Theological and Polemical Works

THEOLOGICAL AND POLEMICAL WORKS OF SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

ΤΟΥ ΕΝ ΑΓΙΟΙΣ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΗΜΩΝ ΜΑΞΙΜΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΟΜΟΛΟΓΗΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΑΡΙΝΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΟΣΙΩΤΑΤΟΝ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΝ

S. P. N. MAXIMI CONFESSORIS AD SANCTISSIMUM PRESBYTERUM MARINUM

^A Having set as your goal, O Father honored by God, to establish a divine friendship with God, you run the race toward it in good order. By reason, you define the nature of beings for the generation of virtue; but by mind, for the establishment of a union [knowledge] that does not go astray, you limit the motion of every age and time. These are the things into which the more ardent love of God and the desire for Him enter—which, in proportion to the infinity of the One Who is loved, extends the motion and impulse of you who love and desire Him; and because of the incomprehensibility of the Beloved and Desired One, it makes your desire incomprehensible. Its end is God Himself; He who becomes the fulfillment of love and desire for those who are worthy, as the self-subsistent enjoyment of goods, of which alone experience—which indeed clearly transcends the intellect—knows as [true] seizure: a union such that it cannot fall under any mental form. For this reason, life has become for you, as it were, the person of reason; but the nature of life…

^A is reason and the rational principle: both of which truly delineate for you, in accordance with Christian piety, the new man; one who, as is right, bears the expressed and imprinted image and likeness of the creating God, which we must now consider to be truth and goodness—the former being the end of contemplation, the latter the end of action; and the former is the adversary of falsehood, while the latter is the emulator of vice and depravity.

Hence, along with the fulfillment of the virtues, there has come to you a comprehension of divine decrees, which is clearly contained by varied knowledge and the power of demonstration. Equipped with this, when you weighed with the balance of judgment that which had been proposed by some in an unrefined way regarding the wills, and did not agree with those who say that these are all the same—namely ^B will (and by this they mean desire), and counsel, and election, and judgment/opinion, and free faculty/arbitrium, and opinion, and prudence/counsel of the soul, and that they differ only in words; and who assert that the will of God and of the saints will be one, and that for this reason Christ is endowed with one free and choosing will—you did not consider it enough for yourself, possessing as you do the enduring poverty of spirit, to assert and confirm by yourself what you had determined with sound and correct judgment; but it pleased you to take on also me, bred in ignorance, that I might, as an act of shared suffrage, approve what seemed right and decreed to you. This, therefore, I approach to do (even if it be a bold deed), having allowed myself to be compelled by the reward of obedience. I shall write of each of these terms in order, and that briefly, and in the manner of one defining—not so that I might write down my own speeches and opinions (for who am I, lacking these, to labor at it?), but so that I may collect what has been worked through by others, so that we may know that between these, both in word and in reality (that is to say, in both), there is a wide distinction.

Concerning the natural will, or appetition

They say that the natural will—or [natural] desire—is the appetitive power of that which is according to nature, ^D containing and, as it were, binding together all the properties that belong essentially to the nature. For the substance, which is contained and as it were bound together by this natural will, desires to be and to live and to be moved, by sense and by mind, according to which it seeks that which is natural and the full complete being (which they call entity). For nature is appetitive of itself, and of all things that constitute it by nature, and toward its own completion.

^A Others, in defining this [natural will], say it is a rational and vital appetite. But [prohairesis] (which we may call choice and purpose) is a consultative or deliberative appetite for those things which are within our power. Therefore, will is not choice—since will is a certain simple appetite, rational and vital; while choice is a synthesis of appetite, counsel, and judgment. For, desiring, we first deliberate; and having deliberated, we judge; and having judged, we choose that which was shown by judgment to be the superior over the worse. And the former [will] depends only on natural things, while the latter [choice] depends only on those things which are within our power and are able to be accomplished by us. Therefore, will is not choice.

On the Will ^B and whether it is not simply of a thing good or bad.

But neither is choice [prohairesis] the same as will [boulēsis]. For [boulēsis] is a phantastic appetite for things that are in us and that are not in us—that is to say, one formed by thought alone. ^C This phantastic appetite belongs solely to the faculty of the cogitative soul, without the deliberative reason, [consisting in] a sort of natural will or desire for things in our power. But choice is a deliberative appetite for things that are within our power to do. The definition given above would have sufficed to show the difference between these and to put an end to the contentiousness of those who dispute needlessly and—I know not how to say this decorously—openly contradict well-known truths. But since those who are inquisitive desire to investigate these questions at greater length, we shall speak otherwise. They say, namely, those who have discussed these matters: It is not the case that everything to which it is fitting to extend choice, it is also universally fitting to extend will. For we say that we "will" to be healthy, to be rich, and to be immortal; ^D yet we do not say that we "choose" to be rich, healthy, and immortal; since will pertains even to things that are possible and things that are impossible, while choice pertains only to things that are possible and that can be brought about by us. Again, will is of the end, while choice is of the things leading towards the end. Thus they say the end is the "willed"—for instance, health; while the things leading toward the end are the "deliberated"—for instance, the means to health. Thus, they say that will maintains the same proportion toward the object of will that choice maintains toward the object of deliberation.

^A For we do not choose only those things which we think can come about through us. We also will things that cannot come about through us. It has been demonstrated, therefore, that choice is not will; and it will be demonstrated again that it is neither counsel, that is, deliberation.

Concerning counsel, or deliberation.

They say that counsel, or deliberation, is an appetitive inquiry concerning the things that are within our power to do. ^B *Proaireton* (choice), however, is what has been judged from counsel. It is clear, therefore, from this that deliberation concerns things that are still under inquiry, while choice concerns things already judged. And this is clear, not only from the definition, but also from the etymology. For *proaireton* is something chosen before another. But no one prefers one thing to another without having deliberated, nor does he choose without having judged. Therefore, counsel—that is, deliberation—is not choice.

Concerning choice.

They say that choice is an appetitive deliberation of the things within our power to do. ^C For choice is a composite sort of thing, and blended from many parts, being composed of appetite, counsel, and judgment. For none of these, when considered by itself, is choice, since neither appetite alone by itself, nor counsel, nor judgment is choice, but rather it is something blended from these, just as the human being among us is a composite of soul and body. For it is then that choice occurs—and an object of choice—when what has been judged from counsel, about which the choice is concerned, receives appetite. Necessarily, therefore, choice concerns these things after the judgment, just as counsel concerns them before the judgment. For we choose those things about which we deliberate.

Concerning which things we deliberate.

^D We deliberate about things which are within our power and can come about through us, and which have an uncertain end and outcome. Now, it has been said—about things that are within our power; because we deliberate only about things to be done, for these are within our power. For we do not deliberate about wisdom itself, nor about God, nor about things that happen necessarily and always in the same way, such as the cyclic motion of the seasons; nor about things that do not exist at all times but happen always in the same way, such as the rising and setting of the sun; nor about things that exist by nature but do not always occur in the same way,

as for example with the graying of a man of sixty, or the puberty of a man of twenty; nor about things that exist by nature, but occur at other times in other ways, at an uncertain time, such as rain, droughts, and hail. For these reasons, ^A the phrase "in our power" was used. The clause "things that can happen through us" was added because we do not deliberate about all human matters, nor about every object, nor even about all things that are in our power and can happen through us; but we must add that they also have an uncertain end. For if it is manifest and certain, we no longer deliberate about it, even if it is in our power and happens through us. It has been shown that deliberation does not concern the end, but the things leading to the end. For we do not deliberate about becoming rich, but about how and by what means we shall become rich. And to speak briefly, we deliberate only about those things whose action is equally possible. And "equally possible" is that which we have the power to do, and the opposite of which we also have the power to do. For if we did not have the power to do both, we would not deliberate about both. For no one deliberates about things that are agreed upon and manifest, or about things that are impossible and not possible. But if we have the power to perform only one of the opposites, that one is agreed upon as being indubitable, while the opposite ^B is impossible. For example, if bread and a stone are set before one, no one deliberates about which he shall make his food; the one is agreed upon, while the other is clearly impossible. These, then, we choose—those that are equally possible, about which we also deliberate.

On Sentiments.

But neither is fixed preference (*proairesis*) a sentiment (*gnōmē*), even if the multitude rashly think so; but it relates to sentiment. For they say that sentiment is an inward appetite for those things which are in our power, from which preference arises; or a disposition toward those things in our power that have been deliberated upon with appetite. For the appetite, being disposed toward those things judged by deliberation, has become a sentiment; after which, or more accurately to speak, from which, is preference. Therefore, sentiment stands in the same relation to preference as a state (*hexis*) does to an action.

On Power.

But neither is power (*exousia*) preference. For preference, as I have often said, is a deliberative appetite for those things in our power that are to be done; whereas power ^C is the lawful authority over things in our power; the unhindered authority of the use of those things in our power; the appetite for those things in our power that is unenslaved. Power and preference are not, therefore, the same thing; since we do choose according to power, but we do not have power according to preference; and the one only selects, whereas the other makes use of those things in our power, and those things that follow upon those in our power—that is to say, preference, judgment, and deliberation. For we deliberate according to power, ^D and we judge, and we choose, and we strive, and we use those things which are in our power. On...

On opinion.

But neither is opinion a type of choice. For opinion is twofold: rational and irrational; but choice is mutable. Irrational opinion, they say, is a simple and ready knowledge; as when someone puts forward another person’s opinion while being ignorant of the cause of it. For example, by saying that the soul is immortal, without providing a demonstrative cause for its immortality. They say that rational opinion is knowledge established through the conclusion of the intellect; as when someone, having thought about something, provides the cause of it scientifically. For intellect is that which traverses and operates through intervals, beginning from a proposition and reaching a conclusion. For example, if it is proposed to someone to prove that the soul is immortal, and he says: "Since the soul is self-moving, and that which is self-moving is always moving, and that which is always moving is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal." Or again: "Since the soul is incomposite, and that which is incomposite is indissoluble, and that which is indissoluble is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal." ^B For it is the property of the intellect to traverse a path that leads to the knowledge and science of a thing; and it proceeds by means of arguments from propositions to a conclusion; and by this process and way it creates that type of opinion which is rational.

And again, opinion is of things not only in our power, but also of things not in our power; whereas choice is only of things in our power. And we speak of opinion as true and false; but we do not speak of choice as true and false, but as good and bad. And opinion is of universals; but choice is of particulars; for choice is concerned with things to be done, as these are the particulars. It is, I think, clear through many arguments that choice is not opinion. For if opinion is knowledge constituted by the conclusion of the intellect, while choice is an appetition deliberated upon concerning things to be done which are in our power, then choice is not the same as opinion.

On prudence, or intelligence and wisdom.

^D But neither is prudence, or intelligence and wisdom, choice. For they say that prudence (in Greek, *phonēsis*) is an appetition contemplating rational and cognitive subjects.

^A And they say that choice—as reason has variously defined it—is a deliberative appetition of the things that are within our power. But they say that prudence comes about in this way: for example, the first movement of the mind they call intelligence; and the intelligence concerning something, they call notion; and this, when it remains and impresses the soul toward the thing being contemplated, is termed cogitation; and the cogitation, remaining in the same place and examining itself, is termed prudence; and prudence, when it is expanded, produces discursive reasoning—called by those skilled in these matters the internal word, which, when they define it, they say is a most complete movement of the soul taking place in the discursive faculty without any utterance; from which they say the uttered word proceeds.

^B Again, they say that what is called *phronēma* is the knowledge, supervening upon prudence, of the thing understood by the prudent faculty. For they speak of prudence, the thing understood, the prudent faculty, and the *phronēma*. And prudence is the relation; the thing understood is that which is contemplated; the prudent faculty is that which contemplates; and *phronēma* is the knowledge of the thing understood which is generated in the prudent faculty from prudence. If, therefore, this is so, and choice is not so, then choice is not the *phronēma*.

^C It has been demonstrated, therefore, as I think, clearly, that the things proposed are not the same as each other, according to those who think so. And if they should say that they are altogether the same because appetite is predicated equally of all things as a genus—that is, the appetitive power which exists in nature—then let them say that all species of animals, terrestrial, winged, and aquatic, are the same as each other, because "animal" is predicated of all of them equally as a more general and higher genus; and thus the order of the universe will vanish, not consisting in the true existence and distinction of things, but being only a show of empty names.

That in no way after the resurrection will the will of the saints be one, either among themselves or with God, even if the thing willed is the same for all, as some say.

Therefore, choice having assumed the impulse and use regarding things within our power, exists as the limit and end of the rational movement within us. For the rational nature, being endowed with the natural rational appetite—which they also call the will of the intelligent soul—desires and reasons; and having reasoned, chooses. For they say that will is not simply the natural one, but the qualitative one; that is, the will regarding something.

^A seeking, it inquires; and inquiring, it considers; and considering, it deliberates; and deliberating, it judges; and judging, it chooses or decides; and making a decision and choosing, it acts, and is incited to movement; and acting and in the incitement of motion, it makes use of it; and making use of it, it ceases from the appetitive movement toward that thing. For no one makes use of something without having first acted; and no one acts without having chosen; and no one chooses without having judged; and no one judges without having deliberated; and no one deliberates without having considered; and no one considers without having inquired; and no one inquires without having willed; and no one wills without having reasoned; and no one reasons without desiring; and no one desires rationally without being by nature a rational being. Man, therefore, being an animal rational by nature, is appetitive, and reasoning, and willing, and inquiring, and considering, and choosing, and acting, and making use of things. ^B

But if man, along with other living beings, is also an animal by nature endowed with the faculty of choice, and choice concerns those things that are in our power and can be accomplished through us and have an uncertain end; and if the principle of the virtues—which is the law active within the natural faculties—and the mode of using these same faculties, which is the cause of the unnatural passions by way of a perversion, are in our power, then everyone who is by nature endowed with the faculty of choice is also capable of opposites and is endowed with the faculty of judgment. And if he possesses the faculty of judging opposites, he is absolutely capable of choosing; and if he is capable of choosing, since the movement toward both possibilities lies within him, he is not by nature immutable. ^C Therefore, since counsel, as well as judgment and choice, concerns those things that are ambiguous (inasmuch as they are among those things in our power), when there will no longer be anything ambiguous or uncertain—the truth itself being clearly manifested to all—there will be no future choice, which moves through intermediate things situated within our power; for there will be no judgment either, distinguishing between opposites, from which we might choose the better over the worse. But if at that time, according to the law of nature that now prevails, there is no choice, all doubt regarding existing things having been removed, there shall be only an active, intellectual appetite in those who are thus by nature endowed with the faculty of desire; having attained in an ineffable manner the mystical enjoyment and possession of that which is by nature desirable, toward which it directed its movement through the things enumerated above. Its satiety is the infinite intensification of the desire of those who enjoy it; each one will share in it as supernaturally as he has desired it; and there will be an immediate union with that which is by nature desired. ^D If then, to the extent that one has desired—

and loved, so too he will be a participant of what is desired and loved; by the principle of nature, the will of all will shine forth as one. Thus it is absolute (that is, ^B even though it is itself distinct in the manner and mode of its movement).

But if, in regard to the mode of movement, the will of all men is not one, it will never come to pass—as some have opined—that the will of God and the will of those who are to be saved is one in every way, even if what is willed is one for both God and the saints: namely, the salvation of those being saved, which is a divine purpose, established as the end of all things before the ages. In this there will be a harmony of will between those who are to be saved themselves and God who provides salvation, since God wholly permeates all things generally and each thing specifically, and, as one who fills all things by the measure of grace, He is also filled in all things, like members, according to the proportion of faith in each one, through which they are joined to Him in necessity. For if the will of God has by nature the power to provide salvation, while the will of man has from nature the capacity to be made a partaker of salvation, it will never be the case that the one which provides salvation by nature is the same as the one to whom salvation is provided by nature, even though the scope, purpose, and end of both is the same—namely, the salvation of all—which God, its Author, promoted, but the saints chose by their own will.

^C If, however, the divine and human will are to be one and the same in numerical identity, as those who hold such views claim, then since God established all the ages by His will, the choir of the saints would also be the Creator of all things by the same will, whether that will be natural or based on choice and deliberate intent; and, quite simply, by the very will through which they are naturally disposed to be identified with the Divine. But this is absurd, and, as I think, the work of a wandering mind. For as long as all are not creators, or only the Apostles, or only the Prophets—and these again, or Peter alone, or Moses alone—and since there is not one, but many mansions with God and the Father for the saints, [*] and since the human will, which has been moved toward the good by imitation, cannot be identical in natural quality and quantity with ^D the will that is good by nature—which is clearly impossible (for how could that which is by nature participant be the same as that which is by nature endowed with the power of participating?)—it is impossible for the will of God and the choir of the saints to be one and the same in every way, even if, as I said, the thing willed is one in both—namely, the salvation of all—in which the union of their wills regarding salvation consists.

But, as it seems, being ignorant of the enormity of the absurdity that springs from what they say, they allow their own minds to be carried aimlessly toward things they ought not. For if there is no will, however conceived or described, that is unrelated and does not possess a relative category, it is a quality, and not one of those things that exist in themselves, as if it were considered in another. But if it is among those things considered in another, the will is by all means an accident; and if it is an accident, it will be a characteristic either of substance or of hypostasis.

^A For there is nothing intermediate considered in itself, that is, neither participating in the other, nor composed of both. And if it is of substance, they will predicate one nature of both God and the saints; as all have reduced themselves into one substance through one will. For that which is predicated generally and equally of some things is indicative of the substance under which they belong. But if it is of hypostasis, the hypostasis of all—both of God and of the saints—will be one, with all things being fused into one another. For that which specifically inheres in someone by way of hypostasis, if it is observed in others without difference, confuses all with one another; and it makes the "how" of the reason of each person completely indiscernible.

That it is not possible to speak of one will in Christ, whether it be called natural or of election, as it pleased some. ^B

Therefore, if their argument and reasoning have faltered in these things, it will not even have the power to move on to our Lord and God and Savior of all, Christ, and to establish any will at all said of Him. For if they were to say that this will of Christ is natural, they will be shown to be suffering from the Manichaean fantasy from the start, as they profess one nature of Christ, which neither is nor will be, and which they advocate as being made known by a corresponding will. And at the same time, they will be caught emulating the madness of Arius and the confusion of Apollinarius, as if they had fused the substances, ^C making Christ a stranger to God and Father and to the immaculate Mother by the account of substance. For a natural will characterizes a nature, and no argument will gainsay this. But if it characterizes a nature, it is clear that those who say this proclaim Christ to be a nature. But if Christ is a nature, He is neither God by nature nor truly man by nature; just as the Father is not Christ by nature, nor is the Mother Christ by nature. But if Christ is God by nature, insofar as He is Christ by nature, he who says this asserts many gods; for he professes one nature of the Father, as He is God, since Christ is not Christ by nature, and another nature of Christ, as He is God, since He is Christ by nature; and the end of such monstrosity for them will be a condemnation leading to polytheism.

If, however, they posit that will as of election, which they call according to judgment, ^D either it will be entirely according to nature, having the mode of the use of things to be acted upon in Christ in all respects convenient to the reason of nature; and thus Christ will be shown by their opinion to be not immune and outside the risk of all affections, but one containing affections or passions, and good according to progress, whatever He might be by nature. For such is the choice according to nature of things to be done in accordance with the will, making the better choice preferred over the worse;

for when the judgment of the one choosing among things within his power has been carried out or has gone awry—the judgment whose ^A ballot is choice—then the principle of things done according to nature stands firm through the rightful use of them, or the manner of things done contrary to nature comes into existence through the misuse of them; the former being the herald of the choice according to nature, the latter of the choice contrary to nature.

And if the choice of Christ were according to nature, not only would we again accuse those persons—they who boldly sketch out another nature for Christ that is intermediate between divinity and creation—of these same things, but we would also laugh at them as raving mad, since they make Christ, by the nature of the opposing things, a mere man subject to choice according to the error of Nestorius. But if it were contrary to nature, I pass over in silence the blasphemy, lest I inadvertently stain and defile my tongue with the very things by which I accuse and refute them. For by speaking of a will in Christ ^B which is a faculty of choosing, they have asserted that the person of Christ can altogether be moved both according to nature and contrary to nature. For such is choice, as I said above. But if the choosing will is a badge and mark of the person of Christ, they have in any case severed Him from the Father and the Spirit as being of a different will and a different mind. For that which is understood as belonging properly and privately to the Son by reason of His person can in no way be common to the Father and the Spirit by reason of person. Therefore, all the holy Fathers who have made mention of choice in the humanity of Christ have signified the appetitive power substantially implanted in nature—or, to say the same thing, the natural will—or our own choice existing in the God made flesh by way of appropriation. ^C

This is what I, your servant and disciple, most considered when I set forth the choice in those things written to my most holy lord and master regarding the difficult passages of Holy Scripture, addressed to Thalassius; knowing, that is, and since it did not in the least escape me, that if the Creator of men has become man for us, He has of course also established for us the immutability of the choosing mind—as He is Himself the Author ^D of immutability—regarding the things of our condemnation through that very experience, by essentially...

taking on the passions, and by lovingly adopting those ^A of humiliation—of which the adoption has been the cause of the choosing mind’s passionlessness for the race, while the experience has been given as a faithful pledge of the natural incorruptibility that follows. For the human element of God was not moved according to choice as we are, being made through counsel and judgment for the discernment of opposites, so that it would not be considered mutable by nature according to choice; but rather, having received existence at the same time as the union with God the Word, it had an undoubting, or rather a stationary, movement of the natural appetite, that is, of the will—or, to speak more properly, the station was unmoved, having been deified in Him through the most pure essentialization to God and the Word. By naturally forming and moving [(6)] this as His own—and just as the natural state of His own soul—He fulfilled the great mystery of the dispensation for us without any imagination, having subtracted nothing at all of the natural elements of the assumed nature, except for sin, the reason of which has not been sown at all in any of existing things.

^B The distinction of the names having therefore been made clear to us, through the description appropriately fitted to each, let us not be troubled when hearing those who indiscriminately use the names to confuse the things that are understood; if indeed truth lies for us in things, and not in names. And let us not deem that which is not the same to be the same; but, believing piously and religiously, let us confess Christ to be truly God perfect and truly man perfect, the selfsame One being so in reality and truth, and not called so by a mere empty appellation; and for this reason let us proclaim Him to be two natures, of which He is the Person—since He is not without flesh—and let us speak freely that He possesses two natural wills, according to the Fathers, since He is not without soul and mind; and let us not be bold to innovate a vocal expression for which we have no refuge in patristic authority. For ^C as for "one natural will of Christ, or even one of the choosing mind"—not only because of the absurdity shown [to follow] is there a fear for those who have taken pains to be pious to say—

but also because no one of the holy Fathers is ever found to have said this; for they truly know that choice belongs to those who can be moved toward both [to both good things and evil things, that is]; and to think or to say this of Christ, who is truly the very essence and origin, or source, of good things, abounds with every impiety. And thus much for these matters.

Concerning the one operation in the seventh chapter of the Questions of the great Gregory, which is outside the natural order of things and is in us by the authorship of God.

^BRegarding the one operation placed in the seventh chapter of the *Questions* of the great Gregory, the rationale is clear. For in describing the future state of the saints, I said there was one operation of God and the saints; that is to say, the one which deifies all the saints in the blessedness for which we hope—the operation of God being such according to essence, but that of the saints having come to be by grace. Or rather, I added that it is of God alone; since the deification of the saints through grace is the result of the divine operation alone, for which we do not have the power scattered within our nature. Now, of those for whom there is no power, there is also no act, which is the completion of natural power. Therefore, the act depends on the power, and the power on the essence. For the act is from the power, and the power is from the essence and in the essence. ^C These three, therefore, they say are connected to one another: the one using [the power], the power, and the possible. And they call the essence or substance the one using; but they call that which we have, whereby we have the movement of ability, the power; and they call the possible that which is naturally adapted to occur by us according to power. But if that which is naturally adapted to occur by us, we have by a natural power—and deification is not among those things that are naturally adapted to occur by us, not being among those things that are within our own power (for there is no rationale in nature for those things that are above nature)—then deification is not an act of our own power, for which we do not have the power by nature; but it is of divine power alone, not being a repayment of just works to the saints, ^D but a demonstration of the abundance of Him who has made it; who has established by choice those who are lovers of good things, [continued] which He Himself will be shown to be by nature, according to the principles that He Himself understands; so that He might be known perfectly, and yet remain completely incomprehensible. I did not, therefore, abolish the natural operation of those who experience this, which is intended to be brought to completion, but I merely indicated that they undergo the enjoyment of good things; rather, I only pointed out that it is not a repayment of just works to the saints.

^A For I have demonstrated that only that power which is above essence—which is the cause of deification—is the worker of deification, and that it has come about for the sake of those who have been deified.

And let no one suspect that a single operation of Christ is being proclaimed in these statements. For we do not proclaim Christ a man who has been deified, but God who has perfectly become man, and who has made manifest—through a flesh that is by nature operative and animated by a rational soul—the infinite, infinitely infinite, and super-infinite power of His own ineffable Godhead; ^B the same being entirely God and truly man; the same being perfect and most complete by nature in both, and lacking nothing whatsoever that belongs by nature to both, with the single exception of sin, for which there is no rationale. For the natures of which He was the Person, these He also naturally received as essential principles. If, then, He received the essential principles of the natures of which He was the Person, He also rightly possessed the natural operation of the animated flesh, in which the essential principle of that nature is implanted. Even if He had a natural operation as man, of which the principle is constitutive of that nature, it is manifest that as God He also had a natural operation, of which the principle is the manifestation of that super-essential Godhead. For being perfect God and perfect man, the same Person according to each, He operated naturally without being divided. If, then, He operated naturally according to each as the Person of whom He was, it is obvious that along with the natures of which He was the Person, He also possessed their essential and constitutive operations, of which He Himself was the union, working in a way appropriate to Himself, and confirming by the very things in which He worked, the truth of those things from which and in which He existed.

^C Christ, therefore, is one from two natures—namely, from Godhead and from humanity—the only-begotten Word and Son and Lord of glory, in whom He is known and in whom He is truly believed to exist; and He possesses two natural and generic movements, that is to say, operations, which are the constitutive principles of those from which He is, and whose effects were the particular actions; these indeed proceeding from Him and being brought to completion by Him, without any division of those from which He existed, and without any confusion whatsoever. For He undergoes no division or confusion, He who is never subject to change ^D and who provides to all things that exist their endurance and existence, as well as the mode of their existence.

NOTE

...having assumed it, sin apart. There are one or two lines missing in Turrianus; nor are the things he does have sufficiently clear. Nilus, the Antiquarian of the Dufresne codex, takes him to task in a final note, and frequently criticizes him as one who does not think ecclesiastically concerning Christ and His mystery. But who this Nilus is, and whether he is the Nilus of Thessalonica, whose tract against the primacy of the Pope exists—to which the excellently orthodox Matthew Caryophilus, Archbishop of Iconium, learnedly responded—is uncertain. If, however, he is that same person, it is worthy of note that he is so hostile to the Roman Church and a schismatic, and is not of sound faith in examined dogmas: let our innovators see whom they make such a man to be, and whom they wish to be a preeminent leader of their battle line.

^A These things have been said briefly, O holy Father, by your command, that you might have—if they bring any benefit—a means to shake off the trifles of those who babble at will and who have taken license from the difficulty of the times. And do not despise your poor servant, but enrich him with the divine Spirit, bestowing in return for his obedience your powerful prayers. And may you never cease to commend me to Christ, the great God and Creator of all, whom every creature adores, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, unto the ages. Amen.

^A

SCHOLIA

1. By reason, the nature of existing things is circumscribed toward the generation of virtue, according to progression; which is a complete denial of nature for the sake of virtue. But by the mind, the motion of all age and time is restricted toward the constitution of an unwavering union, according to ascent; which is a transgression of those things in which nature exists—I mean place and time, in which the subsistence of existing things is found. But the restoration by grace toward Him from whom are all things, and through whom and in whom are all things—as the end of all—takes place by way of assumption; which is indeed a passion of the one being assumed, but an operation and act of the One assuming.

