are torn away and replaced; just as flame proceeds from fire and is rendered back to the fire. A An union according to essence is in those things which have a different hypostasis or person. An union according to hypostasis and personal is in those things which have a different substance and nature.
QUESTIONS OF THEODORE THE BYZANTINE, THE MONOTHELITE, WITH SOLUTIONS BY MAXIMUS
B The first doubt and question of Theodore the Byzantine, deacon, rhetorician, and synodical official [note: (r)] to Paul, Archbishop of Constantinople.
If the Fathers, according to him, predicated both the will and the ignorance regarding Christ in the same manner, it is necessary that those who say the will in Christ is not to be viewed according to appropriation, C must also say that He was ignorant. And how could He be God, who does not know things that are to come? But they also introduce Him as a mere man, according to the heresy of the Agnoetae already condemned. But if, fearing the absurdity that follows from this, they say that ignorance is according to appropriation, just as they do abandonment and insubordination, let them say the same regarding the will. For the Fathers classified ignorance with the will, preserving the same rationale for it, as Athanasius says in his book against the Arians, and Gregory the Theologian in his first discourse on the Son, and others in other of their writings.
117 His second doubt and question.
If every expression and voice, which [is] not [used] by the Fathers...
NOTES
D Maximus according to their mind. The divine man surely notes that this union is used especially in theology, and is removed from that [notion] by the consensus of all the Fathers: so that we may truly understand internal emanations in God, by which the persons, the Son and the Spirit, truly proceed, who yet do not coalesce and become confused with the Father, the author, or even among themselves, but have each their own hypostasis, and that which truly exists in a person. Therefore, the "union according to conjunction" is cold indeed. Certainly, an union according to conjunction is not so abhorrent to the Trinity. For what greater conjunction is there than that by which one person is in another, and as it were permeates that person, which the Greek theologians call *perichoresis*? Therefore, there is a connection (for it is not a division and separation), but without confusion, and with a true distinction of those things which are thus joined. Greg. Orat. de Theol. Chrysost. in I ad Cor. Damasc. de Trin. [...] they are united and permeate each other without any conjunction. Therefore...
[Note regarding (r)]: ...with a great separation. It certainly implies a contradiction in terms. To me, [it implies] without any coalition, concretion, and, as it were, fusion and confusion. To Gregory, [it is] characteristic of Sabellius; [he sees] conjunction as a sort of elision, as if things that are united are reduced to one medium, with the extremes compressed, just as almost happens among grammarians in syllables. We speak in our customary way in divine matters, in which, however, it is not permitted to fall back from common usage and the voices of the Fathers, or to distort them thus. This is enough for the brevity of the short work. Perhaps he was one who presided over ecclesiastical judgments, or who was as it were for synodical letters to Paul the Archbishop. Does [it mean] as it were a defender or vindicator? What if both words are to be joined, so that one explains the other, and he is a rhetorician, whose duty it was to explain pontifical sanctions and decrees? Or [that he was] one who administered justice to subordinates according to their rationale; such as almost anyone whom bishops call an "official." I would wish for more certain monuments by which his entire office could be explained. A very boorish man indeed, who would intrude such trifles, which possess more of nonsense than of anything subtle.
an innovation that is evidently established, it is necessary that one of two things be done: either let them show that the voice of the Fathers maintains that there are natural wills in Christ, or, since they cannot show this, let them acknowledge that they are substituting their own innovation under the name of the Fathers. But if they interpret other sayings of theirs toward their own intended goal, they are inventing such names. And if the latter is worthy of censure, then so is the former.
SANCTI MAXIMI SOLUTIONES. First solution of the questions posed by Theodore, deacon and rhetor, to Marinus, priest.
The questionings coming from the rhetor, most holy and God-honored Father, do not so much possess the reasonableness of a case as they demonstrate the unreasonableness of the case; both from his falsehood and from the contention aimed at overturning the divine incarnation of the Only-begotten. For the Fathers did not, as he says, speak of ignorance in Christ according to the same reasoning as they did of the will. For who could show this, even if, as is their habit, they not only fabricate things that nowhere exist, but also boldly advance them against themselves? For otherwise, the reasoning for both ignorance and will would be the same, drawing into identity things that are entirely and strictly incompatible with one another. Since the one represents the destruction of a being, while the other represents the positing of a being, it is clearly impossible for them to come together, just as it is for a habit and its privation to exist as the same thing. For just because the divine and great Gregory enumerates the ignorance which the Arians had brought forward—that is, the very thing—it does not mean he asserted it to be the same thing as the will. For he does not even explicitly mention the will there in any place where he discusses these things. B "But do you," he says, "enumerate for me against these words of ingratitude, that is: 'My God and your God' [John xx, 17], 'greater' [John xiv, 28], 'created' [Prov. viii, 22], 'sanctified' [John x, 36], and what follows." If, because he merely included them together, they perhaps attempt to bring ignorance into identity with the will, then surely, entirely, the statement "My God and your God," and "greater," which were said by the Father, and "creating" and "sanctifying," would all be the same thing as ignorance for them because of the syntax, since he joined these to ignorance as well. And if this is a perversion of the mind, then that other thing is a still greater perversion of those who— C D
introduce these things into the mind, not only of those who dare to speak or write them. A
Furthermore, if the principle of ignorance and of will is the same: either things which go by nature also necessarily ignore, or things which by nature ignore also necessarily will. Consequently, God, who wills by nature, will be afflicted with the infirmity of ignorance, and all inanimate things, which by nature ignore, will be moved by a natural will. If this is so, then Christ himself also, who consists of divinity and humanity—having both ignorance and will according to "arrogation" (as they call it)—will also necessarily have ignorance, according to nature, against the divine will. I pass over mentioning that, even if erroneously, because they championed it through "arrogation," they have been shown to be supporting two wills, B I say, the one according to nature and the one according to "arrogation." Since these two are clearly present, along with an equal number of ignorances, it is absurd to imagine a double ignorance in Christ, who has none at all, but rather entirely eliminates all, as he is the wisdom and power of God. (1 Cor. I, 24).
But what is this "arrogation" or "vindication" that they speak of? Is it the substantial one, by which any thing whatever "arrogates" to itself those things that exist in it by nature, as things which it has by nature; or is it that which is situated in an affect or habit, by which we mutually cherish the things of others C and deem them our own, while we ourselves experience or perform none of these? If the former, they have merely declared the incarnate God to be a bare man, since they teach that he is ignorant by nature. But if the latter, they have not even left him as a man at all, but only as a bodiless God, as if he merely related to the things of the flesh by a simple affect, and not as if he were a man, naturally appropriating the things of the flesh—all the while existing and remaining God. For in the very place where he puts the ignorance, the Teacher clearly enumerates D all the things that belong to the incarnate God: for instance, sleeping, hungering, thirsting, being weary, weeping, being in anguish, avoiding, the cross, death; and with these also the resurrection and the reception into the heavens, by which he has bestowed salvation upon us, in that he voluntarily took on these things according to nature for our sake and suffered them. If, therefore, they hold that these things occurred in Christ according to that mere "arrogation" of relation, and do not maintain that they are natural to the incarnate Logos as man, what remains for them to leave to Apollinarius and Manes? For they have surpassed Severus in impiety, having spoken out even more, as if—»
A they do not teach these things as natural to the incarnate Word as man, what remains for them to leave to Apollinarius and Manes? For they have vanquished Severus in impiety, having made use of a greater blasphemy and a greater effrontery of words; for whereas he did not attack the truth with such temerity, he did usurp the word for natural properties, even though he abolished the nature of the flesh while he pushed natures, which are distinct, into one. For these things will follow those who commingle the unmingled, and reject and pervert the mind of the Father, who clearly sets all things in their proper order. Wherefore the all-praised and God-bearing teacher, in his second discourse concerning the Son, discusses these things regarding ignorance, B laying them down as a certain canon and standard, even if they have brought these things forward into our midst for the first time without interpretation, snatching away the listener with fraud: "It is evident to all that he knows as God, yet he says that he is ignorant as man, if one separates the visible part from that which can be perceived only by the mind." He determines, therefore, that ignorance is to be understood only by the distinction of substances that consists in the subtle thought of the mind; but that the natural wills, and everything else that is natural (with sin alone excepted), are known by the personal union of the double nature of the Word himself who became incarnate, as the most authoritative confirmation of those things from which, and in which, and as which he exists. If, therefore, we understand ignorance in that which is in the subtle thought of the mind, by a separate apprehension and partition, it is not properly his, which does not even pertain to us according to nature as something constitutive or marking, although they are said to be ours because of the ancient transgression, such as ignorance, abandonment, disobedience, and insubordination. For what is the principle of nature in these things for us, or what is constitutive of the substance? For this reason, we do not attribute these to Christ, as though they were Christ’s at all, nor anything else, as I was saying, of those things which are recognized in the distinction that is in the subtle thought of the mind; and very rightly so. For if we do not know the incarnate Word in a distinction, nor imagine him merely by subtle thought, but believe him to exist in the highest union of natures according to hypostasis, it is clear that nothing of those things which are accepted in the division that is in the subtle thought of the mind is his at all; but we acknowledge as his truly and solely those things which happen to be natural along with the nature, and are outside the stain of sin, which in the unity of the person and his one subsistence are truly and really preserved, and which the pious confess.
C If, therefore, they show that the will is not natural, and that it is constitutive of our substance, let them do so. But if it is natural (for man is by nature endowed with the faculty of will), then either the will, together with the other things of the incarnate Word, who has become man in substance and exists as endowed with the faculty of will according to both natures of which he consists, both exists and is known, or the other natural things along with it—I mean, of course, the natural will—will be known in the division that is in the subtle thought only in name, but not properly and really; and according to them, the theory and initiation of the whole economy, or rather the incarnation itself, will be taken by them in division and according to phantasy, with nothing natural D left in reality.
A For where there is nothing natural, there will never be a nature. Just as where there is a nature in the proper sense, there are all things that pertain to it, without omission, save only for sin. Wherefore there will be no pretext for them against the truth. For every cavil is removed, and in every way, so that if they but wished, they might embrace it with joy, and confess it sincerely with us, who believe in Him with right faith; and not lean—as if on spider webs—upon the feeble reasonings of their own minds, but rather upon those who believe in Him in an orthodox way, that Christ is in those things of which He consists, and those things of which Christ consists, these are Christ. Therefore Christ is God and man at once and simultaneously; and He is in deity and in humanity; B and He is united out of deity and out of humanity.
