OF THE ALL-WISE MONK, LORD LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM: QUESTIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST IS ONE COMPOSED NATURE, AND TESTIMONIES OF THE SAINTS AND EXPLANATION OF THEIR DOCTRINE
A 1. Being met with their difficulties, let us also now propose a few out of many to them; and let us say to them: If, as you say, Christ is known according to His one essence to be of the same essence as us and as the Father, then we too are consequently of the same essence as the Father; for things which are like the same thing according to the same thing are also like each other.
B 2. In saying that a nature comes into being from natures, if they say it is of the same name as the former, it is clear that they will call it neither God nor man. But if it is synonymous, it will necessarily be one of the two; for each of the two is not synonymous with the other. Therefore, it will be either God or man alone. For if the two are not synonymous with each other, then that which is synonymous with the one will not be synonymous with the other; just as that which is equal to the unequal is also unequal to the other of the equals; so also that which is equal to the unequal is likewise unequal to the other.
3. If the union, being an operation, is always preserved, and if, therefore, it is one and always existing, what does it unite? For the nature of the union is not like the nature of time, which is destroyed immediately after coming into being; for being among relative things, it pertains to the united things as long as they are said to be united, along with the nature and the time. In what united things, therefore, is it always—according to which it is also called united by derivation from this relation? But once it has come into being, as these men say, as one true nature out of the two natures which have been united, it will have no place. Furthermore, the union unites a duality that is not united—which this union will unite, being necessarily considered in at least two things. For to the united things it is either one or nothing, and thus it does not admit of union; for that which has become one no longer
A is said by them to be two, or it will be said that the two are not truly united according to that which they have already become as one. Wherefore we say well that if the union is of two natures, it is rather the hypostasis that is one—for it is not the nature; for the things united according to nature, as things united, are two, but the hypostasis is one, as things united.
4. Every whole composed of parts not of the same kind will have a name relative to its own form, and to the natural form of each of its parts; for man would not be called simply body, nor only soul, by reason of natural form, nor [merely] body and soul. For the mortal element is in neither of these forms, but it is clearly in man. Therefore, either Christ is neither God nor man, nor God and man as one, but some other natural form; and let them say what this is. If the form of the composite is in all respects of the same kind as both of the things which were composed, how will it not be equal in number to them according to natural discourse?
B 5. If Christ is one nature—or, if you will, one substance—after the union, then there is also one beginning of his being; for it is impossible for the same substance and nature to have two beginnings of that from which it originates and exists. For that substance which manifests existence, when it has come to be, then also exists. When, therefore, and how is there a beginning of the existence of this composite nature? If [it exists] before the union, then it would not be called one because of the union—for it is evident that it was one before the union, and there was no need of union for it to be one. But if its beginning is from the aforementioned recent union, how shall we still confess that nature which came into being in the times of Augustus to be eternal and before the ages and divine?
C 6. Every union, being completed and observed as a certain newer nature, shows it to have certain things which none of the united natures possesses in itself. For neither the nature of the soul nor of the body by itself ever hungers, or thirsts, or shivers, or experiences heat, or sleeps, or dies, or laughs, or weeps, or simply senses sensibly, just as neither the flute separately nor the flute-player by himself plays. What, then, did the Lord, who is neither God nor man, show himself to possess in a unique way? It is supposed, therefore, they say, like his bodily walking upon the waters and such things. But this must be understood as not being a property existing D of a composite nature; and for those among the saints to whom God is not combined according to essence into a nature or into a hypostasis, [God] has often granted them to be carried upon the waters, moving transitionally in the body upon them. If, therefore, there is no physical property of Christ that is unique, nor even one nature that is solely his own—for it is not according to mixture, as with mixed drinks; nor according to participation, as the water of the Egyptians which became blood; nor according to alteration, as bronze is changed into rust; nor according to the necessity of natural union, as the soul has become part of the human body; and even regarding the bleating of a goat, and the wax-modeling which is proper to man,
if the same man models wax figures and utters a bleat, he does not show that his nature is compounded, but rather that two proper energies of the natures proceed from this one nature of his. Thus, therefore, to be moved from place to place is of human nature; but for the heavier nature of the body not to sink while walking upon the lighter nature of the water, but to be supported, the solid upon the more porous, this is of divine nature. A It has the power to make, to have made, and to transform all things most specifically, to impart being and to participate in being, and to deprive natures of their essence, even if it proceeds from the same Person. Evidently, therefore, in such things the divine and human nature are seen to cooperate, yet no other compound nature is offered to our view from these.
B 7. If the unconfused composition, which the adunation of one with another exhibits, adds nothing more or less to the two natures—and adunation is neither nature, nor change, nor the removal or addition of a nature—how, without addition, or removal, or change of nature, will the quantity of joined natures, according to number, appear more or less, so that it makes those which were two essences either three or one? If, moreover, they presume to add anything more to the natures than an unconfused adunation, such as that it is productive or simply representative of a nature, let them tell us with confidence what they think that is.
8. If from two natures joined unconfusedly it is possible to make one, C what else happens from two natures joined by confusion? They will either say that there are two natures in Christ from the unconfused Word, or they will be forced to explain what the difference is between the unconfused and confusion in the adunation of natures. And if they say, "We do not mix," what more will he say who claims a mixing? Let them say to the Nestorians, who speak and shout freely of two hypostases, "We do not divide," and we say this: for what else will clarify the definition? For things that are entirely indistinctly composed are not otherwise than those of which one must say there is one hypostasis of nature, nor are things entirely distinct otherwise than those of which one must say there are two natures and hypostases.
9. D If there is one nature of our Lord Christ after the union, we might say to them: "Tell us, O you men, do you say that this was in some way improved after his holy resurrection, or not? Or is it not entirely improved, but something is said to be improved in the very resurrection of the Lord, and something else not?" If, therefore, you say that there is something perfect and natural that was improved according to nature, and another perfect and natural thing that was improving according to nature in his holy resurrection, from this very thing, look, you acknowledge to us those two natures; and thanks will be given to the common Father for the holy return of our brothers.
10. Those who say that they see the duality of natures in Christ after the union only by mental abstraction, let them tell us the natural difference between the invisible and the visible
A in Christ recognize by mental abstraction, or is it otherwise? If, therefore, they recognize the physical difference in the same [person] by that same mental abstraction, just as they confess this, they will be compelled to confess that as well; or if the former is a fabrication, they will say that this is also so. But if they were to say that they see the difference not by mental abstraction but by the senses, affirming that they see by the senses what is invisible, they will be objects of wonder. If, however, they see both by mental abstraction, but they conceive the difference by the [faculty] of judging existing things and those things beyond the senses, while they use the [faculty] of fabricating non-existent things for the duality: why, in the first place, do we not also fabricate ten, twenty, and thirty natures in Christ, but only two? And who gave us a law to treat as dogmas these fabrications about Christ who is true God, and to let our faith be carried away by mere phantasms? B To be an idolater, not from without, but in our very soul, by fabricating things that do not exist, and then also relating them as myths to others? For these things, when granted, destroy the whole mystery of piety and all the teachers together with a single prejudice, tearing them down with the instability of falsehood.
Further, let them tell us truly: if, therefore, according to this very mental abstraction by which they say there are two natures, is it permitted for any of the Fathers or Apostles to say there are ten natures of Christ, or fifty, or any number truly? For if it were permitted to say so truly, why did they not speak the truth? And yet this has been investigated of old: how many are the natures of Christ? But if there cannot be more than two natures of Christ truly conceived, it is clear that the reality of the matter holds only up to this number. C But if the thought is regarding the reality and the truth, why then is it conceived and imagined through a fabrication and falsely? For by this one must simply distinguish between mental abstractions: that the true one is born in us from existing things, but the false one breeds non-existent things in us. Therefore, the two natures of Christ are truly [known] by mental abstraction; for even when united, they are only objects of contemplation by our mental abstraction. For that which is by nature invisible does not become visible because it is united to something, except by mental abstraction. But since our mind cannot contemplate many things at once, nor form thoughts about many things simultaneously, we necessarily separate the union from the united; and in judging the union and the united, we speak of the distinct definition of each; and considering each of the united things individually, we recognize what kind of properties each has and what it possesses; D for if we do not know them in this way, we do not understand the union either; for this is seen through the mutual communication of properties. But it is not possible for anyone to contemplate all the united things at once, and their properties, and the properties of the union in one simple act of imagination. Therefore, we necessarily fabricate the distinctions of the united things by mental abstraction; but even this we do not do in order to lie by the mental abstraction regarding the distinctions of the things joined together in ourselves—for this was not the purpose—but because of the falseness of our nature, as it were: "For every man is a liar" (Rom. iii, 4). For since we are unable to contemplate many things at once, even when united, unless through this method we grasp the truth of the united things—how many and what sort each is specifically—and since this is not truly known, then neither is...
some things are united will be apprehended. For the union itself, not being, and the division of the united things by a false conception, are ignored, so that by a true conception their union may be known and apprehended; for sense perception, seeing only a thing, is unable to discern whether it is one by nature or by union.
A 11. That one nature, as you say, brethren, after the union, will it be one in number with the natures before the union, from which you say it consists of two natures, or not? If, therefore, it is not the same, then the God who is before flesh is not the same as He who is in flesh—that is, the one after the union and the one before the union—one in number, but He is one in the Word, and another in Christ. But if it is the same in number as the nature of the Word, then the Word even after the union is without flesh, or else He was composed with flesh even before the union.
12. Every being is either created or uncreated; for those who fabricate goat-stags, as the Father says, will not provide a middle ground between these. If, therefore, there is one nature of Christ, if it is uncreated, what is the one from the holy Virgin? And if it is created, what is its substance in common with the uncreated Father? Similarly, if it is unbegotten and timeless, what is the one born of a woman? And this, because the fullness of time came in the latter days; but if it is generated and under time, what is that through which all things were made, and through which the Father made the ages? And how is it that Christ has neither beginning of life nor end of days, and in this is made like to Melchizedek? For that which is one in itself, according to the same thing and in the same respect, does not admit of opposing definitions, as has often been said.
B 13. Does the Mediator between God and men seem to you to be a medium between them also according to physical reason, or only according to intent and a reconciling purpose? If, then, only according to intent, is He, by nature, one of the two, or something else besides the two? But if not, He must of necessity be the medium by nature; and for the medium, it is necessary that it either be none of the things between which it stands, sharing from a part of each, or all of both; which you wish, answer us.
14. The Apostle, after the union, clearly knows the form that took and the form taken in Christ—that is to say, the nature; and that these are neither one nor similar is evident to everyone.
15. If, because of the example of man mentioned by certain of the Fathers, it is not possible for two natures to be preserved in Christ, let them tell us: do those who kill the body kill the nature, or not? And do those who are not able to kill the soul not prevail over a nature other than the body, or not? If, therefore, they were truly men to whom the command was given by the Lord not to fear those of this kind, it is clear that these things are said because two natures are in them, namely, the one that is killed and the one that is not killed.
A 16. If the nature which is divinity remained, and the nature of the Word, and the nature which is of humanity, the nature of flesh, how are there not two unchangeable natures in Christ?
17. Furthermore, regarding difference, it is a difference of certain things; for the account of this is of things existing in something, and not of things understood in themselves. If, therefore, you speak of a difference, you must grant that there are distinct things in Christ. How many are these? You will say at least two. And if you are asked what these are, you will name, I suppose, divinity and humanity. But what are you to define these, being cross-examined as to the things themselves, if they are not quality, or quantity, or relations, or anything of the sort, but you must confess them to be essences entirely? Thus, it is clearly deduced that you are stating there are two essences in Christ because of the difference.
B 18. We ask you further, brothers: Do you say that the Son and Word is distinguished in some respect from his own Father, or not? We know that you say so, and that you confess this to be the hypostasis. Far be it from you to speak such blasphemies, and far be it from the rest of you to lack perfect piety. Again, therefore, we ask you this: Do you say that the Word is distinguished in some respect from his own flesh, or not? If in no respect, you are placing this flesh closer to the Word and more united than [he is with] the Father, even though the union with the Father is according to hypostasis; indeed, the Word is separated from the flesh that is his neither by nature nor by hypostasis. If, however, you distinguish it in some respect, [state] by what account of difference—and not of division—you distinguish this flesh of the Word; answer this. If, indeed, it were separated from the Word by the same [criterion] by which he was separated from the Father—that is, by [the criterion of] hypostasis itself—then, first, you have C granted two hypostases of Christ; and second, you are representing the flesh as equal to the Father in all respects, if the Word is distinguished from the Father and from his own flesh by the same and sole things. But if it is by something else, it must necessarily be nature, or else you should indicate to us if you have something to suggest in Christ besides nature and hypostasis. But if you have nothing, you are entirely giving the definition of the Word and of the flesh in Christ according to the account of nature. Now, there is also a number of the things being defined, since there are two terms for these; and those which have two terms, clearly have two defining accounts. But if the terms are of natures, and the defining words are [also] of natures, it is clear that the natures will be made manifest; there is no doubt that the natures of Christ are clearly numerable. It is therefore well said by us: union of substances into one nature in the holy and supreme Trinity, but union of natures into one D hypostasis in the holy and ineffable incarnation of the Word. For the Father who said this also declared that the converse is the argument of the mystery regarding Christ, as opposed to the argument regarding the holy Trinity.
19. We ask yet this also: Of this nature of Christ, the Son of the living God—according to Peter's secure confession—what do you say the God Word is, a part or the whole? For if you say he is a part, you must also call the Father the father of a partial nature. And since the Word is partial, insofar as he is a Son by nature, the fatherhood of the Father will also be partial, in accordance with the natural fatherhood; therefore, each of the two divine
A subsistences, both of the Father and of the Son, will be deficient by half in the Verb according to nature, and there will not be a perfect nature considered in any of the persons of the holy Trinity. Furthermore, one must also reflect upon this absurdity, that it will be possible to say: if the nature of the Word was made perfect with the flesh, then from the incarnation of the Son, both the Son and the Father made a progression toward his Word, so that he himself might be the perfect Father of a perfect Son. But if, fearing these things, you say that the whole of the one nature of Christ is the divine Word that is in him, B first of all, you have either granted the whole of Christ to exist even before Christ, since the Word existed even before his union with the flesh, or you do not say that the Word existed before the flesh of Christ. It will therefore be thus: first, the whole is proper, if indeed Christ, of whom the whole is the divine Word, existed before the ages and before his own flesh, which is a part of Christ. Then again, how the one nature will also have as a part of itself this Word—which it already possesses as a whole—is not to be seen; for the same thing will never be both a part and a whole of the same thing. Yet also, according to this answer of yours, the flesh will be cast out entirely from Christ, since this one nature of yours is already completed by the Word alone; C or else the flesh will also be added, and it will not result for you in what you intended. For everything that is observed in something in addition to its proper natural integrity will introduce some excessive quantity, if indeed it is truly united to this entity, and will not just be thought of as existing outside of it according to the standard of creation. Therefore, if these things are absurd, it is impossible to call the nature of Christ "one," while viewing either the Word or the flesh in it as a part or as a whole. Either, then, there is some other nature which you call "one"—other than the Word and the flesh entirely—and it is neither God nor man, or there are not one, but absolutely two.
20. We say further: Are the things that have come together—the Word and the flesh, from which you say the union of Christ out of two was made—or is it something else besides these? But you will surely say these are the same. Yet the Word remained the Word and the flesh remained the flesh after the union, even if united to the Word, and properly D belonging to the one who makes it his own. How then will there not be two even now, as Word and flesh, and as the proper and the one who makes it proper?
21. Cyril the Father says in the first of the *Scholia* that the name "Christ" has neither the force of a definition, nor does it signify the essence of anything—what it ever is—just as "man" or "horse" or "ox" does, but rather it provides a designation of an action being performed upon someone. If, therefore, this name is neither definitive nor signifies an essence, it is clear that it should be called, according to your view, the one nature of Christ in a physical sense. But you will not call it God, for it is a part of this nature; nor yet man, for this must be argued against in like manner. What then is the name of its integrity, tell me? Just as we affirm something other than soul and body for humanity; for the word "Christ," he says, signifies an anointing around someone who is anointed; because neither an anointing
without an ingenerate substance, nor the one anointed is someone without substance, nor again is the anointing and the anointed one substance, it is evident. Deservedly, therefore, and possessing a certain knowledge of physical things and names in a twofold way, we say that there are two natures of Christ. B
22. Furthermore, we say to you concerning the matter laid before you, as it is divine, it does not admit a concept of "genus" in any way; for if there is a first cause of this, what will be a higher genus? That "one" is used in a twofold way regarding Christ only according to the more principal words; and if, according to these words, it must be granted to anyone to speak of it there; and "two" are also said to be of a twofold nature in certain things: therefore, that which is "one" is one either in species or in number; and those things which are "two" are two either in species or in number. Those things, then, that are one in species will have complete physical parity with one another; but those things that are two in species have, in every respect, physical disparity; those, however, that are one in number are not prevented from having physical disparity between them, even if they are not divided apart from one another; and, with each being considered in its own proper delineation, they are numbered according to the defining term of number. For, thinking and numbering in this way, we say that the whole common man, and horse, and angel, existing without any difference in species of the same nature in all the particulars under them, is one; but we know many of these particulars separately by number; for we know that each of them can be numbered individually. And again, we speak in terms of number of the whole world, and of any given man as having divided natures or natural species, not numbering that one. Therefore, concerning our Lord, if indeed you speak of simplicity on account of the unity of the person, and of the enumeration of the inseparable things in him as being one in number, you speak well, and it is right for us to accept this with you, since you confess the physical diversity according to that single person; but if we wish to enumerate those things that are in Christ according to that natural form, since it must be confessed that those things which are in the form must necessarily be similar according to form, and seeing them to be necessarily dissimilar, we will no longer dare to call these things "one" by the index of form, but "two." Therefore, we consistently recognize Christ as two indeed in natures, but one in number. C D
23. Furthermore, they must be asked, since they say that the one nature which they call Christ's is from two natures, whether they also say that his one subsistence—that is to say, person—is from two subsistences or not? Where then, and how, did the other of his natures exist before the union, let them say; and whose was it then? For the human nature was not yet Christ's, not having been anointed by the Divinity. But if they say the union is from two subsistences, where was the perfect human subsistence existing before Christ? Then, when it was enclosed in the womb of the holy Virgin; for in that holy chamber, the union of the natures of Christ happened from the beginning; unless, perhaps, according to Nestorius, they think the union of the divinity after the birth
A of the humanity is relative to it.
24. Further, we must examine them: do they say that Christ consists of two natures that exist in reality, or [do they say] that one of these—human nature, for instance—is fashioned by them in thought before the union? For if both were truly pre-existing, where—let us ask again—was the simple human nature before Christ, and then [how] did it become [what is] in Christ, having been fashioned within the holy womb? But if they fashion one of the natures of which they say Christ is composed in thought beforehand, then first, either they have no basis for a true conception and present a false fabrication—or, having taken the discernment from the observation of Christ after the union, as being of two natures and suchlike, they think these prior to him. How, therefore, do those who think of their pre-existence before the union from the discernment of them after the union not acknowledge two [natures] after the union? And if they conceive one of the natures of which they say the Lord is composed by thought and the other in truth, it was necessary for Christ himself to exist partly in truth and partly to appear to exist only in thought; as if there were a middle part of his nature that, according to them, does not exist, and their account of Christ's nature arrives at only half a nature, and not at one perfect nature, as they claim. B
25. Furthermore, since you know the coming-together of the natures and confess with us the unconfused [state] of those which have come together, answer us: where do you observe this? For if you see it because you observe the divine and the human as complete in the same person, preserving the natural principle of each through the exchange of properties in this one composite being, it will be clear that you are explaining the operations and passions from a perfect [source] concerning a perfect [source], and not from nothing. Since it is necessary that the causes also be thus, and that they be preserved as different and perfect, just as their own properties and inquiries [are preserved]. Since, therefore, they are different and twofold—being divine and human—the differences also will be two, and these [will be] those. And if you confess that these things which are the causes of the properties are natures, then you also confess that the properties flow from two natures. C
26. Furthermore, if they confess a natural difference in Christ, do they say that this difference is of things that exist, or do they say that the difference in Christ is of things that do not exist? Since they will certainly say that it belongs to things that exist—either of these two or of more—let them therefore say of which things they wish it to be, and not be hesitant.
27. Furthermore, if to say "two" is to divide, how is it that those who speak of two properties do not also divide the union? But perhaps they might say that this does not naturally divide the nature. Lo, even in the case of individual things, and in the holy Trinity itself, we see more properties, but one nature. Yet most of them, not thinking of these things in this way, even if concerning the D
A present case they propose such things to us, as has been shown in other places. Nevertheless, let us say to them: Since, therefore, you speak of "two things" according to these [entities]—which are such that they do not divide the nature, but rather the hypostases of the persons of the one nature; for it is by properties that these are divided, according to both you and us—you are saying, therefore, that this duality exists in Christ only according to these, that is, the properties, and you know there are two hypostases of Christ's persons, even if you confess his nature as one. May this, brothers, be far from you to admit! But if you were to say that neither the nature nor the hypostasis divides the properties, then neither would Paul be distinguished from Peter in any way, nor the Son from the Father, since they would be the same in nature, and yet indistinguishable and unrecognizable by properties.
28. If they speak of a difference, they will necessarily be compelled to speak of a duality of the things that differ; for the enumeration of things of different natures, and of accidents that vary in some way, or at the very least, if there were a measurement of things stripped of the parts of number or of some mere concepts, B arising from the difference that exists in regard to the word, or order, or time, or place, or habit, even that would evidently proceed: therefore, let them either speak of no difference, or else let them speak of the number of the differing natures.
29. If those who say that Christ is from two natures, namely from the common divinity and humanity, do not recognize these two even after the union, then let them not recognize, after the economy of the incarnation of the Word, the two common natures of humanity and divinity, nor number them separately, nor claim that there remains two in any respect at all; for they contend that these things from which the union has arisen have ceased from their duality. Yet they confess these to be common natures. C
30. If, because the union of natures is one, they recognize that which has come together as one nature, and because there is a difference of natures, they recognize these as two, they must understand this. For they must not suppose that what is properly attributed to him because of the union is also attributed because of the difference, but rather [they must treat] the one in one sense and the other in the other. Since, therefore, the difference is essential to the things that have come together, while the union is added to the essences, we do well to distinguish the essences by their own proper term, and we say there are two, namely, by (reason of) the difference; but we believe the person, through the union, to be one for them. D
31. Furthermore, the account of every perfect composite ought neither to exceed the mark nor fall short, but be sufficient; and duality is the first composition and the first sufficient number. How, therefore, will it be improper to speak of a duality in the case of the composite natures that fulfill the one perfect being, yet of a unity of hypostasis? For the two hypostases did not come together with one another as the natures did.
32. Furthermore, every unit, if it is said everywhere in the same sense of the term concerning something, is said with respect to something as one. And a duality prior to a duality said in the same sense in the same thing is just this: but if it were said after the duality, it is either not said in the same sense of the terms or it is not a unit; for a unit does not have a nature or an order in some same thing once it is contemplated after the duality.
How then, if they say that the single nature is the same as the natures from which it is (inasmuch as it first became natures, and only then a unit of nature), do they make this claim? A For if a unit has not existed in some way, it is impossible for the duality in this very same thing to appear; since it is from the unit that the duality comes, and not from the duality that the unit comes. If, therefore, it was necessary that two natures should have preceded it, will they ever become one and the same? By no means; rather, the one will be either according to something else or before them.
B 53. Furthermore, if they say that they no longer know those two [natures] because of the union (for they say that separation is the cause of the duality), one must inquire of them: do they know some sort of distinction of these natures at the Lord’s death, or not? If indeed they do not, then the death is a phantom, and the glory concerning it in the Lord is false; for death is undoubtedly the separation of the soul from the body. But if in reality a natural separation occurred, it was entirely, according to them, a separation of the two natures of Christ’s properties. If, then, they confess the death of the Lord, they will also have to grant that there were at some point two natures of His—though this, they would say, was either a matter of the one [nature] being fragmented into parts, or of another nature being born in Christ. C But it must be further reasoned with them that, since they confess the birth of Christ to be from two natures—thinking of this as from divinity and humanity—and since they grant that it is divided into two natures at the time of death (not into just any things, but into an inanimate body and a soul inspired by God), they are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that these things, appearing in the separation, are different from those things they spoke of as existing prior to the union. Furthermore, they must acknowledge that this single nature, according to them, which exists from the natures of divinity and humanity, is different from the single nature thought to exist after the Lord’s resurrection, which is from the soul inspired by God and the inanimate body. D For where the simple parts are different, the composite things will also be different. Therefore, those who do not clearly confess two natures united in Christ will be found to be saying that there are two prior to the incarnation of the Word, and one in their union; and another two at the time of the separation of death, and yet another one, more recent, at the Lord’s resurrection—and thus they end up with six and multiple [natures]; and here [they are] united, but there divided, and they devise every kind of rending of Christ, while pretending to speak in defense of His union.
54. One must also ask them this: if they say that the Father is distinguished in terms of essence from the whole of humanity, then if they also know that Christ, who is called a single nature by them, has something in common with the Father, and is united in terms of essence according to whatever standard of ours—as they were just saying—the Father is distinguished; for if they should say that He is united to the Father according to nature, He is clearly distinguished from us, that is, from humanity; therefore, He is also distinguished from His own flesh—if this is true flesh, and is one with humanity; therefore, Christ is without flesh, distinguished from the...
according to nature, yet does not share with the Father in the union according to nature, He is divided in nature from the Father, and He will not be God; or the Father is not God, if Christ is the one God; for we must not believe in multiple divided gods; yet according to either of these blasphemies, fitting would be the torment of Gehenna for those who choose to say these things.
35. If Christ is not some nature according to that which He is (for even the Fathers have forbidden this), or [if he is so] in no respect, or only in so far as He is God, or only in so far as He is man, or in so far as He is God by nature and man again by nature, though it is the same one Christ, yet the nature in divinity and humanity is not understood as the same. But if they should say that the Son is a nature in so far as He is, then [there is] one Son and one nature; therefore, then, is the Father not the same as the Son in number or in B definition? Neither is the Father the same as the Son in nature, nor in number, nor in natural definition, as Arius wishes. But if, again, they should say that it is [a nature] according to person and nature, the same things will again meet them: for since the person of the Father and [the person] of the Holy Spirit is different, and the nature [is] different; but since the person of Peter and the person of Paul is also different, and the nature [is] different, these things are clearly absurd.
36. If there is one composite nature of Christ, and one simple nature of the Father, how is the Son consubstantial with the Father? For the composite is not the same as the simple; therefore, they proclaim either that Christ’s nature is not one, or that it is not consubstantial with the Father. But if they say it is consubstantial with the Father in part, let them know that, as has been said already, no nature, that is, essence, is said to be consubstantial with anyone in part; for thus a man would also be said to be consubstantial with a stone, a dog, and an angel. C
37. Does this one incarnate nature of God the Word differ from the one non-incarnate nature of God the Father, or not? Let them be examined. If, therefore, they say that it differs, the Son will not truly be consubstantial with the Father, differing from Him according to nature; for it is not possible to speak of consubstantiality in part for them. For we see that all things which are strictly consubstantial are consubstantial with one another in their totality. But if they say it does not differ, then the one nature of God the Father is also incarnate, and likewise that of the Holy Spirit.
38. Furthermore, since a composite subsistence—such as perhaps an army or a house—and a nature composite of natures, and a body composite of bodies, and everything simply composed of some things, even if they are all likewise called subsistence, nature, or body, yet they are seen and called either worse or better than their own parts; if the Word can be considered nature and Christ can be considered nature promiscuously, that is, as the whole to the part, in what D then, he says, is Christ worse or better than the Word?
39. The Apostle says: “According to the working of the might of the power of God, which He worked in Christ, raising Him from the dead.” For this working power was a nature, or not...
If, however, both were one nature, both the one working and the one experiencing the resurrection, who is the one experienced and who is the one working and raising it? For Christ would no longer be demonstrated to have raised Himself as being one nature. If, therefore, we piously honor His resurrection, we shall confess that Christ raised His other nature from His other nature; just as in sleep the soul also awakens the body, for it often rouses it from the bed through thought; so it is also written: “I laid down and slept; I awoke, for the Lord,” that is, He who is in me, He says, “will uphold me.” And the text: “A lion’s whelp from the root of Judah has lain down; who shall rouse him?” Not another, he says, but He Himself; for He had authority both to lay down His soul and to take it up again.
B 40. But that we may not hide ourselves by covering our own eyes with little words, let us ask them plainly if they acknowledge this one nature from two natures to be without beginning or to have begun in time? For if it is without beginning, how is it from certain things, and later-born, and composite? But if it has begun and has a cause and is composed, how is it God? “But we,” they say, “speak of the same as without beginning and as having begun, as the Fathers do; but the Fathers, O you men, do not say the same thing in the same respect and at the same time.” For it is not possible that there be in the same thing, in the same respect, something that admits of contrary statements. But even if the same one Christ is said to be visible, it is not in the same respect; as neither is He “put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit,” and the saying, “For even if He was crucified from weakness, yet He lives by the power of God,” and such like. For they are not in the same respect at any time, nor is the text, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word became flesh,” to be understood in the same way; for while testifying that the Word is without beginning, having become at no time or in any way a beginning, it says that the flesh came into being. But being disobedient, they seem to believe the Word faithfully through irrationality. For they say, “He knows how these things will happen to Him, even if they seem impossible to us.” But the Word, O brothers, never said anything about Himself so irrational or incoherent. Why, then, must you slander Christ in order to establish our own particular ignorance in this question?
D 41. Furthermore, the divine nature is altogether simple; is, then, the nature of which you say there is one in Christ composite, or simple? If it is simple, how is Christ composite? But if His nature is composite, how is it divine? Therefore, truly, the subsistence is one, composite in its natures, but the natures of our Lord Christ, the true God, are two.
42. If you were to speak of one nature of the Word of God incarnate and not incarnate, how would you not openly adulterate the paternal teaching? But if you confess it as incarnate, and not as the incarnate Word, you [say it is] unique; because of this...
there will be two natures in Christ, who is from the Word and from flesh. For because the one nature of God the Word is acknowledged as perfect even without flesh, the union A will show nothing newer into a nature if it has remained one. We ask of you: Do you confess the nature of the Word to be incarnate by the nature of the flesh, or not? If you do not, then it remains for you to acknowledge the incarnation only in word, or by power of imagination, or by a trope of language. But if you say that the nature of the Word has been incarnated by the nature of the flesh, acknowledging one that incarnates and another that is incarnated in the one composite person of Christ, how will you be able to number these without a duality?
43. This "one incarnate nature of God the Word," is it the same as "the one," and is "incarnate" added in vain, not contributing at all to the representation of quantity, which is the subject of the current inquiry? Or does it bring the same conclusion to the two natures? And they inveigh against us in vain. Or is it neither one at all, nor two, and is there a necessity B for those who utter such things, ultimately babbling like children, to speak of one with subdivision?
44. Has anything of the Lord’s nature received a natural improvement after His holy resurrection, according to what Cyril the Father says to Acacius, and the other Fathers, or has His whole nature, which they call one, remained as it was? If therefore it was not improved, then it is either even now passible, or it was not passible even before the resurrection; and all the teachers who speak of the improvement of His humanity are liars. But if a certain perfect nature in Him was improved, either the whole of this one [nature] which they speak of is improved, and His divinity will also have been brought into a progress of impassibility; or else the part of Him that made the progress is a perfect nature, and one that does not admit of progress, or they will be forced to say that there is one perfect nature or [only] a part; and they will be drawn to either blaspheme or to act piously upon hearing [these things] with them. C
45. If they confess one nature regarding the Lord just as they do regarding man, they speak of that which is "from two natures" regarding the same [Lord] just as they do regarding man. But man is not given as from a pre-existing soul and body; for we speak of [man] as "from two" for the sake of thought alone, by setting forth his proper parts beforehand. But regarding the Lord, we do not assert that the Word pre-exists His own composition by way of imagination, as we do in the case of man. But if the "from two" regarding the Lord and regarding a simple man is not in the same manner, then neither do we unite the Lord to the one nature of man in the same manner. For things composed of dissimilar things are, by linear D necessity, dissimilar. Therefore, the example is not entirely appropriate for them, even if the nature of man were in reality called one, and was always demonstrated as only one.
46. If the flesh, which is passible by nature, was not seen to be impassible because of the union with Him, how much more then has the Word, who is impassible by nature, not become passible because of the union with the passible? What, then...
do you ask of us, as if the matter were in doubt, as to what nature had strayed, if you do not speak of a natural divine passibility, and not one of mere inhabitation B 47. If the Word is by nature impassible, but according to the custom of speech among them He suffered as He knows, He knows Himself not to be altogether impassible, unless He is ignorant of Himself as being passible.
48. If, just as we call the soul and the body parts of a whole man as a natural form, so too we call the Word and the flesh parts of Christ, not merely as of some composite, but as of a natural form, tell me: what is that whole form?
49. Through the one passion of the single flesh, how does the part of the man suffer, while [the other] part suffers with its own flesh and not with itself? For he who suffers with another, suffers in himself; how [can he be] not in the one who is suffering? Or if he indeed suffers through himself just as the one who is suffering suffers in himself, and not in the one who suffers with him.
50. Of our Lord Jesus Christ there are two natures, but one is the death. Therefore, if indeed this is by nature his alone, then it is of his mortal nature only; but if it is also contrary to nature, then it is of the immortal [nature] too; how, then, can you say that the Word is well-pleased to suffer either according to nature or contrary to nature?
51. If it is entirely necessary that there be an equal number of natures, as they say, since we declare the nature of the holy Trinity to be one, let them declare the hypostasis also to be one; or since we declare the hypostases to be three, let them declare the natures also to be three. For much more is it impossible for a hypostasis to exist without an essence, than for an essence to exist without a hypostasis.
52. If the union and the things united are among those things relative to all, as is acknowledged, how do these men think that after the union there are not two things, which they themselves rightly call united? For the union not having ceased, it is necessary that the united things also be introduced. Furthermore, if, before the union, these two things specifically united in Christ were not two—for it is not the case, as Nestorius desires, that the humanity of the Lord pre-existed and was then united, nor are two seen after the union; for the cessation of this infinite union is not such that it is either never, or [only] in the union that the two things united in Christ are [considered] two without confusion.
53. They say that our Lord Jesus Christ is from two natures, whether common or particular. If then from common [natures], then the whole holy Trinity was incarnate and crucified, and all humanity is in Him. But if from particular [natures], which are understood by them to be either in potency or in operation before Christ: if indeed [they are] in potency only, or if immediately after the union two natures in operation also became His, or if they are not yet, but will eventually be, or if they never become [natures] in operation—and thus they would be thought of as always imperfect and possessing this [potentiality] in vain, for a purpose they will never reach in operation. But if they know these [two] to be particular, separate, and existing as two in operation, even before the union according to the economy, let them say in what they differ from Nestorius.
A 54. If you confess that the whole of the composite Christ is God and man, behold, you call the totality by the names of the parts that effect it; how then do you not say that the duality of natures which are united—which are God and man, and the parts of the whole hypostasis of Christ—is Christ?
55. If there are not two natures of God and man, but one, what is properly Christ’s nature? Therefore, if you are to be consistent, the holy Virgin would be called "Christotokos" and not "Theotokos" by you, as having given birth to a nature other than that which is simply divine and human.
B 56. Furthermore, we must ask those who speak of a "differentiation" but do not count the things that differ: as we say that these are distinguished in word, and not separated in hypostases, do they say that the determination [of the difference] exists by nature before the differentiation, or with the differentiation? If then they say [it exists] before the differentiation, the determination will exist even in things that are entirely undifferentiated, just as a point, a unit, a spirit, and the divine nature itself which is devoid of differentiation are defined; and thus, for them, the one nature, inasmuch as it is one, is determined. But inasmuch as it is determined, it has also fallen under number; and they give a number not only to Christ, but also signify number of the intellect that is in him, individually, and of the divinity that is in him. But if [they say it exists] with the differentiation, or after the differentiation, they necessarily observe the determination of the things that differ; how then, while speaking of a "differentiation" and calling it the determination of those things which differ in word, and while the union according to hypostasis is admittedly preserved, do they count the things that differ in word and are different, by definitive terms as if by certain boundaries?
C 57. Number either pre-exists, co-exists, or post-exists the differentiation by all means. Those, therefore, who confess the differentiation of the united natures of the Lord—if they know the number surrounding it, that is, the differing things, before the differentiation itself—let them say where they saw these things and when they counted them as different, so that out of two different things there could be one nature for them now, or [one that is] undifferentiated, when it was divided [while still] having a similarity, and when it was united, having taken up the [notion of] that which is different. But if the number is with the differentiation or after it, by necessarily granting a differentiation, they will be compelled to [show] the number of the differing things either with it or because of it.
58. If they say that there are not simply two natures of our Lord Jesus Christ, let them say, of that nature which is divine—which is acknowledged to be above the common and the particular—what do they say the other of the two out of which the Savior consists, namely humanity, is? Is it common or particular? If, therefore, they devise this as some particular nature existing particularly and perhaps without the Word, it is clear that they are following the Nestorian impiety. If they call it common, do they mean it either by thought or in reality, as the essence of the whole form? If, therefore, they say by thought that it is one of those out of which the Savior is composed, existing according to one nature, it is clear that the middle part of the natural reason concerning him will be by thought and not in reality, namely the human part of his composition; but if according to this he is also incarnate from the Virgin, and was seen by men, and was crucified, and the rest,
then these things were done in thought only and not in truth. But if they say it is in reality, yet [assert] a common nature of humanity according to him, since Judas and Pilate are in the common [humanity] which is said to exist in reality, A then these also were crucified no less than the Lord, and rose from the dead; and He himself no less both betrayed and crucified them and himself. Thus, Annas and Caiaphas could also be thought of as having been born with him from the holy Virgin. Nay, even his forefather David, and that immaculate one herself, being one of the common nature, might be considered as having been born with the God Word, who generates the common nature of humanity. What could one find more absurd than these things, or more blasphemous? But if they should say: "You, therefore, who celebrate the Lord in two natures, of which of these do you speak?" We shall answer them without envy, that we speak of Christ as being from two—namely, the divine and the common human, both pre-existing the union—but in two, that is, the common divinity which surpasses the common word and the particular, and his own individual humanity. For it is possible to establish the expression "out of two natures," and [to understand it as] being out of the nature taken by abstraction from the common [nature] of men in addition to the indwelling divinity, [existing] by thought; for by thought we contemplate those things which are in Christ prior to Christ; but to confess those things which are in him in reality is not [to speak of anything] before him, but in him; so that those who know two natures united in Christ speak of his subsistent humanity more [correctly] than those who say he is "out of two natures." B
59. Further, the one nature of the God Word which is now incarnate, was it at some time incarnate, or not? But if this is indubitable to them as well, it must be heard from them: if it was of the God Word, and it was a nature, and it was one, and [existed] before he was incarnate, having become incarnate, what did he acquire, or what did he lose? If he lost nothing (for "incarnate" is not said by way of change or transformation, just as we say of ice, "one nature of water turned into stone"), it is clear that he acquired flesh, that is, humanity. But what is this? A quality or a certain nature? If the nature itself is entirely the nature acquired by the one nature of the God Word that acquired it, let them tell us in good faith what sort [of nature] they are.
60. Adhuc, do they say the nature of the God Word is incarnate, or that of Christ alone? If of Christ alone, C they are perversely judged by us regarding Christ, not because of the name, but because they make their apology concerning the natures not through God the Word. But if they dare to say the one nature of the Word is also "out of two," it will itself, evidently, be understood by itself as from divinity and humanity; and being incarnate again, having acquired another nature of flesh, it [will be] triple instead of double, composed of two [natures of] flesh and one divinity.
61. Further, since they say that one thing came to be out of two natures, one must inquire of them: by what definition do they say this one thing [is one]? For [they must say so] either by name, or by genus, or by species, or by the number...
...themselves say that something is one by form, or by number, for beyond these we cannot speak of something as one in any other way. Therefore, if by name it has become some one thing, these two have been united only by the similarity of their appellation, while they remain distinct in nature and uncompounded with one another, and each will be predicated as either man only, or God only, or some other thing which retains neither the name of God nor of man. But if it exists as one by genus, from which God and man are constituted, then these are of the same genus: why then must one seek a genus for them that is common and more universal than God? And how, by the occasion of that recent union, was that most ancient genus devised by them? But if they say it is one by form, there will necessarily be two or more individuals under it, that is, hypostases, and Christ is considered in two or more persons; but how one is to reason that there is a single form of both divinity and humanity is beyond understanding. If none of these is B reasonable, it necessarily remains that that which is constituted from two natures is one by number. But we say that what is called one by number is one by hypostasis, and not one by nature; for just as every number has its status as some one thing from the composition of numbers or units, so too do the hypostases exist by the composition of natures and the concurrence of properties, or at least by the connection of one nature and a property; for to be one by nature is peculiar to an entirely incomposite monad.
62. If they say that the Fathers avoid this novelty of expression because they did not pronounce "two natures" literally regarding Christ, let them either produce one who speaks of a single nature simply, or let them not rashly criticize such a term as this, since we hear the choice teachers speaking not only of natures, but even of two.
63. Is the nature of the Word of God one as incarnate, or also as without flesh? If indeed it is one as incarnate, before the incarnation it was not one, but half of one, or some such part; furthermore C neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit will be of one perfect nature. But if it was one even before the incarnation, then the flesh either added nothing natural to the hypostasis of the Word, and the union of natures celebrated "according to hypostasis" is fallacious, or that which was added joined one nature or a part of a nature to the prior single nature of the Word.
TESTIMONIES OF THE SAINTS.
But why, they say, by surrounding us from every side, do you compel us toward your opinion? For we hold the instructional teaching of the Fathers regarding Christ according to the letter, namely, the one nature of the Word of God incarnate, according to the holy Athanasius and Cyril, D
A you claim is an alien designation not found clearly stated by the Fathers, namely, two natures, even if they cannot be separated in Christ.
And yet, O you men, your leader Severus cries out that most of the holy Fathers used the expression B of "two natures" without reproach; how then do you object to the contrary? Truly, however, according to that which is said in Wisdom: "A man who wishes to separate himself from a friend seeks occasions." Since this pretext of yours for our dispute has nothing strong, worthy of argument, or precise, we shall readily and in various ways, with God’s help, set forth the case. For, in the first place, if we truly honor the confession of the two natures in Christ, in their inseparable union, yet differ from you regarding the other exposition of the dogma—that is, the one which speaks of "one C nature of the Word of God incarnate"—if we did not embrace this latter one just as fully and kindly as you do, you would indeed do well to separate yourselves from us. But if we accept that one as being entirely one and the same as the other, how is it that you neglect to discern this very thing? If it is truly identical in force to speak of "one nature of the Word of God incarnate" and a "duality of natures of Christ united according to one hypostasis," why do you say that such a profession is to be rejected, simply because we do not find this concept set D forth by the Fathers in these exact, identical words? For if it is not permitted to speak of the same thing in parallel terms—as in the text, "Hear these things, all nations, give ear, all you who inhabit the world" (Ps. XLVIII, 2)—let them tell us what is the difference between "hearing" and "giving ear," or what distinguishes the "nations" from those who "inhabit the world"?
If, however, while the thing signified is the same, they reject the confession made by means of the "duality" because it was not uttered by the Fathers word-for-word—if, indeed, the fact that a pious concept is expressed without the harmony of certain previously known holy Fathers constitutes a significant stumbling block and a cause of scandal—then, in the first place, no Persian, Roman, Frank, or Indian, nor any prophet, nor the Lord Himself, would be accepted as teaching pious dogmas, since the words which they use are not previously known to them, unless they are interpreted to them through other words of different sounds and various paraphrases. Otherwise, even the Hebrews would not be persuaded that the Word of God is indeed the "image of God," and the "character," and the "splendor," since this is not stated word-for-word anywhere in the Old Testament. Nor would the Samaritans accept anything regarding a future judgment, since nothing is explicitly stated about it in Moses. But neither would the Arians, the Eunomians, and the rest endure the term "consubstantial" (homoousios) or "co-eternal" in reference to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since these terms are nowhere explicitly spoken in Holy Scripture, nor in Christian writings before them. Moreover, we ourselves would not accept the very utterance of our Father Athanasius regarding the Lord, declaring "one nature of the Word of God incarnate"—for it is not even from those who
A were before him that we potentially heard it, although the power of this concept was acknowledged of old. For "The Word became flesh," we heard from the Theologian; yet that there is "one nature of the God Word incarnate," we did not hear together with him, but we understood it from this very statement, "The Word became flesh." However, if we do not defer more to the pious concepts [of others], which are expressed in whatever way, but instead follow [merely] the words, every doctrine pronounced for the first time, however entirely correct it may be, will be judged to savor of innovation and will scandalize the hearers. B For through a newer composition of words, the recent teachings are altogether expressed, since we often know that even the texts of Holy Scripture, when interpreted literally, are true, yet we sometimes regard them as false according to allegories. Indeed: "I will lead you into a land flowing with milk and honey," spoken of the region from the Jordan to the Euphrates, would be a fabrication unless, with the help of the imaginative faculty, we understood that the land abounded ferlitlely in herbs and plants; where there are many pastures, many sheep and fatted beasts and flocks; where there are such animals, and an abundance of milk; likewise where there are many plants, there are very many bees gathering nectar; and where these are more numerous, the honey from them is also plentiful. And when, therefore, He says: "If your eye scandalizes you, cast it from you," one must attend to the meaning before the literal text, since the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, as you yourselves respond to us.
