provides a change and grace to the senses of the soul. For just as, according to the blessed Job, what is flavorless cannot be eaten, so speech is ineffective for rousing desire unless it is seasoned by the mysteries of the divine oracles. B Be of good courage, therefore, having become a preeminent example for those who come after, as you teach how upright children ought to be affected toward their good parents. For if, while the saint were still surviving, you had exerted such zeal in defending his reputation from the darts of adversaries, you perhaps would not have escaped the suspicion of being a flatterer. But now, the candor and sincerity of your mind, and what your affection is toward him, and your opinion of him who brought you to light in a spiritual birth, are clearly demonstrated by both the zeal with which you follow him now that he has departed this life, and the indignation with which you are inflamed against his enemies. Farewell.
OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA: REFUTATIVE DISCOURSE AGAINST EUNOMIUS
CHAPTERS OR SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST BOOK
1. Preface, showing that it is of no utility to attempt to benefit those who do not accept the benefit. 2. That we justly came to this refutation, having been deeply grieved by the accusations brought against our brother. 3. That, seeing nothing great in the power of the argument in Eunomius’s book, we reasonably took courage to undertake the refutation. 4. That Eunomius employed much vanity and garrulity, not concerning himself much with the essential matters. 5. That he did not act rightly in lampooning in his own writings the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia. 6. Mention of Aetius, the ringleader of the impiety, and of Eunomius, briefly containing the origins and pursuits of these men.
[7.] That Eunomius is refuted by himself, having made an apology not accused [by anyone]. [8.] That the insults which he used against Basil are shown by the facts themselves to be more appropriate to him than to the former. [9.] That while blaming Basil for not defending the doctrine at the time of the trials, he himself is shown to be not a stranger to this charge. [10.] That all the insulting words he used against him are proven by the very facts to be false. [11.] That he used the sophism concerning the prize in a cold manner, by which he tries to construct [the argument] that we admit he had been judged, and that he did not make his apology without accusation. [12.] That he vainly reproaches with cowardice one who showed such great courage during the trials before the Emperor and the prefects. [13.] A recollection of those things spoken dogmatically by him, and a conflict against the things said according to division. [14.] That he acted wrongly in calling to mind the saving dogma, not naming the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as it has been handed down, but using other names according to his own will. [15.] That he acted wrongly in calling only the essence of the Father the most proper and the supreme, concluding tacitly from this that the essence of the Son and of the Spirit is improper and inferior. [16.] An examination of the signified meaning of subjection, according to which he says the nature of the Spirit is subjected to the essence of the Father and of the Son, in which it is established that the Holy Spirit is coordinated with the Father and the Son, and is not subjected. [17.] An examination of the operations, what they are according to nature, which he says follow the essence of the Father and of the Son. [18.] That he does not act according to reason in dividing the dogma into a plurality of essences, providing no proof that things are thus. [19.] That while calling the divine essence simple, he allows for simplicity only in name. [20.] That he acts wrongly in conceiving a certain operation prior to the existence of the Only-begotten, which is productive of Christ’s hypostasis. [21.] That the blasphemy of these [men] is more grievous than the Jewish error. [22.] That one ought not to dogmatize about greater and lesser regarding the divine essence, in which [section] there is also a technical exposition of ecclesiastical dogmas. [23.] That the teaching of the faith is not without witness, having been secured by scriptural testimonies. [24.] That he speaks vanity, reasoning in his dogmas about the magnitudes and differences of works and operations regarding piety. [25.] That one who establishes the Father as older than the Son according to some interval-based concept will be forced to say that not even the Father is without beginning. [26.] That such a theorem does not befit even creation, which was examined regarding the Son and the Father—which they are forcing—but the Son must be contemplated uniquely with the Father, and one must confess that every creature has taken its beginning from some defined time. [27.] That he vainly supposed that the same operations produce the same works, and that the variation of works indicates differentiated operations. [28.] That he vainly supposed that an uncrossable sequence can subsist in the harmony of natures. [29.] That he vainly thought that the [variation] in the operations...
A in operations, to dissolve what is from the substances, and vice versa. 30. That there is no divine precept which commands such things to be investigated, in which the vanity B of the philosophy spent on these things is also demonstrated. 31. That perception through providence is sufficient for knowing the identity of essence. 32. That the Eunomian pronouncement, that the mode of generation follows the mode of likeness, is inconceivable. 33. That [Eunomius] has vainly asserted that the mode of generation is shown by the natural dignity of the begetter. 34. A commemoration of those things which he C slanderously uttered against the *homoousion* or consubstantiality, with a refutation. 35. The doctrine of the Anomoeans is proven to tend toward Manichaeism. 36. Another review, as if in passing, of the ecclesiastical dogma. 37. A defense of those things said by the blessed Basil, but which were contemptuously attacked by him: our [author], of course, asserting that the same concept can be applied to the appellations of Father and Unbegotten. 38. A battle against his sophistical syllogisms by means of several arguments. 39. An answer to the question proposed by him: whether He who is, is begotten. 40. That Eunomius, when refuted by the blessed Basil, had used his own help very coldly. 41. That that which follows is not identical with that from which it follows. 42. An explanation of the signification of "Unbegotten" or "Unoriginate," with a disquisition on eternity.
BOOK FIRST.
(α) It would seem that it is not possible for anyone willing to do good to all, and to pour out his beneficence indiscriminately upon any and all people throughout the whole world, to escape the criticisms of many at the same time; nor is it possible for those who intend D to cure the incurable to avoid the loss of various medicines, since neither is the effort worthwhile, nor does any utility redound to the sick, nor any praise to those who seek praise. On the contrary, it often happens that such merits become an opening for men to go from bad to worse; for the diseased, and those already on the threshold of death, are easily destroyed by more potent drugs; and those who are like wild beasts and devoid of reason, as the Gospel somewhere testifies, become worse when they are beneficially treated with a profusion of pearls. Wherefore, in my judgment, it would be useful, when we bestow something, to separate the precious from the worthless, as the divine Word has admonished, lest the wickedness of one trampling upon pearls grieve the generosity of the giver, and, through ignorance of the noble gifts, insult the beneficence shown to him.
A This occurred to me as I pondered him who liberally shared his own goods with all—I mean the man of God, that mouth of piety, Basil—who, because of the abundance of spiritual treasures with which he overflowed, poured out the grace of wisdom indiscriminately even upon envious souls, and upon Eunomius, who was ungrateful toward those who had earnestly endeavored to do him good. For this man, by reason of the excessive sickness of his soul, in which he had grown weak concerning the faith, appeared pitiful to all who share in the Church. For who was so devoid of feeling as not to pity one who was perishing? Basil alone was moved to undertake the task of healing—impelled solely by compassion—for in his abundance of humanity, he did not hesitate to lay his healing hands upon the utterly desperate; and, grieving at the man's destruction, because of his natural propensity to pity those in misery, he fashioned a speech as a refutation of heresy, like an antidote to poisonous drugs, a ready remedy, with no other end than to heal the man and, once healed, to restore him to the Church.
B But he, as if seized by a phrensy of the mind, rises up against the physician, resists him, fights him, and counts as an enemy the one who was striving to snatch him from the abyss of impiety. And he did these things not simply or as chance might have it, as happens with those who merely encounter such matters, but he erected a written pillar of this madness against himself. Having obtained as much time for leisure as he had desired, during all that intervening period he was in labor with a book, waiting longer than elephants, with their immense bodily bulk, carry their young; meanwhile, he kept throwing out threats, and privately he would not cease to fashion and lick his offspring into shape. Yet, late and with difficulty, he finally brought forth an aborted and altogether imperfect birth, which all those who hold the same opinions as Eunomius treat like nurses, feeding and cherishing it. But we, on account of that word of the Prophet saying, *Blessed is he who shall take and dash your little ones against the rock* (Ps. cxxxvi, 9), when this booklet also came into our hands, decided to seize that foolish little child and dash it against the rock, as if it were one of the Babylonian children. The rock, however, was Christ (1 Cor. x, 4)—that is to say, the reason and argument of the truth. C May only that power which strengthens the weak come upon us, through the prayers of him who perfected his own power in the weakness of the body.
If, therefore, that divine and holy soul were even now still enjoying the use of this light in a mortal body, and if that grandiloquent mouth were continuing to utter that invincible voice according to the grace given to it from the beginning, who would have attained such confidence as to dare to mutter anything concerning this subject, since those divine words surpass all language and all human reason? But after the spirit of Basil flew up to God—even while he dwelt on this earth in his small and slender body, he lived for the greater part of his time with God in the heights—and now that he has abandoned even that shadow of a body and has departed from the things entrusted to the earth, while hornets and drones are buzzing about the honeycomb... D
A and destroying the honey, let no one find fault with me for boldness if I rise up to defend the one who has left behind a silent mouth. For I have not taken on this labor because I am conscious in myself of possessing greater power of speech than others, but because I know accurately, as well as anyone else, that thousands of those who possess the gift of wisdom in abundance abound in the Church. Yet, since I claim it belongs to me more than any other to inherit the estate of him who has departed, both because of the writings and because of the laws of nature, for this reason I myself claim the inheritance of his word before all others—being numbered among the least of those contributing to the Church of God, but no less strong than the one who has broken away from the Church into the opposite rank. For in a healthy body, even the smallest member, due to the harmony of the whole, would be stronger than one that is corrupt and severed, even if the former be greater and the latter smaller. B Let no one imagine, as I say these things, that I am boasting in a grandiloquent way, or bragging as if with my own strength about empty vanities. For it is not to compete in a contest of words, or to make a display of rhetoric, that I am brought down to this man, out of some juvenile ambition. For in those matters where winning is useless and unprofitable, we readily concede the palm to those who desire it; especially since I am persuaded that even he is a seeker and hunter after words: for when I turn my mind to the time which he has worn away in adorning this dogma of his, I conjecture that he has truly labored in this book as well; both because he has dedicated no small part of his life to this writing, and because his admirers greatly exult and take pleasure in his labor. And it is no wonder that a man who has devoted the Olympiads of so many years to this matter should have accomplished something greater than those who are accustomed to write extemporaneously. However, his delay and hesitation in constructing this work demonstrate even more clearly his ineptitude in seeking out finery and figures of speech, and his completely C vain and superfluous zeal for these embellishments of language. For, having collected a great sweepings-heap of little words, prepared on the spur of the moment and gathered from I know not what books, and having painstakingly piled up an infinite heap of words over the few things that could be understood, he has produced this laborious work. This, the disciples of error indeed praise and admire—perhaps from that blindness in which they labor regarding what is right, being obviously deprived of any faculty for discerning the right from the not-right—but those whose hearts have not been darkened by the filth of infidelity laugh, and count it as nothing. For who could restrain his laughter when he sees that, while every care and industry is promised on behalf of the truth, the whole industry is actually expended on ineptitudes of words and figures, with no profit? For what moment does it bring to the refutation, as he himself thinks, of our doctrine, and the commendation of the truth of those things about which there is dispute, this strange assessment, D adorned with elaborate figures of speech?
A For no one could discover to whom he was looking among those known for their rhetorical skill, when he pushed himself into this, like one of those stage performers of wonders, who, by means of parallelisms, and isocola, and similarly sounding and similarly ending words, makes the discourse rattle, as it were, with the rhythm of his petty phrases. For such, along with many others, are those silly twitterings in his introductions, and those worn-out Sotadean verses, which I think he could not even recite with a steady and composed bodily state, but rather would have to stamp with his foot and click his fingers sharply in rhythm simultaneously, saying that there will be no further need for other discourses or secondary labors.
B Therefore, having yielded to him the advantage in these and similar things, and permitting him to enjoy the victory to his heart's content, I will gladly pass over all the effort spent on these things, as appropriate only for those who look toward vainglory. If indeed there brings any glory at all to be tickled by such speeches! For even the genuine minister of the Word, Paul, being adorned by the truth alone, both judged it base for himself to shape his discourse with such varied ornaments, and trained us to look toward the truth alone, legislating this well and properly. For why should one scrape together that cosmetic curiosity of discourse, which consists of frequent pauses and clauses, for the completion of a false and tricked-out beauty, when someone is already made radiant by the adornment of truth? For to those whom the truth has deserted, it might perhaps be useful to veil the lie with the charm of words, sprinkling such vain and superfluous diligence upon the discourse like a cosmetic. For in this way, error might become plausible and acceptable to the listeners, being covered and shining with such verbal ornaments. But when someone pursues the truth itself, pure and uncontaminated by any external mixture, the discourse shines with a beauty all its own.