2. Person, that is, subsistence; nature, that is, essence. For the essence is the "according to image," the reason; but the "according to likeness" is the life, which is the subsistence; from both of which virtue is filled up. For they say that virtue is the subsistence of wisdom, and wisdom is the essence of virtue. Wherefore, the explanation of wisdom, with certain truth, is the institution of life through ordered conduct for those who apply themselves to contemplation: but the basis of virtue is the reason of contemplation for those who cultivate action. And the most accurate character and mark of both is an unyielding gaze toward that which truly is.

3. That man is not immutable by nature; and how.

4. That the will is a characteristic either of the essence or of the subsistence; and there is no intermediate thing between these, nor is it common and composed of both, nor lacking in either. ^D

5. That the prohairesis (choice) in Christ signifies the natural will; that is, the appetitive power of nature.

6. Behold the mystery of the dispensation.

7. Regarding the text: "For in Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts xvii, 28); that is, concerning essence, and power, and operation.

8. Regarding deification. May you also hear these things, O Nile; and may you yourself think what the teachers of the truth think.

OF THE SAME TO THE SAME MARINUS

That Severus maliciously says that the hypostasis or person is the same as the nature, in order to establish confusion through the one nature, and to escape the test by saying that he means the nature by "hypostasis," and again to introduce division by advocating union out of hypostases; and that he might seem to escape detection by saying that he understands the hypostases in place of the natures. And again, being accused of the non-existence of the natures on account of the mere difference, he has found a refuge of defense: the mere difference in natural quality. And that, just as Nestorius, by calling the union "mere," introduced a real division, so also Severus, by calling the difference of the natures "mere" and merely nominal, creates the confusion which is in reality.

^B But Severus, being brought into straits by these arguments, and not bearing the force and proof of the truth, again, according to his custom, takes falsehood to himself as an ally, saying that in the mystery of the Incarnation (in the dispensation) the hypostasis is the same as the nature; and [he equates] the distinction in natural quality with that which is in reality and by nature; for the reason that every natural quality is also a thing and is called a reality: whereby, of course, if he were caught and convicted by the proofs through the one composite nature which he posits, then ^C he might teach the empty specter and fiction of Manes, and the confusion of Apollinaris, and finally the contraction into one essence of those things that were united after the union of Eutyches, like a chameleon changing its colors, he might change his own tune, saying that he understood the hypostasis and person by the name of nature. But if, again, by saying that the union is out of hypostases or persons, he should be proven to hold the division of Ebion the Samosatene and Nestorius, as pertains to the division... ^D

knowingly, is convicted of having a false advocate, in that he declares ^A the hypostases to be in place of the natures. If, however, he is again justly accused that, by a simple distinction, he posits that the things which were united have been abolished, he finds as a refuge for his defense that which is a distinction as if in natural quality, speaking not of natures, or rather of substances, but of natural qualities, in the case of Christ after the union; by means of a word that dissolves confusion—that is, by means of "distinction," the malicious sophist goes further, tightening the confusion: for things that are contrary, according to the law of nature, he does not create a resolution by the contraries, but a construction, contrary to the rule and law of nature. And having become such, he causes confusion concerning the distinction in the minds of his hearers, just as Nestorius was shown to have acted concerning the union. For the latter, by naming the union only by a simple empty title, introduced in reality the division of the things; and this [Severus], by advocating a simple distinction after the union, according to his conception, thinks that the things that differ have [real] existence; but according to their activity, he effectively brings about their confusion. For if Nestorius had not thought that the union was only empty, he would have called the one hypostasis of Christ, which was accomplished from the union of the natures, composite. And this [Severus] also, if he were not proclaiming the distinction as empty, would not have refused to speak of the indivisible and undivided quality of the things that differ in Christ after the union, knowing that with every distinction, number ^B is necessarily introduced; and with every quantity, the number that signifies it is joined. For it is impossible for a distinction to exist without quantity, or for a quantity to be discerned without the number that signifies it.

And the one, knowing only the quantity of natures in Christ, but not knowing the unique [person] of the hypostasis according to composition from the natures, makes the empty title of union a covering for the division of the natures; while the other, advocating the unique [person] according to nature only instead of according to hypostasis, and not knowing the quantity according to nature, makes the empty distinction in natural quality a covering for the confusion of the natures. And the one, by advocating the union of the natures in only a voluntary quality, denies the one hypostasis, not enduring to say that the gathering of the things has truly come to pass according to substance. For authority and dignity, and such a volition as this, which Nestorius claimed to be the union, are clearly movements of the intention [gnome], but not of nature. ^C

Ac Nestorius quidem, who recognizes only the quantity of natures in Christ, but does not acknowledge the one person [subsisting] from the natures according to composition, completely covers the division of the natures with the simple and empty appellation of union. Severus, however, while professing only one nature for the one singular person, and not knowing the quantity of the natures, cloaks the confusion of the natures with a simple and empty distinction concerning natural quality. And Nestorius indeed, when he hands down the union of the natures in the mode of volition alone, which is a disposition of the soul, denies the one person, since he cannot bear to speak of a true conjunction of things having taken place according to substance. For authority and dignity, and such a volition as this, of which Nestorius said the union consisted, are movements of the intention, ^D not of nature.

^A But he who speaks of a simple difference in natural quality alone after the union, clearly brings about the removal of those things that have been united, denying the difference of the very essences of the united things in their natural otherness. And to speak briefly about these matters: the one [Nestorius] invented a division in the nature of things from the union of gnomic qualities; the other [Severus], on the contrary, devised a confusion in the nature of things from the difference of natural qualities. Truly a wicked pair of lawless men, who madly and evilly tear apart the truth of correct dogmas through contraries. For the one, introducing a union of gnomic qualities, brings about a separation of the natures which, according to him, were not united at all; and the other, saying there is only a difference of natural qualities after the union, likewise introduces a confused alteration of the natures which, according to him, were not united at all; they do not know what they are saying. For if they had resolved to be consistent with themselves, it behooved Nestorius, who says the union took place of gnomic qualities, not to divide the natures, the union of which he did not even profess at the beginning; but to acknowledge a difference after the union in the natures which he says are united. And it behooved Severus, who professes a difference of natural qualities, not to confuse the natures after the union, which we do not allow him even to call united, as long as he is ignorant of their difference after the union. For the difference of united things is observed after they have been united, ^B whatever madness Nestorius may spew forth in his actions; and the union of distinct things [is observed] after they have met in union, even if Severus stands in the opposing line of battle and defends the lie with wide-ranging advocacy.

If therefore, as Nestorius thinks, the union has taken place only of volitions of intention, then let him also speak of their difference after the union, having abandoned the division of things (namely, of natures) which were by no means united; and he has brought together with the difference of the gnomic volitions also the variation of the intention, by which ^C it is natural that not the difference according to nature is shown, but that according to hypostasis, which creates, in the difference of the gnomic volitions, remission and intensiveness; and he has made man, whom he deems to have been deified through progress, a sinner, in that he does not in every manner and mode possess the same gnomic volition as God. For the difference of the gnomic volitions, as I said, creates the variation of the intention. ^D NOTE. (n) He has brought together with the difference of the gnomic volitions the sinless state, difference or variation. That volition of his, being in no way contrary to God, is without change into evil or into a lesser good, for the human volition of Christ according to intention is not governed by the will of the Word, as by a person moving and using it, but it moves by its own.

^A And a variation of *gnome* (intention) makes for a difference in goodness. But a diversity of *gnome* brings about a diminution of goodness; and he who is still in any way laboring under this, does not yet exist as perfectly immune from sin in his *gnome* and will.

Therefore, Nestorius, not accepting that [the union] occurred according to hypostasis from the coming together of the natures, also dissolved the union of the deliberative wills, not finding how to say what on earth that "one" thing is which is demonstrated from the union of deliberative wills. For he cannot state the identity of goodness, when the distinction of the deliberative wills clearly manifests, after the union, a difference in them according to intensity and relaxation. For if there is a coming together, it is necessary by all means to speak also of the difference of these things. And the term *tautoboulia* (oneness of will) was devised by him in vain, even if it is appropriate for indicating the separation of the persons. For *tautoboulia* is a union of wills, preserving the difference of those things which are unified thereby, provided that the separation of the persons who are willing be seen clearly and without confusion along with them.

BY THE SAME

But let no one censure the argument which prohibits a duality of deliberative wills, since he finds almost all the illustrious teachers stating two wills; nor, again, let him for this reason transfer his pious mind toward the one will of Severus, so that he does not make evil follow upon evil—I mean, [that he does not substitute] confusion for division. For the blessed Fathers did not speak of a quantity of deliberative wills in Christ, but of natural [ones]; ^C they rightly called "wills" the essential and natural laws and reasons of the things that were united. For, considering the appetite of the flesh imbued with soul in the manner of those who possess intellect—not the movement of the *gnome* of some man or other—and seeing it as a power of appetite natural to the being, naturally moved and fashioned by the Word toward the fulfillment of the economy, they wisely termed it "will"; without which it is impossible for human nature to exist. For natural will is a power ^D that is appetitive of what is according to nature, and of those things essentially belonging to nature.

^A It is the connective force of all properties—according to which it is always innate in that which is by nature appetitive to be naturally appetitive. But it is not the same thing to be "naturally appetitive" and "to appet" [or to will], just as it is not the same thing to "be naturally articulate" and "to speak." For that which is articulate is always naturally so, but it does not always speak; because the former is bounded by the reason of nature, while the latter is shaped by the judgment of the one speaking. Thus, it belongs to nature to be always naturally articulate, but to the person to be the one who speaks in a certain way; just as it is with being naturally appetitive and to appet. If, therefore, "being naturally appetitive" and "to appet" are not the same (for the one, as I said, belongs to the essence, while the other belongs to the volition of the one who wills), then the incarnate Word, as man, possessed this "being naturally appetitive," moved and shaped by His own divine will. For His willing, says the great Gregory, ^B is in no way contrary to God, being entirely deified. And if it were deified, it was obviously deified by the connaturality of the One who deifies. Now, the One who deifies and the one who is deified are strictly two, not one and the same by nature. For they belong to the category of relative terms; and things that are relative are by nature always such that they imply one another, and each is conceived in relation to the other. Therefore, as one who is naturally endowed, the Savior, as man, also signals carnally the retraction and flight from death together with the other passions, showing that the dispensation is free from all pretense, and delivering the nature from those passions to which it had become subject because of sin. And again He shows the impulse, having mortally slain sin in the flesh, in order to show, as man, that that which is naturally endowed is preserved within Himself, and to show as God that the hidden and great counsel of the Father is fulfilled bodily. ^C For it was not so that He might suffer that He became man, but so that He might save. Therefore He says: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not my will but thine be done," showing at once with the retraction the impulse of the human will, being shaped and coming to be in the connaturality of the divine, according to the conjunction of the natural reason with the mode of the dispensation; if indeed the incarnation is a clear demonstration of nature and dispensation—I mean of the natural reason of the things united, and of the mode of union according to hypostasis—the former certifying, the latter innovating the natures, without change or confusion. But it is absurd that the same thing, in the same respect, should need to be brought to naught and to be brought into operation; ^D especially if the will of the Son is by nature the will of the Father. The Savior, therefore, as man, had a natural will, shaped by His own divine will, not contrary to it; for nothing natural is ever contrary to God, especially when it is not a volitional [gnomic] will; where also

^A a personal division is considered, if it be according to nature; since the Creator would be held responsible for the reproach, having made for Himself that which fights against nature.

But how did the Word, having become incarnate, truly become man, being specifically destitute of that which characterizes the nature as rational? For that which is deprived of the motion of desire would also be lacking in every vital faculty. And that which does not possess a vital faculty by nature, does not possess any soul, without which not even flesh could ever subsist. Therefore, He would have feigned the dispensation by a simple and naked formation of flesh; and the Word, having become incarnate by a personal union, would not have fulfilled the nature of flesh, intelligently and rationally ensouled, since according to Severus He does not possess a natural will as man. For if, by a natural will, He was truly deficient as man, He did not truly become a perfect man; and if He did not truly become a perfect man, He did not become man at all. For what is the existence of an imperfect nature, of which there is not even a definition?

The aim, therefore, of Severus and those around him, through some total deficiency of nature, is to thrust aside the nature assumed in the ineffable union; and to confirm the filth of the phantasy of Manes, the confusion of Apollinarius, and the commingling of Eutyches. For I remember, while living on the island of Crete, that some false bishops of the party of Severus disputed with me; I heard that therefore we do not confess two operations in Christ, according to the Tome of Leo, on account of the resultant wills which, by necessity, introduce a duality of persons; but not even one again, since it cannot be considered as simple; but [rather] one will, and every divine ^B and human operation [proceeding] from one and the same God the Word incarnate, according to the precision of the dispensation.

Disputation of Maximus with the Severian bishops on the island of Crete

Severus, therefore, and his disciples and followers, aim to eject the nature assumed in an arcane manner, as if something natural were altogether lacking, and to establish the impure and wicked fiction of Manes, the confusion of Apollinarius, and finally that of Eutyches (one might say, a confluence of essences). For I remember, when I was delaying in Crete, and certain false-named bishops of the sect of Severus disputed with me, I heard from them that for this reason they do not confess in Christ two operations, according to what is sanctioned in the Tome of Leo, because a dual will is a consequence of them, and thence likewise a dual person is necessarily introduced: but [they said] neither again ^C is it possible to contemplate [the operation] as one and simple; however, [they confess] one will, and every divine and human operation [proceeding] from one and the same God the Word incarnate, according to the precision of the dispensation. ^D

We say that Severus’s teaching proceeds from this. To these persons one might rightly cast that portion of the prophecy with lamenting voices: “O, O, flee from the north; be saved in Zion, you who dwell with the daughter of Babylon.” ^A For the north is truly the mind of Severus, having become a dark place, and deprived of the dwelling of divine light. And the daughter of Babylon is the teaching of false dogmas, poorly grown together, having been born [out] from the most evil habit that was added to it, which those who have rejected the light of knowledge cultivate; and [they] do not persuade [their] soul to be saved by repentance unto Zion, that is, the Church. For at the same time, the argument of Severus, which is being tortured, is defeated both regarding theology and the economy. For if, according to him, it is natural for wills to follow after operations, and for persons to be introduced by these wills, just as effects by causes—not to mention that the proof for this is [non-existent]—then to every person there is, obviously according to him, a will; and to this, necessarily, a corresponding operation will be introduced. For the argument concerning relative things, having an indissoluble relationship, causes a reciprocal equivalence of the related things in a consequent manner. ^B

Therefore, since the term "will" taken simply is polysemous: if the wills that are introduced reciprocally with the persons were natural, then, according to Severus, the blessed [Trinity] will be a Trinity of natures as well. But if they are gnomical—that is, chosen by opinion—it will necessarily faction against itself, not agreeing with the wills, as a Trinity of persons; or certainly, if there is one will of the super-essential Trinity, the Deity will be a Trinity-named one-person [Godhead].

And again, if according to Severus’s proposition a will follows upon an operation, and a person is introduced by this, if the operation is taken away, of necessity that which follows upon it, the will, is also taken away, and with it the person introduced by that will. But if upon the withdrawal of the operation, the will is withdrawn, and with the will the person, then according to Severus’s opinion, Christ will not truly exist as a person; since, with the operation, on account of the will that is destroyed along with it, the person who is introduced with the will, and who accompanies it, will have been destroyed. ^{C D}

And again, if, as Severus believes, wills are essentially companions to operations, and persons are introduced along with the wills; and [if] from one and the same God the Word...

incarnate, every divine and human operation is said to proceed; then every will, [being] his intention (that is to say, both divine and human), as it is a companion to the operations, will necessarily be brought forth together with the persons—which are introduced in equal number with them—from one and the same Word incarnate; and there is no argument that can gainsay this. ^A

Therefore, by the removal of the natural operations, Christ, according to Severus, will be devoid of essence and nature; and by the exclusion of the one [natural operation], he will again be without will and without person. And by the overall bringing forth of both divine and human operation, he will be of multiple wills and multiple persons, or, to speak more accurately, of infinite wills and infinite persons. For he who says "every operation" has made a declaration of an uncountable quantity. ^B

Therefore, by the reversal of Severus’s proposition, his entire doctrine concerning the Godhead falls to pieces, since he introduces the Arian multitude of gods, the Sabellian impiety through the removal of the persons, and a nature of Deity fighting against itself in the manner of the Greeks. But according to his own proposition, the rationale and faith of the Economy are plainly adulterated for him, as he acknowledges one Christ whom he maintains to be devoid of essence, will, and person, and yet, again, the same [Christ] to be of infinite wills and infinite persons; and what could be more impious than this? ^C

Do you see whither the rule of Severus leads those who are persuaded by it? For such is every doctrine that lacks the truth as its invincible foundation. But tell me, most excellent sir, you who speak of one will in Christ, how and what kind [of will] do you say this is? If you say it is natural to Christ, you have by nature alienated him from the Father and the Mother, since he is not united to either by essence. For Christ is by nature neither of them. And by what reasoning will you escape the danger of polytheism while saying this? But if you speak of it as a gnomic will, it will be a characteristic only of his own person. For the gnomic [will] is a defining mark of a person; and it will be shown clearly, according to you, that he is of a different will from the Father and the Spirit, and [is] at variance [with them]. But if it is [the will] of his divinity alone, then the divinity will be subject to passions, ^D afflicted against nature by the appetites for food and drink. But if it is of his humanity alone, the nature will not be effective. For how could it be, if it is [merely] human? And thus the display of miracles will clearly appear monstrous.

But if the will is common to the nature of both, how will it be his will?

NOTES. Christ will be without will, and not truly existing in person, because their doctrine [is that] the will brings about the person, and conversely, that the natural operations being removed, they do [away with him]; for he who is devoid of every operation, act, and virtue, as Maximus everywhere [argues] from the doctrine of the Fathers, is not, nor does he possess substance.

^A For if it is common by nature, how can the will be common for those whose nature is distinct? But if the will is [conceived] as that of a composite whole (besides the fact that this is a new fable and a fiction; for what is this composition of the will?), you have again estranged him from the Father, having characterized a composite essence by a composite will alone. In this way, then, the Word, approaching, uproots every plant which the Father has not planted; for the field is not accustomed to tend and care for and preserve foreign crops.

Verily, as it appears, Severus has abolished the natural will of Christ’s humanity, not knowing that the most proper and primary property of every nature—especially a rational one—is its motion according to desire. The Fathers, looking upon this, clearly confessed a distinction of *natural* wills in Christ, but not *gnomic* [volitional/deliberative] ones. For they would never have spoken of a distinction of gnomic wills in Christ, lest they proclaim him double-minded and double-willed—and, so to speak, fighting against himself by the conflict of his thoughts—and on this account a double person; for they knew that ^B by this distinction alone of gnomic wills, both sin and our estrangement from God have entered into life. For evil is situated in nothing else than solely in the discrepancy and distinction of our gnomic will from the divine will, with which there is necessarily introduced a contrary quantity, and the number that signifies it, showing the opposition of our gnomic will toward God.

One purpose, therefore, exists for both Nestorius and Severus in their impiety, even if the method is different. For the one, on account of the confusion, fleeing the union in person, makes the essential distinction a personal division; but the other, on account of the division, not declaring the essential distinction, produces a natural confusion of the union in person; whereas it was fitting to confess neither confusion nor division in Christ, but to profess the union of those things which are essentially distinct, and the distinction of those things which are united in person, so that both the reason of the essences and the mode of the union might be piously proclaimed. Both have been torn away from these: Nestorius indeed asserting the union ^C of gnomic qualities alone, and Severus likewise placing the distinction of natural qualities only after the union; both have fallen away from the truth, with Nestorius rashly accusing the mystery of division, and Severus of confusion.

OF THE SAME

To GEORGE, the most holy presbyter and abbot, who had inquired by letter concerning the mystery of Christ.

He who has winged his own mind with divine desire, and...

^A raised his reason by study, and (O Father, to be honored in God) has withdrawn himself from earthly things, is insatiable in his reading of the holy Scriptures; and that care which you bestow upon them, with diligent attention, you possess with indefatigable strength of soul more than any other. For that which exists above sense knows not satiety; nor does that which exceeds the intellect know any contraction whatsoever. For the former is superior in nature to all that which flows and ebbs; and the latter stands above every kind and form; and it makes plain, as is fitting, that which is hidden, and provides the possible comprehension of the undefined; and it is sufficient for as much rapture of the mind as is possible, and for the grasping of the Holy Spirit.

For up to this point, and for this reason, the philanthropic condescension of Him who is above man has been established; by grace deifying those who by their own will ascend with Him; and receiving the fullness of the Word according to Him, in the completion of the work of the commandments: by which, being yourself advanced toward the perfection of prudence and fortitude, you soberly subdue that which is subject to the eyes, that is, the body, and justly fatten that which is hidden, namely, the soul: in order that in the one you may show forth the mortification of Jesus, which utterly destroys all sin; ^B and in the other, you may display the life, bringing forth every sort of virtue in a manner higher than the custom of the age: through whose cultivation, having performed the sacred action and contemplation, you have attained the sacred end, salvation: which, that you might impart to others, and make it known (which thing is a noble image of God), you resolved in your mind that you would employ your venerable syllables toward me, an unworthy, humble, and unknown man: and first, indeed, to instruct me with word and doctrine in wisdom and prudence, and then also, through the grace in which you abound, which distributes itself to all men everywhere (for it is a thing that is not circumscribed by any boundaries, since it has the Word that is without beginning for its author, and it possesses the Author Himself) to imbue me with holiness.

^C Furthermore, regarding the knowledge of the new mystery of the divine formation of the God-Word according to man, who for our sake was incarnate and perfectly became man, you wish to lead me—as if by inquiring and questioning—into an abundant knowledge, not that you might learn that of which you labor in ignorance; since you have comprehended all things that are beautiful and honorable, but that you might advance him toward a more perfect instruction, who has not yet attained the lesser. I, therefore, admiring your pious character, ^D bring forward the argument according to my ability, asserting that it is nothing else according to…

^A nature than the humanity which the Savior assumed, than that which we humans are; but the same in essence and in all respects similar, since it was taken from our own substance, through the mysterious and ineffable assumption—inexplicable by any words—from the most pure blood of the chaste Virgin and Theotokos. To this, the Word was joined like seed, and became flesh, while never ceasing to be God according to essence; and he became perfect man according to us, save for sin alone—on account of which we frequently revolt and wrestle against God in our will, as we have obtained an inclination of this [will] toward both sides. He, however, being by nature free from all sin, as not a mere man but God made man, had nothing contrary to that [nature]; but he preserved our nature chaste and in every way properly undefiled. Whence he also ^B said: *Now the ruler of this world is coming, and he finds nothing in me* (John xiv, 30); namely, [nothing] from those things by which we, corrupting the nature, demonstrate the opposition of the will—on account of which Christ, according to his humanity, is also called "subject" until he shall have freed us from this [stain] by the power of the incarnation. Confirming the truth of this for our sake, he became all things, and did all things voluntarily on our behalf, in no respect falsifying either our substance or any of its blameless and natural properties; even though he deified it together with all those things, like iron heated by fire, rendering it entirely divine and the producer of divine things, as one who has permeated it totally and supremely through the union, and has become one with it without any confusion, by the reason of one and the same person. ^C Whence his humanity differs from ours, not by the reason of nature, but by the new mode of generation; it is the same as regards essence, but not the same by the reason that it was propagated without seed; since it was not simple and bare, but belonged to him who truly became man for us. Just as also his will was indeed truly natural and similar to ours, yet divinely informed by a reason superior to ours. For it is clear that to be born without seed, and to be born from seed, does not divide nature, but rather it is the nature itself that is divided [between these two modes], just as the case also stands with unbegottenness and birth. ^D For if we concede this, that the Word as man differs from our nature in that he was born without seed, it will clearly follow that he also differs from the substance of the Father in that he was born. For "unbegotten" and "begotten" are not the same. Furthermore, we ourselves shall differ from the ancient Adam and Eve, who were produced without seed.

^A Adam indeed is God’s handiwork; but Eve is a piece of the handiwork. Yet the Son is the same as the Father because of the Godhead; seeing that He is God and consubstantial, just as we also are kin and consubstantial with Adam and Eve, and with God Himself who for our sakes became incarnate and human. For just as the unbegotten and the begotten are not the substance of God—for who would say that?—so neither is being born of seed or without seed a variation of human nature itself.

The great Theologian Gregory, ^B therefore, provides no indication that the humanity in the Savior is of a different nature than the one which is ours, even if it has seemed so to some by his saying: "We might have said that these words are uttered as if by a human being—not one understood as the Savior (for His will is in nothing contrary to God, because it is entirely deified), but one who is our peer; since the human will does not follow the divine in all things, but for the most part resists and struggles against it." For it is truly His, and is spoken of as such, not as being from a different substance or outside our own substance and nature, but because it came into being for His sake and in Him, according to one and the same person; and not produced by itself separately, or for its own sake as is ours. Hence, while innovating ^C a proper seed, the Word, by the very mode of birth, held Him—instantly receiving, at the very moment of His naturally being, the divine subsisting within Himself; so that both our own nature might be confirmed, and that which is above us might be believed. For it is necessary in all things to preserve both the nature assumed by God the Word incarnate, who for our sakes perfectly became man, along with those things which appertain to the nature—without which it would be no nature at all, but only a hollow fantasy—and to guard the union: the one being preserved in natural diversity, the other, in turn, being recognized in personal identity. And in this way, wisely and piously, we may declare the whole account of the dispensation to be both unconfused and indivisible.

Whom you, preaching with the right faith, ^D will in turn gain, as He has promised, rewarding you with the fruit of His own goods; just as in this age by hope, so also in the future by the very experience of the reality. For my sake, holy Father, pray that I may become a partaker of it; presenting me through your prayers to Him who calls and provides salvation, and who rewards with this prize, through which those joined in the kinship of their kind pursue one another with mercy, so that He may grant glory to them together with Himself, and beside Himself; to whom be glory and power with the most holy Father and His life-giving Spirit, unto the ages of ages. Amen.

BY THE SAME, AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY ONE OPERATION OF CHRIST SHOULD BE SPOKEN OF ACCORDING TO VICTORY; BECAUSE HIS DIVINE OPERATION, BEING MORE EFFECTIVE, PREVAILS OVER THE HUMAN, THUS ONE SHOULD REPLY.

^A First, you yourselves also concede two operations: one which conquers and prevails (namely, the divine) and another which is conquered and over which it prevails (namely, the human); this indeed belongs to those things which are "relative." But things that are relative always imply along with themselves those things to which they are contrasted.

Then, if you speak of one operation according to victory, as though the human operation were removed because it has been conquered and overcome, you introduce a diminution into them. For that which overcomes and enjoys victory is also itself altogether affected: for it is also conquered by that which is overcome. For even if it is less so, it is nevertheless altogether conquered; ^B just as gold, while indeed it overcomes the silver or brass mixed with it (to give an example), is yet itself also conquered, though less so, specifically in proportion to the quantity which is mixed into it.

AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT JUST AS THERE IS ONE OPERATION OF AN INSTRUMENT AND THE MOVER, SO THERE IS ONE OPERATION OF DIVINITY AND HUMANITY.

If you say, indeed, that the instrument is natural, then in your opinion the Word will be contemporaneous with the flesh, or the flesh co-eternal with Him; for everything that employs a natural instrument has that instrument as contemporaneous to itself, as the soul does the body; and thus it is necessary for you either to call the divine nature a creature, or the body uncreated. But if you say that the instrument is artificial, you introduce into it an inanimate thing, separate and divided in its own right, and one that is not always moved, but only when it pleases the craftsman to take it into his hands and work ^C with it. And hereafter, you will be shown to be of one mind either with the senseless Nestorius, who divides and separates the two natures of Christ God that have gathered into one hypostasis and one person, or disciples of the impious Apollinaris, who says that the body of Christ is inanimate and devoid of mind.

AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THERE IS ONE COMPOUND OPERATION OF CHRIST.

A compound operation belongs absolutely to a compound nature. Every compound nature, however, has a beginning in time and is involuntary; for it exists as created, and is circumscribed by its own place and world, ^D and by members.

^A Finally, there is also a multitude of Christs of whom this can be predicated.