Sed pariter ad hoc diceretis: Quid ergo, pium signum C habente prima voce secundum vos novam effingitis, nisi quia quid machinamini notioni oppositum? Licet enim et ad vos merito dicere quod quarum vocum usus idem, harum abundantia vana; sed considerandum quomodo eadem et iis qui emittunt aliam dictionem ab initio et iis qui omnem talem piam confessionem in dubio erunt. Namque si idem est: Verbum caro factum est, et dicere unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam, cur illa nobis introducta est? Cur si idem est: "Ego et Pater unum sumus," additum est et consubstantiale de Patre et Filio? Si etiam propter quosdam duas naturas in Christo dicentes, propria habentem utrumque non solum secundum sermonem physicum, sed et secundum hypostaseos existentiam scilicet et Verbum et carnem Domini, et non ipsum Verbum carnem assumpsisse dogmatizantes in una secundum hypostasim adunatione, D necessario oportuit dicere unicam Dei Verbi naturam incarnatam, ut et significetur naturarum duplicitas per id quod dicitur, incarnata natura quasi ad aliquid, namque ad incarnantem dicitur. Et perspicuum est quod non in monade res ad aliquid sunt; ut etiam locus impiis non datus sit propter lemma vocis duarum naturarum dividere hypostasim unicam, in imprudentibus eodem nomine significata natura. Et sæpe loco essentiæ et loco personalis hypostaseos
A dicta, it is necessary—and because some have again, more recently and in opposition, acted impiously by dogmatizing a "one nature" of the Word’s becoming human through change or confusion—that we also should innovate such a term as may accomplish the intended goal against the aforementioned heretics; a term which, just as the phrase "one nature of God the Word incarnate" preserves the truth, also separates us from those later-arising individuals of unsound mind, which the first phrase did not clearly possess; and which may clearly set forth that the two natures of the one Christ are united according to His one hypostasis. For what the first phrase said by introducing the idea of something incarnate and of an incarnating agent, this second phrase says purely through the duality; and what that former phrase intends to establish as one through the monad, this latter phrase confesses through the union of the one Christ according to hypostasis. For the former phrase was silent about the union and the totality of the things united—namely, Christ—providing an indication sufficient only for the concept of a monad and a connection, as though demonstrating both the duality of the things connected and the singleness of the synthesis. For it says that the things that are composed are two, yet it knows neither how to name specifically the parts of this totality in terms of the union, nor is it persuaded to be silent about the one hypostasis, nor does it allow the union to be ignored, nor is it willing not to disclose to all whose person it is that they are to recognize the union of this natural duality, and the hypostatic monad, having placed one name over both.
Therefore, since Arius also says "one nature of God the Word incarnate," wishing to show B that the Son is not entirely of the natural immutability of the Father; and Apollinaris uses the same phrase without difference, wishing for the Word to be in the Lordly Man instead of a soul-intellect—that is, in His souled flesh—representing to us a benefit from the dispensation that is of some irrational, heterogeneous nature; and Eutyches says the same thing with an inviolate phrase, but not with the same concept—for he says "one nature of God the Word incarnate" as if the Word Himself had been transubstantiated into flesh, and the Lord possessed nothing consubstantial with us, just as Gregory the Theologian says in his treatise to Cledonius concerning these same people, that they confess pious words but twist their minds wickedly toward them; and again, a little further on, that while the same words, when well-explained, possess piety, when misunderstood, they possess impiety.
As for those who come from Nestorius—and Nestorius from them—they say that the two natures of Christ are united inseparably, as the teacher Cyril testifies in his second epistle to Sucensus. But these, too, speak of the "inseparable" and the "union" deceitfully; for they do not confess that the Word is united to the flesh according to hypostasis or according to the synthesis of the natures themselves, but rather by equality of honor, by consent of will, and by authority; inseparably indeed, yet relatively, even if they claim that the natures themselves are the things united according to D intention. It has been demonstrated to be necessary, I think, not to care simply for the words, but for the concepts; and if there is a newer term, while the primitive and original one...
A and from the beginning, is in conformity with orthodox confession according to its meaning, one ought to hold this in veneration and embrace it as one’s own. If, however, any term is found which is worn-out in all sacred Scripture and among all the Fathers, but is transferred by someone, because of some impious novelty of invention, into a diversity from the correct notion, we ought to reject and detest it just as good money-changers do—not caring only for the image and inscription on the coinage, but skillfully considering and investigating the actual silver itself to see if it is truly genuine. For the testimonies of the Lord are called silver proved in the fire; and as many as judge the virtue of words at first hearing, since letters are the constituent parts of words, let them learn that often "the letter kills, but the Spirit," or the mind, "gives life."
What need have I, then, for more words regarding this? For it is known to all that Manichaeans, Christians, Samaritans, Hebrews, Arians, Sabellians, Valentinians, Marcionites, Nestorians, Apollinarians, and the whole host of those who, properly speaking, hold evil dogmas, all excerpt certain texts from sacred Scripture—both Old and New—and from the preceding Fathers, as testimony for their own inventions, as if these texts meant the same things they desire. Ought we then to judge by the notion, if it were correctly held by them, and not simply by the sounds of the words? But when Sabellius sophistically expounds the text, "I and the Father are one," and rejects the threefold hypostasis; and when Eunomius puts forward the text, "The Father who sent me is greater than I," B and destroys the monad and the equality of nature in the divinity—do we thus foolishly allow ourselves to be carried about by the impious? Or rather, are we being carried about in the opposite direction, tossed about by every wind of doctrine to the madness of error, and thus conclude that the holy Scripture is at variance with itself in proportion to the words, and accept the oracle of the Gospel as both being and not being? Not so, the pious, not so; but, evaluating the difference in reality, we who by trained senses have the comparison of good and evil, evaluating all things, hold fast to what is good.
Wherefore, for the sake of truth, all who for some end of the heretics say that the one nature of God the Word is incarnate must be cast away; but also as many as, according to some impious notion, assert a duality of Natures of Christ united inseparably must be rejected. C We must, however, on the other hand, accept all those who both say that the one nature of God the Word is incarnate—as if the nature of the Word is united to another nature, that is, to the nature of the flesh, according to hypostasis—and all those who confess a duality of Natures of Christ united inseparably—not according to something considered regarding the essence, but according to the hypostasis itself of the natures, that is, for the manifestation of the two in one person—as reverently holding one and the same confession. D
For that the Father Cyril also knows that the same concept of the A one nature of God the Word incarnate, as spoken according to his own concept, and of those who rightly conceive of the two natures of Christ united according to one hypostasis, according to the confession of the most wise Leo and the holy Fathers of the synod of Chalcedon, is to be heard from him in the letter to the presbyter Eulogius, where he says: “And let them not be ignorant of this: for where unity is named, it does not indicate the coming together of one thing, but of two, or even more, and things differing from one another in nature. If, therefore, we speak of unity, we confess [the unity] of flesh spiritually ensouled and of the Word; and those who speak of two natures conceive in this way. Beyond the unity which they confess, the things united are no longer divided from one another, but there remains one Son, one nature of Him as the Word incarnate.” These things were confessed by those of the East. B Furthermore, in his second letter to Sucensus, he speaks in this way, refuting those who, according to a concept of diminution or mixture of the things joined, accuse him of saying "one nature": “For if, having spoken of the nature of the Word, we had kept silent, not bringing in ‘incarnate,’ but placing the oikonomia as if from the outside, the argument would perhaps have been for them not unplausible, to those attempting to inquire where is perfection in humanity? Where does the essence according to us subsist? But since perfection is also in humanity, and the manifestation of the essence according to us is brought in by saying ‘incarnate,’ let them hold their peace,” and what follows. What then, he who introduces both the nature of the Word and the perfect human essence through the term "incarnate" will not argue that there are two natures, while hearing "one nature of God the Word incarnate"? For he says a little later: “For what is the nature of humanity, except flesh spiritually ensouled?” C Since, therefore, the Father clearly testifies to us of the agreement between himself and the truth, we do not turn our mind toward the utterances of those whose thoughts do not appear pious; nor again do we turn away from the utterances of those that are pious. For neither does unity or a monad simply stated in any way whatsoever take away the natures of them, unless it leads one to think of the monad of nature itself in its own proper way according to a confusion of unity—for a different unity does not do this—nor does duality altogether predicated of something divide it into persons, unless it were taken in a personal doubling. For who would say that because a certain unity and monad is spoken of regarding the whole Roman army, and one name stands for all those included in it—of men, and beasts, and camels that are in it—that for this reason the whole army is one nature? But that, he says, is not a unity of natures according to hypostasis. D We must consider, therefore, what I said, that it is not permitted to make one nature by unity simply; but not even if the unity be spoken of only according to hypostasis will it make a monad of nature, but only of hypostasis; for neither does a papyrus roll or a sponge dipped into water and having drawn into its whole self the whole
A waters, arrive at one nature with the water, but at one hypostasis. Just as, therefore, iron and fire come into the hypostasis of a white-hot mass; and stones and wood indeed have come into the hypostasis of a house—a different [thing]—yet they have the same natures, but united to one another, having come together into the composition of this, and into the stance under one, or the hypostasis of the house. If, however, there were a union into one nature, just as there is into one hypostasis—such as occurs in the case of a papyrus roll and malleable wax becoming united into the composition of mastic—then it is necessary to speak of one nature in the union. But it must be observed that neither the mastic nor the wax then remain entirely in their own natural properties, compositions, colors, and other qualities in accordance with this union, nor is there any similarity of either of the individual parts to things of the same form preserved in the composition of mastic; for the composite mastic possesses neither the likeness of the papyrus roll nor of the wax in any way, nor does electrum fully retain the form of gold and silver.
And if it is proper to speak of union in this way regarding Christ, it remains for you to judge, so that He is neither truly God nor man. But if you do not say this of Him yourselves, yet can show that one of the chosen Fathers says this union is into nature, we shall cease our controversy with you. If, however, this dogma of union into nature, being mangled and expanded in its concept, is such that it is neither to be accepted by you nor asserted by any of those inspired by God, how is it just to plead one nature in this way on account of the union simply, or even of the hypostasis? Are you not, out of piety, fearing to subscribe—through an inconsiderate utterance—to the transmutation and confusion of the united [hypostases], just as [you fear] their division?
For let not that also escape your notice, which to those trained in natural things has often been seen: that a natural union having occurred in some instances, the hypostases remain distinct. For when copper is placed under vinegar after a small interval, the copper itself turns sour in taste, becoming rusty, and seems in a way to have been made and poured out in the composition; while the vinegar turns into a thickness condensed into a coagulation, grows bitter in taste, and in some way reddens in color. And simply, they commingle as to their natural qualities, while remaining separated and distinct as to their hypostases. Therefore, a union into nature is not a proof of the indivisibility of the united things, but is taken and clearly understood only as a demonstration of their change according to essence; for this properly follows therefrom.
But these things are so, that we might show you out of abundance that you do not even have this irrational excuse of word-identity for the dispute with us, but [rather that you are] merely [driven] by a certain sympathy and irrational habit and unexamined prejudice, having strayed from primitive and true piety, and, having become heresiarchs, you either cut yourselves off from us, or the book, or
A directors, nor do you labor to instruct us; nor shall we, for our whole life, cease reciting to you the testimonies of the Fathers, so that by soothing you, we may quiet the wildness you show toward us. But if even this is burdensome to you, as far as is readily available and sufficient for moderate proof, we will for now set before you [testimonies] not only B of our select Fathers—causing you to feel shame at knowing the natures maintained in the Lord after the union—but we will also bring forward the confessions of your own leaders regarding this. But if, as is your frequent custom, you laugh and invent things to say in response, namely that while "natures" are indeed spoken of, there are not "two" after the union in Christ, it will remain for you to teach us how many we ought to think they are, if you know that "nature" and "natures" are the same thing, considered at least in terms of quantity. For you do not bear the condemnation of such ignorance—for not distinguishing singularity from plurality—that out of necessity you would grant that those things that exist in quantity in Christ, and make up Christ, and in which Christ consists, are either plural or at least two. For the union of Christ was confessed by both us and you to be out of two and only two unchanging and complete [natures]. Nevertheless, we shall also show those who say "two" literally; and not only this, but we will also clearly reject the "one nature" disputed by you, which these men talk about, so that nothing may be lacking on our part in the work of a perfect refutation toward them. First, then, we must listen to what are, as it were, the preliminary definitions of Christ spoken by the Fathers; for they say thus:
WHAT IS CHRIST, THE ADORABLE TO US.
*Athanasius.* « God and man, the same, being one according to existence, each being perfect. » But what are these two things, and what is God and man; tell us if they are natures or not?
*Basil.* « Divinity using ensouled flesh. »
*Gregory.* « A new commixture, God and man, one out of both, and through one both. »
*The same.* « A commixture of God and flesh, C through the medium of a rational soul, mediating between divinity and the density of the flesh. Being the Son of God, and becoming the Son of Man, both are one Son and God, the higher having overcome. » Therefore, there is that which was overcome and that which overcame. « Humanity made holy by divinity, and becoming that which made it holy, and so to speak, of the same divine nature. »
D *Cyril.* « One God and man, the same being and conceived as both. — The Word of God and Son, who took on the form of a man and was incarnate. — God, in taking on flesh rationally ensouled, was well-pleased to become also man. — The one nature of the Word of God, incarnate. »
If, therefore, those who define these matters are in agreement with one another in their thoughts, how is it that they do not know that both realities that have come together in Christ remain preserved, even when they speak of the one incarnate nature of God the Word? A If, however, the term "both" signifies two realities in the Lord—and these are neither three nor one—and if these realities are not mere accidents or simple phantasms, but are something in the category of essence, what else can be concluded from these expressions but that the two natures of Christ have been united according to his single hypostasis? But let us press on to the testimonies of the Fathers which clearly make mention of the natures of Christ, and especially those which our opponents dare not reject in any way.
Gregory the Theologian. "For there are two natures, God and man, just as there are soul and body; but not two sons, nor two men."
Gregory. "Both together, therefore, in one being: one God and man at once, Emmanuel." B
WHAT KIND OF UNION THE FATHERS SAY THERE IS IN CHRIST
Gregory the Theologian. "If anyone speaks as if [Christ] operated by grace in a prophet, but was not joined and fashioned according to essence, let him be devoid of the higher energy."
Cyril, from the interpretation of his own Chapters. "Necessarily, as we contend against the words of Nestorius, we say that the union has come about according to hypostasis." C
The same, from the letter to Sucensus. "Therefore, even if one were to speak of the nature of humanity and divinity in Emmanuel, yet the humanity has become proper to the Word; and the one Son is understood with it. Are the natures, then, the entity that took and the entity that was taken into the hypostasis of the One who made them his own, or are they?"
The same. "For it is our way to speak, or to name, 'two natures' for the sake of recognizing the difference between the Word and the flesh. It is clear, therefore, that he who does not speak of two natures denies the difference and does not recognize it in Christ." D
The same, from the Glaphyra. "For two birds, he says, he commands to be taken, living and clean, that you might understand through the birds the heavenly man, man and God at the same time, divided into two natures as far as the reason proper to each is concerned. For the Word was that which from God the Father shone forth in the flesh of the woman."
Gregory the Theologian. "God, indeed, would be called not of the Word, but of him who was seen. For how could [the Word] be God of the God who is properly so called? Just as the Father is not of him who was seen, but of the Word. For when the natures are distinguished in our thoughts, there are also distinguished and the...
names. It must be considered that he says the natures do not exist by conception, but that the natures are distinguished by conceptions. A
Of the same. « As the natures are blended, so are the names, and they pass into one another by the logic of connaturality. »
Of Basil, from the first against Eunomius. « We do not speak of two, God properly and man; for he was one. But we are reasoning about the nature of each according to conception; for not even Peter thought there were two when he said: *Christ therefore having suffered for us in the flesh.* » The same great Basil says to Eunomius that there is one kind of conception, which is true intellectual contemplation, and another which is according to the fabrication of falsehood, such as that of myth-makers and painters. If, therefore, we hear of conception in regard to God and man, it is the true one; but if we hear of it particularly, we must conclude it is the fabricated one. For only in order to articulate for ourselves the difference between the united things do we define each one separately by our imaginations, B until we know what belongs properly to this, and what to the other.
Of the same. From this it must be observed how the truth of each nature is demonstrated in the one and the same.
Of Gregory the Theologian. « He was sent, indeed, but as man; for he was double. »
Of Cyril, from the writing to Theodosius the Emperor. « For we know that theologians, regarding the evangelical utterances about the Lord, sometimes treat those which are common as if of one person, and sometimes distinguish them as if of two natures; and they attribute some as befitting God, in accordance with his divinity, and others as befitting man, in accordance with his humanity. »
[Theologian?], from the second treatise on the Son. « For the combined whole is one, C but not by nature; rather, by union. »
Of Cyril. « After the union, however, we do not divide the natures from one another, nor do we cut the one and indivisible into two sons. » It is clear, therefore, that even if he knows them as indivisible, he nonetheless knows them as natures after the union, and not as one nature.
Of Gregory of Nyssa against Eunomius. « Neither does the human nature enliven Lazarus, nor does the impassible authority weep for the one laying dead. » And again: « The mediator of God and men, just as the divine Apostle also called him, shows nothing as much as the name of the Son, as this name is applied equally to each nature, both the divine and the human. »
Of Chrysostom, from the treatise against the Apollinarists. « So also here, the divine nature having inserted itself into the body, [made] one Son, one person, the combined whole... D
A ...and produced yet another [Son], yet known as unconfused and undivided in the Word, not in one nature alone, but in two perfect ones. For in one [nature], how is there the unconfused? How the undivided? How could a union ever be spoken of? For the one [nature] cannot be joined, or confused, or divided into itself. And after a little: « Again, jumping to something else, they say that after the union one ought not to speak of two natures. Attend to the meaning of the word: you said 'union,' but you will not find a union of one thing having taken place. » And after a little: « They are accustomed also to object to this: Do we not receive the body and blood of God faithfully and piously? Yes, it must be said, not because [the divine] possessed the body and blood by nature before the assumption of humanity, but because since it makes the things of the flesh its own, it is said to have these. O the absurdity! O the impious thought! For among them the dignity of the divinity is in peril, and they do not endure to confess the Lord’s body as a true body; for they imagine that through the subtlety of words it has been changed into divinity, constructing from this a single nature, and not finding how to say what that [nature] is. » And after a few things: « Let us flee from those who divide; for even if the nature is twofold, yet [the union] is an indivisible and inseparable union, B confessed in one person of the Sonship, and in one hypostasis; let us flee from those who falsely set forth one nature after the union: for by the notion of 'one,' they are led to attribute passion to the impassible God. »
Of Cyril, from the things against Nestorius, in the second sermon.
« Confess one, not dividing the natures, while knowing that there is one account of the flesh, and another that is proper to the divinity and to it alone. » Behold, therefore, clearly, he does not exhort us to abolish the duality, but not to divide this [duality] which exists as twofold according to the natures, and he wishes [us] to know, along with the quantity, also the difference of the account of one thing compared to the other, having spoken both of natures and of other accounts.
From the same, from the interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, second part.
« Divinity and humanity have come together mutually in an ineffable way and beyond mind; and the natures are admittedly different, yet one and the only Son from both. » He knows, then, that they are different, and that they are natures. If, therefore, he does not speak of natures after the composition, [he does not speak of] diverse divinity and humanity.
From the same, from the same [treatise], sixth part.
« For if the natures of those things which have met in the union, I mean of flesh and God, are thought to be different and dissimilar to one another, then truly one and the only Son [is] from both. » It is evident, then, that when one [is] from both, then the natures also are thought of, and [they are] dissimilar to one another in Christ after the union.
From the same, from the eleventh chapter of the Scholia.
« That the natures remained without confusion, whether...
A they are called B essences or hypostases — for the nature [*] is also called a hypostasis from the fact that it subsists. If, however, as they are accustomed to answer in a scurrilous manner, then two persons also remain, for he spoke of hypostases — they have first of all clearly exposed themselves as serving their own passion, fearing neither to reject the Fathers nor to become parricides, but only serving their own error; for since the Father says these things, if they think in this way, even now, that the hypostasis is a person, it is necessary for those who attend to what has been said, and who neither invent nor subtract any thought, to perceive it. For it is not just for one who judges rightly to estimate that the most hostile opponent of the impiety of Nestorius now confesses the same things as he, when he is in fact fighting against him and crying out thousands of times in his commentary on the Hebrews and in other places that it is not a union of two persons; for he spoke of the madman—that he invented this union of persons from I know not where—and says that these things which are united remain unconfused even now. If, therefore, he speaks of the hypostases as unconfused persons, the opponent has become an ally to the impious one. But as for those who are forgetful of their own claims, how are they not now convicted of the fact that, regarding the Word of the economy, both the teacher Cyril and we ourselves know nature and hypostasis to be the same thing? From these things, therefore, that which is there is false; and from those things, their loquaciousness there is made manifest.
Of John Chrysostom, from the Epistle to Caesarius.
« Known indeed by the unconfused and inseparable Word, not in one nature, but in two perfect ones. » And after a few words: « What hell, then, vomited forth the idea of speaking of one nature in Christ? » And after a little: « For if the nature is indeed twofold, yet the union is indivisible and inseparable, confessed in one person of sonship. »
Of Saint Justin the Martyr, from the third book of the work On the Holy Trinity, chapter seventeen.
« Therefore, when you hear the opposing voices of the one Son, distinguish appropriately according to the natures what is said. » And a little later: « Each, according as it is its nature to receive. » And after a few words: « Just as there is one man, but he has two different natures, and according to one he reasons, and according to the other he acts upon what has been reasoned. » Then he adds: « Thus the Son, being one and having two natures, according to the one performs divine miracles, and according to the other, he accepted lowly things. » And after other things: « There is one sun, but two natures, one of light and another of the solar body; so too here, there is one Son and Lord and Christ and Only-Begotten, but two natures, one above us, and one that is ours. »
Of Saint Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, from the interpretation of the sacred Creed.
« Those, however, who say (after some things in between) that the natures of Christ, being mingled by a blending together, have become one nature, and who do not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is of two natures un
Aconfused, yet one person, just as the Lord is one, these the catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes. We are compelled to abbreviate these testimonies, lest we draw the work out into greater length and bulk.
From the same, from the sermon on the Divine Incarnation. • Some have risen up saying that the flesh of the Lord and the divinity are of one nature: what hell has vomited forth such a blasphemy?
Of Julius, bishop of Rome, which citation also Cyril brought forward in the council held in the City [Rome]. • He who both knows his own, and guards the union, will neither err concerning the natures, nor be ignorant of the union.
Of Gregory of Nyssa, to Philip the solitary, concerning the Arian objection, the beginning of which is: "Malice is the offspring of the soul." • For although they are one through an ineffable and unspeakable union, yet not by nature—I say this because of the lack of confusion; for the divine is other than the body, for it is something superadded. Christ, therefore, existing as two natures, and being truly known in them, is one sole person, yet unconfusedly.
From the same, from his writings to the same. • For if Christ is also thought of and exists in two natures, yet we know One Son.
Of John Chrysostom, from the sermon on Lazarus. • Tin shares in both lead and silver; in appearance it is silver, in nature it is lead: in the same way Christ also perfectly preserves within Himself the natures of divinity and humanity. CTherefore, just as He has the natures within Himself, so also He Himself is in those natures, not existing as someone else beside them.
Of Ephraim the Syrian, from his treatises on the pearl. • Look upon the pearl, and you will see that it holds two natures; it is highly radiant because of the divinity, and white because of the [previous] assumption.
Of Isidore of Pelusium, to Pope Cyril of Alexandria. • Because the true and God over all became man, neither changing what He was, nor [failing to] assume what He was not, existing in two natures as one Son, immutable and firm, new and eternal, you yourself would not deny this, having very many assents of our holy Father, the great Athanasius, concerning these things.
Of Paul, bishop of Emesa, from the sermon delivered in the Alexandrian Church by him in the presence of Cyril the patriarch, whom he praised and accepted and extolled, immediately adding a sermon himself, in which he says: "We have endured for ourselves." • Behold also John, proclaiming two natures and one Son; "the booth" [is] one thing, and "the one dwelling" [is] another; "the temple" [is] one thing, and "God dwelling within" [is] another; attend to what is said: I did not say D "one and another" as if concerning two persons or Christs or two sons, but "one and another" as if concerning two natures.
Cyril, from the Epistle to John of Antioch and the holy synod under him, in which he says that he accepted his writings as being correct, as follows:
A "We know that the God-bearing men used the evangelical and apostolic utterances concerning the Lord, some as common, as of one person, but others as dividing, as of two natures." Behold, therefore, he confesses both the distinction of the things signified according to the natures, and he was not brought to this to dissolve the union. Concerning him and his synod, he writes as follows to Valerian, the bishop of Iconium: "For all the most God-fearing bishops throughout the East, together with the most God-fearing bishop of the Antiochians, John, have both by a written and clear confession made it manifest to everyone that they condemn and anathematize with us the profane novelties of words of Nestorius, and they consider them worthy of no speech at all, but follow the apostolic dogmas and in no way reject the confession of the Fathers." Then, having said what they say, he adds: "If, therefore, any liars say that they think other things besides these, let them not be believed, but as deceivers and liars after their father the devil, let them be repelled, lest they disturb those willing to walk rightly." B With Cyril witnessing this to us, why do the slanderers feign as if they are fighting against the confession of the two natures in Christ using him?Cyril's citation of the text of Ambrose:
"Let us preserve the difference of the divinity and the flesh; in each the Son of God speaks; for each nature is in Him."Cyril, from the Epistle on the Incarnation:
"The one Lord and Son and Christ is not, therefore, to be divided into a man properly and into God properly, but we say that Christ and the Son is one and the same, knowing the difference of the natures, and keeping them unconfused with one another."Of the same:
"It is thought entirely as one in another; that is, the divine nature in the humanity."Of the same, from the Interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews:
"We think rather that the union has been brought about with each existing within the limit of its own nature." And again: "We do not say that a certain flowing of the natures into one another has been brought about, D but rather, with each remaining what it is, we think that the Word was united to the flesh."Of the same, from the third part against Nestorius:
"Therefore, as far as it comes into thought and into the mere beholding with the eyes of the soul in what manner the Only-begotten was made man, we say that the natures are two, [we say that] there is one Christ and Son and Lord, the Word of God who was made man and became flesh; but those who are blind and not [looking] merely to the eyes of the flesh...A consider that something is [the case] when it is not in reality so. Therefore, neither an angel nor God will be [that which they think], nor anything of the intelligible [realm] simply. From the same, from the letter to Justus, Bishop of Rome. « For I am neither convicted of having ever thought anything other than what seems to be in accord with the truth, nor have I ever called the divine nature of the Word passible. » And a little later: « I know also that the nature of God is impassible, firm, and immutable, even in the nature of humanity, and that Christ is one in both and from both. »
Of Athanasius, in his Commentary on the text: « Amen, amen I say unto you, before Abraham was made, I am. » B « It is clearly impudence not to think of Christ in a twofold way, both divinely and humanly. » In his third discourse against the Arians he says: « All things that were done or said by the Savior Christ during the time of his sojourn in human flesh, both deeds and words, do not possess a single form, but are distinct. »
Of Saint Cyril, from his Address to the Alexandrians. « The ineffable union, which those who think correctly confess, saves both natures unconfused; it makes one Christ, who appeared [as such], and who is both God and man [born] of both; it makes him the same, not two Christs, but one only, united and not mixed. For if the two natures are mixed into one mixture, being different in essence, neither is saved, but both are confounded and vanish, C and as mixed they admit neither interval from one another nor distinction; yet they were divided at the time of death and separated; and the soul descended from the body into Hades with the divinity, and the body was laid in a new tomb separate from the soul, according to the truthful words of Christ which say: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up"; and the temple is indeed destroyed in the time of the three days' burial, as he himself willed, and he raised it up again, and it was united to him by an ineffable and unspeakable Word, not mixed into him or changed into flesh, but saving within itself the unconfused properties of the different essences; for the natures were never mixed. » Then he introduces a testimony of the saint among the bishops, Athanasius, to the same effect: « Two natures of different essences [are] in one Christ and Son of God, [being] saved, and neither confused, nor lost, nor taken away. » D
Of the same, from the Book of Texts. « And some teach one nature in order to do away with the perfect humanity assumed on our behalf by the Word of God for the salvation of all; others teach two hypostases, that is to say natures, according to their division and separation, but not according to the union which is in essence, as seems right to the holy Fathers; so that both parties err from the truth. » What is clearer than this? For only by [their] distinct...
A division and separation from one another did he rebuke those who knew these two natures; as also that they introduced a hypostasis for each separately, and did not maintain that the two subsist in one person by union according to essence; he was utterly turned away from that "one nature."
Cyril from the discourse on the faith. « But indeed he prepared for himself an ensouled and perfect temple in the holy virginal womb; and having been clothed with it and united to it by an ineffable Word, while both natures were preserved and unmixed, he came forth appearing as man, but understood as God, Jesus Christ. »
From the same, from the epistle to Sucensus. « We say that there are two natures, but one Christ and Son, the Word of God, having become man and having been incarnate. »
From the same. « Not as if the difference of the natures were abolished by the union. »
From the same, from the second epistle to Sucensus, in which he shows that by saying the Son was incarnate, he does not wish to commingle the natures: « For even if the only-begotten Son of God be said by us to have been incarnate and to have become man, he is not on this account commingled, as it seems to them; nor has the nature of the Word changed into the nature of the flesh; but neither has the nature of the flesh into his, but each remains in the property according to nature, according to the Word just now delivered to us. » If then we admit neither commixtion nor mutation, how shall there be one nature, let someone say; and what is that which remains both, and exists in natural property?
From the same, from the epistle to Eulogius, and that it is not saying "two" that is rejected, but saying [they are] not united according to hypostasis: « Thus also in the case of Nestorius, even if he says two natures, signifying the difference of the flesh and of the Word of God (for one is the nature of the Word of God, and another that of the flesh), but he does not for that reason B confess the union with us. » Thus, therefore, that there are two natures, he himself also confesses with us, he says.
From the same, from the epistle to John. « For there is one Lord Jesus Christ, even if the difference of the natures is not ignored. » Is the difference then of things that exist, or of things that do not exist?
Gregory of Nyssa from the treatise against Apollinarius. « If therefore the nature of each of these is considered in contrary properties, I mean of the flesh and of the divinity, how are those two natures one? »
Cyril from the first book of the Treasures, that where essences exist, it is necessary that essential differences exist. « Therefore, the essence having been presupposed, differences are conceived in addition. C D
A From the letter of Isidore of Pelusium, to Timothy the reader: "With all diligence, therefore, keep your heart, lest you ever accept one nature of Christ after the incarnation."
From the writing of Theodotus, Bishop of Antioch, against the Synousiasts who confuse the persons: "Let them know well that we, confessing Christ as having two natures, attribute to each nature what is appropriate to it, but preach all things in one person of the Son."
From Cyril of Jerusalem, in his discourse on the words: "I go to my Father": "Let the distinction of the natures appear from the difference of what is said."
From the writing of Peter the Martyr, Pope of Alexandria, concerning the advent of Christ: "Therefore, the union of both is shown, in that He was God by nature, and became man by nature."
From Severianus of Gabala: "Thus confess Christ, the Son of God, to be both God and man, [consisting] of a passible and an impassible nature."
From Proclus of Constantinople, on the text: "A child is born to us": "And He is one Son, not with the natures divided into two hypostases, but by the wonderful incarnation uniting the two natures into one hypostasis."
B From the writing of Silvester, Bishop of Rome, to the Jews: "With two natures united in the same [Person], one falls into ignominy, while the other is shown to be superior to every passion."
From Proclus, on the nativity of the Lord: "He was born incorruptibly; seeing the conjunction of whose natures, Thomas cried out, saying: My Lord and my God."
From the holy Hippolytus, from the blessings of Balaam: "In order that it might be shown that He possesses both within Himself, the essence of God and the essence from men."
From the holy Hilary of Poitiers, one of those who sat at the Nicene synod, from the seventh book on the faith: "I have shown these things briefly for this reason, that we might remember to consider each nature in our Lord Jesus Christ." D Scholium: Since each has its own proper natures, remember one Lord Jesus Christ, who is both.
From the same Hilary, the confessor, in the same sermon: "One and the same through each nature; yet so that, as to each, neither is lacking."
From Saint Ambrose, from the third sermon: A "Distinguish, therefore, even there, the natures; for the flesh had help, but the Godhead did not have it."
From the same, from the discourse to the crowds: "He who does not fashion one nature out of two introduces coagulation and fusion entirely." And after a little: "We confess two natures in Christ united by an ineffable union, and in no way separated or confused from one another, with the property of each clearly being understood and preserved, even if we know Christ to be one, the only-begotten Son; for both together have made for us one Christ, and not one nature."
From the same, from the interpretation of the holy creed: "For Christ is destroyed according to my substance which He assumed, and He raises up His destroyed temple according to His divine substance."
From the same, from the one to the laborers: "Even if we know two natures in Christ, we do not know there to be two sons; but one, substantial to the Father inasmuch as He is invisible, and of the same nature as His mother inasmuch as He is visible."
From the same, from the ninth sermon against Apollinarius: "Since Christ is the Son of God, and eternal from the Father, and born of a Virgin—whom the holy prophet David expressed as a giant, that He alone was of double form and of twofold nature, communicating in divinity and in humanity." C
From the same, from the discourse to Bishop Antoninus: "In order that He may be perfect in each nature."
From the same, from the second sermon to Gratian: "For one is the Son of God, speaking in each, because each nature is in Him."
From Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium, to the Arians: "Distinguish the natures: that of God and that of man."
From the same, from the letter to Seleucus: "One Son, of two natures, passible and D impassible." And after a little: "Christ the Son of God, who is one Son in two perfect natures." And after a little: "I speak of one Son of God made of two natures." And after a little: "The Word of God Himself therefore dwells in the inner part of the temple, suffering nothing, since these two natures result in one person."
From Augustine, Bishop of Rhegium, from the letter to Volusianus: "But now He has appeared as mediator between God and man in such a way that He unites each nature in the unity of His person." And after a little: "Know the twofold nature of Christ: the divine, which I say is equal to the Father; and the human, than which the nature of the Father is greater."
A From Flavian, Bishop of Antioch, from his interpretation on the words of Saint John: "He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father." "In order that we may learn both his natures, both the man who is seen, and the divinity that works through the body."
From the same, from his sermon on the Ascension of the Lord. "Divinity is united to human nature, while each nature remains in itself."
From Isidore the Ascetic of Pelusium, from his letter to Theodosius the deacon. "Christ incarnate is not a mere man, but rather the Son exists as true God in both natures."
From Saint Cyril, from his dialogue entitled: "Christ is One." B "Are, therefore, the two natures confounded so as to make one? Who then is so senseless and ignorant?"
From the same, from his ninth oration, on worship in spirit. "For Christ is clear and manifest on earth, according to that saying: 'God is the Lord, and hath appeared unto us,' and he has, as it were, a twofold knowledge; for God and man are understood in him."
From the same, from his work against Julian. "For how could one nature receive what is contrary to itself?"
From Eustathius of Antioch, C from his interpretation on the fifteenth psalm. "The Lord sent his Son born of a woman. I do not say 'born' in the plural, but 'born' in the singular; for the person is unique. I did not say unique nature (far be it from us to say this), nor that the substance of the flesh and of the divinity are one and the same; but I said one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, recognized in the variety of the natures in all respects."
From John Chrysostom, from his letter to Caesarius. "A divine mixture of divinity and flesh, and from this a single nature being perfected—this is the absurdity of the senseless Apollinarius. This is the most impious heresy of those who introduce a blending and mingling." D And at the end: "Let us flee those who monstrously speak of one nature after the union; for by the thought of the 'one nature,' they are driven to attach passion to the impassible God."
From Amphilochius of Iconium, from his second letter to Seleucus. "If they say that he is of one substance, ask them: 'Why then do you say that Christ is impassible according to the divinity, but passible according to the flesh?' For that which is of one substance is entirely the same; for it is either entirely impassible, or it is passible." And after a few words: "I confess, therefore, that the one Son, Christ, has two natures, denying neither the divine nor the human to him."
A "The deity suffered!" Away with this hostile and blasphemous thought, O wretch; the nature that was assumed suffers, but that which assumed it remains impassible.
From the Encomium on Virginity of Gregory of Nyssa
"God has come, and a mortal, knitting together two natures into one, the one hidden, the other manifest to mortals."These are indeed our words. But the voices of those who are raging against us, whether voluntary according to some divine pushing, or involuntary, I know not, are brought forth in such terms.
Of Amphilochius of Side, who is said to be the only one who held the synod in contempt and without fear; from his letter written against the synod to Emperor Leo
. "For they will take refuge with certain teachers who have spoken of two natures."Severus the heretic, the mixophysite, adds this, using the authorities of Julius and Ambrose: "He who recognizes the properties, and who diligently observes the union, will neither deny the natures, nor be ignorant of their connection."
From the same, from his books against the Grammarian
"We conceive of two natures in Christ, the one created, the other uncreated, but no one has charged the council at Chalcedon with this ridiculous crime, that it asserted two natures in Emmanuel; no one, I say, has brought this charge, but rather considered this to be what should be imputed to it as a fault: that the Fathers of the council, C following Cyril, did in no way teach that Christ was composed of two natures. But we shall never cease to press the point. Let someone show that the council at Chalcedon or Leo in his books confesses either a hypostatic union, or a natural conjunction, or one Christ from two natures, or one incarnate nature of God the Word; this, I say, let him show. And then, along with the most wise Cyril, we shall say that they discern by the mind alone the difference that exists between those two things which have been joined in an ineffable way, and are able to distinguish that both have come into one, and that the nature of the Word is one thing, and the nature of the flesh is another, which, although joined and connected with one another, they perceive by the mind to remain two, even if in reality they are in no way separated."D Although he who says these things testifies in his own formula of faith to Nephalius that it is "the greatest of all absurdities to preach two natures regarding Christ, even if it has been asserted by many holy Fathers." And after other things: "Do not say," he says, "that some of the Fathers used this expression of two natures; for at that time it was permissible for them to use that expression, as we have said, in accordance with...
the time of St. Cyril, when the Nestorian plague was spreading through the Churches, A that expression was rejected more and more." If this is so, you madman, then it was already rejected beforehand, and much more so after Nestorius. How then was it permissible for those Fathers to use that expression? Furthermore, if that word was rejected in the judgment against Nestorius, why does no one rebuke the Chalcedonian assembly, which is posterior to Nestorius, for this very thing which it used? But it charges it with this one fault only, that it asserts that Christ is not composed of two natures, and does not openly confess their conjunction in one subsistence. But who doubts that the holy synod says this? For if it speaks thus in its rendered decrees: "We accept the synodical letters of St. Cyril, who presided over the Church of Alexandria, against Nestorius and the Eastern bishops, which clearly convict Nestorius himself of his madness. In which letters the holy Father confesses a natural conjunction in one and the same subsistence: how is the synod itself not in the same opinion as he, with whom it entirely agrees, and whom it most highly approves and embraces in this matter?"
Moreover, since we with one mouth confess and preach that Christ the Lord is composed of two natures, and that the same is at the same time subsistent in those same two natures; and since we assert both the conjunction and both natures, and are prepared to excommunicate even an angel coming down from heaven if he did not believe the same, why do they themselves not believe and confess with us that Christ is both composed from two natures and subsists in these? Why do they not also condemn and proscribe C Severus and Dioscorus and their sectaries who think otherwise? And when Flavian of blessed memory says in his exposition of faith, "We do not hesitate to preach one incarnate nature of God the Word, and that He assumed the same humanity, because from two natures is one Lord our Jesus Christ worshipped," how does the synod not agree with these men in all things, and how does the sacred synod not think these same things with Flavian?
The wondrous Leo, by his sentence and decree, confirms and ratifies all things which were brought forward against Nestorius in the Council of Ephesus by the divine Cyril. D "Let the acts of the Ephesian council," he says, "(over which Cyril of happy memory presided) against Nestorius remain firm, lest the impiety condemned at that time should by this very thing in any way deceive itself. Since Eutyches was rightly and deservedly expelled from the communion of Christ's faithful and cast down from his seat. For the pure faith, and that most simple discipline (which we preach with the same mind and affection with which the holy Fathers did), condemns by the same judgment the perverse dogmas of Nestorius and Eutyches, and of their followers, and strikes down the nefarious opinion of all these with the same weapons."
But let us return again to him who confesses that several holy Fathers said that Christ subsists in two natures; but that the Council of Chalcedon is not to be reproved because it said that very thing, but because it did not affirm that Christ the same is composed from two; and the rest which he drivels on about. But as if talking in his sleep, I do not know how he has escaped his own notice in his own writings.
A And indeed he, I know not how, forgetful of himself and as if dreaming, speaks elsewhere in his books thus: "I, turning over the volumes of the holy Fathers night and day, have not yet been able to find anyone who asserted that there are two natures in Christ, as the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon judged, who also pronounced that He subsists in two natures." These things, if the holy nature of the matter being sought did not stifle in the hearer for the sake of reverence [a tendency to] immoderate laughter, would they not move him to irony and mockery, seeing how he contradicts himself so shamefully, through mental imbecility or, I know not what to call it, through God allowing it (for I do not know what word to use), yet forgetfully or foolishly or divinely-stricken-ly, as it were? And it was not our intention, the Lord as witness, to reproach the ignorance of a man of the same nature, nor to publish to others the rottenness of another's arguments; but since his dogma has been set in motion, and he himself—who felt warmly B about this dogma—had not yet been condemned by an ecumenical synod, but had been cast out from the throne of the Antiochenes by royal and priestly votes, it was necessary to present the quality of the man, lest perhaps, through the faction-like prejudices certain people have for him, their glorious image of him might lead simple people to be dragged off uncritically by his teachings. For such is this man, and he is seen in others of his submitted writings to be consistent, as one might say, and known for his own inconsistency.
From the Third Book of Severus Against the Grammarian, Chapter 9 or 13.
"But you say that the most approved Cyril does not deny calling them two natures; for the nature of the Word is one thing, and the nature of the ensouled and intellectual flesh is another; I agree, C as also did those who gathered at Chalcedon; for the things which Nestorius also confesses with us from the words of Cyril are set forth—namely, that there are two natures, and that they are distinct in essence, divinity and humanity."
From the same, from the Third Book Against the same John the Grammarian of Caesarea, Chapter 17.
"Accepting the difference, we conceive of two natures in Him, the one created, and the other uncreated."
From the same, Chapter 9.
"To say, or rather to name, two natures D is common to us and to Nestorius, insofar as we know the difference between God the Word and the flesh."
From the same, from the letter to Solon, the beginning of which is: "It has come to my humility."
"The things from which Immanuel subsists, even after the union, are not turned; they have subsisted in the union, and are contemplated in one hypostasis, and not in a monad according to a private hypostasis, with each one contemplated as having its own subsistence."
A From the same, from *Against the Grammarian*, book II, ch. 1: "And of those things from which the union is made, [he says] that they remain undiminished and unchanged, but subsist in a composition, and not in monads possessing private subsistence." Behold, it is forced to speak of that which is undiminished in quantity and unchanged in quality as being naturally composed. And after some things: "And as those from which Christ is one in the composition have subsisted completely and undiminished."
From the same Severus, from his second epistle B to Sergius the Grammarian: "I am greatly astonished at how you call the incarnation a composition, since elsewhere you proclaim one essence and quality in Christ. Has the conjunction begun from confusion, and has every composition ceased and turned into one essence, so that, as you say, the holy Trinity may remain a Trinity, and not receive an unnecessary person?" And again: "And it would be this," he says, "to reduce to one essence two natures, distinct in natural quality, namely divinity and humanity, from which, remaining whole and distinct without any confusion, Christ subsists."
From the same heretic, from his third epistle to the same Sergius: "Know, therefore, that the truth is not so, although I have explained it plainly and demonstrated it through many authorities, that it is not right to say that Emmanuel is of one and the same essence, quality, and property." And again: "No one endowed with a sound mind would say that the nature of the Word of God, and His flesh endowed with soul and reason, which was united to Him in subsistence, has become of one essence and quality."
From the same, from his epistle to the same: "We judge therefore that those should be segregated from the community of the faithful in Christ, who after the assumption of the flesh divide Christ into two natures; for this we deem them worthy of punishment, not because they speak of multiple natures, or properties, or operations, but because they preach that there are two. But if no one, not even one unlettered, would say that the natures are one; yet you judge those who assert there are two to be segregated from the society of the faithful in Christ: then you must confess that they are either three, or four, or ten, D or a hundred."
Severus, from his book *Against the Grammarian John, Bishop of Caesarea*: "Although," he says, "some of the Church Fathers, and even Cyril himself, have said that Christ after the natural conjunction subsists in two distinct natures; yet, since in later times this word has been exploded, even as the assertion of a distinction has been forbidden, and it has been forbidden to say that Christ suffered in human flesh, which by the orthodox... [is] rightly resisted by those sick with division."
A nor did there remain for those who had gathered at Chalcedon any way of defense, since they had defined that Christ must be recognized in two inseparable natures. »
Of the same, on the fact that the Word is impassible
B “And persuaded by the teaching of the sacred Scriptures, which proclaim that He suffered in the flesh, and knowing clearly that the passion will not pass beyond the suffering body—for it does not touch at all the impassibility of the Godhead.” »
Of Timothy Aelurus the Monophysite heretic, from his disputation against Alexander Calonymus.
B “Cyril, the bishop of Alexandria, contradicts himself; for since he has articulated the wise proclamation of orthodoxy in many ways, he is shown to be fickle, having dogmatized contradictory things. For by positing that one must say the nature of God the Word is incarnate, he destroys what was dogmatized by him, and is caught maintaining two natures in Christ; and indeed, having declared that God the Word suffered in the flesh, he says the opposite, that in no way could He have accepted the passion for our sake. But having become an opponent to his own words, he sowed the discord now prevailing in the Churches, which is impossible to reconcile, and like a most destructive flame having ignited it, he burned up the word of the healthy faith; had not the patriarch Severus appeared from God, and with his own holy writings healed the instability and fickleness of Cyril, just as a most loving son covering the gangrene of his father with his own garments.” C
And what do they reply to us again regarding all these things, those who block their ears like asps and do not listen to the wise incantation of the Fathers? For they will certainly object to us and to these points as follows: “Why, indeed, like bees, do you fly over all the Patristic writings, and pluck only what pleases you for your anthology—those excerpts with which you incessantly buzz around us—while you fly over those which are inimical to your own opinions, jumping over them in silence?” And to this, we will say that, in truth, even the Patristic passages that seem to you to agree with your doctrines, when properly examined according to their D meaning, as we said from the beginning, actually support our position all the more. For truly, none of the eminent Fathers is inconsistent with himself or with his peers regarding the meaning of the faith, even if, being carried along by different words and expressions, he seems to you to be an opponent regarding the words, and not the underlying meanings.
you think the sense of the words should be attended to. Furthermore, the argument drawn from likeness escapes you, and you do not understand that this same thing escapes you. For just as a meaning entirely different can lie hidden under the same words wrongly understood, so too can the very same sense be contained under different words rightly taken. Let that man come forward, therefore, if there is any holy A Father among you (from the number of those whom all recognize and revere as orthodox) who seems to favor your opinion; and if you can produce some genuine oracle of his from some ancient codex, bring it forth.
