DISPUTATION OF S. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR WITH PYRRHUS
A ACTA OF THE DISPUTATION concerning the movement of ecclesiastical dogmas, before the most religious patrician Gregory, and the assembly of most holy bishops present with him, together with other pious and noble men, held by Pyrrhus, the former patriarch of Constantinople, and Maximus, the most reverend monk, in the month of July, in the third indiction. Pyrrhus was defending the new dogma of one will, wrongly introduced by himself and his predecessor at Byzantium, Sergius; Maximus, on the other hand, was defending the doctrine of the Fathers and the Apostolic tradition, derived to us from the beginning. When, through the efforts of the outstanding man (namely, the most excellent patrician Gregory), the aforementioned men (Pyrrhus and Maximus) had come into each other’s presence, Pyrrhus began the disputation with Maximus, speaking thus:
PYRRHUS. In what way, my lord Father Maximus, have I, or he who sat before me at Byzantium, harmed you, that you should thus everywhere malign us and sprinkle upon us, before all, the reputation of the taint of heresy? And who even, though not known to you even by face, has ever honored and cultivated you as we have?
MAXIMUS. Since God hears [it], no one, to use your own words, has so honored and cultivated me as you have; but since you have now spurned the Christian dogma, I thought it formidable to prefer your favor toward me over the truth.
PYRRHUS. And by what opinion of ours have we spurned that which is the Christian sense?
MAXIMUS. By the reasoning, specifically, that you have supposed one will of the divinity of Christ and of his humanity: and you have not only supposed it and feel it thus, but you have also, to the ruin of the whole body of the holy Church, proposed a new edict and formula of faith (the Ecthesis) on this matter.
PYRRHUS. What then, does he who thinks there is one will of Christ seem to you to deviate from the Christian doctrine?
MAXIMUS. Absolutely. For what is more impious than to say that the same One, with one and the same will, before the incarnation indeed created all things from nothing, and contains and provides for them, and salutarily directs them; B but after the incarnation, craves food and drink; changes locations from place to place; and performs all other things that are free from all taint and blame (by which he also showed that his becoming man was free from all empty appearance and fiction)?
PYRRHUS. Is there one Christ, or not?
MAXIMUS. One, certainly.
PYRRHUS. And if he is one, is he not also of one will? For if he is one, he must of necessity also have one will; but if he had two, one being the divinity’s and one the humanity’s, he would be divided into two separate wills, and thus into two persons. C But if he is one, as you confess, how can he be shown to have two wills?
MAXIMUS. If it is necessary, because of the unity of the person, that there be unity of will, then by the same logic, because of the unity of the person, there must be unity of nature. For just as the unity of the person does not force a confusion of the natures, so it does not force a unification of the wills.
PYRRHUS. But the will is a function of the nature, not of the person. If, then, the natures are two, let the wills be two; but if the Christ is one, the will must also be one, as belonging to the one who wills.
MAXIMUS. If the will is of the nature D and not of the person, then since the natures are two, the wills must necessarily be two, in accordance with the two natures. For it is impossible for the nature not to possess its own natural moving principle; and the will is the natural moving principle of every intelligent nature. If, therefore, Christ is perfect in his divinity and perfect in his humanity, he must also possess the natural wills of the two natures of which, and in which, and as which, he is.
A PYR. If, therefore, Christ is one, as he is one, he must also have willed as one; and if he willed as one, his will is absolutely one, and not two.
MAX. To say something and not first distinguish the meanings of what is said is nothing other than to confound everything and to strive to keep obscure the matters under discussion; a practice which is alien to a learned and sufficiently liberal man. Tell me this, then: Is Christ, being one, only God, or only man, or the synthesis of both, God and man together?
PYR. Clearly, God and man together.
MAX. Since, therefore, Christ exists as God by nature and man, did the same Christ will as God and man, or as Christ only? But if Christ willed primarily as God and man, then he, being one and the same, willed in a dual manner, and not in a singular one. For if Christ is nothing other than his natures, from which and in which he exists, it is clear that he, being one and the same, willed and operated in a manner appropriate to his own natures—that is, as each is naturally constituted—since neither of them is without will or without operation. But if Christ willed and operated in a manner appropriate to his own natures—that is, as each is naturally constituted—and he has two natures, then he must also have two natural wills, and likewise an equal number of essential operations. B For just as the number of the natures of Christ, who is one and the same, if understood and spoken of piously, does not divide Christ but shows the distinction of the natures to be preserved even in the union, so too the number of the wills and operations that essentially belong to his natures—for he was the same, as has been said, according to both his natures, endowed with the power of willing and operating our salvation—does not introduce division (God forbid!), but signifies merely that they are preserved and remain entire even in the union.
PYR. It is impossible that the wills should be introduced without the those who will.
MAX. You have brought forward this absurdity—not by reason, but by license—even in your own pamphlets, taking Heraclius as your assistant in this, because you also consented to his impious and unlawful union, and confirmed it with a blessing. C For if it is granted that together with the wills there are introduced those who will, then by a logical reciprocal inference, the wills must also be introduced together with those who will. And, according to your opinion, there will be found in the case of the supracelestial, super-good, and blessed Godhead: because of its one will, one hypostasis and person, by the error of Sabellius; but because of the three persons, three also are the wills; and because of this, three natures, by the error of Arius, D if, according to the definitions and canons of the Fathers...
the distinction of the wills brings with it the distinction of the natures. PYR. It is impossible that in one person two wills combined with each other should exist without conflict. A
MAX. If it is impossible that two wills should exist in one and the same person without conflict, then, according to you, it is possible with conflict. But if this is so, you have so far admitted that there are two; and you do not differ concerning the number, but only concerning the conflict. It remains, therefore, that we seek the cause that produces the conflict. What, then, do you say this is? Is it the natural will, or is it sin? And indeed, if you should call it the natural will, since we know no other author of it than God, then God, in your opinion, will be the author of the conflict. But if it is sin; yet sin He did not create, nor had the incarnate God any conflict whatsoever in the natural wills within Him. For if the cause is removed, it is evident that that which exists by that author will not exist.
PYR. Is it, therefore, of nature to will?
MAX. Indeed, to will simply is of nature.
PYR. If to will is of nature, but the more illustrious Fathers said that there is one will of God and of the saints, so it will come to pass that there is also one nature of the saints and of God. B
MAX. It was said above that he who is about to speak of the truth must distinguish what is signified by words, on account of the error that arises from homonymy. For I, in turn, will ask you: when the saints said there is one will of God and of the saints, were they looking toward the substantial and creative will of God, or toward that which is the object of the will? For the will of the one willing and that which he wills are not the same, just as the power of seeing of the one who sees and that which is seen are not the same. For that is intrinsically present in him, but this is external. But if they said it while looking toward the substantial will, they will be found not only to introduce the saints as being of the same nature as God and likewise creators, but also to be contradicting themselves, in that they said it could not be that those who are of different substances should have a common will. But if they looked toward that which is willed, then the Fathers called that which one wills and has as the object of the will a "will" by way of a cause or, as it pleases some to say, by abuse of language (catachrestically); and no absurdity will follow from those who define "to will simply" as being of nature. C
PYR. If we differ from ourselves and from others by our wills—now willing this, and now not willing that same thing—and if this is of nature and of its characteristic definition, we shall be found not only to differ from one another by nature, but also to change it infinitely many times. D
MAX. To will is not the same as to will in such or such a manner.
A For to will, just like to see, belongs to nature, and is present in all things of the same kind and genus; but to will in such a manner, just like to see in such a manner—that is, to will to walk, or not to will to walk, or to see to the right, or to the left, or upward, or downward, or toward desire, or toward the understanding of the reasons that are in things—is a mode of the use of will and sight. It belongs only to the one using it, and separates him from others according to the commonly spoken difference. But if we have nature as a witness to this, then to will to eat, or not to will to eat, or to will to walk, or not to will to walk, is not the destruction of what is naturally apt to will, but of the mode of willing—that is, it is the generation and corruption of the things willed. For if we assume that the things brought into being by God are his willed objects, it does not follow that, if they should perish, that which was preconceived as their essential and creative will B will perish along with them.
PYR. If you call the will natural, and what is natural is entirely necessary, how is it not necessary that, by saying the wills in Christ are natural, we destroy every voluntary movement in him?
MAX. Not only the divine and uncreated nature has nothing natural that is necessary (that is, forced), but neither does the intelligent and created nature. For what is by nature rational possesses as a natural power the rational appetite, which is also called the will of the intelligent soul, according to which we, being willing, reason; and reasoning, being willing, we desire. And being willing, we seek, we reflect, we deliberate, we judge, we are disposed, we choose, we see, and we use. But since, as has been said, it is natural for us to appetite rationally—that is, to will—and to reason, and to consult or deliberate, and to consider, and to will, and to judge, and to be disposed, and to choose, and to strive, and to use; it follows that the natural things of intelligent beings are not forced. C How then, even if this be granted, will such a proposition not be shown to be more absurd than any absurdity? For if, according to it, what is natural is entirely necessary; and God is by nature God, by nature good, by nature Creator; then by necessity God will be God, and good, and Creator—a thing which it is of the utmost blasphemy even to think, much less to say. For who is it that introduces necessity? Consider, if you please, my friend, the blasphemy of such a proposition in this way also. For if he who says that the wills in Christ are natural destroys, according to you, every voluntary movement in him, it is necessary that those things which naturally will should have a movement by which they are compelled against their will; while those things which naturally do not will, should have a voluntary one. Therefore, not only God, who is above all things, D but also all intelligent and rational beings, being by nature willing, will have a forced movement, while inanimate things, which are not willing, will have a voluntary movement! Except that the blessed Cyril, in the third chapter against the reproaches of Theodoret, freed us from superfluous matters by explicitly declaring: "Nothing natural [is] forced."
It is possible for anyone who wishes to learn this, if they but take such a chapter into their hands.