C Now, as I am about to approach the examination and discussion of what Eunomius has written, I seem to myself to be in doubt, like a farmer when the wind is dead calm, uncertain how he might separate the grain from the chaff; for there is so much that is superfluous and chaff-like in this heap of words of his, that I am almost led to believe that in everything he has brought forward, there is no substance of facts or arguments at all. To go through one by one everything he has written is, I consider, at once useless to our purpose, difficult, and alien to our goal. For we do not have such an abundance of leisure that we are free to occupy ourselves with these vanities; and I believe it belongs to the approved workman not to waste his strength on vain things, but where the toil produces acknowledged fruit.
D I pass over, therefore, whatever he has poured forth at the very beginning for the sake of self-display, as if he were a herald of truth; I pass over also the reproach of infidelity with which he has bespattered his adversaries; while he [cont.]
A neither sets forth what those points are that were agreed upon, nor does he explain what they are, beyond saying that a judgment was rendered regarding the disputed questions. And indeed a legitimate judgment, which compelled those who were puffed up beyond what is right to be of a moderate mind. He writes this, using his own words—resembling the Lydian harmony—as follows: “By a just judgment, those who were unrighteously exalting themselves were compelled to be wise,” what he termed a judgment, and an interdiction, and a proscription of the rebels; I know not what he intends to signify by the name of interdiction. I shall pass over these and other matters of that kind in silence, as they are a vain swarm of words and contribute nothing useful at all. But wherever he endeavors to confirm his heretical doctrine, there I deem it worth the effort to dwell more studiously and accurately. For thus the interpreter of divine dogmas acted in his own books: B though he had many resources from which he might have amplified his discourse, he brought forward only those things which he judged necessary, contracting the prolixity of the argument by selecting the heads of blasphemy from all those that his impious book contained.
But if anyone desires that our refutation be instituted in the same order which he observes, let him explain, if he will, what benefit would come of it. What profit would return to the hearers if I were to unravel the riddle and enigma of the inscription—which, like the Sphinx of the tragedians, he puts before us in his prologue—by commemorating, that is to say, that new apology for an apology of his, and many other trifles, and the long narration of his dream as well? For I think the readers would be afflicted with quite enough trouble by Eunomius’ oration, partly on account of the base and vain novelty in the inscription itself, and partly on account of the odious enumeration of his own personal experiences. For what toils and what struggles C does he not report that he himself has undertaken, spread abroad by land and sea, and celebrated throughout the whole world? If these were to be written again—and indeed with the addition, as is necessary, of the refutation of error augmenting the discourse—who would be found so iron-hearted and adamant as not to be moved to nausea by the importunity of such diligence? If, furthermore, I were to recount word for word the divine history—who that man was who grieved him at the Euxine Sea because of the homonymity, what kind of life was led there, what studies were undertaken, how he dissented from a certain Armenian because of the similarity of their customs, and in what matters they subsequently came to an agreement with reconciled minds, so as to consent to his own teacher, the invincible and most celebrated Aetius (for with such praises he honors the man),—then what were the plots and D schemes devised against him, by which they brought the man to judgment, making no other charge against him than that he excelled in glory above the rest? If, I say, I were to recount all these things here, would I not, just as those who, by associating with those who have a disease of the eyes, draw the disease upon themselves from their constant intercourse with the sick, so would I also seem to have become a partaker of the illness of dwelling studiously upon vain and frivolous things, following the traces of his chatter, and examining each particular point? What sort of slaves does he say were sent into freedom, what is the nature of the initiates, what is the status of the purchased, and what...
is the meaning of the presence of Montius, Gallus, and Domitianus within this discourse, or of the false witnesses, the angry emperor, and the few who were sent into exile? For what could be more foolish than these narratives to one who does not intend solely to recount history, but to refute the opponent of his own heretical doctrine? And what is revealed through this history serves even less purpose A; for I suspect that not even the author himself could read through it without nodding off, even if, as parents, they are held by a certain natural affection for their own offspring. For the deeds are supposedly recounted there, and the calamities are heightened by the narrative's language, and the history itself is prepared in the volume of a tragedy.
But that I may not, by making excuses longer than necessary, linger too long on these foolish things—just as someone driving a horse through thick mud is himself splashed and dirtied by the resulting filth, so I too, by running through and mentioning piece by piece everything he has written, would soil my own book—I judge it fitting, as much as possible, for the discourse to leap over this whole collection of refuse with a high and swift bound. For it is a sufficient gain to depart quickly from these disagreeable things, to hasten the discourse to the rocky ground of history, so that terms full of bitterness may not be sprinkled into my own work as well. For it is fitting that such things as these should only come from the mouth of Eunomius concerning the priests of God: calling us B satellites, lictors, and satraps who strike and track down what is hidden, not permitting those who wish to hide to lie concealed, and whatever other things he is not ashamed to write against the gray hair of the priests. For just as in the schools of non-Christian rhetoric, for the sake of exercising the pen, the tongue, and the mind, and for the sake of ready facility, certain subjects are proposed to young men, through which, taking hold of a handle as it were, they may set upon some indefinite person; so this declaimer rushes with all his force upon the aforementioned priests of God, and sharpens his slanderous tongue, and with no crime cited to show of what they are guilty, he insults them out of a mere lust for reviling, having heaped every sort of disgrace upon them and having compounded disjointed calumnies; calling one essentially a soldier who feeds on lentils, and a "holy" man lacking holiness, pale from fasting but breathing out murder in his bitterness; and C much more of such buffoonery, just as someone is disparaged in the public processions of the heathens—since, due to an excess of shamelessness, he rails without a mask, and in this way, having shaded his own bitterness behind no veil, he offers up from the wagon the things that come from his mouth in a naked and brazen voice.
Then he confesses the reason why he is provoked; he says that those men were making an effort so that many would not be led astray by their deceit. And it is for this reason that he is angry, because they could not dwell at will in every place they desired, but instead—according to the decree of the one who was then in power—Phrygia was made their dwelling place, so that many might not be injured by their wicked company. And D while he is indignant about these things...
"And the great heaviness of the trials, and the noble endurance of their sufferings, and their exchanging their own country for Phrygia." A Assuredly. For those events brought no disgrace to Oltiseris, nor did they overturn the loftiness of his ancestral glory, nor did they injure the splendor of his lineage, so that there was any danger that those things, on account of which he is now indignant, should result in harm also to that famous B and binominal Priscus, the father of this man’s father—that source from which he derived such excellent and illustrious accounts of his origin: namely, concerning the millstone, and the leather, and the servile pittance, and the rest of the inheritance of Canaan. And if those who procured this exile for them deserved censure on their account, I also confess that those who were the cause of these things for them—if indeed there were any, or if they ever existed—are worthy of reproach. For they caused the memory of the deeds performed by these men to be buried, and to escape those who are more serious in their character and life; and it is not permitted for later generations to inquire more curiously into past events, as to from what blood both were sprung, and what course of life they followed, inherited from their fathers; and what was less, or what was greater, than becomes children and free-born men, who respect themselves—and yet later they arrived at such celebration and fame of name that they became known even to emperors, as this man insolently boasts in his writing, and that all imperial powers and magistracies were moved on their account, and that their doctrine spread through the greater part of the world.
C But, if we are willing to confess the truth, has not the greatest injury been inflicted by these things either upon the writer of these speeches himself, or upon his master, and the instructor of that same life, Aetius, whom to me Eunomius seems to esteem not so much for the perversity of his dogmas, as for the short paths and resources of his life? I affirm this, not led by any uncertain conjectures, but having been made certain by these my own ears from those to whom this was best known. For I once heard what kind of person this Aetius D was from Athanasius, Bishop of the Galatians: a man to whom nothing was more ancient than the truth, and who, to gain greater faith for the things he was relating, would show the letter of George of Laodicea. He said, therefore, that Aetius did not study the absurdity of his dogmas from his earliest age; but that with the progression of time he gave himself to the task of innovating doctrine, so that by this, as if by an art, he might prepare a living for himself—inasmuch as he had abandoned the cultivation of the vine which he possessed (but how he did so, I shall keep silent, lest I appear to start my narrative with more malice than necessary). A For in the beginning he was a furnace-worker—an art which is occupied with fire and the manufacturing of iron furnaces—spending his time with small hammers in his hands, and sitting by a tiny anvil under a wretched hut, sordidly and with great difficulty earning the necessities of life through this labor. For what reward of any account, pray, would be worthy of one who tends to the decaying parts of copper vessels, and clears out the...
holes, and softens tin with blows, and casts the leaden bases of cauldrons? The cause of his change of life was a certain misfortune that befell him in his trade. For having once accepted from a soldier’s wife a gold ornament from those worn around the neck or arms, in order to repair for her a break that had occurred in it, he deceived the woman through his craftiness; he stole the gold, and in return gave her a vessel of bronze, equal in size to the gold one, and similar in appearance through a superficial coating, having smeared the bronze with gold. The woman, having been cheated by the appearance—for he was skilled in the coppersmith’s craft through the sophistries of the art to mislead those who used his services—discovered the fraud and wrongdoing regarding the gold in time, when the coating had been worn away from the bronze. Consequently, she brought the thief to justice, certain soldiers having been stirred to indignation because of their kinship and fellow-feeling with the woman. Having suffered what it is natural for an impostor and thief to suffer after such a piece of audacity, he B swore an oath to abandon his trade, as if it were not his will and intent, but rather his employment, that had put the desire for theft into him.
After this, it came about that he became the servant of a certain itinerant doctor, so that he might not be entirely without the necessities of life; and under the pretext of medicine, he frequented the houses and hideouts of the most obscure and wretched people. Later, having gradually increased his means, and having persuaded a certain Armenian—whom, as a barbarian, it was no trouble to lead into a trap—to give him his ear as if to a doctor, and having received many weights of gold from him, he considered it beneath him to continue serving others in the medical art; rather, he wanted to be considered and called a doctor himself. From that time forth, therefore, he participated in medical assemblies, and mingling with those who engage in argumentative strife, he was one of those who shout. And by the inclination of the discourse, when his own side was added, he was held in no small regard by those who hire the impudence of a tongue for their own contentions. C
But when his means became more prosperous through these things, he did not think he ought to persist any longer in this life either, but gradually abandoned that medical art along with the coppersmith’s craft. Now, because Arius, that enemy of God, had sown those wicked seeds of tares—the fruits of which are the doctrines of the Anomoeans—the schools of the doctors at that time were resounding with the noise regarding that question. Having therefore practiced in such a debate, and having observed a certain path of syllogisms from Aristotelian echoes, he was famous, surpassing Arius, the father of the heresy, in the novelty of the things he invented; or rather, having understood the sequence of the things proposed by him, he seemed to be a man of sharp wit and a discoverer of hidden things, declaring that what is created, and from non-being, is dissimilar to the Creator and to Him who brought it forth from non-being. D
A Since, therefore, he tickled the ears of those who desired novelties with such arguments, Theophilus the Blemmys—who, through a certain familiarity, had earlier access to Gallus, whereby Aetius gained an entrance to the palace—became aware of this new-fangled language. When the monstrous crime was perpetrated by Gallus against the prefect Domitian and Montius, all those who had been participants in that detestable deed became, as was expected, participants in his destruction. He alone, however, escaped punishment, having been judged worthy to suffer no adversity, unlike the others who were accomplices in the same crime. In the meantime, when the great Athanasius had been driven from the Church of the Alexandrians by the tyranny of the emperor, and George the Tarbasthenite was harassing and disturbing that people, Aetius again became an Alexandrian, in no way inferior to those who were nourished and fed by the Cappadocian. For he was not unskilled at flattering George, being a Canaanite himself, and for this reason George was very kindly disposed toward him, as if he were born of the same race and tribe; he, in turn, was delighted by the company of Aetius, having long since been captivated by the perversity of his doctrine, and Aetius was presented to him as a kind of unexpected gain.
