mention in that celebrated letter of Saint Sophronius to Sergius of Constantinople, an interpolation which the most learned Joannes Cotelerius edited from the Royal Codex in the notes to volume I of the *Ecclesia Graeca Monumenta*, and which I do not think it necessary to recite here again in Greek and Latin. Therefore, after these words of the holy Patriarch of Jerusalem, which are read in the sixth volume of the Councils by Labbe, col. 91, in the aforementioned codex: "Besides these, let there be an anathema and a curse upon Cyrus, the most wicked adulterer of the Church of Alexandria; Theodore of Pharan; Sergius of Constantinople; Honorius of Rome, leaders and patrons of the Monothelite heresy; Pyrrhus, Paul, and Peter, prelates indeed of the royal city, but defenders of impiety, fighting against themselves and the truth; Macarius of Antioch, and his disciple and teacher of madness, Stephen; Polychronius, a new Simon Magus; and he who even now at Alexandria fights against the truth, Harmasius, a detestable man; and all who are heretics with them and enemies of the orthodox faith, puffed up with Saracen pride." In this last passage we learn who those Harmasites were, whose mention is made in the scholion to the *Hodegos* of Anastasius, p. 252: "Thus act according to the proposed mode and end, against the Jacobites B regarding nature, but against the Harmasites regarding the theandric operation." Where indeed pure and unadulterated Monothelites are indicated as different from the Monophysites or Jacobites; who, however, were not entirely the same as the Maronites of the mountain of Lebanon and the inhabitants of its vicinity, who are reported to have been called Mardaites at that time. In that addendum, Honorius is indeed customarily reckoned among the patrons and leaders of the Monothelite heresy. As for the rest, our Damascene omitted him in his short work *On the Right Opinion* and in another *Exposition of the Faith*, which we shall hereafter provide at least in Latin from an Arabic translation. St. Germanus of Constantinople, in the synod of one hundred bishops which he celebrated around the year 715, subjected to anathema Sergius, Cyrus, Pyrrhus, Peter, Paul, and John, his own recently deceased predecessor, while omitting Honorius, as is gathered from the *Libellus Synodicus*, syn. 137. Eutychius of Alexandria, in the second volume of his *Annals*, pages 329 and 330, likewise hints that he is worthy of excuse; both, indeed, as far as I understand, because of the apologies which Saint Maximus had written in his defense. C
BY THE SAME ON THE TWO WILLS AND OPERATIONS IN CHRIST AND ON THE OTHER NATURAL PROPERTIES; AND INCIDENTALLY ON THE TWO NATURES AND ONE HYPOSTASIS.
D 1. Those who profess two natures and one person in our Lord Jesus Christ must certainly confess twofold and diverse natural properties of the natures, but simple ones that belong to the person. For it is impossible for a nature to consist without properties, which are to it
A natural, by which it is constituted and distinguished from the rest of the natures, in such a way that they are never considered as belonging to another species. On the other hand, it is impossible for one and the same person to be devoid of its own constitutive and distinguishing marks—or rather, the personal properties that signify it and distinguish it from other persons of the same species—which those who are learned in these matters are accustomed to call accidental and adventitious, and which are never all found together in any other person. Every composite nature, consisting of diverse natures, necessarily includes the properties of those natures, even if a mingling occurs in the union. For although fire and water are utterly contrary—for fire is hot and dry, but water cold and moist—yet when a body is fashioned from the four elements, it possesses the four qualities: heat and dryness, and coldness and moisture. If, therefore, where mingling is seen, it is necessary to perceive the natural properties of the things from which the composition is made, how much more so in that conjunction which is without any mingling! B
2. Indeed, nature is compared with nature, and is said to differ from another nature, that is, species from species, by essential and natural differences. Similarly, a hypostasis is compared with a hypostasis of the same genus, and is said to differ from hypostases of the same species by those properties by which hypostases are sealed; but a hypostasis, as a hypostasis, is not compared with a hypostasis of a different species. For the hypostatic properties of Peter, for example, if they were compared with this ox, would distinguish nature, not hypostasis. For we do not say that this man differs from that horse because he is bald and the other is long-haired, nor because one is large-bodied and the other small, but because the one is endowed with reason and the other is devoid of it, nor again because one is the son of this person and the other of that. But if we say that one is the son of Nestor and the other the foal of a horse, and that one is wise and the other devoid of wisdom, these are established as natural differences. For the hypostatic differences of individual men, when compared with the hypostatic differences of horses, are reckoned as natural. C Wherefore also in our Lord Jesus Christ, if you refer the shape of his body, or the features of his appearance or face, and his being the Son of the Virgin, to that account by which the Son of God exists without any shape, these will pertain not to distinguishing persons, but natures. For since from two natures one composite hypostasis is produced, these and those—that is, both the natural and hypostatic properties of the divine nature, and those of the human nature—become the hypostatic properties of one and the same person. D
3. Wisely, therefore, did the Creator of natures, that is, of the species, create a very great difference, so that in one...
A demonstration of the riches of His own wisdom and power, He might be more admired and thus more sought after; and being sought after, He might be contemplated; and being contemplated, He might render the intellectual and rational animal God-like. For this reason, He also fabricated the multitude of species. For "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," and, "By the beauty of the creatures, in proportion, the Creator is grasped." He further made both a difference in hypostases according to each species and a bond among them—a physical bond; for all hypostases that are subject to the same species are united by the rationale of nature. But the hypostatic difference exists because they are distinguished from one another by certain characteristic properties. Since, indeed, solitude is something abhorrent to companionship and morose, while society with those of the same nature is something sweet and pleasant (for B every animal loves its like), for this reason the first and only blessed, and beginningless and deathless nature, is contemplated in three hypostases. For says the subsistent Wisdom: "I was that in which He delighted," namely, the Father and God. For this reason, He created various hypostases not only in the individual orders of the angelic powers, but also in every species, so that, associated by a communion of nature, they might rejoice in one another and, being bound by a natural habitual relation, might care for one another and act in a friendly way toward one another. The difference of the hypostases distinguishes what belongs to each, both in terms of genus and possession; so that each one, recognizing what is his own, might care for it, and not encroach upon what is another's as if it were his own; and so that the existence of each might be known and recognized. One who is about to raise a C question concerning any subject ought, therefore, to know first what it is, and then whether it is one or two. I say this concerning the things sought regarding our Lord Jesus Christ—both the wills and the operations and the remaining properties on which we are here inquiring. But so that this may become clearer, let us first say how nature differs from hypostasis; and then we shall clearly know both the constitutive elements of nature and the properties of the hypostasis. And then we shall consider whether those things which exist in our Lord Jesus Christ are simple or double. 4. Nature, then, is, according to the holy Fathers, a common and indefinite thing; that is, the most specific species—for example, man, beast, animal, D winged creature, horse, ox, [dog]. But hypostasis is a particular [thing...
[namely] this individual. For to subsist in itself is a certain substance, which, along with its accidents, has obtained its existence in itself, separately and distinctly from other hypostases, by act and reality. It shares, indeed, with individuals of the same species in the principle of nature, but by certain accidents and characteristic properties with which it is sealed, [this individual] has a difference from the individuals of the same nature and species. To say it simply, nature is the common thing, such as humanity. For Peter is a man, and Paul is a man, and the rest are individual men. But hypostasis is the particular; [that is,] this individual. Peter is a hypostasis, and Paul is another hypostasis. Yet Peter is not one nature and Paul another; but Peter is a hypostasis, possessing the perfect, same nature of humanity, and therefore he is a perfect man. And Paul is another hypostasis, possessing the same perfect nature B of humanity. And each human hypostasis possesses this same, perfect nature; yet they do not all have one and the same hypostasis. For Peter is one, and Paul is another. There is one hypostasis and another, but Peter is not of one nature and Paul of another; for all men are of one nature, but not of one hypostasis. In like manner also [the white horse and the swift horse; the unicorn ox, and the small dog, and the lame lion.] And these things [have been said] for the present concerning nature and hypostasis. Let us say also what a natural property is, and what a hypostatic property is, and what is the difference between them.