PYRRHUS: Since one should accept with gratitude those things which have been shown to be true through investigation; and because it has been quite clearly and distinctly proven that there are natural wills in Christ; is it not possible, just as we say that one composite thing comes from two natures, that we might also say that one [will] comes from two natural wills? This would allow both those who say there are two wills—given the natural distinction of the natures in Christ—and those who say there is one—given the supreme union—no longer to differ with one another over mere words; for, as the great Theologian Gregory says, the truth does not lie for us in names, but in facts. A
MAXIMUS: You see how you go astray because of this, from being utterly ignorant that compositions exist for those things that are in the hypostasis, and not for things that are in something else and are considered by their own rationale. This is the common sentiment of all—both of the philosophers outside [the Church] and of the divine initiates and teachers of the Church. But if you call it a "composition of wills," you will be forced to call the other natural things also a "composition," if indeed you wish to show the rationale of your own dogma to be consistent with itself—that is, [a composition] of the created and the uncreated, of the infinite and the finite, of the immense and the bounded, of the mortal and the immortal, of the corruptible and the incorruptible; and you will be led into absurd conclusions. B And how will the will derived from the wills be called "will"? For it is not possible that what is composite be called by the same name as what composes it. Or else, indeed, what is composed from natures will also be called "nature," according to the delusion of the ancient heretics. Furthermore, you again separate [Christ] from the Father’s will by right, by designating him as composite in will and composite in nature, and as characterizing him by nature alone.
PYRRHUS: Nothing, then, as with the natures, did their natural [properties] have in common?
MAXIMUS: Nothing, except the hypostasis of the natures themselves. For just as the same Person was the unconfused hypostasis of his natures, so also the union [was the hypostasis] of those things that belonged to them by nature, indivisibly. C
PYRRHUS: What, then, of the Fathers, whose words are the law and rule of the Church? Did they not say that both glory and insult were common? For he says, "That from which the community of glory [is derived] is one thing, and that from which [the community] of insult [is derived] is another."
MAXIMUS: Indeed, the holy Fathers said this happened by way and manner of mutual communication. And it is manifest that mutual communication D belongs not to one, but to two, and not to equals: since the things that naturally belong to one part of Christ, through the ineffable union, have been made common to the other part.
A If, then, by the mode of exchange you speak of a common will, you are claiming not one, but two wills; and thus your cleverness has once again tumbled back into that from which you were eager to flee.
PYR. What then? Was it not by the nod of the Word united to it that the flesh was moved?
MAX. You divide Christ when you speak in this way. For Moses was moved by his B nod, and David, and all who, having put aside human and carnal properties, have become capable of receiving the divine impulse. But we, following the holy Fathers in this as in all things, say that the same God of all, having immutably become man, was willing not only as God, in a manner appropriate to his divinity, but also as man, in a manner appropriate to his humanity. For if things that have come to be out of nothing possess the power of preserving that which exists—not that which is not, nor that which is nothing—and if the impulse towards things that are preservative, and the aversion towards those that are destructive, are a property of this power according to nature, then the Word who is above all essence, having taken on essence humanly, also possessed the power of preserving C and maintaining the existence of his own humanity. He showed by his operation, through his will, the impulse and aversion of this power: the impulse, in so employing natural and blameless things that the unbelievers did not even believe he was God; and the aversion, at the time of the passion, when he voluntarily drew back in fear of death. What then has the Church of God done that is absurd, when, together with his human and created nature, she confesses the principles that were creatively implanted in it by him without any deficiency, without which it is impossible for nature even to exist?
PYR. If fear is naturally present in us, and this is among the things that are censured, then according to you, things that are subject to censure—that is, sin—are naturally present in us.
MAX. Again you deceive yourself, not with the truth, but D through homonymy—that is, through the ambiguity of a word. For fear and dread are both according to nature and contrary to nature; and fear according to nature is a power that preserves the existence of that which is by means of contraction; but fear contrary to nature is irrational contraction. The Lord, therefore, did not admit the fear that is contrary to nature, as it arises from a betrayal of reason; but he did, as one who is good, voluntarily admit for our sake the fear that is according to nature, as it is an indicator of the faculty that resides in nature for preserving that which is. For in the Lord, natural things do not precede the will as they do in us. Rather, just as when he truly hungered and thirsted, he did not hunger and thirst in the manner that is in us, but in a manner that is above us—for it was voluntary—so too, he truly felt fear, not according to us, but for our sake he felt fear. And to speak generally, every natural...
had its mode conjoined above nature by reason; so that nature might be verified by reason, and the dispensation might shine forth through the mode. A
PYRRHUS: Therefore, so that we might avoid this subtle logic, which is difficult for the many to grasp, let us confess the same one to be perfect God and perfect man, declining all else, since the word "perfect" itself points to the natural things contained within.
MAXIMUS: If to speak of the natures without the property belonging to each, or to speak of Christ as perfect God and perfect man without the marks of perfection, is, in your view, the completion of piety, then let the synods be anathematized, and before them, the Fathers; for they commanded us to confess not only the natures, but also the property of each nature. And not only the same one as perfect God and perfect man, but also the marks of his perfection, that is, saying the same one is visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, subject to corruption and immune to it, able to be touched and untouchable, created and uncreated. And it is in accordance with this very same pious understanding B that they dogma-tized two wills in the same and single one, not only through the determined number of two, but also through the pronoun "another" and "another," and through the proportion of saying "human" and "divine." For the nature of number is not limited in one way. C
PYRRHUS: Since we cannot use these terms because of the slander of the heretics, let us be satisfied with only those things which have been spoken synodically; and let us name neither one will nor two.
MAXIMUS: If one must confess only what has been spoken synodically, then one should not speak of the "one incarnate nature of the Word of God," which comprises the whole piety of the mystery, since it has not been issued in any synodal decree. Furthermore, even so, you will be compelled to confess the wills along with the natures and their properties. For if you say that those things which naturally belong to the natures of Christ are their properties, and since "to will" is naturally implanted in each of his natures, then it will be necessary for you to confess the wills along with the other natural properties and the natures themselves. D
Furthermore, if the synods anathematized both Apollinarius and Arius on account of the term "one" (since each of them abused this word to establish his own heresy—Apollinarius in order to show the flesh to be of the same substance as the Word; Arius, strictly contending to introduce the Son as being of a different substance from the Father), how can we be pious, we who do not confess the terms that are contrary to the heretics? Moreover, the fifth synod, to pass over everything else, decreed word for word that it "adheres to all the writings of the holy Athanasius, Basil, both Gregorys, and certain others," with the addition of the term "excellent doctors."
A compositions, in which both are contained, to accept, and they have handed down B two wills.
PYR. Does it not seem to you that what is called the natural will offends the ears of the many?
MAX. Setting aside the divine, how many kinds of life do you say exist in beings?
PYR. You tell me yourself.
MAX. There are three kinds of life.
PYR. What are these?
MAX. The vegetative, the sentient, and the intellectual.
PYR. That is so.
MAX. Since each of these is distinguished from the others by a certain principle of creation, what is the differentiating and characteristic principle of each kind?
PYR. I ask that you tell me this as well.
MAX. The characteristic of the vegetative life is the movement of nourishing, growing, and generating; of the sentient, the movement of impulse; and of the intellectual, the movement of free will.
PYR. You have set forth the property of each kind of life very clearly and distinctly.
MAX. If the property of each kind has been shown to be clear and distinct, I ask again: if the movement of nourishing, growing, and generating belongs by nature to the vegetative, and the movement of impulse to the sentient?
PYR. Without doubt, by nature.
MAX. Therefore, does the movement of free will follow accordingly for the intellectual?
PYR. This, absolutely, he will grant who wishes to teach in accordance with his own principles.
MAX. If, then, the movement of free will belongs by nature to intellectual beings, then every intellectual being is also by nature possessed of will—for the blessed Diadochus, bishop of Photice, defined will as a free power. If every intellectual being is also by nature possessed of the faculty of will, and God the Word truly became flesh, animated by a rational and intellectual soul, then as he was also man C essentially, he was in the same way possessed of the faculty of will. If this is so, then it is not the ears of the pious that are offended by talk of the natural will, but those of the heretics.
PYR. Indeed, I have already been persuaded in what has gone before that the wills in Christ are natural; and I do not seek any other proof regarding this. The argument has shown nothing less than that the very nature of things—which has been divinely revealed—bears witness that he himself, the same one, was possessed of will in a manner appropriate to his own natures; willing as God, and obeying as man, and that the natural wills were altogether appropriate to the natures. As the unoriginate will belongs to the unoriginate nature, and the originated to the originated, and it is impossible that they should ever collapse into one will, even if they belong to one and the same, just as the natures [are distinct], the unoriginate and the originated, the uncreated and the created, the one that created and the one that was created, the infinite D
and the finite, the one that deified and the one that was deified. But those in Byzantium, still fighting against natural wills, say that the Fathers meant that Christ has the human will according to attribution. A
MAX. Since you yourself have been the leader and guide of such an admirable and brilliant teaching, by what attribution do they say this? Is it the substantial [attribution], by which each one, possessing the things that are naturally his own, claims and attributes them to himself on account of his nature? Or is it the relative [attribution], by which we amicably attribute to ourselves in return the things that belong to others and embrace them, though we ourselves neither suffer nor effect anything in relation to them? B
PYR. That one, clearly, which is by necessity and relationship.
MAX. Therefore, before this absurdity is demonstrated, it would be more just to examine more accurately whether man is by nature endowed with the faculty of the will, or not. For when this is proven, the blasphemy of such a heresy will become clearer.
PYR. If you think so, let us examine this.
MAX. That natural things are not taught, not only those who have examined nature through reason and far surpass others have said, but even the custom of the common people. But if natural things are not taught—for there is no one who is ever taught to will—then man is by nature endowed with the faculty of the will. And again, if man is rational by nature, and that which is rational by nature is also by nature possessed of free power (for free power, as the Fathers testify, is will), then man is by nature endowed with the faculty of the will. Furthermore, if in brute animals nature acts, while in man, who is moved by the will through power, [the will] is acted upon; then man is by nature endowed with the faculty of the will. And again, if man has been created according to the image of the blessed and super-substantial Deity, and the divine nature is by nature possessed of free power, then man also, as his true image, exists by nature possessed of free power; but if he is possessed of free power by nature, then man is by nature endowed with the will; for it has already been said that the Fathers defined the will as free power. Furthermore, if willing exists in all men, and does not exist in some while not existing in others—for that which is considered commonly in all characterizes the nature in the individuals constituted under it—then man is by nature endowed with the faculty of willing. C
PYR. It has been proven through many arguments that man is endowed with the faculty of the will.
MAX. Since this, then, has been clearly proven, let us consider, as we proposed above, the absurdity of their proposition.
PYR. Let us consider it.