These things did not escape the notice of his true disciple, this Eunomius, who, when he perceived his own father—a man in other respects most excellent, except for the one fact that he had begotten such a son—living in a manner that was indeed honest and in accordance with the laws, yet difficult due to poverty and full of infinite hardships (for he was a farmer, accustomed to the plow, and deeply engaged in the labor of cultivating his small plot of land; yet during the winter, when there was a respite from the labors of the fields, he would skillfully form the first elements and syllables for children, earning his food and clothing from those wages)—when he observed these things and the like in his father's house, he bade a long farewell to the plow, the plowhandle, and all his father's implements. B Fearing that he himself might be forced to struggle with the difficulties of such labors, he first turned his mind to the wisdom of Prunicus; and having practiced writing rapidly by hand, he initially dwelt with a kinsman of his own lineage, having no other reward for the ministry of writing than his daily bread. Then, serving as a tutor to the children of his master, little by little he began to be kindled with a desire for rhetoric or eloquence. And those things which he did in the interim I pass over, knowing them well, such as the life he led in his own country, and where he was caught in Constantinople, and with whom. After these things, he was occupied with the making of cloaks and belts, as they say.
C Since he saw that all these things were petty and that nothing very desirable resulted from the labor spent upon them, abandoning the other pursuits of life, he devoted himself to Aetius alone out of everyone. It was not without purpose, I think, that he had chosen him as his guide and living exemplar. For from the time he came into the communion of that ineffable wisdom, from that moment everything sprang up for him without sowing or plowing, for he is a wise man, according to the things upon which he has set his heart. D
A And he knows well by what art he may be able to reconcile to himself those who are more subject to the passions of men. For since the human condition is, for the most part, easily captivated by pleasure, and since there is a great inclination of nature toward this passion, with nature easily slipping from the harsher disciplines of life into the smooth path of pleasure, he therefore, so that he may attach as many as possible to himself as companions in his insane and pestilential dogma, presents himself as sweet and honey-tongued to his followers, rejecting the difficulty and hardship of virtue as though they were useless, for the sake of the approval of his own mysteries. And whatever things they teach in secret, and whatever they divulge and bring into the light, those who are polluted by that stain, and whatever things are handed down to them by the grave high priest of the mysteries, B and the mode and rite of baptism, and the patronage of nature, and things like these: if anyone should wish to know these things accurately, let him ask those to whom there is no religious scruple against speaking of what is shameful and indecorous. We shall be silent, for it is not right even to mention the accusers of such people, since they [the accusers] know how to honor purity even in their words, nor to defile their books with pretentious language, even though that which they might say would not be foreign to the truth.
But to return to those things for the sake of which the discourse has drifted hither: just as the fallacious and cunning art of Aristotle was the occasion of impiety for Aetius, in the same way, this handle was offered to his unique disciple to insult brilliantly the simplicity of those whom he had led into error. C In what matter, then, did Basil in the Euxine Pontus, or Eustathius in Armenia, affect him with so great an injury, those about whom he wove a long and verbose digression in this place? In what matter did they disturb his own way of life? Did they not rather increase their new glory with a great addition? For whence did such celebrity and fame of name come to them? Is it not from those men, if the accuser does not lie? For the fact that those famous men, as this writer testifies, deemed them worthy to be those with whom they fought—men who were obscure and unknown—rightly provided the occasion for their adversaries to take on greater spirits, and to persuade themselves that they were superior to the rest; and by this D way, they were able to hide the ignobility and obscurity of their former life, having obtained a famous name among all. All these things ought to be zealously avoided by the prudent: for you will find no one of those who think rightly who desires to become famous through wickedness and evil deeds. But to such as these, this seems the supreme degree of happiness, just as there is a story of a certain inglorious and abject person in Asia, who, when he sought the celebrity of a name among the Ephesians, did not indeed conceive of a deed worthy of praise in his mind—for he was not able to do such a thing—but nevertheless became more famous than all those who are celebrated for the greatest crimes committed, by having devised a most pernicious act against the Ephesians. For there was at Ephesus a certain public building, conspicuous for its magnificence and opulent bulk: this man burned it down by casting fire into it, and being captured, he was brought to trial for his most audacious crime.
A And finding that he might become famous among many, he devised a way for the name of the perpetrator to be commemorated by a crime of such magnitude. Such, too, is the thesis of these men regarding their own display, except that they differ in that their evil is greater. For they do not wreak destruction on inanimate buildings, but on the living edifice of the Church itself, by introducing—like fire—the corruption of their doctrine. But I shall reserve the discussion about doctrine for its own proper place.
Now, however, let us see how truthfully this man complains in his preface that he is hated by the unbelievers on account of the truth. For perhaps it will not be irrelevant, even from matters that do not pertain to doctrine, to learn, as if by a sign, with what fidelity he conducts himself in those things which properly pertain to dogmas. For "he who is faithful in a small thing," saith the Lord, "will also be faithful in a great one" (Luke XVI, 10). B For he, intending to write an apology for his apology, says that he took the occasion for this new, unaccustomed, and paradoxical inscription and dissertation from nowhere else than from him who had refuted his first speech; for he had bestowed the name "apology" upon his first speech; and our master (a) had objected that the title of an apology is appropriate only to those who have been accused of certain crimes; but if anyone should write something of his own accord, that writing would be something else, not an apology. Although convinced of an obvious absurdity—namely, that one ought not to institute an apology unless an accusation has preceded it—he does not deny this, but says that, having been accused of the greatest crimes, he descended to an apology and to his own defense. C But how mendaciously he asserts this, I believe it will be clear from those very things which we shall now relate. He complains of many and intolerable evils inflicted upon him by those by whom, as if they were judges, he was condemned, and he claims that anyone can learn this from the books published by himself.
How did he suffer such atrocious things, if he refuted the crimes laid against him by means of an apology? For if he employed an apology to this end, that he might escape those things of which he was truly accused, then that apology was entirely false, tragic, and vainly concocted; but if he suffered what he narrates, it is evident that he suffered these things not having made use of an apology. For the goal of every apology is this: to prevent those who hold the right of casting a vote from being turned aside from the truth through calumny. D Unless perhaps he will attempt to say this: that he did indeed put forward his apology at the trial, but, being unable to win over those who had been chosen to judge, he was worsted by his adversaries. But he said nothing of the sort about the trial, nor was he likely to. For how could he? Since he testifies in a public book that he spurned the sentence of judges who were hostile and inimical to him. "We confess," he says, "that we were condemned in silence, when certain malefactors and wicked men had violently taken their seats on the judges' bench." Here, being very drowsy or indignant, I suppose, and thinking of something else, he committed a solecism
A regarding the word "insilientium" (those who leap in), not perceiving its usage, but thinking, in his grandiloquence, that he was acting the Attic stylist. But that the usage of this word is different from what this new "Atticist" supposed is known to all who have been trained in the precepts of the rhetoricians; yet this is nothing to our purpose.
A little further on, he adds this: "For if he thinks that the apology is utterly destroyed because I fled from corrupted judges, the good man is greatly mistaken." When, then, and before whom did this keen man institute his apology, if he both fled from the judges as enemies and, as he himself asserts, kept silent during the trial itself? Behold this distinguished champion of the truth, B who, turned aside by a slight momentum, rushes of his own accord toward falsehood, and while honoring the truth in word, resists it in deed. But this is delightful: that he even languishes in the defense of a lie. For how did the same man justly purge himself through an apology regarding the crimes objected to him, and yet, conversely, prudently keep silent because the judges were enemies?
Moreover, it is clearly shown by that very discourse which he inscribed "Apology" that he had not been called to any tribunal at all. For he does not direct the proem of his discourse to fixed and defined judges, but to certain uncertain men, as well those who were living at that time as those who were to be born later: before whom, I also admit, he has need of a long apology, not unlike that which he has now published, since it, too, would stand in need of another apology — but a general and accurate one, one that might be able to persuade the listeners that he was not in his right mind when he smeared these C things onto paper. He was not in his right mind, he who invents judges who are neither present nor, perhaps, yet born, and who defends himself before those who do not exist; and who asks the not-yet-born not to wish to discern the truth from a lie by the multitude of believers, preferring the greater number. Such an apology is indeed worthy of such judges, who are still contained in the loins of their parents; and it is fitting that they should believe that he speaks the truth, he who alone contradicts the common sense of all, and deems his own vain and empty fantasy more worthy of faith than the unanimous consent of all those who, throughout the whole world, glorify the name of Christ.
Let him write also, if it pleases him, an apology for his second apology. For this which he has now published is not a correction of crimes, D but rather their confirmation and approval. For who does not know that every true apology is directed toward the refutation of the crimes objected, so that he who is accused of theft, homicide, or any other crime, either denies altogether that he committed it, or transfers the cause of the deed to another, or, if he can do nothing of this, seeks pardon and mercy from the masters of the vote? But this man, Eunomius, neither denies what is objected to him, nor transfers the cause to another, nor flees to mercy, nor promises better things for the future, but that very crime,
A of which he is accused, he confirms with greater zeal and preparation. For what is objected, as he himself says, is impiety; not something uncertain or indefinite, but certain and determinate. But his Apology teaches impiety; it does not wash away the crime, but utterly establishes it. For if the doctrine of piety had been uncertain and unknown, there would perhaps have been less danger in contriving such a novelty. But since the doctrine of the theologian Basil resides in the souls of all the pious; does he who delivers matters contrary to the common decrees and persuasions of all, repel from himself by his defense those things of which he is accused? Or does he not rather provoke the anger of all who hear him against himself, and stand as a more bitter accuser of himself? I, at least, think so. Therefore, whether the followers of Eunomius are going to hear some apology, or to accuse the things which he has contrived for the subversion of piety, that is for him to consider; or whether he considers how those who are about to inflict injury, and what sentence the judges are going to pronounce against him, now that the crime has been established by the apology and confirmed by new arguments.
B But I do not know how I have fallen into this, out of the series and order of my discourse, as the order of the oration is not being observed. For it is not my purpose now to examine in what manner an apology should be instituted; but whether Eunomius has instituted an apology. But let us return to the proposed subject. That he is caught by his own words is manifest. For he who, bearing it ill that he has been judged for lying, says he encountered iniquitous judges, and was led about by land and sea, and suffered very many inconveniences from the heat of the sun and dust; presently, veiling the lie, he drives a nail with a nail, as the proverb has it, and corrects this lie with another lie; for since all, even he himself, know that he uttered absolutely no word in the trial, he says he declined the tribunal of enemies, and was condemned while silent. How could it be more clearly shown that this man fights both with the truth and with himself? When he is reproached for having wrongly entitled his book, he says he was compelled by the necessity of the trial to prefix the title of "Apology" to his book. When it is shown that he spoke nothing before the judges, he presently denies the trial and rejects those judges. C See this excellent champion of the truth, how valiantly he fights against falsehood! And being such a man, he dares to call the great Basil malignant, wicked, a liar, audacious, unlearned, spurious, and ignorant of divine things; and to the catalog of reproaches he adds also stupidity, insanity, fury, and infinite such things, which he sprinkles here and there throughout his discourse, thinking it sufficient to oppose the harshness and bitterness of his tongue, as equivalent to the testimonies of all mankind, who also revere the name of the great Basil as if he were one of the ancient saints: and does he think that that man, who is unassailable by blame, can be harmed solely by the lust for reviling and by impudence? The sun is not so low and debased, that stones or anything else thrown D at him reach as far as he. For what is cast returns again upon the one who threw it; but the goal of the shot remains higher; even if someone, as
A a detractor, assails the sun, he does not dim the light of its ray with his taunts; but the sun will be, and even when mocked, the sun; while the one who insults it will be convicted through the blinding of his own organs of sight as being in the dark. And even if he strongly desires to persuade those who hear and those who associate with him—following the pattern of that former apology—not to add their agreement to the opinions of all people regarding the sun, nor to consider the experience of the many as more authoritative than his own private conjecture, by attaching what is superior to the greater part, he will in vain rave before those who have sight.