Solution by the same holy Maximus of the second absurdity.
To show that the Fathers speak of natural wills, we shall then demonstrate this when they are able or, to speak more properly, willing to obey, who have stopped the ears of their minds to all divine and Patristic testimonies. For if they were willing to cleanse the eye of the mind—as if from some stain or from a contentious zeal—and clearly, or rather without being occupied by any passion or desire, to apply it according to reason to the multi-luminous and sacred radiance of the teaching handed down to the Fathers, they would surely understand that they designate them as natural wills; C both from the fact that all expressly say and teach in common, “A natural appetite, and an innate appetite, and that the flesh possesses naturally the desire not to die; for this is a recognition of nature.” And how, he says, can the will be common to both? Or where would the difference of nature be shown by one will? For it is absolutely necessary that the volition be concomitant with the nature, and that the nature not desire to die, but hold fast to the present life. And just as hunger or thirst is no crime, so neither is the desire for the present life to be blamed. There is also, by nature, an innate power of love for present things. Likewise: “Since it pertains to the flesh, which He assumed for our sake with all that naturally belongs to it, even to flee from death.” D These are the doctrines, sentiments, and words of the renowned Athanasius, Basil, Gregory, John, Theophilus, Cyril, and the rest of the approved Fathers. What proof can be greater than these, so that it is manifest that they teach that the wills are natural? And what contradiction could arise, from whomsoever, when there is no ambiguity in these things that have been said, nor does anything drag their meaning into obscurity?
We, therefore, do not from this point invent novel terms, as our adversaries claim, but we confess the voices of the Fathers; nor do we fashion names according to our own thinking, so that they may serve a preconceived purpose—for this is a reckless thing, and a [index: entries preserved]
A result of heretical and manic thinking. But we piously bring forward these voices just as they were understood and spoken by the saints themselves. But what pretext, and from where, will they have, in order not to think in this way at all, but rather to hold opinions that are different and contrary to these, if indeed they wish to be pious at all and not deviate from the doctrine of the Fathers? For if they hold them to be hypostatic—that is, personal—volitions, B being ashamed of the natural ones, they will either introduce a personal diversity as well, or they will dogmatize those that are contrary to nature and the fall of the substances, driving the natures—or rather themselves—into non-existence. For there is nothing of either the personal or those things that are contrary to nature (if indeed we were to concede that anything of that kind can be said at all), since it is not known at all after the natural volitions have departed. For whether one might wish to call them divine and human, or deifying and deified, or created and uncreated, or whatever else it might please one to call the volitions in Christ, we are urged to call them natural and not otherwise, if we wish for them to signify the natural diversity of those things from which He consists. For if it is absolutely necessary, according to the Fathers, for the volition to coincide with the nature, and it is not, of course, permitted to call the volition a common one of both substances, nor does the diversity of nature become apparent through one volition, it is clear that it is necessary to speak of two natural volitions, so that, according to the Fathers, the diversity of the substances in Christ may be known without confusion and without division. What argument, then, do they have in response to this, or what arbitrary formation of names would they fashion for themselves, while interpreting the words of the Fathers according to their own purpose? And what sort of personal volitions would one who is a follower of piety and an adherent to the true faith wish to embrace, when the loss of the natural ones would result? And who would endure that He who is one should be torn asunder by a multitude of persons? But what of those that are contrary to nature? And who could endure the abyss of evil and non-existence into which they are gradually casting C themselves? Nevertheless, we are grateful to them for this: that, having ceased their fight against the number of the volitions, they have turned to explaining the nature of them—which we might, perhaps, even concede, however it might please them to name them, with the number of them cast aside, until at length, brought by the inappropriate terminology to the absurdity of the matter, and to the end that leads them to nothing, they might themselves be persuaded to confess two natural volitions according to the mind of the Fathers. Who, indeed, would not marvel at their circumlocutions and their versatile ingenuity? How, through certain periods and circuits of speech, they attempt to tear down the great mystery of the divine economy concerning us? For sometimes, by bringing forward the volition against the natural operations, through "one," as they say, they introduce to themselves one, having abolished the twofold operation. At other times, truly, by committing ignorance to the volitions, as though the volition were excluded along with the ignorance, and along with D
A what is external to these, it is accounted. Sometimes, however, by an arrogation of what pertains to nature, they deny everything entirely, and subvert the whole mystery, as I was saying; since they seize all these things in Him as if they were naked habits and affections, B and not, as is truly the case, by the power of the union in the incarnate God-man, as if they were naturally present. Whereas it would have been fitting for them not to fall away from the truth, but rather to be bent with all their might toward it, and to come to its defense—for the reason that they ought to have truly asserted and most firmly confessed that the natures of the one and the same Christ our God are in no way lacking to them, but possess everything that pertains to them. To Him be glory with the Father and the Holy Spirit, unto the endless ages. Amen.
DOGMATIC TOME OF MAXIMUS, MOST HOLY MONK AND CONFESSOR, TO MARINUS THE PRESBYTER.
Those whose reason shines with virtues, their mind is illumined by the rays of knowledge, removing from them all contagion of forgetfulness, just as those [rays] remove deception from the other, and lead them to the initiation B of the secret things, to the extent that it [the secret] has shone forth for us, and they lead them back to the imitation of Him. This, most religious and venerable Father, you have shown in C the Holy Spirit, by striving with such diligence in sacred customs and more sacred actions, that you exceed all praise—just as you have enough intensity to add even more vigorous effort; for you make the end and goal of the course a greater extension, and the end of reason you make a constant upward movement toward the Reason, so that you might both transcend nature and cast off all forms, and converse purely with the most pure, according to your submission D of self to all and toward all, and your perfect crossing-over in the mode of habit or affection: for it is He who grants, through grace, the easy and ready felicity of the course, which is comprehended by no boundaries, his...
[index: entries preserved]
A limiting and exceeding all that is finite; leading us into the Holy of Holies, where the forerunner, Jesus, who is higher than we, has entered for us, in our flesh and nature, that He may cause us to penetrate, more tenaciously adhering to Him, who from glory to glory, through the functioning of virtue, ascends together with Him, and by the alertness of the mind, passes through the heavens from knowledge to knowledge. And this, because that which is taught more occultly and in most verbose silence, with every operation of the mind withdrawn, uniquely approaches the Father of spirits in ignorance, into whom, through the gift of grace and the blessed diligence and assiduity in performing the holy work, he is moved—exceedingly and more highly than nature would seem to bear—and raises up those who lie below, like me, by extending a sympathetic hand through writing, B and through the thought hidden in language and reason, persuading me through diligence to withdraw from those who withdraw from God, and to worship, practice, and prefer love—that which unites his own and towards Himself with the whole heart—in accordance with which, as it is simple and imageless, he exhorts me to dispel all duality and the concealment of the form, both of my own intellect and of that which is visible, and to successfully attain that virtue which is truly blessed and which manifests the blessed ones, which, supported by your most sacred prayers, I might be able to accomplish, having abandoned the sin that easily besets me.
Since you are again rousing my intellect C to the task, and, wishing to cleanse the receptacle of my soul from all ignorance, have commanded me to investigate the work of the most divine and great Teacher of the holy Church of the Theopolitans—which is to say of the whole world—against the *Diatetis* (or "Mediator"), or rather, to speak properly, the *Diai-retes* (that is, the "Divider"), insofar as he perfectly separates God and us, through extreme mutation and confusion—the God who became man for our sake and the consubstantial offspring of the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ—how he says that the operation is one in Him, while yet professing that the operations are natural; I produce him as a wise interpreter and teacher of his own voice and diction, who determines this to be nothing else than the indissoluble union of the innate operations, and the result from them—I mean the work and the action—as being D indicative of these and signifying them, if anyone has shared in the calling according to the operation, insofar as it is specifically a particular and also a universal [thing]. For insofar as it is brought forward from the substantial operation according to natural property, it occupies the order of a particular, just as, on the other hand, the latter, as it brings forward, [occupies that] of a universal. For [operations] are naturally constituted to share the particulars of the calling with the general, and the universals with the...
B particulars, so that by this means they might in some way be appropriated and reckoned also in the order of the particular. The effect, therefore, as I was saying, of both those two innate operations—that is to say, the action—the Teacher, C as it gathers both together in union, and from the name derived from them, called one operation, because nothing divine or human is performed separately, but is produced from one and the same [source], conjointly and unitedly, according to the unitary interpenetration in these things. Yet he did not for that reason say that his operation was one according to substantial natural property, just as he did not say his essence and nature were one, for the very reason of the oneness of the one Person, which participates in neither of those from which it was composed. For even in the union of the natures, the distinction according to essence remains, truly preserving along with itself, essentially and intact, the distinction of those things which adhere to the natures.
And explaining this in that same book composed by him, *Adversus Diætetem*, where he had very skillfully and shrewdly distinguished concerning the natural property, which has an aptitude for operation, and concerning the operation itself, which proceeds into work and action from that aptitude, he discourses thus: "Therefore, we also confess one operation in Christ (and he adds the reason, namely, that nothing divine or human is performed separately)." But when he had shown the reason for the union by these words, he subjoins also the reason for the essential distinction, saying: "Yet not one property of his; far from it! For the property of divinity and of humanity is not the same"—that is, the one that has an aptitude for natural operation, according to his teaching. And going on again: "And to state the same thing in general in another way, it is altogether necessary that the operation of any natures coming together should be one, namely, by the communion of the union and of the result of the same; and to speak of them as one property without confusion, perhaps even in those cases where no place for confusion can be understood at all." Very clearly, therefore, by his own words, the Father has made his own meaning plain: that he did not say there was one substantial operation in Christ, lest confusion be introduced into its parts; nor altogether one that is personal, lest it should happen that he be sundered and separated from the extremes (that is to say, from the Father who is without beginning, and from the immaculate Mother). For the Person, and the things that pertain to the person, are manifestly disjointed. But what does he say? One by the communion of the union and of the result, which he defined above as work and action; giving not the slightest occasion for those who wish either to confuse or to separate and sunder, but rather driving the former far away, by showing what is primarily and by nature proper to his humanity, and what to his supersubstantial divinity; and putting the latter to flight, by allowing no sundering or separation of the operation in one and the same [person]. For the name of operation is [used] commonly of both simple
A motion and that which is considered in a relation, or is taken from the effect itself, and it brings no confusion to things, as long as the things which are understood are explained distinctly; by which we surely preserve indivisibly both of those natures that have substantially concurred, and we recognize what is proper to one nature and what is proper to the other inconfusedly, because they are united; and we recognize as well what belongs to both, as existing in the whole that is constituted [of them]; so that we neither confuse them by reason of the whole, nor sunder them by reason of the natures. But let us hold the definitions of the substances, because they are distinct, and bind the union by the definitions of one and the same person. Thus, therefore, and for this reason, that man, as if any other approved and divine Father is, as I seem to have already written, speaks of one yet double operation in Christ; noting the one, indeed, out of consideration for the union of the natural operations, as surely as of the natures themselves; and the other, [out of consideration for] their substantial distinction. And so much for these matters.