BY THE SAME

Concerning that which is written: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me" (Matt. xxvi, 39).

If you take [the passage], "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," which has the appearance of shrinking away, as referring to man—^B not to him who is understood as the Savior (for his will, having been entirely deified, is not at all contrary to God), but to him who is our fellow in nature; since the human will does not altogether follow God, but—as the divine Gregory says—for the most part resists and struggles against God;—then what do you make of the sequel of the prayer, that is, "Nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt"? Does it denote shrinking or courage? ^C Supreme agreement or dissension? Yet no one who is of sound mind will deny that it is a mark, not of resistance or fear, but rather of perfect concord and agreement.

But if it is [a mark] of perfect concord and—as you might call it—coalition of mind and agreement, from which [of the two] does it seem to you to proceed? From man, such as we are, or from man as understood in the case of the Savior? But if it [proceeds] from man such as we are, then what the teacher says about him is erroneous: "For the human will does not altogether follow the divine will, but for the most part resists and struggles against it." For if it follows, it does not resist; and if it resists, it does not follow. For one [condition] destroys the other as its contrary. ^D

But if you take this, *"Not as I will, but as thou wilt,"* not of a man such as we are, but of the man understood as the Savior, you have confessed the highest concord of the human will with his and the Father's will; and you have shown that he, gifted with a dual nature, possessed both natural wills and operations, he who in neither of them had anything in the least contrary, even while preserving the natural distinction in all things—of those [elements] from which, and in which, and as which he exists.

^B But if, being refuted by these arguments, you proceed to say that this, *"Not as I will,"* does not belong either to a man such as we are or to the man understood as the Savior, but—speaking negatively—is to be referred to the beginningless deity of the Only-Begotten, in order to exclude him from willing anything properly or privately apart from the Father; then you necessarily reduce to that same beginningless deity also that which was willed (namely, his refusal of the cup). For although you say that the negation has the power to take away that he wills anything properly or privately, it does not, however, invalidate or exclude that which he willed. For it is not possible for the negation to be placed upon both: that the Only-Begotten wills anything privately apart from the Father, and also upon the thing willed. For if you wish to apply it to the common will of the Father and the Son, you invalidate that which God willed (namely, our salvation). For this is what he naturally wills. But if it is not possible to place the negation upon both, it is clear that if you place it upon the willing anything properly and privately, in order to establish the common will, you will not be taking away that which was willed—namely, the refusal of the cup; but you will be applying it to the common and beginningless deity, to which you have also referred the negating will. But if even to think this is execrable, then it is clear that the negation here—that is, *"Not as I will"*—completely removes all resistance and exhibits the total concord and affinity of the human will of the Savior with his divine and paternal will; so that the Word, having truly put on the whole [human] nature, wholly deified it as he took it on (truly and essentially). Therefore, inasmuch as he became man like us for our sake, he spoke in a human manner to God the Father: *"Not my will, but thine be done,"* as he who was by nature God, yet also as man, willed the fulfillment of the paternal will. Wherefore he was known to have by nature the faculty and operation for our salvation according to both the natures from which, and in which, and as which he was a person: the one, as he willed this benevolently with the Father and the Spirit; the other, as he remained obedient to the Father even unto ^C death, even the death of the cross, and performed the great mystery of the dispensation toward us through the flesh for his sake, having become obedient unto death, even death upon the cross.

SCHOLIUM

to be referred to the beginningless deity of the Only-Begotten, as they themselves say, have a necessity, in that they do not want to say that he has any will peculiar to him apart from the Father, to refer also what was willed—which is the refusal of the cup—to the beginningless deity itself. And because it is not possible to place the negation upon both—both his willing something specially apart from the Father, and what was willed—they of necessity carry this over only to the willing something specially, and not to what was willed, which is the refusal of the cup, that is to say, our salvation. What could be more absurd than this? For it happens that he has [the Father] will to pass by what is by nature to him a thing willed. For whose it is to say, *"Not as I will,"* his is also entirely the [saying], *"Let the cup pass from me."*

BY THE SAME, A Dogmatic Tome, sent to the island of Cyprus to Marinus the deacon.

^B I have not marvelled more at the modesty of your great piety (d) than I have admired the fortitude of your great zeal, most holy servant of God, and most wise listener and teacher of his mysteries. For by the holy interweaving of both [piety and zeal], you have acquired perfection in all good things. For through the former, having become wholly and entirely in your whole self given over to God, through the fulfillment of his divine commandments, you deem yourself to be entirely—by reason of an extreme excellence of poverty—among those who, like me, are muddied in the mire of unclean passions by a worldly disposition of soul; ^C at the same time, from this, you procure for yourself a secure protection by sound reason—for nothing is stronger for the setting and maintaining of good things than voluntary poverty; for it stands as a firm and unbreakable foundation of the divine structures in the soul, and becomes a source of salvation to all others who are intent upon what is noble—by leading [them], more by the demonstration of active [virtue] than by didactic address, into the height of virtue through a lofty humiliation, [and by guiding] those who direct both their mind and life wisely toward you. By this zeal, I say, having taken up the whole fervor of the Spirit, ^D and having acquired that fire in the earth of your heart, which the Word, who is by nature most benign and most humane, came to cast upon it, which consumes all our wicked habit and movement—you inflame those who are crazed through deceit and ignorance, and who are raving in vile deeds and counterfeit words (e), exposing them as [...]

^A a structure that is rotten and groundless; but those who are chilled by the freezing of this icy and dark attack ^B, you warm—inasmuch as the blessed lamp of divine knowledge and virtue is kindled within you—with the radiance of the divine words. You drive away and dissolve the night entirely, moving the extreme contraction of the soul toward extreme courage and power. And again, you illumine from the "eternal mountains"—I mean, from the words and dogmas of the Fathers, which transcend all knowledge and power of the senses—those who long for the light; and by the taste of wisdom, you cause those who have already well envisioned this through faith, as that which by nature is the object of desire, to arrive at it through experience and bring them piously to a complete transformation. For nothing so images the work of your divine priesthood ^C as a zeal that is tempered by godliness according to God, and is unyielding, together with the innate Word within us, which holds this together and simultaneously inspires it, making it act and wisely steering it—things which nature and the primary Word commands—toward our ascent to Him, and toward a complete restoration through holy deeds and good dogmas; and [toward] the shunning and turning away from those things that cause us to miss this holy ascent.

And what else so vehemently disrupts and, as it were, walls off this journey toward the Word, except the terrible betrayal by those who now swarm against those who walk the royal road of the divine and patristic dogmas ^D; and who know no deviation into the abysses of confusion and the chasms of division which occur unfortunately for those who are carried along on either side

73- OPUSCULA THEOLOGICA ET POLEMICA A barathrum, divisionisque deturbant voragines, ^A know, or even in any way allow themselves to be led by those who know; [led] by the grace of the most holy Spirit, who wisely guides and directs those who auspiciously hasten toward the perfect, face-to-face knowledge and initiation of him, the great God and Savior of all, Christ, through a true and orthodox faith. For it is a betrayal, the changing of one’s pious opinion regarding him and directed toward him into something different, by the acceptance of the confession and doctrine of heretics, thereby selling him out, [leading] to the destruction of his most holy flesh taken from us; or rather, to the subversion of the entire dispensation. And this betrayal ^B—like the first one, which occurred when the Word walked with us in the flesh—is as much more serious as the knowledge of his divinity and the truth of his humanity have become more clearly manifest to all, having now reached the ends of the world through the magnificent voices of the holy Fathers who preach it. For since all everywhere firmly profess, and with orthodox faith believe, according to the exposition of those God-chosen teachers, that one of the holy and consubstantial Trinity, the only-begotten Son, who is perfect God by nature, became perfect man by will, having truly assumed from the holy Mother of God and ever-virgin our flesh, consubstantial with us, ensouled with a rational and intellectual soul, and having uniquely and inseparably united it to himself according to hypostasis, ^C he exists as one with it, just as he was before; yet he is not uncompounded according to hypostasis, even if he remains simple according to nature, as one who has remained God and is consubstantial with the Father; and he is, conversely, twofold, as having become flesh; so that, by the duality of nature, he may be kin by essence to the extremes, and keep the natural distinction of his own parts toward one another; while by the singularity of the person, he may possess the perfect identity in the parts, and the personal distinction from the extremes, as one and alone; and by the lack of deficiency in the natural and essential invariability toward them (I mean the extremes), he may be perfect in both respects; that is, the same [being] is simultaneously God and man. On the other hand, those who impiously teach the diminution of the things naturally belonging to him introduce him as imperfect, and as having suffered a fall from what is natural. For if he does not preserve the characteristic property of each nature ^D without deficiency—with the exception of sin alone, as the divine Fathers hand down—from which and in which the incarnate Word truly exists even after the union, then it is God who is deficient (if indeed he is an imperfect God at all), and it is conversely man who is deficient, if indeed he is completely man who exists maimed of his natural properties.

Therefore, one must not, under the pretext of a union which harms nothing, but only binds things together into one according to hypostasis, corrupt their existence by the removal of the natural will—

or [as if we had] ^A perchance blended and fused, as if from parts into a certain whole, both the essential wills and the equal number of natural operations into one will and one operation—such a thing will be shown to be mythical, and altogether strange and foreign to the communion with the Father and with us; since He does not possess a composite will or operation by nature, nor, on the other hand, does such a will or operation belong to us. For there is no composition of such things as are in a subject, since these things themselves are not understood to exist at all by themselves, outside the subject substance. ^B Furthermore, it is ignorant and highly worthy of scorn that they boast and admit, on account of the natural affinity and relationship with both extremes, that [the nature] is split and cut in half according to the distinction; and this [they call] an indivisible union, which is in the person. Or, if again we preserve intact the natural will and the operation that essentiallly belongs to the divine nature of the incarnate Word, but remove and strip these from His human substance: we thus injure that preternatural union, which would lack what it is that it joins into one person, since the flesh—animated in the manner of those who use reason and intellect, that is, our substance and nature—does not exist and remain perfectly in the Word, while having suffered the loss of those things which belong to it by nature? For where indeed, or what kind of nature [exists], having suffered the fall of those things which belong to nature, and yet exists unscathed? For where or what is the nature that has suffered the fall of those things that belong to it by nature, and [yet] remains unharmed?

If, therefore, the Lord was lacking in these, or in any one of the natural properties in the flesh, He was not even flesh and human at all (or let the assertors of this dogma show that He is a human being who is either outside these and lacks them, or is a human being at all; or, if he is not at all, it is manifest that the Word did not become human, being deprived of these or one of them by nature). For how, and by what reasoning, [could He be human] if the nature lacks no such thing? But if he is some other thing ^C altogether strange and unknown to our substance: and [if it is] either co-essential to Him from the beginning, and having descended along with Him from above, it is clearly that which it is said to have become; then what is the descent to us, if we have not at all come together through the holy flesh, not taken from us and united according to hypostasis? Or is the whole thing a fiction and an empty specter deceiving the senses, and not a substance of flesh; since it is not the first-fruits of the human race, which by grace reduces the dough into one, and frees it from all the divisive elements, of which the transgression of the old Adam has become the cause; on account of which also the condemnation of death was pronounced upon our nature? Why, therefore, do they begrudge us our perfect salvation and confession? Why do they hurl against us their syllogisms, which they claim are unavoidable and from which no one can extricate himself? And they say that wills follow from operations, and that contrariety follows again with these, from which they say that those who will contrary things ^D are also abundantly introduced.

^A But to let those constructions stand, whence and how do they contrive such things? I only wanted to inquire and learn: since they themselves acted in such a way, and set in motion the new exposition, have they done this involuntarily, and who exerted force upon them? Furthermore, after the act—when there was absolutely none before—they subsequently acquired the will for what was done; whence, then, and from whom did it come? And who was it that compelled them to have the will for what was performed, so that it might even be performed against the will, and what was being done might be deprived of intent?

But again, if the Word Himself, who became flesh, did not will and work according to nature as a human being, how did He willingly admit to hunger and thirst, labor and fatigue, sleep, and all the rest? For the Word did not only will or work these according to nature, having a nature that is—with the Father and the Spirit—supra-essential and beyond all limits; although, again, as God, ^B He gave the nature the occasion, whenever He willed, to work its own things, just as the divine teacher of the Nyssaeans and great Gregory [(k)] says. For if He willed these as God only, and not also as man, either the divine nature itself was body, or, having changed its essence, it became flesh through a falling away from its own deity; or, if not, His flesh was not animated by a soul possessed of reason, but was entirely inanimate and without reason according to itself; or if it were animated by a soul that possesses reason, it also possessed the natural will. For everything that is by nature rational is also by nature entirely endowed with will. And if He had a natural will as a man, He surely willed essentially those things which He Himself, as God, had by nature fashioned and placed into nature for its constitution. He did not come to falsify the nature which He Himself as God and Word had created; but He came to divinize completely the nature which He Himself, willing it for Himself, through the good pleasure of the Father and the cooperation of the Spirit, united according to one and the same hypostasis, with all the things that belong to it by nature, apart from sin. Therefore, as God by nature, He willed those things that were divine and paternal by nature. For He existed as a co-willer of His own ^C divine and paternal [will].

^A And again, as man by nature, the same One willed those things that are human by nature, keeping the dispensation free from all deceit, in no way contradicting the will of the Father. For none of the natural [faculties], just as nature itself is not, fundamentally, ever resists the Author of nature; nor does the will or the judgment, and those things that pertain to judgment, whenever it agrees with the reason of nature. For if perhaps someone might say that some of those things which are by nature resist God, the reproach belongs more to God than to nature: for He implanted war naturally into existing things, so that they might be in tumult and fight against Him and against one another.

For that nothing natural is contrary to God is clear from the fact that these things were created by Him by generation and birth, and have no cause for accusation against the essential constitution of these things in us. Rather, the contrary is true, that we suffer reproaches clearly because of the perversion of these things. For by this [perversion we succumb] to every judgment of vice, according to the ancient-evil serpent; but by that [original] constitution, we exist as a creation of God and a precious creature by nature. For this reason, according to the divine Fathers, we do not perform even the slightest diminution of natural wills, nor of operations, nor even of the natures themselves, in the one and same God the Word incarnate; believing rightly that He is the same perfect God and man at once, because He perfectly possessed both divine and human [properties] naturally, and it was becoming for Him to will and to operate; and that He possessed, properly, both divine and human essence and will and operation: so that we may not, by the deficiency of either of the natural properties, teach absurdly and impiously the diminution, or rather the perfect abolition and destruction, of either of the natures from which and in which He exists.

That He possessed a will according to human nature, just as truly as [He possessed] a divine one according to essence, the Word Himself demonstrates clearly through the economy of the refusal of death, undertaken on our behalf in a human manner, in which He said: *Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me* (Matt. xxvi, 39); so that He might show the weakness of His own flesh; and that it was not as an empty specter that the flesh appeared to those who saw Him, deceiving their perception; but that He was in truth and properly a man, which fact the natural will confirmed, from which he thus refused to die according to a sure design of deliberation.

^D That, however, it was again entirely deified, consenting to the divine will, from which it was always moved and formed and according to which it was moved, is clear from the fact that He held as perfectly valid and approved only the judgment of the paternal will, according to which, as man, He said: *Not my will, but yours be done*; offering Himself to us as a standard and example in this also, so that we might reject our own will for the sake of the perfect fulfillment of the divine [will], even if we should foresee death hanging over us because of this. For if not as man by nature...

he possessed a natural—that is to say, human—will, and if ^A he was not submitting this will according to the economy and driving it toward union with the Father’s will, when he said to the Father himself, “Not my will, let it be done, but yours,” it is evident that he was speaking this as God by nature; and from this he subsequently showed himself not to possess the same and equal will as the Father, but one that was different and naturally diverse; and by subjecting this, he asked that only the Father’s will be done. And if he possessed a natural will other than that of the Father, it is evident that he also had a different essence. “For of one essence, there is also one will,” according to the most wise Cyril. But when the natural will is different, the nature is also completely and in every way different.

There are, therefore, two alternatives: either, as man, he possessed a natural will, and for our sake, according to the economy, he recoiled, desiring to avoid death; yet he again pressed toward it through the perfect inclination of [his human will] toward the Father’s will: or, as God, not possessing a natural will as man, he suffered the passions of the body as God by nature in his own essence, which was naturally recoiling from death—and he possessed a natural will essentially different from the Father’s, which he sought and entreated in prayer might not come to pass. But what God is it who by his nature fears the death of the flesh, and for this reason asks that the cup pass by, and possesses a natural will other than the Father’s?

We therefore banish this absurdity from our souls and hold to the pious confession of the Fathers; and when he says, ^C “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,” as the great Athanasius says in his book on the Incarnation and the Trinity, “nevertheless, not my will be done, but yours: the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak”—we understand that he shows two wills here: the one human, which belongs to the flesh; the other divine. For the human one recoils from the passion because of the weakness of the flesh, whereas his divine will was willing. Thus also the great Theologian Gregory, in his second oration on the Son, clearly teaches us, saying: “For his will in no way opposes God, since it is entirely deified.” So that, according to this divine teacher, he possessed a human will; yet it was in no way ^D hostile to God, because this will was not at all from personal opinion, but was properly natural, being always formed and moved by his divinity according to the essence toward the fulfillment of the economy, and, in its entirety and through its entirety, it was deified by its inclination and consubstantiality with the Father’s [will], becoming divine, strictly speaking, by union, but not by nature; and though truly becoming and being called this, he in no way departed from what is according to nature by being deified.

When, therefore, the doctor says that his entire human will [was] deified toward his divine and Fatherly...

will, he declared the union, and completely drove away from the mystery of Christ whatever is contrary, or those who will things contrary. For by saying, *His entire will*, he shows the innate movement of his human will toward his own ^B Father, and the essential and natural distinction from his divine and Fatherly will, once and for all banishing confusion along with the fiction [of a single will]. For the divine Father and the holy doctors of the Catholic Church who follow him, knowing that this [confusion] and its equivalent in impiety—division—destroy the doctrine of the mystery of Christ in the flesh, have magnanimously decreed that both the distinction and the union must be affirmed regarding both wills: the former, as it is preserved in point of fact and in a natural sense; the latter, in turn, as it subsists firmly and personally in the mode of the dispensation, to establish those things which exist in the one and only Christ according to an indivisible union, and all the natural properties inherent in them. For as they taught that there is one and another—namely, divine and human—and a dual nature in the one and the same [Christ], so too did they clearly proclaim one and another will—I mean divine and human—and two wills; and one and another operation—divine as well as human—and again a dual operation, that is, two. For thus did they openly designate and proclaim by word the number of the substances. For the same one ^C is seen as man, although he was God by nature, willing through indulgence for humanity that the cup might pass, and thus far representing what is ours and human, as the most wise Cyril taught us, in order that he might drive away from [our] nature every fear of death, and might strengthen and rouse it to fight bravely against it (namely, death). But he is seen again as God, even though he was man by essence, willing by the Father’s will to fulfill the dispensation and to work the salvation of us all. He is seen also as man, being God by nature, working in a human way and of his own accord enduring to undergo sufferings and torments for our sake; but he is seen in turn as God, even though he was man by nature, working divinely and naturally producing divine signs and miracles: from which the same one was recognized as being at once God and man, having naturally, by the same number [as the natures], the wills and operations, together with those substances from which and in which he existed, to establish the existence of those things which he truly and properly was.

But if anyone, for the sake of confuting these points and contentiously denying them, should object with the Deivirile (God-man) operation of the divine Dionysius ^D and the operation akin to it of the most wise Cyril, which was shown forth through both, let him know that no strength will be gathered to him from this source with which he might tear down the pious confession. For the term "Deivirile," which Dionysius fittingly used to name the operation, signifies by a figure of circumlocution that the operation of the double [nature] is twofold, his

^A divine and virile—that is, human—nature, having clearly proclaimed it through the conjunction in his utterance; yet he did not do so simply, whence he did not name this [operation] by a number, even if, in indicating the union of the natural operations, he taught it singularly. Nor does this imply any damage to the natural distinction between them, just as the inseparable union of the substances does not damage the distinction of the substances themselves. For otherwise, concerning those who say these things: if he had one operation, and that "Deivirile"—if the incarnate Word possessed this one natural operation, then as the one operation according to nature is divided into two, by what logic will that single operation according to the same [principle] establish and distinguish the diverse substances? It would make each [nature] possess an immutable, essential likeness to things of the same genus, and again, an essential distinction from things of a different genus. And I will omit saying that he has fallen away from the natural kinship with the Father and with us, since neither has the Father, nor do we possess, a Deivirile, innate, and essential operation. If, however, [one calls it] "hypostatic"—in addition to this new opinion—for who is it that says a hypostatic operation exists? And thus such an argument proves him to be alien to the Father in operation, if indeed he possesses an operation ^B hypostatic, and not natural, compared with the Father. For by hypostatic properties, the Word is clearly distinguished from Him; indeed, he has a personal, and not a natural, operation, otherwise than the Father. For the Word is openly distinguished from Him by personal properties.

Furthermore, the kindred operation, shown to be one through both—according to the renowned Cyril—is not spoken of by him for the sake of abolishing the essential distinction of the natural operations of those [natures] from which and in which the one and only Christ God exists, but for the sake of establishing the supreme union of these. And this doctor seems to have imitated the God-inspired Dionysius under other expressions. For that he might show that this [Christ] is not God stripped [of his humanity], nor again a mere man, nor God working separately without communication with a body, nor man acting separately by his own will; but [that he is] God incarnate and ^C perfectly become human for our sake, working the same [things] both divinely and humanly—he said that the Savior is found to be operative not by word alone and by God-befitting commands, raising the dead and curing every disease and every infirmity; but that He was eager to take up His holy flesh as a sort of assistant for this purpose—doing this as God by His omnipotent command, yet again giving life by the touch of the holy flesh united with Him hypostatically, so that he might show that this [flesh] also is able to give life through His essential operation, to which touch, voice, and such things properly pertain. Then, after he showed that his natural operations—[of] Christ the God, composed of both—are preserved perfectly; [and] the one of His divinity, through His omnipotent ^D command, [and] that of His humanity, through contact; he set these forth as united...

^A entirely by their natural communion and indwelling with each other, so that the operation is shown to be one, by reason of the union of the Word Himself and His all-holy flesh—not natural, not hypostatic for the teacher has said nothing of that kind—but related to the parts through which, as has been said, it was shown ^B both by an omnipotent command and by the contact of a hand, with the command having the power of all things, and then the hand.

It has been shown, therefore, by the very doctrine of the holy and wise teacher, that he declares the difference of the natural operations, just as that of the natures themselves to which they belong, to be preserved even after the union; and he defines the union itself again, on the one hand, by saying "an omnipotent command and contact," and on the other, by saying "one and related"; through which he magnificently dismisses every heresy and division of the mystery concerning Christ. But those who do not understand it in this way, but think of one operation of the Word and flesh as related, teach the coalescence of the substances of Eutyches and Apollinaris. It is necessary, therefore, in all things to preserve the reasoning unharmed and the manner of the dispensation inviolable, lest that wretched pair—I mean division and confusion—find any entrance against the truth.

According to this ^C, therefore, and the same pious sense, any other expressions of the holy Fathers that occur and signify one are to be interpreted, and we must by no means take them as contradicting the holy expressions that signify two; for we are well aware that the former are valid for distinction against confusion, and the latter are safe for union against division; but let us embrace both—these and those—joyfully with heart and mouth, and confess them with right faith. Through the expressions which seem in appearance to be contrary, let us wisely defeat those who in their actual sense and in reality oppose themselves, others, and the truth, and let us manfully drive them from our fold—that is, the catholic and apostolic Church of God. And let us not afford even the slightest entrance against the right faith to those who, in the manner of robbers, attempt to move the boundaries of the Fathers* ^D, in order to disturb any of their dogmas, whether of arms or of those shining with piety, through which their destruction and undoing is naturally brought about.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that, regarding natures and natural operations, expressions of the holy Fathers occur that signify not only two, but also one, such as: "One incarnate nature of God the Word," and "Deivirile operation," and "Related and displayed through both." As for natural wills, however, no single expression, as far as I have been able to discover, can be found

^A that signifies them, but rather those that signify them by pronouns and number. By what manner, then, and by what reason—even if we should entirely allow [the question to be] examined—is it necessary to speak of one or two wills in Christ God, when the legislation and teaching of the Fathers commands us to confess and profess two natural wills in Him, just as [they command us to confess] the natures themselves and their natural operations, at least insofar as we know their distinction?

Having said these things to your God-revered sanctity by way of digression, I ask that you might both pardon and correct for me whatever in them has either been spoken improperly or not well understood, through the goodness of fatherly compassion and love; and that you commend me to Christ our God, who with the Father and the Holy Spirit is glorified unto the ages of ages. Amen.

SCHOLIA

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^C 83. You yourself, God-revered and most blessed Father, having a name corresponding to your virile courage, would that you be fortified with victory against all the enemies who, whether secretly and in ambush, or openly and clearly, war against the holy, catholic, and apostolic Church of God; and that you, already having grasped by hope the ever-blooming crown of the gifts and operations of the Spirit from Him, as if possessing it in your own hands, having attained the happy enjoyment through the perfect inclination of your mind toward the object of natural desire; and from this, clearly—even if someone ^D (Heb. II, 15).

NOTES

^A ...and, having attained that blessed joy, who, if anyone, might manifest and describe this, even by mere words, let alone dare to transmit it through your venerable and blessed letters to one so feeble and cowardly? You have condescended to transmit this to one who has not yet learned how, for the battle of God—that holy war waged on His behalf—to move the practical faculties of the mind, which are, as it were, the fingers of the soul, or to stir the very reasonings, and by this means to valiantly put to flight those who raise themselves up against the Lord Almighty with words and dogmas; and to drive them from that good land, which is the Lord our God Himself, and which is one and the same as the orthodox faith, the truly steadfast seat and foundation of pious dogmas, and the ever-flowing nursery and nature of the virtues. But you, in imitation of Christ, have done this so that you might clearly reveal this, in relation to me—who have ^B set myself apart from Him by my own resolve, and who dwell in a habitual state of wickedness, a region far removed from Him, as it were, and who by my actions feed the foulest passions and affections like swine—the greatness of your condescension in His love for the good, and by the magnitude of your inclination toward me, show the power of the divine gifts and works within you, so as to rouse me to the desire for this and to sharpen me, immovable, toward a sacred and blessed zeal, casting off the burden of sloth and negligence that weighs me down, above all others, with all my might.