Who, then, wishes well to Eunomius, let him persuade him to put a bridle upon his mouth, and not to break away in the disorder of his speech, nor to kick against the pricks, nor B to speak boldly against a venerable name, but rather, by the mere mention of the great Basil, to be filled with reverence and awe in his soul. For what more will he gain from this immoderate self-display? When such a person is deemed by all to be what his life, his discourse, and the common testimony of the world declare him to be? But he who attempts to find fault with him demonstrates his own character, as the Gospel says somewhere, being unable to speak good things because he is evil, but rather speaking out of the abundance of the heart and drawing from an evil treasury. For that the words of his abuse are empty, not touching upon the truth of the matters, is a proof derived from his own writings.
He proposes a certain place, in which he says the contest concerning the doctrines was held, but this place is nameless, C and indicated by no familiar sign, so that it is necessary for the listener to be swept along by uncertain conjectures regarding things unknown. In this place, he says, a gathering of selected men from everywhere took place, and he waxes puerile in his speech, as if bringing before the eyes the arrangement of those things. Then he speaks of certain judges, nor even naming these, stating that the penalty of death had been proposed, and that our teacher and father had subscribed to these. But as judgment awarded the stronger case to the opponents, he allegedly fled the places, deserting his rank, and followed a certain smoke of his homeland; and he is prolix in deriding the man in his account for D his cowardice; all of which anyone who wishes may learn from his writings. For I do not have time to scatter through my own words all the vomit of his school, but to that for the sake of which I mentioned these things, I shall proceed.
What is that nameless place in which the argument about the doctrines is examined? What is the time that called the best men to this contest? Who are the men who hastened through land and sea toward the communion of labors? What world does he speak of, hanging in suspense over the outcome, waiting for the
suspended in uncertainty, and awaiting the sentence of the judges? Or who declared this battle? And the like. But perhaps these things and others of this kind should be permitted to Eunomius, so that, like adolescents in a grammar school, they might strive to confer a certain weight and amplification upon their speech by such inventions and fictions. Let him say only this: who is that invincible pugilist with whom our teacher [Basilius] feared to engage? For if this too is a fabrication and falsely devised, let him win again and bear away the palm of vanity, and we shall remain silent. For when one contends uselessly against shadows and phantoms, the true and genuine victory is voluntarily to renounce such a victory. But if he speaks of things that took place at Constantinople, and denotes that assembly, and dwells upon the description of the tragedies enacted there, and calls himself a great and insurmountable athlete: I confess that we avoided an encounter with our adversaries at the time of that battle, although we were present.
Let him who reproaches Basilius with cowardice show whether he himself stepped forward into the midst; whether he uttered a voice in defense of himself and his own doctrine; whether he amplified his oration in a youthful manner; whether he bravely engaged an adversary. But he will find nothing to say unless he wishes to fight openly against himself. For he confessed that by his silence he had accepted the sentence passed by the judges. If, therefore, it was necessary to speak during the contests (for he now legislates this in his writing), why is he condemned for being silent then? But if he acted rightly and fittingly by preferring to be silent rather than to speak before those judges, what iniquity C is it that silence should be praise for him, but a source of calumny and accusation for us? What could be more unjust than this absurdity, if, when two men have spoken after that convened assembly, he asserts that he indeed instituted his apology at an opportune time, so long thereafter: yet he attacks his adversary with insults, as if he had neglected the opportune time for speaking? Perhaps he ought to have refuted that speech which was first to be written later? For this, it seems, is what that complaint demands. Why did he not refute at the time of the trial, during the present, those things which he was to write later? For it is left clear by his own confession that he made no use of an apology in the trial itself. For I shall repeat the same words again. He says: "We confess that we were caught silent," and he adds the reason: "when malign men had obtained the power of judging, or, as he himself says, had leaped into the place of judges." However, that he professes to have instituted his apology at an opportune place and time, it becomes manifest from other things, as I said. For the text reads word for word: "That, however, I did not invent anything of my own accord, but being compelled by the judges, I betook myself to an apology at the due time and in the due manner, is clear from the facts themselves and from his words." What then will he say, who in every way easily twists his speech? Was it not necessary to be silent during that trial and contest? Why, then, was Eunomius mute during those same contests? But to him, an apology even after that struggle was timely and opportune. How then is the refutation of the things that have been adduced untimely for Basilius?
A But above all, as it seems, true is the saying of the holy man: that under the pretext of an apology, he contrived to establish his own dogmas according to what he thought best, and the one who in truth is a zealot of Phinees, who destroys with the sword of the word every person who has committed fornication away from the Lord; he brought forth the sword that is a medicine of the soul and a destroyer of impiety—I mean the refutation of blasphemy. But if this man stands in opposition and does not accept the cure, having mortified his own soul through apostasy, the fault belongs to him who chose the evil, as even a secular writer says. Such, then, is Eunomius—both against the truth and against us.
It was lawful for us, according to the older law, which permits those who have suffered wrong to defend themselves by requiting the authors of it, to heap abuses upon him abundantly, and in great leisure and security to spend careful effort in hurling insults and mocks at the one who has caused us pain—which he would bear with difficulty; for if he himself abounded in such invectives and accusations against one who provided no opportunity for reproach, how vast an abundant and kindly material would one discover, if he had the mind, to mock and expose to ridicule the grave life of Eunomius! B But since we have been instructed from the beginning by a disciple of the truth to learn from the Gospel, we neither strike out an eye for an eye, nor do we exchange tooth for tooth, knowing that wicked deeds are destined to be dissolved when met with their opposites. And no one of the things spoken or done wickedly would proceed to an irreparable degree if something of better things were to intervene and cut off the continuous succession of evils. Therefore, the sequence of insulting and heaping abuse is halted by long-suffering from rushing forward; for if anyone were to counter an insult with an insult, and a reproach with a reproach, he would certainly increase the absurdity by nourishing it with like things.
For this reason, leaving aside all the discourse that lies in between, which is nothing but insult, mockery, reproach, and jibes, I shall urge my discourse toward the examination of his dogma. But if anyone says that I am avoiding the use of insults through a lack of experience in such retaliations, let him consider himself—how great is the ease toward what is worse, which, without any labor, slips automatically into sin. For to become evil rests solely in the choice of the will, and often the choice alone is sufficient for the completion of wickedness; C but much greater is the ease in sins of the tongue. For the rest of sins require time, and labors, and often the help of others to be committed, whereas the faculty of speech has the power to transgress at will. A proof of what is said is the very book of Eunomius, which we have in our hands; he who does not examine it cursorily will find the downward slope of the sin in his words, which is entirely among the easiest things to imitate, even if one were completely unpracticed in the experience of blaspheming. For what need is there to labor at forming names for insults, when it is possible to use the very things that have been said against the one who has insulted us? D For everything there...
A is of calumny and blasphemy, he has stitched together to suit the examples he has forged against him; and there is nothing of the absurd that is not written therein. Clever, he says, contentious, an enemy of the truth, a sophist, a deceiver, one who sets himself against the opinions and records of the majority, who does not blush at the refutation drawn from the facts themselves, who has no fear of the laws, nor reverence for the censure of men, unskilled in discerning truth from craftiness and cunning. To these he adds impudence, and a readiness for reviling. Furthermore, he calls him sluggish, and full of contradictory suspicions, a man who strings together a discourse from inconsistencies and fights against his own words: he contradicts himself, and while he attempts to say many evil things about him, yet afterwards, he is unable to satisfy the bitterness of his mind with the novelty of his insults. And when there is nothing more that he can babble, he has recourse to the same things, and returns, as if moved in a circle, to what he has already said; and he repeats the same things a third and a fourth time, and oftener, running through a kind of reciprocal course of calumnies and insults; and he turns himself in every direction by the similarity of these things, so that we no longer feel indignation at his impudent desire to calumniate, as anger in a way vanishes through the satiety and disgust of the insults. They would move one to execration rather than to anger, so servile are they and devoid of all wit, and are scoffs snatched from the crossroads, in no way differing from the accusations of some old woman fuming and gnashing her teeth.
What then? Is it necessary to go through each point, C and to refute accurately all that has been said in an injurious and calumnious manner, and to demonstrate that he, against whom these things have been forged, was by no means such a person? But in that case, we ourselves would seem to be insulting him who shines upon the world like the sun, if we were to laboriously attempt to prove that he was not a malefactor and a criminal. For I am mindful of that divine voice, when it fittingly applied to him those things from prophecy, where it likens him to those women of shameless brow and chastity, who are accustomed to shift their own vices and crimes onto those who are temperate and of good character. For whom does he blather as being an enemy of the truth? Whom as being repugnant to the common opinion of men? Who asks the readers of his book not to look to the multitude of witnesses, nor to look to antiquity, nor to assent to them, as if they were far more worthy of faith and assent? It is, of course, the mark of the same man both to write these things and to put forth those claims, and to strive to win over the minds of his hearers to his own innovations, while attacking others with insults as being contrary to the common opinion of men. But as for that point—not to blush at the refutation drawn from the facts themselves, nor at the censure of men, and other things of this kind which he impotently babbles—I leave it to the judgment of the reader: to whom indeed they might actually apply, whether to him who possesses temperance, reverence, modesty, and every
A purity of soul and body, and who prescribes this most diligently for himself and those near him, or to him who commands one not to provide distress for nature when it is carried along by the immoderate appetites of the body toward whatever it happens to desire, nor to resist pleasures, nor to pursue a harsher discipline of life, since, as he claims, no harm to the soul arises from such things, but the heretical faith alone suffices a man for perfection? But if he denies that such are the teachings of his party, I, for one, and each of the sound-minded, would pray that he be truthful in such a denial. But his genuine disciples will not allow him to carry through with this denial; otherwise, his greatest theorem will fall, and the tabernacle of those who have joined themselves to the doctrine for this reason above all will be dissolved.
But as for one who is shameless and does not fear human reproach, shall we examine him based on his life in youth, or on what followed thereafter? Or by both? You would find the charge of shamelessness returning upon him from both sides. For neither his youth nor his subsequent life bears witness to the same things. B Let the word-monger recall to himself both what he perpetrated in his homeland during the time of his youth, and what he lived out in Constantinople, and let him hear from those who know what kind of things they are privy to concerning the one who is being slandered. But if one should wish to judge from his subsequent pursuits, let that one himself say who is worthy of such a name: he who, even before his priesthood, spent his paternal estate liberally upon the poor, and especially during the time of the famine when he was in charge of the Church, while still enrolled in the order of presbyters, and who, after that, did not spare even what remained, so that he too might boast with the Apostle: "Because I did not eat bread for nothing"? Or is it he who has made the protection of doctrine an occasion for profit? Who forces his way into houses uninvited, not even veiling the loathsomeness of his passion by his personal conduct, nor considering the natural aversion of the healthy-minded toward such men, those who, according to the ancient law, were, by reason of the similarity of the sign, excluded from the camp of those dwelling together.
D Again, he is called rash, and injurious, and—in both respects—a liar, by the one who teaches his adversaries with patience and in meekness. For so does he vaunt himself in his book, he who leaves behind no excess of bitterness wherever he can snatch at any opportunity. Whence, therefore, and from what facts does he prove his rashness and his eagerness to commit injury? Because, he says, when I was a Cappadocian, he called me a Galatian; then, as one who lived on the border of the regions, in some obscure corner of Corniaspina, if instead of Oltisere he called me a Galatian—if, indeed, it can be shown that he even uttered this at all.
A For I did not find this noted in our books, but let it be granted that it was said entirely.