For as concerns the authorities brought forward by you, since they have often been found to be adulterated and spurious, we cannot any longer admit them as integral and genuine. We assert, however, that even within these very authorities which you are accustomed to abuse, mention is often made of nature and essence, and also of subsistence and person. For they are not always taken in their proper sense. For when the great Athanasius and Proclus assert that persons and hypostases are joined in Christ; then the blessed Cyril says: "If anyone distinguishes the hypostases." Furthermore, if we understand these terms as having been used in their proper signification, the Nestorians—who maintain that persons are joined in Christ—will immediately and deservedly thrust them upon us. How, then, could Cyril speak in this sense, he who says in his 4th anathema: "If anyone assigns the words [of Christ] to two persons or subsistences," and what follows? And in his epistle to the emperor Theodosius, and also to John of Antioch, he says: "We know that the God-bearing men often take the evangelical and apostolic words concerning the Lord, some as referring to one person, others as dividing them B as if referring to two natures." For if the Father always and everywhere, regarding the economy, knew nature and hypostasis to be the same, then all those God-bearing men who divide the words as if referring to two natures would be subject to that anathema which is laid upon those who assign the words to two hypostases. Do not, therefore, bring forward things said less properly against those things which are spoken properly; but instead the truth of all those things which are brought forward is to be inferred by us and by you through a fitting, harmonious, and more common discourse.
C But, they say, Nestorius abused the term "two natures" in Christ, which is a term you also use. To this we reply that this use is shared by many other words of the Holy Scriptures; what then? Must we abstain from these also for that reason? What? The Arians also, the very first of all, and the Apollinarists, and other heretics asserted that there is one incarnate nature of the Word of God; must we therefore not be able to assert that very same thing? But D all wickedness will stop its mouth, and we shall speak with boldness; for they also stood together. Although they seemed in appearance for the most part to oppose one another, in reality, however, they all agreed. For the former took "hypostasis" for "substance," but the latter for "subsistence." On this matter see, if you please, Basil [in his] epistle 282, to Meletius, and epistle 549.
A ...nime profecto. Yet let impiety shut its mouth; let us speak freely against it, as it becomes a divinely inspired herald to speak. For the word of truth triumphs over falsehood by being proclaimed, not by being hidden; furthermore, it honors those who proclaim it, and is not itself honored by those who proclaim it. This is enough. It remains to see the oracles of the holy Fathers which, as they themselves say, clearly attribute to Christ the Lord one nature, while entirely forbidding that two be attributed to him.
Of Saint Cyril, from the second epistle to Succensus.
• To say that two natures subsist after the union without any distinction is B plainly to contradict those who confess the one incarnate nature of the Word. But, O most foolish heads, the holy Father adds these things after certain others in order to rout the errors of the Nestorians. For the phrase "without distinction" appears to me to signify a correct dogma, but not so to those who think the opposite. For among them, this phrase "indistinct," according to the interpretation of Nestorius, is received far differently than it is among us; for he says that the man in whom the Word dwelt is in no way distinguished from him, in dignity, that is, in will, and in authority. Therefore, the cited words of Cyril are not accepted by them in their proper significance, but are distorted by a certain malice into a perverse sense. See, therefore, how the holy Father uses that phrase rightly, [and] utterly rejects the perverse sense, as we urge and beseech you to do from the beginning even to the end. For we can, just as we can express that phrase in an impious sense, C so too can we interpret this other following phrase, "the one incarnate nature of God the Word," with Arius, as if the Son were not of an immutable nature; and with Apollinaris, as if the Word itself acted in place of a mind in an animate, irrational flesh; and with Eutyches, as if the Word itself had been converted into flesh. If, therefore, we do not accurately weigh the mind and intent of those who profess [these things], we shall never rightly interpret this or that phrase. For the holy Father says that heretics are not to be listened to, inasmuch as they think wrongly regarding the conjunction of the natures, even if the words they use might seem to sound well. For they do not assert that Christ is one individual according to hypostasis, D but according to a [mere] habit. For in many words that seem good, the Apostle also clearly perceived that deceit and fraud lie hidden. That Cyril thinks thus is clearly evident, and from his following oracle, which they are accustomed to chant the most.
Of the same, from the second volume of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (12).
• Separating, he says, the two natures of Christ from one another, and showing each apart and unconnected from the other, they wish this one thing to be meant: namely, that the persons in Christ were joined by mind, and by consent, and by an affection of wills, not otherwise than those of whom we read in the Acts of the holy Apostles: "And of the multitude of them that believed, there was one heart and one soul."
A For if everyone of those who believed was distinguished from all others by the particular mode of his subsistence, and yet, because they were joined to one another by will and faith, it is said that they were of one heart and one soul: do they therefore suppose that in Christ, too, the persons were joined to one another in this same way? See how the holy Father openly indicates what it is he rejects in the dogma of those who profess an indivisible conjunction of the two natures of Christ. And a little later: "Indeed we do not assert," he says, "that the nature of the Word of God is circumscribed by a human body; for the divinity lacks quantity." B Then he adds: "One will find in Christ a perfect human individual, perfect, I say, with regard to the account of his own nature; one will find likewise perfect the Word sprung from God; yet one will confess Christ and the Son to be one, proceeding from both, not understanding Christ himself as a composite by a conjunction of persons, but rather believing that the natures themselves have been compacted into one in a certain arcane and ineffable manner, which mode God himself knows. Furthermore, we say that no confusion has occurred in the natures, so that neither the divine has been turned into the human, nor the human into the divine; but rather, both remaining in their own state, we believe the conjunction to have been made." And a little later: "If anyone, therefore, were to say that only the persons are joined in Christ, and that the natures are kept entirely distinct from one another, he would surely wander from the straight path." Who does not understand the meaning of these words? Who could say that the holy Father asserts one nature in Christ? Nay, rather, would he not confess that he is clearly taught by him that the natures have coalesced into one person, not by a conjunction in every way, but only that which concerns the subsistence? C
From the Epistle of Cyril to Sucensus
"So that the two are no longer two, but through both one living being is perfected." D Furthermore, if the holy Father had wished to imply that the natures are no longer natures, he ought to have said: "Those which were long ago two, are now no longer two"; or, "That which is now one, is no longer two as it was before." But if those which were before two are even now two; if through both, and not from both, one is simply perceived: it is clear that this comes about in a different way; so that, as regards the natures, these are indeed two; but as regards the composite, this is one living being, just as he said in express words.
And yet every living being, they say, which is truly one, is also one nature: and so if Christ is one living being, his nature also must be one. But if you wish to proceed by the straight path of demonstration in your objections, you ought not to be ignorant of those things which are commonly taught by the dialecticians and the instructors of this art. For with convertible terms the reason is the same, and one being posited, it is necessary that the other should follow:
but if a stone is a nature, but for that reason not also an animal, it is not necessary that if anything is one animal, it should simply for that reason be one nature. And furthermore, if, because Christ is one animal, there is also one nature, then because He is from two natures, there will also be two animals, which is what Nestorius alone impiously babbles. But if you say that He consists of two animals, as from the divinity and the humanity—that is, from the different natural species—do you therefore also say that He is one animal, as something common and as a species different from divinity and humanity? And how then does this Father, and the others, say that the name "Christ" is neither a name of essence nor of nature, nor has the force of a definition, nor signifies a species of nature, or anything of the sort? Therefore, the animal is one, inasmuch as it is a person that subsists. B But you might say, perhaps, that just as He is one animal as partaking in both eternal and temporal life, so also, by partaking in a temporal and an eternal nature, He is one nature. The fallacy is obvious; for instead of the partaker, you have spoken of the thing participated in as the second. For if that which partakes of each life were "life" and not "animal"—that is, a partaker of animals—it would be well called a person. But if that which is contemplated in two lives is an animal, and that which has partaken of two essences is something substantiated, and not the essence (or nature) itself—which is impersonal—then what is the substantiated thing and the animal, if not the person properly speaking, which subsists in accordance with different natures and lives? So we rightly say one animal, but by no means one nature, just as we do not say one life with regard to the composite person of Christ.
Cyril, from the letter to Acacius (13).
C "We see that two natures have come together, one with the other, in an indissoluble union, without confusion and without change; for flesh is flesh and not divinity, even if it has become the flesh of God; and likewise the Word is God and not flesh, even if He has made the flesh His own in a providential manner. When, therefore, we contemplate this, we do no injury to the concurrence into unity by saying that it has come to be from two natures; but after the union, we do not divide the natures from one another, nor do we cut the one and indivisible Christ into two sons, but we say that there is one Son, and, as the Fathers have said, a single nature of the Word made flesh. So, insofar as it reaches into thought and to the mere seeing with the eyes of the soul in what way the Only-Begotten became man, we say there are two natures."
But let us also say this in return, that He is sufficient for us, clarifying Himself; for He said: "We do not divide, and we do not unite"—referring to the natures, and not to the nature, as these men wish—"and we do not divide the one Son"; not
A that He said one nature, but rather with the eyes of the soul, by which man also differs from the beast which sees only with the eyes of the body. Therefore, the holy Father truly said that there are two natures of the incarnate Word.
From the same, out of the same letter.
"Let us take as an example our own composition, by which we are men; for we are composed of soul and body, and we see two natures, one of the body, another of the soul; yet from the conjunction of both, man is composed. And it is not to be thought that because man is composed of two natures, he is two, but rather one and the same according to the composition, as I said, that is from body and soul." Behold again, he clearly says that one must not think there are two men, but one; he did not say that one should not consider the one nature as two, B since the example of man was not taken in all respects."But," they say, "in the second commentary to Sucensus, the holy Father Cyril expressly said, taking the example of man, who consists of soul and body: 'So that the two are no longer two.'" But is it not clear that he said this in such a sense, that is, that there are not two men, insofar as they are referred to the composition itself? For the same man says a little above: "We conceive two natures in him, one indeed of the soul, another of the body, even if he does not say this in express words." For he adds: "But we understand that these belong to one." Therefore, the holy Father knows that there are two, since he said that they belong to one. For if he had been completely ignorant of the C two, he would never have said this, namely that they belong to one man. But they no longer remained two, that is, they do not truly subsist apart, one from the other, but they make one composition, namely man; since they are seen and conceived to be one thing. For how could it be said that the body and soul are preserved in him, if they are no longer two? Although, speaking about Christ, he uses the example of man, having regard not to nature, but to subsistence. For he argues against Nestorius, who asserted two subsistences in Christ himself. For truly, if the example of man had been taken concerning Christ with regard also to nature, would it not then have to be judged concerning the Lord as it is of Adam, who did not consist of two pre-existing natures, soul and body? But the Word preceded the flesh; D of man, on the contrary, no part is said to have preceded another. Furthermore, man can always be divided into his own natures, and sometimes is even divided in reality; would anyone who is not clearly senseless dare to affirm the same of Christ? Why, therefore, do you compel us to receive and approve a statement related to subsistence, as if it should be understood concerning nature itself as though it were a subsistence? Therefore, the holy Father feared to preach one nature concerning Christ in his Epicheiremata, when it is permitted to affirm this of man? This certainly cannot be said.
"In many places," he says, "it is evident that Cyril is offended by the word 'double': how much more, then, does it displease him
A to use the word 'two'? Is Cyril, therefore, in opposition to Gregory, who uses that word freely in many places? 'He was sent,' he says, 'but as a man; for he was double.' And elsewhere: 'The Father,' he says, 'is not of that which was seen, but of that which was understood; for he was double.' And many other of the Fathers say the like; for it is evident, he says, that he was double according to the natures. But that Christ or the Son is not rightly called double, Cyril the Father says; for this is what Nestorius devises; for if he does not admit as 'double' according to nature, how is it that he himself said in his commentary on Matthew, 'The true and intelligible stater, and in a way conceived in the form of wood, this is our Lord Jesus Christ, of double form'?"
Cyril's from the Responses to the Objections.
B "In the property of the nature of each remaining and being understood, according to the account just now given to us, having been united ineffably and unspeakably, he showed us one nature of the Son, although incarnate; for it is not of those alone that are simple according to nature that 'one' is truly spoken." Behold, they say, of the Son, who is Christ, he said 'one nature.' But let them also join what follows, and discern if they reason rightly; for if the name of the Son, also set before the incarnation, is spoken in place of Christ, it will be phrased in this way: he showed us one nature of Christ, although incarnate; but this, for Christ to be able to be understood as bodiless, is as if inconceivable, or as also being in addition to this one nature of his, and C Christ having put on flesh: Christ will therefore be from the Word and flesh and another nature of body. And being understood not only as two natures simply, but from one that is divine and simple, and from two that are composite, to wit, the human, he will finally be said to be from three natures; but nevertheless, there are two natures from that one nature of Christ according to you, and the nature of the flesh brought in to Christ after his second incarnation.
But why, having laid aside this blindness, do you not contemplate with upright eyes the stated object? For that he says the same one nature remains to the Son of natural sonship, even if he assumed another nature, behold, he himself makes clear by saying: "For not of those only that are simple according to nature, to wit, sons, is 'one' truly spoken." Does not this, therefore, teach you the rather that he of whom he says these things is not simple according to nature, but double? For it is, according to the Father, D as we also often sound out to you, that though there be more than one of the natures, the person is one, and the one and the same Son is Son by nature; and not that he is the one of the natures Son by nature, and the, other, Son by grace; so that the teacher is clearly shown in these things to be speaking our words, or yours; especially where, if it even were as you wish, all the oracles in other places said by the Father as concerning the two natures of Christ would be clearly at odds with these his words:
A which no man speaking in the Spirit of God is suspected of suffering.
Of the Great Athanasius.
B "We confess him also to be the Son of God and God according to the Spirit, and the Son of Man according to the flesh, not two natures in the one Son, one to be worshipped and one not to be worshipped, but one nature of God the Word, incarnate and worshipped with his flesh in one act of worship." Behold, they say, how the Father clearly does away with the duality of natures in the one Son! But, O you men, he did not do away with the two natures, but rather the idea that one of the two natures in the Son should be worshipped and the other not. For this very reason he added, "in one and the same worship of the one Son—not of nature," as he says; for as though by a more universal whole, namely the Person, it comes about that his parts, that is to say these natures, are worshipped at the same time, because both are contained likewise within the Son who is worshipped. But you, by sophistically placing a complete stop, and not a minor pause as we do, by separating the one Son, you seize upon the first part of the sayings to suit your own purpose, and by presenting the following parts in a disjointed manner, you are refuted by the sense of the whole passage. C This, then, is how it should be understood, if indeed it was said by Athanasius; for no holy man is accustomed to contradict himself regarding the same things. But that Apollinaris spoke these things in accordance with your interpretation is testified to in Church History both by his disciple Timotheus and by Polemon, his intimate, whom the holy Father Cyril and Severus, bishop of Petra, mention; for Polemon has these words:
"For in saying that the same person is God and man, they are not ashamed to declare one nature of God the Word, incarnate, as if it were some composite; yet if the same person is perfect God and perfect man, we must admit that there are two natures in him, just as the novelty introduced by the Cappadocians, and the opinion of Diodorus and Athanasius, and the pride of all the bishops of Italy, suggests. D And thus our opponents pretend to hold the same views as our holy Father Apollinaris, while in reality they preach two natures of Christ along with the followers of Gregory." And a little later: "Why do they pretend to be disciples of the divine Apollinaris? For he alone brought forth this opinion to overthrow the two natures; because he clearly left it written that Christ is both the Son of God according to the Spirit, and the Son of Man according to the flesh, not two natures in the one Son, one to be worshipped and one not to be worshipped, but one nature of God the Word, incarnate, and to be worshipped along with his flesh in one and the same worship."
Who then would not be amazed if Athanasius had brought forth all things similar to these, he who was recently charged with thinking like the impious Diodorus? And if he had brought them forth, how could he, even upon...
questioning by Apollinarius and Timothy, have been accused of this? And how could Apollinarius be the first A of all to have produced these things, as his disciples claim, if they had been previously stated by our teacher Athanasius? And how could he who spoke such things say, in his discourse on the holy Trinity: "The nature of the Craftsman and of the things crafted do not mix into a unity of nature, but such a thing contains the greatest impiety, since it drags the preeminence of the Godhead down into a unity with the created substance." If, therefore, our teacher Cyril also brings forward this same text B as being Athanasius’, it is not impossible that, according to our understanding, or by the rascality of some, it was brought to him as a Patristic, and not a heretical, testimony.
Of Julius of Rome, as it seems, from the book on the conjunction in Christ of the body with the Godhead.
"It is acknowledged in Him that there is something created conjoined with the Uncreated, and something Uncreated commixed with the created; that from both a single nature is composed, and that the Word, with His divine perfection, has contributed to the whole for its complement; just as in the common man, which is composed of two imperfect parts, these parts complete a single nature and are designated by one name." C First, the Romans do not accept that this is by Julius; for nothing of this sort by the man is said to exist in the books of the ancients. Moreover, John, Bishop of Scythopolis, who worked long and hard on the most ancient writings of Apollinarius, found the text word for word in those writings. And that it belongs to Apollinarius is clearly shown by what is added in the same book a few pages later; for he said that the body of the Lord was not animated by a soul, which Julius would certainly never have said. It reads as follows: "For in this way the body lived by the sanctification of the Godhead, and not by the construction of a human soul." That Apollinarius previously taught that the Lord was soulless, and then, as if D repenting, changed his view to say He was mindless and soulless, Socrates says in his *Ecclesiastical History* concerning him and his followers: "And at first they said that the Word of God had not taken a soul in the economy of the Incarnation; then, as if in repentance, correcting themselves, they added that He had taken a soul, but that it did not have a mind, but that the Word of God was instead of a mind in the man He assumed."
Of the same Julius, Bishop of Rome, from the letter to Dionysius (25).
A There is one nature, since there is one person, which certainly does not divide into two; for the body is not one specific nature and the divinity another specific nature according to the incarnation, but just as a man is one nature, so too is He who became in the likeness of men. And if they do not acknowledge the one according to the union, they might also be able to partition the one into many and speak of many natures, since the body is manifold, made up of bones, and nerves, and veins, and flesh, and skin, and nails, and hair, and blood, and breath, which all have a distinction from one another, yet it is one nature; so that also the truth of the divinity with the body is one, and it is not divided into two natures.
And after a few words: B "For it is necessary that those who speak of two natures should worship the one and not worship the other; that they should be baptized into the divine and not be baptized into the human. But if we are baptized into the death of the Lord, we confess one nature of the impassible divinity and the passible flesh, so that in this way our baptism may be toward God and completed in the death of the Lord."
And after a few words again: "Therefore, let those who speak of two natures give no excuse to those who divide; for the body is not a nature by itself, nor is it life-giving by itself, nor can it be divided without the life-giving (Word); nor is the Word by Himself divided into His own nature which He has according to His incorporeal state, since the Lord is in the flesh and did not live in the world without flesh; nor does the created body live without the uncreated divinity, so that one might separate a created nature; nor, indeed, did the uncreated Word enter the world without a body, so that one might divide the nature of the uncreated. But if each exists according to the union and the meeting and the compound in human likeness, one name also is adapted to the compound: from the divinity, the 'impassible,' and from the body, the 'passible.' And just as when we hear from the Apostle Paul that Christ is passible, we did not hear it partially, nor did we think the divinity was passible, so also when the same is proclaimed as created and a servant, it is said of the whole, not of a part alone, nor does it thereby make the divinity created or a servant."
C That this authority is falsely ascribed to Julius (22), and that it therefore possesses no force, will be clearly evident to anyone who considers it; nor do we think there is any need for futile arguments to overturn it. For it will be easy for anyone to perceive from this that it is recent, devised by the malice of the adversaries, as D even Dioscorus, Severus, and the leaders of this heresy from more ancient times
A did not produce it. For it is clear that even those who are intensely favorable to this dogma, whether deterred by open calumny or by excessive impiety, have deliberately passed over in this matter all the works of Julius and the other Fathers, although in other respects they are accustomed to laboring greatly to draw forth some authorities from their writings for the proof of their own opinion. Although anyone who has even lightly touched upon the ancient writings of Apollinaris concerning the dispensation of Christ will not think it worthy of doubt whether this testimony of Julius is genuine or not. For passim, while he mentions two parts of the nature of Christ, namely the body alone and the divinity; then he proclaims that the Word assumed only human flesh, and calls the composition of Christ similar to a human one, which was the chief dogma of Apollinaris himself, who first asserted that the divinity acts in place of a soul, and that there is but one nature in Christ, deprived of a soul; then, by remitting something of his impiety in some degree, he taught that the divinity exercised the duty of only a human mind in Christ, and declared that the Word is a part of the soul itself. That therefore the praised epistle is wrongly attributed to Julius is manifest from what has been said: how great an injury is done to Christ the Lord through it will be B evident to one considering it, if he carefully weighs the very words and their greatest absurdities.
“One nature is,” he says, “since there is one person.” Are there then, where there are several persons, necessarily also several natures? And yet there are three persons in the divinity, but one nature: but the matter stands in reverse in the very dispensation of Christ, as Gregory the Theologian testifies. Furthermore, since there is one subsistence, or person, of red-hot iron, is the nature of fire and iron in it one? Do we think that these things are thus, contrary to the laws implanted in us by nature? He adds then: “Which cannot be divided into two, since the divinity does not subsist in Christ apart from the assumed flesh.” This is: as far as place is concerned, one does not truly subsist apart from the other, since they are not distinguished by C place, because the whole fullness of the divinity dwells corporally in the human flesh of Christ: but what concerns the Word, it certainly cannot be said that one nature dwells apart from the other per se, which he declared a little later thus: “We confess,” he says, “one nature of the impassible divinity and of the passible flesh.” Furthermore, that it is not proper to the Word to lack passions, nor proper to the flesh to be subject to them, is clear from this, that the Word suffered in its own person, but not also in the sense that the Word vivified the flesh, but also the flesh vivified the divinity. D What could be said that is more absurd than these things? What is more alien to the reason of piety? But let us also consider from the following the tide and surge of impious thoughts, which is stirred up by unstable falsehood. “For the body,” he says, “is not a nature subsisting by itself, nor is it of itself vivifying, nor capable of being divided.”
A Does it follow, then, that just as it does not possess a vivifying power from its own nature, so also the body does not possess the capacity to be divided from its own nature? Or does it possess the one from the nature of its own essence, but not the other? Is it rather that, from the union with that which is by nature vivifying and indivisible, it has received both? Otherwise, if it does not possess these things, and if the nature of the body has demonstrated in Christ its own divisibility—when the flesh is not itself divisible—who was circumcised? Who was nailed with nails? Who was pierced with a lance, unless they say that these events happened only in appearance and as a shadow’s type?
B We must also consider how full of folly the statement that is added is. For he says: “Nor is the Word separated into a peculiar nature, which it has in the divinity that is devoid of flesh.” The Word, therefore, O most wise men, even after it has assumed flesh, still retains its own nature as it exists without flesh; and how could you not be aware of your own assertions? What answer will you give us to our questions? For does the human nature of the Lord also have its own nature according to the fleshly, even if it was divinely assumed, or does only the nature of the Word that is without flesh remain? Was the manifestation of the Lord’s flesh only an appearance? For if the manifestation of the Lord’s flesh was in truth, and there are two natures, both of them collect into one common subsistence, which is His own. C But what does he say to these things? “If, however, it is one in both according to the union—O man, if it is one, how is it both? And if it is both, how will it be one according to the same?” Is it not clear that it is one according to the person, but both according to the natures? “No,” he says, “but according to the human-like composition.” What then? While the nature of soul and body is preserved, do we know there to be another nature in man besides these, or not? If we say no, then not even in the Lord Christ, while divinity and humanity are preserved, must we invent another nature as the communion; but if we affirm it, and contend that besides the substance of soul and body there exists another, a more common nature of man, which is altogether different from those two, what then will be the nature in Christ that is similar to this, which is neither divine nor human? Of what kind, I pray you, is this natural and supreme species?
D Since these things are so, what name do you think should be attributed to the composite? If it is such that it signifies the subsistence, I raise no objection; but if it signifies a nature, I ask, which nature is signified by this name? Surely, if it is said to be different from the divine and the human, of what kind will it be? If it is the same as the divine, it will not be the proper designation of the composite, since both the nature and its name existed before the composition. But if it is the same as the humanity, in that way too it is not the designation of the composite; and—
since all this was admittedly accepted by all, let us overlook it. But to leave it aside: how is it that, while you say one natural name must be recognized for the composite whole, you at the same time affirm two opposite things of it, calling it both created and uncreated? And, what is even more paradoxical, claiming that of it, only what is uncreated and impassible belongs to the divinity, and what is created and passible belongs to the body, you have declared these things of Christ not partially, nor even by speaking of parts, but of the whole Christ? A If we were to grant that you could speak as you wish, I would still press you with the necessary consequences of your own words: if you hold contrary opinions about each of the things in Christ, and if you believe that the whole Christ, by nature, is such that whatever is said of one of the natures within him is said of his entire subsistence, then, just as his flesh is truly passible and created, so too is his divinity; and just as his divinity is impassible and uncreated, so too is his flesh? These things, besides bearing a manifest impiety, are in every way impossible; for it cannot be that the same thing, in the same respect and in the same way, can be all contrary things at once.
Of the same Julius, from the epistle on the union in Christ.
A "We confess that in him the created is united with the uncreated, since one nature is composed from each part, and the Word, according to its divine perfection, effects a partial operation into the whole, just as in the common human being it happens from two imperfect parts, which fulfill one nature and are manifested by one name." B It is clear, then, that the divine perfection belongs to the nature of the proper whole, that is, to Christ; thus, it is a natural part and a lesser nature, and it should not be judged that the Word is merely stripped of flesh in relation to Christ. Let him who wishes investigate whether Julius truly said this.
Of Gregory Thaumaturgus, as they say, in the Exposition of Faith in Part.
"To believe that the one Christ is two natures," he says, "makes the holy Trinity a quaternity." For he speaks as follows: "And there is true God (who, being without flesh, allowed himself to be seen in the flesh), and perfect in true and divine perfection, we do not say that we worship two natures, nor four—God, and the Son of God, and C man, and the Holy Spirit." First, the usage and the source D are greatly doubted and uncertain; yet, even so, he says that we must not speak of two persons in Christ, so that, by acknowledging him as God and in perfect divinity, we do not, by saying there are two persons of him, introduce a quaternity of divine persons—counting one for God the Father, one for the Son of God, one for the man, and one for the Holy Spirit—but he says that we should not even acknowledge two natures of him, but rather confess him to be perfect God in one natural perfection, and not in two; for as to the fact that he was made flesh without change and without...
A losing his divinity, he wishes to demonstrate this. The same author, therefore, says a little before: "And while those things which pertain to the flesh were taking place, the power maintained its own impassibility." Impious, then, is he who transfers the passion to the power; for the Lord of glory appeared in human form, having assumed the human dispensation.
*Gregorii [Nysseni] ex opere contra Apollinarem.*
"They accuse us as if we were introducing two natures, divided or contrary, and were distinguishing the supernatural and admirable union." Now truly, good sirs, it is manifest that nowhere is it established to speak of division and conflict regarding the natures: for this destroys the B admirable union. It would have behooved you to say only this, that we introduce two natures and distinguish the admirable union.
*Cyrilli ex epistola ad Sucensum.*
"Although the conjunction having been made, as is confessed, those things which have been united are no longer separated from one another, but one Son remains, one nature of him who assumed the flesh."
But to one wishing to weigh the matter accurately and piously, it becomes clear that he asserts one nature of the Son, insofar as he is Son by nature; for it cannot be that he who once was Son by nature should also become Son by adoption through grace, even if he assumed the nature of flesh, which is never to be separated from him; as if he who has already turned out to be Son by nature C were in need of the grace of adoption, being deemed unworthy of adoption by nature; for the essence that is son-ed by nature, from the moment it exists, is also united with the dignity of natural sonship; therefore, having been honored together, it is glorified and adored along with him.
Now, because we wish to leave nothing unaddressed, as far as lies in us, of the pretexts for the enmity with which they pursue us, we shall indicate in this place the objections accustomed to be brought against us by them in the course of discourse, and thus we shall bring to an end the refutation of the lies poured forth against the Church. Since they are able to establish their own doctrine neither by arguments fit for demonstration, nor by testimonies drawn from Scripture or the Fathers, bringing forward the causes why they dissent from us, they speak almost thus:
"Even if the dogmas which you now teach seem pious, we nevertheless flee your society; for the reason that you reverence and fear the Council of Chalcedon, and D Leo the patriarch of Rome, who indeed (as he who boasts himself their master, the Antiochene patriarch Severus, says) while pretending that he agrees with the one...
A gathering for the deposition of Eutyches, were in earnest really studying to favor Nestorius.
But do not those who utter such things show themselves quite petulant and bold? For they do not tremble at the glory of God, but speak blasphemously, they who shall render an account to Him who is ready to judge the living and the dead, who will render to each according to his work, and will reveal the counsels of the hearts. We, however, relying on God, will show to all who listen to these things, as if pleading our cause before judges, that there are deceitful lips in their hearts, and that they spoke evil from their hearts, and their anger is according to the likeness of the envious and man-hating serpent, not in zeal for God. For how is that which is objected to them by these men plausible—that they favored Nestorius—when they venerate the Ephesian council by which he was overthrown, and approve both the writings of the most holy Cyril against Nestorius himself, and all the terms used against him? They who mention him everywhere as a B kind of propitiatory sacrifice, and before all others, condemn him and his associates who think as he does as pre-eminent among the impious, and cast them out from the communion of the faithful of Christ?
"But there were some," he says, "in the council who are detected as having long favored Nestorius."
In order that we may grant this to them in passing (for we know the ease with which this argument can be refuted, and we do not wish to unnecessarily extend our defense in length), how is it that for the sake of five just men alone, Sodom and the whole of Gomorrah were preserved, whose cry of lawlessness ascended even to the heavens? But here, because of two or three impious men, thinking secretly in an ungodly manner, was the whole venerable multitude C and holy assembly of the sacred prelates—as if all were impious—deserted by God, so that they could not discern the truth, especially when God Himself promises: *Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them*? And this divine oversight does not pertain only to them, but even more freely to the whole holy Church of Christ throughout the whole inhabited world, of all peoples and nations; for the dogmas then decreed were not to come for a temporary time, but for an everlasting tradition, as we see, by the help of God, even until now. Would he not be the first to act impiously against the account of divine Providence, who counts as naught the teaching of the faith regarding the dispensation of Christ, as it has been preached to the world through the holy councils and D confirmed for succeeding generations? But if, even from the account of divine Providence, you do not have a favorable disposition toward the holy council, but still suspect it because of your ancient...
error of opinion, fearing that some of the Fathers of the council secretly cherished the depraved dogma of Nestorius, although they all openly proclaimed one opinion with one voice; let us consider, for this reason, whether the universal synod ought to be rejected. For is it not possible, I ask you, that those who formerly thought wrongly might later, having changed their opinion, think piously and correctly? Assuredly, A what was done by the Fathers of the council clearly declares this, namely, that if not long before, yet at that very time, they thought piously and correctly, since by a written judgment they condemned and overthrew the nefarious dogmas of Nestorius. And who could deny that this could have happened? Just as no one will deny that it could have happened that certain others, who at that time in the council thought piously and correctly, might later slip into impiety. Did not Paul, who previously persecuted Christ, later preach the faith which he had once tried to destroy? Did not Judas (who together with the eleven apostles preached the Lord, when they were sent out by him two by two throughout the world) afterwards himself lay snares for the same Lord? But even if, at the time of the council, some of the Fathers had thought wickedly within their own hearts, since they nevertheless approved the rightly done deeds and sayings of the council itself by their own suffrages, on what account would the sacred synod deserve censure? For it is written that it is for God alone to search the hearts and reins.c
"But if," you say, "it possessed any part worthy of blame, then the whole of what remains is deemed unacceptable."
Therefore, the entire threshing floor must be rejected solely on account of the tares, and the whole chorus of the apostles must be rejected on account of the inclusion of Judas among them. C Furthermore, if the whole ought to be judged by a part, since many of the Fathers of the Ephesine council were present at this synod of Chalcedon, it will be reasonable to infer the mind and intention of this council against Nestorius from them rather than to infer the contrary from those few. Are you ignorant that even of the Fathers of the Nicene council (13) (14), seventeen or so, panic-stricken by the threat of deposition, approved the rule of faith against Arius and subscribed to it, yet afterwards bitterly persecuted the divine Athanasius, and yet the whole synod is not disparaged on account of this? But if you do not think that the goodness of the whole council should be judged by its manifest part, but rather contend that the whole should be rejected on account of doubtful matters, then since the whole Council of Chalcedon is rejected by you on account of one part, and along with the whole, that part of the fathers who were present at the Ephesine council and constituted a portion of it appears also to be considered worthy of disapproval, must not the whole Ephesine council itself, because of this part found to be depraved, D necessarily be thought to be rejected as having patronized Nestorius? And from the remainder of those seventeen, must not the Nicene council be considered as having been set at naught as a design of Arius? But that you may not be ignorant of [the nature of] your lawless abuse...
c Ps. vii, 10.
and insolence, remember that in the number of those who subscribed to the definition of this same council there was the divine A Symeon, who left us his own virtue attested upon his column, whom even your own patriarch Severus celebrated with sacred orations and hymns; and along with him, Baradatus and Jacob, who performed very many miracles, also subscribed. But why do you cast these stumbling blocks before those who are burning with a desire to attain piety, and why do you attempt to turn away from the truth those who are eager to walk uprightly—stumbling blocks which are purely and simply the inventions of deceitful rhetoric? But in order that we may more easily make it clear before God and men B that your separation from our communion is absurd, leaving everything else aside, we say this one thing: If you, by embracing the right dogmas which we propose, confess that one nature of the Word of God took on flesh, and that the two natures of Christ subsist in one and the same person, paying faith to the council and to Leo (for those who hold, teach, or subscribe to anything contrary to all these, even if they were angels, we judge to be proscribed), we will gladly embrace and commend Severus and Dioscorus C and Timothy, and you, and anyone else who thinks as they do, and say nothing more. But the judgment of all these (who hold such views, or who indeed profess them with their lips but believe otherwise in their hearts) we leave to God Himself, the judge of all. But if it behooves us also to judge and define concerning the integrity and piety of our Fathers, [to determine] who are good shepherds and true lights, and who are "wandering stars" and thieves and wolves who furnish service and labor to the devil for the tearing apart and destruction of Christ's Church, then we naturally pay reverence to and love and obey those whom we clearly discover from the scriptures to be interpreters of the truth, as those who enter into Christ’s fold through the door—that is, through Christ Himself who is the Truth. But we do not obey a stranger, because we do not know the voice of a stranger—we who are counted within the very flock of the good shepherd, and of the shepherd of all, the great Christ Jesus. D
"But," you say, "even the Fathers of the council themselves disagreed with one another regarding certain terms, and strove vehemently that the first exposition, which had already been exploded, should be retained, or [were] entreating on behalf of Dioscorus himself, who was the defendant. How, then, are they not suspect?"
But what is strange about this? For indeed in the Nicene synod itself [the Fathers] disagreed among themselves; and they contended vehemently that the first exposition, which had already been exploded, should be retained, or [they were] interceding for Dioscorus himself, who was being held as a defendant. And what is strange about this? For even in the Nicene synod itself...
Some of the Fathers disagreed among themselves, as Eusebius shows in his history (19). A
"But," you say, "it proves that the synod was of a different mind in the depths of its heart than what it proclaimed; and that one thing was conceived in its mind, while another was brought forth, as the duplication of its definition, the repeated votes, and the reversal of its own decisions clearly declare."
But, O you fools, it is most clearly evident from the proceedings of the synod that by renewing its decrees, it corrected what it had previously held less correctly. But lest we too be detained with you by such forensic cavils, we add and say to these things: that to no men, not even those inspired by the Divine Spirit, does a perfect understanding of things immediately shine forth at first glance; but even the holy ones sometimes perceive more clearly what they previously saw only obscurely. Furthermore, unless we view all things with jaundiced eyes, it becomes more and more evident from this very fact that the synod acted in all things considerately and cautiously, and not rashly or negligently. B
"But," you say, "this synod is to be censured for another reason. For it is agreed that it burned with unjust hatred toward (21) Dioscorus, who once presided over the Church of Alexandria and keenly attacked the Nestorian errors; and it not only (22) cast him from his seat without just cause, persecuting him as an enemy of Nestorius, but its reports of defenses and accusations contain such calumnies as would best befit Tertullus, who pleaded for the Jews against Paul before Felix."
For to deceive the minds of lighter judges, such things have been craftily concocted. For the synod called Dioscorus (to whom it was imputed as a crime that he (23) had received the impious Eutyches after his deposition, and had proscribed Flavian, C who had justly deposed him) (24) into court many times and in many (25) ways, so that he might defend himself against these charges brought against him; and when he, at first (26) equivocated and then even more impudently refused the judgment, only then did the Fathers of the council depose him.
"Why then," someone will say, "does the synod say that it deposed Dioscorus not because of (27) evil dogmas, but because of his contumacy, in which he refused to obey when summoned?"
In truth, however, most foolish men, he was indeed called by the Fathers of the council because of the suspicion of the Eutychian dogma into which he had fallen; but when he refused to obey, submitting himself and his affairs to their investigation, he fell into another crime, namely that of contumacy, for which he was affected with a special punishment and, having been deposed, D was not in this the...
A prescription of the canons relieved of his office; yet he was by no means absolved from the charge of impiety thereby. For if anyone, perchance having been accused of sacrilege and summoned, should decline judgement and therefore be condemned for contumacy, he would not by this lighter condemnation depart victorious in the principal case; but he would rather confirm the suspicion of the crime objected to him.
If you say that he declined judgement not due to the stings of his own conscience, but terrified by the iniquity of the judges, I shall reply that he ought to have signified this in writing and to have proceeded in a due and orderly manner, not to have refused proofs entirely. For this clearly demonstrates that he was devoid of any excuse for his offense. And indeed, what could he have answered, had he been present? Let anyone who bears the case of this man ill say so. For that he received Eutyches is manifest; but whether he acted rightly in receiving that man (who confessed B that there was one nature only in Christ, namely the divine, and that it was entirely devoid of human substance), or what defense he could have used to protect himself, I leave to you yourselves, the patrons of Dioscorus, to judge.
«Be it so, he says; but he received Eutyches after he repented of his error and began to think piously and correctly.»
But how is it that you, who cannot be so easily induced to believe that those Fathers of the council who once fell into suspicion of Nestorian heresy with you could have changed their opinion C — how, I say, do you think it pious and correct that he now holds this view, he who cast not some slight suspicion regarding his crime, but openly confessed his own impiety in writing; who, on that account, as one persisting in his error, was deposed from his rank; who, finally, neither in the assembly of the synod, nor before trustworthy witnesses, nor in the Church, nor in any writing, declared that he had changed his depraved opinion? But if it is so, if Dioscorus received him as one already repentant of his error, it follows that he was justly deposed by the most holy Flavian, who had previously thought so nefariously, even if afterwards, by taking refuge with Dioscorus, he performed penance. How, therefore, can D the man who received this person, while he was confessing his old error and had been justly deposed before having completed his penance, and who also cast out Flavian himself, who had justly deposed him—how can he maintain that he cast out Flavian justly? Either therefore Dioscorus, in receiving him, did not receive one who was truly repentant, or he himself cast out Flavian, by whom Eutyches had been justly and deservedly deposed, with the greatest injustice.
«There was a rumor, he says, that Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, favored the errors of Nestorius; therefore, everything that he himself performed against Eutyches was suspect.»
And who, alas, you wretches, reflecting upon the exposition of the faith delivered by Flavian, could admit that this is true? For he says:
«We preach our Lord Jesus Christ, begotten before the ages from God the Father without beginning
A according to his divinity. But in the last days, the same, for us and for our salvation, from Mary was born according to humanity, perfect God and perfect man, the same in the anticipation of soul and body, consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and consubstantial with the Mother the same according to humanity. For we confess the same Christ, from two natures after the incarnation from the holy Virgin and the making-man, in one hypostasis and in one person, one Christ, one Son, one Lord; and we do not refuse to say one nature of God the Word, yet incarnate and made man, because from both there is one and the same Lord of ours, Jesus Christ. But those who proclaim two sons, or two hypostases, or two persons, and do not preach one and the same Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, we anathematize and judge to be aliens from the Church; and first of all we anathematize the impious Nestorius, and those who think or speak his mind; and such will fall away from the sonship promised to those who think rightly.»
Thus speaks he who was deposed by Dioscorus, as he says, on the grounds of Nestorianizing. Furthermore, with all complaint against Dioscorus simply passed over by us, did the whole synod of holy fathers and sacred ministers of God seem to you to have deposed Dioscorus B out of hatred—him, who was present, and called to the council in various ways, and accused of predisposition towards Eutyches—while Severus, who dwelt in Antioch (the synod of Chalcedon not being present in his times or places, nor called by him, nor accepting Nestorius, but rather casting him and his dogmas out in writing, and accepting the orthodoxy against him, but not the contrary perverted opinion of Eutyches),—Severus, I say, who not only judged them absolutely to be rejected, but dared by one sentence to separate them all at once from the company of the faithful,—does this not seem to you to have been done through extreme injustice and audacity? C Although we see it has long been the custom, both among our own people and among foreign peoples professing the same institutions, that the judgments of the whole are held to be far superior against private individuals, than those of private individuals against the whole in which they are contained. And therefore it would be right for you, if you wish to be judged rightly, O sons of men, to deem the whole assembly of the sacred prelates of the Church more authoritative than a single part of it, and to consider the former more worthy of belief; for what other person have you ever seen who dared to anathematize a synod, and not rather [to see] all the heresiarchs anathematized by D synods
A For it is truly wonderful how the servants of God have always guarded the principle of order; for God is not [the author] of confusion. When various synods have been superstitious, their decrees have been annulled by more authoritative synods; yet no one of the God-bearing men has dared to condemn [a synod] individually, nor has any synod dared to anathematize a synod. How much more, then, has this one, with an impious spirit, dared to anathematize a common assembly of those who worship God? But in all these things, though they have not spat out from their soul the slimy filth of irrational prejudice against us that was hidden within them, what do they say again? B "That most of your ordinations are [bought] through the giving and receiving of gold, and possess the curse according to the intent of Simon Magus. How, then, is one to be in communion with you? Unless, indeed, one must be despised for being an heir to a curse," they say.
So then, if some physicians are detected as adulterers and thieves, must the medical art be reviled for this reason, and avoided? Except that if we were to respond to those who say these things to us—as if we were the so-called "Pure" ones, relying on our own blameless life—we would answer them as Novatians, and not as Mixophysites. But if not that, but they simply complain that we are lovers of gold rather than lovers of Christ, and say that while they agree with us in doctrine, they are scandalized only by this, and for this reason seek communion with us—would it not have been better for them to act kindly and pray for us when we confess our sins? For we have been commanded to pray for one another so that we may be healed, C and not, like Pharisees, to loathe those who are of the same nature and the same faith. But we trust in the Lord that the Lord has left us a seed, and we have not become like Sodom, nor have we been made like Gomorrah.
What then? If we show that very many of the sacred prelates among us are not appropriating anything, even to a shoestring or the lace of a shoe, on these grounds will their zeal be released and the scandal be annulled, so that they may run to the truth? Or will not even this be enough for us to heal them? Shall we further say, then, [that] your priests who slip into houses and capture weak women for the sake of base gain, not of that which is in the women's quarters, and D
at the feet of the bed, where the sacred service is performed for them, they haggle over the wages to be paid them monthly or yearly? A I pass by the rest, fearing lest we be brought out upon the stage even by profane men, we who indeed present to others an empty appearance of piety, but utterly despise and reject piety itself and its power; for we all stumble in many things. For if you yourselves confess, and cannot deny, that it is the custom for a price to be accepted for the laver of the sacred font, and for the precious relics of the divine gift, what else shall we hear reproached against us than that word: "My name is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you"? It is sufficient, therefore, for each of us to remove the beam from his own eye, and then we shall be able more clearly to see the speck in another's eye, as he who alone is without sin teaches us. [d] [e]
B Now that these things have, with God, been set before us for judgment and examination by all men, we implore you, before the Word of Truth, the true judge of all our words, deeds, and thoughts: let every one who reads—whether [it concerns] our own opinion or that of another—set aside the bias that comes from kin or foes, and let him listen to what is said and judge the things spoken as if they were from men wholly unknown to him on either side. And if we never allow one or the other side to be prejudiced in our minds, and if we truly judge—with a bare standard of our own, without any bias or antipathetic obscuration—the things [proposed] by those who are opposed to us as being truer, more reasonable, more powerful, and wiser than our own, we shall be able to see the truth more clearly; for otherwise we are accustomed to indulge these enemies of ours too much. C For which reason we do not hesitate to affirm boldly that those who adhere to them, because they think their doctrine is correct, even if in reality it is evil and they think wrongly, will not incur the mark of impiety when God comes to judge the hidden and secret things of the heart. "For," he says, "if our heart is convinced before him, and our heart does not condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knows everything." But if the Word of Truth clearly reveals himself to us and fills our minds with his light, and we, on the contrary, close our eyes and stop our ears—becoming deaf of our own accord and rejecting the truth itself—we will truly be found the most miserable of all, worthy of the commiseration and mourning of all, especially when we face that fearsome day D upon which, before the angels and powers and the whole world undergoing the judgment of God, we shall be rejected by Christ. On that day, indeed, nothing will avail us—neither our devotion to the heresiarchs, nor kinship of blood, nor the customs of acquaintances or country (which bind some in an indissoluble knot), nor the pursuit of money, or any worldly gains that hold us fast.
For neither the applause of families, nor the zeal for contention, nor empty glory—in which those who love to be called masters by men delight—will be able to rescue from those most extreme miseries, and atrocious punishments, and the outer darkness, those men who have turned their backs on the clear light of truth and have chosen to revel in the darkness of falsehood. For it is pleasing to God to set truth before all things, and especially in matters concerning God Himself, who is the Truth. For this reason alone, Abraham, having spurned the impiety of the Chaldeans, leaving behind all things—father, house, B kindred, friends, country, and the rest—devoted himself entirely to piety; and for this, precisely as the first and only reason, he was loved by God Himself, and was watched over, and glorified, and multiplied. The Apostle Paul, too, considered all things that were his gain to be refuse, for no other reason than that he might gain Christ. And all the rest of the holy ones among the Greeks, and Samaritans, and Jews, acted in the same way. "For he who does not deny father, and mother, and brothers, and sisters, and children, and fields, C and house, and even his own soul for my sake, is not worthy of me," says the Lord. And let no one reason, saying: "But the contention regarding heresies does not distance one from orthodoxy to the same extent as the impiety of the Chaldeans, Hebrews, and Greeks distances one from the true faith, so that he who disobeys the Word on only a portion of the true faith would be alienated from Christ in the same way as they." For someone who disregards even a small portion of the doctrine of piety for the sake of some irrational prejudice and habit, clearly shows that, even as much as he seems to be pious, he does not have this from an authentic choice of heresy, but from the accidents of parents, or places, or the tradition of friends. For if he happened to be a son, or a friend, or an associate of Manichaeans, or Greeks, or Hebrews, he would be even more disobedient to the truth; for if, when standing at a small distance from it, he does not run toward the truth and seek it, but is drawn away, if he were standing further off, he would be even more implacably opposed to it.