And I have admired, O blessed man, your wise indulgence toward me, a poor man, and the manner of your ready counsel; and for many years, as you have been increased with more divine virtues, I have, with tears, though I am but a great sinner and liable to reproach, earnestly and humbly besought our Lord and God that He might preserve you, a proven and good shepherd and father, safe for me and for all. Especially ^C now, when we have obtained you, when the very event of things has clearly confirmed the prediction—which is the Truth itself in nature and in reality—that affliction, such as has not occurred from the foundation of the world, nor ever shall be, has seized all people everywhere because of their sins. May you, with the most robust staff of your God-pleasing prayers, strengthen and support [us], and with the all-holy pipe of your God-inspired teaching, lead and enlighten us well, and make us dwell, through active practice, in a place of pasture that is the ever-living habit of the virtues; and, through knowledge, nourish us upon the water of refreshment—the constant supply of the holy streams of doctrine; ^D and, through the Catholic Church—that high preserve and fold which the Lord has, by His own will, betrothed to Himself with His own life-giving blood—safely guide and receive us, that we may be delivered from the onslaught of the adversaries: who, having seized the opportune time when all things are troubled and in confusion, seek to confound the great and ineffable mystery of the saving dispensation of Christ our God, which spans all ages and times, and those who naturally, in 33 ages and time, appear...

through the good pleasure of the Father and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit—to have been assumed from us by Him, and united to Him in one and the same hypostasis, in that holy flesh which does not possess after the union those things that belong to it by nature, save only for sin (for it was not even of the nature of sin). Or rather, they [say] that the Word Himself, who became incarnate and for our sake became man, either did not perfectly preserve those things which essentially characterize our nature, as the matter exists in us, but rather changed them into His own divine nature, and by this showed a defect of His own divinity that required some addition for its essential perfection; or else He brought it wholly into non-existence, as if it were not very good, and destroyed the work of His own creation, since He did not create them with any reason or wisdom, nor unite them to Himself hypostatically. For how, since that which was created by reason and wisdom is not preserved in that same Word and wisdom in an indissoluble union? Or how, if it is preserved, is it not acknowledged even after the union? And for what cause, if not that through the confession that He who is God by nature became man, it might be believed in truth? Or perhaps [they suggest] He did not even assume from the beginning those things which belong to the nature along with the nature itself? But that He took some soulless and irrational flesh, and in no way existing from us or consubstantial with us—or that He did not take it at all, but brought it down from above and from the beginning ^C co-essential with Himself, and united it to Himself, and made a phantom of the economy for our sake and towards us, approaching us in human form but not communing with us in human nature, so that He might recover the whole race from the ancient fall and set it free from the condemnation brought about by it. For these things, and more than these, are imagined by those who do not profess perfectly and altogether in Christ the God the natural properties, and (apart from sin) the natures themselves, exactly as they are. ^D

^A For we do not observe the divine and uncreated nature as non-existent and lacking will or energy, nor do we recognize the created human essence, which is like us, as non-existent and lacking will or energy. And if we know that neither of these is devoid of natural existence, will, and energy, and that the one and only Christ and Son is in truth the hypostasis ^B of these—I mean the divine nature and the human nature—and that he is in them, how, if the same one is by nature truly God and by nature truly man, did he not also have by nature a divine will and energy, and by nature a human will and energy, lacking the nature of neither of these? Through these things, making the names truly agree with the realities, and by them in turn confirming the realities, he was clearly known as the same one, having and willing and working naturally both the divine and the human, and from this was believed to be ^C what he was, and from those things from which and in which he was. For if the natural will and the essential energy were to be removed, how will the one who is from these and is these, and who preserves them in one hypostasis, be God or man? And how will this or that be shown to exist essentially, if he does not preserve the property of each nature undefectively, apart from all sin? For that which has departed from those things which are by nature, even if it is outside of the essence, has no existence—because it has no natural motion. ^D “For that which has no motion,” as the God-revealing and great holy Dionysius says, “neither is, nor is anything, nor is there any affirmation of it at all.” Therefore, we who confess the natures of Christ the God—I mean the divine and the human which is like us—must, for the sake of establishing a certain faith in their existence and the truth of our confession concerning them, profess that there are likewise natural wills equal in number, and as many essential energies. And we must not, under the pretext of the divine union according to hypostasis, diminish or deny any part of them at all, knowing that the union according to hypostasis neither harms those things which are natural, nor the natures themselves, even if it brings them into one through itself according to the one hypostasis. It does not in the least depart from the natural logic of the two; just as I say that it also gathers the natural properties themselves, by their inter-connaturality, entirely again into one, and does not permit either to be viewed at all without the other, or outside the communion of one with the other—according to the most renowned Pope of the city of Rome, Leo—it does not obscure their essential and natural difference at all, but preserves it perfectly.

For by maintaining it, it is maintained; and by preserving it, it is preserved. And in so far as it keeps it unharmed, it itself remains unharmed. For to this extent the union of things is clearly manifested, as long as their natural distinction is kept unharmed. For when this ceases, the other also ceases entirely, having been annihilated by the stain of confusion. ^A

Therefore, I say that this union does not do violence to the things, nor does it destroy their difference, but, in accordance with the designation, it simply and fittingly joins into a unity the things that are according to it, which are always and in every way preserved in it without diminution and perfectly, as distinct by nature, having suffered no turning or confusion whatever; neither in the essences themselves, nor in the wills, nor in the operations, nor in any other natural thing. How then do some use as a pretext for this—I do not know how to say it politely—a "covering of good-dispositions," and say that the incarnate Word is by nature without will and without operation regarding that which is ours, that is, the human; as though the substance assumed from us were in Him strictly inanimate and irrational? For that which is without operation is clearly motionless and inanimate; and that which has no rational will is clearly irrational and senseless. And if the incarnate Word existed without these things by nature in the way that we do, how will it be believed that He has become man? And how, rather, will He not be shown to have turned the divine nature, and to have fallen involuntarily under the sufferings of the flesh according to it? For by the abolition of natural things, Arius and Apollinarius have made their assault against Him. The one, by dogmatizing Him as inanimate, and the other as irrational—which is the same as being without operation and without will—have blasphemed by calling Him a creature and a thing made in and of Himself. For each of them said that the Only-Begotten was passible by the nature of His divinity, and not by the nature of the flesh; although Apollinarius, still ^B abounding in impiety, even declared a perfect change into flesh by the fall and mutation of His own divinity, and sanctioned a still greater impiety by that mutation.

Therefore, we who wish to cultivate piety must shun such a confession, and must strengthen the teaching of the holy Fathers, and must hold fast to the two natural wills. ^C

^A and essential operations, confessing and admitting them in one and the same Person. For if we should say that there is one will and one operation in Him, we would openly profess that He is either not by nature man but only God, or only man by nature and not God, or clearly that He is neither man nor God. For example, if we should happen to say that the will is natural, it is entirely either divine or human; and if it is divine, the Word will naturally desire divine things according to it, showing Himself to be God by nature and co-willing with His own Begetter, and not as a man; for it is not in the nature of that which is by nature divine to be characterized by that which is human, just as it is not in the nature of that which is by essence human to be recognized by that which is by essence divine. This, however, would follow by consequence if we should say the will is human. But if we say it is personal, it will be the mark and badge of His person alone; and never by it would He share with the Father and with us, for the extremes are distinguished and separated by person. The same things, again, may be said concerning the operations.

^B But not for this reason—God forbid—do we reject the unique expressions of the divine Fathers concerning these, I mean the operations, signifying as they do one thing; for instance, the "Deivirile" (God-manly) operation of the divine interpreter, the blessed Dionysius, and the "one and kindred operation brought forth by the work of both" of the most wise Cyril. For they piously proclaimed these to them on account of the union and the entirely natural cohesion of the natural operations among themselves, just as they also proclaimed the twofold ones (which signify two) on account of their essential and natural distinction. For the word "Deivirile" embraces both the divine and the human operation at once. For ^C the Doctor invented a fitting term which, being uttered singularly, might embrace both operations—as I was saying—and by circumlocution denoted the twofold operation of Him who is twofold by nature. For since he had previously said: "He did not operate the divine things in the manner of God (in that He was not God naked), but He operated the divine things by nature (for He was God by nature), but through the flesh which was united to Him in person; nor did He operate human things in the manner of man (in that He was not a simple man), but He operated the human things by nature (inasmuch as He was man by nature), but by divine authority, and not by any necessity or natural force, as is our case, being ^D driven to act, He intertwined His divine and at the same time manly natural operation; with the result that neither exists without the other, but they are understood as existing in one another and through one another, by reason of the indissoluble union, like those things which are connatural and as it were grown together; and having embraced both in a single word, he proclaimed them by circumlocution. Thus, by what he said, both that He operated divine things and human, even if not in the manner of God, nor indeed in the manner of man; for He was not, as I said, naked God, nor a simple man; yet He truly operated, the essential . . .

distinction of the natural operations might be set forth: for by the composite and appropriate term, He concisely called it ^A the Theandric operation, so that he might teach the inseparable union of these.

But that saying also of the most wise Cyril: “One and kindred operation produced by both,” is very close to the deep thought of this great Father [(q)]. For he himself also teaches by it the connaturality and union of the natural operations. For this most renowned man, desiring to show that both the flesh is God, and the essential operation according to it, has become divine by the union with the Word who is God by nature, and that it operated things beyond man, without departing from that which He was by nature; just as the Word Himself also, by ^B the assumption of this for our sake, voluntarily became man, working the things according to man; although existing as God by nature, he declares that this One did not heal and vivify solely by an all-working command, as if He were not naked God; but that He was eager to take His holy flesh as a sort of fellow-worker, especially for this, and to vivify and heal through it and through the touch and voice according to it; so that He might show it capable of vivifying; because it had come to be in union with Him; and that not another’s flesh existed, but strictly His own. Wherefore he also demonstrates one operation of Him and of it, I say of the holy flesh, and kindred through both; one, indeed, by the union; ^C but kindred again, in its parts; as being the same, both in the all-working command, and in the touch of the holy flesh: for through both, as God, the Word clearly demonstrated this; showing that through it also He vivified, as it had itself become through and through vivifying; just as fire, burning through iron, by the union with it, renders the iron endowed with the power of burning; so that finally, for this reason, the burning is not of the fire according to nature only, but also of the iron itself because of the union; and again, the divine operation of the Word in the miracles, not to exist of Him alone because of nature, but also of the holy flesh itself, because of the union according to hypostasis with Him; for He employed it as His own fellow-worker ^D in divine things, as the teacher says, even as the soul employs its own body towards the fulfillment of its own works. This, therefore, is the one, kindred operation shown through both, declaring the union of the natural operations; the heterogeneous and dual nature of these, just as also...

* For even the flesh is God, by the union with the Word; and its natural properties have become divine, by the union and connaturality with Him.

NOTE (q) It adheres to the intelligence of Dionysius; it possesses the same most lofty sense. And certainly no one of the Fathers has treated more fully and more deeply than Cyril this communion of the flesh of Christ with the Word regarding operation and virtue, and the union to Him, not only in its own species, but also in the mystical benediction, as he calls it, or the Eucharist, being perfectly consonant and very close to Dionysius, whether Cyril read him, or whether he set forth the same ecclesiastical doctrine and tradition as he did; of which many things also, related to me and adorned in style, are brought together in the *Bibliotheca Patrum* for the feast day of the Body of Christ. Turrianus does not express it sufficiently clearly; it contains the greatest thought of the Father.

^A And the God-manly operation, by itself, properly signifies, that it is referred to both parts, out of which and in which the one and only incarnate Word was known to exist; and that it belongs to both, as if it appeared through both, namely, of the command that effects all things, and of the touch of the holy flesh.

Nor must one be at all troubled by the word "cognate" (or "akin," or "of the same race," as you might say), as though it were somewhat unusual. For the holy Fathers have used the term "cognate," both for those things which are of the same essence and for those that are diverse. A witness to this is the great Gregory the Theologian, who, when discussing the soul in his Funeral Oration for his brother Caesarius, speaks in these words: "But a little later, having taken up the cognate flesh, with which it philosophized on heavenly things there" (r). Here, the teacher has called the flesh cognate to the soul on account of the union, but not on account of nature. And again, in the *Oration on the Holy Lights*, while teaching about the only-begotten Son, he says: "To whom the cognate Spirit also bore witness" (s). Here, he has applied "cognate" not on account of union, but on account of nature. Even the most wise Cyril himself uses the word "cognate" and "akin" indiscriminately, both for things separated by essence or nature, and for things separated by person; and he says this in his Commentaries on the Gospel of John, regarding the cure that is wrought through divine baptism: "In a certain way, it is akin and friendly to both. For by the Spirit He sanctifies the spirit of man, but by water, the body." But what, and what sort of affinity or "cognation" is there between the Holy Spirit and water, according to essence or subsistence, in relation to our spirit and body? Even if ^B this belongs to us in the highest degree, and to those parts of which we are composed, according to grace, through the holy regeneration.

But the singular number itself, as is manifest to all, is also used by the saints through all classes and cases of things conjoined, both in those things which are of the same essence and nature, and in those which are of a different essence and nature—they attending, clearly, to that which exists as one through union or by nature; as is the saying, "One from both, and both through one." And that, "One person and one nature of God the Word incarnate." That point also, "Even if both are one, yet not by nature, but by the union." And again concerning those which are of the same essence and nature, like that, "And it was, and it was, and it was, but one it was. Light, and light, and light, but one light." And that, "One God, and one nature, that supreme one," says Gregory the Theologian. Therefore, one must not in any way construe the singular expressions of the saints, or those said to be "cognate" on account of the union, for the sake of overthrowing the dual or heterogeneous [terms] spoken by them; or ^C again, based on the difference ^D [that exists]...

to be received, in order to overturn those which they brought forward as twofold or of different kinds for the sake of distinction, or, conversely, that these must be reconciled with those. For whoever interprets in this way, and does not embrace both with equity and in a convenient and appropriate manner—whereby he might attribute some to the union, and others indeed to the natural distinction—will surely, in all likelihood, fall into either division or confusion, or, to speak more properly, he will entangle himself in these things and remove himself from the true fellowship and confession of the holy Fathers. For although the flesh is one with the Word by reason of person, and, in that it is united to Him, has been enriched by His operation, it has nevertheless not lost the fact that it was essentially created, nor has it suffered any loss at all of its natural, blameless passions and affections. But if the matter stands thus in truth, as it clearly does, it has manifestly obtained a nature distinct from the Word, as well as a natural operation. This Word Himself, inasmuch as He was man (inasmuch as it pertained to Him by nature; since, in a manner similar to us, He had entered into the communion of blood and flesh), possessed the same two natural operations, just as He possessed two natures: the divine and paternal, and that which is ours and human; by which He was believed to be the same person, both God and man. For those beings whose natural operations He possessed, the natures of those He also possessed. For just as by the voice and touch of the holy flesh ^A He showed Himself to be God, who provides healing and life; so likewise, this same person, by that same touch and the office of His hands, was clearly known as man, being girded with a towel [e], and washing the disciples’ feet, and breaking the loaves, and distributing them to them, and dipping the morsel into the dish [f]. And again, by His voice, He signified the sadness that was upon Him, saying: *My soul is sorrowful even unto death* [g]. And: *Now is my soul troubled*. And: *So you could not watch one hour with me?*

And as many such things as there are, ^B if any, which He does not abolish—that which is natural to each nature, from which and in which He consists—but by natural operations He confirms the natures.

And: *So, could you not watch one hour with me?*

That it may also be shown by the authority of the wise Cyril that the flesh did not, by nature, have one operation with the Word—just as it did not have the same essence—even if it became akin to Him through being deified by the union, let us hear what he says while expounding the Gospel according to Matthew in the second book of his *Confession*. "Therefore," he says, "He operates in the Spirit of God." And truly, indeed, it is not the natural operation of the flesh and the power of humanity that dissolves Satan ^C and confounds Beelzebub; otherwise, let someone come forward and teach you, if he wishes, what prevents anyone who has made up his mind from being endowed with authority over unclean spirits. See whether the nature of the flesh works this. For we are all in the flesh, and the definition of humanity is one and common to all. But not even the work of the flesh, ^D

^A nor of humanity, is the prevailing over spirits, since not all have the power; rather, the achievement is seen as the work of the Spirit. Therefore, what the Father said is true, as flesh and man are understood, that it was the work of the Spirit and not of the flesh, that is, of humanity, which had the strength against the demons. For the body of the Lord is acknowledged to be holy, and having the power over every infirmity; but it was and is holy, not because it is understood simply as flesh, existing only in its own proper definitions, but because it is the temple of the God-Word dwelling in it, who hallows his own flesh through his own Spirit.

Wherefore, as this divine man says, according to the truth, it is not a natural operation of flesh and a power of humanity that dissolves Satan; nor does the nature of the flesh perform this. For otherwise even all men who exist in the flesh, and who are one according to the definition of humanity, if they only so wished to act, would also have obtained that strength against the spirits. The blessed man therefore clearly showed that he taught this, and became the interpreter of his own words, namely that by the indwelling—which is to be united according to one person—and not by being flesh, existing only in its own proper definitions, is it holy and life-giving, having the power against every infirmity. Let us, therefore, also guard, according to the instruction of the saints, both the definition of the distinction whole and inviolate, preserving the natures themselves and what essentially belongs to them even after the union; and [let us guard] the mode of the dispensation and mystery of Christ in every way indivisible, uniformly ^C maintaining the supreme coherence of the things united, and let us drive away from ourselves every harm of both division and confusion.

If, however, we do not thus receive and understand in a pious manner, according to the principle of the union, the terms uniquely uttered by the saints—both the "God-man" ^D and the "One" and "kin"—but instead imagine this either as natural or as personal, we will necessarily dogmatize one nature for Christ: [a nature] partaking of none of the things from which he is composed, because Christ exists as neither by nature. For nature can never naturally hold communion with nature, but every being is, on the contrary, entirely distinct in essence from every other. This, then, will follow for us—that if we call the operation "natural," it will be gathered that he is a partaker of none of those from which he is constituted, that is, he is neither God nor man, and holds no communion with the Father nor with us. For this argument, as elsewhere in many places, Maximus also treats here: nor should the theologian have deviated from his opinion on such a manifest matter, and [I should not] distort what is abhorrent to all sacred and profane philosophy, owing to a note of elision poorly omitted by the hasty pen of the copyist.

^A Let us not, therefore, wish to confess in the Word himself, who was incarnate and became perfectly man, [either] a natural or a personal operation. For none of the holy Fathers, from the time when Christ descended to us until now, has delivered that we should confess a natural or personal operation in him; nor indeed has any expressedly admitted one, so far as I know, except only the divine Cyril. While we embrace this word with our whole heart for the sake of the union, even though it belongs to him alone, [we ask] is it not also fitting to accept with delight the dual expressions of almost all the holy Fathers—and indeed of Cyril himself again—for the sake of the natural distinction? Lest, while we claim and receive one expression that is his alone, we reject and condemn the words of him as well as of the rest of the holy Fathers; as if the refined piety of the proclamation had been entrusted to none of them—except only to Cyril—and as if he himself, in his other discourses which signify a distinction, had not held to what he said was a single and cognate, or related, operation.

^B Furthermore, how do some say that there is simply one operation in Christ who is God? For it must be that this [operation] belongs either to his parts, or to him entirely as a whole. And indeed, if it belongs to the parts, being divided towards both, it will be split; but if this comes to pass, it will utterly be dissolved, ^C and will simultaneously dissolve what is united according to it. But if it belongs to the whole, it will be receptive of contraries, being mortal and immortal, created and uncreated, circumscribed and uncircumscribed. And if this were so, Christ would have possessed his own operation according to habit and privation, which [operation] was and was not; on account of which, as acting appropriately according to it and its character, he was at once receptive of contraries, and not [receptive] according to one [part] and another; than which, what could be said that is more impious?

The same thing must also be said concerning the will. For how, according to the wise Cyril, did the Word take the flesh as a partner in his work if it lacked its natural operation? ^D For what lacks natural operation and movement is altogether dead and inanimate. By what reasoning, then, did he take up that which was dead into a partnership in his work? For that which is without operation is completely devoid of movement and lies inert. But in what way did he show it capable of being vivified—as the same Cyril again taught—through its natural movements, such as touch, voice, and walking, if these were not its own, or were not essentially in it? For if they were essentially its own, the flesh plainly had a natural operation; for the movement of the hands and feet, and speech according to utterance, belong to its essential operation. If [it does not have it]...

these were not by his nature, the Savior did not exhibit [the flesh] as capable of bestowing life. ^B These few and meager things, drawn from many, instructed by your teachings and those of the saints who live according to God in your midst, I have dared, by your most holy command, to commit to this modest writing, and to dare things beyond my ability, being small and worthless. I possess neither a mind keen for comprehension, nor a speech ready for explanation, nor a character adorned for the accomplishment of virtuous things; but rather, I am sheltered by grace through your intercession, by the all-good God, who also covers the multitude of my sins. I beseech you with tears, groveling before your honored footsteps as if present—since the Holy Spirit has appointed you bishops and saviors of souls—not to be vexed where I have not written with sufficient precision, but to graciously effect the correction, so that you may thereby show yourselves to be ^C mediators of God, rather than merely imitators; for you have obtained not only His light and mercy for all, but also [the power] to bestow them worthily. I beseech you to commend my weakness—the weakness of a poor and mendicant man—to Him, so that I may be protected from the flame, both visible and invisible, which because of my sins consumes all things, and that I may forever rest and be guarded in the dew of His most holy and orthodox faith and of sacred virtue. Amen.

SCHOLIUM

TO THE CATHOLICS RESIDING IN SICILY

Peace be great to those who love thy law, and there is no ^D [stumbling-block for them].

[Ps. CXVIII, 165], as the God-bearing David says to God; knowing from this and declaring to all who desire salvation, so that, by applying themselves to the nature of the supreme Desirable [God] with the most divine and supreme love, they may with great joy pursue, as far as possible, the good of peace both with themselves and with everyone, in an indissoluble bond, removing all stumbling-block from among all, through the pious and utmost concord of minds toward one another. For which reason, I too, your servant, have diligently applied myself to put into writing, with readiness, what I had previously stated in speech, for the security and assurance of your holinesses, dissipating through this apology every suspicion against our humility that has arisen among you from the deceit of others. “For I cannot bear,” as Gregory the Theologian says, “that any of those who diligently observe all our affairs, whether they are right or otherwise, should be offended in me; for it is good, so long as it is possible and reason dictates, that one should, without either sinning or being suspected of sinning, not place an obstacle or a stumbling-block before the multitude; for we know how inevitable and most grievous is the punishment from Him who cannot lie for those who have caused even one of the little ones to stumble.” [Matth. XVIII, 6]

^B I therefore make known to your holinesses that it has never occurred to me, according to the suggestion of those who slander me, to entertain the notion of equivalent and contrary dogmas. For I have never confessed or written, all together, that there is one and two—that is, three, according to them—wills and operations in one and the same Christ, Who is God. For the one refutes the other, and there is no foundation [for such a belief].

NOTES

^C [The note discusses the historical context of the letter, identifying it as directed against the Monothelites who attempted to attribute the concept of two operations to Maximus. It notes that the term "equivalent and contrary" (ἀντιῤῥόπων καὶ ἐναντίων) is used by Maximus to mock the Monothelite evasion, as they claimed that to say "one" and "two" was essentially the same thing, whereas Maximus contends they are mutually destructive. The note further critiques contemporary controversialists who, while claiming to follow St. Thomas Aquinas, deviate from both his teachings and the Roman See.] ^D

^A For one thing is overturned by another, and it possesses nothing firm based on natural reason, not to mention that what they thus think is supported by no witnesses of the truth (that is to say, by no authority of the holy Fathers). For if it is one, how is it also two? But if it is two, how is it also one? And what is this, and by what name is it called? And with whom is the Word who became flesh co-operative, or consubstantial, according to it?

^B If indeed they say that it is with the Father, they thereby introduce a double divine operation: provided that they do not acknowledge the third operation feigned by them to the end of abolishing the two operations of the same [Word] according to nature, I mean the divine and the human. For if not to the end of abolition, it is clear that they represent the two divine operations of the same as natural and hypostatic. But if there are two, they are necessarily different; and from this arises their polytheistic conception, inasmuch as the divine operation in the Father and the Son is recognized by them in heterogeneity and not in natural identity. And not only is their opinion polytheistic, but already even atheistic, since they posit that the Son has no divine operation at all; for they mingle nature and hypostasis with one another, along with the properties of each, and are known to think the same as Sabellius, by describing the Son as communicating with the Father according to both, I mean nature and hypostasis—which is alien to the sense of the Catholic Church; to say nothing of the fact that they render the Father also naturally passible and incarnate, that is, made man, by that equal operation of miracles and sufferings with the Son. For, they say, setting aside miracles and sufferings, the Son performs nothing else, through that third operation which, as I was saying, is fabricated by them; which they also assert the only-begotten Word possesses, besides the natural divine one, in common with the Father.

^C But if, driven into a corner by these things, they determine that the Son, by virtue of this third operation, does not indeed communicate with the eternal Father, but rather with the immaculate Mother, they here also attribute to him two created, that is to say, human operations—again, natural and hypostatic—thereby alienating him from God and the Father, and, proceeding headlong into the schism of Arius, causing a complete dissociation of the Only-Begotten from the Father in their opinion through both operations. Why, we shall even say that we ourselves perform miracles.

^D

NOTES

^A but they do not declare him to be merely by nature capable of suffering; inasmuch as they claim that the Christ preserves his kinship with us by that third—as they call it, or as it pleases them to name it, that of the whole—that is, the energy of the person; in accordance with which they reasonably acknowledge him to be one who voluntarily admits not only the experience of sufferings, but also shows forth the power of miracles, which is clearly impossible. For it is not possible that the same and single energy, or will, or nature in its totality, should be at once divine and human; or uncreated and created; or without beginning and having a beginning; or composite and incomposite; so that by one and the same energy the Son might preserve his kinship by nature and changelessly toward both, I mean the Father and the Mother, or that he might perform both, I mean both things that are divine by nature and those that are human. For this, not even those who fashion hippocentaurs could ever imagine. ^B If, however, it is impossible for the same and single energy, or will, or nature to exist at once as divine by nature and human; or for the Son to have communion with both, I mean the Father and the Mother, in accordance with the same and single energy, or for him to perform both, even the divine and the human; but [it is performed] rather according to what has been said, the divine things by the divine [nature], and the human things by the human nature that is his, yet with the communion and natural union of the other, though not in a divided manner; then this third energy, according to them, is also nameless as it is non-existent, being confirmed by no divine reason or Father at all. ^C But what, they say, shall we attribute to the whole, if we do not grant to it the one energy as to the one whole, because of the union? But they who put forth these things fall into error as to what they are saying. For, imagining that the whole is something different from its own proper parts, out of which and in which it consists, they assert—not as if they were proving it by demonstration, but by assertion—that it is necessary that something else, in addition to that which belongs by nature to the parts, should be joined to the whole as a whole; I mean the one energy. Let them demonstrate, then, first, that the whole has an existence and substance other than that which is of its own parts; and then, in this way, let them attribute to it, as the whole, another energy besides the essential energies that reside in the parts. ^D If, however, they do not attribute another natural existence and substance, then surely they must not attribute to the whole another natural energy, beyond those that belong to the parts. For Christ is both by nature—for he is the same who is God by nature and man—and he possesses his own proper things according to each nature: I mean both the divine will and energy, and the human will and energy; but not one single one, to the destruction of the two energies by nature, or another *in addition* to the two by nature; that is, three energies and wills. Therefore, just as he has each substance, so likewise he has each essential will and energy according to the same

^A nature, and we attribute them to the one and only Christ by nature. For if we consider the distinction of the parts of the same, we fittingly attribute the divine things to his Divinity, and the human things to his humanity according to him. But conversely, on account of the union, we apply the properties of each nature to the other by reciprocal communication. From which it comes that we say both that God is capable of suffering against sin, and that the flesh ^B assumed and became what it was anointed by; and I am bold to say, "co-god," according to the theologian Gregory. He did not perform divine acts as God—for it was through the flesh, endowed with an intelligent soul and united to him hypostatically—but not by a naked divinity, as previously mentioned. Nor did he perform human acts as a man, but by an infinite power of authority, not subject to any necessity. For the passion was not a payment for a debt, as in our case, but an emptying which the Word, having become flesh, chose for our sake. ^C Nevertheless, we attribute all the things belonging to the natures of which he is composed, to the same, whole, unique, and only Christ by nature, with the sole exception of sin. Whence it is that we confess the same one to be both capable of suffering and incapable of suffering; uncreated and created; circumscribed and uncircumscribed; earthly and heavenly; visible and intelligible; capable of being grasped and incapable of being grasped by nature—that which cannot be grasped by anything. But if, on the other hand, being restricted by these things, they should say that the effect of his two ^D natural operations—that is, the divine signs which the Savior God performed for other men, such as the resurrection, or the assumption, or the cleansing of the leper, or any other such prodigies—is one and the same operation, not even in this way does their reasoning possess the appearance of a good argument. For we do not know of but one of the Savior's divine signs, but rather many and infinite ones, concerning which the most theological John says: "If they were written one by one, I do not think the world itself could contain the books that would be written" (John xxi, 25).

Furthermore, if we do not know the essential substance of a thing from the things that are external to it, nor in any other thing (much less in him who is above all things, the Word of God incarnate for our sake), but recognize it from the natural properties existing in it and distinguishing it (and likewise, one might say, from natural wills and operations), then otherwise they would also define a carpenter simply as a "wood-working animal," and not as rational or mortal, whose nature they would declare from a seat or a footstool, and not from the attributes that essentially constitute it.