MAX. Since man is by nature endowed with the faculty of the will, as has been D demonstrated...
and as these men believe, Christ possessed the human will by that appropriation which consists in a mere relationship and affection—it is necessary that they also include A the rest of our natural properties with Him (if, indeed, they wish to follow their own principles), saying that these too belong to Him by a mere attribution. And thus, the understanding and initiation into the whole Economy will be found to be accepted by them as a mere appearance and fiction. Furthermore, if the decree of Sergius anathematized not those who spoke in any way, but those who spoke absolutely of "two wills," and these men do speak of two—even if erroneously, because of that "appropriation"—then those who preside over this position are providing support for the anathema pronounced against themselves. And again, if, according to the proposition which they maintain, persons are introduced along with wills; then, because they speak of two wills—even if erroneously, due to that "appropriation," as has been said—they will, according to such a proposition, also speak of two persons. And who would endure the splitting of the one into two persons? B
PYR. What then of the Fathers? Did they not say that the will which Christ formed and expressed in Himself was ours? MAX. Yes, indeed, ours. PYR. Therefore, they did not signify that which resided in Him by nature through the human element, but that which He had taken up through appropriation. MAX. Since they said that He likewise assumed our nature, then, according to them, it will be found that He also possesses nature itself only by a mere appropriation. For if that is true concerning the will, it will be so concerning nature; and if it is false concerning the will, it will be so concerning nature as well. PYR. How then? In saying that He formed our will in Himself, did they signify that which was in Him by nature? C MAX. Certainly. PYR. How do you say this? MAX. Because the same Person was entirely God with humanity, and the same Person was entirely man with divinity; in Himself and through Himself, He subjected the human will to God and the Father, providing Himself as the best model and pattern for us to imitate, so that we too, looking toward Him as the author of our salvation, may voluntarily surrender what is ours to God, by henceforth no longer willing anything other than what He wills. D PYR. They were led by perverse intent and craftiness...
A MAX. If this is granted to the followers of Severus, will they not then say, with plausible reasoning (as far as the granted premise is concerned), that they do not profess one nature from any evil purpose or malice, but because they wish, just as you do in the case of the one will, to demonstrate through it the supreme union? For they will use their own weapons against them, just as David did against Goliath. Behold how those who speak of one will fall into the same opinions and utterances as them. Furthermore, what is it that they choose to call this one will? For it is only right that they themselves assign the name to it. PYR. They say it is the will *ex sententia* (gnōmikē). MAX. Therefore, if it is *gnōmikē* (from *gnōmē*, or sententia), it is a derivative form; and if it is a derivative form, then the *gnōmē* will be the substance, acting as the archetype and primary form. PYR. The *gnōmē* is not a substance. B MAX. If it is not a substance, it is a quality; and thus a quality will be found arising from a quality, which is impossible. What, then, do they say the *gnōmē* is? PYR. The *gnōmē* is nothing other than what the blessed Cyril defined it to be, namely, a mode of life. MAX. Is this mode of life, let us say, of virtue or of vice, present in us from choice, or not? PYR. From choice, certainly. MAX. Do we then choose it by willing and deliberating, or involuntarily and without deliberation? PYR. Admittedly, by willing and deliberating. C MAX. Therefore, the *gnōmē* is nothing other than a qualified will, clinging to something that is either truly good or is thought to be good, at a relative level. PYR. You have correctly explained the definition of the Father (Cyril). MAX. If the explanation of the given definition is correct, first of all it cannot be called a *gnōmikē* will. For how is it possible for a will to proceed from a will? Furthermore, by attributing a *gnōmē* to Christ, as the inquiry concerning it has shown, they establish Him as a mere man, moved by deliberation as we are, laboring under ignorance and driven by doubt, and possessing opposing impulses; for everyone deliberates and enters into counsel concerning matters that are in doubt, and not concerning those about which there is no doubt. D For we simply possess by nature the appetite for what is good by nature; but of that which is good in this or that specific way, we make trial through inquiry and the deliberation of counsel. And this is the reason why, in our case, *gnōmē* is appropriately spoken of, being as it is a mode of use, and not the definition of nature; since nature has changed [or: has been transformed] countless times. But in the case of the human nature of the Lord, it did not subsist in a merely human way as it does in us, but divinely; for He was God
who for our sake appeared in the flesh from us, A His will cannot be called—that is, it cannot be said that he was "transformed" in terms of nature. For even His very being, that is, His subsisting divinely, naturally possessed both an affinity toward the good and an aversion toward evil, just as the great eye of the Church, Basil, teaches in his interpretation of the forty-fourth Psalm, saying: "According to this, take also what was said of Him by Isaiah, that 'Before the child knows or chooses the evil, he will choose the good. For before the child knows good or evil, he disobeys evil so as to choose the good.' For the 'before' signifies that it was not by seeking and deliberating as we do—but by subsisting divinely—that He possessed what was good by nature."
PYR. What then? Are the virtues natural? MAX. Yes, indeed, natural. PYR. And if they are natural, why are they not present in equal measure in all who are of the same nature? [MAX. They are present in equal measure in all who are of the same nature.] PYR. And whence arises such great inequality in us? MAX. From the fact that we do not cultivate the things of nature in equal measure. For if we all cultivated the natural things with the same zeal—for which we were even born—then virtue, just like nature, would be seen in all, without admitting of "more" or "less." PYR. If those things which are natural do not proceed from training but exist from creation, and virtue is natural, how is it that we acquire by exertion and training virtues that are natural? MAX. C Training, and the labors that accompany it, were devised by those who are zealous for virtue solely to ward off the stain of deception which has grown into the soul through the senses, not in order that virtues may be introduced anew from without; for they are present in us from creation, as we have already said. Wherefore, as soon as deception is perfectly cast out, D the soul immediately brings forth the splendor of virtue from its nature. For he who is not foolish or senseless, is prudent; and he who is not cowardly or rash, is courageous; and he who is not incontinent...
[NOTE: The text here concerns the citation of Isaiah VII and Psalm XLIV in the context of the Lord's natural relation to the good versus our acquired habits. The passage notes that while the interpretation given by the Lord's divine nature is immediate from birth, for us it is a matter of natural affinity versus the aversion to iniquity.]
he who is timid or bold, is steadfast: and he who is not injurious, is just. But that reason which is by nature is prudence; and the faculty of judgment is justice; and irascibility is fortitude; and desire is temperance or chastity. Therefore, it happens that when those things which are contrary to nature are removed, those things which are according to nature are left to appear alone: just as when rust is removed and wiped away, the splendor and brightness of the iron, which was there by nature, is revealed. A
PYR. The greatest blasphemy hence appears on the part of those who posit a *gnome* in Christ, which they call [your] *gnome*.
MAX. But this too must not be passed over without notice, that the word *gnome* in Scripture and among the holy Fathers is one of those words which are of various and manifold signification: as is evident to those who read carefully. For sometimes they use it for admonition and counsel; as when the Apostle says: *Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give my gnome* B (that is, counsel). Sometimes, however, it is used for consultation, as when the blessed David says: *They have craftily imagined a gnome against thy people*—which another interpreter explains, saying: *They have craftily imagined a counsel against thy people.* Sometimes, however, it is used for a sentence, when Daniel, the great one among the prophets, says of someone: *The impudent gnome went forth from the presence of the king.* At other times it is used for an opinion, or faith, or a way of thinking, as when Gregory, to whom the title of Theologian belongs, thus discourses in his first Oration *On the Son*: C «But since it is not a great matter to rebuke—for it is very easy, and for everyone who wills—but to bring forward one’s own *gnome* in return, this is the work of a pious and intelligent man.» And to speak succinctly, lest by going through every single instance I heap a crowd upon my discourse and weary it, I have myself observed and noted down twenty-eight meanings of this word *gnome* in holy Scripture and the holy Fathers. For it does not have the force of any common or particular expression; but the mind and meaning of the speaker D is regulated either by what precedes or by what follows. Wherefore it cannot be that a word of such a kind is aptly applied to one single thing being signified.
PYR. How indeed can it be that what is said in many ways is assigned to one specific thing being signified?
MAX. In order, therefore, that the turpitude of such a heresy may become more clear, let us consider an argument of this kind in another way.
PYR. As it pleases you, let us consider it.
MAX. By saying "one will"—whether they please to call it an elective, or *gnomic*, or authoritative will, or by any other manner (for we do not contend about this)—they will be compelled to say it is either divine, or angelic, or human. And first indeed, in whatever way they refer to it, they will call it natural;
A for since each of these signifies a nature, they are convicted of proving by this method of resolution what they seemed to avoid by the method of division. Consequently, if they call it divine, they acknowledge Christ to be God and only God by nature. But if angelic, they show Him to be neither God nor man, but some angelic nature. If, finally, they call it human, they declare Him to be a mere man, and subject to power.
PYR. When they fall into these absurdities, they say that the will is natural neither in effect nor by choice, but that it exists in us as a capacity. MAX. Does this capacity belong to us by nature, or not by nature? B PYR. By nature. MAX. Therefore, once again, according to the art of resolution, they will call the will natural, and this detour of theirs will be of no use. And since a capacity, through instruction, produces a habit and an initiative, then according to them, Christ acquired the habit and initiative of will through instruction and progress; and He was progressing, since He did not know the subjects of instruction before He was instructed. What reason, therefore, is there for them to turn away from Nestorius, while they ardently embrace his words and thoughts? That by saying "one will" they are defending C his doctrine is also testified to by the *Ecthesis*, of which they show themselves to be patrons, proclaiming that Nestorius teaches one will in the two persons which he fabricates.
Moreover, in rejecting that the will is natural, they will say that it is either hypostatic or contrary to nature. But if they say it is hypostatic, then in that respect the Son will be of a different will from the Father; for that which is hypostatic is a characteristic of the hypostasis alone. But if they say it is contrary to nature, they are teaching the loss of His own substances, since those things which are contrary to nature destroy those things which are according to nature.
I would also love to ask them this: does the God and Father of all will as Father, or as God? D For if He wills as Father, His will will be different from that of the Son, for the Son is not the Father. But if He wills as God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, then they will concede that the will is of nature, that is, natural.
Furthermore, if according to the Fathers, whose will is one,
A their substance is one; but according to them, if the will of the divinity of Christ and his humanity is one, then they say that the substance of these is one and the same. And how do they, holding such impious views, affirm that they follow the Fathers?
And again, if according to the same Fathers, the difference of nature does not appear in a single will, it is necessary that they either, by speaking of one will, do not speak of a natural difference in Christ, or, by speaking of a natural difference, do not speak of one will, if indeed they regulate themselves according to the rules and norms of the Fathers.
And again, if according to the same teachers, the will is not common to both—that is, to the substances—it is necessary for them to say either that both his natures do not have one will in common, or, if they say this, that they manifestly fight against the laws and decrees B of the Fathers.