Is he therefore to be called rash and insulting and to be branded with any other abusive epithets? And does the wise man not understand that an accusation made on minor points by a sycophant provides, for the one accused, a strong defense of his own uprightness? For he who has been stirred up to bring an accusation would never, while letting the greater issues pass, spend his malice on the lesser ones—concerning which he is indeed voluminous, expanding and magnifying the injustice, and philosophizing solemnly about the lie, judging it to be of equal magnitude whether the discourse be about greater or lesser matters. For he knows, according to the fathers of his heresy—I mean the Scribes and Pharisees—how to strain out the gnat B while greedily swallowing the humpbacked camel, burdened with the weight of its own malice. In regard to which, perhaps, it would not be out of place to say: "Check such legislation in our society," for it orders one to consider as nothing the trifles of affairs, and to distinguish by gravity the calumny directed against the truth. For Paul does not sin in the same way when he lies, as when he purifies himself in the Jewish manner at the time of those who were being profitably deceived, as does Judas at the moment of his betrayal, assuming the guise of a friend and someone to be greeted. Joseph also lied while playing with his brothers through benevolence, and this while swearing by the health of Pharaoh. But the brothers also lied against him, first plotting death, and after that slavery, because of envy; and many such things could be said. Sarah lies, blushing with laughter. The serpent also lies, suggesting that man would cross over into a divine nature as a result of the disobedience.
Great is the difference in a lie according to the circumstances, and it is not even possible to say how great, whether one examines the argument from ancient narratives or from the present life. C Therefore, we also shall accept that, according to the common verdict upon men which the Holy Spirit declared through the Prophet, that "Every man is a liar," even the man of God was brought into a lie, having assigned to the neighbor-territory, by mistake or by the arrogance of the name of the place, an inaccurate identification. But Eunomius also lied, and what is the lie? It is a contradiction of the Truth Itself: he says that He who is always, at some time was not; he contrives that the One who is truly the Son should have a false-sounding name; he defines the Creator of all as Himself a creature and a product; he names the Lord of all a slave; he ranks the One who has rule by nature with the nature that is in bondage. Is the difference in the lie, then, small? And is it so slight that one ought to consider it as nothing, whether one lies in this way or in that? D
And look now, how much he cares for the truth—he who repeatedly attacks others with reproaches as sophists. Our teacher had said in his book against him, that at the time when affairs were changed,
A he had carried off Cyzicus as the prize for his impiety. What, then, does he do, this man who reproaches others as sophists? He immediately seizes upon the word "prize," clings to it tenaciously, and claims that we acknowledge that he had instituted a defense on his own behalf, and through that defense had gained the victory, for the prize of victory is won from contests; and he constructs a syllogism through arguments which he thinks are irrefutable, thus concluding his discourse. I will quote his own written words verbatim. For if, he says, the prize is the mark and end of victory, and the trial implies the victory, and the trial necessarily carries with it an accusation, it follows that whoever grants a prize to someone also admits that a defense and plea had been instituted.
What, then, is our response to this? We do not deny, nor do we refuse to acknowledge, that he has fought this detestable fight of impiety very manfully and generously, and that he has surpassed others by a great margin in the struggle against the truth. But we do deny that he has gained the tokens of victory over B any adversaries; rather, by comparison with those who joined him in the error of impiety, he surpasses them all in his abundance of lies, and thus received Cyzicus as a prize in exchange for his extreme wickedness. Just as one might say that among all those who have labored in the same way against the truth, he had the greater share, and for his victory in blasphemy was raised up by a bright and conspicuous proclamation, receiving Cyzicus as a reward from those who ordained that contest. That we acknowledge these things to be according to the sense already stated is shown by our discourse: for we say that Cyzicus became for him a prize of impiety, not an achievement of a successful defense.
What, therefore, do our words have in common with this childish weaving of sophisms, as if it followed from them that he had undergone a trial and prepared a defense? C For such a claim is like someone at a banquet, who, having poured more undiluted wine than the rest, and for this reason been honored by his fellow drinkers with some gift, might offer that victory at the banquet as evidence of having been tried in the courts and having excelled in litigation. For it would be possible for him, too, to imitate the structure of that syllogism: "If the prize is the mark and end of victory; and if the trial implies the victory; and if the trial necessarily entails the accusation; then I have surely gained the victory, since I was crowned while drinking in the contest of heavy drinking."
But someone will surely say to the man who is so adorned: "There are other contests in court, and another manner of wrestling at banquets; and the one who is victorious by the cup has no superiority—because of such a victory—over those set in opposition to him D in the courts, even if he should exult and boast in floral garlands." Therefore, whoever is set ahead of those who are the same as him in the discourse of impiety, does not for that reason provide testimony through the prize of impiety that he has been victorious in a trial. What, then, does our testimony, in which we acknowledge that he excels in impiety, contribute to the defense which he has not actually spoken? For if he had defended himself before the judges, and had, by winning over his adversaries,
obtained the honor at Cyzicus, then perhaps he might not inappropriately use our words against us. But if throughout his entire book he constantly insists that, shunning the hatred of the judges, he accepted the sentence passed against him in silence, not bearing that the outcome of the trial had been delivered to his enemies, why does he deceive himself, and use the term "prize" as if it were a testimony to his defense and his apology? The clever man is clearly unaware that Cyzicus was delivered to him as a gift for that impiety in which he excelled beyond others; and if he chooses, in his own estimation, to blow it out of proportion and accepts that word "prize" as if it were the reward of victory, let him also accept what is attached to it: that he surpassed the rest in his zeal for wickedness. If he intends to use our words against us, it is just to use both or neither. A
But that is his conduct in our own matters. In the other things, however, which he has uttered through wantonness, will he be shown to be any more in love with the truth? In those passages where he traduces [Basil] as timid and cowardly, and as one who flees from the more difficult toils, and by other such methods, laboriously detailing the sensations of fear and dread, even mentioning some I-know-not-what hidden little house, firmly and strongly secured with bars and bolts, and the trembling conceived from the fear of those entering, and his voice, and his eyes, and the features of his face, and everything of this kind by which fear and dread are betrayed—yet even if he were not shown to have lied about anything else in his book, this alone would be enough for him to be convicted and condemned of lying. For who does not know how great that champion [Basil] was at that time, when the Emperor Valens was harassing the Church of Christ? How he stood with an unconquered spirit for the house of God, remaining superior to all those tumultuous crises and terrors, and by the loftiness of his mind greater than all the threats devised against him? Who among men in the East, who among those inhabiting the furthest shores of our world, was ignorant of that excellent struggle of his for the truth against the attempts of the powerful? Who did not stand amazed looking at his adversary, who was not merely one of the common people, nor one whose power and hope of victory depended upon sophisticated and painted speeches—in which to excel is inglorious and to lose is no great loss—but he was one who held the entire Roman Empire under his sway? B And though he possessed such a kingdom, he was corrupted by slanders against our doctrine, Eudoxius, bishop of Germanicia, having through fraud brought him over to his side. He had as abettors of his own lust all those who held any rank, the courtiers, and those who were in charge of public affairs; of whom some linked themselves to him of their own accord because of the compatibility of their dispositions, while many others, through fear of the emperor, did promptly and eagerly that which was pleasing to him, and because of their dissension from the professors of the orthodox faith, honored him with every observance, especially when he was implementing against those who did not agree with the emC peror's impulses—exiles, and confiscations of property, and banishments, and threats, and fines, perils, prisons, chains, scourging; and indeed, what of the most severe things was not put into operation against those who did not agree with the D
A emperor’s impulse? At that time, it was more dangerous to be caught in the house of God as a pious person than to be caught in the most wicked of crimes. But to go through each of these things in detail would require a great book, much time, and special labor. Furthermore, since the evils of that time are manifest to all, it would be of no profit to our present discourse to record those calamities meticulously in writing. There is, moreover, another burden in the narrative concerning them, namely, the necessity of making some mention of our own affairs while seting forth that sorrowful history in order. For if any such deed has been performed by us in the struggles for piety, which brings renown to the narrative, Divine Wisdom counsels us to leave it to our neighbors to recount: “Let thy neighbor praise thee,” it says, “and not thine own lips.” B Eunomius, not reflecting upon this, being very keen, consumed the greatest part of his own book in boastfully exalting himself and speaking insolently.
Passing over all these things, therefore, I shall set forth with precision the works of our teacher that are indicative of fear and cowardice. The one, then, who was arrayed against him in opposing battle, was the emperor himself. The one ministering to his impulses was he who governed the whole empire after the emperor. The assistants to this desire were all those about him. Let us add also the season for a more precise examination and demonstration of the noble athlete’s confidence. What, then, was the season? The emperor was marching out of Constantinople toward the East, his spirit puffed up by the successes he had recently achieved against the barbarians, and thinking that nothing at all should stand against his impulses. Leading the way in his march was the prefect, ostensibly preparing what was necessary for the emperor’s arrival, but in reality, so that he might drive the Orthodox from their own sees and substitute others—not legitimately called or ordained—in the place of those cast out, to the contempt and injury of the Church. With this intent, therefore, just like some evil cloud, the tyranny proceeded from the Propontis against the Churches; and since Bithynia had been suddenly desolated, and Galatia ravaged with great ease, and all things had flowed according to their will, our region now lay before the creeping evil as the next target. What then did the great Basil do—that cowardly person, as this man calls him, and timid, and accustomed to fear in difficult straits, and trusting his safety to a dark cell? Was he struck with dismay at the onset of the evil? Did he make the disaster of those who had already been taken a counselor for his own safety? Did he accept the advice to yield for a little while to the rush of evil, and not cast himself into manifest danger by resisting men who were practiced in blood? Or does every extravagance of language, and every height of... D
words, fall far below the truth of what actually occurred? For with what speech could one explain that disregard for all dangers? How could one set before the eyes and represent that new and unusual struggle, which one could not rightly say was undertaken by men, nor against men, but any man would say that the virtue and boldness of a Christian was contending against the murderous power of a ruler? A
For the prefect, anticipating the presence and arrival of the emperor, summoned him to his presence; and while the emperor’s power was formidable in itself, he made it yet more formidable by the multitude of his punishments. After those tragedies which he perpetrated in Bithynia, and after the Galatians had been overcome with his usual ease, he deemed it no great task to act with similar madness among us. The beginning of the matters to come was a speech mingled with threats and promises: if Basil would comply, he promised him all honors from the emperor, and furthermore the helm and rudder of the Church; but if he resisted, he held out everything that the bitterness of a soul clothed with the power to do anything could devise. Such, then, were the actions of those men. B
But our own man was so far from being struck with fear by what he saw or heard, that, just like a physician or a faithful counselor—summoned to provide aid where matters are desperate and given up—he even admonished them to repent for what they had perpetrated, and for the future to cease their murderous quest against the servants of the Lord; for they could effect nothing against those who desire only the kingdom of God and honor that immortal strength and power. For, he said, those who wish to inflict harm cannot find anything that will hurt a Christian, whether spoken or done. Confiscation of goods will not affect him who possesses faith alone. Exile will not frighten him who in his mind transcends the whole world; who regards every city as foreign because of the fleeting nature of his sojourn, yet every city as his own because of the common nature and status of all. But to endure stripes, or labors, or death, when it is demanded for the defense of the truth, is something that does not strike terror even into women: for all Christians, he said, reckon it as the highest happiness to undergo even intolerable torments for the sake of that hope; and he said that they grieve only at this, that nature has appointed only one death for each individual, and it is not granted them to die more often to contend for the truth. C
As Basil was thus bracing his spirit against those threats, and setting at naught all the pride of power and empire, suddenly, as upon the stage when in rapid changes of characters one is brought out in place of another, in the same way the harshness of his enemies was transformed into blandishments. The man who had been until then so terrifying and full of threats, changing his tone, transferred himself to mild and moderate speech. "You, for your part," he says, "do not make light of that which the great emperor desires to introduce to your people; but rather receive..." D
the teacher to be named, and do not resist his will." He desires that a small part of what is written in the faith A be removed, namely, the word *homoousios* or consubstantial. But our teacher replied that for the emperor to be received into the Church is the most serious matter of all. "For it is a great thing," he said, "to save a soul, not because he is emperor, but because he is a human being." He declared that he was so far from removing or adding anything to the faith, that he would not even change the order of the things written therein. This person, who was timid and unwarlike, and trembling at the sound of the door, spoke thus to one who stood out with such dignity; and what he said in words, he later proved and confirmed in deed: he who stayed and turned back the destruction of the Churches at that time, which was flowing like a torrent through the provinces with great violence, and stood against it himself, being the only one sufficient and fit to check the incursion of the calamity, like some great and immovable sea rock, which breaks and shatters the vast waves of the sea by its own mass.