^A Recognizing these as the properties that constitute him; to even think otherwise is ignorance. Whence we distinguish him as by nature God and the same truly and properly as man, not from elsewhere, but out of the natural properties that are innate in him, by which he is characterized at once in a divine and a human manner (namely, as I have said, from his divine will and operation, and from the human will and operation of the same). By these, and through these, he confirms what he was and what he has become: working wonders supernaturally as God voluntarily, yet the same one voluntarily suffering for our sake as man. He is not some other thing beside those out of which, in which, and as which he is known—not some kind of bastard or intermediate thing, that is, a third result, according to the example of mules, ^B as the empty-talking fable-mongers—that is, the heretics—monstrously imagine, having strayed from the pious preaching of the holy Fathers—but he is truly and properly those things out of which, and in which, he truly and properly exists. For existing by nature out of divinity and humanity, and in divinity and humanity, Christ is God by nature and man, and absolutely nothing else.

And how, they say, does the wise Cyril profess to hold to a certain intermediate order of the expressions concerning Christ, writing thus to Acacius: "For some of the expressions are most especially suited to the divinity; others, again, are in this way suited to the humanity; and others hold a certain intermediate order"? ^C And what does this contribute at all to them in support of their own opinion? For the teacher does not, by means of a change or the rejection and loss of the extremes—I mean the divinity of Christ and his humanity, or his divine and human will and operation—hand down to us in these things some other "middle" or "intermediate" result, which does not participate in either of the natures out of which he is, or which is again, in their view, a certain composite operation, or possessed of one; but he teaches that he is truly those things out of which he exists; yet that these are not named as divided, but rather both of them are together and in the same one, as Christ is one and alone. ^D And the man himself testifies to these things, defending the Oriental bishops, and writing to Acacius thus: "But the brethren at Antioch do not in any way divide the things that are united; yet they contend that the expressions concerning the Lord must be separated, and that some are fitting to his divinity, and others, again, to his humanity. For the same one is God and man. They add, nonetheless, that there are also others that have been made common in a certain way, and as if looking to both—I mean divinity and humanity; I mean, for instance, that some of the expressions are most especially suited to the divinity, others again to the humanity, while others have a certain intermediate order, signifying the Son of God to be God and man at once and in the same." He has shown us, therefore, that this "middle order" of expressions does not signify that Christ is something other than what he is derived from, in which, and as which he exists, as some have supposed, but that he is God and man at once.

And he brings forward the divinely inspired Scriptures to prove these things, saying thus: “When he says to Philip, ‘Have I been with you so long, and you have not known me, Philip? Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me? He who has seen me has seen the Father’; and, ‘I and the Father are one,’ we maintain that this voice is most appropriate to divinity. But when he rebukes the crowds of the Jews, saying, ‘If you were Abraham’s children, you would do the works of Abraham. But now you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth; this Abraham did not do,’ we say that such things were spoken in a manner befitting a man. Nevertheless, we affirm that both those things which befit the divinity and those which belong to the humanity are to be attributed to the one Son alone. We declare that those intermediate expressions—such as when the blessed Paul writes, ‘Jesus Christ, yesterday and today, the same also into the ages,’ ^B and again, ‘One God the Father, from whom are all things, and we are from him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we are through him,’ and again, ‘Whose are the fathers, and from whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all God, blessed into the ages, Amen’—are of this sort. For behold, having named Jesus Christ, he says that he is the same yesterday and today and into the ages, and that through him all things were made; and he names him who is from the Jews according to the flesh, God over all, and indeed blessed into the ages, Amen. Do not, therefore, divide the words spoken concerning the Lord in these passages. For they embrace at once both what befits God and what befits man. But rather, assign them as to one person, the Son, that is, the Word of God incarnate.” By these words, the Doctor taught us that the intermediate expressions also signify nothing else at all in Christ than what befits God and man at once; whence he also commands that these be attributed to him indivisibly, as to one who is the same, being God and man by nature, and altogether nothing else, as I was saying. ^C

“And yet,” they say, “he himself confesses one operation in Christ.” For so he says, interpreting the holy evangelist John: “And truly, when he raised up the daughter of the archisynagogue, saying, ‘Girl, arise,’ he took hold of her hand, as it is written: giving life indeed as God, by the all-creating command, and giving life again, also through the touch of his own flesh; showing forth one and coherent operation through both.” But this, indeed, contains the opinion of the Doctor very clearly, that he does not define one operation for the two substances from which the one and only Christ exists, as some might suppose; if indeed he declares to Hermias, saying, “For they will work similarly.

For those which have the same nature, have the same account of operation.” ^A For those which are of the same operation are acknowledged to be of the same substance. Therefore, one of two things is necessary: either we introduce the teacher as contradicting himself, or we must acknowledge that he assigns the same nature—just as he does the same operation—in Christ; but he does not declare that the natures are different, which have come together into one and the same thing by the immutability of the operation. “For those which are of the same operation, and of the same substance, are acknowledged [to be],” he says. But if both are unseemly—to be inconsistent with himself, and not to advocate the natures from which [Christ] consists in Christ—it is manifest that he does not hand down one operation of both substances, or rather, of Christ who is composed of them; for he says saying, “Displaying one and a cognate operation through both,” but rather, he shows that the Word, being God by nature and having become incarnate, brings forth his own life-giving and divine operation by nature, both in an incorporeal manner and through the body. For by saying “cognate,” he signified nothing else than the same life-giving operation, made manifest to those by a miracle through both—that is, through the all-working command and the touch of his holy flesh—just as fire, burning both immaterially and through matter, shows the same burning power in both ways. ^B Therefore, the teacher does not say these things for the sake of abolishing the human operation of the Savior; for by speaking of the touch of the flesh, he clearly signified the human [operation], since the power of touching is a clear demonstration of the human operation. But neither did he hand down any other operation besides his two natural ones; but he declared that the operation, which is life-giving by nature, as has been said, proceeds through both (that is to say, through both the command and the touch) from one and the same Word of God. ^C But if those who are hard-pressed by these pious proclamations of the Fathers bring forward the epistle of Heraclian to Achillius, in which they suggest that he says there is one nature and one motion in Christ, in addition to the two, as a whole, let them interpret it themselves. For the letter says this: “One indeed is the whole nature and motion of the Lord according to itself; but two are those according to relation. One is the motion and nature of the parts according to appropriation; but two are those according to themselves. And when I say motion, I wish operation and passion to be signified.” It is therefore necessary for those who put these things forward as a bulwark for their own dogmas to explain clearly in their discourse: what, and how it is said, and by the testimony of which of the approved Fathers it is supported, that the Lord has one nature and motion as a whole, and which are the two according to relation? And what is the one nature and motion of the parts according to appropriation, ^D and which are the two according to themselves? That is, [they must explain] these three pairings of the natures and motions of the same [Lord]. And who is it that hands down that each declares the same and one motion?

^A And I mean by this an operation and a passion; and how, if according to them both are [meant], is the Son not separated from the Father in every motion, since by nature He is passable in every respect? If, that is, the motion of God and Savior does not in any way signify both simultaneously (that is, operation and passion). For God is by nature impassable and absolute and simple, or rather, far simpler than any simplicity. But how, again, when they introduce the three pairings of motions, do they not introduce twelve operations and passions? If, according to their opinion, the motion signifies both. And who among the saints has ever professed natures in Christ God according to relation, or according to attribution? ^B Let them demonstrate these things first from Patristic judgment, and then their own assumption of doctrines will be confirmed from that source. But if they are unable to do so, let them henceforth abandon these things, and let them follow with us only those things which have been piously decreed by the holy Fathers of the catholic Church and by the five holy ecumenical synods. Let them confess one and the same and sole Lord and God Jesus Christ, perfect by nature in all things as God, and perfect by nature in all things as man, sin alone excepted. And let them not, by the removal of what is perfect by nature in both respects in every way, destroy His divine or human will and operation, knowing that the superessential Word neither diminished, nor altered, nor destroyed in any way at all—neither what He was from eternity and without cause, nor what He became later for a cause, that is, for our salvation. ^C But rather, He preserved them wholly and perfectly (sin alone excepted), in Himself and through Himself, according to everything and in all things, and they are properly (as I was saying) according to natural substance. Whence He is also endowed by nature with the faculty of willing and of working our salvation, one and the same sole Lord and God, according to both natures from which and in which He exists. For God, existing by nature as possessed of authority and as the Creator ^D of the power of all things, did not become a man mindless, or devoid of the life that is natural to us and of those things which have received their being from Him by creation; but He became man as a rational being, that is, truly endowed by nature with the faculty of willing and of working, He who is by nature and alone God, having assumed me entirely with those things that were mine, in order to grant salvation to me entirely, having released the entire condemnation of sin—since what is not assumed is not healed; and He is united to God, this also remains, as the namesake of theology says. But since...

the irrational objection of those who are unequally yoked—which we have refuted—is being raised against us by others following these pious teachings of the holy Fathers, and those who turn our words against us, or rather, deceive the more innocent, by bringing forward letters—namely, those said to be written by us to Marinus the presbyter, and the letter to Pyrrhus—it is necessary to speak briefly about these things as well. We do this to assure your Holiness in all matters, so that you may have from us what is in no way ambiguous or doubtful. ^B To Marinus the presbyter, indeed, we have written in various ways regarding various scriptural chapters; yet in no way whatsoever have we spoken of those opposing things, or of contradictory dogmas—of one, I say, and of two, that is, of the three operations or wills that they falsely attribute to the same one Christ, as if we established them in Him in such a way, ^C just as they do, or attribute them to Him or to any other person. “For if I build again those things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor,” says the vessel of election (Gal. II, 18). Hence, even that letter which is thus produced, or rather fabricated as if from us to Marinus, being completely alien and not ours, we ourselves reject, and we implore all who piously confess the Lord to reject it likewise, so that we may block every opportunity for the adversaries—namely, those who “take occasions in sins” (Ps. CXL, 4), and, while concealing their own desire for contradiction, engage in slander against us. Since they are unable to stand on their own argument, which is destroyed by the impact of the truth, they use the mask of our supposed letter to effect a treacherous infiltration against those who are simpler. ^D Yet the latter would no longer suffer or perform this, if they preferred our apology regarding these things to the truth of the lie.

Again, regarding Pyrrhus, who had previously written a huge volume to us—in which, I know not how, he had greatly honored us—and who in that same volume, by way of examination and not by any decision, had discussed the question of one and two operations of the same Christ, [D (footnote text)] [Note: (c) Regarding the letter to Marinus. It does not appear that this letter to Marinus is one of those that exist addressed to him, all of which are dogmatic; indeed, the first among those published by Turrianus seriously attacks the will in Christ, and admits an election similar to ours only insofar as it is a free movement, yet not in accordance with opposites, nor having the rationale of an uncertain conjunction; and thus it excuses and professes that it has admitted these things in the Questions to Thalassius. Where he also correctly explains the will through appropriation and adaptation from the sense of the Fathers, as if Christ leads our own will, like a head to the members, in His own way; to which nothing... [Note continued]. Since that letter to Marinus, which stands apart from the rest of the epistles of Maximus to Marinus, satisfies the addition of the particle *Filioque* to the apostolic letters, it is uncertain if it had anything of the sort, since not even those who abrogate it for Maximus have challenged anything of his, or have found a copy of it more complete than the one we have at present. It could have been alleged in this way by those Greeks who, being more studious of the Photian dogma, did not approve of that pious exposition of Maximus and his... [Note ends].]

^A seeking after our own [judgment] as well, and as he was inquiring as to the judgment and opinion regarding either discourse, we reasonably also honored him in the prefaces of our letter to him, fulfilling the apostolic exhortation. For the divine Apostle says, "Outdoing one another in honor," [Rom. XII, 10] whereas the divine Word commands us to love and bless even those who are otherwise disposed or who write to us. At the same time, I was also moved by a zeal not to exasperate the man, but rather to soothe him, in order that by the very lure of praise I might compel him toward an assent to the things which I was handing down piously according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. Hence, I was also acknowledging that I had understood what had been written to me by him in the manner in which I myself had written to him; acting, so to speak, as an impulse, as I have said, and an invitation to the assent of the pious doctrine, which would procure for him the greatest salvation, if only, having embraced this, he would confess with us, as we have written; that is, the two natural operations of the same and one Christ our God, just as also the two natures united inconfusedly and indivisibly, the divine and the human, the uncreated and the created; but not one and the same, to speak in any manner whatsoever. For it is not the doctrine of the Fathers, but rather of the heretics, which hands down one and the same operation or will or nature in one and the same Lord and God of ours. ^B

Such was the mode of my praise toward him—that is, toward Pyrrhus—and the logic of it, as I was intending to pull him gradually away from the contrary opinion and transfer him to the correct doctrine of the faith. But if anyone, failing to grasp the force of my intention herein, still bears ill-will toward that praise of mine, let it be permitted to him, and as it seems to him, let him reject that which is no longer pleasing or approved by us, but is now rather heavy and burdensome, since he [Pyrrhus] has been fully overthrown; yet let him hold as valid and approve the force of those things which have been written by us to him in a catholic manner. ^C

You have, holy Fathers, the reason for the assurance I have given you through my defense. But act manfully and be strengthened in the spirit, and do not be swayed to the right or to the left by the pursuits and doctrines of the adversaries; rather, be established and guided by the royal road, by Him who says: "I am the way, and the life, and the truth," [John XIV, 6] being "of one soul, thinking the same thing," [Philipp. II, 2] and "the God of peace will be with all of you," [Philipp. IV, 9] being always piously preached and holily worshipped by you; and who, finally, after the blessed way of life and confession in this age, will provide for you a more blessed inheritance and rest in that future one; with whom to the Father, together with the Holy Spirit, be glory, honor, power, adoration, now and always, and unto the ages of ages. Amen. ^D

COPY OF A LETTER TO LORD MARINUS, PRIEST OF CYPRUS

FROM THE EPISTLE OF ANASTASIUS TO JOHN THE DEACON

^B Guided by the divine law according to God, O Father honored by God, you have spurned human law; you who have—by setting aside, in your condescension, the middle path, and by magnifying in your poverty the completeness of my lack of experience in understanding and speaking, or, to put it more appropriately, my rashness—exalted me beyond measure. For I am not ashamed to confess my own faults and those of my own weakness as is fitting, and with even greater readiness to reveal them, in proportion to what you have struggled to cover up with your philanthropy. For who would ever have received the speech of an irrational person so readily, and accepted the mind of a frantic person—not to say anything further—as you have mine, O Father honored by God, ^C not only by passing over my lack of education out of love and honoring it to the highest degree—which is the greatest thing for the unadorned for the sake of good reputation—but also by adding, through grace, the awe-inspiring quality with which you are accustomed to beautifully adorn your own mind, you have illuminated me in excess? From these things the reason and manner of true nobility—or, to speak more truly and appropriately, of kinship with God—consists; not knowing how to act more loftily, for it is not in its nature to do otherwise than to be moderate. For it is accustomed, immovably, to settle firmly toward lowliness, by the excess of things not present revealing more clearly the need and making known the nakedness; and by the demonstration of things beyond worth, it introduces a more austere feeling than those ^D that are according to worth, when, having grasped the depth of the soul, it would make the magnitude of that which is unbecoming appear unveiled. Having experienced this in particular, through the clarification of your prayers, I have touched upon the divine laws, which the discourse of the economy, surpassing reason, has seen fit to guard providentially and to propose to those who, like me, are in need of and require guidance.

And after a few words: Accordingly, therefore, of the synodical [epistle] of the most holy Pope who is now [presiding], not in so many heads...

^A but only in two, did the citizens of the Queen of cities (Constantinople) find fault: of which, one pertains to theology, namely that he said, "The Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son"; the other pertains to the divine incarnation, namely that he wrote, "The Lord was, as man, free from original sin."

For the first, they brought forward the consonant testimonies of the Latin Fathers; and furthermore, also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the sacred work composed by him on the holy evangelist John. From these, they demonstrated that they do not make the Son the cause and author of the Spirit. For they acknowledge one cause of the Son and of the Spirit, the Father—the one by way of generation, the other by way of procession; but [they did this] so that they might signify that He proceeds through Him, and by this [argument] demonstrate the union of substance and an unvarying likeness.

Concerning the second point, they are in need of no defense at all. For what reason is there to doubt in this matter, even if it seems so to those who seek occasions [for strife] because of their own perversity? Nevertheless, they did offer satisfaction, saying: "That He had neither the sin that is in the mind, by which Adam seems to have primarily struggled, nor the act and operation of evil which proceeds from it through the body."

And these things, then, are [from] those in whose name they had been called into account with no just reason. But those others, concerning whom they are very justly blamed, have until now made no apology, since they have not even cast out the expressions introduced by them. I asked the Romans, in accordance with your command, that in order to avoid the deceits and guiles creeping in from the burrows, they should themselves render and interpret their own [documents]. But since it is their custom to do and write in that manner, I do not know if they will perhaps comply. There is, furthermore, another reason, which is that they cannot exactly express their mind in another language and idiom, just as they do in their own native one; as we also do in our own. Yet they themselves were entirely concerned with the matter, having learned by experience what damage and injury comes from it. ^C

The book of Theodore of Pharan, the leader of the Monothelites, author of the gnomic operation in Christ, examined.

I have read the book of Theodore, bishop of Pharan, concerning substance (or essence) and nature, and concerning hypostasis and person, and the remaining chapters: and perhaps they are not altogether devoid of utility under the guise of an introduction. But in the matters which he teaches regarding person and hypostasis, he seems to agree not so much with the rules of these, as with himself, calling the operation "hypostatic"—whom those of the opposing opinion also bring forward as a teacher and patron of their own view; having nearly shaped and dictated the whole Ecthesis (or formula of faith) which they issued from his words. For in this manner he overshadowed and darkened the argument, ^D having granted to the person, as a person, the operation that characterizes the nature; not the "how" and "what kind" of the...

the manner of its emergence; according to which the difference of the agents and of those things that are done is known, whether they are according to nature or contrary to nature. For as something operates primarily, yet not as each one of us operates—that is, as man—but as a specific individual, as Paul or Peter, shapes the manner of his operation, by concession perhaps or by increase, being molded by himself according to his own judgment. Whence, in the manner, the distinction of the persons is known according to the action; but in the reason, the unchangeableness of the natural operation. For one is not more, and another less, operative or rational; but we all alike possess both the reason and its operation according to nature. But as to more or less, and thus or otherwise, one is just or unjust, because one follows the reasons of nature more, while the other shrinks from them and refuses to follow them. ^B Diligent care must be taken regarding those who have wandered in any way. For they do violence and somehow drag the boundaries of things, and the canons, to what they think, as if changing them by command, in order that they might establish their own, supposedly from a perversion.

The quaternions that were sent, although I did not go through them carefully—I mean those concerning the soul and the remaining chapters—I shall indicate what I think about them. For the speed of those who were departing did not allow me the opportunity to read them through; for after many days from the time one had come to Byzacium, it came to my own insignificance at Carthage. ^C Furthermore, the weakness of the eyes, which I suffer from—so to speak—stood in the way; because I had the intention of fulfilling your command concerning these as quickly as possible, I sent them. The arrangement decided upon for the sake of the transcription of the book, which you, most holy ones, had for the sake of the interpretation of the evangelist John, appeared to me also, your servant, to be very generous; and it was pleasing, so that there might be no pretext for insulting and attacking the author of the exposition, among those who, out of caprice, attempt to scrutinize and investigate everything not well.

OF THE SAME. From his letter written at Rome.

as is the case everywhere with the Churches of the Christians, ^B they obtained and possess precisely the greatest such foundation; inasmuch as it is not at all being overcome, according to the same promise of the Savior, by the gates of hell, but rather possesses the keys of the orthodox faith and confession in Him; and it opens to those who approach with piety the true and only piety by nature; while it locks and obstructs every heretical mouth that speaks injustice against the heights. For indeed, those things which the Creator and Master of all Himself, our Lord Jesus Christ, and His disciples and apostles, and the succeeding holy Fathers and teachers and martyrs, who sacrificed themselves through their own works and words, struggles and labors, and sweats and blood, and finally through extraordinary deaths for the sake of our own Catholic and Apostolic Church, which believes in Him, founded and built up, these men strive to tear down with two words, without labor and without toil—oh, the long-suffering and forbearance of God!—and to invalidate the great and most luminous and most hymned mystery of the Christians' orthodox religion. ^C

But it is not pleasing to you to follow the great Maximus who defends the Romans, in those matters where even then they said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; and who teaches that there is no difference between saying "from the Father through the Son" and "from both," by which the letter ^D [introduces...] "from the Son" proceeds. From which they do not make the Son the cause of the Spirit—as they appeared to themselves [to do] from their own words and manner of profession.

NOTICE

Maximus' passage from the letter to Marinus, concerning the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son in the synodicals of Martin I, by which the Constantinopolitans were offended, and which Maximus himself explained, so that the Latins might understand not two causes, but one path—the Father—is doubted by some, even Catholics, as to whether it is Maximus'. And I fear that Leo Allatius may be too liberal in his *Vindiciae of the Ephesine Synod of Cyril* on this matter, cap. 72, when he states that most people doubt it. Anastasius in the *Collectanea* recorded it as a matter of certain faith, and judged it to have weight in the matter of the faith and the Church. At the Council of Lyons under Pope Gregory X, I know not who doubted it: not Beccus, nor George Metochites, etc. At the Council of Florence, by that distinction and opinion of Maximus, the peace of the Churches was reconciled: not Dometius and other Catholics from among the schismatics, [but] Palamas, Mark of Ephesus, etc. The most ancient books have preserved it, in which that more ancient Roman codex is seen, of the synod, from which it was copied in the reign of the Emperor Michael Duca Angelus Comnenus. Those who doubt it, I consider to be little versed in the reading of Maximus, nor do I think there exists any of his letters or dogmatic tomes in which the character of his style shines more clearly, especially in those things which he uses as a preface, just as in other dogmatic epistles to the same Marinus, and to other holy men, of a different subject matter. Nor does the expression of Maximus so abhor from the true and Catholic sense that his testimony should be so easily abandoned by a Catholic man. The Father is the one cause absolutely, or the author: nor is the Son the author, except because [he is] from the Father, and as it were his virtue, with whom [he constitutes] one cause, and principle from a principle: which the Greeks more willingly express by the particle "per" [through], so that they may signify order, and so that they may preserve 485 for the Father the "procatarctic" [pre-conditional], by reason of the primary and original cause (from himself, that is). Therefore Maximus did a work worth doing, who, both while alive and after life, reconciled the voices of the Doctors and Ecclesiastical men that were dissenting in appearance to the same sense, just as Athanasius once did in almost the same subject matter (namely, concerning theology).

John Veccus excellently explains the passage of Maximus in that very sense, *Orat. 2*, t. II of *Graecia Orthodoxa*, p. 63 and 64, where, having omitted the more extensive explanation, which he prefers to devote to Damascene, whose cause is more difficult, and in which the adversaries more glory, he writes shortly about Maximus: ...where Leo Allatius [asks]: Would it not have been pleasing to you to follow the great Maximus, who took up the patronage of the Romans, who at that time affirmed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and who taught that "from the Father through the Son" and "from both" differ in nothing: by which, in that epistle, "proceeding from the Son" is assumed into "proceeding through the Son." Allatius omitted the particle "and," which is not in itself useless, by which it is signified that this is argued for ancient tradition, since by no schism of the Churches was the Roman Church teaching thus, nor was it unknown to the Greek. And George Metochites discusses this argument excellently in his five books on the procession of the Holy Spirit, which were sent to Leo Allatius himself, so that he might contribute them to the third volume of his *Graecia Orthodoxa*; and so, having been sent, they perished both for me and for the ecclesiastical cause. I would render the final words thus: "For that reason, because the epistle openly explains 'proceeding from the Son,' so that it is the same as 'proceeding through the Son.'" Indeed, he sets forth the same thing at length to Constantine, l. iv, p. and following, where he most excellently—as though studious of the holy Maximus for both parties—had joined those words softly, so that he might draw them to assent and settle the quarrel; he demonstrated that they did not make the Son a cause of the Spirit—such as they seemed to themselves to have, from their own words and manner of professing—the primary one, that is, and such as is the Father: which itself had happened to them from contention, and because the Latins had pressed them on account of the Monothelite heresy; as Veccus himself says very well, p. 47, saying that he had discovered [this] from Maximus' epistle; and anyone may easily notice: nor otherwise in Photius and Cerularius, thus turning private hatreds into a cause of faith. In the excerpt from the letter which the aforementioned Royal Codex says was written at Rome, another, Roman, which alone has it, joins it with the letter to Marinus, as if it were a part of it: "and after other things," how not at Rome,

but was written in Byzacium in Africa. But did an unskilled scribe guess "Byzantium" for himself instead of "Byzacium," so that he imagined the same letter was written in the same place? Anastasius, who neither damaged nor lacked it, would never have omitted such an illustrious testimony and eulogy of the Roman faith and Church, and the privilege of Peter. However, nothing is inconsistent with the other writings of Maximus, in which he incidentally praises the Romans and their firmness in the faith: nowhere failing to place the primacy of faith and the stronghold of ecclesiastical communion in the Roman Pontiff, from whom even absolution from heresy must be obtained, and by whose judgment matters of faith must be settled.

It might cause concern that he enumerates six synods, when the sixth synod was celebrated after Maximus had already died. I think that by the sixth he meant the Roman and Lateran synod under Pope Martin I, which, because of its fame, could be numbered among the five general synods by Maximus; for it was truly confessed by Catholics as the supreme judgment against the hydra, having been attended and communicated in by all that was orthodox, while the other sees throughout the East, except for the Jerusalem see, were infected with the Monothelite heresy, in which, indeed, it had been condemned by the authority of Sophronius, and also by John IV at Rome, yet not with that pomp and celebration with which it was done by Martin from the Lateran council, with Maximus himself as its instigator, whose most illustrious acts exist, in which everything was ventilated, and the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers were brought forward, by which the Catholic truth was most clearly established, and whatever belonged to the Monothelite dregs was withered, with their heads also being named and proscribed: so that they already seemed to be one standard of Christianity, in the one holy catholic [Church], by which they had gained for true believers throughout the East such a longing for themselves, as much as Theodosius, a presbyter of Gangra, testifies in his *Hypomnesticon*. But the letter of Maximus to the illustrious Peter, which Anastasius preserved for us excerpted in his *Collectanea*, and which we lack in Greek, should not be delayed further; since other dogmatic letters of his to the same man exist, which I present in the following [pages].

EXCERPT 74 FROM A LETTER OF THE SAME SAINT MAXIMUS, WRITTEN TO PETER THE ILLUSTRIOUS

Where he mentions Pyrrhus and the holy Sophronius, bishop of Jerusalem, and Pope Honorius: thus he proceeds after some things:

You have deigned to signify in your praiseworthy letter to your unworthy servant concerning Abbot Pyrrhus. And after a little: And [it] will certainly be [the case] that perhaps for this cause, for the refutation of him, and of all who indifferently follow the impious novelty according to him, I might hasten to your divinely-kept and most famous footsteps, so that all who are lovers of piety according to you might know the utter ignorance of these men, and also the superfluous abundance of [their] impiety. But I feared lest I be thought to do anything outside the sacred laws, doing this beyond the will of those men of the apostolic see, who well lead the whole plenitude of the Catholic Church, and order it according to the divine law. For these divine laws, namely, sustain the celestial and the terrestrial, and it is necessary not to deviate from them at all; but those who have proposed to live holily according to you must perform the divine things according to God; ^A so that they may also have God as the administrator of their deeds and their reception without failure. For, most famous lord, what is worse than these things, as I indicated before, is the new faith and exposition (*Ekthesis*) [even from the ancient heretics]. For he ^B—whose predecessor indeed impiously nurtured it in the womb, and this one has begotten it still more impiously, and again the later ones cultivate them into contempt of the divinity—has often known how to endure with long-suffering for the manifestation of his reprobate mind (for God also knows how to endure long-suffering for the exposure of wickedness: not that he should let this one remain longer through the interval, but that he might more justly punish this one, having become greater) ^C, they write "innocent" [for] "guilty." For Sophronius, who prudently taught and preached the dogmas of the Catholic Church, [was said] to have moved himself into error here and there. And after a little: For the divine Sophronius, as you yourselves testify, most praiseworthy one, spent time in the region of the Africans with me and with all the wandering monks, while they themselves were fabricating those perversities against all. And after a little: And indeed the house of all was, through divine concord and unanimity, in one grace of God favoring in the universe, which consists under the sun, peaceful and tranquil with the Churches fortified by faith. But those who envied this harmony, and the confession of Christ God, [brought about] like some cloudy mist, and a strident or heavy wave of the sea and of barbarians, with no one moving them except the demon who is a friend of contention, who stirred up the human race to discord, suddenly devised the *Ekthesis* against the true faith of Christians; then sentences for it, and crude compositions; then the actions of the monuments; then the robber synods and the mustering of bishops, not those who were truly gathering, but those contracted by violence; not those hastening by exhortation, but those departing from the flight of the Barbarians; then commands and threats sent here and there against the pious. For they were reducing him who was then ruling into servitude by sophistical gifts.