"But," you say, "I am personally persuaded that my own opinion is more correct, and therefore I remain steadfast in my conviction." D
But that the Jews—whom the Apostle nevertheless affirms are displeasing to God, and crucified the Lord, and persecuted the apostles, and obey no men—were in this state, the same Apostle testifies where he says again: "For I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge." It is not right, therefore, to embrace the doctrines that are handed down with blind eyes; but it is necessary to weigh them diligently, and to look into them more deeply. For every doctrine of all the nations and heretical sects, however impious and absurd, thinks that it is doing something good, just as even human sacrifices [do].
A Scythians 44 think that by worshipping God with human victims, they are acting piously and rightly. We must therefore search, as much as in us lies, and seek the truth, and by accurately weighing all things, embrace the correct judgment in all matters. We are certainly not accustomed to accept silver or buy a garment without having first B carefully examined both and explored them most diligently. Since this is so, how shall we be able to be worthy of plea for having rashly embraced and professed divine dogmas? For our negligence in these matters cries out, in a way, that those things which we believe concerning Christ and His grace—through which, as it is written, many and greatest promises have been made to us, [b] and it is granted to us to become partakers of the divine nature—are of no moment. Therefore, as much good as sincere piety carries with it, so much evil does the impiety contrary to it surely contain. For this alone is the cause for us why we fall away from God and slip into every kind of sin, as the Apostle bears witness, saying: *Since they did not approve of having God in their knowledge, God gave them over into a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient* [i]; and the things which follow after. This the Apostle says concerning impiety; but concerning piety, in the Epistle to Timothy, he says: *Exercise yourself unto godliness: for bodily exercise profits little; but godliness is profitable for all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come* [1 Tim. IV, 8]. But some bring forward another reasonable plea for these people, [to explain] why they have fallen away from the truth.
“How,” they ask, “can their doctrine be displeasing to God, C among whom some have been found, both among the living and the dead, who, having embraced the same dogmas as they, have obtained the grace of healing the sick and performing other miracles? For it is manifest that the divine power works in them, especially [given that they believe they] practice the right religion and profess the right dogmas.”
To which we reply that this does not suffice for the full proof of the matter for one who is an accurate investigator and judge of divine dogmas. For first, this happens rarely among them, and as the saying goes, one swallow does not make a spring. For since the Arians—both at other times and even in our own days among the Lombards—and the Nestorians among the Persians perform such miracles, [this happens] not as a proof of their own peculiar sect, but of the entire Christian religion, whose power and authority the Holy Spirit clearly declares D through these prodigies to peoples who are altogether alien to the right faith. Moreover, it is often possible to see that this gift of performing miracles is given promiscuously to some, both to the orthodox and to the heterodox 45, not on account of their piety alone (for the truth would not exist in contrary and contradictory matters), but on account of natural simplicity and lack of vanity, or rather the childlike state of the soul.
and because individual gifts are dispensed to individual persons owing to the particular dexterity and aptitude of each, by which one excels the others who profess the same religion. For if that power were always at hand to all on account of their faith alone, then all who profess the same faith would necessarily always perform miracles. But the matter is otherwise; for often those who teach the dogmas of the faith perform no miracles, whereas their disciples are highly endowed with that power.
B For the one and the same Spirit does not grant all things, nor do all things belong to one and the same person. For to one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another the gift of healings, to another the working of miracles, and to another faith, by the same Spirit. 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9. Indeed, it is a matter of wonder to me that he who enjoys the gift of tongues does not also possess some other gift akin to it, by which he might interpret the very tongues in which he speaks. C There are, therefore, some who lack the gift of wisdom, and intelligence, and the sublime spirit of faith, who nevertheless rejoice in the power of performing miracles. Nor is it consistent with reason to infer one gift of the Holy Spirit from another. Let us speak more clearly. If they alone possessed those gifts of miracles, or if they excelled us in them, it might seem possible that their opinion is sound and pious, as being confirmed by the Lord with those signs which, as Scripture testifies, are wont to accompany those who believe correctly. Just as the same Lord confirmed both the preaching of the apostles among all nations with miracles, and exalted the signs of Moses and Aaron above the miracles of Jannes and Jambres among the Egyptians. But if the divine miracles of the Holy Spirit are wont to be performed far more frequently and greater throughout the whole world among us than among them, how do they think that their dogma is proved to us by miracles? Let them, therefore, cease to thrust upon us that which is of no service to them in defending themselves and supporting their own obstinacy. D For if even Sceva the Jew, together with his sons, invoking the name of Christ, drives evil spirits from possessed bodies, and yet is not on that account numbered among the disciples of the Lord, then clearly neither do these persons have from such things any pretext for their error. For "Many," he says, "will say to me in that day: Lord, did we not prophesy in thy name, and cast out demons, and perform many miracles? And then will I declare to them, that I never knew you." It is clear, therefore, that it is not sufficient for discerning those who are dear to Christ, or
A for the manifestation of a miracle, or even for the benefit of the one who is persuaded, to have a more correct faith—rather than that of the one who is performing the act—or for the simpler assurance of the spectators regarding piety; but sometimes it occurs by God for a more common benefit to the need of the time or place, through anyone of those present. At any rate, in our own times and in these regions, it is recorded that a certain mimic B from among those who work in the theaters, having been denounced for sedition and murder, and having fled out of fear of the judge into the deserts called the Barbaric frontier, fell in with some Saracen Christians. Having been captured by them, and appearing to them as a monk because of his shaven hair, and being believed, just as the monks who frequented them were accustomed, to be able to offer the most holy sacrifice of the life-giving bread, he was urgently compelled by them through signs to perform the liturgy of the divine sacrifice, being left alone C as the only one of the fellow captives to perform it. And since he could not persuade them by speech of his own unfitness, and had no strength to resist their command any longer, an altar was set up from brushwood in the desert, a shroud was spread out, fresh bread was set forth, and wine was poured into a wooden cup. He stood by, blessed the gifts by lifting his eyes to heaven, and invoked the name of the Trinity alone; and after breaking the bread, he distributed it to them. Then, as it had now been sanctified, they kept the cup and the shroud with the highest veneration, so that they would not be put to a profane use, while they neglected only the altar itself. Suddenly, a great force of fire from heaven descended upon it, D which did not touch or harm any of them, but completely consumed and utterly destroyed the whole altar made of brushwood, so that not even a fragment of the brushwood remained there. Moved by this portent, the Barbarians turned their eyes toward the man who had offered the sacrifice, and insisted vehemently that he should ask some gift from them for such a deed. He requested that those who had been captured along with him should also be released with him; he obtained this immediately, and freed all who were with him from their miserable captivity. Now this man was considered one of our own for this one reason, that he was accustomed to attend our assemblies, since they knew not even the slightest difference that exists between Christians and Christians. As for the Saracens, they professed the dogmas of the Jacobites and were accustomed to live together with them. These Jacobites also preach the one nature in Christ, and they wandered through the deserts with the Saracens themselves, and diligently performed for them [the ministry of…]*
…] ... the ministry. They neither truly knew nor taught that the dogmas of the Christians are to be investigated and compared with the institutions of other sects; but just as the Persians approved the doctrine of Nestorius, so too did these men accept the perverse dogmas of Jacob without any examination.
THE THIRTY CHAPTERS OF THE BLESSED LEONTIUS AGAINST SEVERUS
I. If things which are altogether the same are of one nature, and these very things are also called one nature, how will things which are not altogether the same by nature be of one nature, or be called one nature? Moreover, the divinity of Christ and his humanity are never altogether the same, according to their own view. Therefore, they will not be of one nature, nor will they be called one nature after the union.
II. Things of which there is one nature also have a common definition (ratio); and things that have a common definition are of the same substance. But the divinity of Christ is not, according to them, of the same substance as his humanity. There is, therefore, no single definition for these; and things for which there is never a single definition, their natures will clearly always be different.
III. If those who say Christ is of divinity and humanity also say he is of two natures, and if both seem to them to signify the same thing, how will they not be compelled, from the things conceded and admitted by them, to say that he is in two natures—since they speak of him after the union as being in divinity and humanity? For the meaning is the same here as that declared by both.
IV. If those who say Christ is of two natures, say he is of divinity and humanity; and those who say he is of divinity and humanity, also say he is of two natures; and since they speak of divinity and humanity after the union, they therefore also admit two natures for Christ after the union. But if they deny that it should be said there are two natures in Christ after the union, then they also deny that it should be said there is divinity and humanity in Christ after the union.
V. If they acknowledge that the elements which came together are not confused in the union—and the elements which came together are two, as they themselves admit—how is it that they do not recognize as two the things that were not confused in the union, even after the union? If they do recognize them, why do they not confess it? If they do confess it, why do they refuse to number these things, of which they acknowledge the nature... B C D
THE THIRTY CHAPTERS AGAINST SEVERUS OF THE BLESSED LEONTIUS
A ...and were provided by them. They certainly neither believed nor taught that the dogmas of the Christians were to be examined, nor that the institutions of others were to be compared; but just as they approved the doctrine of Nestorius without any investigation, so too did they approve the perverse dogmas of Jacob.
I. If all these things are altogether the same, they are of one nature; but if these things which are not altogether the same are called of one nature, then how shall one nature be spoken of? But they never call them the same in every way and according to nature, not even the divinity of Christ and his humanity according to them; therefore, these would not be of one nature, nor would they be called one nature after the union.
II. Of things of which the nature is one, the definition is common; and of which the definition is common, the existence is consubstantial; but the existence of Christ is not twofold, nor is it consubstantial with his humanity; therefore, the definition of these is not one; and if the definition is not one, it is clear that their natures are always different.
III. If those who say that Christ is from divinity and humanity, also say that he is from two natures, and both seem to them to mean the same thing, why, if they say that by the union divinity and humanity are meant, are they not compelled to say that they are from two natures? For the term "from two" denotes the same thing here as it does there.
IV. If those who say that Christ is from two natures, say that he is from divinity and humanity, and say that he is from two natures, and (yet) do not say divinity and humanity after the union (as two) natures, but say that he is from two natures and (then) after the union do not say that he is two natures—if they deny that it must be said that there are two natures in Christ after the union, then they deny divinity and humanity in Christ after the union. D
V. If they acknowledge that the united things are not confused in the union, and yet that the two joined things are what they are, how is it that they do not recognize two things which have not been confused in the union and remain two after the union? And if they acknowledge them, how do they refuse to number them, since they know the property of their natures is unconfused after the union? For the divine Basil says: "If they confess them, let them also number them."
VI. If they say that Christ is from two natures, but do not say that he is two natures, they say that he is from these, but they do not say that Christ is these; but if not, then let them explain whether they want him to be recognized in those things from which they constitute him. For if the things from which he is are not in him, they are either nowhere, or they are in another, namely in something besides him; and let them clearly teach who this is.
VII. If in the case of consubstantial things the expression "one nature" primarily signifies the identity of the subjects, how is it that in the case of things of different substance, "two natures" necessarily signify not a difference, but a separation?
VIII. If in every way and altogether number brings with it division, then number will be the cause of the division, not the division the cause of the number; and of the two it is necessary that one be true: either nothing of the united things is numbered, or nothing of the counted things is united. And how is it not ridiculous to give such power to number? For every number is in the habit of representing the quantity of things, not their nature or the quality of their relationship.
IX. If the union and the united things are of those things which are said in relation to something; but things which are in relation to something are also always together; therefore, the union and the united things are also always together. But if the united things cease, the union also ceases with them.
X. If number altogether separates the things that are numbered, not only will the number of natures separate the natures, but the number of properties will also altogether separate them. How then, since they acknowledge two properties, will they themselves not be subject to the cause of division?
XI. If, according to the divine Gregory, the economy concerning the Savior is the reverse of that of the Trinity—and we confess three hypostases but one nature in the theology—how shall we not concede two natures but one hypostasis in the economy concerning the Savior? Since if it is the reverse, there is a conversion of the whole according to the whole.
XII. If "other and other" is the pronoun of hypostases according to the same Theologian, while "otherwise and otherwise" is the pronoun of natures; and the former is always for the theology, then the latter is always for the economy; but if the latter is always for the economy, then the natures are always, since their pronouns are also always.
XIII. If it is the same thing to say "other" and to say "another nature," and the former is always true in the divinity of the Savior and his humanity, then the latter must necessarily be true always in the same.
XIV. If single nature is not the same as composite nature, and the single nature of the Word signifies one sole nature,
A then the composite nature according to the natures of Christ will not signify one nature. But if the simple and the composite signify one nature according to them, let them state the difference between the Christ-nature, composite according to them, and the simple nature of the Word.
XV. Of nouns and verbs, some possess a plural pronunciation but a singular meaning, as Thebes B and Athens and "the camps"; others, on the contrary, have a singular pronunciation but a plural meaning, as "chorus," "populus" (people), "army," "city." Let them say, then, how one composite nature is spoken of by them. If it is as the twofold and double nature is spoken of among the Fathers, there is no place for adding the term "one" to the composite nature, since it is not applied to the "double" either; furthermore, their battle against the "two natures" is futile, for to a singular meaning they themselves have assigned a plural concept. But if they desire the meaning to be singular, just as the appellation is singular, then the simple and incomposite nature signifies the same thing for them, and the term "composite" is superfluous for them, for the same notion is given through the simple as through the composite nature. C If, however, neither of these things mentioned be intended, then they are inventing a confused "one nature" out of two natures, such as the nature of mules has been imagined to be, and such as is the monstrosity of multiform animals described among the Gentiles.
XVI. If saying "one nature of the Word incarnate" is contrary to saying "two natures united," then of the two alternatives, one is necessary: either this flesh is not a nature, nor does it have the nature of flesh, or, existing, it is not said to be what it is. Let the wise men choose, therefore, which of these impieties they prefer: that this nature is not flesh, or that flesh is not called a nature.
XVII. "One nature of the Word incarnate" has a triple meaning. For it might be said D by way of reversal—as for instance, that "incarnate" is again "one nature," naked of a body, just as a bronze statue has one nature of bronze, having been shaped—or by way of a change of substance, as if one were to say "one nature of the Word turned into flesh," just as if someone were to say that the nature of water has been turned to stone; or [it is said] because the one nature of the Word is considered not only in itself, but with flesh. If they say this according to the first notions, they are refuted of impiety directly by that fact; for with Apollinarius and Eutyches they destroy the mystery of the incarnation. But if they say it according to the final meaning, how is the nature of the Word with flesh, by nature, one with the nature of the flesh which is with the Word, and how, if it is not one by nature, will it be called "one nature"?
XVIII. Those things which are properly opposed to one another, the whole
negation opposes to the whole affirmation; just as to the affirmation which says: "Paul is an apostle," the negation is opposed which says: "Paul is not an apostle." Thus, therefore, to the two natures, one nature is opposed. For if Christ is one nature, he is not two; and if he is two, he is not one. But if, while saying "one," they add something else, it is no longer stated by them contradictorily, but differently and by way of paraphrase; and to them the confession of the two natures consists of a name and a definition: from the name of the nature of the Word, and from the definition of the flesh animated by a rational and intelligent soul—for this is the definition of human nature. How, therefore, while stating the definition of the nature, do they refuse its appellation? Or how, while conceding the naming of both natures, do they repudiate the number? Let them respond, those who can neither understand what is consistent with them nor what is repugnant. B
XIX. A simple nature is not of the same substance as a composite one; if, however, the nature of the Father is simple, but the nature of Christ is composite, then the nature of Christ is not of the same substance as the nature of the Father. Yet they pretend that Christ is *homousios* to the Father, and that the same is *homousios* to us. Let them say, therefore, if it is possible for the one, as they say, composite nature of Christ to be *homousios* to the Father in its entirety, and again to be *homousios* to us in its entirety, and if this does not also bring us back to the consubstantiality of the Father. But if they say that the one nature of Christ is not *homousios* to the Father and to us in its entirety—that is, [not] of the same substance—it remains that one half of the nature is *homousios* to the Father, and half to us; and what is this other than dividing that which they themselves call the one nature of Christ into a nature of the same substance and a nature of different substance, and into the parts that complete for them the one composite nature of Christ? It is, moreover, the impiety of Apollinarius and the insanity of Arius to deny perfection in the divinity of Christ and in his humanity. C
XX. If God and man, even according to them, is called one Christ even after the union, while his nature is both; how is Christ not two natures after the union, since God and man are never the same by nature, nor is the same nature ever one by which he is God and [also] by which he is man?
XXI. If some say that Christ is *homousios* and *homousios* after the union, referring this to different things—that is, to the Father and to us—but the Father and we are in no way *homousioi*, then what is *homousios* to us will never be *homousios* to the *homousion* of the Father. But if things that are *homousia* are [things] of one nature and are so called, and yet according to them the divinity is not *homousios* to the humanity, but things that are of different substance are of a different nature, and things that are other according to nature will clearly be other natures as well. D
XXII. Properties are not properties of themselves, but of some things; if, however, there are two even according to them after the union
they are certainly two properties. They say, however, that these are natural properties; let them say, then, if they are not two natural properties. If they profess two natural properties also after the union, then there will always be two natures, since there are also two natural properties of these.
XXIII. A difference is necessarily a difference of things that differ; for the constituent differences distinguish those things that differ according to substance. Let them say, therefore, whether those who speak of a difference between divinity and humanity do not also speak of a natural difference after the union. But if they speak of a natural difference, they necessarily speak of a B difference of natures. If this is so, they also speak of two natures differing even after the union, since two natures are necessarily two natures by way of a natural difference.
XXIV. If, according to the truth and the holy Fathers, substance has this difference from hypostasis, which the common has from the particular, the one nature of the Word is not called one nature with the flesh, but with the Father; for with Him He has the unity and identity of nature. If, however, He is and is called one nature with the Father, it becomes manifest that He is never called one nature with the flesh. If the Word is not called one nature C with the flesh, it is clear that neither will the flesh be called one nature with the Word. If, moreover, neither flesh with Word nor Word with flesh is called one nature, and between one and two there is no middle ground, it is manifest that the negation of one nature brings with it by consequence the confession of two natures.
XXV. If the hypostasis of the Word distinguishes its property from the Father, and by this distinguishing property from the Father, which is the hypostasis, He is other than the Father; but he is not distinguished from the flesh by this distinguishing property, how then will the Word be other than the flesh, or how as a hypostasis will He be separated from it? If, however, He is not distinguished D from the flesh by this property, He must be distinguished by another natural property, which, while joining Him to the Father, distinguishes Him from the flesh. From these things, therefore, it is clear how we speak of two natures in Christ, but one hypostasis: because by the property that distinguishes Him from the Father He is joined to the flesh, just as, indeed, by the natural property joining Him with the Father, He has a difference from the flesh. And just as there is one nature with the Father because of the same unity of nature, so also there is not one nature with the flesh because of the natural and immutable property of this [nature] in the union with the Word.
XXVI. If all things of the same substance are united by the reason of nature, and for this reason are called one nature, while those of different substance are, by their nature, suited to be united by union and not by nature—and union is not the same as nature—then that which is produced from both is not the same. If, however, those things which nature joins are called one nature, those joined by union will be said to be one by hypostasis, yet not by nature and substance.
A XXVII. It is commonly conceded by all that the name "human" declares nature, but "Paul" or "Peter" declares the hypostasis. According to the blessed Cyril, the name "Christ" has neither the force of a definition, nor does it declare the substance of anyone, as "human" and "horse" and "ox" and each of those contained under the same species do. Therefore, to speak of a human simply is not the same as to speak of Christ; how, then, do you transfer the example of the human, which name signifies nature, to the person of Christ, when the name of Christ, according to the doctor, does not declare nature, but hypostasis? If, however, you say that they take not a human simply, but someone—who is a hypostasis—for the sake of the argument of unity, notice that he also describes Christ himself by the account in the two goats. Just as, therefore, here he does not refer the example to the hypostases of the goats, but has the reference to the difference between the living and the sacrificed; so also here, the image of "some human" is taken not for the destruction of the natures, but for the unity of the person. That "some human" is also among the same Fathers [spoken of as] from two and [as] two natures, insofar as he is soul and body, can be proven from their writings in many places.
XXVIII. One must understand the statement that Christ is from two natures as either from principles or as from the united parts themselves. If as from principles, his principles will be from hypostases rather than from natures. For his principles according to divinity are the Father, and according to humanity, the mother. But it is manifest that he who is from these as from causes is not the same, for he is not the Father, nor is he the mother. If, however, it is understood as from parts, how are the parts not in the whole? Or how is the whole not in the parts? For if neither the whole is in the parts, nor the parts in the whole, it remains, as was said before, that either these things do not exist at all, or the divinity and humanity of Christ are seen in something other than Christ, and Christ is seen in others, and not in his divinity and humanity. But this destroys not only his humanity, but the very existence of the divinity of the Word itself. C
XXIX. Quantity in things consists not only of a defined number, such as two, or three, or four, and so on, but also of an undefined number, such as many, few, more, fewer, and the like; and from analogy, or proportion, such as greater, less, equal, relative to something; and from the indicative word, such as this, and that, and these, and other, and diverse; or from order, such as before this, and after that, and from the beginning and afterwards, and from other modes as well, as is reasonable. If, therefore, those [adversaries] know how to divide the things declared by all the modes that declare things, their absurdity is refuted by that very fact; for they themselves also say "one and one," and "indefinite natures and properties," and "this and that," and "another and another," and "different and different," and "greater and less," and "equal," and "relative to something," and "before this," and "after that." If, however,
they do not posit A all the modes, but only the specific number—and especially when they posit the division of the dyad—their logic will be a matter of drawing lots. Since they should explain why it is that, while the quantity of the underlying things is declared in many ways, the number of two alone casts upon them that dreaded notion of division, which they fear so much, when in reality and truth it is otherwise. For "two," taken together, reveals the things being numbered—not separated—more through the cohesive power of this number than does the "one," or the one dissolved and considered by itself.
XXX. If all composition is expressed singularly, and excludes number from those things which are composed, it is necessary that one of two things must be the case: either our name and the whole man is not composite, or the number is not predicated of the body and the whole man according to them. Let them tell us, therefore, whether such scriptural B expressions do not signify to us a number of composite things: "He placed each of the members in the body," and "Many members, but one body," and "They have numbered all my bones," and "They pierced my hands and feet," and "All his internal parts were poured out." Moreover, the Apostle counts three in both parts of man: soul, body, and spirit, which are fermented according to the parable of the Savior into three measures of flour. And again: "Glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's." And again concerning the same: "These are contrary to one another." Let them say, then, whether these things that are counted and are contrary to one another are not species of number. Let them also say who are the two on the bed and at the mill, of which one is taken and one is left. Furthermore, let them say whether the Lord does not understand man to be two things—namely, body and soul—of which those who plot against him can indeed kill the body, but the soul cannot be killed by such plots, C yet both perish in Gehenna if they are judged worthy of destruction. For if we say that the continuous nature of time is more unified, and later is divided by the Lord into twelve hours; or again, as He Himself said, that the whole law depends on these two commandments, the love of God and the love of neighbor, perhaps the Lord Himself will not escape with us the charge of division, having divided the day into twelve hours and the whole law into two general commandments. And, in short, to the one who reads the Scripture and the Fathers with diligence, it is possible to find a varied and manifold use of number in things simple and composite, united and divided, and in things that subsist and things considered by thought, and to proceed even unto those that are entirely without substance. D And let us not be ignorant of this: that they pretend to the simpler folk that there is some difference in saying "two," "both," "the two," "in both," and "through both." For all these, and things of such a kind, are the same as one another, and nothing else.
found in common usage, and others among the more elegant. Just as many other things of this kind are declared by many parts of speech. Therefore, the divine Apostle varies the use of these in the same matters when he says: *Who made both one*; and again: *That he might form in himself the two*; and the things that follow, *and might reconcile both*. So that it is most true that neither in divine Scripture, nor in the holy Fathers do these create a different sense in a different meaning, but rather, in whatever one of these is found, the same thing is declared by the different meaning of all of them. But we, having given thanks to God for the things we have said thus far, let us put an end here to the number of questions. For it was not our purpose to write books, but to hand down aids to the more studious, and the seeds of a more perfect B treatment of these matters, so that those wise men who do not doubt everything may know that there are other things which they themselves deserve to have questioned by us more thoroughly.
OF THE SAME LEONTIUS: SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS OBJECTED BY SEVERUS
C The things which were previously collected by us according to true doctrine from the holy Fathers against the followers of Nestorius and Eutyches are sufficient, by the grace of God, for the absolute and perfect refutation of the empty arguments of the knowledge falsely so called. But because the inventors of evils, as the Apostle says, have failed in searching out searches, so that to many they seem to be using now certain new arguments, and such as are not contained in our refutations hitherto; necessarily, as you who love according to God have exhorted, we have now set down things which are indeed contained in those former ones, but were D not delicately examined: so that when you have these, besides those superior arguments against the knowledge falsely so called—which, in my opinion, are not ignoble—you may defend the truth. I shall proceed, however, to the solutions in the order in which the doubts have been constructed, and I shall expedite and direct them with greater art of discourse.
Opposition of the Acephalus. When the Word assumed nature
did he assume the nature which we behold in the species, or the nature which is in the A individual? Orthodox. For what other thing do you suppose this to be than that? Aceph. I mean that we behold one in the multitude, and the other in the single number. Orth. But you have not answered that which I asked; for the question is not whether we behold this in a multitude and in unity—for that is conceded—but whether this is that, and that is this, or whether it is another thing. For the fact that it is beheld in one or in many makes that in which it exists appear as many or one; it does not cause the nature itself to appear one or many. Just as, indeed, is the case with whiteness and that which is whitened, whether there be one or more things in which whiteness B is beheld. That these things are so, is evident from the fact that the definition of the nature is the same, rendered for both the multitude and the one; for the definition which you would render regarding nature simply, this same one will be rendered to you regarding the nature that is beheld in some individual. Nor does it cause the one to be many, because many participate in it; nor does it cause the many to be one, even if one should participate in them, if the one who participates in it is composed of diverse things. Aceph. What nature, then, did he assume? Orth. Assuredly, yet it is the one that is the same in kind. Aceph. But what is the hypostasis besides this? Orth. That the participating in it makes another, but not a different thing. Aceph. Is there, then, no other from another? Orth. Not altogether, as long as it is neither consubstantial nor C separated from that which essentially subsists of itself and is composite; for these things make the hypostases. Aceph. Was the humanity of Christ, then, not dividing with distinguishing properties the proper humanity of Christ himself from the common one? Orth. Yes, indeed, but this is not with respect to the Word, but with respect to the genus of men from which it was composed according to the body. Since the Word himself is separated by distinguishing properties from the common essence of the divinity, as Son and Word, he is not by these same properties separated D from his own humanity; but rather, by these he is separated from the Father and the Spirit, while by those others he is separated from his Mother and from men, by properties that distinguish the extremes. He admits communion and union with himself, being united and divided by the consubstantiality of the extremes and the diversity of the parts, and he makes the distinction in a way contrary to the extremes. For there—namely, in the mystery of the Trinity—he unites the same substance and distinguishes the diverse person; but here, on the contrary—namely, in the mystery of the incarnation—he separates the diversity of substance and couples the same person. Aceph. But you would never say that, while hypostasis signifies that which is divided and existing by itself—
A And the number, and most especially that of the two, signifies something else besides this. For every number is in quantity, but unity alone is without quantity. But if the unit is without quantity, and for this reason is indivisible by the two, then also of every number is the quantity and divided state.
Orthod. Since, therefore, you have remembered the number and its properties, it is necessary to say that number is spoken of in two ways: one simply and by itself, and the other considered in relation and in things—just as white, whiteness, and that which has been whitened. The nature of number itself, therefore, neither couples nor divides, for it does not have subject things; but as has been said above (3) and below in relation to the state of that which is ascending and descending; for that which is spoken of simply is neither, because it receives both: and it is called "above" by looking to the "below," and "below" by looking to the "above"—yet it is defined by the relation of that which is ascending or descending. Thus also the number itself, by itself, neither divides nor couples, but receives both through a certain relation; for example, the number two, the four, and so on. For if you consider the units themselves from which the number consists, it is divided into them; but if you look at the group of these, it is coupled from them; for two and two, by way of example, compose the number four, and the number four is divided into two and two. Wherefore nothing is truer than that the nature of number has nothing defined, neither divided nor united, but that this subsists in the C interconnection and composition of things. Therefore, it is unlearned to establish that the division of things necessarily follows the nature of number, and not rather that the number imposes a sign on the nature of things—whether they are united or divided—declaring the quantity of the subject things, and not that the number itself divides and couples them; to say nothing of the fact that those who treat these things, referring them to quantity, say that one quantity is continuous and another discrete; and that one quantity consists of parts having position, and another of those not having it. For we speak of ten cubits of continuous, for example, wood, not dividing the unity that is in the ten-cubit-long wood along with the number. And again, when we speak of ten modii, we know these to be in division. Thus, therefore, it is with other things also.
If, therefore, number is imposed upon natures, it does not principally constitute their quantity, but their diversity of kind; as when we speak of the natures of horse and man and ox as three, we do not signify their division according to quantity, but their D diversity according to species. But when we speak of three men, if it should happen, Peter and Paul and John, we signify rather their division according to quantity, and that they are so many, just as in the Holy Trinity. For we confess three hypostases, but we proclaim one nature and substance of these, not indeed acknowledging any one of them not to be substance, not [in the sense of] limiting…
the number of substances, because in this way we know that a diversity of substances is simultaneously introduced. Which indeed the Arians, knowing, applied the name of substances to the hypostases that are in the divine substance, connecting in this way a diversity of substance. Thus also in the economy, when we say two natures, we declare their diversity, not their division, excluding thence a count of hypostases, although they are not without subsistent being; just as there we excluded a count of substances. Even though no divine hypostasis is without substance, just as neither here is either nature without subsistent being, knowing well that in things separated by hypostasis and substance—like this horse, this ox, and this man—nature declares not division but difference, just as the hypostasis also declares the division, and not what pertains to the subject; B since indeed in those things which are not discerned by themselves, but are at once both within and together with one another, nature will declare not the separated, but the differing, whether in theology, that is, in the Trinity, or in the economy, that is, in the mystery of the incarnation, or in every thing.
Aceph. Plainly, hypostasis and substance, or nature, in theology are not the same; in the economy, however, they are the same among themselves. For if the newness of the mystery has innovated the natures, according to the divine Gregory, it will innovate, I suppose, the appellations also, so that according to him, the account and definition of the one may be adapted to both.
Orth. This, indeed, I know not what excess of madness it does not surpass. For the definitions of things are predicated synonymously regarding those that are of the same genus C and those that are of the same species, as those skilled in such things demonstrate. For if, defining substance simply, we say it declares the essence of something, that name of substance will be common to all things with which it is shared, although there may be a vast difference among substances; for we say that substance exists in God, and angel, and man, and animal, and tree, and the definition of substance is rendered common to all, declaring that these exist, but not declaring what these are or in what manner. For these things are declared by the definitions particular to each thing. That this is so, the categories make manifest, being predicated synonymously of the genera ordered under one another; for the genera and the differences are predicated of the species and of the individuals; for they participate in substance D and animal, the corporeal and the incorporeal, the rational and the irrational, the sensible and the intellective, in like manner—not this one more and that one less, but similarly and commonly, and, to speak once for all, they participate definitively. Furthermore, the demonstration called "circular" is rejected and disapproved by those who teach the art of demonstrating; for he who uses this demonstration acts similarly as if someone should make a statement, and thereafter produce himself as a witness to the statement, and demand that it be held as trustworthy because he himself said it. If, therefore, [it is used] not from universal accounts definitionaly, but circular, circular...
and of definitions, of substance and of hypostasis, that is, of person and of nature, and concerning the life-giving and holy Trinity, and concerning the great Word of God, the one of the Trinity of the economy, the proofs which for the Fathers proceeded, and now proceed, the discourse would be arbitrary and not demonstrative. For let someone explain the Word, according to which hypostasis and substance, that is, nature and person, in theology define and manifest the common or the particular, but it does not befit [them] to hold [it] thus in the economy. For indeed, to say that because of the new and strange mystery, these are defined otherwise in theology and otherwise in the economy, is, first of all, [to be] ignorant of the fact that the most mysterious of all mysteries is God Himself, who is veiled even from the holy Seraphim, to whom, as the great Gregory said, the mysteries that are here look. Concerning whom every discourse would justly be silent, and every agitation of the mind would cease, as it advances toward what is beyond reason and mind; but the manifest mystery of the hidden things of God, namely the incarnation, is so much more manifest than that of the Trinity, as that which was above nature has advanced into the manifestation of nature. But is the definition of hypostasis and substance alone changed in the economy? Or is it that every voice, and every name, and every word [is changed]? And what is this arbitrariness of this one, and not of all? But it does not have this by nature; and therefore neither by discourse, as the great Basil said.
C Acephalous. In theology, all the Fathers unanimously declared that hypostasis differs clearly from substance, that is, person from nature, for the same reason that the particular differs from the common; but in the incarnation, this rule is no longer kept by them, but they often take hypostases for natures, and conversely, natures for hypostases, so that by this the same thing is shown for both. For the blessed Cyril says: "If anyone divides the hypostases." And again: "The natures remained unconfused, that is, the hypostases." And the great and immortal Athanasius affirms that there are two persons in Christ. The Fathers would never have done this, unless they had known that the definitions of these names were being changed in the economy.
Orthodox. But I would not say that the definitions of the names are changed, but rather I would say they have used these names for different things; for the use of names, which occurs in many ways, is one thing, but what is signified properly and definitely by these same names is another. Since the Divine Scriptures, and the holy Fathers, and common custom use names also according to metaphor, and homonymy, and transposition, and other ways, they do not, however, provide a common definition of these; indeed, the great Apostle calls...
the parts of a man the outer and inner man; speaking thus, he does not indeed posit the definition of the whole man upon the part, A but rather attributes each part to the designation of the whole, just as inversely it is customary to call the whole by the part. Similarly, this is the case in other divine Scriptures, as is clear to all. Therefore, according to this, it is customary for the Fathers to call each nature a hypostasis or person, not only in the mystery of the Economy, but also in that of Theology. For this reason, some of them have said that man himself consists of two hypostases, yet we do not think they meant that they share the nature, or that they were speaking of the definition of a hypostasis, that is, a person. And all, while establishing that the Lord is one and the same, have denied of Him the "one and another" — which is the proper characteristic of a hypostasis strictly so called — regarding the very name of hypostasis, not, however, taking the nature to share in the definition B of the hypostasis. When, therefore, the Word proceeds through names simply and authoritatively, nothing prevents the indifferent use of names; but when the discussion is about a dogma and there is an inquiry, then we are compelled, having silenced homonymies, to take the proper meanings from the definitions themselves, so that the polished truth of the realities themselves may in no way be harmed by the indifferent use of names.
Aceph. Simple things are not composite, and for this reason the nature of the composite does not admit the definition of simplicity. If this is so, it is a calumny against those who say that Christ has one composite nature to suppose that any among them call it simple and not composite.
Orth. The nature of the composite C is not the same as the nature of the things which are put together. For just as the nature of a bond is not the same as the nature of the things which are bound — rather, the nature of the bond is one thing, if we suppose it is called a female or a male, and the nature of the bound wood, for example, or vessels to which the bond is applied is another — so too the nature of the composite and of the union is not the same as that of the composite and united things. For composition and union relate either to a disposition or to a substance, and occur either by way of apposition, or mixture, or collection, or coagmentation, or agglutination, or confusion, or immission, D or I know not what other different natures of unions are said to exist, which refer "union" under one species. But the nature of the things which are united or composite, or in whatever way they are fitted together, receives a different definition of things, and this is proper to each one of the united things, unless by chance confusion has happened to the united things. How, then, do you call Christ one nature, and that composite? For it is either that of the composition, or of the things composed, or of that which resulted from both. But if you call this composition the one nature of Christ, you will provide the account of the union, not the definition of the united things. But if you speak of the things composed according to the totality of Christ, there will be two, and not one, provided that neither has migrated into the nature and property of the other but persists even in the indifference of names...
A in the union, keeping the difference between them. But if you call it a resultant, it is most fitting that this be called not the nature of Christ, but rather his hypostasis; since if the nature of Christ is not the same by nature as the Father, as it is by nature as the Mother, nor is it the same by nature as the Mother, as it is by nature as the Father, so that it might be consubstantial—how then do you call Christ one nature, and a composite one at that, when the title of Christ signifies not a nature, but the hypostasis around which the natures are viewed and in which the person is delimited? And how might we pass over that which is the truly novel offspring of this new wisdom?
Aceph. Everything, he says, that has things as if it were a single nature is called one nature, as for instance one sun and one heaven; and because of this, there is one nature of the sun and the heaven and things of that sort.
Ortho. But have you been ignorant, O best of men, that the nature of the sun is the same as that of the stars? And that the heaven is the same as the other heavens? Just as radiance, air, and water, and the combinations of these, have their commonality in such a nature; but the being of this or that is signified in the proper and delimited definition of the hypostasis. For if anyone defines heaven thus, as "the circumference outside the universe," or "the common complex of things intelligible and sensible," you have declared not its substance, but its hypostasis. Or if you define the sun as "the star shining by day," or "having the middle region among the planets," you have again declared the hypostasis of the sun, and not its nature; for the nature of each hypostasis is apprehended by being rendered according to a common definition: such as that it is fiery, or airy, or earthy, or aquatic, or rational, or irrational, or living, or non-living, or sensible, or intelligible. C For these essence-making properties disclose the nature of the underlying subject, to which if what properly distinguishes each one is added, it characterizes the hypostasis of that thing. Therefore, your premise is false that every singular thing has a singular nature. For on the contrary, it has a common nature according to the same species, but a proper hypostasis, which separates its own proper [characteristics] from the common through those marks and properties that have the power to separate. For just as Paul and Peter are not names of a nature, but of a hypostasis, so too the sun and the moon, and the daystar, and heaven; and this D winged thing, and the terrestrial, and the aquatic, as if making it proper, is divided and separated by the property of the hypostasis from the commonality of the substance.
Aceph. We know that many of the holy Fathers, both before the Nicene Council and after it, opposed certain expressions of earlier holy Fathers because the heresies had cleverly and maliciously made use of some of their words and significations. For this reason, we think that the blessed Cyril did not use certain words of the Fathers, and especially that of the two natures
A seeing that Nestorius B everywhere laid hold of these for the sake of division, and misused the authority of the ancients. And now we too, being wary, define that Christ is from two natures, yet we do not define him as existing in two natures.
Orth. This defense and excuse is neither good nor fitting; nay, it is a reverence utterly devoid of all reverence, to reject the very words of divine authors on account of those who have maliciously used the words of the theologians. For heretics have abused not only the words of the Fathers, but the Scriptures themselves, as it seemed good to them; otherwise, according to your rule, it would be permissible to imitate Marcion and strike out many things that are in the Scriptures. But it is not right to do this in divine Scripture, nor in the case of the B famous Fathers; rather, it is most fitting to adhere to their mind, and likewise to their sacred words, and to purge away the perverse expositions of the heretics, and to show that the Fathers understood those same significations in one way, and the heretics in another. For every word receives shifts into the contrary and into perverse interpretations. Thus we find the great Athanasius defending Dionysius, and the blessed Cyril himself not once excusing words, nay, even adding to them, as C seemed good to Nestorius. And not only this, but in many, or rather in all his books, he confesses two natures. But if this holds good entirely, that those who come after should avoid certain words of the famous men who preceded them, then let it be permissible for us, because Eutyches and his followers have misused the word "one incarnate nature," to avoid it; or, if we do not avoid it, let it be permissible to approve of those who say that Christ exists in two natures. For if heresies had proceeded only as far as the blessed Cyril and then ceased, and the most famous of heretics, Eutyches, had not risen and been detected, perhaps this which you say would have to be done by us. But if D there were heretics after Cyril, let it be in the power of their successors to say again certain things which, as you say, some ancients did not say, especially after these things have been defined in synods. For the resolution of every doubt about which both parties have doubted, according to the ecclesiastical canons, is the judgment of synods; and he who opposes the synods is found to be seditious no longer against certain persons, but against the whole of Christianity. But this shall not happen to us, who have preferred truth to contention.
Aceph. We too contemplate the natures only by thought; having therefore united them, we finally say that both are one nature, and that this is and is called composite. For by the same reasoning by which you, taking the hypostases in thought and uniting them, compose them into one hypostasis, by that same reasoning the natures for us, when composed into one nature, do not admit of confusion, but decline division and manifest the union. But if we are accused of confusion because of the composite nature, you do not escape this accusation yourselves.
For by whatever arguments you gather the hypostases into one A hypostasis and prove them to be immutable, those arguments are sufficient for us to compose natures into one nature, and to preserve what is united in such a composition without mutation. Orth. The Fathers and true doctrine have stated that the concept (ἐπίνοια) is twofold. For one kind is as it were a certain notion and reflection, which develops and explains the universal and indistinct contemplation and knowledge of things; so that what indeed appears simple to the senses, is found to be manifold and varied through the activity of the mind. The other is a fiction of the mind, occurring through a combination of sensation and imagination, assembling from things that are, those that are not at all, yet appear to be. Such is the B fabulous construction of Hippocentaurs, Sirens, and others of this kind; for it takes parts from wholes, and from parts forms something else, with great liberty and ease, fashioning in the mind and in thought things that are in no way observed in hypostasis and substance, and then, being shaped by materials, producing images.
By which contemplation of these concepts, therefore, O admirable one, do you take the two natures? If by the first, you will define Christ as being a gathering of concepts, and not a conjunction of natures. For this is the nature of those things which we contemplate by concept alone. But if you take the concept in the second way, you have filled your mind not with things or contemplations, but with false and empty fictions; and surely this will differ in no way from idolatry, since our venerable Fathers did not determine that natures are by concept, but explained their division according to the first kind of concept. For when they say that natures differ by concepts, names are divided at the same time; C as if to say, they are divided by concept for the sake of distinguishing them from division according to act; which they banished as far as possible, declaring that there are natures and that they are called such in act; but they accepted the division of these according to concept, positing as divided by reason those things which are not divided in reality, because of the difference and property of those things which are united, even after the union, immutably.
How then do you know the natures by concept alone, while they are known by act? How do you accept these by concept, and not preserve them even by this concept? But rather, I know not how, you mix and confuse them into one nature by concept or by act? Although the concept, both in those things that are in themselves and in those that are not, after their complication and union, knows and confesses these things. Since even if confusion has occurred regarding them, that concept knows from what things they are to be known and distinguished. Therefore, to know the natures by concept alone makes them not to be, D and to have no substance, or to be confused and obliterated. But after the union, not even to grant them this (that is, that they are divided by concept), renders them more
devoid of substance and more corrupted than those that are confused.
A Whence, and from whom, did you receive the idea of composing Christ out of hypostases, seeing that hypostases, as we have already said, declare that which is divided and that which exists by itself? When did you ever recognize the natures as divided and existing by themselves, so that, by joining them together, you might dogmatize that He consists of hypostases? It is not right to say this even before the union, if you dare not say that the man was formed first and that God subsequently entered into him; nor, again, is it pious to suppose that the same thing is divided by concept and divided by energy, that is, by act. For whatever is predicated by way of concept will not necessarily be predicated of the things subject to that concept. B And for this reason, while the division according to act implies and presupposes hypostases, the division according to concept does not admit of a number of hypostases. For just as the "greater" according to concept, when spoken of the Father and the Son by reason of the nature of the Cause, does not imply "greater" by nature, so that which is divided according to concept never implies division according to act, and therefore implies no hypostases.
Who among the truly serious, even those who shun laughter, would not pour out a wide peal of laughter at you, or rather, would not put on mournful sackcloth and deep night, considering your great folly, not to mention your impiety? For since things that are together by nature and time do not admit of "before" and "after," and since the blessed Cyril did not say "after the union" in such a sense, are you not ashamed C to say this? For if there is no union or things united in respect of those things which are together—when they are taken not as things, but as united things—where is the existence of the one, namely the humanity, before the union, such that you might hand down that "after" this as a dogma? When did the union, once it had taken place, cease, so that some other effect of it might be thought to exist, not in the union itself, but after it, and apart from those things of which it consists? For the union is not like the nature of things that have come to be and no longer are, such as they claim the nature of time to be. And who has caused that which has come to be to cease? And why?
Consider what follows, D unless perhaps it began from the union and ended in confusion—which, while you wish to say it, you labor to bring forth, but do not dare to cast off the burden from your mind, I know not whether because of the intolerableness of the impiety, or because you cannot escape being refuted. For the matter stands thus: to say and to think the one is impious; to say and to think the other is right and holy. Or rather, to think what is pious is just, and to confess it is to be saved, according to the divine Apostle. Since, therefore, we profess not a union of hypostases, but of natures, how do you conclude that what is not conceded is conceded? What license of speech, to speak of confusion, and—
A of the unconfused; for if B according to them one nature makes the two into one, and this very thing is known to produce confusion, let them say what is the difference between confusion and the unconfused? For they do something similar to the persons and hypostases of Nestorius; they set them as divided, and then say they do not divide. For what else would one who divides in act ever do? But if, according to them, neither do [their] hypostases introduce division, nor does the one nature, according to these, introduce confusion, let someone say what other result of division or confusion they wish there to be. And whatever one who connects yet does not confuse, or one who preserves the property of the other yet does not divide, would piously offer—how, as they avoid the two natures, regarding the number of two as of necessity introducing division, do they not shrink from speaking of two properties? Or what is the logic, since a contradiction is never true at the same time, as dialecticians demonstrate, that you use them as if they were saying something else and contrary, defending "one nature" against those who speak of "two"? For either it is the same as the two, and the war you wage against them is in vain; or it is not the same, but you take "one" as contradicting the "two," and the "incarnate" is added in vain. But if it signifies neither "one" simply, nor "two" joined, and between "one" and "two" there is no middle, you yourselves see what is left; for surely a double or a half, or a third, or whatever superparticular ratio falls between one and two, this will be declared to you by the addition of the word "incarnate"; and division will certainly follow for you alongside the "one," and they take something other along with it.