Nor did the conflict end there for him. The emperor himself B tried his fortune again, inflamed with anger because he saw that his first attempt had not succeeded according to his desire. And just as once the King of the Assyrians, through the work of a certain cook named Nabuzardan, destroyed the temple in Jerusalem * IV Reg. xxv, 9, so this man also, by entrusting such a task to a certain Demosthenes, the one set over the provisions and the chief of the cooks—a man more impudent than the others—thought he would achieve victory in the entire undertaking. Therefore, as that man threw everything into confusion, and a certain god-hating man from Illyricum, who carried the tablets in his hands, was summoning all the nobles to this task, and as the anger of Modestus was again inflamed more fiercely than in the previous onset, all were stirred up by the emperor’s anger, and were angry along with him in his fury, obviously serving and gratifying his indignation; all were C held in suspense by the expectation of what was to come. For the prefect was there again; there were new risings of fears, sharper than the former ones, and additions of threats; and the anger was more vigorous, and the tragedy of the courtroom was present: heralds, ushers, lictors, screens, and curtains, by which the minds of those even very well prepared are easily struck with terror. Again, our noble athlete of God is seen in the contest, far surpassing the glory of the first battle. But if you seek proofs of these things, look at the events themselves. For what place did the calamity of that time leave untouched? What nation remained free from the devastation and assault of the heretics? Who of those who were thriving in the Church was not cast out from their accomplishments and labors? What people escaped that outrage? Not the whole of Syria, nor Mesopotamia D as far as the borders of the barbarians; not Phoenicia, nor Palestine, nor Arabia, nor Egypt, and the nations of Libya, as far as the boundaries of our inhabited world; nor others who dwell therein—the Pontians, Cilicians, Lycians, Lydians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Carians, Hellespontians, islanders as far as the Propontis itself; not the nations of Thrace, where Thrace extends, and all the neighbors as far as the Danube itself. Those who, from all these provinces, [suffered] the calamity...
they were restrained by such an evil? But the Cappadocian people alone of all others did not perceive the common calamity of the Churches; whom our great defender rescued from all temptations.
These, then, are the proofs of the cowardice of our master; these are the achievements of one who shrank from the most arduous labors; who did not win glory for himself among a gathering of miserable old women, nor did he study how to circumvent poor little women prone to every fraud and deception, nor did he consider it a thing much to be desired to be highly esteemed by desperate men of corrupt mind; but he demonstrated by his very works the strength of his soul, and that intrepid, unconquered, and noble spirit of his, B whose illustrious deed was the salvation of the entire homeland, the peace of our Church, an exemplar of everything honest for those who live according to virtue; the overthrow of adversaries, the protection of the faith, the security of the weak, the strengthening of the more resolute, and, to express it in one word, whatever good can be imagined is contained in this deed; in which narrative alone the senses of hearing and seeing correspond with the reality itself: for it is the same thing both to recount with a splendid oration all deeds, and by the deed itself to bear testimony to the words, and to corroborate both by mutual supports, memory indeed from those things which are presented to the senses, but the facts from those things which are told.
But I know not by what reason the discourse has strayed C so far outside the proposed subject, having turned to the individual points which the slanderer brought forward in insult. And yet this delay of the discourse in refuting these calumnies has perhaps been very useful to Eunomius, since, being occupied with washing away the accusations against men who have been driven out, he is unable to betake himself to those things which are of greater moment. Just as, therefore, it is superfluous to accuse of verbal insolence and levity one who is being judged for homicide (for the proven homicide is sufficient for the sentence of death to be brought against him, even if the murderer has not rendered himself liable by any temerity of speech), so it seems worthwhile to me that I should undertake to refute D only his impiety, leaving aside that license of reviling which he exercises against us. For it is clear that if his impiety is struck down in matters of the greatest weight, by the same effort all the rest are also refuted, even if we do not pursue everything point by point. The head, therefore, of all those things which he has contrived is nothing else than blasphemy against the orthodox faith, both in the former book and in this one which we are setting out to refute: for he uses every diligence to uproot and abolish from the foundation all pious thoughts concerning the only-begotten Son of God and the Holy Spirit. In order, therefore, that it may be made manifest to all how false and inconsistent that whole apparatus of his against the dogmas of the truth is, I will first set down his discourse word for word, which I will then examine separately, taking up each point.
A Every discourse by which we explain our dogmas is perfected from the supreme and most properly called substance, and from that which exists by it, but which, after it, takes precedence over all other things; and furthermore from a third, which is not coordinated with any of these, but is subjected to them, for the former as to a cause, and for the latter as to an operation, according to which it was made—comprehensive, indeed, for the completion of the whole discourse, also of the operations which flow from the substances and belong to them. B Again, since each of these substances is and is understood to be purely simple, and is entirely one according to its own dignity, yet limited in its operations by the works themselves, and the works measured by the operations of those who performed them, it is surely quite necessary that the operations which follow each of the substances should be lesser and greater, and that the former should occupy the first rank, and the latter the second. And to speak generally, they extend to a difference as great as the works extend; since it is not even lawful to say that the operation by which He created the angels, or the stars, and heaven, or man, is the same, but that in proportion as the works are older and more honorable than other works, by so much more, one who wishes to think piously of this would assert that the operation also surpasses the operation; since the same operations produce the same effects, and different works show forth different operations. C Since these things are so, and all things, in their mutual relationship to one another, maintain an unchangeable order, it is right that those who make their investigation according to the natural order of things, and do not wish to mix and confuse everything together, if an argument should arise concerning substance, should seek the proofs of the things demonstrated and the solution of the things in dispute from those operations which are primary and cognate to the substances; but that they should resolve doubt concerning operations from the substances, regarding the descent from the first to the second as being more appropriate and more useful for all things.
This, then, is the artificial and subtle explanation of the blasphemy. But God to us is true, and the Son of the true God directs our discourse toward the truth through the guidance of the holy Spirit. Let us again take up in order the things that have been said. He said that the discourse of his dogmas is completed from the supreme and most properly called substance, and from that which exists by it, but which, after it, takes precedence over all other things; and furthermore from a third, which is not coordinated with any of these, but is subjected to them, for the former as to a cause, and for the latter as to an operation. D First, then, of the things wickedly contrived in the discourse, this is it: that, having promised to explain to us the mystical dogma, as if correcting the evangelical utterances, he did not use those names by which the Lord delivered the mystery in the completion of the faith, but, with the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the holy Spirit suppressed, instead of the Father
A he speaks of a certain supreme and most sovereign substance, and instead of the Son, of that which exists on account of that [first] one, and which holds the first place after it among the rest, and instead of the holy Spirit, of that which is joined to none of these. Yet if it were more appropriate to speak in this way, the truth would not have been so devoid of resources as not to find these names, nor would those who subsequently received the preaching of the mystery in order—both those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word, and those who after them filled the whole world with evangelical doctrines; and again, those who in later times settled the doubts arising regarding this dogma in a common council, whose written traditions are always preserved in the Churches—if it were necessary to speak thus, would they not have made mention of the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit? But if it were entirely consistent with piety, and removed from every danger, to transfer the words of the faith to this novelty, it follows that all those men were unlearned, ignorant of divine matters, and, as this man says, lacking in cognate names; those, I say, who could not and would not prefer their own thoughts to those names which we received from the divine oracles. B
But I think the cause for Eunomius’ coining of these new names is manifest to all. For all men, upon hearing the name of Father and Son, immediately recognize from the very words their own natural relationship toward one another; for what the natural relationship is, is understood from these appellations, even if everyone is silent. In order, therefore, that these thoughts might not be generated in the minds of men concerning the Father and the Only-Begotten Son, he withdraws from the hearers that notion of mutual relationship which enters the mind along with the names; and, abandoning the divinely inspired words, he employs those expressions for the exposition of his dogma which are most suitable for overturning the truth. C
Furthermore, he rightly says that these things do not complete [the expression of] the doctrine of the universal Church, but his own [doctrine] in these matters. But to anyone who is willing to pay even the slightest attention, it is easy to perceive how impious are the things which he utters. But perhaps it will not be beside the point to examine individually what he means when he attributes the supreme and most sovereign substance to the substance of the Father alone, and not to that of the Son and the holy Spirit, while nevertheless he concedes that they possess a supernal and proper substance. For I think that this is nothing else than a kind of machine for denying completely any substance of the Son and of the holy Spirit, and that he is secretly striving D through these circumlocutions of words so that we might believe that nothing exists underlying them but an empty name, with the true notion of substance and essence destroyed through these subtleties and frauds. And that these things are so, anyone who is willing to apply his mind to his discourse even a little will discover without difficulty. For it is not possible for him who truly believes that the Only-Begotten and the holy Spirit exist by their own proper substance, to be—
A so meticulous about the confession of names with which he thinks he must venerate God, who is over all. For it would be the extreme of folly for one who agrees with the thing itself to be pedantic about words. But as it is, by assigning the highest and most sovereign status only to the substance of the Father, he causes us to infer through his silence regarding the rest that they do not exist properly. For how is it possible to say that anything truly exists, to which it is not acknowledged that it "truly exists"? For it is necessary that beings to whom it is not granted to exist properly should be designated by names expressing the contrary. For what is not proper is necessarily improper. Therefore, to assert that the Son and the holy Spirit do not exist properly is nothing other than to deprive them of all substance B altogether; and Eunomius, looking toward this, devised these names proper to his own doctrine. For one cannot say that he has progressed to such a point of stupidity that he opposes the "above" to the "below" as if it were a place, and assigns to the Father some loftier watchtower, having stationed the Son in lower places. For no one is so childish in his understanding as to conceive of local difference in the case of that intellectual and incorporeal nature. For the position in a place is a property of bodies; but that which is by nature intellectual and immaterial is acknowledged by all to be far removed from the concept of a place. What then is the cause of his saying that the substance of the Father remains the highest? For one would not easily suspect that he is led into these misconceptions by any ignorance, he who pretends in many instances—which he displays—to be wise, and, as the divine Scripture forbids, acts more C wisely than he ought.
But, furthermore, he will not say that the "above" indicates an excellence of power, or of goodness, or of any other such thing regarding his substance; for this is known to everyone, not just to those who suppose themselves to excel in wisdom: that the substance of the Only-Begotten and of the holy Spirit is in no way lacking in completeness regarding perfect goodness, power, and all such things. For all good things, as long as they are not receptive to their contrary, have no limit to their goodness. Since it is their nature to be circumscribed only by their contraries, as one can see in the case of specific examples. Power D halts when weakness overtakes it; life is circumscribed by death; darkness is the limit of light; and, to express it in a word, each individual good ends when its contrary approaches. If, therefore, he posits that the nature of the Only-Begotten and of the Spirit is mutable toward the worse, he reasonably diminishes the concept of their goodness, as if they were capable of being brought together with their contraries. But if the divine and unalterable nature is inaccessible to what is worse—and this is confessed even by his own enemies—then it is altogether contemplated as boundless in goodness. And the boundless is the same as the infinite. But to conceive of an increase or a decrease of something infinite and boundless is the height of irrationality. For how could that which is infinite...
the rationale and notion of infinity subsist if someone were to posit an intensification or a relaxation within it? A For we recognize that which is "higher" by the mutual opposition of boundaries set side by side; but where there is no limit, how could anyone be able to conceive of an "excess"? Or is it not the case that, in conceiving of a certain temporal superiority, he assigns "more" according to the prerogative of origin and antiquity, and for this reason declares the Father’s substance alone to be the supreme one of all? Let him say, then, to whom he attributes that excess of life by which the Father prevails, since no span of time can be rightly conceived by the mind as being cast in between the Father and the Only-begotten Son?
