of these in Christ separated and submitted apart from the other. For in all other men, it is not simply the nature of man that is seen, but the nature of each one as an ensouled ^D nature, and in like manner neither is flesh called simply flesh, but is discerned from the soul by its own proper hypostasis, nor is the soul [discerned] from the flesh. The rationale of the mystery of the incarnation of our Master teaches this, and demands of us faith concerning this: that the Word, whose own hypostasis and nature pre-existed before the ages alien to flesh, in later times assuming flesh to himself, did not, in his own hypostasis, assume the human nature of a simple man.

CAP. XXIX

CAP. XXX

one [entity] receiving a property distinct from the divinity. ^A

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

conjunction with our Lord Christ, you separate what you pretend to acknowledge in the Word alone. For he who distinguishes anything by nature and by hypostasis no longer thinks of its union as anything other than accidental.

BOOK VI

^{A B} CHAPTER I. If the Word has flesh as a robe, according to what was said to him in his words concerning himself: "He shall wash his robe in wine," it is evident that he who anathematizes the one who says Christ is a "Theophorus" anathematizes the one who says he is a "bearer" before the other. But if the robe of the Word is the flesh, and the Word is God, and the flesh is man, it is more consistent to call Christ a "God-bearing man." And as for his apostles, who were "clothed with power from on high," the Holy Spirit of God having come upon them, it is reasonable to call these and such as these Theophori, so that what is adventitious to the human hypostasis may be understood as the divine nature. In the Lord, however, the contrary is the case: the human nature is glorified, as that which is adventitious to the divine hypostasis. For he himself put on that which is of our nature—he who clothes all of us—taking up flesh of his own nature and giving the Spirit.

^C CHAPTER II. "God was in Christ," according to the saying, does not mean that the Word is in a man, as one who carries is in the one who is carried; nor can God be in Christ in any other way. If, then, God was in Christ as indifferently as one who carries is in the one who is carried, then the Word in the flesh is bound by limits, and comprehension, and is a covering, and a veil. By a local apposition, the extremity of one is united to the other, just as the husk or the shell is a covering for the almond. Consequently, the Word is also circumscribed by the flesh, whether in whole or for the most part; furthermore, in this way he would exist not to reveal the Word to the world, but to cover him up, and he would not be manifest for the sake of any understanding; for he would have devised incarnation for himself. Otherwise, the Word might be thought of as a body even before the flesh, if he has such a manifestation. But so that all these absurdities may be granted to us: if it is so, he is not a "God-bearer" but a "man-bearer," being God from God; or if Christ himself who is carried is, according to you, also a "God-bearer," then Christ shares in two gods—to one who extends himself within him, for the reason that God was in Christ, and to the other who ex-

extends himself externally.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VII

^A If Christ is not a God-bearing man, then Christ is not a man who hears the truth from God. "For why," he says, "do you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth which I heard from the Father?" But he is a man inspired by God, and not a God-bearer; for the flesh did not dwell in the Word, but the Word in the flesh.

CHAPTER VIII

He who prevents God the Word from acting in Jesus prevents the man from being seen as God the Word. You speak well, if you speak clearly; for the Word alone acts in the flesh by Himself according to His divinity, primarily as God, but through His natural connection with it. In that same way, the soul acts independently in its own body, according to the man, for its vivification, and fire in iron, according to the mass, for its ignition. And this is demonstrated, for the work of one of the united parts truly proceeds into the other through the manifestation of the powers in the exterior of the one acting, from the thing acted upon, thereafter always advancing.

CHAPTER IX

If Christ is not the one acting as God and being acted upon as man, then Christ is either the one acting alone, or the one being acted upon. The Word effected the assumption of the flesh into Himself and acts; He effects its resurrection from the dead. Yet, it is not as though the whole Christ is acted upon by another, or acts for the sake of another; for it is the same Christ to whom both the Word and the flesh belong. According to the operations done in others by Christ, the Word often acts specifically for Himself through His own flesh, performing miracles by using the flesh united to Him as a physical instrument.