But these things are sufficient. But how and by what C reason the Fathers—when the Word of God and the humanity in Him have perfection and nothing is lacking to them—take not hypostases but substances for the concurrence of the united, when neither of them is without subsistence, i.e., without hypostasis: this has been most fully set forth, God helping, in the first chapter of those things recently called into doubt, and thereafter, and in the first book of our treatise against the Enantiodocetes (that is, the authors of the contrary fiction). Therefore, we ask to be excused from repeating and iterating the same things.
Aceph. Since our constitution and that of things is twofold, D consisting of the common and the particular, as is manifest to all—for we all participate in the commonness of substance, and by the particular reason of hypostasis we are what we are called—what, of the common or the particular, is lacking to either nature of those things which are assumed for the union of Christ? For if nothing is lacking, it is more true to speak of a union of natures than of hypostases: from which it follows, that either those who speak of two natures after the union must also speak of two hypostases; or, if they avoid the number of hypostases, for the same reason of the communication of idioms, they must yield also to those who say that one nature has been made out of two. But if those who say this are accused of introducing confusion, how are those not also to be accused, who [say] one hypostasis out of the
A hypostases?
Orth. But you are ignorant, O wise men, that the definition of nature is one thing, and the account of the economy—that is, of the incarnation—is another. Hence, on the one hand, you speak as if concerning natures that are entirely divided, separating the natures by the hypostases; and on the other, you dogmatize as if, from things entirely confused, one nature of flesh and divinity has come to be. If, therefore, there was ever a time when these were not united, let one consider them as they are, as entirely separated. But if we know the union of the Word of God was concomitant with the existence of the humanity, how will things which were never separated from one another admit the account of things that are entirely divided? By thought, therefore, one might divide these, but not by sense and act, and this after the union, not before they are joined. For in general, to accept a division before a union is absurd, or at any rate to accept it before the other entity exists is not permitted; since it is not even permitted to accept a privation before the habit, and much less the habit before the [things] in which the habit is discerned. For such things are not said simply, but with reference to something, and at some time, and in some manner: for instance, first, that the thing which is by nature apt to receive the privation exists; then, that it suffers the privation at the time in which it was able to have [the habit]; then, if it is in the place in which it is naturally adapted [to have it], and as it is adapted. For if someone does not have something, it does not immediately follow that he is deprived of it; but [he is] that which is by nature adapted to fly, for example, and in this time—for not before it is endowed with wings—and as it is adapted by nature—for not without those [things] without which it is not—and in this place; for it is naturally adapted to fly in the air and not in the waters.
B Thus, therefore, also in the case of division; for it is not conceived of prior to the things in which it is considered, nor indeed prior to the union itself, but when the things [exist]. And after their union, and as is natural—that is, by thought and not by act—the humanity [when] united is separated from the divinity. But by the division that is according to thought, which is not prior to the things nor prior to their union, but is considered within them on account of immutability, the consequences which follow from division according to act will in no way follow. For otherwise the same thing would be divided in thought and divided in act, which is absurd. Nor, indeed, will there be any division according to thought at all if the things under consideration do not exist in act, even though these may be together and in the same [place].
D If, therefore, one should subject the united things to the account of the union, he will see that whatever things being perfect are taken for the constitution of something, these remaining perfect become parts of the whole constituted from such parts, so that the things are considered first, then their union, then the distinction according to consideration; for, since the mind cannot consider three things at once, it exercises its operation on things which are [actually] simultaneous in part. On account of this, in the mode of union, it follows according to act that the humanity was separated from the divinity, and Christ was not God and man.
A Not that these things are contrary to one another—that is, nature to union—but that they are different, and around the same one and of the same one; yet they are not the same thing, nor is the rationale of these things common. This, however, they themselves also confess, since, according to them, one nature is said to exist out of two on account of the union, even if they do not understand the confusion that follows from it.
Therefore, in the rationale of the divine nature, they themselves will also concede that the union has something incommunicable; B otherwise, it will not be a condescension of charity, but a natural conjunction or coupling of the High with the low, that is, of divinity with humanity (11). And who is so ignorant of the divine height, or so little considers the human lowliness, as to think that these natures receive communion and union with one another by a natural propensity, when they are so far removed from blending? For my part, I am so far from saying that the Word of God has union with our nature by the definition of nature, that I will not even venture to say that the union of the human soul with the body happens naturally without divine power. And what do I say of the human soul, when I would not even say that the mixing and action of the elements happens simply and solely in this way by nature, but rather that they are brought into order and harmony by a divine reason, which is more excellent and powerful than nature? Since, therefore, the mode of the union, C and not the rationale of the nature, contains the great mystery of godliness, let us omit considering the nature of the united things and their perfection. For these are not of the present question; for that belongs to theology, while this belongs to physical contemplation. And that will be more appropriately considered against the Arians; but this, against those who utterly deny the assumption of our nature: and that demonstrates how the nature of the Word, when united, stands in relation to the Father; but this declares how our nature, when united, stands in relation to us, but not how its parts stand in comparison with Him. These things, I say, being omitted, let us examine the mode of the union, and what is accomplished by it.
There are, therefore, three D opinions on the union of the natures in Christ that have been refuted above: the dividing, the confusing, and that which is strictly called the uniting. Now, the two former have been toyed with and are being toyed with by the children of heretics; for the divine Gregory rightly noted them beforehand. For the dividing union, being related to a state of habit and not joining the natures from the beginning, leaves the things as separated, neither attributing nor rendering to them what is common or what is proper; so that from this, two species are established as utterly divided from each other. Except for this, that this opinion shadows and covers the division of the natures with a union based on dignity and will, and thus deceives the foolish. The other opinion, however, being directly contrary to this, and confusing and obliterating all things, fashions and imagines one adulterated thing, in neither of those which are united cleanly keeping its own. These things, as follows, declare the truth of those who speak of the mode of the union. For they declare what follows. ¶
A For everything that is derived from confusion appears bastardized, having nothing pure nor established in its own permanent property. But the middle way between these, the unconfused and indivisible union, knows that those things which have been united remain unceasingly, according to their own property, because of immutability; yet it makes these things common, and to belong to one another, because of that very substantial union: so that those things which are properly the own property of one are common to the whole, and those of the whole are common to the one, because of the unconfused property of the same in the other. For there could not be a mutual exchange of idioms, unless the property remained unmoved in each, and in the union.
Such a union, therefore, is more one than that which divides entirely, and more abundant than that which entirely confuses; so that it makes those things which are united to one another neither entirely the same, nor entirely different. If, therefore, it renders what exists from that union neither entirely same nor entirely different, one must ask in what respect it is same, and in what respect different. The doctrine of truth, therefore, implies that they are the same according to nature—contrary to what occurs in the Trinity, as the divine Gregory noted. But if this is not approved by the adversaries, let them conclude themselves what follows next. For if they are not the same by hypostasis, they will concede, therefore, that they are the same by nature. And if this is the case, the definition of the divinity will be one and the same because of the union; and if so, union and nature will be the same. For the predicate is common to both. For just as for those whose nature is one, the definition also is the same, so it is necessary that for those whose union is together and in the same, according to them, the nature should also be common; and conversely, that those whose nature is one, have different hypostases, because no one person circumscribes a nature. What, then, is concluded from this? Namely, that there is one nature of flesh and divinity, but two hypostases. But if the things that came together do not have unity by nature, nor by hypostasis, and by number, where will the identity of the united things through the union be? And if they are one among themselves by both nature and hypostasis, where will the principle of immutability and the unconfused state be preserved in the union?
That it is possible for the same result to be produced both from imperfect and perfect [things], the dead who rose under Christ and the saints testify. For the union through the resurrection rendered them such—even if they were perfect according to their parts—as nature joined them when forming them in the womb. And we believe that the same thing will happen in the common resurrection yet to come. For we believe that the bodies, both of those that have already been dissolved and corrupted, and of those who have recently lived or have recently died, both imperfect and perfect, will have the same concretion from the resurrection: from which it is demonstrated that from things which previously had hypostasis, it happens that
A a hypostasis can come to be without change; even if this is not granted at all in the case of Christ, because it was not pre-formed. Yet, it does not follow from the fact that it was not pre-formed, that the nature of Christ is one, composed of two without confusion; nor have we known this in any other nature whatsoever, much less in Christ, in whom even a pious person cannot conceive of such a thing. For if "nature" is called B from that which is naturally apt, and no nature is naturally apt to possess a contrary and an opposite, but the one nature of Christ, according to them, has suffered this: then it will not be one nature. For if it is inherent to such a nature to be visible, it is not inherent to the same to be invisible; and if it is inherent to it to be mortal and corruptible, it is not inherent to it to be incorruptible and immortal: otherwise the same argument would apply to contraries. But this is absurd. For if it receives contraries C in turn, yet when it has one of these in act, it can never then have the contrary in act. Let them say, therefore, whether a single nature of Christ is not granted by them to be at once and in the same thing visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, circumscribed and infinite, and in sum, generable and unbegotten? One hypostasis and one person can indeed receive contrary and opposite predicates at once and in the same thing; but one nature, as has been said, is not born or apt for things contrary and opposite to it. For it would depart from itself entirely before it suffered this. And these things are against them.
But as for what some say, that because the humanity of the Lord D was not pre-formed, nor did it pre-exist in itself, nor was it assumed as perfect, but had its hypostasis in the Word, therefore one hypostasis of both is produced: this is in part true, and in part not. For that it did not have hypostasis in itself, nor was it formed beforehand, we will even grant; but that because of this one hypostasis of both is produced, as if it could not happen otherwise, nor could God and a perfect man be united in this way; this we will not grant. For what more will God have for union by having it in this way rather than in that? Nor did the time of the union make one Christ. It is not, therefore, because of the impossible, but because it was not fitting for the humanity of the Lord ever to be bare and without divinity, that we reject the pre-formation. But to those who say that pre-formation follows from hypostases, and that one would know at some time a bare man, and another and another Christ and the Word; but if it is not pre-formed, it is not from hypostases: and if not from hypostases, then there are no hypostases. For how, unless from these these? Since not even if it were granted to be from these hypostases is it necessary now to grant hypostases, as has been demonstrated; but if they say "from hypostases," why not rather "from persons"? And if they say this, why do they not dare to say "from sons," one being the Son of God, and the other the one born of the Virgin? But nothing can be more heretical, nor more closely approaching the impiety of Nestorius, than to think or to say these things.
A For they appear to stand in direct opposition to him, just as timidity fights against audacity. Yet these are common forms of vice, even if by excess and by deficiency they are engaged in conflict with themselves and with virtue.
And this too should be noted: that hypostasis does not simply or primarily denote the perfect, but that which exists in its own right, and only in the second instance the perfect. Nature, however, in no way declares that which exists in its own right, but denotes, properly, the perfect. For the properties which are taken into the account of hypostasis make each one to be a certain individual, an "someone" distinguished from others; but those which are taken into the account of nature do not make one to be a "someone," but something that is from something else. Those things which exist commonly are common, and nothing of these is called universal over other universals, even though it may encompass all those contained under the same species.
B And we should also not be ignorant that those things which characterize nature are constitutive of the substance; but those which signify the hypostasis have the status of accidents, whether they be separable or inseparable. In both cases—that is, in substances and in hypostases—the properties of simple beings are simple, and those of composite beings are composite. As it is in the case of man, and in his definition: his substance is characterized by his being an animal—which is capable of contraries, that is, divided, or conversely, or by parts—rational, and mortal; for this is the unerring definition of his substance. C But the hypostasis is signified by figure, color, magnitude, time, place, parents, or upbringing, or training, and whatever else by parts follows upon these, the sum of which, they say, cannot be truthfully predicated of any other individual; yet these belong to one man, namely this specific person. Moreover, nature specifically participates in those properties which are of the same substance, or nature. But the hypostasis also participates in those properties whose account is different, after they have been assumed into the union and natural coagmentation of an individual.
Thus, therefore, it is in the case of Emmanuel: there is one hypostasis of deity and humanity, and for this reason those things which are predicated as of one hypostasis result in things common to both, as if they were of one nature; yet it is not one nature, D and consequently not properties as of a nature. For even if all things are said of the same one as if he were one, they are yet not said according to the same respect, nor as of one nature. As the same one is visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, tangible and intangible—not according to the same respect or the same formula. Because, therefore, he is one and the same, all things are said as if of one, but yet according to one thing and another. For this reason, these things are not said as of one and simple nature, but of diverse and composite substances, which preserve their natural property in the union.
BY THE SAME LEONTIUS: AGAINST THOSE WHO PROFFER TO US CERTAIN WRITINGS OF APOLLINARIUS, FALSELY INSCRIBED WITH THE NAMES OF THE HOLY FATHERS.
A Certain of those who suffer from the heresy of Apollinarius, or of Eutyches, or of Dioscorus, wishing to confirm their own heresy, have ascribed certain of the treatises of Apollinarius to Gregory Thaumaturgus, or to Athanasius, or to Julius, wishing to deceive the simpler folk; and this, indeed, they have accomplished; for by the authority of such credible persons they have been able to ensnare many of the Catholic Church. And you may find among many of the right-believing the book of Apollinarius whose title is *Fides particularis* (The Faith in Detail), inscribed to Gregory; and certain letters of his inscribed to Julius; and other treatises or expositions of his concerning the incarnation, inscribed to Athanasius—of which kind is that which is titled an exposition agreeing with the exposition of the three hundred and eighteen. And not only these B, but also others of a like nature. This will become manifest to you, and to any lover of the truth, from those things which we shall bring forward, both of Apollinarius himself and of his disciples, among whom, with others, is Valentinus, who is subjoined.
Valentini the Apollinarist, chapters of the Apology. « Against those who say that we state the body to be consubstantial with God. »
The Lord Apollinarius, from the letter to Serapion. I have received the letter of your charity, my lord, and regarding the matter which the bearer of the letter sought, we have afforded him such help as we could. The letter of my lord, however, which was sent to Corinth, we have greatly approved. But we have condemned as a great insanity those who say the flesh is consubstantial with God. C
And again, from the same letter. For by the union with the Word, the flesh has become divine, not by nature; wherefore, in the union, it possesses that it should continue to be divine, just as he himself says: *It is the Spirit that quickeneth the flesh.* For it is not possible for a body to become incorporeal, as others foolishly say.
From the epistle to Dionysius, the beginning of which is, “To me,” etc.
ATo me, piety is the subject of friendship, and there is no occasion for enmity toward those who keep piety. Let no one seek anything new from me now, nor demand that I keep silent about the truth, as though he were constructing peace out of this; but that no one can charge us with these things, which are said against certain people, is manifest from the things we have always written: we do not say that the flesh of the Savior is from heaven, nor that the flesh is consubstantial with God, insofar as it is flesh and not God, but God insofar as it has been united into one person with the divinity.
And from another epistle to the same, the beginning of which is, “I marvel.”
BI marvel, hearing of some who confess indeed that the Lord is God in the flesh, but fall into the division wrongly introduced by the Paulianists.
And again from the same epistle.
It is conceded that the body is from the Virgin, the divinity from heaven. The body was formed in the womb, the divinity is uncreated, eternal; and in the composition, the body remains body, and the divinity, divinity. But if it is the custom of Scripture to speak of the whole as God, and the whole as man, let us follow the divine words, and not divide the indivisible.
And from the epistle to Terentius.
And John indeed accuses him who divides Jesus, but these men divide him outright, acknowledging the union with the body. For it is not the same thing that is united to itself, nor Cis the consubstantial united to the consubstantial, as these men are not ashamed to say. For neither is this composition nor union, because nothing is united to itself, but one thing to another. If, however, the Word is consubstantial with the body, and the body consubstantial with the Word, then both are invisible, according to the text: *No man hath seen God, nor can see him.* He did not appear, therefore, in this way, nor was he handled, being invisible; nor is John truthful when he says: *We have seen, and our hands have handled.*
And again from the same epistle.
If anyone says that the Son is two persons, or that the flesh is consubstantial with God and not with our flesh, or that it descended from heaven and was not assumed by Him who descended from heaven, saying that the divinity is passible, let him be anathema.
From syllogisms.
If the Word is consubstantial with the body, nothing was united to it for its own sake, but it was united to the body; therefore it is not consubstantial with it. If the body is consubstantial with the Word, it was not seen and handled; for both are invisible and unapparent, if they are consubstantial. For John says: *We have seen and handled;* therefore the Spirit of the Lord and the body are not consubstantial; but the invisible and untouchable was joined to the visible and tangible by
A unity: wherefore in this visible body he became visible and tangible. He who calls the body consubstantial with God afflicts the incorporeal God with blasphemy, as if he possessed a body, since the Son, being consubstantial with the Father, possesses his own [body], and when united to flesh, is not, because he is consubstantial with God, divided from his own body, lest the body be thought to be consubstantial—that is, the same substance as God.
And again the same: Apollinarius, and those who are with me, we think these things B concerning the divine incarnation. The living Word of God took to himself from Mary flesh consubstantial with our own flesh, in union with the divinity from the very beginning of the conception in the Virgin; and thus he became man, since man, according to the Apostle, is flesh and spirit. And this is what is meant by "The Word became flesh," that he was united to flesh as the human spirit; for the man among us is also called flesh. But the Lord is the man above us; wherefore he is also heavenly, by reason of his own heavenly Spirit, to which the wisdom of the flesh did not oppose itself. And thus sin was destroyed in Christ, and death from sin was dissolved; and we, becoming partakers of this work, are saved by faith, and although we are from an earthly father, we are made like the heavenly one. Let him be anathema, therefore, who does not say that the flesh is from Mary, and who says that this flesh is of an uncreated nature and consubstantial with God; or even he who says that the divinity is passible, and that mental passions arise from it.
And I, Jobius the Bishop, C confess the Lord Jesus Christ, indeed from eternity the incorporeal God the Word, but in the last ages having united to himself flesh from the holy Virgin, to be God and man, one and the same, one composite hypostasis, and one indivisible person, mediating between God and men, and joining the divided creatures to the Creator, consubstantial with God according to the divinity existing in him from the paternal substance, and consubstantial with men according to the flesh united to him from human nature; worshiped and glorified with his own flesh, since through it redemption from death and communion with the immortal has come to be for us. For the flesh, being highly united to the Word and never separated [from him], is not that of a man, nor of a servant, nor of a created person, but [is] the flesh of the Word of God himself, the Creator, consubstantial with God—that is, of the incorporeal substance of the ineffable Father. But those who say D or teach that the flesh, highly united to the Word and never separated from him, is consubstantial with God—that is, with the incorporeal substance—these, as causing dissensions and scandals contrary to the doctrine of the Church which we have learned from the beginning, we shun in the churches according to the apostolic command, and we hold them as aliens, because they oppose the ancient tradition and ecclesiastical peace.
A Valentinus the Christian, against things wickedly and impiously taught by Timothy and his associates, and their master, the most impious Polemius, have written these things in reply. Since Timothy, having become the first disciple of Polemius, having in his great folly stirred himself up against the Church of Christ, teaches the impiety of his master Polemius against the truth, madly instructing his companion Cataphronius, as he himself writes to those of his own mind, Paregorius, Uranius, Diodorus, and Job, saying thus: "That by the union which is theologized toward the Word of God, the flesh of the Lord is confessed to be consubstantial with God, yet by nature it remains human and consubstantial with us." And again, on behalf of Cataphronius whom he instructed, he says thus: "That one must confess the same thing by union to be the Word of God, and that it is to be believed as the Word, consubstantial with God." And even more impious than this, O Timothy: that you make the flesh which our Lord Jesus Christ wore from the holy Virgin invisible, if, as you say, the flesh is consubstantial with the Word of God, through which we have obtained salvation. B And we believe that along with the Word of God, the flesh of the Lord, which He assumed from the Virgin, is worshiped, and is theologized together, and is glorified, through which meditation is ever guarded for us, being governed for all eternity by the life-giving Word of God. And thus our Lord Jesus Christ is revealed as one person, from flesh and Word; for by the union with the Word of God, the flesh is theologized, not by nature. So that in the union it also possesses permanence, just as the Lord Himself says, that it is the Spirit that giveth life to the flesh. For it is not possible that the body should become consubstantial with the incorporeal God by reason of the union; which the followers of Timothy and Polemius, and those with them, say in many and varied artificial ways, desiring C to attribute to the body, as a compliment, the impossible incorporeality. But to be glorified by the glory of the incorporeal God is possible and fitting for the divinity that bears it; and thus it is worshiped by all creation as the Creator and true Son of God, bearing flesh, and not a man bearing God.
What, then, is this great ignorance, or rather infidelity of yours, O Timothy, both yours and theirs who are with you, and of your master Polemius? Saying that it is the same body, consubstantial and heterousion to the divinity because of the union, saying it is the same, immutable and changed. For if, as you say, even as the Word of God, the flesh is consubstantial, you are acting against yourselves, and you pronounce anathema upon yourselves. And just as one who is drunk and intoxicated does not know what D he is doing or what he is saying, so you do not know what you are saying, nor of what things you are affirming, as this impious dogma, taught most often by you, refutes you. Learn, therefore, O infidels, that union is not *homousion*; but if it is *homousion*, it is not union; for nothing is united to itself.
A It touches, but one thing touches another, which is being united or joined, which is the Word of God having joined himself to flesh; and this is what the divine evangelist said: *The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us*, to wit, that the Word was united to animated flesh.
B Then neither do you know this, O infidels, that nature and substance are the same thing, especially in God, in the ineffable and incorporeal God, and the eternal divinity of the adorable Trinity; but the body which the Lord bore did not become eternal or incorporeal from the union, and therefore it is not *homousion*—that is, not of the same substance—with the incorporeal substance. But the Lord is eternal, and before the flesh He is consubstantial with the Father; and with the flesh the same one is consubstantial with the Father. The flesh was not *homousion*; for he assumed it as a garment, a vestment, and a covering for the hidden mystery, and offered it up for the sake of man, and through it He appeared to men. For we could not otherwise become spectators of God, unless through the body. C But, on the other hand, the Lord is also consubstantial with us according to the flesh, but not according to his divinity. For the divinity did not come from a woman, God forbid; nor is the flesh from heaven, nor is it eternal, as you unfaithfully and impiously say against the truth, handing down your own impiety with such artifice, and (being) refuted and convicted by the truth itself as evildoers, infidels, and liars. Make efforts to understand that the union honored nature, but did not make the body substantial to God, as you dare to imagine, having fallen away from the truth, and insulting the condescension of the Word toward the joining of the body, which occurred for our salvation, by saying that the body was made consubstantial with the impassible divinity because of the union: which surpasses all impiety, even though you may wish a thousand times to make yourselves wise, perverting and deceitfully interpreting the divine Scriptures, and the books of our thrice-blessed Father D and teacher Apollinarius; so that your own writings, which you have produced for the deception and scandal of simpler souls, may refute you, against the head of your own selves, since you have resisted the truth; and you know that *it is hard for you to kick against the goads*, and you have used much circumlocution. Just as the Jews, who dared to commit a crime against the flesh of the Lord, perished; so you, who have incurred scandal because of the flesh of the Savior, even though you be many, you shall be counted as nothing because of your impiety. If, however, you cast out curiosity and infidelity from your soul, you would understand that God appeared in the body,
A and that He has granted the communion of the body for the participation of the Divinity: for the body taken from the holy Virgin does not of itself grant salvation, but [it does so] from the union of the Spirit: not that the body should be held as vile, but that the Spirit should be the more glorified. Do not, therefore, in order to deceive the simpler-minded, wish to alter those things which our thrice-blessed Father and teacher Apollinaris posited into your own blasphemous application; for those things were rightly and piously posited by that holy and God-bearing man, which declared status and honor, and not nature. But the things which you have infidelically and impiously applied declare consubstantiality; for nature and substance are the same, as I said before, and all confessors of the true faith know this.
B You, however, moved from the beginning by contention, and emulation, and diabolical envy against the holy bishops, and fighting a most wicked battle against the truth, and rending the Church of Christ, have turned to such impiety as to say that the passible body is consubstantial with the impassible Divinity on account of the union; which is impossible, and it is impious to say that the body is *homousion* (consubstantial) with men and with God. And how will they look upon Him whom they have pierced? For if the visible body is consubstantial with the invisible Divinity, as you say, then both are surely invisible, according to what is written, that *no one has ever seen God, nor can see Him* (1 Tim. vi, 16). C But our Lord Jesus Christ is invisible according to the Divinity which existed with Him from the Father from eternity, but is visible according to the flesh which He bore from the Virgin. Let both, therefore, be compounded in the one person, and the truth will not be dissolved; so that Christ is neither two persons, nor is the flesh consubstantial with God, being governed by the Word of God.
Whoever, therefore, are confessors of this unadulterated, and true, and apostolic faith, let us not accept the profane empty talk of those around Timotheus and Polemius and those with them, according to the command of the Apostle. And let us also keep in memory what the same Apostle said, that D *a man who is a heretic after the first and second admonition reject, knowing that such a one is subverted, and sins, being self-condemned* (Tit. iii, 10, 11). But Timotheus and Polemius were declared to be not only heretics, but also slanderers; for our thrice-blessed teacher Apollinaris called those in writing blasphemous and insane who say that the body of the Lord is *homousion* with the Divinity; and the blessed Athanasius, our most holy bishop, said that those who dared to say the body from Mary was consubstantial with the Divinity had appeared as if from Hades. But Timotheus, and his teacher Polemius, and those who were followers of them, were very ignorant as to what the one person of the Word of God, and the worship of the flesh fashioned by the Word, pertains to the incarnate God;
not to the flesh is the worship. For the Word is not worshipped because of the flesh, A but the flesh is worshipped together with the Word, as a garment and covering, as I said before. Therefore, as many as do not walk according to this rule, and this true and apostolic and uncorrupted faith, let them be anathema. Beware of dogs, beware of evil workers, beware of the concision. For we are the circumcision, who worship God in spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh.
Of Timothy, the Apollinarist bishop of Berytus, to Homonius, also an Apollinarist bishop, in which are testimonies of Apollinarius.
Brother Agapius, having come to us and heard this which was composed by us concerning the divine incarnation of the Word, from various discourses of our thrice-blessed teacher, Bishop B Apollinarius, requested us to take a part from it and set it forth to him privately, with our signature, for your fuller understanding. And we did this, taking these things from the epistle written to Serapion: “You say well yourself, 'We and Christ are not the same thing.' But to say that the flesh is not consubstantial with us because it is the flesh of God requires a little clarification. For it is better to say that He assumed flesh consubstantial with us, but by the union He made it divine. And you yourself say that in this respect it is not consubstantial with us, because it is the flesh of God; but it would be expressed more clearly thus: that the flesh is C by nature consubstantial with us, but by union it is divine, and through the union it possesses that difference.” When the aforementioned brother had received these things from us, he went to you and showed them to you. When you, my lord Homonius, had seen these things, you gave him a written tablet which contained the following: “I, Homonius, a bishop, confess that the Word of God took flesh from Mary consubstantial with us. But if anyone says that the flesh united to the Lord, in any way whatsoever, is consubstantial with God, we declare him anathema.”
• Since, therefore, you have rightly confessed the nature of the flesh to be consubstantial D with us, but have in no way confessed it to be made consubstantial with the divinity—that is, you wrote that it only has a union, such as a holy man might have with God, not joined into one life and hypostasis, but seen as separate from the divine nature—nevertheless, our blessed bishop and teacher Apollinarius says in various discourses that the flesh of the Lord has the names and properties of the Word in common, and that the flesh remains, even in the union, as flesh, neither changed nor departing from its own nature; and that the Word also has the names and properties of the flesh in common, and the Word remains, even in the incarnation, Word and God, neither changed nor passing over into the nature of a body; deign to explain to us whether, being ignorant of what has been said by our divine Father concerning the holy and saving incarnation of the Word, you have anathematized these things, or whether being aware, you
have rejected them as not well said, and have thus slandered us as having accepted a heresy, and have anathematized the herald of piety together with piety itself? For he said in the discourse, whose beginning is, *Holy*: A “From the beginning, Christ is rightly confessed according to the body in such a way that it is not possible to call the body a creature in the strict sense, being utterly inseparable from Him whose body it is, that is, from association with God, because it has been joined to God in unity.” And after other things: “But it has shared in the title of the Uncreated, and thus also in its consubstantiality with God according to the invisible Spirit, B when the flesh is also taken into account with the title, because it has been united to the consubstantial God.” And again: “Consubstantial with men, the divinity being included with the body, because it has been united to what is consubstantial with us; the nature of the body is not changed in the union that is consubstantial with God, nor in the communion of the consubstantial name, just as the nature of the divinity has not been changed in the communion of the human body and the naming of the flesh that is consubstantial with us.”
And again in another discourse, whose beginning is, *Flesh and that which governs the flesh in one person*, he says these things: C “The Lord Jesus Christ, therefore, was without sin as God, and with the flesh, consubstantial with the only God, the creator before the ages; but the flesh, as the flesh of God, is God, as consubstantial with God, a part united to Him, consubstantial with God, not separated; for it neither exists separately, nor is it moved independently, as man is a self-acting animal. For God is so by the communion of the flesh, though He is not man by Himself; and the flesh is so by the communion of God, though it is not God by itself; D and all things that follow for the flesh, God possesses by the unity of the flesh; and those things that are proper to God, the flesh assumes by the union with God.”
Again, in another discourse entitled *A Eulogy of Mary, and concerning the incarnation*, he says thus: “Mary now sees the body as greater because of the Word who is united to it—I do not say greater than its own body only, but also greater than the fiery angelic powers; for God is united to none of those. None of them quickens the world; none of the angels is equal to God, as He who, composed of body and divinity, declares Himself equal to God, when He says: *As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given also to the Son to have life in Himself*.”
And after other things again. “And knowing that the Spirit acts in Him, in such a way, indeed, as not to be separated, but self-acting,
A can you imagine that it is divine, just as a garment removed from your body can heal diseases? But that which is inseparably united to God, and has become the same thing with Him because of the substantial union—for 'the Word,' he says, 'became flesh'—do you not suppose this to be divine, or even God?”
Again in another book, whose beginning is: “There is no pleasure of eating flesh with God,” he speaks as follows:
Not, indeed, that both are from heaven, but being united to the heavenly, and having become one person with Him, it is heavenly according to the union, and as heavenly it is worshipped with the worship of the heavenly God, and as heavenly it saves by the power of the heavenly.
And from the epistle to Dionysius, the beginning of which is: “For me the foundation of friendship is piety,” a little later he says as follows: B
That no one can object to us these things which are said against certain others, is clear from the things we always write; for we neither say that the flesh of the Savior is from heaven, nor that it is consubstantial with God in so far as it is flesh and not God; but we do say it is God in so far as it has been united into one person with the Godhead.
Again in another book, whose beginning is: “We glorify worthily our Lord Jesus Christ,” he speaks as follows near the end:
Living, moreover, is Christ, a God-inspired body, that is, spiritual; and the Spirit in the flesh is divine; a heavenly mind, of which we pray to become partakers, as Scripture says: “We have the mind of Christ.” C The holy flesh, connatural to the Godhead and establishing the Godhead in those who partake of it, is the foundation of eternal life, the author of immortality, the creator of eternal life for men.
Again in another syllogistic sermon, that is, a disputation, composed in praise of John the Evangelist, whose beginning is: “Through the Word all things were made,” according to the evangelist, he speaks thus:
How is He not true God, who says: “So long a time I have been with you, and you have not known me, Philip?” He indicated that the manner of living was as a man with men for so long a time, and showed the man to be God. Wherefore one need not fear to call such a man consubstantial with God, known by the form of the paternal Godhead, as matter is by the body. D
Again in the things which follow next, he says:
Neither, therefore, does the divine make the human, by the division according to the body, that which is in equality with God, creative and renewing, for it is impossible that another nature, that which is human, should limit the body of Christ in the equality with God by the limitation of a man, as the body of a man and not of God.
And again in another syllogistic sermon, whose beginning is: “That which has a different life, has a different action,” he speaks as follows:
His flesh vivifies us because of the Godhead consubstantial with it: for that which is vivific is of the divine nature;
A and this flesh saves, and we are saved by participating in it as food: but that which has the power to nourish, acting in the one who is nourished, is consubstantial with him and is not itself nourished. Likewise, if that which vivifies is not itself vivified in the same way as that which is being vivified, it is not consubstantial with it; for otherwise it would be a body of death like ours, in need of being vivified; but the body of Christ is not a body of death, but of life: therefore, the divine is not consubstantial with the human.
And in the book to Flavian, the beginning of which is, “Even now beneath the base of men Christ is struck,” after many things he says: B Much more in the conjunction of the incorporeal with the body does the nature of those united remain. For the body also is a body, and the incorporeal is incorporeal; and by reason of the supreme union, God is called corporified, and the body deified; and in so far as God is corporified, he is man, and is both; but in so far as the body is deified, he is God, and again he is both.
Then a little later he says as follows: Already the body ceases to be a product and in the form of a servant; but it has been glorified by the natural union with the Uncreated, and according to this same birth from the Virgin; and in this respect it did not change from being a product into being the Uncreated, but has been united to the Uncreated; and being God by the union of God, it is uncreated in so far as it is God; and because the body of the Father could not exist—for the Father is not corporified—C for this reason it would never be called ingenerate, nor is it ingenerate by its own nature, as the Son and the offspring is, by the natural union and from the beginning with the begotten Son.
And in the book against Diodorus, the first after the book concerning the Trinity, in chapter 14 he says thus: The extraordinary and admirable thing was the union of God with the flesh, which happened once and not a second time; which your soul in no way accepts, nor do those who lead you to this impiety and Antichristian unbelief, and you deride the supreme union, and say: The properties of God and the properties of the flesh no longer remain if there is a union, but that the supreme union is dissolved if we confess the supreme union according to the flesh from David. D
And in chapter 27 he says: You are angry then because by the grace of God we do not accept that that flesh from the seed of David received immortality; and if we are asked the cause, we answer: Because of the supreme union.
Again, in chapter 61: And you are not ashamed to speak of the same nature, but a different generation; as it is vain and superfluous to introduce the birth from the Virgin, if that which is begotten is not worthy of the generation, but is the same as those begotten by man and woman: mocking the supreme union as the supreme impiety, which the divine…
A Scriptures openly introduce, which neither cause the human element to destroy that which is of God, nor cause the divine element to overturn that which is human.
And in the second book against the same Diodorus, in chapter 22, he says: And because you exhort us to answer how the seed of David, which is of the divine substance, [is]—listen: Because, according to the incarnation, how is the created [thing] uncreated? As united to the Uncreated. How is the Creator of the world the fruit of David’s womb? As united to the Creator. How [is that which is] from Abraham before Abraham? As united to Him who is before Abraham.
And in chapter 36 of the same book: But let him who trifles with these things say: how is that which is conjoined with God according to the unity of person not God with Him? How is that which is united to the Uncreated according to a vital unity not uncreated with Him? For if there is no common appellation, nothing will be thus B mingled, that is, united. But it is most alien to reason to designate the incorporeal with the names of the body, when we say: “The Word became flesh”; yet not to designate the body with the name of the incorporeal, according to the union which is with Him. And if this man wonders how that which is created is united into the appellation of the Uncreated, much more will another justly wonder how that which is Uncreated is united by the appellation of created flesh.
And in the epilogue or peroration of the same book, he says: If the Word is called flesh because of the union, it follows that the flesh also is called Word because of the union; and as the Word, so [is the flesh] uncreated; C not because it was not created, but because from the union it is shown to be Word.
Again, he says next: As men are consubstantial with animals lacking reason, yet of a different substance, insofar as they are participants of reason; so also the Lord is consubstantial with men according to the flesh, but of a different substance, insofar as He is Word and God.
And in the Disputatory Oration, the beginning of which is: “Whatever two things are united, whether by species or by D convergence, they remain two,” he says: An instrument and what moves the instrument naturally perform one operation. But of whatever the operation is one, the substance is also one: therefore, the substance of the Word and of the instrument has become one.
Again in the Dialogue, the beginning of which is: “Do you call Christ God or man?” a little later, the adversary inquiring how the body is God, and Creator, and Lord, he answers saying: Because it possessed the unity of the body of God, and of the Creator, and of the Lord, which we do not find to be [the case] of man toward God.
AGAIN, IN THE ORATION WHICH BEGINS: "Let us keep the good of the faith," he says thus near the end:
A Miserable and truly humble, and possessing abject souls are they, who deem so venerable, great, and supramundane a treasure [to be] small. These things are sufficient for those who are not too uninstructed and slow, to show that the epistles produced in the name of Julius are Apollinarii's, beyond those epistles of Apollinaris which Athanasius and the historians mention. For the disciples of Apollinaris himself—being more ancient than all who used these [epistles]—not only are those who, as is likely, ascribed these to Julius on account of the schism, but they are also [older] than the orthodox who, deceived by the inscription, have persevered in believing and saying that they are sound, because of the authority of the person B worthy of credence; whereas, in other respects, it is more the task of all the orthodox to recognize those discourses as belonging to their own teacher. But in order that we may recognize his discourses not merely from the testimony of the disciples, even if some falsely inscribe them either to Julius, or to Gregory, or to Athanasius, but also from the affinity of the discourses and the style, come, beyond the authorities which his disciples—whom we mentioned before—have produced, let us bring into the midst his complete and entire discourses, so that those who read with a desire to know the truth may have the most certain assurance that these and those which are falsely inscribed are the same.
Of Apollinaris, from an ancient copy found in the library of Andrew, the most God-beloved Bishop of the Church of the Sidonians.
To the most honorable lords, the bishops in Caesarea, greeting in the Lord.
We expected, having sent letters of honor to you, to receive likewise from your charity, most honorable lords, such as we always receive from the blessed Bishop Athanasius, who knows us to be in agreement with him in dogmas, and in all things compliant. But since you did not write back, I therefore reasoned that perhaps the length of the letter did not declare our mind and opinion to you; behold, we write clearly things consistent with our common teacher and yours. C I speak, therefore, of these things regarding the divine incarnation, since on account of them, much tumult has been stirred up, not by us, but by others of whom I am silent. We confess not that the Word of God came upon a holy man, which was the case in the prophets, but that the Word himself became flesh, not having assumed a human mind—a mind mutable and led captive by filthy thoughts—but D being a divine, immutable, and heavenly mind. Therefore, the Savior did not have an inanimate body, nor one void of sense or intelligence; for it could not be that, when the Lord had become man for our sake, his body should be without intelligence. Being truly the Son of God, he became himself the firstborn among many brethren. Whence, the Son of God before Abraham was not one, and another after Abraham, but one perfect Only-Begotten of God; perfect, however, by divine perfection and not by human. With those who think these things, we profess to have communion. With those
who think and write the contrary, we have none. A
Of the same, from the Confession of Faith in Part
Since certain people have troubled us, attempting to overturn our faith in our Lord Jesus Christ by declaring him a man conjoined to God—as if he were a God incarnate—for this reason we set forth our confession regarding the aforementioned faith, casting out the faithless contradiction and its specious pretext: namely, the statement that God took on the whole man. For since the whole man in this life is not pure from sin, according to the Scriptures, because he is unable to make his own actions conspire into one and the same with divine actions, and for that cause would not even be free from death. But God, united to human flesh, has his own pure activity, being an unconquered mind which cannot succumb to the passions of soul and flesh, and which governs the flesh and the movements of the flesh divinely and without sin. And he not only does not succumb to death, but he dissolves death. And he is one, in true and divine perfection; not two persons, not two natures perfect in themselves, because it is not right to speak of two sons, nor to worship four—God, and the Son of God, and the Son of man, and the Holy Spirit—nor to glorify man before the Holy Spirit. Wherefore we anathematize those who place man in divine praises with God and the Son before the Holy Spirit. B But we say that the whole man assumed by God for salvation is each one of us who are sanctified, and who have received the likeness of the heavenly man, and are deified according to the likeness of him who is truly and by nature God, but according to the flesh, of our Lord Jesus Christ, a man.
And in the preceding chapter
We confess one true God as monarch, and one true Son, God from true God, naturally having the paternal divinity—that is, consubstantial with the Father—and one Holy Spirit, by nature and in truth sanctifying and deifying all things, existing from the substance of God through the Son. But those who call either the Son or the Holy Spirit a creature we anathematize, as also those who say that there was a time when the Son or the Spirit was not. But we confess that all things are created by God through the Son in the Holy Spirit and sanctified. C Furthermore, we confess the Son of God to have become the Son of man, who not in name but in truth assumed flesh from the Virgin Mary, and to be one perfect being, not two perfect beings joined together; the same being the Son of God and the Son of man, one hypostasis and one person, and one adoration of the Word and the flesh. And we anathematize those who speak of two, and make different adorations, one divine, D and reject the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son. For just as Apollinaris soon says that creatures were made by God through the Son, so here he affirms the Holy Spirit to exist consubstantially from God through the Son. Now if no one denies that the Son is the creator of the world with the Father; no one likewise will be able to deny that the same Son is the breather of the Holy Spirit with the Father; which is the solemn and invincible dogma of the Catholic Roman Church against the schismatic Greeks.
A one divine and one human, and those who adore the man from Mary as being other than the God from God. We confess the passion of the Lord according to the flesh, the resurrection in the power of His divinity, the ascension into heaven, the coming glory to judge the living and the dead, and the eternal life of the sanctified.
From the same Apollinaris, from the discourse or book on the tradition of the renunciation and the faith, the beginning of which is: "The devil, who had deceived him, held the man who had fallen from God."
"If He is man in His totality, and the same is God, the pious mind, not adoring the man but adoring God, will be found to be adoring and not adoring the same being, which is impossible. And the man himself will not judge himself to be adorable, for he will not be impious; but God will know Himself to be adorable. But it is impossible for the same being to be both adorable and not adorable. It is therefore impossible for the same to be God and man in His totality, but [this subsists] only in the united nature of the divine B incarnate; so that those who adore may look toward God, inseparable from the flesh, and may not look toward one who is not adorable, and toward another who is adorable; nor that there should be in Him one indeed who does not suffer himself to be adored, and another who admits adoration for the salvation of the adorers; but rather that He is one in truth according to the one substance, and by no means two certain beings subsisting in persons according to their own measures and dignities."
I think that one who is not too contentious, once he has known these things, can no longer suppose that he can reasonably gainsay them; but directly, and as one might say, without resistance, he will assent to the truth, and will confess with all votes that those books or discourses concerning the incarnation which are falsely inscribed with the names of Julius, Gregory, and Athanasius are indeed the works of Apollinaris. Nor should it be a marvel to us if Valentinus and Timotheus, C disciples of Apollinaris, are such that one confesses the *homousion*, that is, the consubstantial, while the other does not confess it, and both contend and contradict each other based on their teacher. For Gregory, surnamed the Theologian, exposes other more impious blasphemies of his in his epistle to Nectarius, as if from his own books: "For he affirms," he says, "that the flesh according to the economy assumed by the only-begotten Son for the reformation of our nature is not adventitious, but that that fleshly nature was in the Son from the beginning." And after a few words, he adds: "And this is not yet the grave part, but that which is the most difficult of all is that he asserts the only-begotten God Himself, D the judge of all, the author of life, the destroyer of death, to be mortal, and that He underwent the passion by His own divinity, and in that three-day death of the body, the divinity also died along with the body, and was thus raised again from death by the Father. It would be a long task to recount other things of this sort which he adds to such absurdities."
It is therefore no wonder if, through the intermediate and lesser impiety, which posited that the body was of the divinity,
homousion, that is, consubstantial, he made progress towards greater things, adding ignorance to ignorance, and impiety to impiety. And Timothy seems indeed to be the one to whom the secrets of that impiety and fraud were entrusted more A confidently than to others. For this very reason he was able to receive from the blessed Athanasius letters of recommendation to the Westerners, as one fighting against the impiety of Arius, and to bring back in turn letters from them as if sent to a bishop. But his insidious simulation did not remain hidden forever: for afterward, sent to Rome again after the death of Athanasius, he was deposed himself, as was Apollinarius who had sent him.
B I have published, not without labor and effort, on account of the heat of the Roman climate, the Greek text of the five treatises of Leontius, taken from an excellent codex. For until now, as I have already advised, nothing existed but the translation of Fr. Turrianus, a great man and one who served the Church of God exceedingly well; a good translation, indeed, but one which did not satisfy the desire for the original wording. For we know how much it matters, especially in divine matters, to go to the very source of doctrine. Besides the fact that, as far as theological discourse is concerned, one happens to increase in no small number of phrases and idioms in the Greek language. Now, if these treatises are joined with two others of greater bulk, which we have given in the seventh and ninth volumes of the *Scriptura vetus*, and if the remaining parts of Leontius, whether published here or elsewhere in a scattered manner, are gathered together, a certain excellent body of theology will emerge, which, as St. Germanus advises (Spicileg. Vol. VII, p. 49), is to be called Leontius and placed with reverence in the treasury of the Church.
THE SERMONS OF THE SAME LEONTIUS BYZANTINUS
C Homily of Leontius, presbyter of Constantinople, on the feast day of Mid-Pentecost, and on the man born blind, and on the text: “Do not judge according to appearance.”
There is never lacking to those who love the Lord an occasion for festal light. For even today, as we celebrate the feast day, angels rejoice, archangels bound in dance, and all the heavenly powers keep the feast with us. Moreover, we keep the feast, not because we have been delivered from Egyptian servitude, but because we have been deemed worthy of the banquet of Christ, as children of Sion; we keep the feast, not because we have been freed from the making of bricks, but because we enjoy the blessing. We keep the feast, not because Pharaoh has been submerged, but because the devil has been destroyed; and, to say it in a word, we keep the feast, not because Moses divided the sea, but because the Lord Christ has broken down the middle wall of enmity, as it is permitted to hear from the blessed Paul, saying: *For He is our peace, who has made both one, and has dissolved the middle wall of the partition.* And what D middle wall of the partition has the Lord…
A Christ dissolved? That which Adam built through disobedience, hiring out the serpent—that dragon who fled from the ranks—as the craftsman of enmity.
Homily I. — ON MID-PENTECOST.