5. A natural property, then, is that which constitutes C the nature, without which the nature of which it is a property cannot exist; such as life, reason, will, sense, the power of walking, the power of breathing in man, and the like. For he who does not use reason is not a man. For no man has ever existed who does not use reason, whether well or badly. Likewise, neither does one exist who does not sense, or move, or breathe. A natural property, therefore, is that which constitutes the nature and separates species from species—that is, nature from another nature—and which is observed in each hypostasis of the same species; such as "rational." For it constitutes the human nature, as it is included in its definition. For man is a rational, mortal animal; and "rational" separates man from all irrational things, for every man is rational. D For he who is not rational is not a man; for it is impossible for a man not to be a rational, mortal animal.
6. A hypostatic property is that which separates a hypostasis from another hypostasis; such as, for example, the snub-nosed, the white, the black, the bald, and the like. For…
A not every man is snub-nosed; but one is snub-nosed, another aquiline, and another straight-nosed. Nor is every man white; but one is white, another black, and another of a wheat-colored complexion. Nor is every man bald; but one is bald, and another is hirsute, namely, thick-haired. And, to speak simply, all things in human nature which have been granted by the Creator to all men are natural properties, as the holy Fathers and true reason have judged; these belong, of course, to the constitution and to the distinction of things.
7. For nature is a power given by divine command to each species, according to which it is naturally adapted to act and to be acted upon. Thus, to have eyes, and nostrils, and the remaining limbs is natural. For he who is deprived of one of these is not a perfect man. Their difference, however, is hypostatic; sight and the act of seeing are natural; but the diverse sight—that is, the keen or the weak—is hypostatic. The appetite for food and the act of eating are natural; but the craving for different foods, and the likewise intense or relaxed appetite, belong to the hypostasis. Volition and the act of willing are natural; but a different volition and to will in different ways is hypostatic. And whatever some of those of the same species possess, while others do not possess it, these are hypostatic properties.
8. Therefore, it is necessary to know D that every human hypostasis possesses being and has been brought from non-existence into being by the Creator; that is, it is created, and possessed of life, of the power to act, to sense, to understand, of reason, and of appetite—that is, of will; and it consists of essence and accidents. These, therefore, are essential and natural. But their peculiar and varied motion is a hypostatic difference. For the partaking of these exhibits the sameness of nature; but the mode of existence, and each one’s distinct, separate, and self-subsistent hypostasis and compacting, and the peculiar, self-moving, and varied use of natural faculties, shows the hypostases to be distinct and makes us speak of many men. Thus, in the case of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since the existence of each is distinct, there are three hypostases. But since each does not will and operate in an individualistic, separate, or detached manner, but conjointly and with one purpose, therefore they are not three gods, but one God. These things having been thus stated, let us see whether there are two natures in Christ, and then we shall know whether He has double natural properties; for it is impossible for a nature to exist apart from its natural and constituent properties.
A 8. Is Christ perfect God and perfect man, even after the union of the natures according to subsistence? Is He perfect in deity, and perfect in humanity? Yes, entirely. B And are deity and humanity one nature, or two? Two, in truth. For the nature of deity is one thing, and the nature of humanity is another. Therefore, there are two natures in Christ, and Christ is in two natures; since He exists as perfect God and perfect man.
Again: Do we confess Christ to be from two natures? Entirely. Why from two? Because He is from deity and humanity. And what then? Do the terms "deity" and "humanity" signify two natures? Entirely; for the nature of deity and humanity is not one.
Furthermore: Do we confess Christ after the union to exist in deity and humanity? Entirely. Therefore, if we confess Him after the union in deity and humanity, and deity and humanity are two natures, and not one; we confess Him in two natures.
Ad C this: Seeing that Christ, even after the union, has the Father’s nature perfect and without any deficiency, unchangeable and exempt from all confusion, and has likewise His mother’s nature—that is, the nature of Adam—perfect, lacking nothing, inconvertible and unconfused: are the nature of God the Father and the nature of the holy Virgin one nature altogether, or two? Decidedly two. Therefore, there are two natures in Christ after the union. For before the union, there were not two natures in God the Word, but one—namely, the Father’s. Moreover, it is impossible for one and the same nature to be created and uncreated; to have begun and to be without beginning; to be passible and exempt from passion. For if it began, it is not without beginning; and if it is uncreated, it was not created. Therefore, Christ is not one nature, but one person D who sustains, or possesses, two natures: one uncreated and another created; one without beginning, and the other recognizing a beginning.
Again: If the nature is composed of different natures, it is not consubstantial with either of them. For each nature has its own definition alone, while the composite has another, composite definition. But it is impossible that things which admit a different and distinct definition should be of the same essence. If, therefore, Christ is one nature, how can He be consubstantial with the Father and with the Mother? For the former is God, and the latter is man. But God and man are not one nature, for there is not one definition of deity and humanity. For the former is Creator, and the latter is creature.
Again: One and the same nature cannot be of different and of the same substance; nor, again, a nature...
A that is consubstantial is called different in substance; nor is a single-natured hypostasis of the same substance as hypostases of a different substance. If, therefore, Christ is one nature after the union, how will he be consubstantial with the Father and the Mother, who are of different substances?
Again: If Christ is one nature after the union, how is he named? Christhood? That is to say, so to speak, God-humanity. From what nature? Certainly, since it is one, that one nature of his has suffered. Therefore, his God-humanity is what has suffered; and the deity in Christ is passible.
Again: Did Christ suffer? By all means. Did his deity suffer, or his humanity? Which nature? His humanity, certainly. Did his divinity remain impassible? Yes, indeed. Are his nature that suffered and his nature that did not suffer the same, or one and another? One is absolutely other than the other. And if one is other than the other, how are the two one? But while the two natures are not one nature, they are one hypostasis, and two natures: one passible, and one B impassible; and in this way the discourse will proceed correctly.
9. That there is also one hypostasis of Christ, and not two, can be known from this: Is Christ one Son, or two? One, certainly. And how can there be two hypostases if there is one Son? If there are two hypostases, then one is one and the other is another; and there will be two Christs, or one will be Christ and the other God the Word, and no longer one Son.
Again: If there are two hypostases of Christ, then since he sits at the right hand of the Father on a Cherubic throne, and is adored by all creation with the Father and the Spirit, we shall then be adoring not a Trinity, but a Quaternity. But far be it from us to adore anything other than the holy Trinity: one Father, one hypostasis; one Son and Word of God incarnate, one hypostasis with his own flesh; one Holy Spirit, one hypostasis; a most holy and glorified Trinity. For just as a sword glowing with fire is one and the same even after it has received the fire, C so, and with better reason, Christ is one and is one hypostasis, even after the incarnation. And just as I fear to touch the glowing sword, not because of the nature of the iron, but because of the nature of the fire united to it, so I adore the incarnate God, and I adore with him his flesh, not because of the nature of the flesh, but because of the God the Word united to it. I adore the king with his purple robe, and I honor the purple robe for the sake of the king. And yet, the union of the king and his garment is neither hypostatic, nor inseparable, nor perpetual; but in Christ, our God, the union is hypostatic, inseparable, and sempiternal. D Wherefore, as one of the Trinity, I adore with the
A Father and the Holy Spirit, Christ, the incarnate Son of God and God.
10. It has been demonstrated, therefore, that Christ has two natures and one hypostasis. If then he has two natures, it is necessary to acknowledge in him the natural properties of the two natures, perfectly and without omission, if indeed we know him to be perfect God and perfect man.