B Now as to the explanation of the passage of the theologian and great herald of the truth of the Church, Gregory, which says, "The word is modeled by man, not that which is understood of the Savior. For His will is not contrary to God, since it is wholly deified," I judge it to be anchored in a very pious intention, for which and from which, much work has been bestowed by the diligent man; yet so that he has departed somewhat from the propriety of the wording; which those who are ready and agile against everything are even more eager to assail—or, to speak more truly, against whom they rush with all their force—and they care for and hold at heart nothing else so much as searching out and criticizing with excessive curiosity even those things which are by far the most secure, and from whence no position slightly unfavorable to the doctrine and faith is open to them; still less [do they care] if they have caught some raw word from somewhere, and one which proceeded from a simple and pure mind, which this divine Father, to build up and confirm the essential and natural will of the flesh animated [and] assumed from us (namely, the human nature of the Savior), says: "For His will is wise and cautious"; from which the essential distinction is shown between it and the divine, which is the C paternal will, in no way allowing confusion to take root in the mystery of Christ. D That, however, it is pronounced with a heavy accent, as it is in certain copies, as "from God" (θεόθεν), and not rather with an acute accent, "all deified" (θεωθὲν ὅλον), gives a handle against us to our opponents, as if we were manifesting a relative and hypostatic [will], and, as it were, a union by grace and merit, because [we speak of] the saints as being from God.
But the expression "deified," precisely when uttered, does not lead the will of the Savior as man—that is, the way He wills as man (for who is able to demonstrate this?)—into sameness with the essential and natural will, nor does it present the supreme union and consubstantiality. For what is "deified," like that which is "ignited" or "illuminated," A and whatever is of that kind, necessarily brings with it toward itself that which is the relation to that which deifies, or ignites, or illuminates, such that the account of the distinction and of the supreme union is established as firmly from the one as from the other. For not being opposed is insufficient for union; for every natural thing, being also blameless, is not indeed opposed, but neither is it entirely united to God. But that which is deified is entirely and in every way united, and in no way does it undo the essential distinction, in as much as it also remains unconfused according to the union. B
If, however, someone says: "If nothing natural is opposed, what is the reason why Gregory, regarding the innate will in us—if indeed he mentions it and not perhaps another—did not say generally: 'Which obeys God,' but rather: 'Which for the most part opposes and struggles against it'? For either it is not natural, as that which struggles; or it does not struggle, as that which is natural. And therefore, something else exists in natural quality in relation to the human will of the Savior; if the latter is so, [it is] by no means [opposed]; but if the former, [it is] opposed." C We reply that in as much as it is a natural will, it is not opposed; but in as much as it is not moved by us naturally, it is clearly opposed, and for the most part struggles, to which also sin follows. For it consists in the mode of the abuse of the movement, but not in the reason of the natural faculty, that which is against reason and law. For that which conforms to the reasons of nature is formed and moved; and even if it does not have it to be united to God, it certainly has what is fitting and not opposed. For just as in nature there is no reason for that which exceeds nature, so neither is there for that which is unnatural and rebellious. D Hence the teacher did not say, nor express his meaning in these words, "That which does not follow absolutely and entirely," but he tempered it, saying: "That which does not entirely, and that which for the most part," in which is subaudited, "sometimes, and more rarely," on account of the difficulty of the many and the multitude in attaining virtue. For the human will of the Savior, even if it was natural, yet it was not simply human, as neither was His humanity itself, but as if higher than human reason, having been supremely deified by the power of the union, from which it resulted that it was immune from every true stain of sin. Our will, however, is clearly naked and simple, and in no way immune from sin, from the fact that it declines hither and thither; by which declination, nature indeed is not changed, but the movement is inverted; or rather (to speak more truly) the mode of this [movement] is changed into another.
A There is not, therefore, one humanity of ours, and another of the Savior; nor, strictly speaking, is there another will, according to the principle of nature, although it exists in another manner, for it is above us. For He was formed divinely, and in a divine manner, by reason of the supreme union with the Deity. But to adapt each of those things which in us are considered as reproachable—such as contrariety, or opposition, and whatever else falls under this catalog—even if, by subtle mental distinction, one might separate the natures and approach the next nature, and take them up together, it is by no means right to attribute these to the humanity in Christ. For if they are not viewed in us naturally, but contrary to nature and reason, how can one, even by subtlety of thought or by further mental conception, if I may so speak, attach them to Him? But [they are attributed] only by way of appropriation, out of compassion, as to the Head of the whole body, just as the diseases of the sick person are attributed to the physician, until God, having become man for our sake, should liberate us from them. Yet He consumes and causes them to vanish completely by the power of His incarnation. B For the account of passions or affections is twofold: the one belongs to censure, the other to disgrace. The former characterizes our nature, while the latter utterly deforms it. The former He received essentially, as man, for our sake, both to verify His nature and to dissolve the condemnation against us; the latter, however, He appropriated by divine economy, as a lover of mankind, being recognized in us and in our insubordinate manner, so that, as fire does to wax, or as the sun to the terrestrial vapor, He might thoroughly consume them, and bestow the participation of His own [divine qualities] upon us, and thereby render us immune to passions and corruption, according to His promise. It is therefore worth our while to approve the zeal and labor of him who has studied such things for the sake of piety, and to urge him toward a more accurate handling of the patristic texts, for the sake of those who lie in wait for good things and, out of excessive folly, do not even admit that which they cannot overturn, even if they wished to.
C I do not think that the Pope of the Romans, Honorius, in his letter to Sergius, intended to reject the two innate wills in Christ because he spoke of one will; but rather that he supported them and rightly affirmed them. For he says this, not to eliminate the human and natural will of the Savior, but to show that no will of the flesh, or D passionate thought, preceded His conception without seed and His incorrupt birth. For only the will of God and the Father, through the Son who Himself caused His own incarnation, and by the concurrence of the Holy Spirit, brought this about. And that this is his meaning, is clear from this: for when he had spoken of the ineffable union of the human and divine nature, then...
A and that God is said to have suffered, and that the humanity descended from heaven with the divinity; and by this [he meant] to show the extreme interchange of things naturally existing in each nature of the one Christ and Son, B he subjoins, saying: "Whence we also confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ." How so, pray? "Because," he says, "obviously our nature was assumed from the divinity, not sin"—that is, not from sin; speaking almost in unison with the great Athanasius, who, writing against the impious Apollinarius, says this: "He was born of a woman, [Gal. iv, 4] C raising up for himself the form of man from the first formation, in the manifestation of flesh without carnal wills and human cogitations, in the image of newness. For the will is of the divinity alone, because the whole nature is of the divinity." Since the progress of the Word's birth according to the flesh for our sake happened in a manner superior to us—for no passible will of the flesh nor cogitation preceded it, as is seen in us, on account of the pleasure and lust which, from seduction, dominates nature; but the will of the divinity alone, through the Son himself, as I was saying, by the inclined will of the Father D and the cooperation of the all-holy Spirit, making himself the author of the body assumed, within himself and through himself, renovating the mode of birth that had been implanted in [our] nature, and granting his own conception without seed from the holy Mother of God and ever-virgin Mary—considering, therefore, this ineffable reason for his birth, which is explainable by no power of words, that one [Athanasius] said: "The will of the divinity alone in him," but this one [our author] says: "One will of our Lord Jesus Christ." Because, he says, "obviously our nature was assumed from the divinity, and not sin; without carnal wills and human cogitations," as the divine Athanasius says. Yet it is not said that he, inasmuch as he was man and the same person who existed as God by nature, did not possess a human and natural will, just as [he possessed] a divine and paternal one. The same thing he also hints at in the following, saying: "He was conceived without sin of the Holy Spirit, 131 and of the holy, spotless, and ever-virgin Mother of God Mary; and was born of her according to the flesh without defilement." Furthermore, he brings forward the divine Scripture for the part of praise and reproach of the flesh.
A He brings forward a mention of the flesh, not that he might suggest that the flesh of the Lord is of another nature and substance than ours—far be it—since he knew that it was assumed from our substance, that is, from the most holy womb of the ever-virgin and Theotokos who is of the same nature as we are; but that it is "another" in terms of sinfulness, and in that it in no way had [a law] warring against it as we have in our members—the law arising from transgression—against the law of the spirit. "For the flesh corrupted by sin, which B fights against the law of his mind, was not assumed," he says, "by the Savior." For in whom the law of sin through the seed of generation did not precede, in him it does not exist at all in his members; but the law of divine justice, shining forth for our instruction, completely obliterates the law introduced into nature by transgression. For he came, he says, "the sinless one to seek and to save that which was lost" [Luc. XIX, 10], that is, the nature of the human race that had sinned. "For another law in his members, or a will different or contrary to the Father, did not exist in his members." From this he shows, not that he did not possess a human and natural C will (for it does not appear that he said this), but that, as a man, he neither possessed through his members any unnatural operation according to the body, nor according to the soul any motion of will contrary or abhorrent to reason, as is the case with us, "since he was also born above the law of human nature."
He shows more clearly in what follows that the Word had determined to separate from the Savior only the passionate, and not the natural will. And that in the natural and human will, he likewise agreed with the paternal and divine [will], having no difference from it by way of resistance; but, giving himself as an D example to us, he voluntarily subjected his own [will]. He was commending the paternal [will], so that we, too, imitating him, might abdicate our own and fulfill the paternal with all diligence, saying thus: Although it is written, "For I have not come to do my own will, but that of the Father who sent me" [Joan. VI, 38], and, "Not what I will, but if you will, Father" [Marc. XIV, 36], these are not of a different will—that is, contrary and resisting—but of the dispensation of the assumed humanity which, with an affect of pity, appropriated our own [concerns] to itself. "For he said these things because of us, to whom the Teacher of piety gave an example, that we might follow in his footsteps [1 Petr. II, 21]; and that each of us might prefer not his own will, but rather that of the Lord in all things." It is not, therefore, an abolition, as I said, of the natural and human will, but of the passionate and unnatural one; and, to speak generally, [the assertion] that all [that pertains] to the assumption of sound words, which you heard from me
is free from sin, testifies to the God who was incarnate for our sake.