PYR. The discourse very clearly and briefy reveals that impiety is entangled in every artifice and subtlety of our opponents. But what shall we say to the fact that they also attempt to prove this from the Fathers?
MAX. Indeed, if they mean to call those Fathers who divide or confuse the divine dispensation, we concede it to them. For all of them thought there was one will, even though they were diametrically sundered in impiety. But if they mean the Fathers of the Church, we shall by no means concede this to them. For let them show even one of those who are illustrious and known to all, so that we, too, on that day when our deeds are judged and God Christ charges us with having adopted a voice that overturns the entire mystery C of His incarnation, may be able to excuse ourselves by saying that we revered the opinion of the Father in all things.
PYR. What, then, of what Gregory the Theologian said: "For his willing is nothing contrary to God, since the whole was deified"—does this not stand against the two wills?
MAX. Not at all. On the contrary, it provides a greater expression of the two wills than everything else.
PYR. How do you say this?
MAX. Just as ignition (if I may so speak) brings with it both what is ignited and what ignites; and cooling, both what is cooled and what cooled; and walking, both the walker and the space D covered by walking; and vision, both the one who sees and the one who is seen; and intellection, both the one who understands and the one who is understood—for it is impossible for a relation to be understood or named without the things related—so, in consequence, the one deified and the one who deifies with divinity. Moreover, if the deification of the will is contrary to the two wills, as they would have it, then the deification of nature will also be contrary to the two natures. For in both cases the Father has placed the same term, that of deification.
PYR. You have proven that the authority of Gregory greatly agrees with the two wills; but you must also show that Gregory, the one from Nyssa, agrees with this.
A They produce another, who illuminated the Church of the Nyssenes like a bright star. For they maintain that he feels one will, from the fact that he says of the Lord: *The soul wills, the body touches* (d); *by both the passion flees.* For they say that the Father said that the soul of the Lord wills, by the divine will of the Godhead united to it according to hypostasis.
MAX. Therefore, by the same logic, he also said that the body touches by the divine touch; and according to them, the Godhead will also be palpable. For what they themselves say concerning the soul of the Lord, another, transferring it from the same expression to the body, leads them into the ultimate error.
PYR. You have shown with great conciseness and brevity the blasphemy of this interpretation. But what do we say concerning the proofs which they cite from the great Athanasius? Of which this is one: B *The mind of the Lord is not yet Lord, but rather will, or wish (e), or energy toward something.*
MAX. They are also turning this authority against themselves. Therefore, true reason and doctrine in all questions refutes and pulls down those who hold these views by their own arguments. For the truth will never be so destitute as to stand in need of its own weapons against its adversaries. For if, as Athanasius speaks, *The mind of the Lord is not yet Lord,* then His mind will be something entirely other than the Lord; that is, the mind of the Lord is not by nature Lord, or God; because it is believed to have been made C [and to have been added] according to hypostasis, and this is evident from what he adds: that it is either will, or wish, or energy toward something. Using as a rule for this the truly philosophical of philosophers, Clement, in the sixth book of the *Stromata*, who defined will as *appetitive mind*, and wish as *rational appetite*, D or the will concerning something. And [the energy] toward something...
to the will (if I may use the word, an appetite in agreement with reason). But regarding power and action, this divine man said that, through the intelligent and rational soul united to him according to hypostasis, he made use of all the things which were divinely and majestically performed by him. A
PYRRHUS: Truly, by the very arguments with which they seem to impugn piety, they are unwittingly refuted. However, we must also examine the other authority which they bring forward from the same Father, so that no handle may be left to them against the truth. B
MAXIMUS: What is that authority? I do not know it.
PYRRHUS: It is that in which this admirable man says: "He was born of a woman, raising up for himself the form of man from the first formation, in the showing forth of flesh, but without carnal wills and human thoughts, in the image of newness. For the will belonged to the divinity alone." C
MAXIMUS: This authority interprets itself, and stands in no need of any explanations.
PYRRHUS: In what way, then, does it come into doubt for them?
MAXIMUS: Through great ignorance. For to whom is it not manifest—unless he is entirely blinded in the eyes of his mind—that Athanasius did not discourse of the natural principle, but of the mode of the existence of the flesh? For he wished to indicate that the Incarnation was an act of the divine and sole will, with the Father being well-pleased, the Son himself performing it, and the Holy Spirit co-operating, and not of carnal motion and human thoughts—that is, of a nuptial order and succession. For the God of all, having become man, did not innovate the principle of nature; otherwise he would no longer have been man, had he not possessed the [natural] principle, which is unshortened and immutable in all things, but only the mode—that is, the conception from seed and the birth from corruption. Therefore, the divine teachers of the Church have by no means denied the natural principles of the united natures; rather, in agreement with the evangelists, and the apostles, and the prophets, they have declared our Lord and God, Jesus Christ, to be endowed with the faculty of will and operation—according to both his natures—for our salvation. D
PYRRHUS: And is it possible to prove this from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?
MAXIMUS: Most certainly. For the Fathers, not being moved of their own accord, but having learned from the sacred Scriptures themselves, taught this to us also out of love. For it was not they who spoke, but the power of the Holy Spirit which had entirely pervaded them.
PYRRHUS: Since, in order to imitate the divine goodness, you have cast yourself into these labors of inquiry for the purpose of helping others, do not be reluctant to teach us this as well.
MAXIMUS: It is said in the holy Gospels concerning the Lord, "On the morrow he wished to go into Galilee": it is manifest,
A that he wished to enter in a way he was not yet there. He was not absent in his humanity, for he is never absent in his divinity. Therefore, it was as man, and not as God, that he wished to enter; and as man he was possessed of the faculty of will.
And in another place: "I wish that where I am, they also may be." Since Christ as God is beyond "where,"—for he as God is not in a place, and it is impossible for a created nature to exist "beyond place"—therefore it is as man that he wishes that where he is, they may also be; and the same one, as man, was possessed of the faculty of will.
And in another place: "And having come to the place, he said: I thirst. And they gave him wine mixed with gall; and having tasted it, he did not wish to drink." According to which part of him is it said that he thirsted? If it were according to his divinity, his divinity would be subject to passion, desiring a drink contrary to its nature. But if it were according to his humanity, then he thirsted in that aspect, and in that same aspect he did not wish to drink what was incongruous to his nature; and the same one, as man, was possessed of the faculty of will.
And elsewhere he says: "And Jesus walked in Galilee; for he did not wish to walk in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him." Since walking is a property of the nature of the flesh, and not of the divinity united to it according to subsistence, then as man the same one walking in Galilee did not wish to walk in Judea; and the same one, as man, was possessed of the faculty of will. B
And elsewhere again: "And going out from there, they passed through Galilee; and he did not wish that anyone should know." It is acknowledged by all that the act of traveling is by nature of Christ’s humanity, as has been said, and not of his divinity; but if the traveling pertained to him as man, and not as God by nature, then it was also as man that, while passing along with his disciples, he did not wish that anyone should know; and the same one, as man, was possessed of the faculty of will.
And elsewhere again: "And rising from there, he went into the regions of Tyre and Sidon. And having entered into a house, he wished that no one should know; and he could not be hidden." If Christ as God was power manifested of itself (a self-subsistent power), yet as man he was weakness—for "even if he was crucified," says the divine Apostle, "out of weakness, yet he lives by the power of God"—then as man, and not as God, having entered into a house, he did not wish that anyone should know, and could not be hidden; and the same one, as man, was possessed of the faculty of will. C
And elsewhere he says: "About the fourth watch of the night he comes to them, walking upon the sea; and he wished to pass by them." If anyone should take this to have been said of him as he is God, he would necessarily have to accept that his divinity is enclosed by bodily limits—above and below, I say, and before and behind, to the right and to the left.
A If, however, he says that these things were said of him insofar as he is man, then the same person was possessed of a will B also insofar as he is man.
And in another place he says: "And his disciples came to him, saying to him: Where wilt thou that we go and prepare for thee to eat the Pasch?" If eating the Pasch belongs to those who were under the Law, and the Lord became under the Law, insofar as he was man and not insofar as he was God; therefore, insofar as he was man, he willingly ate the Pasch, and the same person was possessed of a will also insofar as he was man.
And the divine Apostle also, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, says concerning him: "Becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross." Did he therefore obey willingly, or unwillingly? But if unwillingly, it would rightfully be called a tyranny and not obedience. But he became obedient, not as God, but insofar as he was man. For as the Fathers perceive, insofar as he is God, he is neither obedient nor disobedient. For these things, as the divine Gregory C is the author, are "of those things which are secondary and subject to command." Therefore, he was possessed of a will also insofar as he was man.
And the blessed David also in the thirty-ninth Psalm says: "Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldst not, but a body thou hast fashioned for me. Holocausta and for sin thou didst not require: then I said, Behold I come. In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will: O my God, I have willed." That Christ is called god insofar as he is man, and not insofar as he is God, just as the Father is called Father insofar as he is God, and not insofar as he is man, I think even our opponents do not doubt. If, however, insofar as he is man, and not insofar as he is God, the Father is his God, then insofar as he is man, and not insofar as he is God, he willed to do the will of the Father and his own—for the will of the Father is also his own, since he is God and himself according to essence. If this is so, he was possessed of a faculty of will not only insofar as he is God and consubstantial with the Father, but also insofar as he is man and consubstantial with us.
We must note, however, that the divine Apostle has interpreted the words of the Psalm now proposed in the Epistle to the Hebrews as referring to the Lord. And the great Moses, in the creation of man, introduces God saying: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." If, therefore, man is an image of the divine nature, and the divine nature is of free power, then the image also, if it preserves the D likeness to the archetype, is of free nature power. If this is so, and the archetype has been made by nature, and [likewise] the image by nature, then the same person, according to both his natures, was possessed by nature of a faculty of will. For it was shown beforehand from the Fathers that the will is the nature’s free power.
It must be known that free power, or
A is spoken of in one way, just as nature is also spoken of; for it is taken in one way in God, in another in angels, and in another in men. In God, it is understood supersubstantially; in angels, as an exertion running concurrently with the habit, admitting no interval of time at all; but in men, as an exertion of the habit considered in time. For if Adam obeyed by willing [(1)], and saw by willing, and ate by willing, then the will was the first to suffer in us. And if the will is the first to suffer in us, and yet—according to them—the Word did not assume this will together with the nature when He became man, then I have not been made without sin. And if I have not been made without sin, then I have not been saved, since what is not assumed is not healed.
