Elementary Introduction to Theology

[In the manuscripts of Saint Hilary and Colbert. This Introduction precedes the book on the two wills and operations of Christ; but I follow the order which the Royal codex assigns; so that the first disputation is on the composite nature against the Acephali, the second on the two wills against the Monothelites; and the third finally against the Nestorians. The learned Billius did not think that another version of the Elementary Introduction and of the book on the two wills should be published, as if the one which Joachim Perionius had adorned were sufficient: although I have had to disagree with it often, because it seemed to me too free. Moreover, Perionius used the codex of Saint Hilary which I have in my hands, in which many things have been inserted here and there by I know not what supposed emendators, which the others do not have, among which two older Colbertine codices are of better note, or which do not seem to me sufficiently characteristic of our author.]

ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO DOGMAS

^A In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, of the one tri-subsistent and adorable Godhead; of the consubstantial and life-creating Trinity, of the one God, from whom every good gift and every perfect benefit descends from above to us. I, a sinner and a wretch, open my stammering and slow-tongued lips, trusting in Him, that because of the humility of those who have begged the word from me, and for the benefit of those who listen, the Lord, the dispenser of grace and of all good things, will impart the spirit of wisdom, and ^B the speech in the opening of my mouth, He who is God over all, blessed for ever. Amen.

CHAPTER I

Substance, and nature, and form, as it pleases the holy Fathers, are the same. And again: Hypostasis, and person, and individual, are the same. Again, difference, and quality, and property signify the very same thing. Of these, therefore, and of similar things, we have proposed to speak; concerning which your Holiness has also asked me with greater modesty. Beginning in this manner, therefore, we say thus:

The Godhead is indeed an incomprehensible substance above substance, and nature, and form; but the hypostases and persons are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For each of them is a perfect hypostasis, and a perfect person. ^C Furthermore, every creature of God is a substance; but the creatures are many, and have much difference among themselves. For one creature is an angel, and another a human; and one is an ox, and another a dog; one is heaven, and another earth; and one is fire, and another water; and, to speak simply, there are many species in the things created by God. Therefore, each species is one nature: for example, all angels are one nature; and all humans are one nature; and all oxen are one nature; and likewise the other creatures. Also, one is the nature of the angels, and another is the nature of the ^D

CAP. II. On hypostasis, person, and individual.

CAP. III. On difference, quality, and property.

CAP. IV. On substantial and non-substantial difference, that is, natural difference and accident.

^A ox differ from one another in that the human is rational, but the ox is irrational. Behold, the rational is the substantial and constitutive difference of the human, and the irrational [that of] the ox. The same applies to the remaining species and substances and natures and forms. Every thing by which one hypostasis differs from another hypostasis of the same species and substance is called an accidental difference, and a quality, and a hypostatic property, a characteristic property—that is to say, an accident. For example, one human differs from another human in that one is tall and another is short, one is white and another is black, one is healthy and another is ill, one is a father and another is a son. All these things and suchlike are adventitious differences, and qualities, and hypostatic and characteristic properties, and accidents. And, in a word, whatever are considered in all hypostases contained under one and the same species in an equal manner, and without which neither the essence nor the species can stand, these are called substantial differences. But as for those ^B which exist in some of the individual hypostases of the same species, but in others do not exist, these are accidents and adventitious.

CAP. V. Of the separable and inseparable accident.

Of accidents, some are separable, others are inseparable. Inseparable are those by which an individual thing differs from another thing, but it does not differ from itself; for example, this human differs from another human in that he is snub-nosed, but that one is hooked-nosed; that one is grey-eyed, while the other is black-eyed. But he does not differ from himself in that respect. For he who is snub-nosed is always snub-nosed, and he who is hooked-nosed is always hooked-nosed, ^C and it is not possible for the same person to be at one time snub-nosed and at another time hooked-nosed. These are called inseparable accidents, because when they come to be in someone, they are no longer separated from him. Nevertheless, they are accidents; for it is possible for one not to be snub-nosed and still be a human, and not to be hooked-nosed and still be a human. For not every human is hooked-nosed, but every human is rational—he who is not rational is not a human.

Separable accidents, on the other hand, are those which the same human—that is, the same hypostasis—sometimes has and sometimes does not have, ^D such as to be ill or to be healthy, to sit or to stand, to rejoice or to grieve, and suchlike.

CAP. VI. Of those things which are of the same and of diverse substance.

Of the same substance, nature, form, species, and genus are those which are contained under the same species and the same essence—for example, Peter, Paul, and the remaining individual humans, and all oxen, and all dogs, and likewise the others. Diverse

substances, and of diverse natures, forms, and species, and of diverse origins, are those which are contained under one species and another, and are of a different substance: for example, man, and horse, and ox, and dog, and the like.