And to speak concisely, through [the mention of] “one will,” I believe that he means to indicate only that the divine will preceded his birth according to the flesh. And through [the clause] “there being no difference of will,” he means that there is not a contrary or opposing will, but one that is altogether in agreement and united. Hence, whenever he says that our nature was assumed from the deity, he mentions one will; but when he brings forward [the verse], A “I have not come to do my own will” (John vi, 38), [he does so] to the matter at hand, leaving aside the number, saying: “These are not [the words] of a different will,” that is, of a contrary and opposing one, from which it is clearly inferred that there are two natural wills in the Savior. For if he did not have a contrary one, he possessed a natural one as a man. For that which is not contrary is absolutely natural, and no one will deny this; for there is nothing in nature, or in what is in accordance with nature, that is completely contrary. There is fear, therefore, of introducing B much [error]—that which he did not properly write in his own works—and of [the adversaries] contriving to make of the man’s letters a covering for their own not very good opinion, interpreting them in a way apart from his own intent. For he has reason on his side, which drives off every assault of the slanderer.
And I, for my part, assume that the sense is thus, being completely pure of all suspicion. The most holy priest and abbot, the lord Anastasius, who returned from the elder Rome—a man adorned with divine virtue and prudence, if anyone ever was—made this more certain for me. He said that he had long and at length C held conversation over there with the most holy men of the great Church regarding the letter which they had written to Sergius; [he had been] inquiring what the cause was, and how the “one will” had been inserted into it. And he found them grieving over this matter and making excuses; and, moreover, that the most holy abbot John, who had dictated it in Latin by Honorius’s order, and who was his assistant for correspondence, maintained that they had in no way made any mention in it of one will by way of a number, although this is now [something] fabricated by those who translated the letter into Greek. And they did not D consider that the natural [will] should in any way be abolished or excluded.
rather, they wish to show—by completely disposing of and taking away that which is ours [i.e., human] and susceptible to vice, and from which conflict and wars arise among those conjoined in the communion of the same nature—that the flesh that was assumed was free from all sin, according to the tradition of the most holy scriptures and the dogmas of the Fathers. And it appears that through such arguments they are in concord with what has just been explained by my insignificance, and are, as it were, sealing the defense that has been made on behalf of Honorius. B Having discovered, then, that they had made these apologies, I greatly admired their precision, just as I was struck with amazement at the craftiness of those who dare all things, even to act impiously in vain for the sake of one man, and who wish, as is their habit both of old and now, by means of certain secret thefts and misinterpretations, to draw over to themselves—a thing contrary to all expectation—those who are courageously contending against them, and to claim for themselves a mind that is in no way following them. Therefore, having learned this, I have necessarily disclosed it to you, God-honored Father, so that, having armored yourself on all sides, you may know how to repel the phalanxes of the adversaries, striking them forcefully with the Word, and in faith vanquishing them with power, having from this the glory of the Only-Begotten for a proclamation and a crown of victory, and having in him, through grace, communion and union.
C But, O most holy and, to me, honorable head, make these things known to him who presides over our blameless and orthodox faith from the seat of the pontiff, under whose wings all we who are near and those who are far away piously find rest; having found the one foundation of the most holy dogmas to be his, and through him, a blessed illumination, by the beams of which we are led by the hand and moved toward the shadowless light and the Father, in the Holy Spirit; looking toward him as the author of our salvation, next to Him who is such by nature and is the Prince, and piously directing our paths, hastening toward a life not dissolved by corruption, but established in incorruptibility—of which, just as we here partake in hope through his God-inspired prayers and God-wise teachings, so may we be deemed worthy to become partakers in reality in the future age through his deifying intercession and mediation; through which we shall obtain a dwelling and perfection in the Word Himself and God, our Lord Jesus Christ.
BY THE SAME, On quality, property, and difference, or distinction, to Theodore the presbyter at Mazarius.
I do not think that you, most holy men, have need of any other knowledge from anyone at all, since you D already possess in yourselves by...
the gift of grace A that knowledge which brings the mind to the one and only bestower of wisdom, the Holy Spirit, from Whom you also pour forth to others the divine sapience like a fount, shedding abroad your concepts through the utterance of speech, so as to extend this gift even to such lowly persons as myself—who am devoid of all reasoning—out of your own philanthropy. You stretch forth your encouragement toward divine knowledge and learning, even though I know you make use of questioning through condescension, to the end that you might move us forward, and by a supreme lowering to our level, lift up us who lie on the ground, oppressed by ignorance, to the sublime summit of your own knowledge. B By this, you cast off my sloth through your modesty, and by your questioning, you purge away the insipience of my mind. You lead me to a habit of wisdom, and to an acute and effective alacrity of soul; through which those who are granted such things attain salvation by grace, by means of those who are deemed worthy to save those who are themselves worthy.
I shall say, therefore, regarding those things in which you bade me further to inquire when being instructed—namely, regarding quality, propriety, and difference—that these are terms which, among profane authors, carry a manifold and varied significance. It would be a long task to unfold the divisions they place upon these matters, and to press the discourse forward, as that would appear less to possess the due moderation of a letter than the content of a full scholarly dissertation. To the divine Fathers, however, the explanation of these things is both coherent and concise, not taken in reference to a subject C (that is to say, substance and nature), but rather to those things which are considered within essence (and thus also in hypostasis or person). They say, therefore, that quality is indeed essential—as in man, that he is rational; or in a horse, that it is neighing—but hypostatic or personal, as in this particular man, that he is hooked-nosed or snub-nosed; or of this particular horse, that it is dappled or bay. Thus it also holds for all other created substances and hypostases, whether commonly or individually, that is to say, universally as well as particularly, contemplated in existing things, in accordance with which there is also a difference among them D regarding both kinds and...
NOTE
Sicily, in the southern littoral region between the Thermas of Philippus Ferrarius. Maximus writes willingly to those who were of the Roman diocese; or to those who, being somewhat further removed from the city of Constantinople, were able more freely both to be taught the faith and to teach it; especially in that city, which had been agitated and nearly destroyed by the long succession of Monothelite prelates, until at length, through Senior Rome, a new light of the new faith shone forth. Yet this could not remove all the rancor of spirits—even while honoring Honorius—but the result was that he shortly after explained himself in that assembly of priests who, gathering again in the Palatine Trullo under the Emperor Justinian II, in the absence of all other patriarchal sees, issued canons and did not a few things injurious to the Apostolic See; by which daring act they laid the root for schism. As the Archbishop of Iconium, Matthew Caryophilus, a man most Catholic among the Greeks, well wrote in his *Confutation of Nilus of Thessalonica on the Primacy of the Pope*. And his observation is pleasing: "In sum, whatever the Orientals did in the councils hidden from the Pope, is not to be attributed to sacred councils, but to the artful machinations of certain men." Regarding Honorius, indeed, the four Constantinopolitan patriarchs could not bear to be anathematized as heretical Monothelites, and for Honorius the Roman not to be included. And this is so, as Pope Hadrian says in the Eighth Synod, act 7: that the anathema was pronounced against Honorius after his death by the Orientals, "nor yet could any of the patriarchs or prelates bring a sentence, unless the authority of the same primary see had acceded to that matter." The Roman Church, therefore, bore this injury, as these things signify, so that by this means it might in some way soothe the ulcerated spirits of the Orientals—especially those proscribed by name from the Lateran synod—and at the risk of one man's head, put an end to the schism of so many years, and so join to itself such a great part of Christ’s flock, and thus so illustrious a one (Senior Rome, the mother, to the daughter). This is the ancient, noted defense of Honorius; this was approved; this stood unharmed for so many centuries, before it was judged by Sirlet and his followers; and it stood and remains stable, as the brightness of one truth, thoroughly supported by ecclesiastical monuments and not wavering on conjecture, always suffices: by this alone the Church wins happily, nor does it yield any wealth of its own to be traduced; but rather it hangs over their throats, this true armor like a battle-line drawn up, terrible to them.
of individuals is recognized, distinguishing the truth of things. A Regarding the unbegotten and monarchical nature, quality cannot be spoken of generally or properly. For the Divine does not grow together out of a substance and accidents, since then it would be entirely created, as being composed and conjoined from such things. Yet, improperly and as far as one might be able from human things to surmise about what is above us—since we are scarcely capable, in any other way than this, of receiving even a dim knowledge of them, or of explaining them in speech at least to some extent, even if not perfectly—a natural quality is the all-holy, the all-powerful, the all-perfect, the super-perfect, the self-perfect, the all-sovereign, the all-sustaining, and whatever else is called natural and divine, and is fitting to God alone as super-essential.
A personal quality, however, is, for the Father, the unbegotten; for the Son, the begotten; and for the Holy Spirit, the proceeding—that is, unbegottenness, birth, and procession, which they also call properties, because these belong primarily to Him alone and to no other [(γ)†], whether naturally or personally. From these, both essential and personal differences are constituted: improperly, as I said, in the case of God, but naturally and properly in the case of all created things. Whence they say that these things are identical to one another—I mean quality, property, and difference—and that they hold the account of accidents, but not of any underlying subject, that is, of substance. C They differ, indeed, in that quality is more universal and is in all things absolutely, since no thing, if you except God alone, is devoid of quality, as if it were unrelated or formless. Property, however, if you compare it with that, is particular, and is spoken of not in any manner or simply, but in such and such a certain way, and with regard to this substance and not another. Difference, moreover, is so called because it has the power of constituting, marking, and distinguishing things. Wherefore they also name it thus, calling it constituent difference, which, as I said, distinguishes the things that exist both according to substance and nature, and according to person and hypostasis, and drives away every change and confusion from all of them.
This, then, being the nature of the matter according to the teaching of the Fathers—to speak briefly, this is the discussion and explanation concerning quality, property, and difference. D But it is impossible that any of these should ever be or be conceived to exist without the underlying substance, of which each of these is, and is said to be.