CHAPTER X

But indeed, he also says, Athanasius, whom you do not touch upon, says in his sermon on the incarnation: "He prepares for Himself a temple, the body, and appropriates this as an instrument, being known in it and dwelling within it." And again: "Offering His own temple and saving instrument as a substitute soul for all." Understand, therefore, that it is called a house because it is an instrument naturally united, just as the body is to the soul; for "the Word was made flesh" is said, not merely that He dwelt in the flesh.

BOOK VII

The seventh infamy of the heretics, who condemn those who say: "One of the holy Trinity suffered in the flesh."

CHAPTER ONE

When you say, they claim, that one of the holy Trinity suffered

in the flesh—for if you say not three gods, but three hypostases, it follows that one should say "one" [unus] or "one" [una] of the Trinity, attending to the person or the suppositum, and not [masculine] "one" [unus]—because this word, when taken in the masculine, refers to "gods," whether fathers or sons: for this reason, against custom, you do not dare to say that Christ is "another and another," while you confess him to be "one thing and another thing."

I marvel how, having fallen into these errors regarding the investigation of the Lord's hypostasis which are, as it were, your own, you shamelessly attempt to show that we are now involved in them. For you have admitted three distinct substances in the most holy Trinity, one of which is that which is said to have been incarnate: and you contended that a hypostasis is nothing other than an individual substance. Furthermore (for those accused are not immune from blame ^B because their accusers are accomplices: this may be forgiven you), we can now respond to the things with which you reproach us: Not only the Word, designating by this locution a number in the masculine, namely "one from the most holy Trinity," do we call God; but we also call the Father and the Holy Spirit "God" in the masculine: and we do not think that they are for this reason three gods. For neither have our holy Fathers, nor the holy Scripture, abstained from speaking in such a way about each one of the three persons of the divine nature. For they generally call the Father and the Son in the masculine, because they place the sum of the perfection of each person in the fact that, substantially with respect to common attributes, and personally with respect to relative attributes, all three enjoy the same fullness of divinity and power; for thus the Fathers of the Nicene synod, gathered in God, express themselves: "We believe in one God," ^C they say, "the Father Almighty, and in one Lord Jesus Christ,"—though when speaking of hypostases and persons they always use the masculine and neuter genders; and concerning this matter, they composed that very Symbol as a rule and index of the orthodox doctrine concerning God and the divine Trinity. They did not say that they believe in "one" (in the neuter gender), but they designated both in the masculine, expressing both the word signifying number, namely "one," and the absolute and relative name, namely "God" and "Lord."

Item, holy Scripture very often introduces two in the masculine, working together in one work; yet they do not necessarily, according to you, point to polytheism as their goal. For example, it is read: "The Lord rained fire from the face of the Lord," and: "The Lord said to my Lord," and: "God, thy God, hath anointed thee." And there are other texts, none of which asserts that there are three gods, or denies that there is one divinity and power in the three. ^D For elsewhere it is said: "The Lord thy God, the Lord is one." And: "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of Sabaoth," and similar things inspired by the Holy Spirit. Was it fitting, therefore, for the Holy Spirit to say one or one [una] ...

^A in the feminine sense, O holy, O mistress, O goddess, lest it be corrected by your reproaches? How do you yourselves call the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit? If you say neither Lord nor God (for these names have a masculine sound), are you not entirely atheists? But if you say these things yourselves concerning those for whom you reproach us, will you not be judged to be of the greatest impudence?

^B CHAPTER II. If the most holy Trinity is impassible, but Christ is passible, and Christ is one of the most holy Trinity, then either the most holy Trinity is passible, or Christ is not one of the most holy Trinity. But if you add, "He has suffered in the flesh," this sort of suffering does not free one from suffering; just as if someone were to say that another had been strangled in such a way, that person of whom it is spoken is not free from the ^C experience or the strangulation. Yet Christ is not only one of the most holy Trinity, but he is also one of the humanity, in one and the same person. For the divine Word assumed something as an addition to his nature, namely, that which was fashioned by him, into his own person; and that which was taken was not taken as a person, but as a nature, joined hypostatically to the nature of the Word in his own person. For it has been demonstrated sufficiently for the place, as often as possible, that many natures ^D exist in one hypostasis.