11. From the divine and paternal nature, he has the uncreated, the timeless, the beginningless. For he did not begin to be, as if he were not before; B but he was always, being begotten from the Father, inasmuch as he is God, possessing the volitive faculty, the active, the omnipotent, the infinite-powered, the creative, the all-working, the infinite, the uncircumscribed, the incomprehensible, the unsearchable, the immortal, the omnipotent, the sustaining, the good, the wise, the just, the saving, the simple according to nature and uncompounded, the immutable, the unalterable, the all-seeing, the foreknower of things to come, the surrounding of all things—that is to say, the containing of them—the unparticipated; though he is participated in according to energy, not according to nature; the self-determining, the beneficent, the distributive, the illuminating, the invisible, the intangible, the super-divine, the supersubstantial, and, to speak simply, all that the Father possesses belongs also to the Son, except for the property of being unbegotten. And a true witness of this is the Lord himself, saying: "All that the Father has is mine" (John XVI, 15). And to the Father himself he says: "All mine are yours" (John XVII, 10).
12. It is peculiar to his hypostasis, however, that he is the Son, begotten of the Father, and not the Father, unbegotten or begetter. For he is begotten of the Father without passion, and without copulation—that is, without mixture—as light from fire; or rather, as perfect light from perfect light. From the Father, therefore, he has his being and everything that he has. C Wherefore he also says: "My Father is greater than I" (John XIV, 28); for I am from him, even if not after him; he himself is not from me. Therefore he also honors the Father.
13. Having spoken, therefore, of the properties of the divine nature of Christ, which he has from the Father, let us also speak of the natural properties of his human nature, which he acquired from our assumption. For if, being perfect God, he became for our sake perfect man, like us, it is evident that, possessing all the natural properties of the divinity, and by this reason being perfect God, he also possesses all the natural properties of humanity—that is, all the natural faculties of humanity, both the active and the passive ones, so that he may be a perfect man. For if any of the natural D
A properties are lacking, he will not be a perfect man, but deficient.
14. Let it be established beforehand that we have received from the Creator the power for every function, action, and passion according to nature; and these things are natural. For it is impossible for any nature to engage in action, or to exert an operation, or to suffer a passion, the power for which it has not received according to nature. For example, the earth cannot bring forth a sprout unless it has received the power of germination from the Creator according to nature; nor can water produce fish, or contribute to the fertility of the earth, unless it has received such a virtue from the Author of the universe. Moreover, plants cannot grow, nor birds fly, nor land beasts walk, nor serpents creep, unless each of them has received the faculty for growing, flying, walking, or creeping. In this way, clearly, man himself can neither perceive, nor understand, nor freely will, nor act, unless he has received the power for each of these things naturally from the Creator.
15. Man, therefore, is a microcosm B. For since he consists of soul and body, he occupies a middle place between mind and matter. He is, in fact, the bond of the visible and invisible, or the sensible and the intelligible, creation. For the mind is the eye of the soul, and its purest part. Therefore, he has in common with inanimate bodies the fact that he is blended and compounded of the four elements. With plants and trees, not only are these things common to him, but also the nourishing, C growing, and generative faculties. With brute animals, in addition to these, he shares also the vital life, and the irrational appetite—namely, the irascible and concupiscible; likewise the imaginative faculty and memory, and the senses, and the motion of impulse (which indeed is the motion of the whole body), and finally the faculty of voice and respiration. With the incorporeal and intelligent powers, he has in common reason, and the appetite that follows the intellect, which is the will, the first motion of the mind. For man is moved to thinking by desiring; and by desiring, he judges. Furthermore, this appetite is free; for by freely desiring, he thinks, reasons, and judges. D
16. The properties of the body are cutting, flux, and the change of qualities—that is, heat, cold, moisture, and dryness—and the organization of the members. However, the rational soul, itself by itself and alone, has life, intelligence, and the rational appetite, which is properly called the will. Moreover, in addition to these, there is that most specific property of the soul which separates it from the substance of the angels,
A that it dwells in the body and imparts to it life and motion, and that it leads the body and the irrational appetite—namely, desire and anger, and the movement according to impulse—with free power according to its own appetite, or will, and that it naturally rules over its own body as if it were its own personal and natural servant. For this reason, man is more according to the image [of God] than the angels are. For an angel has no natural servant, nor is it naturally a master.
17. Community exists between soul and body, from which the soul imparts to the body the vital faculty, and the imaginative faculty—that is, that which perceives or discerns sensible things; the faculty of sensation itself, or the five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. B To these belong also the memory, and movement according to impulse, the nutritive and augmentative power, and also the irrational appetite—anger, I say, and desire, hunger, and thirst, and fatigue, and saliva, and pleasure, and displeasure, [fear, cowardice, and agony, anguish,] disturbance, sweat, and death. For death is the separation of the soul from the body, and the entire economy of nourishment and growth.
18. All these are irrational passions and energies; energies, indeed, and faculties of nature—wherefore all natural things are gifts granted to nature by God; but passions, because every created nature moves and acts through suffering; only the divine nature is passionless, moving itself without passion C and acting without movement, being immune to passion. Furthermore, some of these seem to be energies rather than passions, while others seem to be passions; for it is more appropriate to call life an energy, but death, and cutting, and flux, a passion. Now cutting, and flux, and change according to quality—that is, whitening, blackening, cooling, heating, sickness, and such like—are passions. Likewise, the organization of the members, or rather their forming. For nature acts, organizing and forming; but the body suffers, being organized. By "nature," I mean the law and force given from the beginning by the Creator to each species, in accordance with which it moves or remains at rest. It moves in accordance with the force it has received, acting, understanding, reasoning, D willing, sensing, and moving from place to place—for it has the power for these from the Creator. It resteth, not moving in regards to those things for which it has not received the power of action, but remaining stationary. Movements are creation, and decay, and alteration, growth, diminution, and local motion. This last is six-fold: forward, backward, to the right, to the left, upward, and downward; and all the rest that we have mentioned are also movements. But intellection, and likewise the rational appetite,
are considered to be actions, reasonings, inquiries, considerations, counsels, judgments, affections, elections, opinions, and even movements of impulse. Although intellection seems rather to be an action, and appetition a passion (for whoever appetites, suffers), yet we call the appetite of reason an action, for the reason that it is self-determining A, dominating the irrational passions, and judging, governing, and restraining them like a bridle: namely, anger, cupidity, sense, and the movement springing from impulse. For passions without reason are subject and obedient to reason. Indeed, all these things in men who follow nature as their guide obey reason and are subject to it, so that they are moved and inclined wherever it may direct.
B 18 bis. Moreover, these passions constitute the substance of the animal; for without them, life cannot subsist. They were given to man by the Creator for service: the faculty of concupiscence, that we might pursue God and His commandments; but that of irascibility, that we might resist the devil and sin, and that cupidity might become manly. Thus, that which is an appetite without reason was given to conserve the nature of the animal; but that which is rational and free, that it might freely, as it were by a bridle, lead every natural movement, and subject it to the law of the Creator, to whom it is itself subject. Therefore, intelligence and appetition are conjoined in man, so that those things which are experienced by those who are devoid of reason might not happen to us, who use reason, against our will. C For the mind, which appetites freely and with reason and intelligence, also by appetiting understands, inquires, considers, deliberates, judges, is affected toward that which is approved by judgment, chooses, and turns to action. For the rational part, by its own nature, commands that which is devoid of reason. But if man, as one endowed with reason, was created king of all brute creation, how should he not exercise dominion over those passions which are within him without reason? Since, therefore, the appetite is a participant in reason and intellect, it is led by the appetite to understand and to reason; and conversely, it follows reason and the mind with a free appetition.
Furthermore, among those things which are common to soul and body, the vital faculty is rather an action; then imagination, sense, and D memory, as well as appetite, are actions subject to passion, or passions conjoined to action. But anger and cupidity, hunger, and thirst, and fatigue; also fear, dread, anguish, pleasure, sadness, spittle, and sweat; and likewise the faculty of nourishing and growing, and finally death, are passions.