B Let us, however, assume that time does intervene; how, I ask, would that which is prior in duration participate more in the definition of substance than that which is posterior—participate, that is, in the definition and notion of substance itself, so that it deserves to be called "supreme" and "properly" so, while the other does not? For while the prior is indeed a participant in a longer time with respect to the posterior, it participates in neither more nor less of the definition of substance than the posterior. C This entire matter will become clearer by way of examples. What did the blessed David—who appeared fourteen generations later—lack, in so far as relates to the definition of substance, compared to Abraham? Did human nature change in him because he was born later in time, or was he "less" a human being? Who is so foolish as to assert this? For the definition of substance is the same in both this one and that one, and not in the least bit altered by the passage of time. Nor would anyone say that the one who preceded in time is "more" of a human, while the latter participates less in human nature because he entered onto this stage of life after others—as if nature had already been consumed in those who preceded, or as if time had exhausted all its force and faculty upon them. By no means does it rest with time to give everyone’s nature as if measured out; rather, nature remains the same in itself, preserving itself also in those who come after. But time rolls on according to its own inherent manner, whether it encompasses or flows past nature—nature which remains fixed and immutable and constant within its own boundaries. D Therefore, even if the Father were prior in time and duration, as we have supposed in our hypothesis, for that reason the primacy and summit of substance ought not to be ascribed solely to the Father; but when there is no difference with regard to temporal duration, by what logic could anyone dare to invent such a thing in that nature which preceded the ages? For since every interval accustomed to measuring things is found to be beneath the divine nature, what argument remains for those who attempt to divide the pre-temporal and incomprehensible substance by the distinction of "upper" and "lower"? But the argument leaves no doubt that what he asserts is nothing other than a defense of Jewish impiety, which, by what they dogmatize, holds that only the substance of the Father exists.
while they reckon the substance of the Son and of the Spirit among things that are not. For everything that is not truly A existing is said to be so only in word and by a misuse of common parlance. Just as a man is named, not he who is shown through imitation in an image, but this one here who is properly called so—not a likeness of a man, but the archetype of the likeness—while the image is a man only as far as the name goes, and for this reason does not possess the capacity to be called A properly, which is what is said, because he is not by nature that which he is named. And so here too, if the substance of the Father alone is said to be properly, while that of the Son and of the Spirit is not, what else is this—or is it not a manifest denial of the saving proclamation? Let them, therefore, depart from the Church to the synagogues of the Jews, in that they do not grant the Son to be properly, B thereby contriving that he does not exist at all; for to be improperly and not to be are the same thing.
Since he wishes to be thought wise in such matters, and despises those who attempt to write without logical agility, let him tell us who are scorned by him: from what philosophy did he learn that substance is capable of "more and less"? What is the reasoning that has established such a difference, that one substance is "more" a substance than another, I mean according to the very definition of substance? Let him not set before us C the differences of qualities or properties, which we conceive by thought around a substance, and which are something other than the underlying subject. For we are not proposing now to examine the differences of vapors, or colors, or weight, or power, or dignity, or manners, and habits, or whatever else is contemplated in body and soul; rather, I am speaking of the subject itself to which the name of substance properly belongs, if it possesses any difference in "being more" than another substance. But up to this day we have never heard of two things, admitted D to exist, such that while both indeed are, one is "more" and the other "less." For both are equally, as long as they are what they are, with all notion of excess and defect being removed, as we have said before.
If, therefore, he does not grant at all that the substance of the Only-Begotten is to be contemplated (for his discourse seems to slide stealthily towards this), he who does not grant him "to be properly" ought not to concede even "to be less" of him. But if he confesses the Son to be a substantial power that has subsisted in any way (for we are not yet arguing about this), why does he again take away what he grants? By setting forth that the one confessed to be [substantial] does not exist "properly," he is contriving that he, as has been said, does not exist at all. For just as it is not possible for that to be a man to whom the definition of the name does not perfectly apply—for if one lacks the properties, the whole definition of his substance is erased along with it—so also in every matter, that to which "to be" is not testified either perfectly or properly, the partial acknowledgement of its being has no demonstration of its subsistence.
substance, which is not genuinely affirmed, either as being something perfect or proper; for you would not prove it to be something by conceding to it a part of essence and existence. For he who asserts that a thing does not exist properly is planning the destruction and ruin of the whole thing. Wherefore, if he has any sense, let him turn his mind and thought to better things, and cease to teach that the substance of the Only-Begotten is improper and inferior. But if he is resolved to persist in impiety (though I do not know why he should wish to repay his Creator, God, and Benefactor with blasphemies), let him pay the penalty for the vain opinion he has conceived regarding his own doctrine; for, in his ignorance, he makes one substance greater than another according to the reasoning of substance, and determines—in a way that cannot stand—that one is supreme, another inferior, and asserts that the one is proper and the other improper. We have not known any philosopher, even one estranged from our faith, who was so delirious; nor does this harmonize with divine oracles or the common notions of men.
Quid igitur in his vocabulis novandis iste sibi proposuerit, satis, ut arbitror, ex dictis jam est manifestum: videlicet tanquam propugnaculum vel fundamentum quoddam totius improbitatis suæ, verba hæc præmittit et supponit: ut si persuaserit unicam solam substantiam supremam et maxime propriam esse, facilius de aliis rem conficiat: quasi de iis, quæ infra illam primam, et non proprie esse cogitentur. C Maxime vero hoc ostendit progressu disputationis, cum sua de Filio et Spiritu sancto placita edisserit; nusquam enim utitur veris nominibus, ne, ut ante dixi, naturæ consortium et communionem inter se, ipsis vocabulis etiam invitus mentibus nostris objiciat, sed sine propriis nominibus illorum mentionem facit is, qui docet, ex verbis et nominibus idoneis et accommodatis animos audientium ad rei veritatem ducendos esse. At quale nomen accommodatius esse queat, quam quod ab ipsa veritate impositum est? Sed Evangeliis adversa in mundum introducere volens, non nominat Filium, sed substantiam, quæ per illam primam sit, et quæ post illam primas teneat. Quod autem hæc non alio consilio affirmet, quam ut sanam et orthodoxam de unigenito Filio opinionem ex mentibus hominum eximat, magis etiam patefacit et reliquis illius imposturis et machinamentis. D Porro quoniam modus loquendi, quo usus est, ita comparatus videtur, ut is etiam, qui aliquid impie de Christo proferre non cupit, eo uti queat: propterea ego quoque tacitus nunc prætermitto eam, quæ est de Domino nostro, disputationem, exstructa illius refutatione ex manifestissimis tantummodo blasphemiis contra Spiritum sanctum, quem aperta et nullo verborum involucro tecta blasphemia aggreditur, dum eum dicit non ejusdem ordinis cum Patre et Filio censeri posse, utrique autem subjectum. Quam ejus impietatem pro viribus nunc examinabo.
Quæ igitur subjectionis vocabulo notio subjecta sit, et in quibus rebus divina Scriptura id nomen usurpet, principio inquirere oportet. Cum Deus hominem honorasset, eo quod ipsum ad imaginem
A and had made it the likeness of its creator, the Creator God subjected every creature devoid of reason to him. Just as the great David also, in the Psalms, recounting this grace of God, sang: "All things," he says, "He subjected under his feet," and subsequently enumerates by name those things which are subjected to him. Furthermore, another meaning of subjection is found in the sacred Scriptures; for the blessed David, ascribing the cause of things successfully managed by him in war to the God of the universe, says: "He subjected peoples to us, and nations under our feet"; and again: "Who subjects peoples to me." And it is often possible to find this word in Holy Scripture in that sense by which it signifies dominion gained over adversaries: for that saying of the Apostle concerning the future subjection of all men at the end of the world, by which they will be subjected to the Only-Begotten, and through Him to the Father, when he says—not without hidden wisdom—that the Mediator of God and men Himself will be subjected to the Father—insinuating, clearly, the obedience of all men toward the Father through the Son who is a participant in our humanity—I judge should be passed over for the present, B as it requires a longer and more accurate declaration. I shall not depart from those things which are clear, and in which no ambiguity remains concerning the meaning of subjection. In what sense, therefore, does he teach that the substance of the Spirit is subject to the substance of the Father and the Son? Is it as the Son is subjected to the Father, in the way the Apostle uses the word subjection? It follows, therefore, that in this respect the Holy Spirit is not subjected to the Son, but is rather of the same order as He, if indeed there are two persons who are subjected. Or is it not in this sense? In what other, then? Is it as we learned from the psalm that the creature devoid of reason is subjected to the rational nature? Therefore, it differs as much as the subjection of brutes with respect to man. But perhaps he will deny this notion also? He must, therefore, come to the remaining one, namely, that he says it is subjected in the way that one who resists and struggles is accustomed to be subjected when, compelled by a more powerful one, he submits himself, and, conquered, yields his hands. C
Let him choose from the things said whatever he wishes; I do not sufficiently discern by the choice of which of them he could escape the inevitable condemnation for the blasphemy uttered, whether he says the Spirit is subjected in the manner in which brute animals are subjected to man—namely, fish, birds, and sheep—or in the manner of those who have defected from authority, he has brought him, like a captive, to the throne of Him who, prevailing with strength and arms, has obtained victory. But he will affirm none of these, but will rather answer that he has not used the word subjection according to the prescription and meaning of Scripture, but that the Holy Spirit is subject to the Father and the Son by some other notion. What, therefore, is this notion? Is it because He is placed in the third position in the order of words which the disciples received from the Lord, that for this reason he teaches that He is subjected, D and is not of the same order as them? By the same reasoning, let him also subject the Father to the Only-Begotten Son, since Scripture often places the name of the Lord first, and only in the second place that of God, who is placed before by Himself. And: "The grace of the Lord"
nostri Jesu Christi, et charitas Dei; and countless such testimonies are available for those who are diligent to search for them in the Scriptures, such as that saying: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but the same God." A If we are to follow this line of reasoning, then God who is over all, being mentioned in the third place by Paul, must be subject to the Son and to the Spirit. But we have never yet heard of this kind of philosophy, which casts everything that is mentioned as second or third in a certain sequence into the category of things that are subordinate and subject. Yet this person contends that the enumeration of persons, by its sequence and order, serves to establish their greater and lesser B excellence in nature. He defines the sequence of order to be indicative of a difference in natures—I know not from where he has imagined such things, nor under what necessity he has fallen into this suspicion. For the order according to number does not effect a difference in natures; rather, the things that are numbered remain what they are in their own nature, whether they are counted or not. Number is a sign by which the quantity of things becomes known; it does not relegate those things which are of an inferior nature into a second class, but rather, according to the will of those who are counting, it arranges and orders the C things signified by the number in a certain immutable sequence. "Paul and Silvanus and Timothy." Since mention is made here of three men, in a sequence chosen by the will of him who numbered them, did the number demonstrate that Silvanus was something other than a man, and not a human being? Or was Timothy, being placed in the third order, suspected of being of some other nature because of the rhetorical order of him who named these three? Certainly not. Each of these is a man, both before and after the enumeration. And since speech cannot signify three at once with a single voice, it makes mention of each separately in an order that suits it; and it joins the names with intervening conjunctions, D thereby, as I suppose, showing the unanimity and harmony of the three with the one through this composition of names.
But this does not please this new sectary and teacher. Instead, he dogmatizes in opposition to the order of the divine utterance, and he tears away that which was joined by the Lord himself to the Father and the Son, removing it from its natural and proper station and order, counting it among created things, and saying that it is the work of both: of the Father, as providing the cause for its creation; and of the Only-begotten, as having himself produced its hypostasis and subsistence. And he affirms this to be the cause of the subjection, although he has not yet explained to us what is meant by this subjection.
Then he says: "With the inclusion, evidently, of those [energies] that follow upon their essences, and those
names that are proper to them." The meaning of these statements is not very easy to grasp, being covered with much of the darkness of impiety; but as one might guess and conjecture, it is of this sort: He calls the productive powers of the Son and of the Holy Spirit the "energies of the essences," through which the first essence produced the second, and the second the third; and he says that the names of the works that have been brought into being are aptly and conveniently fitted to the works themselves. But we have already examined, as far as we were able, the malicious deception he used regarding the names; and whenever the subject leads us to that part of the examination, if the argument requires it, we shall bring it to light again.