And after a little. They persuaded him to produce the *Ekthesis* in his own name. Shortly after. And he becomes the enemy and defender of these men equally; or rather one should assert [he was] the encourager and accuser, publishing the argument of these men: and it becoming known that he himself was not moved by himself, but forced by them, he made the most impious *Ekthesis*, these things in his writings on his own behalf

^A saying, and rendering an account to John of holy memory, the Pope of Elder Rome. And after a little. But they convict themselves, that these men very manifestly did this, and he himself by no means. For he had no interest in this matter, being carried away to other things.

Post brevia. Concerning all of which, the wretches, they neither became aware of the Apostolic See; and what is laughable, nay rather, that we may speak more properly, most worthy of lamentation, as being a demonstration of their audacity, they were not ashamed to lie recklessly against the Apostolic See itself: but, as if having become of its counsel, and as if by some decree received from it, they accepted the great Honorius to be with them in the actions taken for the sake of the impious Ecthesis, making a display of their own presumption to others, men of the greatest eminence in the cause of piety. Who, then, O most famous one, and of what sort, persuaded Sophronius to do these things so atrociously and for so long a time to these liars? What Church did he not beseech? What pious and orthodox bishop did not supplicate them, crying out and protesting that they should cease from their own heresy? For even as the holy Arcadius was breathing his last and surrendering his spirit to God, he did not cease to beseech them even until that hour.

Et post pauca. But what of the divine Honorius; and what indeed after him of Severinus the elder: and what finally of him who stood forth after him, the holy John? Moreover, did the most blessed Pope who now presides omit anything suitable for supplication? Did not the whole East and West provide tears, lamentations, adjurations, and deprecations equally, as much to God through prayers as to these through letters? But God indeed truly admitted the faith of these blessed men, and kept the compensation for it for the ages. But they, disdaining the Lord’s respite, gently exhorting them to conversion, and being sluggish in supplication for such a long time regarding the deeds of these noble men, in no wise suffered the heavenly faith to be preferred.

Post aliqua. The divine and great Sophronius, therefore, then coming to Alexandria, immediately from the first reading (for Cyrus had given to him also those nine chapters of impiety to retract) shouted something mournful and huge, shedding fountains of tears, fervently beseeching him, supplicating, remonstrating, casting himself down at his feet on the pavement, that he might proclaim none of these things from the ambo against the catholic Church of God: since these were clearly the dogmas of the impious Apollinarius. ^B And a little after. In such a way, O head to me more reverend than all, did they lacerate him with insults hateful to God and in turn with, as it were, stage illusions, and most miserably did they lament for the most holy Sophronius, as one who, like some second Jeremiah, was weeping for the catholic Church, and such a great fall of divine things… ^C And after some things. For if the Roman See does not only not disregard the rejected Pyrrhus, but also is not ignorant of him who thinks evilly and believes evilly, it is certainly manifest that everyone who anathematizes those who have rejected Pyrrhus, anathematizes the Roman See, that is, the catholic Church. For I omit to say that he who is such, even if he communicates only with the Roman See, and with the catholic Church of God, surely he also communicates with himself. I beseech therefore, my blessed master, to command all not to name the most holy or "Almific" Pyrrhus. For the sacred rule does not permit such a one to be called by any name. For he has fallen from all sanctity who, with no doubt, leaped away of his own accord from the catholic Church. For it is not right for him to be called by any praise, who has been long ago condemned and cast out by the apostolic see of the Roman city, because of the sense of external opinion, until he is received by it, having been converted to it; indeed, to our Lord God through pious confession and orthodox faith, by which he may receive sanctification and a holy appellation. Therefore, if he wishes not to be a heretic, nor to be heard as one, let him not satisfy this person or that; for this is superfluous and irrational: because as through one being scandalized against him all were scandalized; so also through one satisfying him, all without doubt are satisfied. Let him hasten to satisfy the Roman See for all. For this being satisfied, all everywhere will commonly proclaim him pious and orthodox. For he speaks in vain only to those who think the similar ones should be persuaded, and does not satisfy and implore the most blessed Pope of the Roman Church, that is, the apostolic see, which, from the incarnate Word of God himself, but also by all the holy synods, according to the sacred canons and definitions, has received and has the empire, authority, and power of binding and loosing in all things and through all things over all the holy Churches ^D of God which are in the whole world. For with this [See] the Word, who rules over the celestial virtues, also binds and looses in heaven. For if he leads others to be satisfied, and does not implore the most blessed Roman Pope, he does something similar to one who is perhaps accused of homicide or some other crime, and hastens to show himself innocent not to him who has obtained the rights of judging according to the laws: but only uselessly and without profit to others and private men, he strives to show the cleanliness of his own acts, which have no power to release him from the crime.

Wherefore, my blessed master, still further extend your command, which is seen to have been good to you and according to the pleasure of God, so that no one may have license to speak anything or to debate for the sake of dogma. But learn clearly his will by investigating it more abundantly, if he is willing to agree.

OF SAINT MAXIMUS: ON THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST

1. Arius confesses three hypostases, yet he denies the Monad, nor does he say that the holy Trinity is consubstantial. Sabellius, however, confesses the Monad, but denies the Trinity; for he says that the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit are the same. But the Church of God confesses both the Monad and proclaims the Trinity. Macedonius teaches similarly to Arius; for he posits the holy Spirit as a creature. But the Church proclaims the holy Spirit to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and how he affirms Him to be God ^A. Likewise, also regarding the one of the holy Trinity, Nestorius speaks of a difference in nature, but he does not confess the union, for he does not say that it came to be according to hypostasis. Eutyches, however, confesses the union but denies the difference according to essence, and introduces a mingling of the natures. The Church, however, preaches both the union according to hypostasis, because of the indivisibility, and the difference according to essence, because of the non-mingling.

2. How does the supreme union possess both identity and difference? Identity of essences and difference of persons, and the reverse. For example, in the case of the holy Trinity, there is identity of essence, but difference of persons; for we confess one essence, but three hypostases. But in the case of man, there is identity of person, but difference of essences; for while there is one man, the soul is of one essence, and the flesh is of another. Similarly, also in the case of the Master Christ, there is—indeed—identity of person, but difference of essences; for while there is one person, that is to say, one hypostasis, there is ^B of a different essence...

NOTES

(d) (e) *And how He affirms Himself to be God.* Our codex has this not as an enclitic. Whoever wishes it to be said thus, and as if with a certain admiration, I would not myself say anything against it. Thus, truly, what follows immediately in the second number repeats this admiration; it asks what Turrianus asks by way of interrogation: "How does the supreme union have both that which is the same and that which is different?" Maximus does not ask this, but expresses wonder, in divine matters just as clearly as in created ones: except that, in divine matters, "different" and "difference"—which Turrianus so readily employs—are not sufficiently apt for that which is "distinct" and "distinction"; rather [it should be] "another," or "other," or "differing" and "difference"; because, clearly, "different" seems to introduce division; and thus Ambrose and Calepinus render "different" as "separated," from which comes that of Caesar in *African War*: "When they had seen the Numidians scattered and fleeing in all directions"; and likewise Plautus in *Rudens*: "Thence they each went their own different ways." Let the more rigorous theologians say, if it were permitted, "otherness"; just as also "something else" is said of persons, and "something else" in divine matters, although it is strictly in respect of two, or even more. To those words of our Hilarian codex, I add what is necessary so that the sense may be full: "For the matter stands one way in God, and another way in Christ and in us, and in an opposite manner"; and both these, Maximus set out to explain, since in both cases there is a supreme union, the one being essential or of nature, the other personal or of subsistence.

^A

For just as it is impossible to confess the union of the holy Trinity without proclaiming the distinction, so it is absolutely necessary to preach both the union and the distinction in the one of the holy Trinity.

3. For just as in the holy Trinity the union and the distinction are not signified by the same terms — but the distinction is signified by saying "three hypostases," while the union is confessed by acknowledging "one essence"—so too in the One of the holy Trinity, the distinction is signified by knowing the two natures, while ^B the union is confessed by proclaiming one composite hypostasis and person.

4. For just as we anathematize Arius, not because he proclaims the distinction according to hypostasis in the holy Trinity, but because he does not speak of the natural union; so too we anathematize Nestorius, not as one who acknowledges the natural distinction in Christ, but as one who does not speak of the union according to hypostasis.

5. Just as we anathematize Sabellius, not as one who proclaims the union in the holy Trinity, but as one who does not speak of the union which is according to hypostasis; so too we anathematize Eutyches, not as one who does not speak of the union according to hypostasis in Christ, but as one who does not acknowledge the natural distinction.

6. The distinction according to hypostasis in the holy Trinity, and the natural distinction in the One of the holy Trinity, are not to be spoken of in the sense, but understood with the eyes of the mind. And for what reason, I ask, do you indeed set forth three hypostases or persons in the holy Trinity because of the distinction according to hypostasis, but in the One of the holy Trinity you do not set forth two natures in one hypostasis and person because of the natural distinction? ^C

7. Just as because of the consubstantiality of the holy Trinity you say one essence, and because of the difference of subsistence you say three hypostases; so because of the difference of essence of the Word and the flesh, say two natures, and because that which is not of the proper hypostasis and subsistence of each, say one hypostasis or person.

8. Because we speak of one essence in the holy Trinity, we do not confuse the persons, nor do we destroy the one essence by speaking of three persons and hypostases; so in the One of the holy Trinity... ^D

^A we speak of the one hypostasis, not in the confusion of his two natures, nor do we divide the two natures in the partition of the one hypostasis.

9. He who does not speak of the union according to hypostasis in Christ on account of the difference of his natures is a Nestorian; and he who does not speak of the natural distinction in the union according to hypostasis is a Eutychian; but he who proclaims both the union according to hypostasis and the natural distinction in the One of the holy Trinity holds the royal and blameless faith.

10. Therefore, he who speaks of both difference and union in Christ neither destroys the difference nor confuses the union. For the divine Cyril anathematizes those who, on account of the difference, destroy the union which is according to hypostasis; and the ecumenical synod anathematizes those who, on account of the union which is according to hypostasis, destroy the natural distinction in the One of the holy Trinity. ^B

OF MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR. Various Definitions.

Substance and nature are the same; for both are common and universal, as being predicated of many things that differ in number, and nowhere are they circumscribed by a single person.

Enypostaton (that is to say, as if one were to say existing in hypostasis) is that which is common according to substance; that is, the species, which subsists really in the individuals that are under it, and is not considered by mere thought.

Otherwise, ^C or again, enypostaton is that which comes into composition with another thing distinct according to substance for the establishing of one person and the generation of one hypostasis, and subsists together, and is in no way known by itself.

Homoousion, that is to say, consubstantial, is what is of the same substance with another, but differs from it by that distinction which is according to hypostasis; as is the case in man and the other species. If, therefore, anything is the same as another according to substance, it is not also the same as it according to hypostasis; and if anything is one and united with another according to substance, it is not necessarily one and united with the same also according to hypostasis; and if anything has a difference from another according to hypostasis, ^D this has a union with the same according to substance.

Substantial union, therefore, is that which draws together many hypostases, distinct in number, into one and the same substance or essence. Substantial distinction, however, is the principle by which the substance, or nature, remains without any diminution of itself, immutable, and at the same time unconfused and unmixed; and while converging with another—that which is of a different species—to form one hypostasis, it in no way departs from its own nature according to nature.

^A Hypostasis and person are the same: for both are particular and proper, in that they are circumscribed in themselves, and are not predicated by nature of many.

“Enousion” (having essence) is that which is considered not only as having in itself the collection of properties, by which one thing is recognized from another; but that which also has truly acquired the common attribute of essence.

“Omopostaton” (consubstantial or co-hypostatic) is that which is joined with another into one and the same hypostasis, while being different from it according to essence; as is the case regarding soul and body, and all other things which, differing by the distinctness of nature, are known according to hypostasis. If, therefore, anything joined to another by union is the same according to hypostasis—that is to say, has become one hypostasis with it—it is something different from the same [thing] according to essence. And if anything that is united to another happens to be so according to hypostasis, this is not one, nor is it of the same genus as that [first thing] according to essence. And if anything joined to another preserves a distinction according to essence, this has union with it according to hypostasis.

Hypostatic union, therefore, is that which drives and binds together diverse substances, or natures, into one person and one and the ^B same hypostasis.

Hypostatic distinction is the principle by which the diversity of the collection of properties—which is considered in the commonality of the substance—cutting [things] off from one another by number, creates the multitude and plurality of individuals.

“Relative” (if you speak of it as being posited in affection) union is that which drives diverse minds and opinions into one will.

Relative distinction is the motion that cuts the one will by the diversity of minds and opinions.

Relative union is a friendly coexistence, or else a concordant conspiracy and assent of wills.

Relative distinction is a diversity of opinion, or a dissimilarity of wills, or a division of disposition.

Confusional union (that is, confounding) is that which, from persons or things that truly exist, creates a composition such that they concur into some whole, which, after the union, does not at all possess the existence of its own individual parts in species and form; but, having been abolished, mixed, ^C and obscured together, it keeps absolutely no distinction of those things which have concurred in it, by which their substantial property might be signaled and become known.

Division is that which completely cuts the substance of each thing, setting it apart and separating it, and causing it to be considered by itself, both as regards essence and as regards hypostasis, namely, the existence of each thing.

It is the proper characteristic of hypostasis to be considered by itself and to be distinguished in number from those that are of the same genus.

It is the proper characteristic of the “enypostaton” (that which has an existence in another) either as [being joined] to another different [thing] according to... ^D

^A an indissoluble union; or as it exists naturally in individuals for the purpose of subsistence.

It is the property of substance, or essence, that it is predicated and appears naturally in all things and of all things. It is the property of the “enousion” (that which has essence) that it exists in reality, and bears upon itself the true characters of all personal properties.

Virtue is either potential and faculty, or operation in matter. Operation is virtue, or power and faculty, without matter. Or again, operation, or action, is the effect of natural virtue and faculty.

Natural will is the natural appetite for those things which constitute and make up nature. Will according to opinion, and arbitrary, is the free impulse and motion of the mind toward either alternative.

Difference, or distinction, is the reason by which the diversity of things signified is preserved among themselves, and which declares the mode of that which has being.

Identity is total similarity without any variation, by which the reason of that which is signified is entirely unique, known by no mode of distinction or difference.

Other Treatises, equally theological and polemical, follow, inscribed by the indulgence of our Most Holy Lord Pope Alexander VII from the Vatican and the Most Eminent Cardinal Francesco Barberini’s Roman codices. First copied and revised by Lucas Holstenius, then by Leo Allatius—of blessed memory—with the assistance of the Most Eminent Cardinal Piccolomini and Rev. Joannes Baptista de Marinis, Master General of the Order of Preachers.

A spiritual and dogmatic tome, demonstrating how the Emperor Heraclius, ^B at the suggestion of Sergius, the prelate of Constantinople, published the Ecthesis (that is, a formula of faith so called), which is suborned and far dissonant ^C from the sacred Oracles and the Fathers; but consonant with the unholy heretics, both those who confuse and those who...

divide the mystery of Christ our God, in the monstrous manner of their discourse. The letter was sent from Rome to the most holy Stephen, Bishop of Dora, who is subject to the holy and apostolic See of the holy city of Christ our God. ^A

The Lord likened the present life to a mill, and its activity to the motion thereof, and the rest to a bed; and He decreed ^B that of those engaged in both (I mean the mill and the bed), one should be taken and the other left. He who is "taken," let us suppose, is he who has been freed—the former through contemplation, the latter through action—and who has remained without being inwardly attached, according to his disposition, either to the circumscription of spatial intervals, in which the motion of visible things is seen, or to the decay of the passions, in which the "rest" consists. But he is "left" who of his own accord is entangled in these things, because of the pleasure-loving and wandering nature of the soul.

But why, O radiant and most excellent men, should you have deemed me—your servant, who was previously bound by the very danger ^C of which you now speak, as we have learned by report today—why should you have chosen, in the manner you have written, to descend with such compassion toward the needy and the poor, being yourselves so far lifted up from the earth by the grace of God and exalted, so that you have lifted up your life to the Word, and your mind to the Lord of things here below and of things above? Are you rendering and rendering back the image to the Archetype? Or, to speak more truly, wishing to make a demonstration of your height by the voluntary ^D lowering of your supreme beauty, so that you might thereby lead us also to the measure of the super-infinite God the Word, who in His emptying toward us displayed the indescribable height of His own majesty? For this reason, He desired to transform us all the more, in that He fashioned Himself for our sake toward the humbler [state], becoming by nature man without change or confusion, He who is excellently merciful and humane; having left nothing of what was ours unassumed, lest grace should be wanting to Him, or salvation to us; which He could not have bestowed upon the whole nature, had He not assumed the whole; but [as it is], He would have made it of a worse lot, in so far as He had not assumed it all. For as the great Gregory says, "That which is not assumed is not healed." For how could God the Word, who is far above all essence, becoming incarnate for our sake from the Holy Spirit and the ever-virgin Mary, the Theotokos, by assuming flesh possessed of a soul—both intelligent and rational—and having become by nature a new man, renew the old, if He had not assumed him wholly and entirely, saved only for sin alone—that [source] from which the aging [of our nature] arose, and on account of which death was condemned by nature, having as its food that by which we have been filled, having partaken bitterly of the tree of transgression? And how could He who emptied Himself raise up the one who had fallen, if He had not united the whole, in its entirety, from that very first conception, into Himself according to hypostasis, save only for the slip alone, from which the shattering [followed]?

And why, on that account, the penalty? For this reason ^A He assumed a soulful and rational mind along with the body connatural to it—that is, a perfect man—free from every blemish, and united it to Himself according to hypostasis, He Himself being God above nature; and having taken its natural aspect, He possessed in all things a self-determining will. If, having transgressed the commandment by a will (though not without a will), we transgressed, we stood in need of the healing pertaining to such a will; by the assumption of the like, the Like—God Himself having become flesh—heals it. And had He not also taken up its rational and vital operation, by which—as I pray had never happened—we both conceived and performed sin, we would have stood in need of the salvation pertaining to it, which by the assumption of all defilement cleanses it, and by His incarnation deifies our entire nature. ^B For if God, being the Word, created this nature possessing these things substantially—I mean both the will and the operation—and set forth the one as self-determining and the other as operative, it is manifest that, having thus taken the nature and united it to Himself according to hypostasis, He created it from the beginning—that is, naturally volitional and operative. For if He did not take up the nature itself, but only its suffering or merely its inborn powers, then He did not assume the nature, but merely displayed a phantom of the economy. For it is impossible for our nature, or that of any other existing thing, to be or even be called a nature, apart from its inborn powers, by which everything is naturally characterized. ^C Whence our nature is not unwilled, since neither is that of a man. Nor yet inoperative, since neither is it inanimate. But if it were unwilled and inoperative—in regard to what concerns us, as it has seemed to some heretics of former times and even now—then He who is above us did not become truly man according to us, not confirming what is ours by our own characteristics, and by which He Himself from the beginning, having created it, characterized man, making him self-determining and operative by nature. And yet the arrangement of the holy Gospels confirms beyond ^D gainsaying that He assumed the power of both these things, through which He introduces for our sake the super-substantial Word as willing and working: on one hand, by crying out, “And about the fourth watch of the night He comes to them, walking upon the sea, and He wished to pass them by”; and on the other, “And having risen from there into the regions of Tyre and Sidon, and having entered into a house, He wished no one to know, and He could not be hidden”; and again, “Having departed from there, they were passing through Galilee, and He did not wish that anyone should know”; and, “On the morrow He wished to go into Galilee.” And after these things again: “Jesus was walking in Galilee, for He did not wish to walk in Judæa, because the Jews were seeking to kill Him”; and, “Where do You wish that we should prepare for You to eat the Passover?” and what follows.

They gave Him vinegar mixed with gall, and when He had tasted it, He did not wish to drink. For these things, namely: “He wished to pass by them,” and, “He wished to go out,” and, “He did not wish to walk,” and, “to wish to eat the Passover,” and, “not to wish to drink the vinegar,” confirm to us His human will and energy, similar to ours. For instance, to wish or not to wish to pass by, or to eat, or to walk, or to drink is clearly a volition, through which He was recognized as being by nature volitional. But by tasting and eating, and going out, and moving transitionally and walking, He showed Himself to be active in energy, according to that which He later became human for us by nature, but not according to that which He existed without beginning as God by nature for Himself. For it is not natural for the Word, who was God and by nature the Son of God, to wish or eat anything corporally, or to be circumscribed locally by translational movements, being everywhere and infinitely surpassing everything at all times. ^B And even so, the Scripture clearly teaches that He is endowed superessentially with the divine and paternal will and energy: “As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom He wishes.” Here, too, therefore, the wish to give life to the dead testifies to His divine will; but the very act of giving life reveals His energy as the maker of all things. And simply, if there is anything else of this kind, it depends upon the nature that is preeminent over all things and hidden from them, for the manifestation of that nature, as far as it is possible.

For indeed, the Word Himself, through His own disciples, shows Himself to possess the faculty of the nature of the will and the power of operating for our salvation, according to both natures, from which and in which He consists. But those who came after them, their successors and the narrators of the divine appearing of the Word in the flesh, the approved Fathers of the Catholic Church, preaching both His natures alike—the divine and the human—and not only this, but also His will and energy, speak of these things with a great proclamation of voice. ^C Indeed, he who has his name from immortality, in his book *On the Incarnation and the Trinity*: “And when He says, ‘Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will but Thine be done’; and again: ‘The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak,’ He reveals two wills here; the human, for the weakness of the flesh, shrinks from the passion, but His divine will is willing.” But Gregory, who has his name from Theology, in his discourse ^D

^A on the second word about the Son, says: “Let the seventh text be mentioned: *The Son has descended from heaven, not that he might do his own will, but that of him who sent him.* If, indeed, this discourse were not said concerning Him who came down, we would say that the statement was fashioned as if about a man, and not one understood according to the Savior. For His will is not opposed to God in any way, nor is it entirely divine alone, but it is one that accords with us; since the human will does not altogether follow the divine, but for the most part resists and struggles against it.” And he who is namesake to this, who became the teacher of the Nyssenes—or rather, the doctor of the entire world—says in his discourse on Pascha: “The leper approached, his body already liquefied and putrid.” How is the healing wrought upon him by the Lord? “The soul wills, the body touches; by both the disease flees.” For he says, “the leprosy departed from him immediately.” ^B And again the same writer in the same discourse: “Again, when many thousands of men were following him in the desert, and he was steadfastly lingering with them, not wishing to dismiss them fasting, he breaks the loaves with his hands.” Do you see how the divinity, joined to either part, is declared through both, while it acts through the body, and the affection of the will is elicited by the soul? And in the second book composed against the impious Eunomius: “In what way did the Lord, reconciling the world to Himself, divide the benefit He bestowed upon men between soul and body, willing through the soul, but touching through the body?” And again the same writer says in his writings against Apollinarius: “Since, therefore, the human will is one thing, and the divine another, He speaks as if from the person of man that which is suitable to the weakness of nature, He who made our sufferings His own. But He adds the second voice—that sublime will which is of God’s majesty—wishing the divine will to be confirmed over the human for the salvation of the world. For by saying, *Not my will*, ^C He signaled the human by the word; but by adding, *But thine*, He showed the connection of His own divinity with the Father, of which there is no difference of will, because the nature also is the same.” And the divine John, who adorned the throne of the Imperial City, in the discourse entitled, *Against those who were absent from the assembly, and that the Son is consubstantial with the Father*, whose beginning is, *Again the horse-races, and again the gathering to us is lessened*

Do you see how he also foretold his former age? Ask the heretic, then: Does God feel fear and shrink back? And is He hesitant and sorrowful? And if he says, "Yes," then stand aside, and place him down below with the devil, or rather even lower than him, for not even he would dare to say this. But if he says that none of these things is worthy of God, say to him: "Therefore, God does not pray either." For aside from these things, another absurdity would arise if these were the words of God. For these words do not signify only agony, but two wills—one of the Son, and one of the Father—contrary to each other. For the saying, *Not as I will, but as you*, indicates this. But not even they ^B would ever admit this; rather, while we are always saying that verse, *I and the Father are one*, with respect to power, they say that it is spoken with respect to will, saying that the Father and the Son have a single will. If, therefore, there is one will of the Father and the Son, how does he say here, *Nevertheless, not as I will, but as you*? For if this is said of the Divinity, a certain contradiction arises, and many absurdities are born from this. But if it is regarding the flesh, what is said is reasonable, and there is no cause for reproach. For the flesh's not wishing to die is not a fault; for this is of nature. For He Himself demonstrates all things that are of nature, without sin, and with great abundance, so as to shut the mouths of the heretics. When, therefore, he says, *If it is possible, let this cup pass from me*, and, *Not as I will, but as you*, he shows nothing other than that he has truly been clothed in flesh which fears death: for it is the property of that to fear and shrink from death, and to be anxious at the dread of it. Now he leaves it desolate and stripped of its own power and inspiration, so that by showing its weakness, he might also establish its nature; and now he conceals it, so that you might learn that he was not a mere man. For just as if he had always shown human things, he would have been believed to be such; so if he had always performed the things of the Divinity, the account of the dispensation would not have been believed. For this reason he varies and mixes both words and deeds, so as not to give occasion for the disease and madness of Paul of Samosata, nor that of Marcion and Manes. Because of this, he both predicts the future as God, and again shrinks back as man. ^C But let us clearly listen to what the teacher of the Church of Alexandria, Cyril, teaches in the twenty-fourth chapter of the *Thesaurus*: "When, therefore, he is seen fearing death, and saying, *If it is possible, let this cup pass from me*, consider again how the flesh, which was anxious at the fear of death, is taught, because God is carrying it, no longer to yield to that affection." For he said to the Father: *Not as I will, but as you*. For he does not say this ^D inasmuch as he is the Word and God [he was taught, while being carried by the Word of God, no longer to suffer this].

eager to bring the dispensation (the business, that is, of human salvation) to its end. For this is the Father’s will. Yet he also possesses the "not willing to die," because the flesh naturally flees from death. ^A And he, commenting on the great evangelist John, says: “Christ himself held this discourse, teaching that for him it was a matter of mind to die for all, because it was thus advised by the divine nature; but that it was not by inclination, because of the torments that awaited him on the cross. And as far as the flesh was concerned, which flees from death, he spoke such things.” The divine Severianus, formerly bishop of the Gabali, regarding the passage, *Father, let this cup pass from me*, and again, *Father, save me from this hour*, says: “The Lord, having anticipated them, blocks the mouths of the heretics, in order to show that he put on this body subject to many things, one that is anxious with the fear of death, that trembles at the violence of death, that is grieved and troubled at the end of life. He says: *Now my soul is troubled*. *My soul is sorrowful even unto death*. It is not my divinity; for the divine is impassible, untroubled, and fearless. For the spirit, the Lord says, is willing, but the flesh is weak. ^B Consequently, he indicates two wills: the one, divine; the other, human.”