19. All these things are natural and blameless, granted by the Creator to human nature as a benefit. For He bestowed both our being and our being in this manner; and there is no man who has not become a participant in these. And that we possess these things declares both the wisdom and the virtue of the Creator: but for us, neither
virtue nor vice is imputed A to them. For they are good, and have been gifted by the Good B for the sake of good. But the manner of their use constitutes virtue and vice. For if the will is subjected to the law of God, and the intellect, in accordance with His law, governs the things subject to it—I mean all the psychic movements, and especially anger and desire, for these are naturally subject to reason—we have wrought virtue and fulfilled the requirements of justice. For to this end did we receive power over them; and as having received power, we also received a law, and have become subject to law. For brute animals, because they do not possess the directing intellect C which might master anger and desire, have not received a law. Therefore, because we are by nature servants of the Creator, and possess free will—that which constitutes virtue (for that which occurs by force is neither virtue nor is it pleasant)—we received a law, so that we might recognize that we have a Master, and in order that, walking in darkness, we might not fall into pits: "For Thy law is a lamp to my feet," D says David, "and a light to my paths," so that our desire and goodwill toward the Master might be recognized; and that we might participate in the good with God; "so that the good may be of him who chose it, no less than of Him who provided the seeds." For He Himself granted us the power of doing good; and He made us possessed of free will, so that the good might come to be both from Him and from us. For to everyone who chooses the good, God is a fellow-worker for the good, so that, having preserved what is according to nature, we might attain those things which are above nature; that is to say, incorruptibility and divinization, through union with the Divine, by means of becoming familiar with Him through the potential of the will; so that, not using our natural powers irrationally, we might be compared to unreasoning beasts and be made like them. For if our will is not subjected to the Divine will, but the free-willed intellect uses anger and desire according to its own opinion and choice, it has wrought vice. For vice is nothing else than sin, and failure, and transgression of the Master’s law. Wherefore free will is the first good, fitting for the rational nature; and to use it, and to exercise authority over and master the unreasoning passions—I mean anger and desire—this is virtue; but to betray the free will and be defeated by the unreasoning passions, and to live irrationally and like a beast, this is vice; this is sin. Let us not, therefore, act shamelessly by doing the things of the unreasoning beasts, but let us restrain the impulses of nature by reason. For the way of life of unreasoning beasts is not fitting for the rational being, but rather it is fitting even to use the unreasoning passions rationally, and to regulate them by reason, and to lead and drive them with authority, and to be led and to yield to the Divine law, and to use these things as the Lord has ordained.
20. A Now it is worth our while to understand how ambiguity in names leads heretics into error. For as to the Monophysites—the Acephali, that is—it came about that they proclaimed one nature in Christ, because they said that nature and hypostasis are one and the same, lest they divide Christ into two persons. And likewise with the followers of Nestorius, it led them to profess two hypostases, lest they confound the two natures of Christ into one. Thus also with the Monothelites, it was their failure to know the difference between natural will and personal (or arbitrary) will that caused them to speak of one will in Christ. In order, therefore, that we may avoid the error which the ambiguity of names produces, let us explain the question regarding the will in this way.
21. The word "will" is ambiguous. For sometimes it signifies the act of willing, that is, the volitive faculty; and sometimes it signifies the object of the will, which is subject to the volitive faculty—that is, the very thing which someone wills. Willing is one thing, and the object of the will is another, just as sight is one thing and what falls under the sight is another. For sight itself is the faculty of seeing by which we see, which performs its role in the eye; but what falls under the sight is the object we see—a stone, or wood, or something of that kind. So, clearly, will B is the very faculty of the soul by which we will; but the object of the will is the thing itself which someone wills. For instance, I wish to sail; "to sail" is the object of the will. And the object of the will is always either an operation—that is, an action—or a passion. Let us see, then, whether the will is natural or personal.
22. Therefore, does every man possess the volitive faculty or not? It is clear that all men are endowed with the faculty by which they will, and there is no one who does not possess the ability to wish. For what man has ever existed who has not willed anything at all? However, not every man wills in the same way; but one wills well, and another wickedly, each according to his own judgment. Thus, the will—that is, the volitive faculty, and the act of willing absolutely—belongs to nature; but that which falls under the will—that is, the willing of this specific thing, or the willing in such a way—belongs to the faculty of judgment and the person.
23. And again: Since the "will," as we have said, is among those things which are equivocal, it sometimes signifies the act of willing, and sometimes the object of the will. For it must be known that willing (the faculty) is one thing, and to will (the act) is another; and to will this specific thing in such a way is another; and the object of the will is another; and that which is endowed with the volitive faculty is another; and the one who wills is another. Just as sight is one thing, and to see is another, and to see something in a certain way is another; and the visible object is another, and the visual faculty is another, and the one who sees is another. For sight itself is the visual faculty C of the soul, which performs its role in the eye, by which we see; but to see...
is A to use this visual faculty, to act, and to perceive. For no one sees unless he possesses sight, that is, the power to see. And what is it to see? To see heaven, or earth, or some other thing. The "how" of seeing is to see well or ill. A visible thing is that which is subject to sight; that is, the body being seen, or color, or form. A visual being is that which possesses the visual power to see by nature, even if it is asleep or blinded. For man is a creature gifted with sight. He who sees is one who is using his sight, that is, the visual power, and is acting and perceiving. B Similarly, will is this appetitive faculty, which is given to the soul naturally by the Creator; that is, the ability to will. To will is to use the appetitive faculty in action, and to desire. No one wills unless he has a will, that is, the power to will. An object of will is that which is subject to the will; that is, the very thing which we will. For example, I will to sail; sailing is the object of will. I will to be temperate; to be temperate is the object of will. That which is involuntary is what someone does not will, just as the unseen is what someone does not see. To will a thing is to will in a certain way: for instance, to will to be united to God; to will to eat; to will to drink; to will to sail; to will to have relations with one's wife. C But "how" to will is to will well, that is, to will rightly and according to the law of God to have relations with one's own wife; or ill, and contrary to the law of God, with another's. A volitional being is that which possesses the volitional power by nature, such as man, the angel, or God; for each of them possesses the volitional power by nature. For each of the hypostases of the Godhead wills; and each hypostasis of the angels wills; and each hypostasis of humans wills. And what each hypostasis possesses is natural; for what is observed in all hypostases of the same kind and same essence is natural. A willing being is one who is using the will, that is, the volitional power, and is desiring; that is, a hypostasis. D Therefore, "will" sometimes signifies the faculty of will, that is, the volitional power; and sometimes it signifies the object of will, that is, the very thing which we will. Thus, the will is natural, and to will simply is natural. For every human has the power to will, and every human wills; that is, he uses his will; for man is a creature gifted with will. But the object of will is not only natural, but also a matter of intention and of the hypostasis. However, not every human wills in the same way, nor does each will the same thing; so that the "how" of willing—whether well or ill—or the "what" of willing—this or that—is not natural, but is a matter of intention and of the hypostasis, both in the case of angels and of humans. 24. Volition, at times, signifies the faculty itself whereby we will; at other times, the thing itself which we will. Therefore, the faculty whereby we will pertains to nature, as does willing simply. For every man has the power whereby he wills, and every man wills; that is, he uses his will. For man is an animal gifted with the faculty of will. But that object which we will does not pertain to nature, but to choice and to the person. For not every man wills in the same way, or wills the same thing. Wherefore to will in a certain way, well or ill, or to will something, this or that, is not of nature, but of choice and per-
Bsonality. For matters stand not so in the case of the holy and undivided Trinity; for there is one natural will of the three subsistence-persons, and one natural object of will, which is the good. Neither does each subsistence-person have a particular object of will or a particular movement, but there is one movement and one object of will for the three subsistence-persons. Therefore, they are not three gods, but one God—the three are one God—being one God with his own powers, yet not composite. For each of them is a perfect God and a perfect subsistence-person; for a composition of nature from subsistence-persons does not occur in God. Indeed, this is something entirely strange and proper to God alone.