For this reason we celebrate today, because the Creator Christ has destroyed the wall of enmity. For the present feast today is in the middle—in the middle of what? Of the Lord’s Resurrection and the coming of the Holy Spirit. It announces the latter, and is not separated from the former. It proclaims the latter, and embraces the former. It theologizes the former, and speaks properly of the latter. For *the Lord is the Spirit* (II Cor. III, 17). Truly, for those who love the Lord, the season of feasting is never lacking; for we are persuaded by the Apostle Paul, who says: *Therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth* (I Cor. V, 8). By the leaven of wickedness and malice, the Apostle does not speak of that which is baked from the threshing-floor and wheat and flour, but that which is cast forth from Jewish malice and wickedness; which is always souring in impiety; which is unmixed and useless, as if not possessing the salt of knowledge. For which of the Jews’ feasts has not become a slaughter? Which of their public gatherings has not become a formal condemnation? And which of their Passovers has not become a pit for the righteous? For you have just heard from the two Evangelists, John and Luke, the two fellow-disciples, the God-inspired brothers, the like-minded friends, the good distributors of divine oracles. For Luke not only wrote the Gospel, but also the Acts of the Apostles. For what reason? So that while we rejoice, the Jews may be put to shame. For if, as you have just heard, B they enclosed the foremost of the apostles, Peter, in prison, binding him with two chains and keeping him with four quaternions of soldiers, in order that after the Passover they might tear him apart like a calf, yet He who raised Himself from the dead—He who is insulted by them today as an unlettered man—miraculously delivered Peter from C the prison, so that those wild beasts, the Jews, might know that they were laboring in vain and found themselves empty of hope. For neither when they enclosed the Lord Christ in the tomb, and stationed the military guard, and rolled a great stone against the monument, and applied an artfully crafted seal, were they able to hold Him, except for as long as He Himself willed and permitted them; nor, when they enclosed His servant Peter in prison, and bound him on every side, and appointed thirty-two soldiers to keep watch over him diligently, trembling before the fisherman as if he were a barbarian, were they able to become masters of the one they desired, always inheriting confusion instead of glory; those whom the prophet Isaiah also chided, saying: *O Lord, strong is Your arm* (Isa. LIII, 1), D instead of, *being accused,* He speaks of that; He speaks properly of this. *For the Lord is the Spirit* (II Cor. III, 17). He lives by the power of God (cf. II Cor. XIII, 4). By His own, truly, who raised Himself. He celebrates the Lord’s solemnity; by which especially the Holy Spirit, the Lord, is proven to be, thus distributing His own gifts by authority (cf. I Cor. XII, 4). These are new things, but subtle.A and they did not know—but knowing, let them be ashamed. For it is truly full of shame that Herod the King, though he attempted it, could not—neither with chains, nor locks, nor guards, nor pontiffs, nor Scribes and Pharisees, nor the whole assembly of the Jews—keep in custody one disciple of the Lord, an unlearned and private man, poor, a companion of fishers. What say you to this, children of the Jews? You who, just now, with unblushing face and mouth dared to say to the Lord: "You have a demon; who seeks to kill you?" Do you say, O Jews, that He has a demon, whom your father the devil cannot even bear to look upon? Him, I say, by whom that legion was invisibly beaten and, unable to bear it any longer, openly and plainly shouted the truth: "What have we to do with you, Jesus? Have you come to torment us before the time? I know who you are, the Son of God." The demon, B scorched and suffering, makes his excuse; and you, having been beneficiaries, proclaim that the Lord Jesus possesses a demon? To whom, I ask, did the legion of demons say: "If you cast us out, permit us to enter into the herd of swine"? To Solomon, who built Jerusalem, or to the Lord Christ, who carries all things in His hand?
But the demon-loving Jews will immediately say: "What then? Did not Solomon rule over the demons? Did he not enclose them all as one? Do they not fear him to this day?" But, O Jews devoted to demonic magic, you put these things forward in vain; for only the Lord Christ powerfully bound the strong man and plundered his vessels. For Solomon not only failed to rule over the demons with royal authority, but he was even ruled by them, corrupted to the very end. For having loved the passion of polygamy, seduced by the devil’s pimping, and neighing like a stallion mad with lust into a herd of foreign women, he defiled the chamber of the knowledge of God and faith. For, having abandoned the God of his fathers, to whom he had even built the temple, he constructed caves for idols. How then could he who was a servant of demons be the master of demons? O the malice of the Jews! O the long-suffering of the Lord Christ! Reviled, He is long-suffering; insulted, He holds His peace; struck, He prays for those who nail Him to the cross. He restores sight to the man born blind, and he is slandered as a sinner. D For do you not know, keeping it in an incorruptible memory, what the Jews, blind in soul, recently cried out to the one who had received outward sight, saying on the previous day: "Give glory to God! We know that this man is a sinner"? O the unbridled lips of the Jews! Is Christ a sinner? And how is a sinner
A one who takes away sin? When does a slave set a slave free? When does a person liable for judgment redeem one who is liable? When does a debtor tear up the bond of another debtor? For a slave does not free a slave; one who is not liable for judgment does not redeem one who is condemned; nor does a condemned man set another condemned man free; a rich man tears up the bond of one held in debt. For a prisoner does not release a prisoner! B And what kind of criminal evidence of the Master Christ have you seen in the transformation of water into wine? This is a command of Divinity, not a directive of sin. What about the calling back of Lazarus from the dead? Even this He willed as One who gives life, and did not perform it as a sinner. Since we have been convinced of this, O Jews, take the blind man himself as your guide in your error. Do not be ashamed to be led by the blind man; for he does not cast you into a pit, but establishes you upon a rock. For he has the inextinguishable C lamp of faith shining brightly.
What, then, does the blind man say to the Jews? "Never since the world began," he says, "has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind." O miraculous things! The unlettered one becomes a teacher of those learned in the law, speaking to them with freedom of speech, saying: In vain do you rest in the law. Do you not call Abraham righteous, and Moses, and Elijah, and Elisha, and all the prophets righteous, but call Christ a sinner? Who among those you deem righteous caused one born blind to see? But if none of those righteous ones had the power to do this, D and He whom you slander as a sinner has surpassed them all, it is certainly envy that makes you wish to hide the miracle which occurred in my case.
But the Jews said to the blind man: "You were born in sin, and do you teach us?" You insult the prophets, you contemptible blind man! Did not Moses the prophet turn the navigable sea into dry land? Did he not cause manna to rain from heaven? Did he not open the barren womb of the rock? Did he not cause the sea to provide a supply of quails into the bosom? Be silent therefore, blind man, be silent. Are these not greater things than your presumed recovery of sight?
But the blind man answers the Jews against them: Your torrent of eloquence is boasted in vain; you are not dealing with an unlettered man. What sight lacked, hearing made up for. I, too, know that Moses and Elijah and Elisha, in whom you rest and pride yourselves, performed miracles; but nevertheless, having prayed, having made supplications, having fallen down, having groaned, having made requests over a period of time, they received the gift of grace. But the present Jesus, who is called a sinner by you, but is acknowledged as God by me, having power concurrent with His will, by will alone, made up what was lacking.
A What then did the Pharisees say to the blind man? For great was the contradiction that took place at that time, which I have no power to set forth at present, because of the shortness of the time and the desire to explain the things that are set before us; wherefore, making myself your debtor for the present, I proceed to the proposed theme.
For you heard just now the evangelist John crying out: "In the midst of the feast Jesus went up to the temple and began to teach; and all the Jews were marveling, saying, How does this man know letters, having never learned?" B O Jewish wonder, filled with condemnation! "How," they say, "does he know letters, having not learned letters?" Does the Creator of letters need these? Did He who polished the tongue as on a lathe need practice? Does He who distills wisdom need instruction? Did He who wrote upon the tablets with His finger need to hold a stylus? "How does this man know letters, having never learned?" Leaving the greater things, you turn to the lesser. If you wish to investigate the unsearchable, tell me first: how did He open the eyes of the man born blind? For did He apply eye-salve? Or did He bring forth a lancet? Or did He soak a sponge? Or did He shave the head of the blind man to turn back the flow? Did He regulate him with a light diet? Did He give him an antidote to purge the bile beforehand? Did He scrape away the roughness with a razor? Did He pierce the film clouding the eye? C Did He not illuminate him with a strange, harmful, and contrary course, in as far as human customs are concerned? For He merely smeared the eyes of the blind man with clay; yet clay blinds even those who see, let alone grants sight to those who do not see. Just as, therefore, O Jews, by healing the man born blind without the art of medicine, He manifested the authority of His divine power; so also here, without the myth-making of rhetoricians, the entanglement of sophists, the vain fiction of poets, or the babbling of astronomers, He taught those present, so that they might learn from the blind man that He is the One who took dust from the earth and fashioned Adam with clay; and might learn here clearly, after such great instruction, that He is the One who said through the prophet: D "Open your mouth, and I will fill it." What then does the Lord do? Answering the Jews, He said just as you heard a moment ago: "Why do you seek to kill me? Did not Moses give you the law, and none of you keeps the law?" The Jews then said to the Lord: "Do we not keep the law? Is it not for this reason that we wish to kill you, because you break the Sabbath, binding [the limbs of] the paralytic and granting sight to the blind? Do you say that we do not keep the law?" The Lord then said to them: "This is not keeping the law, but violating the law. For if," He says, "you circumcise a man on the Sabbath, so that it may not be broken by the law of Moses, are you angry with me because I made a whole man whole"
on the Sabbath, and opened the doors of the rational soul? What is more necessary, O Jews? To circumcise flesh, or to restore the paralyzed? To remove the foreskin, or to liberate the soul from sins? To sharpen a sword, or to give sight to the blind? To assemble an unlawful council, or to increase the grace of the world? If you circumcise a man on the Sabbath so that the law may not be broken, are you angry with me because I made a whole man whole on the Sabbath? Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment. O wondrous things! God Himself says to men concerning Himself: 'Judge the righteous judgment for me.' He summons His own enemies B and challenges them to be judges of His miracles, saying to them: 'Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment.' Do not condemn the innocent, as in the case of Susanna. For I myself also raised up Daniel there, that he might both punish the guilty and deliver the innocent. Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment. Do not stone me unlawfully, as in the case of Naboth, lest you suffer the pay of iniquity like that Achab, whose blood the harlots washed away. Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment; for you have always judged perversely, but now at least judge justly. Did not the prophet say, reproaching you: 'Hear this, you leaders of the house of Jacob, and the rest of the house of Israel, who abhor justice and pervert all that is right'? Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment. For the bones of men-pleasers shall perish. Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment. Why do you move your lips to calumny? Why do you sharpen your tongue for accusations C and charges? Why do you forge your mouth against the innocent? Did I not say to you that you must even give an account for an idle word? Why do you delight the devil, and condemn yourselves? Do not judge by appearances, but judge the righteous judgment. Where divine praises were to be read without any simulation and in sincerity, there you eat flesh. What did David cry out, saying: 'My mouth shall speak wisdom'? For surely my mouth will not speak calumny? 'And the meditation of my heart, understanding'? For surely not slander? What is more honorable to hear from the Holy Spirit: 'The mouth of the prudent shall be sought in the Church,' or, 'Whose mouth has abounded with malice'? What is better to hear: 'The mouth of the just distils wisdom,' or, 'Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness'? What is more useful to hear: 'A truthful mouth shall be filled with laughter,' D or, 'The mouth that lies kills the soul'? What is clearer, for us to say ourselves to the Lord: 'Our lips shall praise Thee,' or, 'Our lips are our own, who is our Lord'? Believe, therefore,
A the One who said: 'Keep yourselves from unprofitable murmuring, and refrain your tongue from backbiting; for even a secret whisper does not go forth in vain, and a mouth that lies destroys the soul.' 'Do not judge according to appearance, but judge righteous judgment' between me and Moses. For Moses, in breaking the Law through the Law, renders the Law void for the sake of circumcision, so that the child may be circumcised; but I fulfill the Law and honor grace. For I neither sharpen a craftsman's sword, nor do I seek a wage for my work. 'Do not judge according to appearance, but judge righteous judgment.' Why do you seek to kill me? You are troubled in vain; I do not yet wish to suffer; when I will, I suffer—not when you forge the nails. I am carrying out a dispensation; for do I undergo necessity? I humbled myself; no one took me as a captive. For you heard the evangelist John, the patron of this opinion of mine; for what did he add by saying: 'They sought to take Him, and no one laid hands upon Him, because His hour had not yet come'? What does this mean: 'His hour had not yet come'? It means: 'The things that were seen had not yet been fulfilled.' For let no one, hearing the evangelist proclaiming: 'His hour had not yet come,' think that the hour is the cause—as B the Greeks, like children, babble—that it is ordained for each and every man, both the manner of death, and the day, and the hour, and how one must die, and that it is impossible for anyone to die before the decree of fate arrives. Away with such absurdity! Such a narration is old-womanish, and very foolish, and an adversary to the truth. For if to each one the manner of death, and the day, and the hour, and how one must die [are ordained], and it is impossible to escape, why do we who are ill seek medical help to cut short the death that afflicts us? And why do we who sail seek harbors and watch the stars? And why do we who travel on foot avoid places infested by robbers? And why, when preparing to fight against enemies, do we don helmets and sharpen weapons and raise up wall defenses, if it is impossible for anyone to escape? Moreover, why do we loathe Cain, if such a manner of death was ordained for Abel? And why do we kill murderers, if those whom they killed were fated to die in that way? And why do we pray to receive a long life of years, and not to fall into temptation? Is it not because the Lord is truthful, when He said concerning the faithful: 'I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him My salvation'? And again: 'Call upon Me in the day of your trouble, and I will deliver you, and you shall glorify Me.' D Indeed, from what was just read to us from the Acts of the Apostles, we know clearly that the prince of the apostles, Peter, calling upon the Lord in the prison...
obtained the help that comes from Him; for no sooner had the blessed Peter cried out than the Lord immediately sent an angel from above—the Angel of the Great Council of the Father—and illuminated Peter’s prison, just as He had once cooled the furnace for the three children. For the Lord is one and the same, both He who there showed the coals to be roses, and here broke the chains; He who there shattered the statue, and here dissipated impiety; He who there put Nebuchadnezzar to shame, and here struck down Herod; He who there burned up the Babylonians, and here gave the Jews into captivity. But what is the beginning of the reading? It is necessary to present some things and store others for another time. For you heard just lately the writer Luke saying: "At that time, Herod the king laid his hands to afflict some of those in the Church. And he killed James the brother of John with the sword. And seeing that it was pleasing to the Jews, he proceeded to seize Peter also, whom, having arrested, he put into prison, delivering him to four quaternions of soldiers to guard him, intending after the Passover to bring him out to the people." B Truly we are celebrating today, since we contemplate not only the struggles of the Lord, but also those of the martyrs. James is slaughtered, and Peter is imprisoned, and the Church prays, and the chains are broken, and the devil is confounded. The Passover of the Jews is fulfilled, and he who is sought is not found. Herod condemns the guards to death, and Peter proclaims the miracle. The iron gate was opened, and the heart of the Jews was not opened. "At that time, Herod the king laid his hands." What time? The time at which the royal name of Christ the Father was bestowing the power to walk upon the lame; was putting diseases to flight with cloths; was wiping away fevers like a sponge with shadows; was weaving the crowns of martyrs. It was the time when he adorned James with the crown of martyrdom, and was preserving the strenuous athlete Peter. "At that time, Herod the king laid his hands." What time? When the statues were falling from their pedestals, and idols could no longer deceive; when altars were being dug up, and while they were being dug up, the priests were lamenting; when the mouths of those speaking from their bellies were being stopped, and the sorceries of amulets were being cast away. "At that time, Herod the king laid his hands." What time? When the Synagogue was being dissolved, and the Church was being drawn together; when those addicted to the legalities were devoid of counsel, but the apostles of Christ were abounding; when the circumcision of the flesh was being diminished, and the seal of the heart was being increased; when the unleavened bread was fading, and the heavenly bread was flourishing, and when the seven
A lamps’ candelabrum was being extinguished; but the cross, glorious with twelve rays, was being kindled. *Per id tempus, misit Herodes rex manus, ut affligeret quosdam de Ecclesia.* O the wisdom of the king! Or rather, the enterprise of a tyrant! What kind of king is this, who is not in the hand of God, but in the will of the devil? Are you so eager, Herod, to put Peter to death? And for what reason? Has he plotted insurrection? Has he fashioned a diadem? Has he donned the purple? Has he amassed treasures of possessions? Has he hired soldiers? Has he stirred up fortified cities? B Peter is naked and destitute, so far as earthly things are concerned. He abandoned even his ancestral nets, and his fishing boat, and despised the catch of fish. He obeyed Christ, who became poor for our sake, saying: *Do not possess gold, or a scrip, or a purse, or two coats.* Why, Herod, do you leave the barbarians alone and slaughter the apostles? Why, leaving off the besieging of walls, do you pierce the Church? Why do you stretch out your hands, not to capture the fortresses of a tyrant, but to overturn the altar of the King? *Per id tempus, misit Herodes rex manus, ut affligeret quosdam de Ecclesia.* O hands of Herod, not stretched out for prayer, but armed for the killing of a righteous man! These hands, as you know, were armed against the column of the Church. C Beholding these hands, Peter cried out and prayed in the prison with the words of David, saying: *Do not destroy my soul with the ungodly, and my life with men of blood, in whose hands are iniquities; their right hand is filled with gifts.* For if Herod had not received a reward from the Jews, he would by no means have sharpened the unrighteous sword for the slaughter of James, nor would he have bound Peter with two chains, wishing to bring him out to the people after the Passover. O Jewish Passover, always mingled with the blood of the innocent! They crucified the Lord Christ before the Passover; they wanted to kill his disciple Peter after the Passover. O filthy Passover! O synagogue that loves bloodshed! Rightly did Solomon long ago call the synagogue of the Jews abominable. D For what reason? Because it is a drinker of other men's blood. *Willing,* he says, *to bring him out to the people after the Passover.* Why then not during the Passover? They pretend to honor the feast of the Passover. O honor filled with insult! If it is not lawful to kill during the Passover, then you should not have bound him during the Passover either. Indeed, you wish to appear to have honor for the solemnity, you who treasure up slaughter; yet you hold the victim,
and do you not think it is a slaughter? O piety filled with condemnation! Or rather, O lawlessness, kept by some up to this day, having taken its origin from there and not seeking to find its end. For do we not know that often some of those who are under consideration for power, having shut up some innocent person in the public prison, as soon as they know the honorable Passover to be imminent, immediately, for appearance' sake, release them from the public prison, devising another, more harsh imprisonment, keeping them in their own houses and strangling them with hunger, or shutting them up in the house of an extortioner who gapes with insatiable greed—not perceiving that this is not to honor the feast, but to insult the Lord Christ. Do you wish to celebrate? Free your fellow-servant from false accusation. For then a person truly celebrates, not when he puts on a silk garment, but when he has freed a soul that was crushed. To God be glory forever and ever. Amen. B
Homily of Leontius, Presbyter of Constantinople, on the Holy Friday of the Great Week, on the Passion of Christ, and on Job. Lord, bless.
Great are the gifts of prayer, and indelible its accomplishments. Wherever one might turn the eye of the mind, he will find nothing more precious than prayer. Prayer acted as a rudder for Noah, and preserved him without shipwreck in the divinely sent flood. Prayer dissolved the barrenness of Hannah, and miraculously delivered her from the accursed curse. Prayer made the belly of the whale a house of prayer for Jonah, and preserved the city of the Ninevites unharmed. Prayer granted to King Hezekiah fifteen years of life. And so that I may not prolong the speech, that we may bring into the midst the Lord Himself, who is the measure of how much prayer can do—He who both acted and taught, who not only prayed Himself but also exhorted others to pray, as one can hear Him saying to His own disciples: "When you pray, say: Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come." C Address the Father as children, await the King as soldiers, as those enrolled as citizens in the kingdom of heaven. And besides the name of the Lord, invoke no other.
The Lord taught them not only to pray for themselves, but also for those who treat them spitefully, who are hostile, and who plot against them, as it is possible to hear from the Lord Himself saying to them: "Pray for those who treat you spitefully, do good to those who hate you." What the Lord taught, He also did. He prayed for the enemies by whom D and He Himself also for His enemies who were setting Him aside. And when did the Lord pray for...
His enemies? When? On this day, when He was fastened to the cross. For today, as you know, the Judge of all is being crucified. Therefore, when the Lord saw Himself being crucified by the Jews, and the Jews being condemned by the inanimate elements; the sun being darkened, but they feeling no sorrow; a general earthquake being stirred up, but they not departing from their malice; the veil of the temple being rent, but their hearts not being pricked; many tombs being opened, but their minds not being illuminated; the dead being resurrected, but they being numbered among the dead; moved by mercy toward the human race, on the B cross itself He poured out prayers to His Father on this very day, saying: "Father, forgive them this sin, for they do not know what they are doing."
Do you see, my dear friend, how He taught and fulfilled, and what He taught, He performed in very deed, and prayed for [His] enemies? For what reason? Because the Father of the Lord, as if angered for the injury inflicted upon the Son, willed to exterminate the Jewish race—they who, in place of adoration, were fashioning a cross; in place of invocation, were forging nails; in place of oblation as a sacrifice, were offering vinegar; in place of gifts, were striking with a reed; and in place of precious offerings, were plaiting a crown of thorns, audaciously shouting: "His blood be upon us and upon our children." On account of these crimes, when the Father was considering whether to wipe out the Jewish nation on the spot, the only-begotten Son, taking the role of mediator, supplicated the Father, saying: "Father, forgive them this sin, for they do not know what they are doing." For many of them will return to a sounder mind; therefore I ask, let the wheat not be mowed down with the tares, let not the sheep perish with the wolves. Let not the doves be destroyed with the ravens. Let not the roses be burned with the thorns. Not only is there Caiaphas C here with his lash, but also Paul who will return to the right path; not only is the servant of the high priest seen striking a blow, but also Stephen adorning the crown of martyrdom. "Father, do not hold this sin against them."
These things the Son uttered to the Father, not as if the Father were ignorant of what the Son willed, or the Son were in doubt as to what the Father willed, since the will of the Father and the Son is one; for the Word knows what the mind or reason wills, and the mind knows what the Word wills. Therefore, He did not speak these things as if ignorant of the paternal will; but even upon the cross itself, the only-begotten Son wished to give proof and indication of His Father, so that He might not suffer the calumny of being a stranger and alien to the nature of the Father, but might declare Himself to be of the same substance. For this reason the only-begotten Son prays, so that what He had received from the Father, He might also render back to the Father.
Someone might say: "What is it that He received from the Father, so that He might render it back to the Father?" Hear, even if you know, for in D
A am calling it to mind, not teaching: you heard at the baptism in the Jordan the Father above, from the heavenly regions, crying out: *This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; listen to him*. By this attestation, the Father willed to make His Son known and attested to men. Since the Son willed to return this testimony to the Father, He cried out upon the cross itself: *Father, forgive them this sin, for they know not what they do.* You will understand that the Son spoke these words so that He might reveal His Father, from those words of the Son to the Father: *Father, I have manifested thy name to men*. For the sake of this, the divine dispensation or incarnation was also carried out, so that the Father might make the Son known, and the Son might make the Father known, and that in like manner the Holy Spirit might be known between the Father and the Son. For the same cause, think that the Son said to the Father: *Father, forgive them this sin.*
But, O good listener, do not deny this sentiment or will. Do not diminish the honor of the Incomprehensible. For if you diminish the honor of the Son, you diminish also that of the Father; for where the Son is, there also is the Father. For this reason the Son is named from *oios*, which is to say, like as the Father is, so also is the Son. B Therefore, when you hear the only-begotten Son of God praying, understand it according to the nature of the incarnation. For He prays by way of dispensation, but He performs miracles as God; he who suffers and he who performs miracles is not another, but the one and same who sleeps and who raises the dead. He is one and the same who hungers and who satisfies. He is one and the same, the only-begotten Son, who dwelt without constraint in the virginal womb, and who was ineffably fixed upon the wood of the cross, and who in the hewn-out tomb took the rest of three days; and who in the cloud of the ascension carried the first-fruits of human nature on high, and dwells inexplicably and without circumscription of time in the paternal bosom; to whom in the heights nothing at all is lacking.
Eximia are therefore the gifts of prayer, indelible its rewards. Prayer is the warding off of calamity, the bringing of joy, the consolation of friends, the bounty of God, who is above all. What is it? You just heard Moses the author saying: *The Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite: You have sinned, and your two friends; for you have not spoken the truth before me, as my servant Job has. And now take seven bulls and seven C rams, and go to my servant Job, and he shall offer sacrifices for you, and you shall live; for had I not accepted his face, I would have destroyed you.* You see that prayer is a benefit, accustomed to be bestowed upon and to assist friends, and how God is wont by means of prayer to pardon and remit things done amiss. *The Lord said to Eliphaz: You have sinned, and your two friends. Go therefore to my servant Job, and my servant Job shall pray for you.* Rightly does the Lord in this place call Job both servant and attendant. He calls him servant as to servitude; attendant, as to the of D
observance of piety. A Go to my servant Job, he says, and my servant shall pray for you, and you shall live. Oh, the goodness of the Lord! He himself shows philanthropy, and yet attributes the grace of the benefit to Job, and most fittingly so. For just as in these worldly affairs, if a king wishes to enrich and glorify one who is closely bound to him by kinship and alliance, he bestows letters and petitions through him—bestowing immunity upon the condemned so that he might benefit those others and honor his kinsman—so also does God, the King of all, desiring to honor Job as his own man and to render him illustrious, forgive the sins of his friends through his intercession, so that he himself might receive glory, and they might be delivered from their sins.
Go to my servant Job. Unless he invokes me for you, I grant no pardon. Go to the servant of mine, Job, whom you have treated with outrage; offer him the honor of a supplication. You who have treated him with disdain, do him honor; embrace him who is covered in sores as a priest; consider him who sits upon the dung-heap as though he were standing at the altar. For it was not because he was a sinner that I abandoned him, but as a just man that I glorified him. Gold is tested in the furnace, and the just man is made bright through temptations. Did the dung-heap harm him? Did it not rather make him more glorious? Did he not trade well? Did he not give simple things, and receive double in return?
Go to my servant Job, who has come from labor and distress to rest. Learn the progress of a faithful friend; he is faithful, but you were faithless. Learn from these things that you see, that no one who has trusted in the Lord has been abandoned. Go to my servant Job; for if he had not interceded, I would have destroyed you. C
When Eliphaz heard these things, he straightway took his two friends, Baldad and Sophar, and they went with swift foot to the most noble Job, and, approaching him, they fell at his knees, and begged, and besought him, and asked for his intercession, addressing him with these words: "We have erred, O most noble one; we did not understand what happened to you. Now we have recognized that the adversary is humbled, since you have been shown to be crowned as victor. Intercede for us, become reconciled to us, you who are our king, and whose God and master of the games is the one who sent us to you, saying that without your intercession we would not obtain forgiveness for our transgressions." D
Hearing this, Job, trained in philosophical science, did not put off his prayers; he did not hesitate; he did not reproach; he did not refuse to grant forgiveness for the failings of his friends. Therefore, as soon as he had completed the sacrifice of prayer, he besought God, and heaped a huge benefit upon his friends, and set himself to thanksgiving. What then does the historian Moses say? For it will not be beside the point to indicate the following as well: "And while Job prayed for his friends," he says, "the Lord forgave them their sin. And God added all that Job had previously, double." And when his brothers and sisters heard all that had happened to him, they came to him, and eating and drinking at
A his table, they exhorted him. O the rush of brothers and kin! In times of mourning, no one is there; in times of feasting, many. When he sat upon the dungheap, all fled from him; when he dwelt in royal palaces, all ran to him. And this happens not only then, but also now. Often, someone is struck by misfortune, and he is not only unrecognized by his kin, but on the contrary, he receives oaths that they will never approach his family. But if, by the providence of Him who made Job wealthy a second time, this man also attains to dignity, all his kin run to him, entreating him, welcoming him, often saying, "We see that which we prayed for," so that you might rightly call such people kinsmen of fortune, not of nature. The same thing also happened to the most noble Job; for when he sat on the dungheap, and scraped away the pus with a potsherd, and was suffering and groaning as he said, "Why did I not die in my mother's womb? Why, when I came forth, did I not perish immediately? Why did knees meet me? Why did I suck the breasts of my mother?" B at that time no brother appeared to weep, no sister to lament, no kinsman to grieve. But as soon as he attained to his kingdom, and became master of double the wealth, immediately his brothers stood around him, his sisters came, and his friends leaned upon him.
But why do I speak of brothers and kin, and not turn my discourse more quickly—because the time is short—to the wife of Job? For she, even while Job was suffering and struggling in his trial, became more harsh and inhuman than everyone else, reviling him with insults and calumnies, inciting him to blasphemy, and addressing him in this manner: "How long will you persevere, saying, 'Behold, I wait a little while longer, expecting the hope of my salvation'? For behold, your remembrance has vanished from the earth. My sons and daughters, the labor and pains of my womb, have perished, whom I bore to no purpose with such great effort; and you yourself sit in the putrefaction of worms, passing the nights in the open air. As for me, I am a wanderer and a servant, passing from place to place and from house to house. When will the sun set, so that I may rest from the labors and pains that now encompass me? But speak some word to the Lord, and die." Do you see the words of faithlessness? "How long will you persevere, saying, 'Behold, I wait a little while longer,'" that is, how long will you deceive yourself, expecting the hope of receiving good things? What hope is left to you? C What good did it do you to lift your hands toward heaven so often, and to extend your prayers? From above you were warred against, and fire was brought down from heaven.
While the woman was still saying these things to Job, as he was passing through his trial, then indeed Job answered nothing; but when he attained to his kingdom, and had recovered his wealth, and saw his brothers and friends and kin, and everyone feasting, and likewise his wife shining in royal robes and becoming the mother of those same children, then, turning to the woman, he said:
What do you say, woman? Are you not she who heaped more grievous curses upon me than all the others? Were you not crying out to me: "How long will you go on saying, 'Behold, I still wait a little time, expecting the hope of my salvation'?" Does not the farmer await the harvest? And should I not wait for God, who raises the needy from the earth and lifts the poor from the dungheap? Has not the harvest of good things come? Is not the spring of enjoying good things here? Do you not abound in more riches than before? Look at your children. Are they not better formed than those before? Have you not become an excellent vine? Some of your fruits have indeed been gathered, but others you still possess. Those were living, and these are leaping; for thus you have received all things double. For if, woman, I had complied with you and blasphemed God, whence would such a store of wealth have come to us? You see how much fruit patience has brought forth from the dungheap. B Therefore, woman, henceforth do not say: "I am a wanderer and a slave." For the wanderer has fallen, and the idolater has been brought to nothing. Truly the wanderer, the devil, has fallen, who always digs pits against himself. For today a crown is also being woven, and Job is being crowned, and Adam is being renewed, and the thief is praised. Today the tomb is also being sealed, and heaven is being opened. Today the Master is being slapped, and human nature is receiving liberty. Paul bears witness to this, crying out: "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free; stand firm." To Him be the glory and the power unto the ages of ages. Amen.
FRAGMENTS OF LEONTIUS
From Leontius.
Substance and the substantiatum (that which has substance) differ exactly as essence and the essential differ. For “substance” denotes the person, while “substantiatum” denotes the being. For while substance sets itself to circumscribing particulars, the substantiatum scrutinizes the distinctions of the things to be defined and establishes the theory thereof. Of this kind are all qualities, both those called essential and those called accidental, neither of which is substance—that is, the substratum of action—but is always observed in relation to substance, as color in a body and knowledge in a soul. C Whoever therefore says, “Nature is not without substance,” speaks truly, but does not define it altogether appropriately, because he attributes to substance what is not substantiatum. Likewise, he says… D However, the same Leontius should be compared in his *De sectis*, act VII.
A If someone, correctly stating that a body is not without form, then incorrectly concludes that form is a body, but not that it is considered within the body, nature—that is, essence—could not be without a hypostasis. Yet nature is not a hypostasis, for it does not reciprocate. For while the hypostasis is also a nature, the nature is not also a hypostasis. For the nature receives the rationale of “being,” while the hypostasis receives [also] the rationale of “being of itself.” The one carries the meaning of form, while the other is indicative of the “something.” The one manifests the character of a universal thing, while the other is distinguished from the common by what is proper to it. To speak concisely, things are called consubstantial if they are of one nature and share a common rationale of being. The definition of a hypostasis, however, is either things which are the same according to nature but differ in number, or things which are constituted from different natures while at the same time possessing a communion of being and holding it in one another. In this way, I say, they participate in being, not as complementary to one another’s essence—as is the case with substances and what is predicated essentially of them, like a quality in a body, such as whiteness or blackness—which one might find also in other things, and even more so in the case of soul and body, for which the hypostasis is common, but the nature is distinct.
B The discourse is also different, because the definition of perfection is twofold: one spoken of simply, the other considered in terms of relation. For if the Word were passible by nature, or accepted circumscription from the things here below, we might reasonably fear, with Nestorius, lest, when joined to flesh and to the whole man, he be circumscribed. But if he is by nature immutable, incircumscript, and impassible, then even if he should come to be in a body, he would preserve his own rationale of impassibility and complete immutability. Indeed, when he created the world and brought it into this form of the whole—bringing it into being that was not before—he does not appear to have fallen from his super-cosmic and super-essential state into this cosmic or terrestrial one, or to have come from his own incircumscript state into being circumscribed by it. Therefore, he was not circumscribed when he brought forth the world and all that is in it, nor later when he attached the great world in the small—man—to himself. And what is the wonder in this? Especially since the human soul does not suffer these things simply because of being in a body, but because it is of such a nature as to be capable of suffering even without a body. For truly unspeakable and inconceivable is the union that is alone according to essence—both essential and hypostatic. For how could things so different by nature and separated by such a distance happen to be together, and though mingled, not be confused, but remain one and be known as two? That one must resist those who have dogmatized that the union is not according to essence, but according to energy, or good pleasure, or some other relation—they approach the truth in no way, but have rather divided the lie into many parts. For what could this be, and where is the worthy name of the union, which is transcendent and the only one after the only and first, if it does not bind the things together and lead them into one? Whence it comes to my mind to wonder that D
A any of those who advocate such a union would throw in "without confusion" and "without change." For what kind of change is it reasonable for them to apprehend in the division of things, while confounding the dignities into one dignity? For dignities could never become one dignity, just as neither could many natures, after the faculties have been divided, remain one nature immutably. For that which unites diverse things also unites the dignities, now that the faculties have been divided. For what joins things, joins the dignity also. Whence it comes about that whomever we know to have become participants of divine dignity, we place in the same rank by the privilege of the divine essence, and we attribute holiness to each of the two natures. For the measure of dignity does not altogether separate those which are unequal in value, but will unite the natures in that very respect.
Furthermore, those who, besides Christ, are holy, they wish to join with the Trinity; for they dare to proceed to such a degree of impiety. For they usurp the denomination of "gods" and "sons of God," and "holy spirits," according to the text: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." We say that the impious Nestorians ought to have known that the preeminence of the varied distribution belongs to the superiors over those who are inferior, but there is a common gift of energy and a bestowal of dignity granted equally to all; and either these are to be joined B along with the Word of God, or, if they prefer, with one of those contemplated in the Trinity, so that the holy Trinity is split into two natures, and there are two, three, or four substances established in number. But perhaps they would not wish to fuse that with the nature of the Word of God and constitute one son and the same prototype. For there is one natural sonship, from which all sonship by participation draws its origin. Hence it was also necessary for the Nestorians to have taken their man—a god, as it were, from a machine—unless they prefer that he emanated from special grace. Wherefore we proclaim with a loud voice a truly essential union and a twofold rationale of unions and separations. Some things are united in species but are distinguished in substances; others are discrete in species but present a simple or composite union in substances. But we have already said enough about those which have a simple or twofold constitution; for we are not able to shed light on these and like matters by questioning at will.
But while we wish to speak of the composition of things, or connection, or mixture, or union, or by whatever name C we may see fit to call the essential relations of heterogeneous things, we shall easily grant this license to those who, being occupied with names, contend over their proper or improper signification. For it is not our intention to sprinkle flowers upon our discourse, but to know the things themselves. D Of those things, therefore, that exist essentially and are conceived according to essence, some preserve the particular rationale of their existence, while others disturb and destroy it. And the relation of these, mutually intervening, produces from two things one as to number, preserving the difference of essence in regard to their unity. An example of this is man in living beings; and in simple and natural bodies, it is substance.
Thus, at a lamp, one may observe: for the wick is one thing, and the fiery substance of the flame is another. A
What more need be said? Nothing of those things which have been united undergoes change or confusion, because neither part is liable to passibility. For if this were the case, the active part indeed would act, but would not suffer, while the passive part would suffer, but would not act. Our hearing, furthermore, must according to divine judgment be purified from every incongruity—the daughter of presumption and prejudice, which blinds the mind. An impious witness, not reverencing the face of an honest man, produces examples that are hardly probative and are less known. Let such men demonstrate that these things are not those of the Fathers, and let them substitute others. Therefore, he who does not receive the Fathers, who are radiant and renowned in the Church of God, but rather sets himself in opposition to them, clearly withstands the command of God. And what need is there to speak regarding the union according to substance, and the one hypostasis of the two natures? And that such things are indicative of the difference of the essentially united natures of Christ? The mode, namely, of the union occurred substantially, B and not relatively; so that in the perfect humanity resides the Word, which is [to us] the inner man, according to the Apostle, co-existing and contributing to the definition of the whole after the union. Since, as we have said, the contention for us is not about a word, but about the very things themselves and their union and natural conjunction one to another, which the Fathers considered to have occurred substantially, whereas Nestorius introduces it as relative and moral. C
Species is man, horse, ox. For Socrates likewise, in that he is an animal, is a genus; in that he is mortal and rational, he differs; in that he is a man, he is a species; thus also for all men. Genus, difference, and species are the things that complete the essence of each; hence they are called essential. But what is particular and what is an accident is termed accidental, in that it inheres in something. For now it exists, and now it does not have a place, whence it bears the name of "separable." The particular, for instance, is to be risible; the accidental is to be black, to be moved, to be standing, to be sitting. Of things that occur, there is the goal, the useful, the consequence, the identity, the order; that which designates the goal is the cause, or even the title. D
*From the Scholia of Leontius.*
One must know that the "enhypostatic" [or "what is in a hypostasis"] is twofold. For it signifies that which simply exists; in which sense we call not only substance—which learned men describe as that which exists and subsists by itself—enhypostatic, because it simply exists and subsists, but we also call those things which are accidents enhypostatic, even if they have their being in another, that is, in a substance. But if we wish to speak properly, they are hetero-hypostatic.
A But we find that the term "insubsistent" is B used in two ways. For that which in no way exists is called insubsistent, such as a goat-stag or a hippocentaur; but that which has its subsistence in another is also called insubsistent, as is the case with accidents. For although they subsist in substances, yet because they are said not to subsist by themselves, they are designated by this term "insubsistent."
In the same manner, "subsistence" [hypostasis] is used with a double signification. For it signifies that which exists simply in being, especially when it is abstracted from its characteristic properties; and it also signifies the person who subsists by himself. Whence holy Cyril, sometimes using the name of "subsistence" for that which simply exists, says that the *subsistences* have remained unconfused, speaking of substances; and again, that a "union of the things themselves, that is, of the hypostases, has taken place"; and if anyone divides the *subsistences* in the one Christ; and other similar things saying of [the same] substances. But also holy Athanasius, in his Epistle to the Africans, says: "Subsistence is substance, and it has no other signification than being itself." At other times, however, the same Cyril, taking "subsistence" [hypostasis] for the person who subsists by himself and in his own right, said: "If anyone assigns the words in the Gospels to two persons, that is, to two *subsistences*, let him be anathema." We must therefore know that both "enhypostatic" and "insubsistent" are used homonymously; and indeed, [the term] "subsistence" [hypostasis] also has different significations. Therefore, in discussions concerning these matters, one must first ask the one who is debating which signification he is following, and thus make one's defenses accordingly.
C D *Hypostasis* has two significations. For it signifies both that which is simply endowed with existence, especially when it is abstracted from the properties by which it is characterized, and the person who subsists in himself. Whence holy Cyril sometimes uses the name of *hypostasis* for that which simply is, when he says that the *hypostases* have remained without confusion, implying the essences; and again, that a union of the things themselves, that is, of the *hypostases*, has taken place. And if anyone divides the *hypostases* in the one Christ, and other such things, he speaks of the essences. But also holy Athanasius, in the Epistle to the Africans, says: "The *hypostasis* is essence, and the essence has no other signification than being itself." At other times, however, the same Cyril, taking the *hypostasis* for the person who subsists by himself and in his own right, said: "If anyone assigns the words in the Gospels to two persons, that is, to two *hypostases*, let him be anathema."
"*
From Leontius, Monk of Byzantium A
The Fathers and right reason have declared that *epinoia* (concept or mental construct) is twofold: the one is a kind of cogitation and mental meditation, demonstrating and acquiring an adequate and indubitable vision and knowledge of things, so that what appears simple to sensation appears manifold and diverse to this mental inquiry; the other is a production of thought, having a connection with sensation and phantasy, conceiving things that in no way exist from those which do exist, and imagining them to be real. Such is the fabulous fabrication of hippocentaurs and sirens. For, taking parts from all beings, and combining something else from these parts with great license and ease, it constructs in thought and words things that are in no way seen in subsistence and substance; then, when it is fashioned in matter, it turns them into idols.
From the Scholia of Leontius, an argument B proving, if man is one nature, that Christ has two natures.
Since there are certain principles in holy Scripture admitted by all, which we and they both accept, let us examine both propositions by this standard; and whatever we find in harmony with these principles, it is evident that this is legitimate; but that which is contrary, it is evident that as being illegitimate it must be rejected. It is admitted, therefore, that He is God and man; and that He is God in the proper sense and man in the proper sense; and that He is God by nature and man by nature; and that He is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us; and that He is the same one from the holy Trinity, and one of us; and that God the Word deigned to become man, and C we shall find many other such things if we investigate. Let us therefore examine both propositions by these principles, and first that which concerns one nature; and if it is sound, let us accept it; but if it is unsound, let us reject it. Let there be, therefore, three things assumed: souls simply, bodies simply, and men already rendered complete. Taking from these one soul and one body, we shall complete a certain man, for example, Peter; and whoever is found to have the nature of him, to him he is evidently consubstantial. That completed Peter, therefore, is neither consubstantial with souls nor with bodies; nor in the proper sense anima, nor in the proper sense body; nor by nature anima, nor by nature body; for the definition that is given to the soul or to the body will not be given to Peter. To whom, therefore, will he be D consubstantial? To men; for he can receive their definition, and he is something else besides the soul and the body. Let us come to Christ. For among them, the divinity has an analogy with the soul, and the humanity with the body; therefore, Christ is neither consubstantial with the Father, nor consubstantial with us; just as Peter is neither consubstantial with the soul, nor consubstantial with the body.
A If we say such things about Christ, we abolish the principles which we admit to be established, which is absurd. But if we suppose that Christ has two natures, we abolish none of these principles, but we find that everything is consistent. For he is one and the same who is both God and man; one and the same who is consubstantial with the Father, and consubstantial with us; and properly God, and properly man; and by nature God, and by nature man; one of the holy Trinity, and one of us. B For the same subsistence can receive the definitions of both natures; and the definition of divinity that is given is found to be in Christ, and the definition of humanity that is given is found to be in Christ, implying substance; so that it is necessary for the two natures to belong to the one subsistence of Christ.
From the Scholion of Leontius on Number.
C It must be known again that, just as "one" is said in many ways; for it is said in number as Peter, in species as man, and in genus as animal; so also "two" is said; for they are called two in number, as Peter and John; two in species, as man and horse; and two in genus, as substance and color. When, therefore, we say "two" in Christ, we do not say that he is two in number, but one indeed in number, yet two in species, that is, in nature. That we are able to speak in this way is shown by Aristotle, upon whom they rely, who, when speaking of matter and form, said that they are indeed one in number, but D two in species. Saint Gregory also says of Christ that he is a "double one," not by nature, but by connection. Therefore, to call the same thing one and two in different ways is not absurd. This double authority, namely that of Aristotle and that of Saint Gregory, should be cited; and when they doubt us as to how it is possible for two species to be found in one object—for they say that we see many objects of one species, and to indicate two species in one object is absurd—let them hear Aristotle saying "one in number, but two in species," and Saint Gregory affirming that he is "one by connection, but not by nature"; it is therefore evident that by nature he was two.
APPENDIX. LEONTII ET JOANNIS COLLECTANEA DE REBUS SACRIS.
(Ang. Mai, Script. Vet. collect. VII, 74.)
PREFACE AND TITLES OF THE FOLLOWING WORK.
A God is for us the prelude to every work and word; for this is the most secure beginning of all, and those who hold to it arrive at the harbor of rest. Since, therefore, the first book took up matters concerning God, the second book logically takes up matters concerning men, instructing us in those subjects by which the present life is examined, and setting forth the instability and fragility of human affairs, and concerning prosperity, and how neither pleasant things are permanent, nor those things by which we are afflicted everlasting. In a word, it is possible to find in this book everything that shapes our life in character and in action.
THE TITLES OF THE SECTIONS.
Section A. Tit. 1. On the creation and structure of man. 2. On brothers. 3. On free will, and that free will has been given to us. 4. On the unstable and insecure nature of human affairs, and what man and his life are like, and that present things are vain. 5. On beneficence, and that it is necessary to do good to all, and not to return evil for evil, but to strive to overcome evil with good. 6. On the wronged, that it is necessary to help them. 7. On subjects, that it is necessary to be subordinate to those who rule, and to yield, and to accord honor, and not to speak against or speak evil of them. 8. On subjects, that those who are ruled become like the characters of those who are in power, whether they happen to be good or wicked. 9. On anarchy, that is, a people not having a shepherd. 10. On those who sin, and that those who are continuously immersed in sins are hated by God, and B it is pleasing to God to destroy them; for the failure to punish them becomes the cause of others also becoming like them. 11. On those who sin and continuously ask for forgiveness. 12. On good news. 13. On bad news. 14. On one who announces and mediates a response; and that he who treats with contempt the one sent, disdains the one who sent him. 15. On the petitioner, or rather, the one seeking. 16. On insatiability, and that we have an insatiable desire for more. 17. On unjust petitions, and that it is not necessary to carry out unjust requests. 18. On greeting, and that being moderate and bowing down with condescension produces goodwill. 19. On encounters, and on those falling from evils into evils. 20. On riddles and those things spoken to someone in a dark manner. 21. On listlessness and despondency.