Furthermore, if the free power of nature is His work and creation, yet the Word incarnate did not—according to them—assume it together with His nature by an ineffable union, He either rejected it B from Himself because He condemned His own creation as not good, or He begrudged us the healing that comes through it. In doing so, He would be depriving us of perfect salvation, and at the same time showing Himself not to be immune to fault, by demonstrating that He either does not will to heal perfectly or is not able to.
So much for the Word of God incarnate being possessed by nature of a faculty of will, even in respect of His being man. As for our knowing that He is possessed of that same faculty in respect of His being God, we shall learn this from the following. For our Lord and God Himself, the only Truth, says this about Himself in the Gospels: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate C." For it is manifest that He did not say this in respect of His being man, since He had only recently become man; but in respect of His being God, showing the diverse modes of His wise providence toward the human race, by which, when He willed to gather human nature to Himself from its outward error, it did not will to be gathered.
And again He says: "As the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will." If that "as" is a comparative adverb, and comparisons are made between things of the same substance, then this cannot be D understood of the human will in Christ. Therefore, the Savior taught us that, just as the Father, God
A being consubstantial with the Father and of the same will, vivifies those whom He wills, so also the Son, being consubstantial with the Father and of the same will, vivifies those whom He wills. These are the dogmas of the evangelists, and the apostles, and the prophets. What greater proof is there, then, that the same One is by nature possessed of a will, both in so far as He is God, and in so far as He is man?
PYR. Nothing is clearer than this to demonstrate that wills are natural. How, then, did Vigilius, the B then bishop of the Romans, accept the document offered by Menas, the bishop of the royal city, which contained one will, and this when it had been revealed to him in the imperial secretum of the one who was then Emperor of the Romans, and of the senate?
MAX. I am amazed at how you, being patriarchs, dare to stumble into falsehood. He who preceded you, writing to Honorius, said that it “was dictated,” but [it was] “not offered,” nor “revealed.” Yet you yourself, C in your letter to Pope John, said that it “was offered” and “revealed,” having been read by Constantine the Quaestor. To whom, then, do we give credence? To you, or to him who preceded you? For it is not possible for both of you to be telling the truth.
PYR. And did my predecessor write such a thing?
MAX. Indeed he did.
PYR. Let that be regarding Vigilius. What do you have to say regarding Honorius, who openly, in letters given to my predecessor, handed down one will of our Lord Jesus Christ?
MAX. D Who is the trustworthy interpreter of such a letter as he who wrote it in the person of Honorius, while he is still alive and...
A illuminating the whole West with his virtues and the dogmas of piety; or are those the ones who speak at Constantinople what comes into their mind?
PYR. Who composed it?
MAX. He himself, therefore, when he was writing again to the holy emperor Constantine, in the person of holy Pope John, regarding this letter, said: «We have spoken of one will in the Lord, not of his divinity and humanity, but of his humanity alone. For when Sergius had written that some people say there are two contrary wills B in Christ, we replied that Christ did not have two contrary wills—I mean, of the flesh and of the spirit, as we have after the fall—but only one, which naturally characterizes his humanity.» And a clear proof of this is that he mentions the limbs and the flesh, which he does not allow to be understood also in regard to his divinity. Then, also making a pre-emptive defense against an objection, he says: «But if someone were to say: For what reason, when you were discussing the humanity of Christ, did you not mention his divinity? We reply that, first of all, the answer was C given to the question; and secondly, that we were following the custom of Scripture, as we do in all things, and in this too, speaking some times from his divinity, as when the Apostle says: *Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God* (1 Cor. 1:24); and other times from his humanity alone, as when he himself says: *The foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men* (1 Cor. 1:25).»
PYR. My predecessor, deceived by the error of the word, accepted this too simply.
MAX. I tell the truth; nothing has turned me against your predecessor as much as his versatile nature D and the lightness of his mind—that he would move his mind from one opinion to another, and would not stand firmly in any conviction. Sometimes, by approving those who called this will divine, he insinuated that only God had been incarnate. At other times, by agreeing with those who called it "deliberative" (consultive), he insinuated that he was a mere man, moved deliberatively according to us, and differing in nothing from Pyrrhus and Maximus. At other times, claiming it to be "hypostatic," he introduced along with the distinction of persons the distinction of wills in things that are of the same substance. At other times, by siding with those who called it one of "free power," he insinuated that the union was one of relation; for power and authority and such things are clearly movements of the mind, not of nature. At other times, by welcoming those who called it a will of "choice and opinion," and establishing him as master of himself, he insinuated not only that the Lord was a mere man, but also changeable and sinful—if indeed opinion is critical of opposites, and inquisitive of the unknown, and deliberative of the uncertain. And at other times, those who called it an "oikonomic" [will], the Word—
A as if one were to speak from the rationale of the incarnation itself—brought in the claim that He was without a will before the dispensation; and he was carried away into countless other absurd notions, not having the truth as his foundation. And if I were to wish to relate these through the accuracy of Scripture, together with the very same absurdities, even the time to come would not suffice. But what was the necessity to put forth papers and to tear asunder the holy Church of God? Nor could he perceive what is most common to all. For either—to grant this to you—the papers contain the dogmas of the synods, as you falsely assert, and thus we have no need of them, we who receive and embrace the synods both before and now; or they do not contain the dogmas of the synods, and in that case it is far more just to turn away and flee from them. Therefore, since the proposal of these same papers is both unjust and lawless in either case, their rejection is also just and canonical in either case. B
PYR. Sophronius, who a short time ago became patriarch of Jerusalem, is the cause of this, and he has compelled us to act contrary to our intention, by inciting the question concerning energies at a time that was not opportune.
MAX. I am altogether at a loss as to what sort of defense you expect to give, you who so gravely accuse an innocent man. For tell me, by the Truth itself, when Sergius wrote to Theodore of Pharan, sending also the libellus—which he calls Menas’s—by means of the mediation of Sergius Macarona, the bishop of Arsinoë, urging him to express his views regarding the single energy and single will in that libellus; and he wrote back approving of them, where then was Sophronius? Or when, at Theodosiopolis, he wrote to Paul the One-Eyed and to the followers of Severus, having sent also the libellus of Menas, and that of Theodore of Pharan, to him, along with his own approval C of the same?
NOTE. D (j) Maximus shrewdly casts back onto Sergius the libellus called Menas’s, as if it were not truly Menas’s, but was supposititiously ascribed to him by Sergius, so that by the authority of the man, and by the false reception of Vigilius, he might scatter the Monothelite heresy by his own hand. Hence it is not surprising that Sergius and Pyrrhus disagree on it, since a falsehood agrees neither with itself nor with the truth. Thus in the sixth synod, that libellus is openly refuted, a task in which Maximus led the way in all things, even if the defense of Honorius is not embraced; because it seemed that by his proscription the minds of the Orientals might be softened, which Martin, at the Lateran Council, by the proscription of so many heads by name, and those with whom there was a suspicion that Honorius had conspired, had offended more gravely; to which dispensation the Roman Church itself consented, as Adrian quite openly indicates, who, in the eighth synod, acknowledges that the Orientals had pronounced anathema against Honorius, but concerning the consent of our see, the Roman see, over which he presided. These great machinations of Sergius, exposed by Maximus and objected to the face of Sergius's successor, are the true origins of Monothelism, and not that which Theophanes relates regarding the conference of Heraclius with Athanasius, patriarch of the Jacobites, to whom he had even promised the patriarchate of Antioch, if only he would receive the synod and consent to the unification; whose deep silence—except for those who have copied it almost verbatim in a similar chronology—[is noteworthy]. And it is a fact that Heraclius, in his letter to Pope John concerning Sergius and the Constantinopolitans, lays all the blame for his novelty—and for the Ecthesis issued in his name—upon him, whose words Maximus reports in the *Collection* with the princes in secret. And I might think that Theophanes had chanced upon some narrative by a Constantinopolitan that was less than approved, whatever the original intent with which he had written these things, whether for the sake of lightening the burden on his own Constantinopolitans and Sergius, or for the sake of seeking protection for Monothelism, for which so great a man, and with the appearance of zeal and the unification of the Churches, after having received the counsel of all, had made a beginning. On account of which, Sergius also preferred to call it the Heraclian Ecthesis, rather than his own, that paper of his profession which he had taken care to have strengthened by his own signature, just as Heraclius himself is the authority. Thus, chronologists often, without great judgment, gather from here and there things said by others that are often contradictory to one another; and he who would wish to defend all of these has surely undertaken a thankless and hollow labor: and my most dear colleague and fellow-soldier, Father Jacobus Goar, could have judged more mildly in his *Theophanes*, because I, as a mere novice, had written, in no other spirit, in his *Syntagmatia* on the heresy of the Monothelites.
A His Faranite and his own consent? Or when he wrote to George, B surnamed Arsas, a Paulianist, asking him to send him authorities concerning their single operation, and included this in the letter—that he would, in these, also bring about the union of the Church with them? Blessed John, Pope of Alexandria, seized this letter by hand from Arsas. And since, for this reason, he wished to depose him, he was hindered by the irruption of the Persians into Egypt at that time. Or when he wrote back to Cyrus, bishop of Phasis, concerning one and two operations, when he had been asked by him, having also sent to him the aforementioned tract of Menas? What then? Since Sergius had in many ways proposed his own malady to the public and had brought ruin upon a very large part of the Church, [and] blessed Sophronius reminded him with the humility becoming to his station and profession, prostrating himself at his feet and offering to him, in the place of all entreaty, the life-giving passions of Christ our God, so that he would not renew the voice of heretics, which had long since been well extinguished by the holy Fathers who had lived before, did he himself become the cause of such a scandal?
B PYR. The argument has fittingly overturned everything that was proposed, and there is absolutely no lack of inquiry concerning the wills. MAX. Since the inquiry concerning the wills has reached an end, do you wish that we also discuss the operations? PYR. As I had been ignorant that wills are natural, so too had I accepted [the belief] concerning operations; and if anything was said by me, whether in writing or by word, it was aiming at this purpose. C But now that it is certain that to will is of nature, and that which is entwined with it as if by way of a part, to operate, is also of nature, all that I had formerly asserted and proved on this matter has become void, and I deem it superfluous henceforth to stir up any discourse at all concerning this. MAX. What then? Since God, because of our purpose foreknown to Him, has called us to the knowledge of His truth, should we not examine those things which were said to certain people concerning this matter, either in writing or by word, for the sake of those who, as is likely, have encountered them without caution, or else those who are encountering them more easily? PYR. If the examination of this discussion concerns this, it is necessary. For to take thought for the safety of those who are more guileless is an imitation of divine philanthropy. MAX. If, then, this is an imitation of divine philanthropy, let us begin from here the examination concerning this. PYR. Let us begin. MAX. D I found in your writings that you taught a single operation of Christ, as of a whole. If, then, there is one operation as of a whole, and the whole is His person, then this one operation will be personal; and it will be shown that there is a diverse operation, just as [there is] a person...
for neither of these is Christ. A
PYRRHUS: If, on account of the distinction of the natures in Christ, you speak of two operations—and not on account of the singular nature of the person, one operation—then two operations will also be found in man, on account of the essential distinction of his soul and body. And if this is so, there will be three operations of Christ, not two.