A And he who does not say this has ceased to be sane, having departed from the reasoning in accordance with nature, against reason. Severus, that deranged sophist, stands alone and apart from all others in this, for he imagines and feigns for himself things that exist nowhere at all, and speaks of a difference of qualities devoid of substance in Christ, so that he may declare Him non-existent, through the destruction of the natures from which and in which He consists, and, in turn, the simultaneous destruction of the qualities themselves. For the natures being destroyed, the qualities—I mean those of which I speak—could not, even in these, be able to subsist as the underlying ground for Christ, even if the wretch does invent a composite myth about Him, and from this proceed to a perfect denial of Him. For God, or the nature of God, is not composite; otherwise, every composite nature would by nature be God. But if every composite nature were by nature God, the Father, who is non-composite, would not be God according to him; for if what is composite is by nature God, then what is non-composite is not by nature God. But if what is non-composite is also by nature God, then he who is godless and an adversary of God would be proclaiming a polytheist doctrine, having failed to know the One who is truly God, and who became flesh, while yet preserving, even in the composition of the hypostasis, that which is simple and non-composite by nature toward the Father, as God by nature and from God, even though He was born as man from men through man, above all men, by the assumption of flesh possessing a rational soul. B And this sub-human creature does not even confess that He who became incarnate is man, denying the human nature in Him, just as he denies the divine. For to Him he does not assign a dual nature, or two natures, as the Fathers do, but rather posits a certain composite and bastard nature, having zealously imitated the filth of Apollinarius. By this means, the reprobate, destroying the great mystery of the dispensation concerning us, has cunningly used the naming of terms, as a clever orator might, making the theft of the realities difficult to perceive, and, as it were, lulling the senses into accepting his impiety. For he calls Him God and man, while truly destroying the property—that is, the truth—of both names, since he does not confess the natures of which these are clearly the names. He also speaks of a "difference," while acknowledging no difference at all, since in his opinion there are no things subject by nature through which a difference and distinction might exist; so that he may introduce confusion through his "one composite nature," and establish non-existence by the denial of the natures; C and he may seem, by the assertion of terms, to conceal what he is destroying, and by the word "difference" to expel confusion. Such is the truly wicked device and invention of this ill-fated and demented man, covered by the darkness of ignorance, and casting shadows upon those who allow themselves to be caught by his fraud. D To those who contend as if on his behalf, it is worth the effort to turn our discourse and add this: that if, as you suppose, Severus follows the blessed Cyril,
A why does he not, in agreement with him, confess the natures also? Even if he recognizes the essential difference in them, as the other does, and discards only their division—why does he establish the difference in mere qualities alone, contrary to the law and definition of that man? For that the blessed Cyril confesses the natures, and also doctrine-wise asserts their difference, is clear from the fact that he does not refuse to communicate, at least in the very assertion of the natures, even with Nestorius—who is divided—even if he is entirely averse to his mind and sense. “For what,” says the Teacher, “have I in common with Nestorius? In saying two natures, insofar as the difference and distinction of the flesh and the Word of God is known. For this is one thing, and that another, so far as natural quality is concerned, and the substance is not of the same genus.” B If, therefore, he confesses the natures, and recognizes in them the difference, and piously renders the reason for the confession, saying, “Because the flesh is one thing and the Word another, in regard to natural quality” (which is the same as if you said substance and operation, regarding the difference of the Word of God), in what way does the deranged man Severus not deign to communicate even with Cyril himself, whom he pretends to honor, and equally confess the natures with him—insofar as the difference is known, according to his teaching, not only concerning natural quality, but also that the substance is not of a common genus? So that he might acknowledge the difference both of the natures and of the natural qualities—that is to say, of the substances and of the operations—and also that the substance of the flesh is not of a common genus with the Word, which is the difference according to nature, and so introduce a difference that is non-existent as regards quality (for every quality is utterly non-existent apart from the underlying substance)? He who does this maliciously, and rises up against the true teaching of the wise Cyril—which is to say, of all the God-approved Fathers—proves himself estranged from him and a companion and advocate of falsehood. C But I ask: when he speaks of a difference of qualities in Christ, does he speak of it after the union, or before the union? For if he speaks of it before the union, he certainly has in mind division, not difference and distinction; and he teaches that the union was made from things that were divided, as things pre-existing by themselves; he either dissolves the union by this difference and confession of qualities, or else asserts that these were not united at all from the beginning. And if he says they were not united, it is clear that he does not consider the natures, of which the qualities are the properties, to be united, even if he simulates saying they are. For it is not possible that some things should have been united while others were divided at the same time; but they must have suffered the same thing together, whether you call it union or division. If, therefore, rejecting division, he declares that they were united along with the natures, and their qualities, he is absolutely forced, if he would be consistent with himself in all things, either to say there is one composite quality, just as there is one composite nature due to the union—and he is convicted of not even knowing the difference in quality—but rather in both, I mean of the substances and of...
qualities, to teach confusion; or since he concedes that the qualities are diverse and distinct, not fearing division, he might say that the natures are also diverse and distinct, not being afraid, nor indeed using as a pretext the total severance to avoid and reject the confession of them. A For if, according to him, the qualities have not suffered severance—being, by his own admission, confessed as such—by reason of their difference, how shall the natures be divided for the sake of confession and difference? But if he does not acknowledge these, but only pretends to acknowledge the qualities, it is manifest that he is causing the natures to vanish, and is dogmatizing that Christ is a mere heap of qualities, just as we recognize the natures of material things which truly subsist in a subject matter, yet are not observed only in bare and naked qualities, as he describes Christ. On account of this, he calls Him a composite nature—meaning that one which he fashioned and welded together from nothing B other than bare qualities. For the difference of these things is the very thing of which he clearly speaks of the union. For the difference is not of one set of things and the union of another, but of the very same things, and no others.
Therefore, this most demented of men asserts that Christ is from qualities and is qualities, and by these he shows Him to be divided again; for he does not teach that there is one composite nature on account of the union, but teaches that there are diverse and distinct qualities in Him, since this is the best definition of union for him. But if there prevails one law for natures C and another again for qualities, it is the task of his diligence, or (to speak more truly) his bewilderment, to teach us so that we may learn how, by the union, he acknowledges two natures as one nature, but not diverse qualities as one quality; or by what logic he speaks of the difference of qualities but does not speak of the difference of natures. And how is it that the qualities have remained unconfused without difference, but the natures have remained unconfused without this? And how is it that the qualities are not divided according to difference, yet the natures are divided according to it? Or how is it that those which are not divided are not predicated with the qualities? D Why indeed does he compose the natures, but does not compose the qualities; and since those [qualities] are not united into one composite quality, why does he absurdly affirm that the others [natures] are united into one composite nature? Let anyone who is his impious lover and patron explain these matters to us as we inquire, so that by solving them he may wash away the crime, or if he is unable to do so righteously, let him bear with him the same stain of crime, and with even greater condemnation, because he dared to profess that he agrees with the Fathers, while he is most absurdly at odds with himself in all things.
These things, most God-revering master, have been spoken by me in passing, according to what you have commanded, for the refutation of the sophistries of Severus and his followers and for the beating back of their arrogance. It belongs to your mind, which is endowed with divine sense, and to your skill, to instruct and teach those who are imperfect and babes like me in greater and more perfect things, and toward a more divine
knowledge, so that you may reconcile A them to God through true knowledge of those things which exist—of which the Word himself, who is by nature above all things that exist, is the cause, our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom, through your prayers, cease not to commend me, unworthy as I am, most holy and God-honored Father.
And again, the divine Maximus.
How then could anyone ever demonstrate—even if he were the sharpest of all in inventing through falsehood things that do not exist, to be composed against the truth and the genuine faith—that the holy synod at Chalcedon, which so piously and at the same time so clearly beheld and declared these things, repudiates the definition of the Nicaean Fathers as if tossing it aside? B And if, on the ground that it indeed firmly preserves that definition, but perhaps introduces a second one, you revile and blame it, what is this second definition which, you ask, it introduces? It is, he says, the confession of two natures and the expression "in two natures." For the Nicaean definition does not contain this; but it was openly introduced by the Fathers gathered at Chalcedon, having not been previously acknowledged nor even mentioned by anyone.
But that you cannot prove even this, is manifest. For many of the holy Fathers before it both judged and proclaimed this expression to be pious; and the sermons of those who preached it are witnesses, clearer and more brilliant than any ray of the sun, even if you, either through ignorance or by pretending not to know out of malice, C make a senseless accusation against the pious Fathers and their decrees. And even if there were nothing of the sort—though, as I said, it is very much in evidence—what would prevent so many holy men (or rather, the entire assembly of Christians; for such is truly the most holy synod of the orthodox Fathers) from authoritatively issuing and sanctioning this against the Eutychian contraction?
And after some intervening words he says: By what logic, and how, do you accuse the holy synod at Chalcedon, even though it clearly made use of the voices of the Fathers, and revile and attack it with both written and unwritten words, as if it were introducing another definition of faith? "Do not judge according to appearance," as God who commanded says, "but judge righteous judgment" (John VII, 24). What is this accusation of yours against the D Fathers of Chalcedon regarding one and the same subject, and what is the refutation of those who preceded them? For if it is permitted to accuse the one at Chalcedon of having another definition of faith because of the expressions added to the definition of the Nicaean, this will certainly follow: to say the same for the same reason also against Cyril and the hundred and fifty Fathers. And if it is not possible against them, I cannot see how it is against the former. I am urged to set forth your fury and opposition regarding these unprovable things; if perhaps, being sufficiently ashamed in this way, you might be brought to shrink from your madness and from such great falsehood gathered against the truth.
A For Gregory, the defender of theology, will escape your accusation against the Council of Chalcedon no better; nay, he will be even more liable to it by your own arguments, for he himself distinctly provides what had been stated in a diminished way by the Nicene Council concerning the Holy Spirit—"because," he says, "at that time that question had not yet been raised"—associating the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, and exhorting Cledonius, by letters sent to him, to think and teach the same.