22. On impossibilities and things not admissible. 23. On astrologers. 24. On despair, that we must not despair of our own salvation. 25. On foul language. A 26. On a curse invoked justly or unjustly. 27. On threats. 28. On those who are incompatible and have no communion with one another. 29. On hanging and those who have brought themselves to the end of life. 1. On forced service. 34. On one who has been impaled and has died on the wood, that it is necessary at sunset to take down the body and cover it beneath the earth.
Henceforth are the cross-references of the titles beginning from the same letter and found lying elsewhere.
On exercise and study: it lies here in the third letter, title four, the beginning of which is, On Discipline. On reward and retribution for what we have done: it lies here in the fifth letter, title one, the beginning of which is, On works and deeds. On involuntary sins: it lies here in the sixth letter, title eighteen, the beginning of which is, On the voluntary. On irrational animals: it lies here in the seventh letter, title one, the beginning of which is, On animals. On a lucky day: it lies here in the eighth letter, title one, the beginning of which is, On a lucky day. On Hades: it lies here in the ninth letter, title four, the beginning of which is, On death. On those who please men (men-pleasers): it lies here in the twentieth letter, title four, the beginning of which is, On flatterers. On barrenness and poverty: it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title three, the beginning of which is, On famine. On those who are weak and infirm: it lies here in the fifteenth letter, title one, the beginning of which is, On those who are ill; and in the parallels, On the instruction of God. On buying/market: it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title three, the beginning of which is, On selling. On straits/poverty: it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title four, the beginning of which is, On trial. On a faithful man: it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title five, the beginning of which is, On the faithful. On sanctuaries (asylum places): it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title eleven, the beginning of which is, On refuge. On the barrenness of good men: it lies here in the eighteenth letter, title ten, the beginning of which is, On scarcity and barrenness. On sleeplessness: it lies here in the twenty-first letter, title three, the beginning of which is, On sleep. On occasion/pretext, that one must not give an occasion to those who want an occasion: it lies here in the twenty-first letter, title five, the beginning of which is, On suspicion. On profitless zeal: it lies in book one, in the eighteenth letter, title, the beginning of which is, On zeal.
A Scholion. Read also in the parallels; for there lie matters concerning the impious; concerning love; concerning the arrogant; concerning the shameless; concerning the simple and guileless; concerning tranquility/freedom; concerning virtue; concerning injustice and sin; concerning good rulers and evil rulers; concerning good brothers and evil brothers; concerning good men and sinful men; concerning those who love and accept the best men; and concerning those who turn away from evils, and those who accept them; concerning good ascetics and wicked ascetics; concerning the perceptive man and the unperceptive; concerning lack of judgment; concerning the foolish, the senseless, and the uneducated; concerning forgiveness towards one’s neighbor, and those who do not forgive; concerning the ungrateful and the thankless; concerning good shame and that which is more shameful; concerning evil shame; concerning praiseworthy deceit and blameworthy deceit; concerning lack of possessions; concerning self-sufficiency; concerning those who are not generous; concerning the reward of those who have lived well and according to virtue, and the retribution of those living in wickedness.
Letter B. Title 1. On this life and this world, that we and our life are in distraction and toil; and how the friendship of the world separates and alienates us from God. 2. On the blasphemous and the boastful. 3. On foods and the necessities for living. 4. On the violent and the unyielding. 5. On books, that one ought not to acquire many books. 6. On a king.
Henceforth are the cross-references of the titles beginning from the same letter, and lying and found elsewhere.
On those blaspheming against God out of ignorance: it lies here in the sixteenth letter, title one, the beginning of which is, On those who stumble. On the help provided by God to those being treated unjustly: it lies in book one, in the fifth letter, title, the beginning of which is, On vengeance.
Scholion. Read also in the parallels; for there you will find matters concerning an evil king; concerning those who loathe the best men; concerning those who use force and plunder the possessions of others; concerning good counsel; concerning the laconic; concerning a reverent life.
Letter Γ. Title 1. On "Know yourself," that is, pay attention to yourself; and that it is necessary for everyone to look around at their own affairs, and not to blame the evils of others. 2. On those who fight against knowledge. 3. On agriculture; that it is good to work. 4. On exercise and study. 5. On murmuring (complaining). 6. On women; that they ought to be subject to their own husbands, and to do nothing contrary to their will. 7. On women; that they ought not to be uncovered.
to pray, or to speak, or to teach in the Church of God. A
From here on are the cross-references for the titles beginning with the same letter, which are located and found elsewhere.
On laughter and jesters: it is located here in the letter K, title 4, which begins, "On flatterers."
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning good parents and bad parents; concerning good elders and bad elders; concerning the good tongue and the evil tongue, and concerning those who have two tongues; concerning a solemn marriage; concerning prudent women and wicked women.
Letter D.
Tit. 1. On gluttony. 2. On those who are displeased. 3. On teachers. 4. On the difference and dissimilar state of men; and that not the same things suit all, nor does everyone rejoice in the same things. 5. On slander; that one must not receive a slander indiscriminately. 6. On the double-minded, and those who are fickle and have an unsettled mind. 7. On the double-tongued. 8. On the discernment of good and evil. 9. On those who are called to account and are held to pay penalties; and that neither parents are held liable for children, nor children for parents. 10. On desire and appetite, and that one must not follow one’s own desires. 11. On reproof; that one must not be reproved indiscriminately. B 12. On glory and honor; that one must not hand over one’s own glory to another. 13. On wills. 14. On the devil, that is, Satan, and demons.
From here on are the cross-references for the titles beginning with the same letter, which are located and found elsewhere.
On adversity: it is located here in letter E, title 2, which begins, "On prosperity." On the needy and those who entreat: it is located here in letter I, title 1, which begins, "On the suppliant." On the people and on sedition arising from it: it is located here in letter K, title 4, which begins, "On danger"; and in letter P, title 4, which begins, "On the multitude." C On self-complacency: it is located here in letter O, title 4, which begins, "On pride." On disposition and a good mind: it is located here in letter P, title 8, which begins, "On choice." On demagogues: it is located here in letter T, title 2, which begins, "On troublemakers."
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning justice; concerning incorruptible judges and corrupt judges; concerning good masters and wicked masters; concerning good slaves and wicked slaves; concerning good creditors and wicked ones; concerning those who borrow who are grateful and those who borrow who are ungrateful; concerning the just and the good; concerning the deceitful and the crooked; concerning reconciliation with one's neighbor.
Letter E.
Tit. 1. On works and deeds, and that according to the works the reward is rendered to us by God. 2. On prosperity and adversity, and that one must not be exalted in times of prosperity or abased in times of adversity. 3. On abundance, and that in times of wealth sins tend to happen. 4. On eulogies and praises, and those who rejoice in them. 5. On enemies and their fall, and that one must not rejoice in the misfortune of one's enemies. 6. On suretyship. 7. On plotting and those who plot artfully. 8. On plotting and those who plot against their neighbors, and that plots against others turn back upon those who devised them. D 9. On those who are called to account and are held to pay penalties; and that neither parents are held liable for children, nor children for parents. 10. On desire and appetite, and that one must not follow one’s own desires. 11. On reproof; that one must not be reproved indiscriminately. 12. On censures. 13. On associates, and that one must avoid public affairs and public places of lodging. 14. On an act of kindness arising from unjust sources. 15. On contractors and those who throw themselves into the lawsuits of others. 16. On merchants. 17. On commendation; that a virtuous achievement is worthy of prayer. 18. On voluntary and involuntary sins. 19. On eunuchs. 20. On dreams. 21. On vengeance, and how it is prohibited to be called to account twice for the same matter.
From here on are the cross-references for the titles beginning with the same letter, which are located and found elsewhere.
On one who asks, that is, on a petitioner: it is located here in letter A, title 15, which begins, "On the one who asks." On doing and saying everything at the right time: it is located here in letter K, title 5, which begins, "On time." On buffoons: it is located here in letter K, title 4, which begins, "On flatterers." On those who have good eyes: it is located here in letter K, title 10, which begins, "On beauty." On incantations and spells and ventriloquists: it is located here in letter K, title 14, which begins, "On those who purify by fire."
On indigence: it is located here in letter Lambda, title 3, which begins, "On famine." A
On compassion: it is located here in letter Sigma, title 15, which begins, "On sympathy."
On persistence: it is located here in letter Omicron, title 12, which begins, "That perseverance completes the work."
On sciences: it is located here in letter Tau, title 5, which begins, "On craftsmen."
On irony: it is located here in letter Upsilon, title 1, which begins, "On dissimulation."
On those who rejoice: it is located here in letter Chi, title 1, which begins, "On those who are glad."
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning good bishops and wicked bishops; concerning those who work for hire, that is, those who work for their own ends, both good and wicked; concerning those who praise evil things; concerning those who give thanks and are grateful; concerning those who accept reproofs; concerning those who swear falsely; concerning good and evil counsel; concerning almsgiving and doing good to the poor, and those who do not give alms; concerning peace and the peacemakers; concerning enmity; concerning the confession of sins; concerning piety; concerning the commandments of God; concerning those who hope in God and those who hope in men; concerning the joy and gladness of the righteous.
Letter Zeta. Tit. 1. On irrational animals that are adorned with natural wisdom.
Henceforth the cross-references for the titles beginning with the same letter.
On zeal and jealousy: it is located here in letter Phi, title 1, which begins, "On envy."
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning just scales and unjust scales; concerning good zeal and wicked zeal.
Letter Eta. Tit. 1. On a good day. 2. On a wicked day. 3. On day and night.
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning stillness; concerning good and evil character.
Letter Theta. Tit. 1. On the sea. 2. On harvest and vintage. 3. On the dead and those who mourn. 4. On death and the fear produced by it. 5. On death and the state in Hades. 6. On not trusting anyone at random. 7. On hunters. 8. On those who are afflicted and anxious.
Henceforth the cross-references for the titles beginning with the same letter, B and found located elsewhere.
On wonderful things: it is located in letter Xi, letter Alpha, title 2, which begins, "On strange things."
On the hour of death: it is located here in letter Omega.
Scholium. Read also in the parallels, in title 1, concerning a modest and orderly daughter, and a wanton and disorderly daughter; concerning an irascible and impudent person.
Letter Iota. Tit. 1. On the supplicant: that one must accept the supplications of those in need. 2. On equality: that one must distribute to each according to his worth. 3. On garments: that one must not use luxurious clothing, nor should a man wear women's attire.
Henceforth the cross-references of the titles.
On fate: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 23, which begins, "On astronomers."
Scholium. Read also in the parallels concerning good and wicked priests; concerning good and bad physicians; concerning minding one's own business.
Letter Kappa. Tit. 1. On the heart; and that the ruling principle is established in the heart. 2. On those who are superior: that one must not contend against superiors. 3. On backbiting. 4. On the danger arising from a multitude of men. 5. On time: that one must redeem the time, and that everything must be said and done at the right time. 6. On flatterers, parasites, and jesters. 7. On thieves and those who associate with them. 8. On the deaf and the blind. 9. On boasting and pride, and that one should not boast about anything. 10. On beauty and comeliness of body. 11. On hucksters. 12. On livestock and their care. 13. On created things and buildings. 14. On those who purify by fire, and those who interpret omens, and those who use divinations. 15. On braggarts and those who puff themselves up.
Henceforth the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter.
On well-doers: it is located in letter Alpha, title 5, which begins, "On well-doing."
On a curse brought on reasonably or impertinently: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 20, which begins, "On a curse."
On this world: it is located here in letter Beta, title 1, which begins, "On this life."
On a good and evil day: it is located here in letter Eta, titles 1 and 2, the beginnings of which are, "On a day."
On a mixed condition: it is located here...
in letter Sigma, title 1, the beginning of which is, "On a balanced condition." On worldly wisdom: it is located here in letter Sigma, title 3, the beginning of which is, "On wisdom." On condition and consequence: it is located here in letter Tau, title 6, the beginning of which is, "On order." On those suffering hardships: it is located here in letter Beta, book 1, title, the beginning of which is, "On the help of God." Scholion. Read also in the parallels: on wickedness; on those who are masters of good works and masters of evil works; on good and evil men; on those who despise; on the vainglorious; on pride; on a pure heart and a good conscience; on a perverse heart and those who possess an evil conscience; on the naturally good and naturally evil. B
Letter Lambda. Tit. 1. On speech and the power from it. 2. On abuse. 3. On famine, and that one should not sell grain in time of need. 4. On grief. 5. On chatter, and that one should not speak at random. 6. On wastrels and spendthrifts; and that one should not take up such people. Scholion. Read in the parallels on good thoughts and evil thoughts.
Letter Mu. Tit. 1. On drunkards, and that one should not hold a symposium with them. 2. On those who labor in vain. 3. On mysteries, and on those who divulge mysteries. 4. On those being taught, and that one should be diligent in learning. 5. On those moving from place to place. From here on are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. On the imitation of conduct: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 8, the beginning of which is, "On subjects"; and in the third book of the parallels on the social life of good men, in both. On those who make a reply: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 14, the beginning of which is, "On announcing." On those boasting loudly: it is located here in letter Beta, title 2, the beginning of which is, "On the blasphemous." On study and training: C it is located here in letter Gamma, title 4, the beginning of which is, "On exercise." On beatification, that one should not call anyone blessed before their end: it is located here in letter Epsilon, title, the beginning of which is, "On happiness." On those who divine: it is located here in letter Kappa, title 14, the beginning of which is, "On purifying by fire." On worldly anxiety: it is located here in letter Beta, title 2, and in letter Pi. Scholion. Read also in the parallels: on misanthropy; on those who kill their mothers; on hired good and evil men; on hatred of evil, and on those who hate what is good; on good and evil monks; on the idle; on just and unjust measures; on the fool and the senseless; on malice; on those who do not give alms; on hatred and those who start fights; on the testimony of a woman; on repentance and those who do not apply themselves to repentance; on long-suffering; on adultery.
Letter Nu. Tit. 1. On the sick and infirm; and that one must visit them. 2. On the newly wed. 3. On being sober and caring for one's own salvation. From here on are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. On night: it is located here in letter Eta, title 3, the beginning of which is, "On day and night." On the laws of war: it is located here in letter Pi, title 15, the beginning of which is, "On war." Scholion. Read also in the parallels: on young people, wise and foolish; on fasting and those who fast.
Letter Sigma. Tit. On estrangement and those who live as strangers.
Letter Omicron. Tit. 1. On orphans and widows. 2. On landmarks, and that one ought not to move them. 3. On the good and evil way, and that one ought to decline crooked things and crooked ways, and walk along the straight path. 4. On an oath, that one ought not to abide by oaths given for an evil purpose. 5. On an evil name. 6. On opinion, and that being is better than appearing; D for error arising from conceit is an obstacle to virtue. 7. On a good name. 8. On the eye. 9. On reproach and disparagement, and that one ought not to reproach a calamity. 10. On the short-lived and those of brief duration. 11. That the rebuke of the best men is more beneficial than the healing of the evil. 12. That perseverance accomplishes the work. From here on are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. That we are made of earth and unto earth we shall go: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 1. That free will is given to us by God: it is located here in letter Alpha, title 3.
That all present things are vain: it is located in the Alpha letter, title 4. That those who are ruled are made like unto those who rule: it is located here in the Alpha letter, title 8. That we have an insatiable desire for more: it is located here in the Alpha letter, title 16, which begins, Concerning insatiability. That we and our life are in trouble and labor: it is located here in the Beta letter, title 1. That it is good to work the land: it is located here in the Gamma letter, title 3, which begins, Concerning agriculture. That one should not judge others or speak evil of others: it is located here in the Gamma letter, title 1, which begins, Concerning, "Know thyself." That the same things do not suit all: it is located here in the Delta letter, title 4, which begins, Concerning the difference between men. That whatever a man does, he also undergoes: it is located here in the Delta letter, title 1, which begins, Concerning works. That in times of prosperity, sins are wont to occur: it is located here in the Epsilon letter, title 3. That plots against others recoil upon those who devised them: it is located here in the Epsilon letter, title 7, which begins, Concerning malice. Concerning desire: it is located in the Epsilon letter, title 8 [sic], which begins, Concerning lust. Concerning dreams: it is located here in the Epsilon letter, title 20, which begins, Concerning visions. Concerning those who augur: it is located here in the Kappa letter, title 14, which begins, Concerning him who purifies by fire. That we must not be puffed up by anything in this life: it is located in the Kappa letter, title 9, which begins, Concerning boasting. Concerning drunkenness: it is located here in the Sigma letter, title 5, which begins, Concerning proper behavior. C Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning holy and righteous men; concerning good and wicked servants; concerning the slothful; concerning a good and gracious name; that ambition brings salvation; concerning those who keep their oaths; concerning self-sufficiency; concerning the irascible and quick-tempered; concerning the faint-hearted.
Letter Pi
Title 1. Concerning those who stumble and blaspheme God out of ignorance. 2. Concerning boldness, and whence the acquisition of it toward all things comes to us. 3. Concerning selling and buying. 4. Concerning experience and inexperience. 5. Concerning a faithful man, and that it is rare to find a faithful man. 6. Concerning a multitude and the people of a city, and how one ought to conduct oneself among them. 7. Concerning a city filled with impiety.B 8. Concerning moral choice, and that God examines the choice for good or ill. 9. Concerning a deposit, and that one must keep it faithfully. 10. Concerning those in authority, and that they must preside diligently. 11. Concerning asylum and those who flee to inviolable places. 12. Concerning endurance and those who endure. 13. Concerning childbearing, and that it is a blessing from God and honorable according to the custom of the ancients. 14. Concerning the firstborn. 15. Concerning war, and law, and earthly cares. 16. Concerning observation, and that one should not observe days or seasons. 17. Concerning those who fall away. 18. Concerning one's country, and that everyone finds his own country desirable and lovely.
Thence follow the references for the titles starting with the same letter and located elsewhere.
Concerning the creation of man: it is located in the Alpha letter, title 1. Concerning promptings of the will: it is located here in the Alpha letter, title 3. Concerning protection, that one must protect those who are wronged: it is located here in the Alpha letter, title 4. Concerning obedience, that one must obey those in authority: it is located in the Alpha letter, title 7, which begins, Concerning those ruled. Concerning those who stumble and constantly ask for forgiveness: it is located here in the Alpha letter, title 11, which begins, Concerning those who sin. Concerning the double-minded: it is located here in the Delta letter, title 4, which begins, Concerning the double-minded. Concerning paying attention to oneself: it is located here in the Gamma letter, title 1, which begins, Concerning, "Know thyself." Concerning those in business: it is located here in the Epsilon letter, title 16, which begins, Concerning merchants. Concerning those lamenting: it is located here in the Theta letter, title 3, which begins, Concerning the dead. Concerning flatterers: it is located here in the Kappa letter, title 4, which begins, Concerning sycophants. Concerning those who lead those who encounter them astray: it is located in the same title. Concerning crooked affairs, that one must avoid them: it is located here in the Omicron letter, title 3, which begins, Concerning the good way. Concerning temptations: it is located here in the Sigma letter, title 7, which begins, Concerning scandals. Concerning feigned piety: it is located in the Upsilon letter, title 1, which begins, Concerning hypocrisy. Concerning temporal and eternal things: it is located in book 1 in the Pi letter. Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning children who honor their parents and concerning parricides.
concerning good and evil fathers; concerning good and evil rich men; concerning good and evil poor men; concerning evil men; concerning good and evil citizens; concerning those who labor and toil; concerning instruction and prudence; concerning the neighbor, and all that has been said about the neighbor; concerning loquacious people; concerning the covetous; concerning the poor in spirit; concerning gentleness; concerning rashness; concerning crafty people; concerning virginity; concerning fornication; concerning distraction; concerning gluttony and voracity; concerning a decorous life and a blameworthy life; concerning those who trust in God, and those who trust in men; concerning the discipline of God, and those who accept it and those who do not accept it; concerning faith in God.
Letter P. Title 1. Concerning those who wander. Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning the association and communion of good and evil men; concerning the zealous; concerning thought and counsel; concerning just and unjust weights; concerning understanding; concerning pardon and forgiveness toward one’s neighbor; concerning silence and those who are silent; concerning a good mouth and a harsh and unrelenting mouth; concerning those who accept advice and those who do not; concerning calumny; concerning the arrogant; concerning the crooked in way; concerning a good and evil conscience; concerning temperance; concerning the restraint of affairs. B To fulfill the promise to God; it is located in book 1, in the O letter, the beginning of which is, Concerning promise. Concerning human diligence, that it is useless if God does not will and cooperate; it is located in book 1, in the S letter, the beginning of which is, Concerning diligence.
Letter S. Title 1. Concerning a moderate state, and that one should be vexed by nothing. 2. Concerning worldly wisdom. 3. Concerning good and evil habit. 4. Concerning wise and prudent men, and that it is necessary for them to benefit their neighbors. 5. Concerning conducting oneself for the benefit of souls. 6. Concerning correction, and that we must be corrected by the misfortunes of others. 7. Concerning scandals, and that we must flee from scandals. 8. Concerning carnal men. 9. Concerning kinsmen; that we must assist them. 10. Concerning the scarcity and barrenness of good men. 11. Concerning those who frequent the houses of others. 12. Concerning a council; that one should not hold discussions while a hearing is taking place in a council. 13. Concerning occurrences, which the Greeks call chance. 14. Concerning soldiers. C 15. Concerning sympathy and compassion. From here are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. Concerning those who change and are altered; it is located here in the A letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning unstable people. Concerning the blind; it is located here in the K letter, title 10, the beginning of which is, Concerning the deaf. Concerning those who observe omens; it is located in the K letter, title 14, the beginning of which is, Concerning one who purifies in fire. Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning the slothful and the contemptuous.
Letter T. Title 1. Concerning tax collectors. 2. Concerning troublemakers. 3. Concerning honor, and that we ought to honor one another. 4. Concerning tyrants; and that those kings who act as tyrants die alone, but not their children. 5. Concerning craftsmen, and who discovered the crafts. 6. Concerning order and state, and that these must be observed everywhere. From here are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning those who honor parents and those who do not; concerning good and wise children, and evil and senseless children; concerning those quick to speak; concerning humility; concerning good and evil ways; concerning honor and those who have lived in virtue, and the punishment of those who have lived indecently. D
Letter Y. Title 1. Concerning hypocrisy, and irony, and pretended piety, and those who suffer from these things. 2. Concerning the abusive. 3. Concerning sleep and sleeplessness. 4. Concerning health, and that it surpasses all things. 5. Concerning suspicion, and that one must flee from the occasions that give birth to evil suspicions. 6. Concerning those who drink water. From here are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. Concerning submission; it is located here in the A letter.
A That one should be subject to rulers; it is located here in the A letter, title 7, the beginning of which is, Concerning those who are governed. Concerning the reception of thieves; it is located here, in the K letter, the beginning of which is, Concerning thieves (tit. 10). Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning the wise son and the foolish son; concerning the proud; concerning patience; concerning obedience and submission.
Letter Φ. Title 1. Concerning hospitality. 2. Concerning envy and those who are held by such a passion. 3. Concerning self-love, and that one should not justify or praise himself. 4. Concerning reputation, and that one should not believe everyone. 5. Concerning murderers. 6. Concerning the love of power, and that one should not leap randomly into positions of authority. 7. Concerning the censorious and those fond of blame, and that those who accuse others while doing the same things, condemn themselves. From here are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. Concerning those who commit suicide; it is located here in the A letter, title 29, the beginning of which is, Concerning hanging. Concerning one who has been impaled; it is located here in the A letter, title 31, the beginning of which is, Concerning one who has been impaled. Concerning disparagement; it is located here in the O letter, title 9, the beginning of which is, Concerning reproach. Scholion. Read also in the parallels concerning brotherly love; concerning good friends and evil friends; concerning the diligent; concerning prudence; concerning those who love honor and the miserly; concerning the love of money and the wealthy; concerning those who fear God and those who do not fear Him.
Letter Χ. Title 1. Concerning those rejoicing and being glad. 2. Concerning the vulgar and the irrational, that one should not joke with them. 3. Concerning money. From here are the cross-references of the titles beginning with the same letter. Concerning those rejoicing in praises; it is located here in the E letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning praises. Concerning widows; it is located here in the O letter, title 1, the beginning of which is, Concerning orphans. Concerning what we should and what it is necessary for us to do. That it is necessary for the good man to act toward everyone; it is located here in the A letter, title 5, the beginning of which is, Concerning benevolence. B That it is necessary to help those who are treated unjustly; it is located here in the A letter, title 19, the beginning of which is, Concerning those treated unjustly. That it is necessary that everything be said and done at the proper time; it is located here in the A letter, title 5, the beginning of which is, Concerning the proper time. That it is necessary for us to be watchful and concerned for our own salvation; it is located here in the N letter, title 3, the beginning of which is, Concerning being watchful. That it is necessary to decline crooked things; it is located here in the O letter, title 3, the beginning of which is, Concerning the good way. That it is necessary for those who remain to be faithful; it is located here in the P letter, title 12, the beginning of which is, Concerning perseverance. C That it is necessary to conduct oneself for the benefit of the soul; it is located here in the S letter, title 5, the beginning of which is, Concerning conduct. That it is necessary to be educated by the evils of others; it is located here in the S letter, title 6, the beginning of which is, Concerning self-control. That it is necessary to honor one another; it is located here in the T letter, title 3, the beginning of which is, Concerning honor. That it is necessary to keep order everywhere; it is located here in the T letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning order. That it is necessary for us always to have the end in mind; it is located in the Ω letter, Concerning the hour of death. Scholion. Read also in the parallels: that it is necessary to labor, for it holds benefit; that it is necessary to do everything with counsel; that it is necessary to bear the burdens of one's neighbor; that it is necessary to proclaim one's benefactors; that it is necessary to obey those who propose good things; that it is necessary to zealously desire good things; that it is necessary to cling to the best men and not to evil ones; that it is necessary to keep silence, for it procures the knowledge of God; that it is necessary to hope in God and not in men; concerning what we should not do and what it is not necessary for us to do. That it is not necessary to praise someone before testing him; it is located here in the E letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning praises. D That it is not necessary to call anyone happy before his death; it is located here in the E letter, title 24, the beginning of which is, Concerning happiness. That it is not necessary to trust someone just like that; it is located here in the O letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning not trusting. That it is not necessary to contend against those who are stronger; it is located here in the K letter, title 2, the beginning of which is, Concerning the stronger. That it is not necessary to speak just like that; it is located here in the L letter, title 5, the beginning of which is, Concerning speech. That it is not necessary to feast with evil men; it is located here in the O letter, title 9, the beginning of which is, Concerning a feast. That it is not necessary to abide by oaths given for an evil purpose; it is located in the O letter, title 4, the beginning of which is, Concerning an oath.
That one ought not reproach a calamity: it is set forth here in the A (letter) T, Title 9, the beginning of which is, "Concerning reproach." That one ought not despair of one's own salvation: it is set forth here in the A (letter) T, Title 24, the beginning of which is, "Concerning despair." Letter T. Concerning a slanderer. Letter O. Concerning the hour of death and our departure, and that we ought to prepare ourselves for it.
LEONTIUS THE PRESBYTER AND JOHN, OF SACRED MATTERS, BOOK TWO.
LEONTIUS THE PRESBYTER AND JOHN, OF SACRED MATTERS, BOOK TWO.
TITLE ONE.
Of the creation and construction of man: and that divine Scripture says man was made in the image of God, and that the soul does not pre-exist the body: and that God fashioned this flesh from the earth with His own undefiled hands, and breathed into it the spirit of life, and that—contrary to what the heretics say—the skins garments are not the flesh. B
1. From Genesis: "God said, 'Let us make man in our image and likeness.'" And a little later: "God made man; in the image of God He made him; male and female He made them."
Scholion. Let the reader thoughtfully observe how God provides the beginning of existence to man when He says, "Let us make"; for He speaks of one to be created in the future, and not of one already existing. The manner of this creation the God-taught Moses explains to us precisely, saying thus: "God fashioned man, dust from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and the man became a living soul." C
Scholion. What will the children of heretics and babblers say to these words of Moses, they who have not learned to subject their own minds to Scripture, but rather [to compel it toward their own corrupted purpose, distorting the meaning of the Scriptures, saying...] D
A to pervert their purpose, asserting that the soul exists before the body, and that the body is the garments of skin? Let those who seem wise to themselves and men of knowledge in their own eyes tell us: If this body of ours is nothing else but those garments of skin made after the transgression, what then is that which was formed by the hands of God from the earth and received the divine breath, which is to say, the soul? And what, then, is that which, after the transgression but before the garments of skin, heard in the sentence: "Earth you are, and to earth you shall return"? Furthermore, what will they say regarding the formation from Adam, or the taking of the woman? Was it after the transgression and from the garments of skin that the rib of Adam was made by God into a woman, or was it before the transgression and not from the garments of skin? Now, if they admit the truth, they will necessarily concede that this took place before the transgression, and thus their absurd assertion collapses. For "flesh of my flesh and bone of my bones" was the woman taken, as Adam testified. But if we admit the garments of skin, but not the flesh of Adam existing before them—and if those garments, which they claim to be the body of Adam, were made after the transgression—then the woman was also created after the transgression. How, then, is she condemned together with the man as a participant in the transgression? But these are mere trifles and savor of heathen stupidity. Let us therefore pass on to what follows, and leave these to be refuted by the great luminaries of the Church.
3. *And God cast a trance upon Adam*, etc.
*Scholion.* Let the enemies of the truth answer us: Did these things occur before the garments of skin, or not? For that which was taken from Adam was carnal and gross, and preceded the transgression. B Although they know well that these things happened before the transgression, they will nevertheless invent various pretexts. Our own opinion, however, is confirmed by the invention of the loincloths, before they were clothed in garments of skin, which the tunics succeeded. For Adam and his wife studied to cover the shameful parts of their flesh. In this way, the garments of skin became the beginning and rule of a second life for Adam, as they covered the flesh—which had been struck by the sentence of condemnation—in place of the leaves.
*From the Commentary on Genesis of Saint Hippolytus of Rome.* "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." Why so? Is it not, according to the opinion of some,
A that we read that three men were made, one spiritual, one animal, and one earthly? The matter is not so; but the entire narrative speaks of only one man. For indeed, "Let us make" is concerning the future; but that which says, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground," shows that the narrative is about one and the same man. Before he says, "Let there be," but now he makes him, and he narrates how he makes him.
*From the ninth epistle of Saint Clement of Rome.* [(5)]
To the end that we might also exist by his will, not being before we were created, and having been created, might enjoy those things which were created for our sake; for this reason we are men, and we possess mind and reason, having received them from him.
*From the work of Saint Peter, bishop of Alexandria and martyr, on the proposition that the soul does not pre-exist the body.* B [(5*)]
Having set forth in the first place the matters pertaining to the divinity and humanity of the second man from heaven, according to the blessed Apostle, we have thought it necessary also to set forth the matters pertaining to the first man, who was made earthly from the earth, in order to show that one and the same man was created at the same time, even if sometimes the inner man and the outer man are spoken of separately. For if, according to the saving Word, the one who made the things on the outside also made what is inside, yet he made both at once and at the same time, that is, on the very day when God said: C "Let us make man according to our image and likeness": from which it is manifest that he was not formed from the joining together of the body with some pre-existing pattern. For if the earth brought forth other living creatures as animals according to the command of the Creator, much more did the dust which God took from the earth receive vital power according to the will and operation of God.
*From the dissertation of Saint Eustathius, bishop of Antioch and confessor, on the soul, against the philosophers.* [(6)]
But since they clearly know that they are convicted by this, they try to escape by inventing the river of forgetfulness, which, as they say, whoever drinks of it forgets the actions of his life. That these things are fables and much D [remainder of page contains only notes].
A removed from philosophy, no one who thinks rightly seems to ignore. What, indeed, shall we say, O Pythagoreans and Platonists? Have you yourselves taken and drunk the water that causes forgetfulness? Or, on the contrary, have you escaped it by forgetting? If, therefore, you were able to avoid the draft of error, it is clear that many others could; but if, as you breathe the air that is common to all, you have greedily drunk the water of forgetfulness, how and from where do you bring forth trifles about souls? From where, in general, do you know the nature of those rivers? For if you have not experienced their need, you are ignorant of the distribution of these waters; or if, having come inside them by experience, you have destroyed the memory of their use through forgetfulness, you have spit out the knowledge of them. But in turning aside to this barbarous superstition, they have erred, having used the Egyptians as guides.
From the same dissertation.
That souls are not uncreated is demonstrated more clearly by the age of newborn infants. For if children, from their first birth, enjoyed perfect intelligence, that absurd opinion might perhaps deserve some credence; but since they lack mind and reason and intellect, it necessarily follows that souls of themselves are not uncreated. For we all know that the soul grows continuously along with the bulk of the body, not only in the size or smallness of the limbs, but also in other proportions of the mind. For newborns lack all intellect and will entirely, but as they grow slowly and gradually, they receive mind, intellect, and reason. But if these things pertain to the soul and it receives better additions easily, there is no doubt that the soul grows together with the body. Just as, therefore, the powers of the body increase little by little, so also the soul cultivates the mind. For whoever does not advance to the better, but remains foolish, possesses souls that are imperfect because of some corrupted part, just as those who suffer from the disease of insanity. And B a little later: Certainly the body of the first-formed man, having been fashioned, lay dead and immovable, though it was most excellently composed in its limbs and frame, and adorned most fittingly with form and beauty—as indeed, having been produced by the Creator himself, it was a C prototype image of God and D
A a most excellent likeness, yet devoid of sense, voice, and breath. But the moment God, as Creator, breathed into his face, he immediately began to move, and from that point he walks, breathes, speaks, rules, reasons, acts, and administers.
From the Holy Athanasius, from his Homily on Holy Pascha (11).
God thus made man; and as God is good, he made man just as great and such as he is. Do not consider his present infirmity, but his primary state. For he made him after his own image, in such a way that he could rival even the stars. This is apparent from the fact that he placed him naked in paradise, standing in no need of clothing. For shame had not yet been poured over his face, such that man would have need of a covering; but, as Scripture testifies B (Gen. 11, 25), he made man and set him in paradise, and they were naked and were not ashamed. Nay, just as the sun and the moon have beauty from their nakedness, so too it was granted to men to shine with natural grace. Since, therefore, God had bestowed such great benefits upon him, and had placed him in paradise to enjoy a soft life, and had heaped upon him all the riches of grace, he wished also to stir up in him a sense of what is right, and judged that his own kindness ought to be honored by obedience. And since he knew it could not happen that the gift would be preserved, lest he should take flight and worship something else besides God the Giver, he gave him a law as a guardian of his nature, so that by the C remembrance and worship of the Lawgiver, he might be guarded as if by certain beneficial remedies. Furthermore, he promised him immortality if he observed the law, but death if he violated it. Now, as things stood thus, that which all know came to pass; and, persuaded by the envy of the devil to transgress the law, man became subject to corruption and was expelled from paradise. Then, as he multiplied in numbers, he lived a wicked life and gave himself over to every impiety and intemperance; for which reason the prophets cried out concerning his former dignity and subsequent indignity: "Man, being in honor, did not understand; therefore he was compared to the mindless beasts and was numbered among them."
From the Blessed Cyril of Alexandria, from his work against Diodorus (12).
"But, O wise man," I would say, "soul and body D are for the creation of man; and one does not exist earlier than the other."
A
Eleutherius of Tyana from his books against Apollinaris, chapter 25.
For man, consisting of an intellectual soul and a sensible body, is known to have one substance; because neither has subsistence earlier than the other, nor does it preserve the account of nature according to which it began to exist and thus entered into life. We define the nature of one living being.Antiochus of Ptolemais from his discourse on Adam.
God, in creating the other four-footed animals, brought forth their souls B along with their bodies; but in forming man, He first fashions the instrument of the body, and then, having created the soul, He placed it within, so that in this He might show the excellence of man. Since the other animals and beasts, when dissolved by death, have their soul destroyed together with their body—for there He speaks of their genesis, where the whole was to be destroyed again—but having formed man, He takes the body from the earth and breathes into it the soul. And a little later: He fashions the body first; and first man received a dead image; and then he received a living image, and a living C character, and the living energy of the soul; he was shown first dead, then living; first He fashioned a dead body, into which man was to end; then when He had finished the dead body, He then bestowed the living character; and He does not make the soul before the body, lest it become a spectator of the things being done; He does not permit the soul to be present at the creation, lest it boast itself to have been a collaborator with God.Gennadius of Constantinople from his second dissertation to Parthenius.
One could not find a nature in the created much lower if it is compared with the nature of the Creator. Moreover, Elisabeth, or any other woman, is prevented from bringing forth the soul into the light along D with the body: first, because the soul received existence posterior to the flesh and not from elsewhere; second, because it is circumscribed in its subsistence by the body, so as to change place together with it. Nor, as infants progress out of the womb, are the souls included in the body; but when birth occurs, they leave the womb together with the body.Clement from the eighth Stromateis.
God created us not pre-existing; for it was necessary...for us to know where we were, if we pre-existed, and how and why we have come here; but if we did not pre-exist, the only author of generation is God. As, therefore, He created us when we were not, so does He preserve us when we have been made, by His own grace.
From the blessed Antipater of Bostra, from his work against Origen, ch. 7.
A He who created man from the beginning created them male and female; not first, according to him, minds, and then men from sins; but from the beginning, creating, He created men, as the voice of the Lord teaches, saying: "Male and female He created them." For both being cast down together from the beginning by God, so too did they receive from Him the blessing of increase, according to that which was said: "God blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply"; which we do not hear as a mere word, but see as a work completed and carried out until the end of this age. And from one blood has been made every nation of men, B dwelling upon the face of the earth, according to the word of the Apostle; not multiplied from sins and from a fall, as the Scripture of these men teaches, but from the blessing of God, as the prophet showed. For if the race of men is multiplied from transgression and the cooling of the good, would not other curses more justly be spoken? And would not the race of men be constituted not from the blood of one man, but from many, and as many as through the pouring down happened to be born? For it would have no room, either from one alone, before the two who flowed down and were condemned to bodies, C or after this, when sensation could also inspire fear, to say that so many myriads flowed down, such that they inhabit the whole face of the earth. But if, of many flowing down under one, only one thus far was condemned to a body, in no way can the justice of God demanded by those people be preserved, if, when many are worthy of such a punishment having sprung from one, only one has been condemned thus far to be bound in the flesh, with the others having deferred such a punishment.If, however, they wish to understand something else by Adam and Eve, D in the first place they stand opposed to ecclesiastical preaching, inasmuch as the Church preaches nothing else about them but that they were the first and only human beings, and that from them the whole race of men has its origin; just as they themselves also confessed, as we have also set forth in other places, saying, to wit, the evangelical doctrine.
A that of those who have existed from the creation and construction of the world, the just are God, Adam, Seth, Enoch, Abraham. But then they are found to be contradicting themselves; for they judge Abraham to have been a man, and they understand the nation which according to history has sprung from him to be likewise men born of him. If, therefore, they should wish to interpret Adam allegorically, the same argument will apply in every respect to Seth, to Enoch, to Noah, to Abraham; and, to speak concisely, also to the rest of the prophets and to the apostles, and to us ourselves, and we would all be found to be something else, and not truly existing. For if Adam, from whom all have their origin, was not a man, it is manifest that neither are his successors. For the prophet, having taken up the same sequence, assigned one and the same order to all, having placed the beginning from him, as the history written by him declares, which the divine evangelist also, following, confirmed the truth of the history, having begun in the genealogy of Lord Christ from Joseph, who was called the father of Lord Christ according to the flesh: then, going further back and recording each progenitor, he traversed the whole history in succession, relying upon the Mosaic tradition, and having commemorated Abraham and Enoch, he arrived at Adam himself, and from thence to the Creator of all: of Enoch, of Seth, of Adam, of God; having left not a particle B of allegory in the succession, but having indicated one and the same order from Adam up to Joseph, whence it is apparent that the same order is preserved even unto us.
Now how can it be said that minds emanating fall into the shackles of the flesh, where they say a swarm of pleasures lies in wait? For it cannot be that even one alone of those that then emanated should be called worthy of such condemnation, or that, many emanating, only one should be condemned, and that it should have received from God himself the blessing of increase. For all indeed, those who did not fall, and who were sent into ministry on account of those who were to inherit salvation, knew of the condemnation that had taken place, and rendered themselves more secure so that they too might not fall; and there was not, after the knowledge of the punishment, such an increase of the fallen. For if they did not know, first of all it must be asked: how, if they did not know, do these know? Then, furthermore: how were they sent into ministry, not knowing the dispensation pertaining to men? And how, when many were falling at the same time, could such an increase of men have taken place, so that not from all, but from one blood, the whole surface of the earth was filled, and that the thing itself be called a condemnation? And these things are recounted in the holy Scripture between the promises of God and the benefits pertaining to the abundance of offspring, as we shall demonstrate, God willing, through the saints commemorated in the sacred Text, as those who C
A know B both that offspring is a prize and gift of God, and that to be accounted worthy of childbearing is a matter for prayer and blessing, while to be deemed unworthy of it is a matter of curse and reproach.
First, that Adam begot in accordance with his own likeness and image; and it does not say, "He emanated according to Adam's image," but that "Adam begot." And Eve, the mother of us all, manifesting her joy and grateful spirit, said: "We have acquired a man through God." Likewise, concerning the birth of Seth, it says: "God has raised up for me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain killed." Now, the prophet would not have written these things in this way if he had considered the birth of man to be a condemnation and a fall. Nor again would Enoch—who, on account of his supreme virtue, did not taste death—have begotten children if he had believed the existence of the human race to be a condemnation rather than a blessing from God. And if Enoch, who had been translated on account of his supreme virtue and knowledge, did not know this, how have you come to know it instead of them? And what of great Abraham, who lamented to God, saying: "Master, what will you give me? I am departing childless." And countless other things which the divine prophets declare prove that the multiplication of the human race is a gift of God, and not a condemnation, and that it is a curse to be diminished; as is shown by the insult that occurred to Abraham, or rather to Sarah, which was suffered by Abimelech, when by divine wrath every offspring was restrained. For we read: "The Lord restrained every womb in the house of Abimelech because of Sarah, the wife of Abraham." And many other similar things. That none of these things can be removed from the history, nor can anything other than what is written be understood, is manifest to all; if not, then neither would Moses ever have been a man descended from Abraham, nor would the people have departed from Egypt through him.
And after other matters: Let us return to the subject at hand. For it is a wonder how they have not ceased to descend to this day with such great force; indeed, as the peoples flourish, so also does the descent of minds into men flourish; and as the peoples labor, so the descent also labors. For what? Is it then possible to conceive that the emanation of minds compels men to marriage? Or do the marriages of men bring about their descent, so that something perfect may result from the nuptials? Furthermore, do the descended minds enter simultaneously with the infusion of the sperm, or do they enter the female womb afterward? Are they waiting while wandering on the earth until there occurs an act of intercourse, so that they may enter the womb, or are they sent down from the heavens at the opportune time? That they receive a soul in the womb is clear from the fact that they are born, and no less from the fact that the Lawgiver said that the formed fetus is a man, and that he is liable to the penalty of death who attempts to destroy it. Now, if the souls wander on the earth before they clothe themselves with a body in the female womb, in what place do they dwell, and what do they do, and how
do they come to crave being clothed in a body of this kind, or such a one, if they do not know these things? Are they still A existing as disembodied intellects when they arrive on the earth, or have they first received another body? And if they are indeed disembodied, they are still intellects, not yet embodied; but if they have not yet been embodied, they are still intellects that are known to have fallen from heaven, and that they must be bound into a body, and they are able to yearn for or select a mother—for they would not be disembodied if they knew these things.
If, however, they exist in some body, having flowed away from their primary state and fallen to the earth, do they put on this earthly body along with the first one, or do they cast that one off and enter into this one? And if they took this one on along with the first body, they now have two bodies, since they have clothed themselves in a body while already having a body. And if they knew what they were going to do when they endeavored to enter the womb (for they say that every body is accessible to them), B they would have greatly feared the matter and would have desired to enter into a beautiful and robust body and be born without peril and pain; just as those who are now bound, according to them, to this heavy body know that they are to die, and send up prayers to God that death might come to them with gentleness and mercy. For if, being placed in this heavy body, they know these things, they would know much more that they were to suffer this; but if they did not know, then flesh is not the cause of their ignorance, because they were ignorant even before they put on flesh.
But if they arrived having cast off the first body, it must be asked above all: at what time did they cast it off? Before the womb or in the womb? And did they lay it aside with some difficulty, or with ease? And are they separated from it according to a divine decree, as they are from these bodies? Furthermore, does the soul desire to become a human, just as it C also desires marriage? If it turns away from it out of necessity, it is well, and is not worthy of condemnation; but if it desires it, it is not a condemnation, but a gain, since gain is nothing other than that which yields to the pleasure of each. And how has such a corrupt descent not ceased, especially after the incarnation of the Lord, but rather emanations occur continuously, nor is the corruption of those falling held back? And why are there more falling in nations given to polygamy, but fewer in those who conduct themselves soberly regarding marriage, so that the intensity and relaxation of the falls depends upon polygamy or monogamy?
And these things are so, if souls dwell on the earth before they clothe themselves with a body in the womb; but if they are sent down from heaven, then in the case of everyone D who enters into marriage, or commits adultery, or simply fornication, the intellect is...
A led astray, unless there be a genital impediment. But we, having bidden such an opinion farewell, and obeying the divine Scriptures and the tradition of the preaching, let us understand: "How great are your works, O Lord! In wisdom you have made them all." For looking through every generation, by that one decree of God, "Increase and multiply," we see our nature running its course to growth, and how the law of God, remaining with the race, operates in its progress without hindrance. Considering also this, that from a small drop of blood falling into the workshop of nature, such a variety of members and forms, such a harmony of composition and diversity of beauty, and such an order, as nature indeed brings, is perfected in the best way, we shall exclaim with all astonishment: "My bone was not hidden from you, which you made in secret." Trusting, or rather knowing, the constitution of bodies to be formed from the flux of bodies, and believing the creation of souls to be according to that first decree of God, "Increase," by the law of nature the flesh is animated. For we know no other nature created besides the first; for God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he began to make; nor does he create another nature besides the first, so that we should say it is brought down with the seed; but the body being formed and perfected by the primordial decree of God, it is animated by a natural consequence, as he who revealed it knows.
TITLE III. On Free Will.
That free will has been given to us by God, and that to be saved or lost is in our power.