MAXIMUS: The very arguments you use to negate what is natural, those same arguments are used against the natures by those who fight against them. For this is your only “clever” tactic: to agree with them in everything. Hence, with the same arguments by which the Fathers refuted them, we refute you, since you suffer from the same malady. For if, on account of the distinction of natures in Christ, you yourselves also say with us that there are two natures—and not, on account of the singular person, one nature—then in this way two natures of man will also be found, on account of the essential distinction of his soul and body; and if this is granted, there will be three natures of Christ, not two. But if, on account of the distinction of the natures, B while confessing with us two natures, you do not say there are three natures in Christ, how is it that, because we, on account of the distinction of the natures, say there are two operations, you conclude there are three operations? For the arguments that you use with us against those who dispute against the natures, those same ones will suffice for us against you regarding the operations. But in this way the argument has refuted you from an equal standing, showing the absurdity of the objection that is moved by you. Furthermore, we say—as an additional point—that “one” according to the species of man is not the same as “one” according to the substance of soul and body. For “one” according to the species of man signifies the sum of C the invariable likeness in all individuals constituted under the species; hence we do not say this indefinitely, but with the addition: "of man." But “one” according to the substance of soul and body destroys the very being of them, forcing it to lack all existence entirely. If, then, “one” according to the species of man and “one” according to the substance of soul and body are not the same, it is therefore not necessary, when we speak of one operation according to species, to call this either personal or [to arrive at] three operations, for the operation pertains to nature.
PYRRHUS: But with the operations, as Nestorius thinks, persons are introduced; and it is necessary for those who say there are two operations to defend his impure dogmas. D
MAXIMUS: And yet Nestorius, while saying there are two persons, teaches one operation. But if, as you suppose, persons are introduced along with operations, then by a logical consequence, operations will also be introduced along with persons; and you will be forced, by following your own rules, either because of the…
A one operation of the holy Divinity, to say also that its person is one; or, because of its three hypostases, to say that there are also three operations. Or, you must say that the union is by relation, as Nestorius does; for this [(1)] one operation is the union, as Nestorius himself and those of his fraternity have demonstrated in their own writings. And regarding ourselves, since the operation according to species is one, but the hypostases are many; either because of the one operation according to species, the person of all must be said to be one; or because of the many persons, there must be many operations. And thus the statement that is current among the Fathers—«Those things which are of the same substance are also of the same operation»—has fallen into ruin.
B Furthermore, if, according to them, a person is introduced along with an operation, and they have granted that many operations proceed from one and the same incarnate God the Word, those persons who are introduced along with the operations that proceed forth must also be granted; if they have determined to be consistent with themselves, then both the persons and the operations of the same being will be found to be infinite.
And again, if—according to their proposition—a person is introduced along with the operation, then when this is taken away, that is entirely taken away along with it. But if this is true, then by the taking away of the two and the one operation, both the two and the one person must also be taken away; and Christ, as far as it rests with them, would have departed from that which is, and from being above being, into non-being: and what could be more impious than this?
C If, however, anyone wishes to examine this in any one of us, as a matter of great abundance, he will find that we also, at one and the same time, both reason and walk; or we may even be thinking of one thing, while speaking of another to those who are present—which it is recorded that Moses did, at one and the same time interceding with God for the people, and speaking to the people, and urging them toward good hopes. And yet, neither because he operates dualistically in a manner appropriate to his natures, is each individual person two; nor, because he who operates dualistically is one, does he confuse the movements that naturally belong to his natures. D By a similar reasoning, in the word which is uttered by the mouth, we see both the meaning which is inherent in the word, and the word which is subject to the meaning, and their complete mutual indwelling; and neither is the distinction of persons introduced by the distinction of these, nor is the confusion introduced by the supreme union. And what, indeed, would one say about the ignited sword, which—no less than it preserves the natures (that is, the fire and the iron)—also preserves their natural operations, I mean the burning and the [Exod. xxxii, 30] [alt-version omitted]
A cutting, and at once manifests them both in the same thing? For neither is the burning of it, after the union, let loose from the action of cutting, nor again is the action of cutting separated from the burning. And neither, because the natural operation is twofold, does it introduce two ignited swords; nor, because the ignited sword is one, does the substantial distinction of them become mixed or confused.
PYR. Was there not one who was operating? MAX. Certainly, one. PYR. If, therefore, there was one who was operating, there is also one operation, as of one. MAX. This one is Christ—for again, because you return to the same points, I shall ask you the same things as above—is he one in person, or in nature? PYR. In person; for in nature he happens to be double. MAX. Does he operate dually, then, because of the doubleness of the nature, or singularly B because of the uniqueness of the person? But if he operated dually, he being one and the same, then the number of persons is not introduced with the number of operations. If, however, he operated singularly, because of the unity of the singular person, the same account regarding this will incur the same absurdities. For if operation is hypostatic (that is, personal), along with the multitude of persons, the distinction of operations will be seen simultaneously.
PYR. Not at all, for although he operated dually, his operations were not two; but because there was one who was operating, there was one. MAX. Another says this to you also regarding natures: that it is not because his nature is dual that there already are and are called two natures; but because his hypostasis was one, his nature is and is called one. But to leave aside all that can be said about this: when you call it one operation, what sort of operation are you willing to call it? Divine, human, or neither? For if you call it divine, you call Christ God alone; if human, you call him not God at all, but only a plain man; if you say neither of these, you teach that Christ is neither God nor man, but one who does not truly exist, a chimerical thing. C
PYR. By saying there is one operation of the divinity of Christ and his humanity, we do not say that this belongs to him by reason of nature, but by way of union. MAX. If, according to your account, the operation accrued to him from the union, then before the union he was without operation; and, as you think, a force was added to him in order that he might fashion the world. And again, if the operation accrued to him from the union, but the Father and the Holy Spirit were not united to flesh according to hypostasis, then they were not endowed with the faculty of operating. If they were not endowed with the faculty of operating, they are not the fabricators of things; I will not even say that they are at all. And again, since union is a relationship, and not
A a thing; the operation and virtue of Christ, therefore, will be a relationship, and not a thing.
To this, it is necessary that you call it either created or uncreated; since absolutely no operation exists midway between created and uncreated. If you call it created, it will signify a created nature only; but if uncreated, it will signify an uncreated nature only. For it is absolutely necessary that natural properties correspond to their natures. And how is it possible for the operation of a created nature, which has a beginning, to be uncreated, without beginning, infinite, creative, and sustaining? Or how can the operation of an uncreated and beginningless nature be created, having a beginning, finite, and be kept by another so that it does not dissolve?
PYR. Do you not then approve of those who call the effect of the things done by Christ a single operation, and agree with them?
MAX. The effect of one action is one thing, and that of another is another, and not one, B as was shown in the case of the ignited sword. For although the operation of the fire and that of the iron are joined together, yet we see that the effect of the fire is burning, and the effect of the iron is cutting; even though they are by no means divided from one another in the burnt cut or in the cut burn, just as the effect of the heaven is one thing, that of the earth another, and that of the sun another. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of one effect unless there is one and only one action. If, therefore, looking to the effect of the works done by Christ, you have dogmatized one operation, either dogmatize also one action, or—because of the infinite actions—also infinite operations. However, our C question is not about the works; for our discourse is not about those things that are outside of Christ, but about those that are in Christ himself; that is to say, about the natural rationale of the substances of Christ, whether this has remained imperfect and lacking from the union, or perfect, and lacking nothing. And if it is lacking, can it be that a nature which is lacking is in existence? If, however, it is not lacking, is the operation to be understood in it (that is, in the rationale constituting the substance), or is it one of those things that are outside? But that a natural operation and virtue is not among those things that are outside is evident from the fact that a nature can indeed exist without works, but without a natural operation, a nature can D neither exist nor be known. For by the things through which each thing naturally operates, it is proven to be that which is immutable.
Whereas not looking to the work, you have dogmatized the one operation fashioned by you like a goat-stag, but rather to the natural rationale of the united substances; and a true proof of this are the chapters handed down by Cyrus, which were graciously and most readily accepted by you.
A In these, while teaching one operation, he said that He performed therein both divine and human acts; thereby clashing not only with holy Scripture and the holy Fathers, but even with the very nature of created things. For nothing that exists, while remaining within its natural state, is by nature capable of producing opposites. For fire does not heat and cool; nor does frost cool and heat; nor does the earth dry and moisten; nor does water moisten and dry. If this is observed in nothing that exists, how have you not shuddered to say that the Word incarnate, who became substantially man, performed both miracles and sufferings—which differ from one another by the rationale of nature—by one operation?
PYR. What, then, did Cyril, that light of the Church, teach contrary to the pious conviction which has now shone forth from this discussion, when he said that Christ exhibited one operation akin to both, by the function of both? B
MAX. This authority is in no way at odds with the two operations; on the contrary, it even supports them. For he did not call it one natural operation of the divinity of Christ and of His humanity; otherwise, he would not have said elsewhere, "One operation of the Maker and of the work—no sane person would ever concede this." But, wishing to show that the operation of the divinity is one, both without flesh and with flesh—just as if someone, wishing to show that the operation of fire is one, both with material and without material, were to say that the fire burns both with material and without material—so too Cyril did not call the operation of the two natures one; C but he called one the divine and paternal operation, substantially subsisting in the Word incarnate, by which He performed divine signs not only by the command of the Maker of all things in an incorporeal way, as He Himself says (since even after the incarnation He was endowed with the same power of acting as the Father, who acts incorporeally), but that He also produced these things corporally through the touch of His own flesh. For this is what is meant by that which was said: "By way of both." It was because the raising of the damsel, or the restoration of the blind man’s sight, or the blessing of the loaves, or the cleansing of the leper, which had been effected by the word and command of the Maker of all, was naturally akin and related to that which was performed corporally D by the touch; in order to demonstrate that the flesh was also lifegiving, as being truly His own, and not that of any other, by reason of its pure union with Him. For by both of these, the command and the touch, the divine operation and power were made manifest in the things themselves, not in the least injuring the natural operation of the flesh that is human, like ours, and subject to passion; on the contrary, it preserved it for its own manifestation—just as, therefore, the soul, as if through an instrument of its own body, manifests the properties of its own natural operation.