But you seem to me to imitate the condition of a weak-sighted person who, because of his own imbecility, cannot gaze upon or receive the brilliance of the sun, and blames the sun itself as if it were dark, instead of attributing it to his own weakness. So, truly, you also, laboring direly under the disease of confusion, cast out those who sufficiently and convincingly refute you as impious and inconsistent with the truth of the natures existing and whole in Christ, treating them not as common lights and interpreters of the truth, but as enemies. If it is permitted to speak truly concerning the truth: B all the Fathers chosen by God after the Nicene Council, and every synod of orthodox and holy men, did not introduce another definition of faith by the addition of their own words, as you assert—you who are most delirious men and clearly insane—but they firmly confirmed that very same one as the first and unique one sanctioned by the holy three hundred and eighteen Fathers, elucidating it and, as if by a second consideration, explaining and fashioning it for the sake of those who distorted and wrongly interpreted it and its decrees to establish their own impiety.
Therefore, the one hundred and fifty Fathers did not permit Eunomius and Macedonius, who were attempting to violate the doctrine that was about the Divinity and the faith of the Trinity, C to prevail with their own voices and dogmas. And so, too, the blessed Cyril did not allow Nestorius, who was contriving to divide the mystery of the divine incarnation and of Christ. Just as also the venerable Fathers at Chalcedon forbade Eutyches, who wished to confuse them. How, then, do you not on that account receive this one also, along with them (that is, the other synods), with the same zeal for what is good and honorable? Or, since you are haters of all that is good and honorable, why do you not attack those as well with the curses with which you attack this one? D Because you fear to do in words what you most perform in deed, namely, by commending those against this one with feigned voices of piety, you might undermine them through this one, inflicting an equal stain and crime upon them by an equal act. Who, then, could endure such audacity of yours against piety and those who cultivate piety? And what follows.
OF THE SAME MAXIMUS
Chapters on substance or essence and nature, and on hypostasis and person.
Substance, or essence, is the species itself and the nature, which
A in itself, signifies; but hypostasis denotes the particular of the substance.
That substance and "in-substantial" [ἐνούσιον] are not the same; just as neither are hypostasis and "en-hypostasized" [ἐνυπόστατον], even if both are considered in each other, yet they are different things. For the "in-substantial" is that which is viewed in nature, and does not exist by itself; but the "en-hypostasized" signifies that which is in a hypostasis, and does not happen to be in itself by itself; that is, it is not that which has come together into one from imperfect parts, but which is viewed in a concurrence according to confusion, from a perfect and an imperfect [part].
That hypostasis defines the person by its characteristic properties. But the "en-hypostasized" signifies that which is not a self-subsisting accident, but which has its being in another, and is not viewed in itself, nor does it exist subsistent by itself, but is always viewed around the hypostasis, just as qualities, both those called essential and those called accidental; which are not substance, nor [do they exist] by themselves, but exist in substance, and without this they do not have being. B
That just as neither of the qualities, that is, the essential and the accidental, is substance, or a thing subsisting by itself, but always possess their characteristic property around the substance, just as color in a body, and knowledge in a soul; for it is not possible to say that color appears without a body, or that knowledge is active without a soul; so neither is it possible to conceive of the "en-hypostasized" or the "in-substantial" without substance or hypostasis. For they do not have existence of themselves, but are always viewed around the hypostasis.
That it is not necessary either to gather the "en-hypostasized" into a hypostasis, or to determine the "in-substantial" into a substance.
That the claim of some, that nature is not "un-hypostasized" [ἀνυπόστατος], is indeed correctly said by them, but not correctly understood; and that "un-hypostasized" should not lead to hypostasis, but rather be viewed in the hypostasis.
That just as if someone says, "There is no body without figure or without color," he speaks correctly, but not C correctly... D
if he does not connect the non-hypostatic to a hypostasis.
For nature would never be non-hypostatic, A nor yet is nature a hypostasis; nor is that which is non-hypostatic viewed as hypostasis. Since it does not convert. For while the hypostasis is entirely and necessarily also nature, just as the figure is entirely and necessarily body (for it is not possible to conceive of a hypostasis without nature, nor again of a figure or color without a body), nature, however, does not necessarily exist also as a hypostasis.
Nature holds the common definition of "to be," B while hypostasis holds also that of "being in itself."
Nature holds only the definition of the species; hypostasis is also indicative of the "something."
From the most holy Clement, presbyter of Alexandria, from the book De Providentia (On Providence).
Substance in God. God is divine substance, something sempiternal and without beginning, C incorporeal and uncircumscribed, and the Author of things. Substance is that which is truly existent on all sides (that is, subsistent). Nature is the truth of things, or the substance of things; or, as others think, the generation and origin of those things that are produced into the nature of things: but as others, the providence of God, bestowing upon things that come to be that which is the "to be," and the "how it is to be."
Definition of hypostasis, by the most wise Maximus.
A composite hypostasis is a certain composite substance, D encompassing all the individual properties that are in those particular individuals. For that which is considered commonly in the individuals under the same species is the mark and note of the essence or nature; primarily indeed in the individuals subject to it; but generically, that which is common to all the individuals under the composite species.
Seven chapters of blessed Eulogius, Pope of Alexandria, on the two natures of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ.
If our Lord Jesus Christ is of one nature after the union, I ask, of whose is it? Of that which assumed, or that which was assumed? And what has become of the other? But if both exist, how are they one, unless one composite [nature] has been formed from both? And if this is so, how is Christ not of a different substance from the Father, who is devoid of all composition?
If our Lord Jesus Christ has never been acknowledged as being of double nature, how is it possible to say that Christ is of one nature after the union, or at all to say
that he was at one time of two natures, and at another time became of one?
Is God the Word of the same substance as the flesh taken by him, or is it of a different substance? But if it is of the same substance, how has the Trinity not become a quaternity? And if the flesh of God the Word is of a different substance, how is Christ not of two natures? A There are some who speak of one incarnate nature of God the Word — and I think that you also speak this way. But if this must be understood as meaning that the substance of God and the flesh are one, how is it possible that the created should be the same as the uncreated, and that which is eternal the same as that which is subject to time? And if it is simply because one nature holds another, or is held by another, who would endure to call one and one not two, but one? B If there is one nature of God the Word and of the Father, how is there not one nature of God the Word, and of the Father, and of the flesh? If in no respect are God the Word and the flesh two, why are they not in every respect one? And if God the Word and the flesh are in every respect one, how will the Word not be flesh, and the flesh the Word, co-eternal with the Father and consubstantial just as God the Word is? But if God the Word and the flesh are not in every respect one, how is it not the case that in some respect God the Word and the flesh are two? C If it is impossible for God the Word and the flesh to be united more than God the Word and the Father are, how can God the Word and the flesh, when united, in no respect be two?
Concerning substance, nature, and hypostasis.
Substance or essence is that which signifies what is common and uncircumscribed; for example, "man." For whoever says this has signified the common nature, without circumscribing by the term any particular man who might be designated privately by name or be properly a single man.
Nature is that which is considered in all things that receive the predication of the same species.
Hypostasis is that which exhibits and circumscribes in some particular individual that which is common and uncircumscribed; such as, for instance, "this man."
Hypostasis is that which, along with the universal, has also something particular.
Nature, according to those outside, is the principle of motion and rest.
Nature is a certain substance and quality for every being.
Nature is called [in Greek] as if from "being born."
The first substance is whatever exists truly by itself, such as a stone. The second substance is that which has the power of growth, such as a plant that grows and diminishes. The third substance is living and sentient,
such as an animal, a horse. The fourth substance is living, sentient, and rational, namely man. Hence he was also created last, as one who possesses a soul immaterial in nature in common with all, and a mind that is the image of God.
OF BLESSED MAXIMUS, That it is impossible to speak of one will in Christ.
The name Christ signifies not a nature, but a composite hypostasis or person. That is to say, the whole Christ is both Lord and God, and omnipotent, possessing in himself also that which, for our sake and for our salvation, He bore inseparably and unconfusedly, namely, passible and not omnipotent flesh—created, visible, circumscribed, not omnipotent by nature, but possessing a will that is omnipotent in Christ. For Christ is not mortal and immortal, nor again weak and omnipotent, visible and invisible, created and uncreated by hypostasis; but the one is by nature, the other by hypostasis and person. And to speak in a word, it is not through a contrariety of purpose, but in the property of nature. For Christ, as I said before, is one, possessing both natures naturally. For that which He says, "Not as I will, but as Thou," shows nothing else than that He truly put on flesh, which was affected by the fear of death. For the fear of death, and the fleeing from it, and the anxiety, belonged to that [flesh]. Now, therefore, He leaves it abandoned and stripped of its own power, so that by revealing its weakness, He might also establish its nature. At another time, however, He does not conceal its operation and power, so that you may know that He was not merely a man. For just as if He had always exhibited human things, He would have been thought to be only man; so also if He had always performed the things that belong to the Deity, the doctrine of the dispensation would not have found faith. Therefore, He varies and mingles both words and deeds, so that He may not provide an occasion for the sickness and fury of Paul of Samosata, nor indeed for that of Marcion and Manichæus. Therefore, He both foretells what is to come as God, and again refuses it as man.
You who refuse to say or acknowledge two wills in the one and only Christ—as for this one will which you speak of in Him, is it something eternal, coeternal, and consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, or is it, in its quantity, entirely divine, simple, and devoid of all composition, as belonging to the divine essence—or does it seem to you to be something different on account of the assumption of humanity? Designate what that is, and tell us the name of this will. For as for the name of the will which preceded the assumption of humanity (that is, the divine will), I declare the name. For just as the divine nature which exists in the three persons is without beginning, uncreated, beyond all thought of the mind, simple, and devoid of composition in its totality, so also is its will. Behold, therefore, I have spoken of that which precedes the assumption of humanity; and all will agree with me, as one who has spoken the truth. And you yourself, whether you wish it or not, will agree. Tell us, therefore, [what is the case] after the assumption of humanity, what name does it have? Search the whole Old and New Testament. Tell us of this one will which you find in Christ;
search, and do not be sluggish. But A if, because the divine will is called divine, and the human will is called human, you might say that Christ has a theandric will? I do not think so. For neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit has a theandric will. But might you dare to call it composite? In like manner, this is B something new to the Godhead. But might you say it is a natural will? You yourself will introduce confusion, after the manner of Severus; for it is impossible that two natures, or two natural wills, should become one nature or one will without confusion intervening. But are you going to say it is a personal will? You will again make the Son alien to the Father, and you will appear to introduce three wills that do not agree with each other, just as [you do with] the persons. C If you say there is one will and operation as of one, you will be forced, will you or nill you, to call the will and operation of the Father one, as of one, and that of the Spirit one, as of one, and the doctrine will be found to be laboring under the error of polytheism. If you say it is one that is posited in affect or habit, you introduce a personal division by the error of Nestorius. But if you also call it "unnatural," you corrupt the substance of the one willing and that which exists. For that which is unnatural adopts the stain of corruption and the destruction of nature, as the Fathers defined. But are you again about to tear D the unity into pieces and force us to calculations and thirds and halves of this one will which you put forward, so that we might be able to know how much is human: and likewise how much is uncreated, and how much is created; and, in a word, whatever you might prefer to call it? Tell us the name of the will which you advocate in Christ. But if, in your opinion, the will which you call one in Christ has no name, assign it to the catalogue of nameless Psalms, so that it might find a place and seat there, at least. For as far as we are concerned, most learned sir, we can never confess anything that is devoid of a name; but, as is likely, it has not yet been revealed to any of those born of earth. Therefore, write down decisively from the teaching of the Fathers, and define for us the declaration of the name. For what we number, these we also confess, according to the great and God-manifesting Basil. I say, that the life-giving flesh of the Son of God, in the God-Word himself, has obtained all the excellent things of its own nature; and that the two natures constitute one person and one hypostasis of the God-Word. For we worship one Son, as one of the holy Trinity, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, as before all ages, now and unto all ages, and unto the ages of ages. Amen.