But it is not so in the case of angels and men; for the will of angels is one, that is, the natural power of willing given to them by God. For each angel wills, and each man wills; but the movement of all the angels is not one, nor yet that of all men, but each subsistence-person has its own movement and its own object of will. For all the subsistence-persons of the angels do not will in the same way, nor the same thing, nor do those of men; but one wills well, another ill; one this, and another that; and when one is moved and wills, the other is not moved and does not will along with him. So that in the case of angels and men, the will is natural; likewise, the act of willing is natural. For every man is a willing being, and every man wills. But not every man is a willing being of the same thing, nor does he will the same thing.
For in the case of the holy Trinity, the three subsistence-persons are in one another, and the Word and the Holy Spirit are powers of the Father; and for this reason there is one movement, and likewise the same object of will. But angels and men, although they are of the same nature, each has his own subsistence separate and divided; and for this reason the power of willing, and the act of willing, is one and natural; but the "how" and the "what" of willing is subsistential and gnomical. And their willing nature would be one, but many are those who will, wishing for different things, and one thing and another.
25. On the Will
Will, therefore, is an appetition that is both vital and rational; and if it is vital, it is altogether sensitive as well. Irrational beings, therefore, desire sensitively, but not logically or with self-determination. But man, being a rational animal, in so far as he is an animal, desires in the manner of animals and with sense; but in so far as he is endowed with reason, he does so with reason and self-determination. Will, therefore, is a natural appetition, both rational and vital, hanging only on what is natural. Now, the natural volitions are, first, to be subject to the law of God. For man is by nature a servant of God, and subject to him; then, those things that affect nature, such as hunger, thirst, sleep, and the like; whereas subsistential and gnomical will is an appetition according to pleasure and according to the personal judgment of the subsistence-person employing it, and not according to the law of God.
A And so that which is severed from the subsistences brings about a difference in judgment.
26. A But, they say, man does not have a natural will; they say there are only two wills: one, the divine and good; and the other, the evil, the diabolical. And whenever man wills the good, he has the will of God; but whenever he wills the evil, he has the will of the devil. But they are ignorant that it is impossible for any nature whatsoever to employ an action for which it has not received the power by nature. For instance, a winged creature cannot fly unless it has received by nature the power to fly; B likewise, neither can a terrestrial animal walk unless it has received by nature the power of walking; so too, man cannot think unless he has received the faculty of thought by nature, nor speak unless he has received the faculty of speech by nature; likewise, neither can he see, nor will, unless he has received by nature the visual and volitional-power. Therefore, it is necessary first to have by nature the power of willing, which is the will, and thus to will. And this is why, in our Lord Jesus Christ, since there are two natures, there are also two natural wills, so that he may be perfect God and perfect man, lacking nothing of the properties of the divinity, nor of those of the humanity. And according to both, we say that he wills, and that he wills C differently according to the natural difference: divinely and omnipotently—for the divine will is omnipotent—and not omnipotently [again,] but weakly and with passibility; for the human will is passible and weak; and another is the human [willing] and another the divine natural object-of-will. For the volitions of the humanity are not the volitions of the divinity; for the human nature is by nature volitional and appetitive of food, and drink, of sleep, and such things; but the divinity is not appetitive of these. For it never desires these, even if it wills the human nature to desire these naturally, and as it ought, and when.
27. D Therefore, by reason of the natural difference, there are two wills in our Lord Jesus Christ; they are not contrary. For the natural will of man is not contrary to the divine will; nor is the natural faculty of willing; nor are those things which are subject to it by nature; nor is the natural use of the will. For the divine will is the creator of all natural things; but those things that are contrary to nature alone are contrary to the divine will; which is that of the sinful pleasures according to the personal judgment of the mind.
appetitus, that is, sin. This the Lord did not A assume: "For He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth." But since the person of Christ is one, and Christ is one, there is one who wills according to both natures: as God, approving and accepting; as man, becoming obedient. Approving as God with the Father and the Spirit, by the paternal and divine will; but as man, becoming obedient to the divine and paternal will of His, by our own will. For He did not become obedient to the Father according to His divine will. For the divine will is neither obedient nor disobedient. "For these things belong to those who are under authority," as the Theologian Gregory says; "and to the form of a servant, which He adopted from us." He became obedient naturally according to His human will; for voluntary and uncompelled obedience is the subjection of one will to another will. He therefore willed and wills, as God, things divine; and He B willed and wills, as man, things human; not by a contrariety of mind, but by the properties of the natures. For He willed and wills things human as His divine will approved, and when and what, His human will being voluntarily subjected to His divine will.
28. For the will and energy of God, according to the blessed Irenaeus, is the creative and governing cause of all time, and place, and age, and every nature. But human will is a virtue of nature, desiring things consonant with nature, and holding together those things which by essence belong to nature. For substance desires both to be, and to live, and to feel, and to move according to C sense and mind, being [eager for its own...]
integrity. For nature has it that she wishes to be saved, and that she should depend, in accordance with the rationale by which she subsists and was created, upon the desire for those things of which she is constituted. Wherefore others, defining this natural will, say: Natural will is an appetitive movement, and a rational and vital B faculty, depending only upon those things which belong to nature. Will then is, according to the blessed Clement, an appetitive power of that which truly is. And again: It is an appetite consonant with the nature of the rational being. And again: The free movement of a governing mind. For God, in the beginning forming man, created him a nature free from sin, and a will possessed of self-determination, as the holy Athanasius says. And nature is indeed free from sin, the whole of creation, whether rational or irrational, sentient or insentient, and lacking life; but not every creature possesses a will C of self-determination; and the divine nature is a will sinless and possessing self-determination; but it is not mutable, but immutable. The divine nature, therefore, is volitional and possessed of self-determination and sinless and immutable. But all creation was made by God sinless: "For all that He made, were very good"; yet it is mutable. For if its genesis began from change, things are mutable by nature; and change is the production from that which is not, into that which is.
If, therefore, He did not assume the human will, by what will did He become obedient to the Father? If He did not assume the human will, by what will did He become under the Law? D If He did not assume the human will, by what will did He fulfill all righteousness? For that He went through every virtue, and fulfilled every righteousness, hear Him saying to John: "Suffer it to be so now: for thus it becometh us to fulfill all righteousness." For He fulfilled every virtue and righteousness; yet He did not progress through works, nor through virtue, but was perfect from the very first union. For He did not become God when He previously was not; but being perfect God, He was made perfect man.
If He did not assume the human will, He did not heal that which first suffered in us. "For that which is not assumed, is not healed," as the Theologian Gregory said. For what had sinned, if not the will? That, therefore, which fell, that which sinned, that same thing stood more in need of healing. But if you say that He did not assume that which sinned, then He did not assume the nature that sinned [and became diseased]. But if He did not assume this, He did not even assume the nature of humanity; for this is what has sinned.
A If He did not assume a human will, how, "before He knows good and evil, does He not acquiesce in malice, so as to choose the good?" For the divine will neither acquiesces, nor is persuaded, nor chooses. Therefore, it does not acquiesce in malice, but chooses the good, obeying the Father's will freely as a man—for choice belongs to a free will—yet not according to our manner, deliberating and judging, and turning over in thought both opposites, I mean virtue and vice, and coming to a knowledge of them, but solely [choosing] good, which is the pleasure of the divine will. And thus He paid the debt of Adam.
By saying, "Before He knows good and evil," B He does not mean that He received this later; for He did not know or deliberate upon evil, because of the union according to hypostasis, nor did He have a mind wavering or doubting. But He himself being one, Christ, this and that—that is, God and man—made use of His own human attributes; that is, all things that pertain to the nature of man, in obedience to the Father's and His own divine will.
But if He accepted the help through angels (for it says, "And behold, an angel strengthening Him"—which is a law of human nature), did He not assume the will? For David says that "He shall give His angels charge concerning Thee, and in their hands they shall bear Thee up."
If He accepted the abandonment, C did He not assume the will of man? For it says, "Eloi, Eloi, lamasabachthani?" that is, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" For God and Father delivered up His only-begotten Son for us to death, having become man. Indeed, His flesh was not abandoned, nor separated from His divinity, nor did it see corruption, nor was His soul left in Hades; but God and Father did not spare His own Son, but for us all delivered Him up to revilings and ignominy, D and to blameless and sinless sufferings, and to death. Wherefore, becoming obedient to the Father's will even unto death, and despising the shame, He crowned our nature with the glory and honor of immortality.