A For the extension of the hand, and the touch, and the grasping, and the mixing of the clay by it, and the breaking of the bread—and, in short, everything that was accomplished through the hand, or another member, or part of the body—pertained to the natural operation of the humanity of Christ; according to which, as man, he himself—who is by nature God—was active, and naturally worked the divine things; so that through both, by both, he might confirm what is according to nature, showing himself truly to be perfect God and perfect man, with the sole exception of sin.
Nor did the Father, therefore, ignore the singular property of each nature, and what encompasses the other natural properties—namely, the creative power, and the vital operation imparted to his body from the soul; B which the incarnate Word of God, preserving whole in himself, showed to be distinct and unconfused: the creative power, indeed, in the fashioning of substance, and quality, and quantity; from which, and in which, and as what, the truth and existence of things are and are understood to be. For even if the Greek philosophers distribute all things into ten categories, yet the totality of things is contained and encompassed by these. He manifested the substance indeed by filling in what was lacking in the eyes of the blind man; the quality, by changing the water into wine; the quantity, by increasing the loaves. And he showed the vital operation in breathing, speaking, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating, and drinking; moving his hands, walking, sleeping, and the rest of things which, in all individuals of the same nature, C are shown to be the natural operation without any variation.
PYR. You have piously and without violence set forth the mind of the Father, not as clashing, but as agreeing in all things with the two operations. But what shall we say concerning the holy Dionysius, who in his epistle to Gaius the Therapeut said regarding Christ, that he "wrought a certain new theandric operation in us"?
MAX. Is the novelty a quality, or a quantity?
PYR. A quantity.
MAX. Therefore it also brings along with itself such a nature; since the definition of every nature is the rationale of its operation or power. Not only that, but also when the Apostle says, *"Behold, all things have become new"* (II Cor. v, 17), he says nothing else than, "Behold, all things have become one." Whether you wish to call this nature or operation, let that be of your own discretion and power. But if the novelty is a quality, it does not signify one operation, but a new and ineffable mode of the manifestation of the natural operations of Christ, appropriately [accommodated] to the ineffable mode of the mutual circuminsession of the natures of Christ among themselves, and to his manner of life as man, being strange and paradoxical, and to the
[PG 91, 347] A unknown mode of the reciprocal communication which is inexplicable by any words through the union. PYR. Does it not signify one theandric operation? MAX. Not at all; on the contrary, the term itself, by a kind of circumlocution through the enumerated natures, has handed down their operations: for if the extremes are denied, nothing intermediate exists in Christ. But if it signifies one [operation], Christ will have, as God, an operation other than the Father’s. The Son, therefore, will have an operation different from the Father, since the operation of the Father is not theandric; besides the fact that it characterizes and constitutes the theandric nature. For operation, being natural, exists as a constitutive and innate characteristic of a nature. And those who have written commentaries on these matters have said that the genus of quantity is one thing, and that of quality another. PYR. Neither quantity nor quality is the novelty; but substance. MAX. I am amazed at how you dared to say this. What is set in opposition to substance by distinction? PYR. That which is not. MAX. And what to novelty? PYR. Ancientness. MAX. Therefore, novelty is not a substance, but a quality. B How, moreover, if we were to take the term as meaning one operation, would we not be introducing this teacher and interpreter of divine things as contradicting himself and the rest of the Fathers by this reasoning? For all have clearly and commonly said and taught that things which are of the same substance are also of the same operation; and that those which are of the same operation are also of the same substance; and that those which differ in substance also differ in operation; and those which differ in operation also differ in substance. PYR. This was stated by the Fathers regarding theology, but not regarding the oeconomy (that is, of God, not of Christ). Whence it is not the act of a truth-loving mind to transfer what was said by them concerning theology to the oeconomy, and to introduce such an absurdity. MAX. If those things were stated by the Fathers only regarding theology, then, according to your opinion, after the incarnation, C the theology concerning the Son is not joined with that of the Father. But if the theology concerning him is not joined, then he is not enumerated with the Father in the invocation of baptism, and faith and preaching will be found vain. And again, if after the incarnation the Son is not joined in theology with the Father, he will not be of the same substance; for those things which differ in definition will altogether differ also in nature. And again, if after the incarnation the divinity of the Son is not preached together with the Father, to whom shall we attribute that saying: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" 1? Likewise that: "Whatsoever he sees the Father doing, this the Son also doeth similarly" 2? And: "If ye do not believe D
my works, believe the works"? And: "As the Father raiseth the dead and quickeneth them, so also the Son quickeneth whom he will"? For all these things show him to be of the same substance with the Father, not only after the A incarnation, but also of the same operation.
And again, if the providence and care concerning existing things is the operation of God, and this belongs not only to the Father and the Spirit, but also to the Son even after the incarnation, then it is also of the same operation as the Father, even after the incarnation.
And again, if miracles are the operation of God, and we have known him to be of the same substance as the Father from the miracles, then he is shown to be of the same substance as the Father from the same operation, and is glorified with him B even after the incarnation.
And again, if the creative operation essentially belongs to God, and things that belong essentially cannot be taken away, it is necessary that those who do not say he is of the same operation as the Father after the incarnation, must also not say he is of the same substance. For where the natural operation is not, the nature cannot exist at any time. Or, if they say he is of the same substance as the Father, they must also say he is of the same operation—that is, power—and must acknowledge him in the confession of the Trinity, even after the incarnation. For where there is a nature, there is also the common operation according to it, to which nothing is lacking.
PYR. We do not say there is "one operation" C in order to abolish the human operation; but because it is distinguished against the divine operation, it is for this reason called a "passion."
MAX. By this reasoning, those who say "one nature" do not say this in order to abolish the human nature; but because, when human nature is distinguished against the divine, it is for this reason called "passible."
PYR. What then? Did the Fathers not call the human movement a "passion," because of the distinction from the divine operation?
MAX. God forbid! For the substance of nothing, to speak generally, is known or defined D through comparison or collocation with another; otherwise, things would be found to be causes of one another. For if, because the divine movement is an "operation" or action, the human is a "passion," then it must absolutely follow that because the divine nature is good, the human must be evil. And likewise, by the rotation with opposition, because the human movement is called a "passion," the divine movement will be called an "operation" and an act; and because the human nature is evil, the divine will be good. But away with such thoughts! For these things are truly great foolishness.
PYR. What then? Did the Fathers not call the human movement a "passion"?
"?
MAX. They have called it by many names, depending A on the underlying concepts. PYR. How do you mean this?
MAX. They have called it power or potency, and operation or act, and difference, and movement, and property, and quality, and passion—not by way of opposition to the divine, but because of the reason for its existence. They called it power or potency because it has the force of preservation; they called it operation or act because it has the force of distinction and exhibits an invariable likeness in all things of the same species; they called it difference because it has the force of discernment; they called it movement because it has the force of manifestation; they called it property because it has the force of constitution and because it belongs to it alone and to no other; they called it quality because it forms according to the species; and they called it passion because it allows it to be moved. For everything that is from God and after God suffers by being moved, inasmuch as it is not self-moving or self-existing power. Thus, it is not through an opposition, as we have said, but because of the reason implanted in them from creation by the Author of the universe. Whence, even when raising it to the divine, they called it operation or act. For he who said, "Each form operates with the communion of the other," what else did he do but what he who said, "And B having fasted forty days, he afterwards hungered; for he gave to nature, when he willed, the power to work what was proper to it"? Or what was done by those who spoke of a distinct operation, or a double one, or one and another?
PYR. It has been truly proven in the question of operations that it is absurd to speak of one operation in Christ, in whatever manner it might be stated. But I ask for pardon, both for myself and for those who preceded me. For it was out of ignorance that we fell into such absurd opinions and arguments, and I ask that a way be found by which this supervening absurdity might be abolished while the memory of our predecessors remains intact.
MAX. There is no other way than that the persons be passed over in silence, but that such dogmas be subjected to anathema.
PYR. But if this is done, Sergius and the synod that was held during my patriarchate will at the same time be cast out with them.
MAX. I am struck with wonder how you call that a synod D which was not held as synodical laws and canons or ecclesiastical statutes command. For neither was an encyclical letter issued with the consensus of the patriarchs, nor was a place or day for meeting appointed. There was no plaintiff or accuser. The participants did not have letters of commendation—neither the bishops from the metropolitans, nor the metropolitans from the patriarchs. No letters or vicars were sent by the other patriarchs. Who, then, possessed of even a grain of reason, would endure to call that a synod which filled the whole world with scandals and discord?
PYR. If there is no other way than this, which
A my own safety I value more than all, I am ready B to do this with full conviction; asking one thing alone, that I might be deemed worthy, first, to venerate the apostolic shrines (or rather, the princes of the apostles themselves); and then, that it be permitted to see the most holy Pope face to face, and to deliver to him a libellus concerning the things that have been absurdly done. When he had said these things, Maximus and the patrician Gregory said: "Since your proposal is good and useful, and contributes to the Church, so let it be."
Having therefore come with us to this most renowned city of Rome, he fulfilled his promise, having condemned the dogmas of the impious Ecthesis, and having united himself, through the orthodox confession, to the holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, by the grace and cooperation of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.
MONITUM.
Because in the following collection of letters there is one or another concerning the soul and its operation, lest I be compelled to interrupt the series of letters by inserting this opusculum among them, I have preferred to place it before them here, and not to detain the reader further. It is published from the codex of the most eminent Cardinal Mazarin, the Naudean codex, and another of the Reverend Abbot Gerasimus Blacchi of Venice. It also exists in the Seguierian codex of the illustrious man de Ballesdens; which I have not been able to see.Saint Maximus the Monk, On the Soul.
First of all I shall set forth by what criterion the soul is naturally meant to be grasped; then, by what means its existence is proven; next, whether it is a substance or an accident; then, consistently following these, whether it is simple or compound; then again, whether it is mortal or immortal; and finally, whether it is rational or irrational. For these are the things most wont to be sought in a treatise On the Soul, as being most essential and primary, and such as can distinguish its property as if by a mark. C For proofs to confirm what has been examined, we shall use common notions, such as the facts at hand are naturally wont to attest as trustworthy. But for the sake of brevity and utility, we shall presently use only such syllogisms as have a proof for the necessity of the inquiry, so that by making the concepts clear and easily comprehensible, they may facilitate for us a certain readiness for the answer to those who oppose us. Let us therefore begin our discourse from here.