BY THE SAME
Ten Chapters on the twofold will of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ. Written, however, for the orthodox.
1. As, besides the persons of the holy Trinity, the Word is of one hypostasis...
A with the flesh, so likewise, in the view of some, blessed ones, there is one will; it is necessary that, as by hypostasis and person, so also by will, he should differ from us and from the Father. But how can it be shown that, because the wills differ, his nature is the same as the Father’s?
2. To those whom the Word is one with the flesh, by these he is separated from the Father; and by those whom he has unity with the Father, by these he is distinguished from the flesh. If there is one will with the flesh, as some think, blessed ones, then by that will he is separated from the Father.
3. If by those things in which the Word is united to the Father and to the Spirit, he is judged to differ from the flesh—but he is united, according to the common opinion of Christians, to the Father and the Spirit by will—then [it follows that] by his will he differs from the flesh, just as the Fathers B themselves decreed for themselves and for us, and which we, blessed ones, strive to keep.
4. It is necessary for them, blessed ones, to say that this one will is either natural or personal; since everything that exists is considered in substance or essence, and in person. For what else could it be permitted to say, to whom it is not permitted? But if they should say that it is natural, they will say—whether they wish to or not—that the nature of the Word and of the flesh is also one. But if they say it is personal, it will be necessary, since there are three persons of the holy Trinity, that they also say there are three wills, if indeed they desire to speak with consistency in their statements.
5. If the will of the Word’s nature is the creator of all things that have been made, and this, according to their opinion, blessed ones, is also the will of the flesh, then it is C manifest that the flesh of the Word will be the creator of all things that have been made; and thus the common opinion of Christians, that it is a created thing, is overturned. For how is that which is created a creator out of nothing, and possessing the prerogative that is peculiar to the divine nature?
6. If because of the one will of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, one nature of them was shown by the God-inspired Fathers, then if there is one will, according to them, blessed ones, of the Word and of the flesh, there will also be, in this way, one nature of the Word and of the flesh. But if in the flesh and the Word the one will does not imply one nature, neither does the one will in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit imply one nature; and thus our faith is empty, and the preaching of the Fathers will be empty D.
7. This one will is either a matter of intent, or it is natural. But if it is natural, there is also one nature, as we have already shown, of the flesh and of the Word.
[alt-version omitted]
NOTÆ (i) If by the one will. No, as Turrianus, whose eleventh opusculum this is, joins this clause to the previous one; by which he is forced to number it the tenth, as it has the character of an epilog. His codex may have had what he renders, "Deinde, si," yet nothing supports this, as it is not a new sentence or argument, which the Greeks are accustomed to attach to others with such particles, just as the Latins often do. The title in the Turrianus codex and the Roman one differs slightly: the latter's is the Roman one, which I have represented.
A and if it is of the power of choice, then just as in subsistence, so also in judgment will Christ be separated from the Father and the Spirit.
8. If, according to the great Cyril, things that are of the same substance and nature are also of the same will, how can things that are not of the same nature be of the same will?
B 9. If the flesh, according to the golden-mouthed John, naturally possesses the unwillingness to die, and the Word united it hypostatically to Himself without change, along with all the properties naturally inherent in it, how do they, by denying the things naturally inherent in it, not also deny the nature itself along with its natural properties?
C 10. If they say that with the will, a person is also introduced, and for this reason, fearing a fear where there was no fear [i], they cannot endure to speak of two wills in Christ, lest two persons should necessarily be introduced along with them—they will be forced, if they wish to show the reason of their own dogma to be well-connected, either to say also one person on account of the one will of the Godhead (since, according to them, the person necessarily follows the will), or, because of the three persons, to posit also three wills, thereby introducing Sabellius’s contraction and Arius’s division.
For indeed, blessed ones, the conception of the same names in a dissonant and varied sense (in Greek, [ὁμωνυμία]) causes error not rarely, while the hearer passes to a different significance than that which the discourse indicated; I beseech your prudence in Christ, for the sake of a clear and unconfused declaration of the things signified, that I might explain to you before all else whether a will truly exists at all, and of what signifi- D cates or things such a name is predicated; and whether, of the things designated under it, some are composite and others simple; and which ones are the composite ones; and whether the composite ones have parts that are simultaneous in time, or are not simultaneous; and which are prior to others, and which are posterior; and finally, what is the demonstrative and defining reason for each part, so that we may possess an understanding of the one will through the reality itself and the sense itself. For the Fathers’ discourse was not about words, but about things 38. Whence we have found the Fathers conceding words, but by no means thoughts. In addition to these, what is free will, what is judgment, and what is a sentential will, and what is a choice? For all these want to converge toward the presentation of wills. And he who does not know these with precision, and yet discourses about wills, is a blind man groping with his hands, knowing neither what he says nor about what he asserts.
OF THE SAME: From the questions proposed to him by Theodore the monk.
A Nature is, according to the opinion of the philosophers, the principle of motion and rest; but according to the Fathers, it is the species which is predicated of many things differing in number, in response to the question "what is it?" Substance is, according to the opinion of the philosophers, the thing itself truly existing in and of itself, which for its subsistence needs no other thing; but according to the Fathers, it is the natural entity which is predicated of many things distinct in terms of their persons (or subsistence). An individual is, as the philosophers think, a collection of properties, the sum of which cannot be seen in any other thing; but according to the Fathers, it is as, for instance, Peter or Paul, or any other singular person, distinguished from other men by his own personal properties. Hypostasis is, according to the philosophers, substance with properties; but according to the Fathers, it is each individual man, personally distinguished from other men.
B
From St. Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, disciple of St. John the Apostle and Evangelist, from the things he wrote to Demetrius, deacon of Vienne, concerning the faith, the beginning of which is: "You who seek God, hear David saying."
The will and operation of God is the cause which is the maker of all time, and place, and age, and of every nature, and it is the reason of Providence. The will of the intelligent mind is the reason existing in us; for it is its free faculty. The will is [the] mind joined to appetite; and appetite is that which proceeds from the reason of the mind, tending towards the thing that one desires.
Of Clement the Stromatist, from the book On Providence.
Will is a natural faculty, having the power of desiring that which is by nature. Will is a natural appetite, fitting for the nature that uses reason. Natural will is the free movement of the mind, which is its own master; or the mind which freely moves concerning something; or the movement of the intelligent mind, being its own master and powerful.
C
NOTES
D The Turrianus codex was desired; these reflections seem to be those which are subject here, after that brief excerpt of the "Responses to Theodore the presbyter"; as also the famous Lucas Holstenius thought, and wrote from Rome. Indeed, these are the very things by which Maximus abundantly frees his faith, and sets forth the doctrine and tradition of the Fathers concerning the natural will and operation so clearly, with such power and abundance, that nothing seems to be missing from his work; and by these, the most impudent mouths of Sergius, Paul, and the other leaders of the Monothelite heresy are most fully refuted—those who boasted either that the Fathers did not mention it, or that it was a matter of indifference whether a single or a double operation and will were spoken of, as if neither pertained to the faith, and as if it were enough for him [Sergius] to have been consulted, and for the part of the dissidents to be silenced; which was indeed the first thing decreed by Honorius, both by circumscribing Sergius, as the Christian Lupus says, and because he hoped that the Theodosians and other Severians would be brought over by that indulgence. However, his decree was approved by none of his successors; his intent was excused, so that he might not be noted by the Lateran Synod with the same verdict as the Ecthesis and the Type. The aforementioned Lupus, in the 5th chapter of his Notes to the Sixth Synod, reports that the long series of those who spoke the same things as the heretics, and whose own words were proscribed in them, were themselves not inscribed among the heretics, and that those who spoke in this way were treated more benignly.
A From the Epistle of Saint Alexander, Pope of Alexandria, to Eglon, Bishop of Cynopolis, against the Arians: Natural will exists as the free faculty of every intelligent nature, such that it has nothing involuntary which pertains to the reason of its essence.
From the book *On the Soul* by Saint Eustathius, Patriarch of Antioch: Natural will is the motion of the reason that exists within us. Will is a rational and vital appetite.
From the greater discourse *On the Faith* by Saint Athanasius, Pope of Alexandria: Will is the free motion of an intelligent soul. The first property of an intelligent soul, and the indication and mark of its essence, is will. The sense of the Lord is not yet the Lord, but rather is will, or operation, or virtue. B
From the book *Against Apollinarius* by Saint Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa: Will is a certain mind and sense, and an affection directed toward something. Liberty is the motion of the will being master of itself. Will is that whereby the intelligent soul chooses things according to its judgment, through elective volition. The will of every nature that uses reason is its natural life. The deprivation of such life is the destruction and removal of the essence.
From the sixth chapter of the *Moralities* by Saint Diadochus, Bishop of Photice: Liberty of will is the will of a rational soul directed toward whatever it may wish, unfolding itself without any impediment. C
From Saint Anastasius, Patriarch of Antioch: Will is a word revolving in the heart, which cannot be manifested except through operation. Will is an incitement of a willing soul, which cannot be curbed unless by itself.
From Saint Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa: Will is an appetite with deliberation, concerning those things that are in our power and can be done by us, and which have an uncertain outcome.