"Behold, the kingdom of God is within you." B Scholion. By this saying, the Lord signified our free will, and that it is in our power to desire and strive to inherit the kingdom prepared for those who love him. For those who say that there is no kingdom of heaven, and that these things are not to be understood of it, we turn away from as destroyers of the Scriptures. For the Lord teaches us that there is a kingdom of heaven, and that it depends on us, that is, on our free will, whether we wish to follow or flee it; and in another place he says: "From the days of John the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent take it by force."
"Do you not know that to whom you present yourselves slaves for obedience, you are slaves to whom you obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?"
Scholion. Observe carefully how the Apostle has taught us that the choice of both good and evil is in us.
From the treatise of Saint Methodius On the Resurrection.
Man, who enjoys free will and has the right of self-determination, and C
A, as I said, received the faculty for choosing the good. Having heard from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: “You shall not eat from it; for on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death” (Gen. ii, 17), he yielded to the devil, who was tempting him to eat from it, and who, with deceitful cunning and in various ways, was persuading him to disobedience; he thus violated the commandment of God, and it became for him a stumbling block, and a snare, and an obstacle. For God did not create evil, nor is He at all, in any way or manner, the cause of evil. But whatever, though it came into being from Him as free-willed, is not kept or observed according to the law—which He Himself justly prescribed not to be kept—is called evil; and it is a most grievous damage to transgress, of one’s own accord, the boundaries of justice toward God.
From the same treatise.
We said, indeed, that the root of wickedness is not to be completely extirpated, but that we must take care not to let it grow and bear fruit to the point of excess. For the total and complete removal and destruction of the root itself, as we have already said, B comes about by God through the dissolution of the body; but the partial removal, to the extent that it does not bear fruit or sprout, comes from us. And for this reason, he who has nurtured it to increase and size, rather than making it barren as far as lies within his power, and has not filled it up, must necessarily pay the penalty, because, being of his own jurisdiction and having the power for this, he chose to honor the harmful over the beneficial. So let no one, being self-responsible, reproach the divine nature with an unbridled tongue, as if it did not distribute the rewards of C wickedness or virtue to each with a just balance.
From the same treatise, On Free Will.
I do not think it should be said that men were made evil by God; rather, I say that the first man was made of his own jurisdiction, that is, free—from whom, also, his descendants inherited the same liberty. I contend, therefore, that man was created free, and I would never concede that he is in servitude. For this is the most beautiful gift that he received from God. For other things serve the divine command out of necessity, and they cannot do anything other than that for which they were created; wherefore we do not deem them worthy of praise while they obey the Lord in this way, D nor do they enjoy any better hope, in that they perform what is commanded even against their will. Man, however, obeys whom he wishes. For man received the power to enslave himself, not being overcome by any necessity of nature, nor being deprived of the capability which was better for him; for whose sake, I say, it was granted, so that some addition might be made to his prior goods—which comes to him from obedience to the Better One, and is demanded as a debt from the Creator. For I do not say that man was created for destruction, but for better things. For if he had been made like one of the elements, or other things that serve God in such an insensate way, he would no longer receive a reward worthy of his choice, but would be as a tool
liable to blame for things poorly done; for the one using it would be the cause of these. Nor, moreover, could man know the better, having not known its author, but only that for which he was born. A I say, therefore, that God, choosing to honor man and desiring him to become knowledgeable of better things, gave him the power to be able to do what he wills; and He exhorts his power toward better things, not by taking away again the self-determining faculty, but by wishing to reveal what is better. For the power to act is present with him, and he receives the commandment; but God exhorts him to turn the intention of that power toward the better. For just as a father exhorts a child who has the power to learn his lessons, and urges him to apply himself more to his studies, showing him that this is better, he does not remove the child's power to act—even if he does not wish to learn willingly—so too, it does not seem to me that God, in urging man to be persuaded by the facts, removes his power of intention to be able to refrain from being persuaded by the facts. For He reveals the very principle of such an exhortation, namely, that He did not remove the power; but He commands it so that man may be able to enjoy the better things. For this follows upon being persuaded by God’s commandment. Therefore, He does not wish to issue a command in order to take away the power He gave, but in order to bestow something better, as to one worthy to attain greater things, inasmuch as he obeyed God while having the power not to obey. I say that man was created self-determining, B not as if some evil already existed, the power to choose which man received if he so willed, but only for the sake of the power to obey or not to obey God; for this was what the self-determining faculty intended. And man, having been made, receives a commandment from God, and from that point evil already begins; for he does not obey the divine commandment, and this—and this alone—is the evil which then began to exist. Nor can anyone say that this [evil] is unbegotten, since he who made it is a created being. But you will surely ask, whence did this act of disobedience arise? But it is clearly set forth in divine Scripture. Wherefore I deny that man was created such by God; I say, rather, that it happened to him through some instruction. For man had not received such a nature. For if it were so, this would not have come to pass in him through instruction, since his nature would be such of its own accord. C But a certain divine voice says that man has learned evil things; I say, therefore, that he is taught to disobey God; for this is the one and only evil, and it comes to pass contrary to the will of God; for man is not taught evil of himself. He, therefore, who teaches evil is the dragon, etc.
From Saint Irenaeus, from the fourth book of the Refutation and Overthrow of Knowledge Falsely So-Called
If anyone should be unwilling to obey the Gospel, although it is permitted to him who D is wicked by nature, etc., until “but not by forcing him,” this passage exists in the Maurist edition of Saint Irenaeus, pp. 281, 282, taken from Damascene and Sirmond’s notes to Ennodius, Epistolarum, Book II, 19. The remaining part is unpublished in Greek, and corresponds to the Latin interpretation on p. 282, line 9, from the end.
A even if it is within his power, it is not expedient; for disobedience to God and the rejection of the good, while it lies with man, brings no common injury or damage. And for this reason Paul says: "All things are lawful for me, but not all things are expedient," thereby explaining the freedom of man—whereby all things are lawful, God not compelling him—and showing what is expedient, so that we may not use our freedom as a cloak for malice; for this is not expedient.
Post-excerpt from the sermon of Saint Basil, that God is not the cause of evils
B Scholion. The text refers to the free will which man received at creation, not to the pre-existence of souls, but rather to that which is exalted and divine according to virtue.
E Macarii homilia in sanctum Paulum
God does not communicate all things to us by a direct path; for since He wills us to be good, but not by necessity and force, He required methods of His own—not because of any inability of His, God forbid! but because of our weakness. For He is able to accomplish whatever He wills by a mere nod; but we, having once become masters of ourselves, have not consented to obey Him in all things. If, therefore, He were to draw us against our will, He would take away what He previously gave: namely, the faculty of free will.
From his commentary on that: « Non in homine via ejus »
Since we know that it is in our power to will and to run, let us, by willing and running, draw God to our aid; and having drawn Him, let us arrive at the end of our affairs. Let us arise, therefore, brothers, and apply all effort to the salvation of our souls, so that, having spent a short time here, we may enjoy C immortal goods in the eternal age.
From the fourteenth disputation of Saint Cyril of Alexandria against Julian
It is possible for every man to live happily and blessedly.
From the same, out of the same book
Man can approach voluntarily and of his own accord that which seems good to him. For it pleased the Creator of all things that it should be so, that they who have applied themselves to good works should be praised, while those who have traveled along another path should justly and deservedly be visited with reproach.
From disputation XV
The human mind is directed by its own will, and proceeds of its own accord to perform its actions, since this has seemed good to God, the Creator of all things. Wherefore, even if any one among us has been made a partaker of the Holy Spirit, who dwells in him through holy baptism, he is not on that account D
A to cease living according to his own will and as it may please him, but has been inclined, as though with free reins, both toward the good and toward the contrary.
*From Disputation XVIII.* Every mortal has received the reins of his own will to direct, and is borne of his own accord to this or that, that is, either to virtue or to wickedness.
*From the Homily on Pascha by Clement.* I consider it in a certain way necessary that God should not strike and compel man with extraordinary measures, he whom He wishes to be saved of his own accord, while he seeks all the occasions solely from the law; God therefore does not use force, nor is it fitting that a free soul, like inanimate statues, be moved by an external cause.
B *From the tenth book of the first introduction of Eusebius.* Nature produced the human race to recognize the seeds of virtue and vice, and allowed the mind to adhere to either, since it gave it free will and the faculty of judging and choosing. Since, therefore, the mind carries within itself by nature the shoots of virtue and vice, it cannot, even if it should fall into the abyss of malice, fail to reverence virtue, because the conscience will be confounded when it has preferred vice. This, moreover, is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that no one can endure to become an accuser of his own malice, but rather, as much as possible, strives to hide and cover up those things which he has perpetrated secretly against duty. And each person is so disposed that he is affected differently toward those who are beneficent than toward those who attempt to harm him. The natural law, which ordains that no one should do to others what he would not wish to be done to himself, teaches us excellently regarding the knowledge of good and evil, and becomes a self-taught teacher for each person.
C *From the dissertation on free will by the blessed Eleutherius, bishop of Tyana.* God made man free and independent, so that what he himself had committed through carelessness and disobedience, God might now grant to him through His own benevolence and mercy, if man should behave accordingly. For just as man, by disobeying, brought death upon himself, so, by obeying the will of God, he is able to procure for himself eternal life; for God has given us holy commandments, by which anyone who follows them can be saved, and having attained the resurrection, can inherit immortality.
D *From the fourth book of the allegorical interpretation of the sacred laws, by Philo.* Behold, He says, I have set before thy face things that conflict: life and death, good and evil; choose life that thou mayest live. A beautiful thing, indeed, that when the Creator proposes both, the soul should be able to choose the better. But it is more beautiful that it should not choose, but that the Creator should impel it and make it better. For essentially, the human mind does not choose the good by itself, but through providence.
A For it is God who grants the best things to those who are worthy. For B since there are two main heads in the lawgiver, the one that God does not govern all things as a man, the other that He instructs and disciplines as a man: when he constructs the second point, that [He acts] as a man, he introduces also what is in our power, as if [man] were capable of knowing, willing, choosing, and avoiding something. But when he constructs the first and better point, that He does not assign the powers and causes of all things to God as a man would—leaving no work for the created being, but representing it as inactive and merely suffering—he shows, whenever he interprets [things] through others, that God knew those who are His own, and brought His saints to Himself. If, however, both elections and rejections come strictly from the one Cause, why do you advise me, O lawgiver, to choose life and death as if I were endowed with free will? But perhaps he might reply: "Accept these as introductory; for they are said to those not yet initiated into the great mysteries, namely, concerning the rule and power of the Unbegotten, and concerning the extreme worthlessness of the begotten."
TITLE IV. Concerning the unstable and infirm state of human affairs, and to what man and his life should be compared; and that present things are vain and weaker than a shadow.
*From the commentary of the presbyter Hesychius of Jerusalem on the Psalms.*
Human affairs wither more quickly than a shadow.
*From the seventh and eighth books of Philo’s Allegorical Interpretation of the Sacred Laws.*
In truth, we must not rejoice in the abundance of fortune and wealth, nor in the splendor of glory, nor at all in any of the external things, which are cold and unstable and bring destruction upon themselves. Nor [should we rejoice] in strength and health or other bodily faculties, C since all these things are common to us even with the most base, and not rarely, because of their instability and infirmity, they bring inevitable ruin upon those who possess them.
TITLE VIII. Concerning anarchy.
*From the first chapter of the Blessed Dionysius of Alexandria’s book, "On Refutation and Apology."*
Anarchy and sedition are rather [a sign of] polyarchy arising from mutual competition.
*It exists in Damascenus, p. 359, but without the title of the work.*
TITLE X. Concerning sinners.
*From the tract of Saint Basil on Cain.*
The most grievous punishment for those who think rightly is separation from God. D
*From the epistle of Dionysius of Alexandria to Aphrodisius.*
To be deprived of the care and providence of God is the most miserable of all things.
by God the most destructive, and the greatest punishment for the greatest injustices? This it causes, to be desolate and orphaned of God; for he who is deprived of his helper and savior is straightway delivered into the power of enemies and robbers. A
TITULUS XI. Concerning those who sin and often seek forgiveness.
From the doctrine of Saint Peter of Alexandria.
Miserable me, I did not remember that God observes the mind and hears the voice of the soul; I became complicit in sin, saying to myself: "God is merciful and will sustain me"; and since I was not struck down immediately, I did not cease, but rather I despised the divine tolerance and exhausted the long-suffering of God. BFrom Didymus's commentary on the third chapter of Isaiah.
Then forgiveness of sins is granted, when works of repentance are brought forth. For if someone does things that are blameworthy and punishable, even though he pretends to repent, he will not obtain forgiveness while he still occupies himself with forbidden things.From the first book of Philo’s Questions on Exodus.
Often the wicked lie, and their passions do not allow them to speak the truth when falsehood prevails.From Abbot Cassian’s book on the eight logismoi.
In the sixth place, we have the struggle against the spirit of acedia, which is yoked to and cooperates with the spirit of sadness; this is a fierce and most heavy demon, and it is always attacking the monk. It falls upon the monk at the sixth hour, C producing in him listlessness and trembling, and working up hatred, both toward the place itself, and toward the brothers living with him, and toward every task, and toward the very reading of Holy Scripture, while also suggesting to him thoughts of relocation; and as if, unless he moves himself to other places, all his time and labor will become in vain. In addition to all these things, it also excites a hunger in him around the sixth hour, such as he would not have felt even after a three-day fast or a very long journey or the heaviest labor. Finally, it suggests to him the opinion that he can by no other means be freed from this grave malady unless he goes out continuously and associates with the brothers, under the pretext of helping and visiting the sick. But if D it cannot deceive him with these things, it overwhelms him with listlessness, becoming more bothersome and importunate to him, so that it can be expelled in no other way than by prayer, abstinence from idle talk, meditation on the Holy Scriptures, and firmness in temptations. For unless it finds him fortified with these weapons, having pierced him with its own arrows, it renders him unstable and wandering, slothful and idle, who, visiting monasteries, cares for nothing other than where feasts and drinking bouts take place: for the slothful mind in such vain thingsConsequently, it binds him to worldly affairs and little by little lures him with these harmful diversions, until it casts him out utterly from his monastic profession.
B The divine Apostle, knowing this disease to be most grave, and wishing like a physician to root it out from our souls, demonstrates the causes from which it principally springs, writing thus to the Thessalonians: "We command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you withdraw yourselves from every brother who walks inordinately and not according to the tradition which they received from us. For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us, because we were not restless among you, nor did we eat any man's bread for nothing, but in labor and toil, night and day working, that we might not burden any of you: not that we have not the power, but that we might give ourselves as a pattern to you to imitate us. For even when we were with you, this we commanded you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. For we hear that some among you walk restlessly, working nothing, but acting curiously. And to those who are such, we command and beseech in the Lord Jesus Christ, that with silence working, they eat their own bread." Let us hear how wisely the Apostle points out to us the causes of sloth. For he calls those who do not work "inordinate," indicating by this one word a great malice. For the inordinate man becomes even wicked; and he is headlong in speech, and prone to calumny, and inept for silence, and a slave to sloth. He commands, therefore, that they withdraw from him, that is, that they separate themselves from a pernicious disease; and he adds, "and not according to the tradition which they received from us," by which words he implies that they are proud and are despisers and subverters of the apostolic traditions.
C Then he proceeds: "Neither did we eat any man's bread for nothing, but in labor and toil, night and day working, that we might not burden any of you." The doctor of the Gentiles, the herald of the Gospel, he who was caught up to the third heaven, he who said that the Lord commanded that those who preach the Gospel should live from the Gospel, works in labor and toil night and day, that he might burden no one: how then shall we, neglecting work, busy ourselves with bodily rest—we, I say, to whom neither the preaching of the Gospel nor the care of Churches is committed, but solely the concern of our own soul? Then, intending to demonstrate D the harm that arises from idleness, he adds: "Working nothing, but acting curiously." For idleness begets curiosity, and curiosity begets inordinateness, and inordinateness begets all wickedness. And indicating its remedy, he infers: "And to those that are such, we command, that with silence working, they"
A eat their own bread." And with more reproof he says: "If any would not work, neither let him eat."
Being instructed by these apostolic precepts, the holy Fathers in Egypt permit monks to be idle at no time, especially the younger ones. For they know that by the assiduity of labor they both drive away acedia and procure food for themselves, and help those in need; for they do not work merely for their own necessity, but they provide from their own labor for strangers, the poor, and those in prison, believing that such almsgiving becomes a holy sacrifice acceptable to God. And the Fathers say this, that he who works is often attacked by one demon and afflicted by him, but the idle man is taken captive by countless spirits.
Moreover, it is good in this place to make mention of a saying of Abba Moses, the most approved among the Fathers, which I heard from his own mouth. For when I was lingering for a short time in the desert, exhaustion seized me; wherefore, approaching him, I said: "It is a wonder in what manner yesterday, being oppressed by acedia and having suffered much, I was not B set free from it until, having left my cell, I went to Abba Paul." To this the Abba Moses answered me in this manner: "Well done! You did not cast it off, but rather you gave yourself over and subjected yourself to it. Know, therefore, that it will attack you with greater vehemence as a deserter, unless you strive to overcome it henceforth through patience, prayer, and the work of your hands."
TIT. Concerning things impossible.
Clement, from the homily on Pascha.
That which is opposite to the same thing, in the same relation and proportion, cannot occur in the same thing.From the eighth book of the Stromata.
In one soul, two opposite motions cannot exist at the same thing.From the blessed Dionysius of Alexandria, from the letter to Aphrodisius.
To all men who are disposed in opposition to one another—that is, who are either evil or good—the same things cannot be equally dear.Philo, from the fourth book of the allegorical interpretation of the sacred laws.
It is impossible for the love of the world to coexist with the love of God, just as it is impossible for light and darkness to coexist D with one another.TIT. Concerning those affixed to the stake.
Scholion.
Those who have been affixed to the stake by judicial sentence ought to be delivered to burial.TIT. Concerning this life and the world.
From the blessed Dionysius of Alexandria, from the first book of the Nature.
The world has opened its workshop and theater, school and gymnasium, for men, that that [man] and things in itA by diligently considering, as much as possible, we may be drawn to the knowledge of them.
*From the same, from the letter on the gymnasium.* Just as in intermittent diseases one is not said to have recovered health when there is an intermission, but when the end of the disease arrives, so life cannot be called happy, even if it is sometimes free from pain, but is rather burdensome to all, since it is often invaded by pains.
*From the blessed Cyril, from the 14th discourse from the works Against Julian.* The author of the Psalms urbanely describes the bitter estuary and confusion of this life and the things pertaining to it, saying: "This sea, great and wide" (Ps. CIII, 25).
*From Philo, from the third book of Questions on Genesis, concerning this life and world.* All sublunar nature is full of wars and of evils both internal and external.
TIT. On the Voluntary.
*From the blessed Dionysius, from the second book on Promises.* The slothful easily shake off a yoke imposed by necessity; for everything involuntary is burdensome, and that which they have undergone under compulsion is easily...
TIT. On the saying: "Know thyself."
*From Clement, from the homily on Easter.* He who knows himself is the place and throne of God.
*Mark the Monk.* Of all things, it is most difficult to know and heal oneself, since self-love is innate in men and steals away the judgment of truth.
TIT. On Agriculture.
*Cyril of Alexandria, from the 16th discourse Against Julian.* Those who are accustomed to tilling the field best are deservedly to be praised.
TIT. On those who impugn knowledge.
*From Philo, from the Questions on Genesis.* Meditation is the nurse of knowledge.
*From Theotimus of Scythia, from the book on the doctrine of the Savior.* Virtue lacking meditation in its works is most quickly destroyed by circumstances.
*From Didymus, from the treatise on incorporeals.* From much meditation and exercise, the violence and ferocity of the passions is weakened.
TIT. On Teachers.
*From Athenodorus, from the book on Hebraism.* Those skilled in letters contend that it is easier to imbue with doctrines a soul that has not yet learned anything contrary to the doctrines, than one which...
A is already imbued with contrary opinions; for the former is like clean tablets, easily receiving what is written upon them, but the latter like tablets already inscribed, upon which a double care must be expended: first to erase the previous contents, and then to write the new ones.
From the Epistle of Dionysius of Alexandria to Aphrodisius.
It is not a sufficient exhortation to sit in a high place like a spectator and say, "Show yourself a man!" but you must descend yourself into the arena and labor, and then invite others to imitate you.
From Philo, from the eighth and ninth books of the Allegory of the Sacred Laws.
The rod is the symbol of instruction; for it is impossible for a person to be admonished and imbued with knowledge without shame and sometimes being corrected by rebukes. — Those teachers are foolish who do not direct their instruction according to the capacities of their students, but according to their own superior learning, not knowing how far instruction differs from ostentation. For he who, glorying in the abundance of his own knowledge, makes a show of what he has gathered over a long time, does not attempt to teach, but, B like one who displays the works of painters and sculptors to the people, courts popular acclaim. For even a good physician does not look to the extent of his art, but to the nature of him whom he must heal, and he does not present all that he has acquired through his art—for those things are countless—but, aiming at the measure of what is needed by the patient, he proffers what is fit.
From Philo, from the ninth chapter of the Questions on Genesis.
A teacher cannot teach in the same way that a student can learn, since the one is perfect and the other is imperfect; therefore, the capacities of the one being instructed ought to be investigated. — One must first listen, then act; for we learn not for the sake of learning, C but for the sake of acting.
From Philo, from the book on Irrational Animals.
Those who imbue others with their own knowledge teach; those who eloquently recount with lucky memory what they have heard from others interpret.
From the same.
Pay attention, you who teach, and investigate accurately the faculty of the one learning; for he is foolish who speaks to a deaf man, and he is vain who admonishes a stone; and you will be guilty of sin if you do not consider how and when you ought to deliver a word.
From Philo, from the Questions on Exodus.
If you wish to rid a student newly introduced D of all ignorance and to imbue him with all knowledge at once, the opposite of what you intend will happen to you. For ignorance cannot be taken away except by time and the acquisition of doctrine; but for both—both cutting away and building up—a great deal of labor and difficulty is required, so that in truth, if we wish to make any progress, it is necessary that we quietly and moderately
remove ignorance and advance knowledge in proportion. Thus also a good physician does not apply to a sick man on one day all the things that make for the restoration of health, knowing that he would do more harm than good to his health in this way; but, considering the proper time, he distributes remedies, applying some at one time and others at another, and gently restores health. A
TIT. On Calumny.
From the fifteenth disputation of the blessed Cyril of Alexandria against Julian.
Men are always carried away into calumny, and intemperance in words clings to many. But I truly think that the truth of the accusations which anyone brings forward must be demonstrated; where, however, he who reviles others cannot do this, he is deservedly called a calumniator.
From the eighth and ninth books of Philo's Allegorical Interpretation of the Sacred Laws.
A foolish man is unable to stand and persevere firmly in any opinion; therefore, at one time he thinks one thing, and regarding the same subjects, even though nothing has changed, he decides the contrary. Thus, his whole life is as if suspended in the air, since it lacks a solid foundation, and he is always dragged toward things that contradict and are opposed to one another. B
TIT. On the Double-Minded.
From the first of Philo’s Questions on Exodus.
The confusion and instability of the soul causes men of no worth to utter words that contradict themselves, and to devote themselves to actions that fight against each other and are diametrically opposed to one another. C
TIT. On Discerning the Good and the Wicked.
From the first book of Eusebius’s First Introduction.
The character of a man is judged by those with whom he associates: for a wicked man necessarily keeps company with those like himself, and a wise and prudent man with those who are devoted to the same pursuits as he is.
From the tenth book of the same author’s First Introduction, as if from Plato.
It is possible, my son, that someone may speak well and yet be wicked; but a wicked man who acts well can never exist. D
TIT. On the Eye.
From the fourth book of the same author’s First Introduction.
Just as the nature of the eyes indeed possesses within itself the faculty of seeing, but cannot by itself comprehend the things seen, unless some other light from without brings aid to the use of the eyes and serves for the understanding of the things the eye sees; so also does the rational and intellectual nature relate to the holy Word of God.
From the sixth book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis.
Often both righteous and wicked men perform the same duties.
but not from the same intention: the one because he judges it to be good, but the wicked man because he hopes that some gain will accrue to him from it.
Concerning testament and inheritance.
From Cyril’s commentary on Genesis. Nature knows full well that he should not reasonably be called a son who has sprung from spurious and clandestine nuptials. For children born of maidservants are treated like intruders, held in no account, and are not reckoned among the legitimate, nor are they appointed as heirs.From the first book of Philo’s Questions on Exodus. We ought to execute the wills of the good who have passed away no less than if they were still living. B
Concerning the meal.
From the book of the holy elders. A table at which there is no mention of God differs in no way from a manger of brute beasts.Concerning the devil.
From holy Antipater, from the disputations against Origen. For the devil, being a sharer of the same immortal glory as the angels, did not guard his own dignity and rank; having been cast out from his own and having fallen from the divine glory, he remained indeed what he was by nature—immortal—and likewise possessed his power, losing nothing of what he had received from God in his nature from the beginning. He is now, however, restrained by God from using this impulse and from fulfilling against us the wrath which he conceived out of envy against the human race, since God provides for us and defends us from the malice of that being, provided that we remain worthy of His protection. C But when, through sloth, we are found unworthy of His aid, then he showcases his own wickedness and power against us, at the time when, being utterly destitute of good works, we have rendered ourselves strangers to the providence of God. But so long as we are worthy to be befriended by His intervention, he is in no way permitted to proceed against us. The swine of the Gadarenes bear witness to this, against whom the demons were never granted the power of harm, which they did receive at that time, however, on account of many and various economies which it is not the time to recount at present. DConcerning works and actions.
From Cyril, from the sixteenth book of the works against Julian. That the repayment of the reward will be commensurate with each person’s good achievements, and that for those who have chosen to perform virtuous deeds, rewards will be rendered by God that are balanced with their labors, the Savior himself confirmed by his own testimony, saying that the distribution of the talents was not made in equal measure, setting the one who had distinguished himself over ten cities, and the other over five. For a person’s life is weighed as if in a balance, and our own righteousness will certainly weigh out the measure of the recompense.On prosperity or adversity.
From the first book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. A Men who suddenly become poor from being rich, or obscure and humble from being famous and great, or subjects from being rulers, or slaves from being free, are accustomed to change their minds along with their fortunes, claiming that the Divine does not provide for human affairs; for it would not, they say, make use of great and unexpected changes and misfortunes. They are ignorant, first, that none of these things is an evil, nor, in truth, are their opposites good, since what one sees is not the truth; second, that these things often happen for the sake of admonition, in order to restrain those who abuse what are matters of indifference—for not all can bear prosperity; and third, as I have said, for testing character, for the seasons of either condition are the most accurate crucible.On abundance.
From the fourth book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. Those who exist in an abundant supply of wealth and glory and similar things, and who flourish in the health and soundness of their body and a comfortable life, so that they are able to indulge in all the pleasures of the senses, believing they have reached the height of blessedness, do not expect change; nay, they even laugh at and mock those who say that all external things and those pertaining to the body remain only for a time.On praises.
From Philo’s book of Questions on Exodus. Glory, as the ancient saying goes, is a false judgment and an unreliable opinion.On those who delight in the evils of others.
From the second letter of Dionysius of Alexandria on nuptials. Toward those who are afflicted by calamities, it is right to show mercy, not hatred. From the third book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. To rejoice at the misfortunes of others, even if sometimes just, is nevertheless always inhuman.On plots.
From the book of blessed Cyril, the fourteenth against Julian. D Those who cunningly exert themselves for their own salvation are somehow obscure and not manifest to all.On merchants.
From the seventh and eleventh books of Philo’s Allegorical Interpretation of the Sacred Laws. Just as voluntary good actions are superior to involuntary ones, in the same way, involuntary sins are less grave than voluntary ones.On contractors.
From the fourth book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. Just as it is unjust to sin voluntarily, so also to sin involuntarily and out of ignorance is not immediately just; butA there is perhaps a boundary between the two, of just and unjust, which some call "indifferent"; for a sin can never be a work of justice.
On good fortune.
From Philo’s Questions on Genesis. Since we pass through a life that is altogether changeable, and are daily caught up in misfortunes, we assume that no one arrives at happiness before the end.On a good day.
From the final book of Philo’s Questions on Exodus. "In the night is deliberation": for the deliberative faculty of the soul is freed at night from the tumults of the senses and of things perceived by the senses.On death.
From Saint Methodius’s treatise on the resurrection. Death was discovered for the purpose of conversion, just as stripes were for the correction of children fresh to school; for death is nothing other than the separation and disjunction of the soul from the body. What then? Shall God be called the cause of death? Far from it; just as masters are not the primary cause B that stripes cause pain to children. Rather, death is a good thing if, as it is said, it is found to be for conversion, like stripes—not the death of sin, O most wise men, but that which separates and detaches us from the body. —See the rest in the book on free will.On those who are afflicted and those who are enlightened.
From the blessed Dionysius’s letter to Aphrodisius. A suffering soul is not at leisure to fathom the mind of one who punishes; nor, being tossed and confused, can it perceive the tranquil and serene intention of a superior.On equality.
From the blessed Cyril’s twelfth book against Julian. The presiding judge of the games does not grant the outstanding honors in the way the athletes might wish, but rather distributes the prizes according to the merits of the competitors. CFrom the same. To distribute equal things to the unequal is the greatest injustice.
From Saint Methodius’s treatise on the resurrection. It is necessary to maintain what is appropriate for each person in relation to the whole.
From Philo, from the works on the holy. One should not share everything with everyone, but only what is appropriate for those who are to receive it; otherwise, the best and most useful thing in life, which is order, will be destroyed by being eclipsed by wicked confusion.
From the same. To distribute similar things to the dissimilar is unequal; and what is unequal is a source of evils. D
TIT. Concerning vestments.
From the fifteenth book of blessed Cyril against Julian. To use beautiful garments is becoming only to the young; it provides pleasure only in the imagination and deceives the eyes.TIT. Concerning the heart.
From the last book of Philo’s Questions on Exodus. Holy Scripture has accepted the heart for the governing principle.TIT. Concerning superiors.
From the first book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. To be subject to superiors is most beneficial.TIT. Concerning danger.
After the biblical passage concerning Achish dismissing David. Scholion. Note that even kings are forced to do many things against their will because of danger. ATIT. Concerning the opportune time.
From the twelfth book of blessed Cyril against Julian. It seems to me excellent and wise not to fail to act at the appropriate time.TIT. Concerning flatterers.
On the passage of Jeremiah XXXVIII, 22, "Peaceable men." Scholion. He calls the false prophets "peaceable men," because they deceived the people with flatteries.From the sixteenth book of Cyril against Julian. Whoever pleases men will deservedly be celebrated by them with praises by way of reward, yet he will receive nothing at all from God.
From the book of Theotimus of Scythia against idols. C A glib mouth and persuasive speech provide pleasure and praise toward vainglory for wretched men, who possess a corrupted mind.
From the fourth book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis. Because of the love of a false and contemptible thing, that which is sincere and more estimable is hidden.
TIT. Concerning sadness.
From the book of Abbot Cassian on the eight temptations. The place exists in the Maurist edition of Saint Athanasius, vol. III, p. 585, 384, namely from the words "fifth to us." However, there is a lacuna in the aforementioned edition, p. 384, as one leaf of the codex was missing to the editors. Now our Leontius thus continues the discourse:From this, one becomes prone and docile to every good work, making the man gentle, humble, meek, patient, strong against every evil, and tolerant of adversity when it comes according to God; D so that from this, in the end, the fruits of the Holy Spirit may be recognized in the man, that is, joy, peace, long-suffering, goodness, faith, self-control. For, on the contrary, from sadness we recognize the fruits of the evil spirit, which are prostration, impatience, anger, hatred, contention, despair, negligence in prayer. We ought to avoid this sadness just as we avoid fornication, avarice, anger, and...
the rest of the passions; this is cured by prayer, by hope in God, by the study of the divine oracles, and by association with pious men.
Concerning speech
From Philo’s Questions on Leviticus. Bestow greater and more diligent care upon those who are in poverty or need on account of virtue or piety towards God than upon those who are in need because of sickness or accidents; and [bestow more care upon these] than upon those who have become impoverished through debauchery and carousing.Concerning drunkards
From Philo’s first volume of Questions on Genesis. To be drunk is spoken of in two ways: first, to blather from wine, which is a vice peculiar to a degenerate man; and second, to be weighed down by wine, which happens even to the wise.Concerning abstinence
From Saint Methodius’s book on Free Will. One must act virilely, like the best soldiers, in arraying oneself against the enemies. For they, when they perceive that they are being besieged by the enemy, caring nothing for the arrows or the other missiles of their opponents, eagerly rush out against them in order to save the city, never flagging in their zeal until they have turned the enemy troop to flight and driven them beyond the borders. For you see how, because of the sin that dwells within us, thoughts arise from without, like rabid dogs or wild and bold brigands, always stirred up against us by their tyrant and prince of injustice, who tests us to see if we are strong enough to resist and do battle against them. Come then, O soul, do not yield or be snatched away to him, for we shall have no ransom to pay in your stead. For "what," says the Scripture, "will a man give in exchange for his soul?" (Matth. xvi, 26). It would be good if, while we resisted them and fought, they would keep their distance; but since this is impossible, and we cannot do what we wish—for we wish not to have those who draw us into passions, for indeed it would have been a matter of being preserved from the sweat [of battle]—yet what we wish does not happen, but rather what we do not wish; for it is necessary for us to be tempted, as I said, so that we may not be delivered to the wicked one. But taking up the armor of God, which protects us and fights for us, "let us put on the breastplate of righteousness; and let us have our feet shod in the preparation of the Gospel; in all things taking up the shield of faith, with which we shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked one; and the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the spirit, which is the Word of God" (Ephes. vi, 14-17), so that we may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil, and "to cast down reasonings and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God."Concerning orphans and widows
From Philo’s last volume of Questions on Exodus. Neither against man nor against woman does the law allow injustice;yet it grants special providence to widows and orphans, since they are deprived of their necessary helpers and protectors: widows of their husbands, and orphans of their parents.
Concerning Oaths
After the passage of Jeremiah concerning Zedekiah. *Scholion.* He who does not believe the prophet, and strives to keep an oath rashly given by himself, becomes a captive.Again, to the passage of Matthew concerning Herod. *Scholium.* It would have been better for Herod to break the oath he had given than to behead the prophet and saint.
Finally, to the passage of John concerning the Lord Jesus and Peter, when the latter's feet were to be washed. B *Scholium.* Read carefully the wonderful treatise on anger of blessed Cyril in the parallel.
Concerning Presumption
From the eleventh sermon of blessed Cyril against Julian. To speak truly, as the man who is puffed up and thinks high things of himself—the vainglorious man—accomplishes nothing, according to the voice of the prophet; for presumption is an impediment to progress, according to the common saying frequent in the mouths of many.From the same. Presumption is an impediment to progress; for he who confesses his ignorance will easily be instructed by another in things he does not know at all; but the presumption of knowledge makes him who presumes to know always and in all things appear foolish and ignorant; for he does not listen to the words of those who teach.
From the eighteenth sermon against Julian. There are some, and these indeed the majority among men, who keep an ill-founded good opinion of themselves. For they think that they always and in all things speak wisely and indubitably. And yet, they assign to themselves the praise of appearing wise and sharp-witted; but they hide the reputation of being wise and sharp-witted only until the argument of those who think differently encounters C them, rising up against them with sharper rebukes.
From Philo’s first allegorical commentary on the sacred laws. Presumption inflates the impure.
Concerning Detraction
From Evagrius. To reproach the innocent is a sin against God.From the rules of Saint Irenaeus. By always speaking well of the worthy, and never ill of the unworthy, we too shall attain the glory and kingdom of God.
Concerning Those Who Fall
*Scholium.* Note that because we do not resist our evil thoughts, we fall into sins. DConcerning the Multitude and the People of a City
A From the treatise of Athenodorus on Hebraism. By nature, every multitude of men is impatient of bridle and rule; especially if it has not been informed by good morals, or introduced by righteous laws into the best form of government.
From Evagrius. Wishing to be approved by the crowds, one must be like the crowds.
Concerning Intention
*Scholium.* Observe how God accepts a good intention. Attend diligently to the fact that the motions of one’s disposition, both in good and in evil, are examined before God.
From Philo, from the second of the Questions on Genesis. Those who have begun plans—whether good or evil—and especially when works correspond to those plans, should be held equal to those who have actually brought them to perfection. For there are many other causes that prevent [one] from arriving at the end [of an action]; but intention and will add force to the proposed subjects for achieving that end.
Concerning the Procreation of Children
From Philo, from the second of the Questions on Genesis. Moses, in prescribing anguish and sterility among the curses, does not say that they will occur in those who act according to justice and the law. For to those who observe the sacred letter of the law, he offers the more ancient law of immortal nature, which was established for the generation and procreation of children for the perpetuity of the race. B
Concerning the Firstborn
From Philo, from the fourth of the Questions on Exodus. The "first birth" relates to the maternal kind, for woman brings forth; "first generation," however, relates to the paternal, for the man begets. Regarding that which "opens the womb," lest, when a daughter is born first and a son is born later, anyone should count the son among the firstborn as the one beginning the male line of descent, the law says thus: "such [a one] does not open the womb first from maidenhood."
Concerning War
From Philo, from the first of the Questions on Exodus. The sight of the destruction of one’s enemies provides no less joy than the victory won over them. C
Concerning Mediocrity
From the eighteenth sermon of Saint Cyril of Alexandria against Julian. If it is just to have nothing superfluous, then superabundance gives birth to accusations.
From the first Stromateis of Clement. As rational animals, we must compose ourselves in an orderly fashion, tempering our severity and excess by relaxing them accurately, and not by negligently dissolving them.
From Philo, from the Questions on Genesis. He who seeks what is beyond his strength deserves to attain nothing;
for everything that observes symmetry is praiseworthy. It is necessary, therefore, for the well-endowed to learn many doctrines, and fewer for the inept, because of the best equality which consists in necessities; and this indeed is the most useful equality for life. A
From Philo, from his first Questions on Exodus. Superabundance and deficiency produce inequality; and inequality—to use the terms more mythically—is the mother of injustice, just as, conversely, equality is the mother of justice. The mean between excess and deficiency is that which suffices, in which the holy Scripture embraces nothing superfluous.
From Philo’s Questions on Exodus. Measures that are overflowing exceed their limit, so that immoderate temperance becomes parsimony, and immoderate fortitude becomes audacity. B
On Worldly Wisdom
From the nineteenth sermon of blessed Cyril of Alexandria against Julian. Great among those who are outsiders are highly esteemed the gift of eloquence and the magnificence of expression, but those things which bring utility are worth little. For since they do not know God by nature, the Creator, they bring into the world innumerable gods.From Philo’s first Questions on Exodus. A well-endowed mind, full of natural alacrity, is wont to be carried towards many things that are indeed useless. But in the sciences, those things that are not necessary must be postponed to those that are. Therefore, it pertains to the vigilant guardian of the soul, like a good farmer, to prune back those things that grow too much.
On Habit
From Irenaeus. — It is not easy to persuade a soul held captive by error. COn Condescension
From the tract of Saint Eustathius of Antioch on Hebraism. According to a certain legislative ingenuity and adroitness, for the persuasion of their subjects and for public utility, legislators use any lie whatsoever as a medicine.From Philo’s Questions on Genesis. Not everything true should be told to everyone; whence even now the upright man manages everything by substituting and changing the names of things. To reveal all truths is the mark of a man who is not a philosopher or a wise man at all. For if the life of men were a stage play admitting of no lie, it would be just to speak the truth to all people in all things; but since comedy dominates on both sides, and a lie is the veil of truth, the wise man requires a manifold art, by which he will make progress, imitating the actors who say one thing and do another, so that they may save those whom they can. D
From the sixth of the Questions on Genesis. Just as with other virtues, so too does the upright man practice fortitude clearly; if at any time he has veiled this beauty, it is [by] temporizing...
the suitability of the times, remaining indeed a servant to his own principles and not departing from his original purpose, but for the sake of the occurrence of burdensome matters, changing—as if on a stage—into another form for the benefit of the spectators. For the upright man is a physician of the affairs of life, who, by reason of the times, prudently handles foolish things, wisely handles wantonness, bravely handles timidity, and justly handles injustices; for indeed he will sometimes speak falsehoods without lying, and manifest insolence without being an insolent man. Let us say that the general is either managing peace while engaged in war-making, or, intending to make war, while engaged in the works of peace; let the king also put on the guise of a private citizen, if he cannot otherwise secure what is of advantage to the government and the subjects; and the master, the guise of a servant, so that he may not be ignorant of any of the things being done in the household. B
From Philo’s Fourth Allegory of the Sacred Laws.
It behooves the political man not to speak simply, but to have a twofold speech: the one, of truth and utility; the other, of reputation and pleasantness. For it is necessary for the political man not to say openly whatever he considers it profitable to think, but to conceal some things, because the listener is often disposed in a contrary manner toward what is unbridled, and immediately reacts rebelliously against the truth, so as no longer to allow any of the instructions intended for correction; but he must always be like the wise physicians, who, intending to cauterize or to cut or to purge, or to do something not pleasant but beneficial to the sick, do not announce their treatments beforehand, C but at times even deny them to those who ask. Then, when they [the patients] expect nothing of the sort, but indeed expect the opposite, they apply the cure with great vigor, judging a useful lie to be better than an unprofitable truth.
TITLE: On Carnal Men.
From Philo’s seventh and eighth allegories of the sacred laws.
In the soul in which external sensory pleasure is held to be the greatest of goods, in that soul perfect reason is not found. But if God walks around [in it], external sensory pleasure is not reckoned as a good.
TITLE: On Kinsmen.
From Philo’s Questions on Genesis.
It is the work of friends and kinsmen to lighten misfortunes. D
TITLE: On Sympathy.
From the fourth book of Philo’s Questions on Genesis.
A more pious disposition does not rejoice so much in its own goods as it is grieved and fearful for the evils of its neighbor; it is grieved when one suffers undeservedly, and it is fearful when a good man experiences adversities.
Schol. Read the parallel passage on almsgiving in the parallels, and that on the neighbor, and you will find it stated there that mercy and sympathy are beautiful; and here also, read through in the [letter] 'N' the title regarding the sick.
APPENDIX. — LEONTII ET JOANNIS.
TITLE. On tyrants.
E Philonis tertia sacrarum legum allegoria. A king is an odious thing to a tyrant; for the one rules in accordance with laws, the other against them. ATITLE. On craftsmen.
E Dionysii tractatu primo de natura. For those who are ignorant of any art and who linger [over it], because they are unaccustomed to the work and have not been exercised in labors, the task presents itself as difficult. But those who are progressing, and much more so those who are already perfect, happily adapt themselves to these tasks with ease.E Philonis septima et octava sacrarum legum allegoria. Those who believe they have attained the perfection of any science whatsoever are very foolish. For if anyone believes he is closer, he is very far from the end; since no person is perfect in any science, but rather is as deficient as a very tender child just beginning to learn, [when compared] to an aged man already wise and experienced in art. B
E Philonis quæstionibus in Genesim. It is impossible for human nature to attain the perfection of knowledge. For man knows nothing in the highest degree, but only thinks he knows; for the perfection of knowledge rests in God alone.
TITLE: On order and habit.
E beati Cyrilli decimo sexto sermone contra Julianum. But yet these things follow thereafter. For the beauty of worldly virtue, I mean the one upon the earth, does not invite God as its inspector so much as it invites the eyes of those who see. CE beati Dionysii Alexandrini ad Aphrodisium epistola. It seems shameful for those who hold a sound intention of proceeding toward the true and noble to be praised by others; but for those who do not judge rightly, if anyone wishes to flatter them, they are inclined [to turn] away from the best things toward base things for the sake of praise.
E Philonis prima quæstionum in Exodum. The sophist, when he holds a different opinion, does not use consistent words; for he recites the praises of every virtue as if breathless, as if catching many listeners with his speech like a hunt; but the life of such people is full of every sin. It seems to me that this differs in no way from actors in stage comedies, who, although they are often negligent, foolish, and some even depraved and sycophantic, are transformed into heroes; but a little later, shedding their costume, the signs of their own ignobility appear. D
TITLE. On the injurious.
E Cyrilli duodecimo sermone contra Julianum. That one should not delight in using injurious language, I think is evident to everyone; yet this is vulgar and common.Ex decimo sexto eorumdem. Everything shameful and unsightly, even for those choosing to live well...
to those who desire dignity and decency, it is unseemly to heap insults, and such a man will never be found among those who strive for noble and honorable things.
TIT. Concerning Sleep.
From the first book of the Stromata of Clement. Whatever is said concerning sleep must also be understood concerning death; for both reveal the separation of the soul, the one to a greater degree, the other to a lesser.TIT. Concerning Envy.
From the eighteenth book of the blessed Cyril against Julian. To those who do not follow a decent and honorable life, it is burdensome, it seems, to see others enjoying an easy and honorable life. They take the matter as a reproach of their own depravity, and, wounded by the praise of others, they kindle the flame of envy. Yet it would certainly be better if the envious would choose what is better, and strive with a living and noble ardor to emulate those who shine in this way, rather than to make an excuse of soul-sickness for things which they are unable to accomplish.From the sixth book of the Questions on Genesis by Philo. Those who are torn by envy and jealousy disregard the prosperity of others and the benefit they might derive from them, considering it better to be harmed than to be cared for by those from whom they do not wish to be; for they consider the benefits offered by the best men to be a loss.
TIT. Concerning Self-Love.
From the treatise on Nature by the blessed Dionysius. Since a man who is a good counselor to others is often seen to be trapped in his own will, everyone is indeed blind to a great degree concerning matters that pertain to himself because of self-love. But when he goes forth to external matters with a mind that is dispassionate and at leisure, he is more easily seen and his disposition is made manifest; then, having been refined and stirred by these things, and having become more agile in understanding, he will eventually attain self-awareness, if indeed he becomes a sharp observer of the truth that exists in his surroundings.From the second book of the same author on the Gospels. It often happens that even among the wise some overlook something, led either by the judgment of their own mind, or rather by the impulse of self-love. D
From the twenty-first chapter of the same. But it is believed that it is the most difficult of all things for a person to know and cure himself because of the self-love that is innate in men, and that the judgment of the truth is hidden from each person by their natural inclination toward themselves.
From the second book of the Questions on Genesis by Philo. Those who do everything for their own sake practice self-love, the greatest evil, which produces that which is unsociable, uncommunicative, loveless, unjust, and impious. For nature has not constructed man as solitary beasts, but as creatures that are gregarious, communal, and most sociable, so that he should not live for himself alone, but also for his father, and brothers, and wife, and children, and his other kin, and for his country and his own people.