If those who confess one composite nature in Christ, and deny the two, admit the difference of natures, how do you, who confess and proclaim two natures in Christ, fabricate a single will in Him by an immense lie? But, he says, "The will is not of nature, but of the person." Which will do you speak of? The willing faculty, and the simple willing, and the natural object of will; or the mode of using the will?
But if you say that the willing faculty A and the simple willing are hypostatic, you speak not the truth; for every man possesses the willing faculty and the simple willing, while those things which are observed in all the hypostases that exist under the same species are natural, and not hypostatic. For not every man wills the same thing, nor in the same way; so that the willing faculty, and the simple willing, are natural, but that which one wills, and the way in which one wills, is different according to each hypostasis, and as an accidental hypostatic property. And a witness to this is the holy John, truly Chrysostom, speaking thus in book I, discourse 14, of his interpretation of the B Epistle to the Hebrews: "For volition is innate and from God; but such and such a volition is our own, and [a matter] of our judgment."
Furthermore, if the willing faculty were also hypostatic, as the Son is a hypostasis distinct1 from the Father, he would also have a distinct will.
Furthermore, natural things are untaught; for no one is taught to hunger, or to thirst, or to sleep, or to breathe; thus neither is one taught to will; but [one is taught] how to will, that is, either well or ill, and what to will. For the law of God does not teach [the act of] willing; for this is naturally given to us by Him; but it teaches C to will well, and what to will. So that willing [itself] is natural, but the what and the how of willing is hypostatic and different, except in the holy Trinity. For there, the three hypostases of the Godhead will in the same way and the same things, according to the essence of the Godhead. For as the one of the holy Trinity, the Son of God, who became flesh and is God, just as He possessed a human nature distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit in that He became man, and is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit, so also in the natural properties of humanity He is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit, having two natures and double natural properties.
Furthermore, that is essential and natural D which, being present, preserves, and, being absent, destroys the definition of nature. Is, therefore, a man without will? By no means. For a man has never existed without will. Therefore, willpower is among those things which pertain to nature. If hunger, and thirst, and the desire for sleep, being irrational appetites, are natural; will the rational appetite, which is free, not be natural?
We are made according to the image of God, in respect to the intellectual and the self-determined. If, therefore, He did not assume the mind and the free will, He did not assume that which is according to the image. And after a few words we shall append a little regarding that which is according to the image. If, therefore, He did not assume a human will, whatever Christ willed, He willed by a divine will—
how then, when He had entered a house and wished to remain hidden, could He not? The divine will, therefore, is not omnipotent, but impotent. Cease, O man, from talking such drivel; the desire for food or drink, or moving from place to place A, and things of that sort, are not of the divine will, but of the human—even though Christ willed these things by human will, according to the Father's good pleasure.
29. But, they say, free will was not given to man by nature, but by the title of honor. For Gregory the Theologian says: “Honoring him with free will.” But listen again to what the same Father says: “Him honored with reason and the image of God.” If, therefore, he did not possess even the faculty of reason by nature, but only by a title of honor, it remains for you to say that the Lord did not assume a soul endowed with reason, but one devoid of mind B.
In how many ways is that which is "according to the image" spoken of?
30. According to the rational, the intellectual, and the free-willed. By the same name, because the mind begets the word and brings forth the spirit, and finally on account of sovereignty. For this triple reason are angels and men "according to the image." Moreover, and preeminently, men [are so] in the manner of the unbegotten, which is seen in Adam; and the begotten, which is in Abel; and the proceeding, which is in Eve. Also, because man acts by nature as sovereign; for by nature the soul has the body as a servant, and exercises authority over it. And because it gathers together the whole of creation; for all creation is united both in God and in man, since man is, as it were, a bond of intellectual and sensible creation C. And because the Son of God was to be created according to this image. For He did not become an angel, but a man.
31. Every composite substance, coalescing from diverse natures, necessarily retains the natural properties of the two natures from which it is composed, even if confusion is perceived in the union. For fire and water are entirely contrary; indeed, fire is hot and dry, but water is cold and moist. Yet, a body which has coalesced from the four elements possesses the four qualities: heat and cold, moisture and
A dryness. If, therefore, where confusion is perceived, the natural properties of those things from which the composition is made must necessarily be discerned, how much more is this the case in that union which exists void of confusion!
32. But, they say, man does not have a natural will; rather, they speak in the manner of the Manichaeans, saying there are only two wills: one, the divine, which is good; the other, the diabolic, which is evil. And when man wills the good, he possesses the will of God; but when he wills the evil, he possesses that of the devil. O excess of madness! O darkness of ignorance! Does man possess the divine will, B or not? Yes, they say. If, therefore, man possesses the divine will, then, according to them, when he wills what is good, he is the creator of all things. But they are ignorant of the fact that it is impossible for any nature at all to use or perform an action for which it has not received the power by nature. For example, a winged creature cannot fly unless it has received the power of flying by nature; nor can a land animal walk unless it has received the power of walking by nature. Thus, too, man cannot act or will unless he has received by nature the faculty of willing and acting; for he cannot even understand if he has not received by nature the faculty of understanding, nor can he see, nor perform any other activity. Hence, in every nature, the natural energies always exist and coexist, but the things willed and the things done do not coexist. And indeed the natural will—that is, the faculty of willing—is one; but the things willed are many and various, for Scripture says: "All his wills are in them." It did not say: "Divine will is in them," but: C "All his wills are in them," that is to say, the things willed.
33. It should be known that all the things willed by the Godhead are natural; for since it is immutable, it is not its nature to will now in one way and now in another, but it always wills in the same way. And therefore, the things willed by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are exactly the same, as their nature is one and the same. Nothing is personal in the supersubstantial Godhead, except the Father's being unbegotten, and the begetting of the Father, the being begotten of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Spirit.
34. As we have said concerning the will, so we say concerning energy: that the name of energy signifies diverse things. For it is proper to the energy of God D that it is not only beyond all sense, mind, and every age, but also beyond all substance and creation. And energy is the natural power and movement of each substance.
A And again: energy is the natural power and faculty declaring each substance. And again: natural and primary energy is the ceaseless power of the intellectual soul; that is, its ceaseless reason, naturally flowing forth from it at all times. And energies are called those actions, as seeing, speaking, breathing, walking, eating, and drinking; that is, the use of every natural faculty. Even natural passions are often called energies, such as hunger, thirst, and the like. And to speak simply, natural energy is the power and movement of each substance, without which only non-existence remains. How then will the Lord not possess the natural energy of human nature? For the non-existence of the natural power of each thing is the non-existence of its nature. If, therefore, He did not possess a human natural energy, He did not possess a human nature either; for of those whose nature is different, their will and energy are also different.
35. Therefore, action is one thing, to act is another, to act in some way is another, and that which is acted upon—that is, the operation—is another; and the active [faculty] is another, and the one acting is another. Energy, then, is the active power itself—that is, the ability to act; and to act is to use the active power. And what it is to act is: to see, to think, to hear, to walk, to eat, to drink. And how to act is: to do so well or badly. The active is that which possesses the power to act, such as an angel or a human being; the one acting is the one who makes use of the energy, that is, the hypostasis. B Energy, therefore, sometimes signifies the active power, sometimes the acting, and sometimes the operation. Energy, then—that is, the active power—and the act of acting, is natural. For every human being has the power to act, and every human being has the act of acting. For man is an active animal. But the operation is not only natural, but also hypostatic, in the case of both angels and humans. For in the Holy Trinity, all things willed and acted are natural; therefore, they are the same for the three hypostases. But in the case of angels and humans, neither that which is willed is the same, nor that which is acted, nor the same mode of use; for each hypostasis of angels and humans has its own movement, and wills and acts in an individual way. C Therefore, in our Lord Jesus Christ, since there are two natures, there are two natural energies, that He might be perfect God and perfect man; and [there are] two willings, and differently willing, according to the natural difference of the two natures: divinely and humanly; omnipotently and impassibly according to the divine nature; and weakly and passibly according to the human nature. And the natural operation of the divine nature is one thing, and that of the human is another; for the things produced by the divine nature are not D the same as those of the human nature.