From the same: According to what reason man is free; and what is internal word (inward-dwelling reason), and what is external word (uttered reason). D Internal word is the motion of the soul occurring within the reasoning faculty itself, without any vocalization; whence we often, while silent, run through a whole discourse within ourselves, and converse in our dreams. According to this, we are all especially endowed with reason; but not according to the external word. For those who are deaf from birth, and those who have lost their voice due to some passion or disease, are nonetheless rational. But the external word has its operation in the voice and in dialects.
A Of St. Maximus, from his syllogisms concerning wills: what is a natural will, and what is a volitional [gnomic] will? A natural will is the impulse and desire for things constitutive of nature, existing simply and in the same way. A volitional will is a certain varied motion and appetite for things conducive to pleasure.
Of the same, from his letter to Marinus the presbyter: what is will, and what is choice? They say that will is natural, that is, the faculty of will. Seek further below in the same letter, concerning counsel, opinion, prudence, belief, and power.
VARIOUS DEFINITIONS
Of our holy and divinely inspired Fathers, concerning the two operations of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ.Of St. Justin the philosopher, and finally martyr, from his book against Euphrasius the sophist, concerning Providence and Faith, which begins: "The Intemerate Word."
If God has a will running concurrently with his nature, as well as an operation (for God is always possessed of the faculty of will and the nature of operation), then no thing endowed with the faculty of willing shall be of the same natural will and operation as Him; for otherwise, it would entirely be of the same nature as He. Regarding operation and nature, however, God knows no circumscription.
Of the same, from the same book.
The operation of every substance is a quality that belongs to it from nature and immutably. Natural and constitutive operation is the defining difference of the nature of the thing that is signified, without which it is impossible to discern the "how it is" of any thing at all.
B Natural operation is the essential and constitutive quality of any substance whatsoever; lacking which, it lacks all substance as well.
Natural operation is an essential force or faculty, not allowing any thing to receive a change from one state to another (in what pertains to essence) through a conflict of qualities.
Natural operation is a force keeping the essential distinction of other things from one another unmixed.
Of St. Alexander, from his letter to Aeglon, bishop of Cynopolis, against the Arians.
Natural operation is the innate movement of any substance whatsoever. Natural operation is the substantial and notifying reason of any nature whatsoever. Natural operation is the notifying virtue of any substance whatsoever.
Of Gregory of Nyssa.
The operation of a soul using reason is the movement of the mind [*].
[*] This [is found] in the first [part of] this treatise.
thought and thought. Operation is an essential motion distinguishing nature, whose property it is; by it, it is known as essentially distinct from others. Operation is an efficacious motion. And it is called efficacious, because it is moved by itself. For we say that operation is the natural power and motion of each substance, without which a nature neither exists nor is known. For of intellectual beings, it is thought; of sentient beings, it is sense, by whose reason they both naturally reach out to things outside them, and are subject to things outside them. Of flying creatures, it is flight; of swimming creatures, the power of swimming; of creeping creatures, creeping; of walking creatures, walking; of plants, germination. And to sum it up in a word, we call natural operation the property by which each nature is marked. That which lacks this is nothing at all. For that which is, since it is a participant in some substance or essence, will entirely be also a participant in the power that naturally declares it. For true reason knows the definitions of substances to be their natural operations and powers. For the soul that uses reason, the operation is its own mental thought and motion. The operation of a rational soul is its life according to nature. A
Of Chrysostom.
The essential operation of God is to be nowhere; not by the reasoning that He does not exist, but that He is superior to place and time and nature: to which by nature are conceived as companions, beginning and end and birth: who preserves things by His will alone, and brings them into being. For without natural operation, the nature of nothing is manifest. For as an identifying mark, and its certain index, the Creator of all things imbued each nature with a motion essentially distinguishing it from others. B
Of Saint Cyril.
Operation and divine power is to be everywhere; to fill heaven indeed, in a way that no one could express in words; and again to fill the earth; and indeed to permeate all things, yet to be contained by nothing. For He is not of such a kind that He can be comprehended, or defined by any interval; nor is He contained by the ambit of any circumscription. For he who is devoid of quantity and bulk and body, will never be subject to these. C
Of Saint Basil.
Since the definition of every substance is its operation according to nature; as, for instance, a token leading the mind to the nature from which it proceeds; of those whose operation is one and the same, of these also the substance is one. D
Of the same, from the books Against Eunomius.
How can there be a diversity of substance, in which identity of operation is recognized? For since substances are different, it is necessary that the operations also be different. How is the Spirit not of the same substance as the Father and the Son, who is of the same operation? How is there a diversity of substance in the Trinity, in which identity of operation is found? For if according to substance it will possess in an immutable way, and
according to power—and if the power is equal, then the operation is also certainly equal in every way; and those whose nature is one, theirs are also the same operations. B
*Of Saint Gregory of Nyssa.* Therefore the identity of operation in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit clearly shows the immutability of the nature. But we can come to know the nature of the one who acts through the discernment of the operations. That the nature is common is openly demonstrated, insofar as one and the same operation bears witness to it. But God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Holy Spirit; yet there is one God in the same proclamation, because neither of nature nor of operation is any difference perceived in the Godhead. If then both operation and power are one, how is it possible to understand a difference of nature in those in whom we find no difference at all regarding power and operation?
It is entirely necessary to confess that the free faculty of the will is also appropriate for and responsive to the nature, and that if they were dissimilar according to nature, the wills would always be dissimilar as well. Since, however, the power is sufficient in both, neither will be lacking in strength for the fulfillment of its own will. Therefore, if we were to see the operations performed by the Father and the Holy Spirit as different from one another, we would infer from the diversity of the operations that the acting natures are also different. For it can never happen that things which are separated according to the logic of their nature should converge into the same genus of operations (for fire does not cool, nor does ice warm), but along with the diversity of natures, the operations that proceed from them are also separated from one another. C
*Of Cyril.* For things that have obtained the same nature as one another will act in the same way. But for those for whom the logic of their mode of existence is different, the logic of the operation in all things would not be the same. Things that possess the same operation and make use of the same natural powers are necessarily of the same substance. For no thing, when compared to something of a different genus and different substance, will possess the same powers and operations without any variation or distinction. For it is proven that those things which are of the same operation are of the same substance. That things of a different nature and different genus should have the same operation, no one who is of sound mind would grant. For fire will not perform some one thing identically with water; but just as they have a discrete logic of substance and quality, so too they will yield a different operation. D For those in whom the operation and power are one without any distinction, for them it is necessary that the community of genus also persist intact. For things that have the same operation love to be of the same substance, and diversity in their nature lacks all probability. For truly we will not grant one operation to God and to the creature, lest we either reduce the creation to the divine substance, or else bring down the singularity of the divine nature to that which is appropriate to things that have been
A brought into being. For those things which have one operation will also have one and the same definition of how they exist.
*From the holy Ambrose, bishop of Milan, from the second book to the Emperor Gratian.*
How indeed can the same operation exist from a different substance? For the lesser does not operate as the greater operates. For where there is a different substance, it is impossible for there to be one operation.
*From the holy Basil, from his syllogisms against Eunomius.*
"It is one thing that operates, and another is the operation, and another is the thing operated upon, and these are very far removed from each other." For the one operating is that which is moved to operate. B But the operation is, as it were, a movement of operating, and is itself, as one might say, the appetite of the will, stretching and tending toward the operation of something; and as soon as it has chosen, it ceases and finishes, and having been moved, it quickly passes away. But [the things] operated upon are those that are accomplished and subsist from this [operation].
NOTICE CONCERNING THE DISPUTATION OF SAINT MAXIMUS WITH PYRRHUS
This disputation was famous, held in the public assembly of the Prefect of Africa, the bishops, and religious and illustrious men; and, as it seems, it was taken down by notaries, and written up not so much by Maximus himself as by them, as was customary in solemn disputations of this kind; which I believe I have detected in the word *parasemeiosis* (σημείωσις), which occurs immediately in the title. For it is as if the disputation were written down in notes and reduced to commentaries and acts; and I have expressed this in the version by rendering it *Acta* ["Acts"], although Turrianus, from whose version Baronius represents it at the end of volume VIII, simply renders it: *Questio ecclesiastici dogmatis* ["A Question of Ecclesiastical Dogma"]: nor does he dwell much on the words of its title; which are sufficiently prolix, and it seemed to me to render everything, so that it serves as a kind of argument of the work, and an intimation of the event is not useless to the reader. It is certainly a great thing that, while Africa was being disturbed by the flight into it of Orientals and Greeks, [and] by the new heresy [and] the arrival of its ringleader Pyrrhus, the ex-patriarch, *genomenou patriarchou* (who had been, and had fallen from the see, although the matter had not yet been sufficiently canonically performed, and his successor Paul was still heard of at Rome as an incubus and a robber), the Catholics chose one Maximus, whom they might oppose to a man of such authority and dignity for the sake of the defense of the faith. That the disputation was held in Africa—the common title with its long circumlocution, and the fact that it praises the Prefect Gregory for this work in that way, sufficiently indicates, unless one is completely blind and ignorant of history. And another, shorter title from a single Roman codex, Ἡ γενομένη ἐν Ἀφρικῇ Διάλεξις τοῦ Μαξίμου πρὸς Πύρρον ["The Disputation of Maximus with Pyrrhus held in Africa"]: which the noble Lucas Holstenius advised should be ascribed to the light of history. Perhaps that most learned man was looking at the fact that the dull-witted interpreter of Photius’s *Bibliotheca* (not Andreas Schottus, but someone who, in his name, though not with his doctrine and erudition, not so much completed as defiled the interpretation of that book begun by him) introduces Photius as if he had written that it was held at Rome, and that Maximus had proceeded there: for which reason he sets Photius at odds with the illustrious father of the *Annals*. Absurdities. Photius is not of such dull mind, or reading so sleepily, that he seemed to himself to detect that in that oration. He truly detects, and wished to give warning, that Maximus had gone to Rome, and Pyrrhus as his companion, *pros ten dialexin* ["for the disputation"], whether during its time, or on its account and by its occasion, Pyrrhus having been brought to it, and so that he might satisfy the Roman pontiff in person concerning the heresy with which he was afflicted; the meaning of which the same Maximus had exposed and refuted: and Photius, in his own manner, sharply criticizes it; unless perhaps *pros* ["for"] crept in for *para* ["at/beside"]; or a scribe substituted it, with other things also not sufficiently corrected.