Chapter VII. Regarding genus and species.

Genus is divided into species: for example, animal into rational and irrational. Behold, animal is the genus of the rational and the irrational; and the rational and the irrational are the species of animal. Again, the rational is divided into mortal man and immortal angel. Therefore, the rational is the genus of the mortal and the immortal, and the mortal and the immortal are the species of the rational. Now, that what is said may become clearer, let us take up our discourse from the beginning. ^B The most generic genus is the first genus, which, as it is a genus, is not a species, for the reason that it has no other genus above it. But the most specific species is the extreme and lowest-placed species, which, as it is a species, is not a genus, because it contains no other species divided from itself. Furthermore, there are, between the most generic genus and the most specific species, other genera and species: genera of those things which are below, and species of those things which are above; these are called subalterns. For example, the most generic genus is substance; for it has no other genus above it; wherefore it is not a species. This is divided into body and incorporeal. The body is divided into animate and inanimate; the animate is divided into sensible and insensible; the sensible into rational and irrational; the rational into mortal and immortal. The incorporeal, therefore, is rational and immortal; and here by "incorporeal" I mean a substance, ^C for instance, a soul, an angel, a demon; each of these is a most specific species. The animate, sensible body is animal; the rational, mortal animal is man, which is a most specific species. The irrational, barking animal is dog, which is a most specific species. Then indeed, the animate, insensible body is plant; the totally inanimate body is earth, air, water, fire; each of these is a most specific species. And for greater clarity, we say this:

Substance, which embraces in a more sublime way the uncreated Godhead, and, by its knowledge and its compass, all creation, is the most generic genus. This is either incorporeal, intellectual, and immortal substance, as God, angel, soul, ^D demon; or inanimate body, as fire, air, water, earth; or vegetative body, as vine, palm, olive, and the like; or animate, sensible body—that is, animal—as horse, dog, elephant, and the like; or that which is composite, formed of body and of incorporeal soul, as man. Of these, substance, since it is first and more universal and encompasses all things, is the most generic genus. The species of this most generic genus are the incorporeal, the inanimate body, the vegetative body, the animate and sensible body,

which is to say, animal. These are called subaltern genera and species. For they are species of substance, as being divided from it; yet each of them is divided into other species, and is more comprehensive and universal than they are. For the incorporeal substance comprises God, angel, soul, demon; the inanimate body comprises earth, water, air, fire; the vegetative body comprises vine, olive, palm, and such like; the animate and sensible, that is, the animal, comprises horse, ox, dog, and such like; and furthermore, man, who is composed of an incorporeal soul and a body.

^B An hypostasis, then, is an individual and a person; such as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; yet the species that comprises them is the super-essential and incomprehensible Godhead. Furthermore, Michael, Gabriel, and the remaining individual angels are hypostases; but the species which comprises them is the angelic nature. Again, Peter, Paul, John, and the other individual humans are hypostases; but the species which contains them is humanity. Furthermore, this horse and that horse are hypostases; and the species which comprises them is horse, absolutely and simply. Again, this and that olive tree are hypostases; but the species which comprises them is olive, simply.

It must be known, therefore, that those things which comprise individuals are called only the most specific species; such as angel, human, horse, dog, olive, palm, and the like. But those which comprise the most specific species are called only genera and subaltern species; such as incorporeal, body, inanimate, insensible, vegetative, animate and sensible, that is, animal, rational, irrational, mortal, immortal, biped, quadruped, reptile, volatile, and all such things; which indeed contain the most specific species, and are their genera, and are their constitutive differences; yet they are contained under the most generic genus, which is substance.

^C But it is permitted to philosophize about these things in another way also: whatsoever things God created by a single command are of one genus. For example, God commanded that fish should be made, and immediately many distinct classes of fish emerged; yet all fish are of one genus; and each class among these fish is a species. Again, God commanded the waters to bring forth winged creatures; and many classes of winged creatures were also produced. All winged creatures, therefore, have one genus. And those individual classes of winged creatures are species of the genus of winged creatures. ^D The same is true of reptiles, beasts, herbs, pot-herbs, and trees. One genus is also spoken of for all animals, and one genus for all plants.

Substance is an existing species; and it is used in many ways; for instance, God, angel, heaven, earth, water, fire, air, animal, irrational, winged, plant, stone, human, life, possession, existence, wealth.

and one genus is absolutely inanimate, lacking entirely any power of growth or nutrition. And again there is one genus of incorporeal things, and one genus of corporeal things; and all creation is also called one genus, and there are many species under the genus of creation, and [η] the differences of the created things, and all substance is one genus.

CHAPTER VIII. On Operation.

CHAPTER IX. On Passion.

CHAPTER X. On Will.