For the human nature does not create, nor does the divine nature eat, nor does it move from place to place, even if the divine [nature] operates through human operation; yet One is the Agent who performs both these and those, because there is one Person. For if He did not assume the human operation, He did not live as a man, He did not understand, He did not reason, A He did not eat, He did not drink, He did not perceive food, He did not walk, He did not see, He did not hear; He did not breathe, nor did He perform any of the things that are human, nor was He completely made man. For the Nyssen, Gregory, says: B "He speaks indeed, as if from the person of man, that which was fitting for the weakness of the nature, He who had taken our passions to Himself." But He brings in the second voice, the sublime and God-befitting will, to be confirmed over the human, desiring [it] for the sake of the salvation of men. For He who said, *Not my*, signified the human by this word; but by adding *thine*, He showed the communion of His own divinity with the Father, of which there is no difference of will, because of the community of the nature.
C 36. These things being thus parsed and chiseled out, let us see if the holy Gospels, and the Apostles, and the holy Fathers, confirm that the Lord possessed all these things, or not. That He possessed a human soul, the Lord Himself says in the Gospel according to John: "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." And again, "And I lay down my soul for the sheep." That He also had a body, witness is Joseph, who asked for His body, and prepared it, and placed it in the sepulcher; that He had also the organization of members, witness is she, the harlot, who anointed His head with ointment and watered His feet with tears; and the nails that fastened in the palms and the soles of the feet; the spear that pierced the side; the disciple who reclined upon His bosom; the tongue that said, "If any one thirsts, let him come to me, and drink"; the mouth that imparted the holy Spirit; the teeth that crushed the Pascha, and the throat that sent it down into the stomach; the liver that turned it into blood; the fatigue that came from the journey, the muscles and sinews being stretched, as the divine D Basil says; the circumcision of the foreskin; the buttocks that sat upon the ass; the scourges upon the back; the buffets on the cheeks with the spittings upon the face. That He also received my cutting and flux, witness is the circumcision, the... [alt-version omitted]
A nails, the lance, the spittle, the sweat, the blood and water which flowed from the side. And that He also adopted the energies of the soul and its passions, witness the energies of His all-holy soul through His immaculate body. For He saw, he says, the city Jerusalem, and wept; and He heard that John was cast into prison; and the sense of smell of the ointment, and the voice that raised Lazarus, and the taste of the gall and vinegar, naturally turning away from the bitterness (for these are surely not energies of the divine nature); and the touch of the leper, and His walking, and the stretching forth of His hands upon the cross—all these derive from natural power, as does the nourishment and growth of the body. For "Blessed," he says, "is the womb that bore thee, and the breasts which thou hast suckled." And, "The child grew in stature." And from the sensitive nature, as being animate yet irrational, came the perception, the movement by impulse, hunger, thirst. For later, he says, He hungered; and upon the cross, "I thirst"; and the desire for food: "With desire," he says, "I have desired to eat this Passover with you." The anger: "For He was troubled," he says, "in spirit, and testified and said, 'One of you shall betray me.'" And the digestion of food and drink, and the hematosis; for whence would come the sweat, the spittle, the saving blood and water, if not from digestion? For He perceived and put all to use, yet not with passion, but naturally; and He was nourished, not for the sake of passionate pleasure, but for the replenishment of what had flowed away. B For even if His most holy body did not see corruption, yet it did naturally undergo cutting and flux. For corruption is the dissolution of the body into those elements from which it was composed. And before all these, life itself was a witness, which is the first energy of a living being, and the movement imparted by the soul to the body.
37. But He did not possess the seminal and generative power; for the properties of the divine persons are immutable, and it is impossible for the Father or the Spirit to become the Son; wherefore neither did the Son of God become a son of man, except by being the Son of God, in order that the property might remain immutable. Furthermore, a person is wont to be mingled with a person of the same kind; but there is no other such person, who is Son of God and son of man. For there is one only-begotten Son, alone from the sole Father, and alone from the sole mother, Son of God and son of man, God and man, Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Moreover, even if the mingling D is natural for the propagation of the human race, it is not, however, necessary; for it is possible for a man to live and be a man without being mingled, and many have been entirely exempt from this affection.
A 38. For the body itself had no proper activity, except division and flux—which things are indeed passions, not activities. But all the rest of things, it is certain, are activities of the soul using the body, not of the divinity; for example, the turmoil. B "For now," He says, "my soul is troubled." The sadness and anguish: "For He began to be sorrowful and in anguish." And, "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." The fear of death: "For, Father," He says, "if it is possible, let this cup pass from me." And finally, death. All these things are not of the divinity, for the divine is dispassionate, ever-living, and immortal; but they belong to the animate being, that is, to a nature possessing soul and sense. From the rational and intellectual soul, He had wisdom. "For He increased in wisdom and stature." He did not increase in divine wisdom, for from the very conception there was a perfect union and supreme conjunction, and there was no addition of any divine power; but He increased in human wisdom. For according to the measure of his stature, the human wisdom was manifested in Him. Just as, from the very conception, He became a perfect infant, not having the parts of His body formed and organized little by little later—as the great and eminent Basil, who is profound in divine matters, teaches in his discourse on the day of the Nativity of Christ—so also from the very conception, He was perfect in human and divine wisdom. Naturally, as man—for as God, He did not become perfect in divine wisdom, but had it from eternity. But according to the growth of the stature of the body, the manifestation of the human wisdom which was perfect in Him was considered an increase. If He possessed human wisdom, He surely also possessed a mind; for wisdom is the offspring and power of the mind. And the Apostle also says, "But we have the mind of Christ." And the holy Fathers interpret the "according to the image" as referring to the intellectual part, whose testimonies we have appended. If, therefore, He assumed man made according to the image of God, that is, the nature of humanity, He surely assumed a mind and a rational nature; and He also assumed a self-determining will. For just as He assumed the irrational appetite, which is obedient to reason, so He also assumed the rational. For He did not assume a mindless and irrational nature. C For if He had assumed a mindless and irrational nature, He would not be man; but He did assume a rational one. For man is an intellectual and rational nature.
39. Are therefore all the holy Fathers, as they spoke of two natures in our Lord Jesus Christ, so also [to be understood as implying] that all natural properties are double? For it is impossible for a nature to exist without its constituting properties. Therefore, of necessity, those who name His two natures must also name His two natural wills, that is, [His] volitional powers; D for as God by nature, He had a divine and omnipotent will.
A But as one who became man by nature, He had a human will, by which He wished to remain hidden, having entered a house, and could not. For you surely would not, I suppose, attribute inability to His divine will. He possessed, therefore, the volitional power of His human soul, and by this He willed human things; and it was by this psychic will that He was moved toward human things, just as by His divine will He willed divine things—He the one and same Son of God, Christ, perfect God and perfect man—but not by way of a contrary disposition. For His human will was freely subject to His divine and paternal will, and He willed those things which His divine will desired it to will.
40. For since the will of Adam was not subject to the divine will, but his disposition willed things contrary to the divine will, this was the transgression; and no one among those from Adam has been in all things obedient to the divine will, but each B hypostasis has, according to its own disposition, been disobedient to the divine will: "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God," as the Apostle says. For this reason the Son of God, having become man by the good pleasure of the Father, assumed a human nature and a natural human will, but He did not assume a human hypostasis, so that the natural will of His humanity might not conduct itself according to a private hypostatic and volitional [*transcriber note: "gnomic"] will contrary to the divine will, but rather be freely obedient in all things, and thus the ancient transgression be undone.