Truly, I think it has been proven sufficiently to the God-bearing men that the doctrine regarding the duality of wills of the same person, and of one and another—that is, of a divine and a human will—and about death being both willed and not-willed by the Savior—the one, in view of what he was from the beginning; the other, in view of what he later became—is sound. We must now proceed, in order and sequence, to the subject of the distinction of operations, and the doctrine of a duality [of operations], with the deiloquent Fathers sealing this same doctrine with their testimonies. ^C Immediately, therefore, the great confessor and teacher Ambrose, the archbishop of Milan, in his second book *To Gratian*, sets forth these things: “Equal, then, in the form of God; but the same one lesser in the taking on of flesh, and in the passion of man. For how can the same nature be both lesser and equal? But how is it that, being lesser, it does the same things that the Father does? For how could the same operation be from different essence? ^D Or can there be one operation, where there is a different essence?” And indeed the of the

^A of Jerusalem, the most renowned bishop Cyril, in the discourse on the Gospel passage where the Lord made water into wine, whose beginning is: “A miracle, and this miracle happened. He performed a miracle; He showed the double operation, suffering as man, but working as God, the same One; for it is not one person and another, even if it is in one way and another.” ^B And thus also the exarch of the great Roman Church, Leo, a man of most courageous heart and most holy, in the dogmatic Tome which he gave to the holy Flavian against the wicked-named Nestorius and Eutyches: “For each form acts in communion with the other, that which is proper to it; the Word indeed performing that which is of the Word, and the flesh accomplishing that which is of the flesh; and the one shines with ^C miracles, the other succumbs to injuries.” And he who acquired a golden mouth, or rather the mouth of Christ, John, in the sermon on the widow who offered two mites into the treasury, whose beginning is: “Simple indeed is the appellation of fasting. And in the other things of the conjoined natures, the operation of humanity is different, and the power of divinity is different. To speak by example: on earth He labors and is weary; and in heaven He sustains the elements. ^D On earth He hungers, and from heaven He supplies rains. On earth He is afraid, and in heaven He thunders. On earth He stands before the tribunal, and from heaven He surveys Himself. But as regards alms, the operation of both concurs. For He who from above, from the Cherubic throne, decrees rewards to the merciful, He it is who, sitting before the treasury, tests those who possess a sense of humanity, and who are therefore merciful.” Now the same [author], in the sermon on the apostle Thomas against the heretics: “Having heard these things, I cleansed my soul of unbelief; I cast away the doubtful opinion, I took up that which is believed, I touched the body rejoicing and trembling. Together with my fingers, I also unfolded the eye of my mind, and at last I sensed the double operation.” But also the most wise Alexandrian prelate Cyril, in the thirty-second chapter of the *Thesaurus*: “For we shall not claim that there is one natural operation of God and the creature, lest we elevate that which is created to the divine essence, or on the contrary belittle the excellence of the divine nature by bringing it down to the level of that which is created.”

from the creatures. For where the operation and the power are altogether one, it is necessary that the unity of the kind (or nature) should also be preserved.

These things, indeed, have been clearly related to us by the pious and orthodox Fathers, whom we have—to hold them to the measure of an epistle—briefly brought forward from the many, and those who exceed in number, and as it were from the whole "cloud of witnesses" (as I might use the words of Scripture), so that the true faith and opinion concerning the all-saving Christ might be most openly demonstrated. Relying upon them, just as they handed down to the holy Churches, moved by the Spirit, two natures of the one and same [Christ], so too they handed down an equal number of wills and operations corresponding to the natures—both a divine and a human will and operation—for the declaration of those things from which, in which, and which the same [Christ] is, and to designate a substantial distinction; a distinction, namely, which would altogether eliminate both the empty appearance and the confusion, and along with these, the division; as it indicates those things which are truly and clearly known—realizing the distinction according to the inseparable union—in the one and the same God-Word who for our sake became incarnate, from which [natures] he exists. For if the substantial distinction is not known without confusion in the union according to hypostasis, ^B the account of those things belonging to him by nature, or even of the union itself, will not be known without confusion.

But those of the opposite and hostile party [hold] the reverse. For the impious Apollinarius says thus in the book he entitled *Demonstration concerning the divine incarnation after the likeness of man*: "And they do not remember that this will is said to be proper, not of a man from the earth, as they themselves suppose, but of God who descended from heaven." And the same blockhead says again in the book written by himself: "*The manifestation* of God in the flesh. For there is one Christ, who is moved by a divine will alone, just as we also know his one operation, which proceeds from his one nature in producing diverse miracles and enduring passions; for he is God in the flesh, and is believed to be such." And after a few words: "That also: *Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done* (Matt. 26:39), does not exhibit one will and another, which do not agree with each other, but one and the same, moved by a ^C divine reason effectively, which however, according to the dispensation, shrank from death. For he was God bearing flesh who said this, having no distinction or difference in that which is to will."

The disciple and successor of his impiety, and an enemy of the truth as his name implies, the heretic Polemon, in his *Antirrheticus* against the holy Fathers, speaks with this perverse mind: "For Christ ^D

^A was God, and by the perfection of the flesh united and become man, not joining to Himself a mutable mind, moved by a natural will toward things contrary, but rather having become for Himself a mind, He has done all things by a divine and immutable will. But not one thing is divine and another deified, according to Gregory the Cappadocian 13, since it is mutable. For that which could be deified could also be altered, according to the first Adam." And in the sixth of the letters written by him to Timothy, his assistant and a wicked partner in his impiety: "He who speaks of two wills in Christ, according to those who formerly said so and who say so now, either introduces two Christs, divided from one another not only by nature but also by hatred, or else teaches that He is at war with Himself. For where there is a duality, there is necessarily division."

But also Themistius, the shield-bearer of the party of Severus and the leader of the evil opinion of the Agnoetae, in chapter 45 of his second book—written against the *tome* presented to the Empress Theodora by the heresiarch Theodosius, the leader of those who took their name from him—speaks thus with a mouth hateful to God: ^B "For just because the holy Athanasius has said that Christ showed two wills at the time He suffered death, we shall not straightway assign to Him two wills; and those wills, according to these syllogisms of yours, at war with each other. But we shall knowingly and piously recognize the one will of Emmanuel, as of one person, moving now in a human manner, now in a manner worthy of God." And the same pernicious and most harmful heretic again, in chapter 52 of the third book of the work he published in accordance with the impiety of his fellow-tribesman: "I say that there is one knowledge of Emmanuel, and one operation, as well as one will. Consider it then in this way: He who is immutable, as God, who is superior to every passion and stain, being moved in a human manner according to the will, shrinks from the passion; but again, with divine confidence, He is emboldened toward the passion, and effects both of these ^C through the flesh." And these things he understands perversely.

The heretics who divide [the natures] are likewise opponents of the ^D truth; I mean the teachers of division, who are driven toward the same erroneous doctrine as those previously mentioned regarding one will and one operation—the same ones who also advocated for a relative, or "gnomic," union. Theodore, that evil-minded and contentious man, he who plundered Mopsuestia, in his—

writings on the miracles, book ii, says: "I will, be thou clean," ^A when the Savior said this to the leper, he showed one will and one operation, proceeding according to one and the same power—I do not say of nature, but of a propense will, by which he was united to God the Word, who according to foreknowledge, was later made man from the seed of David; from the very womb having this innate affinity with him." The follower and successor of that man's madness, the impious Nestorius, in what he calls the *Clear Institution*, in the second book of that work, thus malignantly writes: "We keep the natures unconfused, not joined by essence, but by ^B the disposition and will of the soul (wherefore we also observe in them one will and operation and lordship), which indeed display themselves with equal dignity. For God the Word, assuming the man whom he had predestined, was distinguished from him in the matter of power, on account of the disposition and affection which he foresaw." And the same madman again in the fourth book of the same work says: "God the Word was not one, and the man in whom he was, another. For the person of both was one in dignity and honor, which is worshipped by all creation, and is not divided by any difference of counsel or will in any place or time." And indeed, Paul the Persian, a false deacon of the most defiled heresy of Nestorius, in his ^C discourse and book *On Judgment*, speaking against God with the same sharp eye as those others, says: "Because the union of God the Word with the man whom he assumed was not made according to essence, therefore one nature was not made. And if one nature was not made, Christ is not one single-personed hypostasis; therefore the union is according to good pleasure, held together by the identity of counsel and purpose, so that the distinction of the natures is shown to be unconfused, and the mystery of the good pleasure is revealed in the unity of the will."

As you see, O most excellent ones, both these writings and the dogmas that go before them are in all things extremely consonant and harmonious; yet I know not how, now in this age, on account of our sins, a union ^D has crept in against the blameless faith, confirming one will and one operation in Christ, similar to the efforts of those madmen. They claim one will, saying: "Whence we, following the holy Fathers in all things, and in this as well, confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ." And likewise one operation, through their saying: "But it also follows [that is, that two operations are preserved] that two wills are also to be asserted." For since they decree that wills must follow the operation, it is absolutely necessary, if one is asserting the consequent (that is to say, one will), also to assert the antecedent; that is, one operation. For while they sophistically strive to bring this in together with the will, they have, as it seems, decreed the will to be a companion to the operation.

^A For this reason, also, let him follow the Fathers, whom he chooses as guides for himself in this and in all things; not those who truly are so, but those who possess nothing holy at all. For no one, I suppose, would say that Athanasius, that illustrious man, was a champion of one will, he who cries out explicitly, as we have already shown: "He shows two wills here: the one human, the other divine." Nor Gregory the Theologian, who says regarding the human will of the Savior: "For that will of His is not contrary to God, having been entirely deified." Nor his namesake, the teacher of the Nyssaeans, who says: " The soul wills, the body gives the touch," and "With the body acting, and with the impulse of the will becoming present in the soul," and "Willing indeed in mind, but touching through the body," and [calling] the one will human and the other divine; and saying: "By saying 'Not mine,' He declared the human will in word; but by adding 'Thy will be done,' He showed the union of His own divinity with the Father." Nor John Chrysostom, who teaches: "For the words do not signify only that He is distressed by the anguish of death, but also two wills. For if this were said of the divinity, there would be a certain contradiction; but if of the flesh, what is said is consistent with reason. For it is not the case that the flesh should not want to die is a thing worthy of blame, since it is of nature; and He manifests ^B all things that are of nature, except for sin alone, and with great abundance." Nor Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, who wisely teaches: "For this was the will of the Father, to lead the dispensation (that is, the work of our salvation) to its end. But it also has that which does not want to die, by the reason that the flesh naturally shrinks from death." And: "He has the will to die for all, because the divine nature willed it; but He has an unwilling desire, on account of the flesh shrinking from death naturally." Nor Severianus, the prelate of the Gabali, testifying: "Thus it shows two wills; the one divine, the other human." And neither, regarding the one confession, the great confessor Ambrose, soberly and piously preaching: "For in what way could the same operation be of a different substance? For can there be one operation where there is a different substance?" Nor Cyril, prelate of the Hierosolymites, who advises: "He showed the double operation, suffering indeed as man, but acting as God, the same one." Nor the divine Leo, who declares it clearly: "For each form acts with the communion of the other, that which it has peculiarly." Nor again Chrysostom: "And in other things indeed, the operation of the natures which are joined is different—of the humanity and of the divinity—but concerning almsgiving, that which pertains to both operations concurs; and so, at last, I perceived two operations." Nor Cyril, likewise the most holy teacher of the Church of Alexandria, who also says: "For we shall not grant that there is one natural operation of God and of the creature."

^A These, or some of them, he declares are not holy nor approved ^B teachers of the Church; nay, he also proclaims their celebrated confession regarding two wills and operations to be impious and foreign to Christian doctrine. For he establishes his own teaching in these words: "Similarly, also, the statement regarding two operations offends many, since it has not been said by any of the holy and approved teachers of the Church, but rather, the assertion of two wills contrary to one another follows from it; and thus two are introduced willing contrary things; which is impious and foreign to Christian doctrine." See plainly and, as the saying goes, with uncovered head, he determines that the teaching of two wills, and the operations equal in number to them that follow according to it, does not belong to the holy and approved teachers of the Church, but rather to the impious, as an impious thing and, as he says, foreign to Christian doctrine; and that it introduces two willing contrary things to those who proclaim these doctrines. That is to say, the two wills and the operations equal in number to them [belong] to the God-moved Fathers, whom he deigned neither to follow, nor to call holy, nor in any way to agree with them or to teach these things together with them, for the confirmation of the mystery of God the Word in the flesh.

But whom, and of whom, did he speak when he said that the term "one operation" had been used, and that it was fitting in this, as in all things, to confess one will of Christ the Word? These have clearly been shown to be the defenders of confusion and the leaders and heads of division. For instance—since it is not unseemly to briefly run through the matter to be proven—the impious Apollinarius, fighting against God, says this: "For Christ is one, moved only by a divine will, just as we also know his one operation, and having no difference or distinction in the act of willing." Polemon, truly an enemy of the truth by his name, says: "He created all things by an immutable divine will; not indeed one thing divine and another deified, as Gregory the Cappadocian thinks." And: "He who says there are two wills of Christ, like those who formerly and now swell with pride, either introduces two Christs or asserts that the same one is fighting against himself." The wicked Themistius, contrary to the meaning of his name, says: "But let us understand the one will of Emmanuel as being that of one, at one time moved in a human manner, and at another in a divine manner." And: "I declare the knowledge and operation of Emmanuel to be one, just as also his will." Theodore, struck by God and senseless, [says]: "He showed that there is one will and one operation, proceeding according to one and the same power." The completely frantic Nestorius [says]: "Wherefore we also look upon one will, operation, and dominion of them." Paul, a Persian even in his mind (as one might say, a Manichaean), [says]: "The union is according to a favorable will, which is fashioned by one concurrence of counsel and opinion." And: "The mystery of good pleasure is demonstrated by a singular will." These, then, are the accursed and pestilential ones whom he determines to be holy Fathers. He recognizes these as the approved teachers of the Church, whom, having followed in all things—and in this too—he similarly to them confuses and divides the doctrine of the economy, as well as the one will and operation of Christ our God.

^A

How, therefore, does she, who holds the same opinions as the adversaries, imagine that she thinks otherwise, shifting her votes to and fro, and choosing and preferring the non-existent over that which truly is? For since it is truth—not unrighteousness—that judges, it is surely manifest to all that he who is in agreement and accord with them is not the one who says what they do not say, but rather the one who maintains what they dogmatically assert; for divergence is the mark of heterodoxy, while, as she knows, agreement is the mark of orthodoxy. And yet she herself claims, indeed cries aloud, that the polluted Nestorius never dared to say two wills, but rather confessed a single will—namely, that of the two persons he fabricates. If, therefore, even according to her, Nestorius maintains not two, but one will; and if Apollinarius and all those impious men who glory in those authors do the same (and indeed, as our argument has demonstrated, [confess] one operation), then it is beyond doubt that we, who according to the divine Fathers speak of two wills, are shown to be entirely of an alien opinion; but she, who speaks of one, is shown to be of the same opinion as Nestorius and Apollinarius and their followers, whom she thus teaches; and while she rejects and casts away the divine Fathers, as I was saying, she attributes to herself the pious—and the accursed—Fathers. ^B

By what cogent cause or reason has she brought this forward against the pious confession? If [it is] on the grounds that our faith had failed us, the argument is false. For we were all Christians even before this was published, we who profess the right doctrine. But if it is as if the doctrine were already in existence, the method [of introducing it] is to be shunned, as it introduces an adulterated superfluity—a means by which those men, covering up their own craftiness and having absolutely no testimony from any synod, or Father, or Scripture with which to prop up their claims, say these things, ^C fabricating the decrees of piety. Or did those who were eyewitnesses from the beginning and ministers of the Word deliver these things to us, along with their disciples and successors in turn, the God-inspired teachers of the truth—to say the same thing, the five holy and ecumenical synods of the most blessed and God-bearing Fathers? But if they delivered these things, what is the proof, and from where comes the credibility of such dogmas for them? Furthermore, since we have the aforementioned holy synods and hold to their faith, it is manifest that the inventions that have been superinduced are adulteries. But if these things belong nowhere to the holy synods, what then is this mass of myths, which bends the disreputable by invoking the names of the most famous men— ^D as if to provide bait for the more simple-minded for the sake of their apostasy from the truth—the appellation of the illustrious Fathers and synods, to those who are otherwise...

^A cunningly concocted from the beginning, both for the concealment (as I have said) of their own things and for the deceitful snatching away of those who are led astray. Wherefore, in order to the complete abrogation of such things—I mean those who from time to time search out deceitful inquisitions against the faith—the synodical law of the holy gathering of blessed Fathers at Chalcedon most excellently defines, thus commanding: “The holy and ecumenical synod has decreed that it is permitted to no one to bring forward, or to write, or to compose, or to hold, or to teach others another faith. But as for those who dare to compose another faith, or to bring it forward, or to teach or to deliver another symbol to those who wish to turn to the knowledge of the truth from Hellenism or Judaism, or from any heresy whatsoever, these ^B if they be bishops, [they shall be] aliens from the episcopate, and the clergy from the clergy; but if they be monks or laymen, they shall be anathematized.”

Who then, among those who have felt God in any way, and who depend upon His all-luminous glory—from whom, and through whom, and in whom lies the salvation of those who piously confess Him—would yet choose to abandon the orthodox faith handed down to us from above and from the beginning through the divine oracles and the Fathers, and to prefer the recent innovation? Against which, indeed, as also against every other [innovation] devised by those of different mind contrary to pious reason, the firm decree of the approved and synodical curse of the holy Fathers gathered at Chalcedon has been launched, as the argument has demonstrated; unless, perhaps, one who has grown weary of his own life has preferred alienation from the glory of God. ^C Wherefore, seeing in the very facts themselves, O Lord, and perceiving that there is a progression now openly manifesting itself as a proclamation for the overthrow of all piety and for the abolition of the true faith of the Only-Begotten—a foretelling of the supreme error and of the final beast, according to the divine inspiration and most blessed illumination of the holy men who held these things, for our guard who have reached the ends of the ages—let us each in our own hearts keep this imported innovation with all our strength, so that we may not be dragged along carelessly as if uncaringly, but rather standing with great weight and manfully against all impiety, casting down, to use the words of Scripture, ^D "reasonings, and every height exalting itself against the knowledge of God" [II Cor. x, 4-5]. Hence, also, the Savior of all, our Lord and God, in His love for mankind, ensuring our safety, says: "Then, if anyone shall say to you, 'Lo, here is the Christ, lo, there'; do not believe" [Matt. xxiv, 23], casting away the counterfeit and various faiths and opinions about Him, and those who transmit them far from His own mystery, and warding off those who are His own from every alien deception, with which those who are headstrong and contentious men, alien to the true [faith] in Him...

are accustomed to disturb and impugn the confession of those who are upright, lest our pious and religious mind, caught and overcome by some one of these, should slip from the truth, dissolving into the plausibility of fables, and not being confirmed by the demonstration of the words of the Fathers. "Watch and pray," He therefore mandates again, ^B through the λόγος for us, "that you may not enter into temptation" (Matt. xxvi, 41); by "watchfulness" implying the sobriety of mind regarding this, and by "prayer" wishing to bestow upon us, through grace, His own succor. By "temptation" here He refers to that which arises from error, not that which is from necessity—into which we ourselves enter, and are not led from elsewhere—while we decline from the straight and royal path; which you, with God as your sponsor and guide, following straightly, guide wisely also me, who am yours, and those like me who limp on both legs, and bring us to the light, which no shadow obscures, no evening darkens, of the most divine confession of the Word and of discipline, looking toward the reward which is reconciled therefrom. For the divine law also commands you, who are strong, to bear the burdens of the weak, and so to fulfill the law (Rom. xv, 1; Galat. vi, 2). ^C But a heavy burden, and if there is any other that is heavy, far heavier and more troublesome, is the promiscuous use of terms concerning the same matters, by which those are burdened who in their senses are children, owing to the changes of times and persons, perhaps by the seduction or threats of those who flatter, wheedle, or scrutinize, and especially at a time when all things are perturbed, and they rush in unbridled. I beseech you, therefore, do not cease to stretch out to the client a hand of pitying affection, partly by skillfully purging them with doctrine, ^D and partly by compassionately supporting them with prayers, and by reconciling and bringing them to God the Word, who is rightly worshiped and believed in by you, and [who is] the King of all ages, now and at the time of His terrible manifestation; to whom, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, be honor, power, glory, and adoration, for ever and ever. Amen.

OF THE GREAT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR, On the two wills of our one Christ God.

Others have devised, with skillful art, forms and figures for security and ornamentation; and those who, through poverty of mind, have neglected the care of what lies hidden, imagine that they will attain clarity through this outward culture. But for you, holy Father, who have already transferred the reasonings of your soul to an indivisible life, virtue, devoid of any painted artifice and excelling every form and figure, has sufficed for beauty...

^A Indeed, not only for what is hidden from all, but also for what is visible to everyone, adorning it with as much firm stability, as an everlasting love, which has no satiety at any time, and which, because it cannot be easily dissolved, is earthly, you have preferred. Moreover, the fact that you show forth such a bond with God and exhibit one similar to Him according to the human faculty, and as much as you are entirely alien to, and disagree with, the affection of the mind for earthly and worldly things, demonstrating this — for this reason also you have gained this, that by the injury of the appetite you are not yourself injured by those things for which you yearn. For it is not compared [to this], that a man should suffer evil from those things, for he who himself, by the voluntary decision and intention of his soul, has suffered what things are honorable and of duty, is held fast by them—that is, by the completion of love, ^B and by having attained in himself the victory over the beloved, the cessation of movement, the quiet of the everlasting movement; by which there is an abolition of the death that once held sway over nature, and no victory for the latter through transgression. For you no longer endure commotion and turmoil, since the victorious grace of the Spirit, through the sedulous assiduity of prayer, is accepted and dear, and as you skillfully show its paths by deed itself, how great the ways of royal and divine [virtue] are, for those who intend to walk straight upon the unerring path of piety; and on both sides you discern the deflected paths; and you show to some the evils and sorrows that have not been attempted, and to others the sacred rewards ordained; so that, through the fear of the labor you have admired, ^C and through the love of the divine perfection to which you lead by means of these, you might bring them to completion. And because you are successfully and eagerly striving in this way, I do not unjustifiably praise your prudence; nay rather, being struck by its power and the force of both, I glorify God, the author of virtue and wisdom to you; earnestly asking that you might make use of the same reasons with those for whom a sounder sense is lacking; and do not become weary in the work (for virtue does not grow weary, whose portion it is that all honest things, and those which are of duty, should be fulfilled in act), until you have implanted in them the mind of Christ, and have taught them to search out the deep things of the Spirit ^D; whose own manifestations circumscribe all the wisdom and virtue of things; and it reveals what is learned in mystery and secret hearing, to those who, after your manner, have clung to it, and have held nothing dearer for the method of their life.

But since you have deemed it worthy to ask your servant and disciple about that first and also last virtue, which, as a leader and seal, shines all around—I mean humility—on account of the definition of the natural will which the venerable monk (k) made—as to whether it is well stated or not, saying: "It is the appetitive power of that which exists by nature, and the container of all properties essentially inherent in nature." And that this is one thing, and the gnomic [will] another; I consider that it is well stated, and does not contradict the teaching of the God-chosen Fathers, even if it has been thought by some not to be so, asserting either [a single] will, or the things willed, or the object of will. [index: entries preserved]

^A I would gladly ask them: who among the Fathers defines it in this way? And who is such a one? For if it is so, what else is this than a reciprocal indication, which, while it does not distinguish the reason of each thing according to itself, unsuitably establishes and proposes the same thing as the other reciprocally; such as [saying] that will is the act of willing, and volition, as they call it, and that this again is defined by that. For the things defined are spoken of in turn in relation to their definition by conversion. For it is manifest that they mean the act of willing by [the word] will: yet they do not intend this as a definition of will. For who could prove it? For otherwise, the counseling of counsel, the motion of motion, and the humanity of a man would be definitions according to the sense and opinion of those who speak thus. But whether they signify the thing in this way or that, they in no way harm its existence and truth, whether the thing signified be motion or substance. For if we were to grant that this brings ruin, it would follow that the existence and truth of all universals and particulars whatsoever would slip away from us. For we use different words in all things for the sake of signification. But I say this also: even if they call will the act of willing, they never call the thing itself an object to the will, or that which lies under the will. For how [can] the same thing [be] appetite and the thing that is the object of appetite? ^B For if the matter is so, for what [purpose] would it ever happen that one would be moved [toward it], if it is truly the thing itself to which one is moved, and nothing other than that exists by nature? For it is a relation [habitudo] intervening between the extremes; unifying them through itself, but not coinciding with them in essence. And the divine and great Gregory is witness, who does not bring the thing willed and the begotten into the same [category] with the will and the generation at all; but through these, as natural relations, he draws them back to the begetter and the willer. For since he did not admit the relation of that which is willed and lies under the will, nor of that which is begotten, to the will and the generation (even though the will is naturally a medium), "For it does not follow," he says, "how he was to bring [them] into the same, and to declare them to be one." ^C Furthermore, if they say that will is what is the object of the will, and we are by nature the object of the will, and that which lies under it (inasmuch as we were created by God as author and willer), then God will have no other will thereafter except us alone; of such a sort, namely, that it has a beginning and an end: which is the condition of us mortals: and, before we were, God would have been entirely devoid of will. Indeed, the same inference will follow in regard to us as well; and there will be no proper and natural will in us, but only that which is externally cast as an object to the will will be attributed to it, whether it be some thing, or nothing; whether it be some honorable thing, or evil. To these [points], even some object of will is among those things which are outside. For these (that is, the object and subject of the will) are not spoken of by their own reason, but by that of the one who is moved ^D toward them by the will. And thus, if he who has a natural will wills nothing, [then] nothing is willed or an object of will to him. What then is the argument for those who insist that the object of will is the will, or who declare that it is so stated by the holy Fathers?

^A Be it so, however, let it be called as they conceive it; for our dispute is not about the difference of terms, but about the meaning of pious concepts and opinions. Yet let them answer us, who do not ask without reason: is the divine will one thing and the human will another? And is this one thing and that another? Or if there are innumerable names for them, have they acquired different and distinct appellations? Let them surely teach this, and let them steady our mind, which is wavering in ignorance on a dark subject; nor shall we be intensely opposed to their nomenclature, but we shall even contribute what we may have regarding such matters. For if it is not one thing and another according to essence, it is evident that it is one and the same by nature. And if this be so, the nature also is necessarily one and unchangeable. For if there is no natural diversity of wills, there is no difference of essence and nature at all. But if it is one thing by nature and another thing, they are altogether different; and if they are different, how is it necessary not to acknowledge the number between them? For the denial of this effects the utter disappearance of the will itself, and of the things that differ, as though they did not exist. For how is it possible for them to exist and not be numbered, and for what reason? Or how, while they exist by nature, are the wills not numbered, if they would not reasonably cease to be numbered, just as the natures themselves? For what is good and suitable in the case of those things that are innate and constitutive of realities, it is fitting that it should exist also in the things themselves; and if they take away the number from these also, as if it were according to them harmful, or in no way injurious, it must be contained in the case of the former as well. For the sake of demonstrating the innate difference that exists in them, by which we also make use of it in regard to essences, let them show how they do not utterly bring about the destruction or confusion of the natural human will of the Savior through the rejection of this number.

And how is the Word made flesh a perfect man, if he is without a natural will? For being deified by the union with God, just as the nature itself of the flesh animated rationally and intellectually does not depart from its essential being, just as iron does not cast off that which is its ^C own, though the tempering and union with fire be of the highest degree and throughout the whole; but it suffers the effects of the fire, since it has become fire by the union; yet it remains heavy again according to nature, and cuts, because it has not suffered any loss of its own nature, nor has the whole departed from its natural operation; although it exists as one according to the one and same reason of subsistence, and operates indivisibly both the things that are according to its own nature—I mean the cutting—and again the things according to the union, which is the burning. For the cutting belongs to it, just as the burning belongs to the fire, because of the extreme interpenetration and ^D exchange of these into one another; and neither its nature—I mean that of the iron—even if it is seen with the fire, [note: Clarissimum exemplum.]

does it in any way forbid us to name or count, nor does it forbid the natural operation; although this is observed in the action of burning, yet it is not separated from it at all; but it is seen uniformly in it and is distinguished in it perfectly. What, therefore, is the reason that we should not count what is inherent in the nature (namely the will), and in the same way, in the incarnate Word, who is by far of greater perfection and superior, so that even a perfect man might not be attributed to him? Although in all respects, likewise, those things which belong to nature are the cause of our salvation, through the indivisible union, by the propense will of the Father and the cooperation of the Spirit, a communion began; so that he clearly also entered into a perfect communion of our nature, with the exception of sin alone—which does not pertain to the nature itself, but exists as a perverse movement and a fall of the soul's will and choice, contrary to the reason and law of nature.