Let us illustrate this point regarding our Lord Christ through an example. For if Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, after their departure from here, are already defined by the principle of immortality (since each of them is more this, a rational immortal animal, than the others), while Joseph, being one and the same with them according to nature and truly consubstantial, and still being ruler of Egypt and living in the flesh, were to be defined as mortal, as living this present life while still conceived with corruptible flesh: must we then, according to you, necessarily define them as still mortal and dying twice, lest the definition of Joseph be false, or else define Joseph as immortal even before the departure from here, so that they might not be falsely called immortal? But if this is absurd, it is clear that Joseph is truly consubstantial with those persons who are regarded as immortal in all respects, relative to that part of himself by which he will never die, that is, his soul; yet he is mortal and numbered among the mortals, relative to that by which he exceeds those consubstantial with him in immortality, that is, the body which he carried. Thus, therefore, we also say that Christ, who is composed of flesh and divinity, is passible in the flesh, but not in his divinity. But since you say that the word "flesh" signifies nothing other than the primary cause and mode of the attribute predicated of the subject Christ—namely, the passion—and does not express that one of the different natures existing in him, participating in one and the same person, will suffer this, as we believe: it is therefore necessary for us, according to our way of speaking, if someone says one man is cut in the flesh, to understand that this same man has been cut at once in his soul and in everything [else].

^A Likewise, even when hearing that this one is shaved, dragged, or bitten in the flesh, you will consider him a man in both respects, that is, that these things have happened to the man in both soul and body, not through the flesh as having the power to cut. Furthermore, regarding those who are freed from torture while suffering in the flesh, if we were to say that such a person remained impassible in the flesh—understanding "by means of the flesh"—given this, it would be possible for you similarly to say that he is impassible in the soul through the flesh; for nothing else remains to him besides the flesh. But what foolish, unperceptive person would say this? Therefore, it is clear that "in the flesh" is not said as if by a pain-inflicting instrument, nor as if the flesh were a part of the Word of God understood in Himself when it is said, "The Word of God suffered in the flesh," just as we say that so-and-so stumbled with his foot or was hung by his hand. For when we say the Word of God, we always understand Christ after the union of the natures; and we speak of the flesh as if it were a part of Christ, in virtue of which we say the Word of God suffered as Christ. Just as ^B also in the case of a man, we say as if from a part that he is weak in the flesh but healthy in the spirit, and in the flesh absent from some, but in the spirit present with them; thus, then, the Jews are to be understood as God-killers, and similar things, as Christ is God and the Word. Since, therefore, Christ suffered for us in the flesh, according to the apostle Peter, it is clear that God the Word is also said to have suffered—not as the part, but as Christ. For indeed, the whole of Job is said to have suffered, though his flesh alone suffered; for [the Lord] said to the devil, "Do not touch his soul."