And again: He did indeed have a human will according to the Evangelist Mark, in that having entered a house, He willed to remain hidden, and could not. The divine will is therefore omnipotent, and not weak; but the human is weak. Thus it was by His human will that He willed, with His divine will approving and giving time to His human nature to use its own proper [powers]: to will, I say, and not be able.
And again: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me,"—that is, the cup of death. Behold the natural appetite and desire for life, which naturally both rational and irrational animals possess. "Nevertheless, not my C will, but thine be done." Behold the natural and rational appetite of the intellect, which is self-determining and critical, and a bridle to irrational appetite. "Not my will be done, but thine." "Mine," that is, the human, in which I have no fellowship with You; for neither have You become man as I have, nor did You receive human passions; "but Thine," that is, the one common to me and You, of which I am a partaker, as I am also of the nature of the divinity. "For I have not come down to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent me." Not that by a private and contrary disposition His human [will] D [might be] toward heavenly things *transcriber note: Latin column text continues to "tibi" (omitted shorthand reference to Latin text), [but that it might be] subject to the divine will.
For it is the will and good pleasure of the Father that He should suffer for the salvation of the world, for which also He became incarnate. For here it is the "will" that is indicated, not the power of willing, but the object of the will. For it is not the divine will that He is here intending to perform—since this is uncreated and without beginning—but rather the object of the will, which the divine will willed; just as the saying, "All His wills are in them," must be understood. For there are not many volitional powers in God, but one; nor does that volitional power by which God wills reside in the saints, since their nature would then be one with His. For if the will were one, then the nature of these would also be one. But the "wills" of God in the saints are His precepts.
B 42. It has therefore been shown that Christ possessed, just as He did two natures, so also two natural wills and two natural energies, so that He might be perfect God and perfect man. For he is not perfect God who does not possess all the properties of the deity, and, before these, the divine nature itself; nor is he a perfect man who does not possess the perfect nature of man and all the natural properties of humanity. He possessed, then, the divine will, according to which, as God, He willed divine things with the Father and the Spirit—with whom, as the nature is one, so also is the will according to it. He possessed also a human natural will, that is, a natural power of willing, as having become a perfect man, such as His mother; with whom, as the nature is one, so also was the will one. He also possessed the divine energy, according to which He freely, as He willed, wrought divine things with the Father and the Spirit; and He had also a human energy, according to C which He freely wrought human things. For it was not by His divine will that He willed to go unrecognized, and was unable, nor to eat and drink; for these things fall under the will of human nature, not the divine. Nor did He walk or extend His hands by divine energy; for it is not of the divine nature or its energy to walk or to extend hands. Nevertheless, each of the natures in Christ, with the communion of the other, willed and wrought that which was proper to it, with His human will and energy serving His divine will and energy. For just as through His bodily energy His divine will was working—for He took hold of the hand of the maiden with His hand and said, "Maid, arise," and by the touch and the word the divine energy restored life to the maiden—so also through His human will, His divine will was working. For by willing with His divine will, He worked the miracle, and by willing with His human will, He extended His hand and said, "Arise." And to say it in one word, whatever He willed and wrought humanly was for the salvation of the world; for it was not in a divine manner that He performed the divine works—since it is not for God, unmingled, through touch and the extension of hands to perform miracles—nor was it according to man…
that He performed human acts. For the sufferings were not those of a mere man, nor was it the salvation of the world A performed by a mere human; but being God, and having become man, He displayed a certain new, or rather strange and theandric, operation: divine, yet operating through the human; human, yet serving the divine, and displaying symbols of the deitas which was conjoined with Him.
43. For just B as the nature of iron is one thing, and that of fire another, and the operations of each of these are likewise different—for fire does not cut, but burns and illuminates according to its own natural operation; nor is iron by nature heating or illuminating, but it cuts and is black; yet when a union of both occurs, each performs its own operation unitedly and not disjointedly. For simultaneously with the cutting, the burning also takes place, and through the iron the fire burns and illuminates. Yet there is not one natural operation, but two: one of the fire, the heating; and another of the iron, the cutting. And each has its own proper effect—the fire, the burning; the iron, the cutting—even if the cutting is heating, and the burning is cutting. Thus also in our Lord Jesus Christ, each nature performed the things proper to it with the communion of the other; and the two were not one, nor was there one effect of the two. But it was the natural function of His human nature to obey and serve the divine will of its own accord, and by its own will to extend the hand and touch the maiden, in obedience to the divine will and in service to it—while it was the function of the Godhead, acting through the contact, to accomplish the resurrection of the maiden.
44. Therefore, the great Dionysius did not speak of one theandric operation, but simply said "new," or "strange." For C each of them was strange and theandric—for he did not speak in order to express a number, but the strange mode. For the Lord, having compassion on His own creation which had voluntarily received the sickness of sin like a seed sown by the enemy, assumed the whole that was sick, that He might heal the whole. For that which is not assumed cannot be healed. But that which was assumed, even if it had stumbled, at length attains salvation. What, then, is that which fell and began to be sick first, if not the mind and its rational appetite, that is, the will? This, therefore, stood in need of cure; for sin is a disease of the will. If, then, He did not assume a soul endowed with reason and intellect, and its will, He did not heal the disease of human nature. For this reason, He assumed even a human will, but He did not assume sin—for sin is not a creation of His. In order, then, that He might expel from the soul the disease of sin sown by the enemy, for this reason He assumed a soul and its will; sin D
A however, He did not commit. And in order that He might free the body from corruption and the service of sin, He also assumed a body; He assumed as well the punishments inflicted because of the first transgression, so that, by paying on our behalf the debt that stood against us, He might free us from condemnation. For a slave cannot free a slave; for this reason He Himself, being free as one without sin, and being subject neither to death nor to any other punishment, took upon Himself our penalties for our sake, and died for our sake, "that He might give power to those who receive Him to become children of God," B and might grant them incorruptibility, and an angelic, painless, and toil-free life in the regeneration in the world to come. For it is necessary for us first to endure the things of the [first] Adam, from whom we have our origin, and in this way to attain the gifts of the second Adam. If we follow in His footsteps, and keep the law of liberty, and do not again become slaves to the yoke of sin; for having freed our nature, He gave us a commandment again, and showed us the way by which, if we walk, we shall reign with Him, going where He Himself, our Forerunner, has gone: for if we seek another way, we shall be cast out. May it be granted to us, C as we follow in His footsteps, to be always with Him, and to enjoy His glory and kingdom, now and ever, and to the ages of ages. Amen.
ADMONITION CONCERNING THE DISSERTATION AGAINST THE NESTORIANS
The dissertation of Damascene against the Nestorians was published in Latin in volume IV of the *Antiquæ Lectiones* of Henricus Canisius, in the translation of Franciscus Turrianus; now, however, having obtained the Greek text in Cod. Reg. n. 2926, I present it in both Greek and Latin. In commendation of this work, I will note only this: that John Damascene, for the sake of defending the deity of the one person of Christ, contends with such art, force, and clarity using various testimonies of holy Scripture from both Testaments, that this one little work seems to me sufficient for strengthening the minds of the faithful against the plague of Socinian perfidy raging today, and for recalling to the catholic faith those who read it with a sincere desire to know the truth. The author appeals to a unique monument by which the primitive tradition can be established: namely, the Nicene symbol, which the Nestorians would not hesitate to embrace as a token of faith. For the Fathers knew that this was the more compendious way by which anyone could easily arrive at a certain knowledge of what the faith of the whole catholic world was, in the first centuries of the Church, regarding the mystery of the Word of God having become man. D That John Damascene was the parent of this little work is attested by the codices—the Bavarian which Turrianus used, the Royal, the Vatican likewise, and the Arabic translation which is preserved among the manuscripts of the *Bibliotheca Patrum Oratorii* in Paris; as well as the same method which is obvious in other polemical lucubrations of the same author; and finally the same sentiments which he delivers in the books *On the Orthodox Faith*, expressed in the very same words. It is also cited as a genuine work of John Damascene by Gregory the Protosyncellus in the *Apology of the Council of Florence* against the epistle of Mark of Ephesus.