^B And to me, for this reason, the aforementioned monk quite fittingly seems to have adverted, he who distinguished the gnomical [choice-based] from the natural will. For by it, according to the definition which he has rightly handed down, the Power is the appetitive faculty of that which is according to nature. For whatever of things exists anywhere, and especially those that use reason, it desires that which is according to nature, and from this, having received the power from God, it has it by essence, for the sustenance of what it is. For if it did not have an appetite for that which is according to nature, how and whence would that which is in no way existent have a movement of existence? For only that which is non-existent and unessential and in no way exists does not have its power in existing things, nor motion. But the deliberate impulse is established as a turning aside toward either side; it is not a part of nature, but belongs properly to the person and hypostasis. ^C And having understood this, the divided and man-worshipper Nestorius wickedly taught a union of wills or opinions, so that he might establish one subsistence and person from another, and that the man might consist for him of two; namely, by a certain will of the soul and opinion, and a free movement into the Word of God, as he himself says, having made the union, from which he constitutes the "same-willingness," or "multi-willingness," to speak more properly, inasmuch as the movement of the gnomical will, part by part, from the imperfect goes toward the perfect according to him, being borne along and progressing; but not from that ineffable conception itself, which is entirely and perfectly with all its own, toward the whole and all that is according to it, our nature being united to the Godhead of the Word, according to one and the selfsame hypostasis. ^D In order, therefore, that the monk whom I mentioned might accurately establish the perfection of nature in the incarnate God, and exclude the contrariety, he discarded the claim of the aforementioned monk; for he [properly understood] the natural [will]

^A fixed for him, while he distinguished the gnomic will, giving no space in this to division for the sake of creating faction, nor any entrance to fantasy, as that does not exist in him. But if anyone perhaps insists that it is not possible otherwise in his case than for two wills to be spoken of by way of contrariety—if he understands this in the sense that they are different by nature, I also accept it; but if in the sense that they are opposed, the argument is false. For it is not the case that if something is different, it is also in every respect contrary. For the contrary is the product of a gnomic will moved irrationally, while the different is the product of nature governed by the principles of reason; the one is factious to nature, while the other is clearly constitutive. Essential difference, therefore, exists for the constitution of things in nature, whereas contrariety does not, but rather exists for their dissolution. For nature does not possess what is contrary to the reasons of nature; nor is there any reason in what is factious.

^B Furthermore, if the two wills are in every way contrary and opposed, how is it that among intellectual beings who are divided by nature and hypostasis, this does not happen entirely and in every way? For we are sometimes in harmony with them, although they are gnomically [inclined], and with God, and with angels, and with one another, yet we have not for this reason already fallen away from the gnomic [will] and from the will according to it. For if we have suffered the loss of these, and of the harmony with others—if we still possess this—we hold fast to the other gnomic [wills] as well. If, therefore, this is the case here, and no conflict is observed, even though the gnomic wills exist and are kept in number, and the friendly disposition is in [our] relation—how, in the case of the same and one incarnate God the Word, who became human perfectly for our sake, will there be contrariety in the wills that naturally belong to him by essence? ^C But how do they say these are contrary, by reason of the number itself, or by the very fact of existence? If it is for this reason, they should also abolish the nature of the flesh, as it is contrary to the Word because of its existence. For it is much more forceful, as is evident to all, that what is the subject [is more central] to opposition than that which has existence within a subject. But if they mean only on account of the number, and they wish to render the natures devoid of this, and not even count one of them—let them also, for the same reason, reject it even in the case of the three hypostases of the one and unbegun Godhead, so that that too may not be at variance with itself. But it is an absurdity for one to attribute such great power to that which is nothing at all, ^D which is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor anything else of the things that exist; and it is more absurd to blame the very existence of the natural will, and from this to contrive its abolition; and this, when everything else in the...

NOTÆ. (ι) To that which is nothing at all. He says that number adds nothing of true entity to things, but according to their proportion, it exists either in the nature of things or in the mind alone conceiving them; from the latter, finally, it has completion in either way. They call these formalitates, or metaphysical entities, and conceptual reasons: to which to attribute physical effects, such as division is, Maximus rightly considers absurd.

^A being essentially the primary of natural properties and the ^B innate power of motions. For according to this alone do we naturally desire to be, to live, to be moved, to think, to speak, to perceive, to partake of food, of sleep, and of rest, and not to suffer pain, nor to die, and in a word, to possess perfectly the habits of all things that constitute our nature, and to be rid of those that destroy it, and to avoid those that lead to ruin.

And to me it appears that the most religious monk also acted considerately in this part of his definition, while he added this: "And the upholding power ^B of all the properties that essentially belong to the nature." For the essential and innate will in us always sustains and seeks to sustain all things, and to have a deficiency of none; or rather, we do so through it and according to it. And I think that anyone who gives the account of what is truly real, rather than what only appears to be, will certainly agree that ^C God incarnate, as he is also man, is endowed with a natural and human will; and that he naturally wills each of the enumerated things according to itself, for the confirmation of his intelligently and rationally ensouled flesh, since he became perfect man, lacking none of our properties, except for sin alone; but possessing all things that we possess, without omission of those things which naturally constitute our substance, just as also those of the unoriginate and divine, ^D through which he truly made himself known both as man and as God, and preserved the natural affinity with us, and with the Father, after the union.

For to say that it was only at the time of the saving passion (when, indeed, he was representing our nature in himself, and as man was refusing death) that he showed he possessed two wills, seems to me an assertive statement, but not a demonstrative one. For why at this time only, and not before it, and for what reason? For if he had it then, he had it from the beginning, from the time he became man, and did not acquire it later. But if he did not have it from the beginning, he did not have it at the time of the passion either; but he only feigned the refusal, and with it the remaining things through which we are saved, such as the tears, the prayers, the sadness, the fear of death, the cross, the death, the burial; for if one of those things that are natural in him according to our likeness is invalidated, the others will not stand either. For why not the former, and yet the latter? And what is the logic? And what contradiction is there in praying and in voluntarily showing the natural weakness—the weakness of the flesh, I mean—by restraint, and not resisting at all, but saying: "If it is possible," and "Not what I will, but what thou wilt," and joining to the restraint the strong and eager movement against death? For he was indeed representing in himself in reality our nature, through the natural, brief movement of anxiety.

^A Yet, on the other hand, he immediately puts forward the greatest impulse against death, and [shows] the intimacy and union of his human will toward his own and to the Father’s will, by favoring this and saying: *Not my will, but thine be done* (Luke 22:42). In this way he pushes aside division, and in that way, he once again wards off and eliminates confusion.

But if, because he does not appear to have made an indication of willing at any other time than at the time of the passion, they assert these things, they would say the same thing about the innate faculty of understanding, and they would frame him as lacking mind. For it does not appear that he said that he thought or understood [something]. And in the same way regarding the sense of smell and the other natural [faculties] in us, of which it is not written that he remembered them. Or even about the soul itself, as if it did not exist in reality from the time he became man, but only whenever he mentioned it. For not long before the passion has he been reported as having done this. Therefore, they must either say that it was brought into existence at that moment, because he did not mention it often and from the beginning; or, if they do not say this, but teach according to the sentiment of the great Athanasius: "At once flesh, at once the flesh of God the Word, ensouled and rational," they shall also say that the natural will of the Savior, in which he was man, did not exist only at the time of the passion, even if he made mention of it then, but from the beginning, as being naturally consubstantial to the Savior as man, just as it is in us. Let them cease, then, for it is not the time to agitate and collect such matters. For this is a time of bloody slaughters, on account of our sins, not of dogmas; and a time of loud lamentations, to move God to mercy, but not of sophistic objections, to stir up against us his greater wrath.

^C It occurs to me also to marvel ^D concerning operation, how they teach that this is one in Christ, in reference, as they say, to the individual and its consideration. Not to mention that none of the natural [properties] have their primary relation to the individual, but have their reference to its nature and essence. For who could operate anything without the powers naturally inherent in the nature? Or whence comes to one the ability to operate or to be able, apart from nature? I should like to ask them this: is it for the sake of destroying the natural operations that they put this forward, or what? For if it is for their destruction, how, when, and of what kind could an operation exist at all, once they have been brought to a halt and abrogated? For just as when natures do not exist, it is necessary that what is from them—I mean the composite hypostasis—should also be entirely abolished, so too when the natural operations do not exist, there will be no other operation at all. And I do not say this as though I wished for another operation to be fashioned out of natural ones. For neither is there a composition of those which are in a subject, because there is not even the existence of the whole in itself, but the

^A former exhibits something weak and empty. Wherefore, if they deny that those things which truly are exist by nature, who is he that becomes [the originator] of what is nowhere [existent], and does the latter truly exist as a composite of existences? For who is he who speaks of a personal operation, and from whence do they produce this, and from whom have they received it? But if by chance they pronounce this, they confess the person to which it is referred to be composite, and participant in opposites—that is to say, mortal and immortal, visible and invisible, circumscribed and uncircumscribed, without beginning and subject to a beginning; the operation, according to probability, will be the same. ^B And how otherwise, if not clearly according to a habit or a privation? And some things will be affected, as being existent, while those [others] will par-exist, as non-existent. And how could one who possesses such an operation suffer such things according to the same, and not as another thing [suffering] another? For it is necessary in every way that the one acting be naturally disposed toward his own operation, and the operation toward him. And how is God God, and not by nature God? And how is man man, if he lacks [this] and does not truly exist as such by substance? And what nature is inoperative, or outside of natural operation? For as it is in no way destitute of existence, thus neither is it of natural power. But if it lacks this, it would also lack existence. For that which is powerless, as being utterly inert, is only that which is not. ^C For everything that is among beings possesses a constitutive difference—the innate movement conjoined to the genus, which makes the definition of the subject, through which it is known strictly what it is and that it is, having consistency toward things of the same kind, and again difference toward those of a different kind—and if this is the case, how is it possible for one who lacks natural power according to the flesh to be called the Word who became man, a man perfect, or man at all? For man is not without natural operation, just as no other nature is [without] its own and essential one. For the lack of this either makes the nature to not even be a nature, or else [makes] all things identify with one another, and instead of all, one [nature], by the deficiency of the constitutive [property] having mingled them through and through and confused them. For if they say that the Word who among us [exists] is not inoperative, it is clear that they say he has an innate and human operation. For how else? For it is not possible to act without natural operation; just as it is not possible to exist without substance and nature. ^D But neither is it possible, if the nature is twofold, for the one acting to have only one innate operation, since he who subsists must necessarily possess one nature, even if he should be composite in his hypostasis. For if by reason of the relation it is that, by reason of the same it is entirely this. For we see this being carried monadically upon both. For both the operation is referred back to the one acting, and the nature back to the one who subsists. It is therefore necessary, if because of the union and the monadic nature of the person they say that the operation of the one acting is one, to proclaim for this same reason that the nature of the one who subsists [is] one, so that they may not be detected as preaching a relative union of operations, and not also of natures. For it is not possible to unite these to the hypostasis, but rather to the essence and nature, insofar as it concerns

That there is no hypostatic operation.

as the one who operates, he must absolutely have unique natural operation if he exists in a dual nature. Otherwise, even the nature of the one who subsists would be entirely one, even if the person is composite. For if that is [one] on account of relation and habit, then this too is one for the same reason. For we see this applied individually in both cases: operation is referred to the operator, and nature is referred to the one who subsists. Therefore, it is necessary that, if ^B because of the union and the fact that there is one single person, they call it one operation of the operator, they must likewise, by that same reasoning, declare the nature of the one who subsists to be one; lest, by asserting it only of operations and not of natures, they be found to be teaching a union that consists only in relation and affection. For it is impossible that they should unite these with the person, but not with the essence and nature (at least so far as natural operations are concerned), which are united with him in nothing else but in operation. Otherwise, just as the natural distinction of these [operations] makes two operators, as they suppose: so too, absolutely, the diversity of nature that is in the substances will bring in two who subsist. Either, therefore, let them mix these too together along with one nature, or in no way ascribe division to them or to the substances that are naturally counted. For what does not happen in the case of substances should never happen in the case of operations either. But their natural distinction is declared by the fact that they are numbered; whereas the division is eliminated because they are joined in the highest union. For it never happens, nor could it even be understood, that a divine or human nature is distinguished from another without essential operation. For the definition of a thing is the account of its essential faculty, and if that is removed, it is absolutely necessary that the subject also be removed. And this is the reason why we confess that in the incarnate Word they remain naturally intact: one, indeed, by reason of the fact that it was the flesh, which was approaching the divine essence; and again the other, which is manifest in the danger of human distress, [shining forth] with the power of its own authority; so that we may confess the natures, whose essential operations and powers they are, along with them.

For to whom is it not clearly evident that, in the case of the same essence ^C and nature, it is impossible for a diverse existence and operation to be perceived? For neither differs from itself. This is, indeed, almost impossible. In the individual, however, and the person, absolutely and in every way—if indeed the individual is composite, and we perceive distinct natures from which it consists, and the natural movements by which the operator who is known according to nature confirms his own existence, and he truthfully represents one thing and another out of which he exists through the natural operation according to one thing and another—hence, indeed, we find that one who, of his own accord, omits the natures and directs his mind to the individual himself, does not so much burden the present task as assist it. For since the individual ^D is not confined to one operation at all, any more than a nature is (for who could say, or is sufficient to demonstrate, that it is?), it is clear that he has essential movements equal in number to his natures or essences; and there is no one who would deny it. I pass over saying that the composite person according to Christ is not, strictly speaking, an individual. For he does not have such a relation by the reason that he is divided from the most general genus through subaltern genera into the most specific species, and that his...

^A own procession is circumscribed within himself. Hence for this reason, according to the most wise Cyril, the name "Christ" has no power of definition. For it is not a species predicated of many things differing in number, nor does it signify the essence of anyone. For it is not an individual related to a species or genus, or circumscribed by these according to substance; but it is a composite hypostasis, drawing the natural division of the extremes into a sum of identity and unity within itself, by the union of its proper parts.

But if perhaps those who, because the Lord is not without operation according to the flesh, confess his innate and human operation, argue that it is also "not non-subsistent" (which is to say, not lacking subsistence or person), they are harming [the concept of] the hypostasis. For ^B that a nature is "not non-subsistent" does not make it a hypostasis, just as, for any body, the fact that it is "not unshaped" does not make it a [specific] shape; nor does the fact that it is "not unbegotten" make it a begetting or a vision, nor does simply saying that anything is "not" what it is not form a relation, but rather it forms a state concerning which that which is being affirmed is naturally considered.

Moreover, even if this were the case (which it is not), it would certainly not apply to natural operations, which the holy Fathers do not eliminate in the same way as hypostases and persons; nor do they divide the One into two as they do with these. For who is able to prove that it is not right and appropriate to teach natural operations in the same entity as a token of essential difference? And for what reason, and how, and what is the logic, or what distinguished Father has forbidden us even to name them, rather than merely stating that they are not [to be discussed]? For if it is not good to confess the natural operations, [it is] neither [good to confess] the natures themselves. Or how [is it right] to confess these but not the others? If both are good, for what reason are they set against what is good, and [why] do they construct the hypostasis out of that which is "not non-subsistent" of the nature? For if they knew that the operations were rejected by the Fathers just as the hypostases or persons were, they would not ^C be casually casting them away. But if we know that the Fathers proclaim these, and as they confess a nature, they also exhort others to confess a divine and human operation—while no one at all, except only the divided one and worshipper of man, Nestorius, is known to have taught a divine or human hypostasis at all—why then, if they profess to follow the teaching of the saints, do they concoct such things against it, so as to exclude the natural operations?

And whose work is it to introduce such things, and in such a manner, other than the impostor and madman Severus? A man, clearly, who diligently destroys even his own positions, and who in no way prevails against the worshippers of piety through whatever sophistic nonsense his impudence might devise, since the victory of the truth is illustrious and clear. ^D

^A For if, as they say, the fact that a nature is not *anupostatos* (velut dicas, non inconsistens et quæ vere non exsistat) makes it a *hypostasis* and a person, then by all means—and as a necessary consequence—to say that it is not *anousios* (that is, not deprived of essence or substance) must also make it an essence or substance. But those who say this, how do they not divide the Word of theology, by inducing as many natures as there are *hypostases* and persons, if indeed, according to them, the natures of the equal number of *hypostases* are by all means not *anousioi*? And do they not confuse the doctrine of the economy by the unity of nature on account of the one *hypostasis*? Therefore, they teach such things against themselves, while being at variance with themselves.

But to those who confess ^B the natural operations, and who gather them in this way, it is a grace, as they everywhere harvest the truth according to the tradition of the holy Fathers, from which (tradition) the fact that a nature is not *anupostatos* does not make it a *hypostasis*, but *enupostatos*; lest it be perceived as an accident in thought alone, but rather be contemplated as a form in reality. And in the same way, the fact that it is not *anousion* (not deprived of substance and essence) does not make the *hypostasis* an essence, but represents it as *enousion*, so that we may know it not as a bare property, but together with that in which the property is strictly recognized. Just as, therefore, in that case the term *enupostatos* signifies what is *enuparkton*—and *enuparkton* is that which partakes of substantial and natural existence—so here too, the term "active," or "operative," signifies that which has power (the *endunamon*). And *endunamon* is that which possesses an essential and natural power.

Therefore, to acknowledge in Christ natures that are not *anupostatoi* or *anenergetoi* (inefficacious) is not to gather together *hypostases* or agents, but to confess orthodoxly their essential and natural existences and operations, for the true confirmation and affirmation of the Word of God, who is incarnate, and who operates from them, and in them, and according to them—I mean the natures—in an inseparable union.

By what reasoning, then, do they who refer many operations—and more than one in number—to one and the same [person], ^C by saying "every divine and human operation" ^D (m) [Translation omitted, see notes]

[NOTÆ] (m) *Every divine and human operation.* Thus, the Monothelites seemed to be guarding themselves against the cliff on both sides, as was mentioned in n. 8, so that they would neither confuse [them] with Severus and others, nor divide them from the Catholics (into whose party they were wrongly dragged) with Nestorius. Indeed, even John of Constantinople and his synod, under the Emperor Bardas, thought they had fashioned a mask for them, and that they had confessed the Catholic faith, having induced the imprudent tyrant himself to confess it with these very words—suppressing only the phrase "one of two," which seemed to be causing disturbances in the Churches. Whatever may be the case regarding this dispensation of theirs (that is, of John and his fellow bishops, among whom there were also men conspicuous for their holiness), whether they are to be condemned for the faith actually betrayed, or surely to be treated more leniently, or even to be praised for the prudence of their dispensation, by which they warded off from the Churches as much of the storm as they saw impending through the tyranny of a heretical prince—[it is certain that] Pope Constantine seems to have accepted their satisfaction, and not to have sought more strictly against those whom he recognized as having truly held the Catholic faith in their hearts, and as having looked to nothing more than the safety of the Churches in that matter. Maximus himself finds a sound sense here, if we understand that the same Christ, according to one thing and another, as he truly was, operated through some things and others, and according to the nature of those things, for the sake of the burden of a common and composite person; which, however, the Monothelites deny they intended. Certainly, if...

^A that word, "all"—not "one" or "two" absolutely, or "three," but infinite, and such as a number cannot even be imagined—conveys the thought (just as clearly what is called "all" and "everything" or the "universe"), they by no means fear division; yet they do not know how or why they associate this division with those who confess the two natural operations according to the sense and mind of the divine Fathers, at least insofar as a distinction is recognized. For if many and different natural operations do not divide and cut the one and the selfsame agent into many, how will two do so? And who is the one more to be blamed for such an attack as being unreasonable? For if they did not speak of these ^B as belonging to one and the same, and refer them to one—and if they did not attribute them, as things that permeate one another, as if grown together and preserved in him according to an indivisible union, and moved by him uniformly according to one thing and another (by which, to be sure, he both divinely exercised the power of miracles, as being God by nature, and underwent the experience of passions and sufferings, as being man by nature for our sake, in the actual danger of those things)—their attack would not be entirely devoid of all probability. But now, since they do not say this, but assert that these belong to the same [person] and refer them to the same [person], whence and by what reasoning do they infer many agents? And why, if it is reasonable, do they not first associate the "many" with themselves, so far as the many operations are concerned? For just as two [operations] give two [agents], so surely, by necessity, the many [operations] also will give many [agents]. Unless, however—for I do not grasp that they achieve this, nor do I think anyone else does, while preferring the truth of the "many" over its veneer and false estimation— ^C how again, on the other hand, so to speak, do they oppose the one against the many in him? And what is this [one operation], and how do they teach and deliver it? For it is not possible for the same one to have "many" and "one." For if "many," then not "one"; and if "one," how then "many"? For in the opinion of those who, in order to overturn the two natural operations, obtrude one operation, either that one certainly expels these, or these expel the one. But if perhaps they say it is a single thing fused as if from many, it is not possible, nor does nature allow, as has been said, that things which are in a subject admit of composition. But neither, again, can one that is from many be divided into many. Therefore, they should first remove the many through the one operation, so that they do not, by contradicting themselves, introduce many agents. And again, through the many [they should remove] the one, so that they do not ^D declare a fusion of substance, and thus wage war against those who advocate the two, provided they are not weak. For it is not at all possible for those who destroy themselves along with their own [arguments], and who have absolutely nothing else to rely on in this matter, to attack others with greater force. For [that which] has a basis, that which is, [is established] by him.

NOTE. [Had they wished], it was easy from this to acknowledge his twin operations, as also his natures; and not so strictly to oppose Leo, because he said that each form acts with the communion of the other; since we use such terms promiscuously in natural things, and we no less say that the soul and mind understand, and the body sees and feels, just as [we say] a man, or Peter or John, performs these same things; whatever may be the case regarding the distinction of the principle of action, as well as that of "elicitive" and "denominative," as it is customary for philosophers to speak and to dispute.

^A They overturn it themselves, nor do they require anyone else’s help for that matter. For that which has a foundation and is based upon it adheres firmly in itself, nor does it fear fall or defect from any other source. For only that is vigorous and robust which has the truth as its foundation; it is not prone to dissolve or perish through another, let alone from oneself.

Having dismissed these things, it is altogether fitting that we who cultivate piety and the upright faith should confess that both natures—in the one Word made flesh—in reality remain preserved and exist, and we must by all means confess the innate energy, just as we do the will. And through the pious and most truthful opinion concerning each—both the divine and the human—and through the affirmation of those things which naturally belong to Him, we must confirm the orthodox teaching of the holy Fathers, which they have handed down to the holy catholic Churches of God regarding Him; and we must not deny any of those things which were from the beginning, and which He later became for our sake, nor any of the properties that ^B naturally distinguish them. For they have taught that both are perfect, and that the same one is in both, preserving without lack the natural property of each of those from which He existed, being in all things like us, and likewise tempted in terms of will, sin alone excepted.

Listening then to these blessed voices, we deny absolutely nothing of those things that are ours and natural, nor of those that are paternal and divine, in the same One; but we teach that He has distinct natures and natural operations and essential wills, that is to say, two. For neither our nature nor the paternal nature exists outside of essence, or lacking an innate will or operation. Since this is so, it is ^C indeed manifest that He who from these (that is to say, divine and human nature) exists in one and the same person, being truly the same God and man, is consubstantial with us and endowed with the same operation and innate will as a man, and is consubstantial with the Father and endowed with the same operation and will as God; totally akin to those above, according to all by which their affinity consists; and totally akin to those below, according to all by which their affinity exists in them, provided you except only sin. And whoever does not teach and profess this does not accept the divinely inspired Fathers who proclaim these things; it is evident ^D what manner of men he chooses to follow.

May God grant that we all, through the intercession of your god-pleasing prayers, in the temple of God, the catholic and apostolic Church, guarded in soul and body throughout, may profess this sincere and orthodox confession of our great God and Savior before Him and before all creation, and for all, and before all in glory—

^A to offer to Him at His most glorious appearing, and to be deemed worthy of the same from Him, and to partake of the eternal and blessed gifts promised to those who do not shamefacedly confess Him before men, and to enjoy them by experience according to our prayer, of which we have now by divine favor tasted a foretaste, through the prayers and intercessions of our most glorious and most holy, undefiled Lady, the Theotokos and ever-virgin Mary, and of all the saints. Amen.

SCHOLIA

1. The invisible is a negation of the visible. While it is enunciated, it is not enunciated in order toward sight, but toward that which is visible: which is its habit, that which is not invisible; or toward that with which it has a habit, that which is not invisible. Sight, however, is a habit not of the invisible, but the blindness is the habit in relation to which it is enunciated.

2. Against those who say that nature does not exist ^B without a hypostasis (which does not truly exist; lacking subsistence or person), it must be countered that it is not possible for a hypostasis to lack essence. Then it must be added that just as to call a hypostasis "not lacking essence" does not present it as being this essence. For thus to divide and confuse is to disrupt, the one part being of theology, the other of the mystery of the dispensation. Thus, neither does saying that nature is not without a hypostasis introduce the hypostasis.

OF THE SAME: Definitions of the distinctions by which things are separated.

^C Every distinction of things by which they are separated is either by way of contrariation or by way of opposition, that is, according to the reason by which they are disjoined or by which they destroy one another. For example, things which are perceived by the senses and things which are understood by the mind possess contrariation, as they are of distinct substance and nature (they call them "disparate"), yet they are not mutually opposed or conflicting. For they are not of such a nature as to destroy one another: and this is the cause that they receive a discernment relative to one another according to contrariation, that is, division. Life and death, however, possess a discernment, not that which is according to contrariation, as just explained, but that which is according to opposition, by which, namely, they destroy one another. For the ^D position of the one is the sublation of the other; the existence of the one is the non-existence and cessation of the other. Therefore, if anything is primarily opposed to another, it is also altogether and in consequence marked by contrariation. But if anything is primarily contrary and marked by division, it is not absolutely and consequentially opposed. And, to speak more clearly, substances indeed allow for a distinction between themselves toward contrariation through the differences that exist in them, as soul and body, and all things that differ essentially and by substance. But those things which are about the substance, that is, qualities, are thus separated as if by opposition (as if they were adverse).

^A

SCHOLIUM

Definitions of Unions

NOTES

(o) "The union according to relation." Turrianus renders it "according to habit," not rendering what follows, "as is the case in opinions," which it was easy for him to render, and from them to learn or explain better the force of "according to relation," according to the mind of Maximus and the theologians against Nestorius. Therefore, it is a union that is by affection, free will, and choice, when many are one by agreement, one mind, one will: "Into one will," that it may be one will, not what the same Turrianus renders, "that it may be one in wills." This one will of Christ, indeed, is for Nestorius and his "tautoboulias" (that is, consensus in the object), which is common to the saints with God, from which common class the heretic did not exempt Christ: positing no substantial union in him, nor one by the real manner of subsisting, but only one by affection (if I may speak so) and that which is by grace, in which he would have only the better part, as one who, having received from God, used it better, and from his progress had arrived at being the Son of God, not from his first existence had he existed as Son by nature. These things are thus impure and Judaical of Nestorius, against whom no one of the Catholics ought to be more indulgent, and as a crime rather metaphysical than most wickedly blaspheming against the Son of God, and overturning the whole mystery of the dispensation, he might bring it [as an accusation]. Whoever, of the ministers of Calvin in Septimania, tried not long ago to lift up Nestorius and detract from Cyril, let him keep his darkness to himself, nor scatter the new soot of Orcus—for which the Calvinistic candor, hitherto repressed by the most Christian world, is enough—into his clear youth, far from the celebrated Lyceum of the world.

(p) "The union according to harmony." The same as "apposed," commission, bond. It is properly said of animals, and from this, therefore, in buildings, the structure of which is such that stones are mostly joined to others. "Apposed," a commission of a stone, is cited from the scholium of Aristophanes.

(q) "The union according to coalition." This union, which he [the author] might be to the Greek theologians, he explains most acutely.