Chapter III

^A and the rest will not be his own; how is to think thus, not clearly to be out of one’s mind? Furthermore, the Christ whom we worship as God, and the man whom you think of simply as man (unless you are disposed to grant him even some other thing, if not God, yet something superior to man), behold, he demonstrates his flesh and body to be truly his own, those which suffered the nails and the lance; for these were his members. Concerning which he says: “They pierced my hands and my feet.” And again, he shows the mystical participation of the bread of the Eucharist to be the giving of his own flesh, saying: “He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood.” And elsewhere: “This is my body.” Further, he further considers even the Church to be his own flesh; for this the Apostle teaches, saying: “For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ also does the Church.” And in another place: “You are the body of Christ, and members in particular.” Since therefore the Church happens to be his own flesh and body, will that which is not the Church not be counted as his own according to your calculation? And since he was not crucified according to this flesh, but for its sake, must he necessarily have suffered in a strange flesh? For if that which is not his own in such a way is immediately, according to you, alien; and the Church is his own; then what is not his own in the same way as the Church, will be altogether alien to him. Likewise, if you should say that the flesh which was nailed is strictly his own, the Church will not be his own, since it was not nailed; for that which is not called his own in such a way, seemed to you immediately to be also alien. But, O you men, the flesh is not indeed ^B of the nature of the Word, but it has truly become his own in these last times in respect of his hypostasis. For we also say that the upright posture is of man, being a property of the nature of the soul, yet contemplated in its hypostasis regarding the body. If you had understood how this is said concerning that, you would not have entangled us in syllogisms woven from shadows and dreams. But these things are for these matters. At the end of your argument, having appeared to succumb to a state of lethargy through inattention, you would have moved us to no moderate laughter, had we not been restrained by the dread nature of the subjects under discussion toward feelings of reverence. For even though everything you have said is false to the highest degree, nevertheless we see you now wishing to conclude that we, just as we speak of two natures, likewise say there are two persons or hypostases regarding the Word and the flesh; and this you endeavor to refute in us as a conclusion that is absurd and forbidden—that which yesterday and the day before (and would that it be not until tomorrow!) is the most fundamental part of your own religion alone. And more than anything else, the absurdity of such an opinion is the hallmark by which you are recognized; to us, it is truly and highly detestable and antagonistic; and it is on account of this very thing that we are contending against you in these many matters with the help of God.

If that which is called "one of the Trinity" is common to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, is it common in the same sense to the Father and to the Spirit, or is the one Word constituted from both in some other way? But if the communion is according to the same sense, first, why is the flesh not consubstantial with the Word? And next, is the divine not a quaternity, not a Trinity? But if the Word communicates with the Father and the Spirit in one way, and the flesh in another, how do you not introduce two natures into the holy Trinity? If, however, you say "one of the Trinity" as a whole made of parts, the Word of God in himself will be a half of one of the holy Trinity; and if one must also speak of being consubstantial from two, and you include the Father and the Spirit, you grant that the Word is of six monads of the holy Trinity. But O you who are feeble in understanding and so clever, as you think, in the precision of such matters, first of all, it is not the case that in whatever respect something is said to be one thing and to be from many, it must necessarily be common to all these; but only in the respect in which it is said to be one, even though it is with many. If, therefore, the Word is said to be one of the holy Trinity according to hypostasis—for according to essence he is not one from three, but the Word is glorified at the same time with the two—and he has no communion according to his own hypostasis, neither before the flesh with the Father or the Spirit, nor after the flesh (for the Word is not these, nor does he ever communicate simply as hypostasis to hypostasis), how do you ask about the communion, whether as Word simply or as incarnate, that is, as Christ, the one of the holy Trinity, towards the other two persons, in accordance with the fact that he is one from the three distinct ones? For they are not in the account or number of the hypostasis; for the "one" among them is truly in the essence, and in the number of the essence, according to which they are never even three, so that we might call Christ one of the three. And we consider him to have similarity towards the others in this way; for it is evident that the persons do not have a single, indivisible nature according to the hypostasis, but according to the essence that is in them; for out of the fact that it is a single existence for them, we speak of their identity. For the relation of the Son to the Father is a similarity; and the Son is called the image of the Father when, along with the nature, the idiom of the latter is also understood, that is, the being from a cause. For thus the account of the image, besides the common notion of similarity, also has that which is not a prototype but is from an exemplar, being its own proper account. But when we consider them according to the essence itself of the persons, there is no longer room to speak of similarity, since one is not compared to another; for no distinction will be seen, but we know only their identity in a unified way. If, therefore, you have not been able to advance the question according to reason, yet nevertheless, imagining these things according to the peculiar communion of our Lord Jesus Christ, you shall receive this answer from us: that the Word is one whole person, and one hypostasis of the holy Trinity; for he is from hypostases, not from natures.

CHAPTER IV