What is the faculty of judgment of the soul, by which the soul is grasped.
All things that exist are known either by sense or grasped by intellect. And that which falls under sense has sufficient proof in the sense itself; for at the very moment of contact, it produces in us the perception D of the subject.
A And that which is grasped by intellect is known not by itself, but through its contraries. The soul, therefore, being unknown, will be rightly known not from itself, but from its effects.
Whether the soul exists.
Our body, when it moves, is moved either from without or from within. That it is not moved from without is clear, from the fact that it is moved neither by being pushed nor by being pulled, as inanimate things are. And again, being moved from within, it is not moved by nature, as fire is; for fire does not cease to be moved as long as it is fire, just as a body that has become a corpse is no longer moved, though it is a body. Since, therefore, it is moved neither from without like inanimate things, nor by nature like fire, it is clear that it is moved by a soul, which also provides it with life. B If, then, the soul is shown to provide life to our body, the soul itself, too, will be known by its contraries and its effects.Whether the soul is a substance.
That it is a substance is proven in this way. First, because the definition of substance may rightly be applied to it, since it is the principle of substance that, while remaining one and the same numerically, it is capable of receiving contraries at different times. That the soul itself, without departing from its own nature and remaining unharmed, receives contraries in turn, is evident to everyone. For justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, temperance and licentiousness, which are contraries, C are seen within it. Since, therefore, it is a property of substance to be capable of receiving contraries at different times; and it has been proven that the soul also receives this definition; it follows that the soul is a substance. Furthermore, since the body is a substance, it is necessary for the soul also to be a substance. For it is not possible that that which is endowed with life should be a substance, while that which provides it should lack substance; unless, perhaps, someone might say that that which is not, and is nothing, is the cause of that which is a certain thing and truly exists; or again, that something which has its existence in another, and without which it cannot exist, is the cause of that in which it exists, which only a madman would surmise.Whether the soul is incorporeal.
That the soul is in the body has been proved above; it remains, therefore, to consider how it is in the body. For if it is placed beside it like one pebble next to another, the soul will be a body; and the whole body will not be ensouled, for it will be applied to only one part. But if the soul is mixed or blended [with the body], it must be said to be manifold in its parts, and not simple, and thus it would be cast out of the definition of the soul. For that which is manifold in its parts is also divisible; and that which is divisible is also dissoluble; and that which is dissoluble is composite; and that which is composite D is extended in three dimensions; and that which is extended in three dimensions is a body; and a body added to a body produces bulk. But the soul, being in the body, does not produce bulk, but rather—A bestows life. Therefore, the soul is not corporeal, but exists as incorporeal.
Furthermore, if the soul is a body, it is moved either from within or from without. But it is not moved from without; for it is neither pushed nor pulled like inanimate objects; nor is it moved from within as animate beings are—for it is absurd to speak of a soul of a soul. Therefore, it will not be a body; it is, then, incorporeal.
And again, if the soul is a body, it possesses sensible qualities and is nourished. But it is not nourished; or if we grant that it is nourished, it is not nourished corporally in the manner of a body, but in an incorporeal way; for it is nourished by word and doctrine. It does not, therefore, possess sensible qualities. For neither justice, nor fortitude, nor any other such thing is seen by the eyes. B For these are the qualities of the soul; therefore it is not a body; it is, then, incorporeal.
Whether the soul is simple.
It is shown, therefore, that the soul is simple, from those very things by which it was demonstrated to be incorporeal. For if it is not a body (for every body is composite; and what is composite is made up of parts), then it will not be many-parted; but being incorporeal, it is simple, in that it is incomposite (that is to say, devoid of composition).
Whether the soul is immortal.
To this, that it is simple, I think one must add that it is immortal. And hear how. There is nothing in existence that is its own destroyer, since otherwise it would not have existed from the beginning. For things that perish are destroyed by their opposites. C For this reason, also, whatever is destroyed is of such a kind that it can be dissolved. But what can be dissolved is composite; and what is composite is many-parted; and that which is composed of parts is, clearly, composed of different parts; and that which is different is not the same. Therefore, the soul, being simple and not composed of different parts—being, that is to say, incomposite and indissoluble—for that reason and by that function will be immune to corruption and immortal.
D And again, that which is moved by some mover and by its impulse, and which does not have its vital principle from itself but from that by which it is moved, persists only so long as that effective force holds and preserves it. But when the active force ceases, that too dissolves and perishes. But that which is not moved by the impression of something else, but is endowed with motion from itself, such as the soul is—being moved by itself—truly never ceases to be. For to that power by which one is moved from oneself, there is a companion power by which one is always moved. And that which is always moved never ceases. And that which never ceases has no end by which it is closed. And that which has no end by which it is closed is incorruptible.
A And again, if everything that is corrupted is corrupted by its own malice and vice; that which is not corrupted by its own malice and vice will be immune to corruption. For evil is the opposite of good, and for that reason it will also have the power to corrupt it; for there will be nothing else that constitutes the malice and vice of a body than passion, sickness, and death—just as its virtue consists of beauty, life, health, and a good constitution. If, therefore, the soul is not corrupted by its own malice and vice (furthermore, the malice and vice of the soul consist of cowardice, intemperance, envy, and whatever is akin to these; all of which do not remove its being alive and being moved), then the soul will be immortal.
Whether the soul is rational.
B That our human soul is rational, one could prove from many things: and first, from the fact that it has discovered those arts which are useful for life. For no one could say that the arts were established rashly or without any sound sense or judgment; for one would not prove them to be idle or of no fruit for the use of life. If, therefore, the arts contribute to the utility of life, and that which so contributes is praiseworthy, and that which is praiseworthy is a construct of reason—and these are discoveries of the soul—then our soul is rational.
Furthermore, from the argument that our senses are not sufficient for the apprehension of things, it is concluded that our soul is endowed with reason. For the apprehension of the senses is not enough for us for the knowledge of things, unless we wish to be deceived in their regard. For instance, in the case of things C that are equal in shape and similar in color, though they are distinct in their natures, the sense, being devoid of reason, is powerless to distinguish them. If, therefore, the senses, being irrational, produce in us a false representation of things, we must consider whether things can be truly apprehended or not; and if they can be apprehended, there must be another faculty, and one superior to the senses, which reaches them; but if they are not apprehended, they will not be seen by us otherwise than as they are. That things can be apprehended is clear from the fact that we use each of them according to their nature for our utility, and again we transform them into whatever we please. Since, therefore, we have proved that things can be apprehended by us, but that the senses, because they lack reason, think falsely about them, it will be the mind that discerns all things, and acknowledges all things as they truly are. But the mind is the rational part of the soul; therefore the soul is rational.
D To these things, moreover, we advance nothing that we have not first delineated within ourselves. And this is nothing other than the dignity of the soul. For the mind does not come to the soul from the outside, nor does the knowledge of things; but the soul itself provides, through its own subtle discoveries, an adornment to things. And this is the reason why it first depicts the thing within itself as it were, and then subsequently brings it forth into a work. The soul's
The dignity of the soul is nothing other than to cause all things to be done with reason. For it is shown that it differs from the senses in this; therefore the soul is rational.
A Q. What is the soul? A. An incorporeal substance, endowed with the faculty of understanding, dwelling in the body, and providing it with life.
Q. What is the mind? A. The purest part of the soul, using reason to contemplate things, and considering what was previously conceived by it.
Q. What are the faculties of the mind [φρένες]? A. The powers of the soul which are directed towards any of the things that exist in a proper sequence.
Q. What is a habit [τρόπος]? A. A state of the soul acquired through custom and rendered available by use.
B Q. What is sense perception? A. The instrument of the soul, a faculty receiving those things which touch the organs of sense from without.
Q. What is the spirit? A. An unsubstantial [infigurabilis] substance, preceding every movement.
The end of the booklet of the blessed Maximus the monk, *On the Soul*.
MONITUM ON THE EPISTLES OF SAINT MAXIMUS
The Royal Codex contained these collected in one arrangement, a few more than others, from which those which were in them were emended, either by the most illustrious Raphael Dufresne—may he be of blessed memory—or by the reverend abbot Gerasimus Blacchi of Venice, or sometimes also from the most illustrious Pierre Séguier, Chancellor of France. The Royal Codex begins that body of its epistles with the *Paraeneticus* of George, prefect of Africa, under the title I have inscribed. The cited codices suggest another, namely: *To George the prefect, when he had sailed to Constantinople*. It is clear from this and other subsequent epistles of Maximus that a great closeness existed between him and Maximus, to whom the integrity of the man, the ardor and sincerity of his faith, and his defense of the Churches provided an excellent stimulus. That he later, during the tyranny seized by Constans, betrayed Africa to the Saracens, Theophanes touches upon briefly in his 5th and 6th years, where he calls him Gregory, and Anastasius does the same from him. In the Acts of Maximus also, where Maximus is accused of having been the instigator of the rebellion by his own prophecy to him, he is likewise called Gregory; so that it is uncertain by which name he should rather be called. The cause of his African movement is also obscure, with him as the supposed author. A common cause of such movements is evil courtiers, and the envy with which they not rarely hatch calumny against those who, at a distance, govern provinces with great faith and resourcefulness. There could also have been the fraud of the Monothelites, who from the times of Heraclius already held both the court and the Church at Constantinople, and bore it ill that George, or Gregory, in such a great province, should strenuously labor for the cause of the Catholics and act as a champion of the faith, through whose diligence and that of the holy bishops and pious monks, the entrance for the new heresy was closed off, or even almost for the old heresy of the Severians, whose disciples the Monothelites were, as will be clear from the following epistles, where the discourse is especially about the nuns who were fugitives from Egypt, who were suffering from that heresy and were eager to disseminate it, with the favor also of the Augusta—whom I conjecture to be Martina—during that brief time in which she administered the empire with her son, and Pyrrhus the bishop of the city, from whose exile, and his reduction to a sounder mind through Maximus in Africa, the heresy being refuted, the individual metropolitans in it, with their own synods, slaughtered the new heresy of the Monothelites, and regarding it, having sent synodical letters, they reported it to Pope Theodore; and when they knew that the citadel of the priesthood was the place from which the hydra was to be slaughtered with a more certain blow, when already the apostolic see itself, in John IV, had led the way with that pious solicitude and zeal for the faith. Which was also accomplished from the Lateran synod under Martin, the successor of Theodore, and where the same Theodore had labored in vain to recall Paul, who was already openly a heretic; whom with greater authority than their own African Church…