Now, however, it is worth reflecting upon: how do the energies follow upon the essences? What are they according to their own nature? Are they something other than the essences that they follow, or are they a part of those essences and of that nature? And if they are something other, how and by whom were they brought into existence? But if they are the same thing, how are they separated, so that instead of co-existing with them, they follow upon them from the outside? B For nothing of what has been said can be clearly understood on this point: whether it is by some natural necessity—that forces the energy, whatever it may be, to follow the essence involuntarily—just as burning follows fire, and vapors and exhalations follow the bodies from which they arise? But I do not believe he means this; for that would be to consider the essence of God to be something diverse and composite, possessing an energy that is inseparable and contemplated together with it, like an accident displayed in a subject. Rather, he says that the essences, moving of their own will and authority, produce what they see fit. And who would say that what is done voluntarily and by providence follows [the essence] like those things that follow from external causes? C For we do not know this way of speaking to be used in the common parlance of men in such matters; so that one would say the energy of one who is exerting himself about something follows the one who is exerting himself. For it is not possible for one to separate the one from the other and grasp what remains by itself; but he who speaks of the energy has also included in his thought that which is moved by it; and he who makes mention of the one acting, has entirely, by implication, indicated also the energy. But what we assert will become clearer through examples. We say, then, that someone is smithing with a hammer, or building, or doing some other thing of the same kind. Therefore, with the one utterance, the statement has signified both the work and the one who pursues the craft, so that if the one were separated, the other could not exist. D If, therefore, these two are understood together—the energy, that is, and the one who acts through that energy—how does this man affirm that the energy by which the first essence fashioned the second essence follows upon the first essence, acting in a way as an intermediary between the two, and neither belonging to the first by nature nor being joined to the second? For it is separated from the former by the fact that it is not a nature, but an operation of a nature; and it does not come to pass after the latter, because it did not bring into existence a mere energy through itself, but an active essence.
A Furthermore, let us examine this point also. He calls essence the work of an essence: the second the work of the first, and again the third the work of the second. And by what path has he demonstrated this argument? What proofs has he employed to show this? From what method and art did he compel the belief that the posterior must be the work of the prior? For if one were to reason about these things from the rest of the things seen in the universe, it would certainly not be fitting to make conjectures about those more sublime matters from these transitory and lowly things; yet he might deserve some pardon, whoever, led astray by the things that appear before our eyes, might err concerning those things which cannot be comprehended. But now, who would dare to assert that the heaven is the work of God, and the sun the work of the heaven; and the moon the work of the sun, and the stars the work of the moon, and something else after those among the things in creation? For all things are the works of One, since there is one God and Father of all, from whom are all things. B And if anything does come to pass through another, as for instance the generation of animals, not even this comes to pass as one thing from another, with the nature remaining the same in those things which are being begotten. By what reasoning, then, when he has nothing of the sort to point to in any of the things seen in creation, does he construct this doctrine concerning the supreme nature, that the second is the work of the first, and that the next is the work of this one? And if, having considered the generation of animals, he was moved from there to imagine that something similar might logically be thought concerning the undefiled and pure nature, so that the next thing is thought to be the work of the one that brings it forth, he does not even in this preserve the consistency of his argument. For those things which come to pass from others are entirely of the same nature as those from which they come to pass. C But he testifies that that which is foreign and of another kind belongs to those which are begotten through one another, in order to show the abundance of his falsehood, just as a skilled boxer tries to strike at the truth with a double hand. For in order to demonstrate the subjection and the diminution of the natural dignity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he says that one is produced from another; so that those who have learned of the generation from one another might never come to the concept of kinship from such a mode of existence. And he fights against that very law of nature, declaring both that one is begotten from another, and asserting that the one who is begotten is illegitimate in relation to the nature of the one who begat him.
D But that which seems to me, before all else, worthy of censure is this: If some other person, unskilled in teaching and unpracticed and a stranger to such exercises, had stated his opinion as the circumstances suggested, we would rightly forgive him for using this sort of equipment to establish dogmas. But since he possesses such faculty that he extends himself with his keenness of mind even as far as those things that are placed far above our nature to investigate them, how did he remain ignorant of the principle by which the inquiry is instituted in these investigations of hidden things?
A For who does not know that every argument must take its starting points from things that are manifest and known to all, in order to gain belief for contested matters through them; and that things hidden could not be grasped in any other way, unless those things which are agreed upon lead us by the hand to the understanding of the unknowns? But if that which is taken at the beginning of arguments for the manifestation of the unknown should conflict with the common understanding of men, then clearly the unknown could hardly be rendered manifest through such things.
Therefore, the entire struggle and dispute of the doctrine between the members of the Church and the Anomoeans consists in this: whether one ought to consider the Son and the Spirit to be created, according to the argument of the opponents, or of the uncreated nature, as the Church has believed. This man, therefore, presents that very thing which is opposed by everyone as if it were something agreed upon. And having discovered no proof that the following B essence is a work of the one preceding it, he confidently asserts that it is so. I know not from what schooling or wisdom he has attained such confidence. For if it is necessary that an uncontested and indubitable acknowledgment should precede every construction and proof, so that the unknown may be demonstrated by being appropriately introduced to what is already accepted through intermediate constructions, then he who proposes what is still in question for the construction of other things is doing nothing other than heaping ignorance upon ignorance and fraud upon fraud. This is indeed what the Gospel speaks of somewhere, the blind leading the blind. For to those who are truly blind and wandering in their reasoning, who say that the Creator and Maker of all things is a creature and a product, they yoke another blind argument, that the Son is foreign in nature to the Father and unlike in substance, and altogether lacking in natural kinship. But more on these matters later; for in those cases where he more openly reveals the impiety of his mind, it is timely for us also to defer the refutation of his impiety. Now, however, we must return to the logical sequence of what was said by him.
C Again, since each of these substances is understood to be pure, simple, and absolutely one in relation to its own dignity, and since their operations are circumscribed by their works, and their works are measured by the operations of those who perform them, it is surely a matter of absolute necessity that the operations which follow each of the substances should also be smaller and greater, and that some should occupy the first rank and others the second. The thought running through all these things he has said, even if it is in a multitude of words, is one: to construct the argument that there is no connection for the Father with the Son, nor again for the Son with the Spirit; but that the substances are D separated from one another, torn asunder into some kind of strange and unsociable diversity of nature; and not by this alone, but also separated by magnitude and by a deficiency of rank, one greater and another lesser, as he himself...
says, and as having in all other respects A a variation.
We, however, even if it seems superfluous to many to dwell upon things so plain, and to attempt to refute in detail all that is already considered by the multitude to be false, execrable, and of no moment whatever, nevertheless, lest we be thought to pass over any of the things he has brought forward, intact and unrefuted, due to a lack of refutation, will proceed according to our power to refute these likewise. He says: "Each one of these substances is pure, simple, and is and is understood as one in its own proper merit." Again, in this place, as though proposing things that are agreed upon as though they were certain and established, he thinks he is saying something, believing that for the sake of every demonstration it suffices that he himself asserts it. He says "three substances." For this is indicated B by his saying, "of each of these substances." For he would not have spoken thus if he had thought there was one. If, therefore, he assigns the distinction of the substances among themselves in such a way that he might not seem to fall into the impiety of Sabellius, who accommodated three appellations to one subject, we also agree; and no one of the pious would contradict such a doctrine, except insofar as he seems to err only in the names and the mere utterance of the expression, using "substances" instead of "hypostases." For not all things that have the same definition of substance will likewise agree in the definition of hypostasis; for Peter, James, and John are one and the same in the definition of substance among themselves (for each of them is a man), but they do not at all agree in the properties of their own individual hypostasis. Therefore, if he were contending for this—that persons or hypostases must not be mingled, and that three appellations should not be adapted to one person—his discourse would be faithful, according to the word of the Apostle, and worthy of all acceptance. But because he does not aim at this, nor does he assert these things, so as to separate the hypostases from one another by their own idioms and properties, but rather teaches that a diversity exists in the very subject nature from another—or rather, from itself—and for this reason names many substances, as if each, when compared with the others, had its own proper diversity; for this reason I say that his discourse is stripped of its beginning and head, since he does not proceed to weave the series of his blasphemy from conceded and certain premises. Nor is his proof so constructed that anyone could be led by it to persuasion; but it contains a bare and meager exposition of impiety, just like the narrative of a dream. For while the Church teaches that the faith should by no means be torn and divided into a plurality of substances, but that in three persons and hypostases nothing of difference should be believed according to essence, the adversaries, however, posit the variation and inequality in the very substances; and this man boldly produces and pronounces as if it were already proven that which by no reason has been, nor can be, demonstrated, though perhaps he had never before communicated it to any mortal; otherwise, by those who are rightly and properly instructed
it would be recognized as nothing but old wives’ tales and utter nonsense, possessing absolutely no weight or efficacy to prove what is sought by it, since it is supported by no firm foundation from either Holy Scripture or the reasonings of human intellect. And so much for that.
B Let us now examine the statements of Eunomius. He asserts that every one of these substances which he has outlined in his discourse is simple and in every respect one. But that the divine and blessed nature, which transcends all intellect, is simple, I imagine even those who are quite rustic and dull of mind would not deny. For how could anyone suppose that a nature invisible and devoid of any configuration, and separated from all quantity observed in dimension, is multiform or composite? However, that the sublime substance which is placed above the order of all other things is not simple according to the dogma fabricated by them—even if they prettily assert simplicity in their words—will be evident to anyone who is willing to turn his mind to it for even a little while. C For who is unaware that simplicity, according to its own definition, does not admit of “more” or “less” in the most holy Trinity? For in that nature where it is not possible to conceive of any mixture or confluence of qualities, but where we conceive in our mind a power that is indivisible and entirely devoid of composition, how could anyone, or by what logic, grasp a difference of “more” and “less”? For there is an absolute necessity that one who establishes such differences among these things must conceive of the incidence of certain qualities around the subject; for he imagines the difference in these things either by way of excess or defect, and through this, he introduces the concept of quantity into the object of his inquiry; or he constructs it as having an excess or being inferior according to goodness, and power, and wisdom, and whatever else is piously thought regarding the Divine; and thus he shall not escape the logic of composition. For it possesses nothing lacking in wisdom, or power, or any other good, to which goodness is not something adventitious; but it is such just as it is by nature. D So that he who says that there are greater and lesser substances in the divine nature, unknowingly constructs of the Divine a composite formed from unequal parts; as if one were to understand the subject to be one thing, and the thing participated in to be another, whereby that which is not such by nature becomes such through participation in the good. But if he truly understood the substance to be simple and in all respects one, being the very thing which is good, not becoming so through acquisition, he would not have calculated “greater” and “lesser” regarding it. For it was said also in what went before, that it is only by the presence of evil that good things are diminished. But in those whose nature is incapable of the worse, there is no place to conceive a limit to goodness; nor is the infinite such by a relation to something else, but being understood by itself, it escapes definition; and I do not know how it could be judged to be consistent to speak of “more” and “less” regarding that which is infinite. So if he confesses the transcendent substance to be simple and to have a relation to itself according to its nature, let it be joined to that which is united with the simple and infinite commonality. If, however…
he distinguishes the substances from one another, and as it were alienates the A substance of the Only-begotten from the substance of the Father, and sets another from the substance of the Son for the Holy Spirit, attributing degrees of intensity and remission to them, let him not deceive us with hidden snares; for while he asserts simplicity in word, in reality he fabricates the composition of God.
But now let us again resume his words in order. He says: "Since the substance is sincere and simple and altogether one; and is to be thought of and understood according to its own dignity." What does he mean by "according to its own dignity"? For if he believes the substances to be equal in dignity, the addition of these words would certainly be empty and superfluous, as it dwells upon matters that are certain and clear to the confession of all; but perhaps pardon should be given for an ill-timed use of terminology, since a better and sounder assessment of God does not reject this emptiness and superfluity of speech. Yet the danger of committing sins of speech does not hang over him (for the disease is easily curable), but he attempts far worse things, and tries to attack impiously. For he calls each of the three B substances simple "according to its own dignity," so that by the decrees he has established from the beginning regarding the first, second, and third substance, the principle of simplicity also might be subverted. For just as he named the substance of the Father alone to be supreme and uniquely proper, assigning nothing of these to the Son or to the Holy Spirit—neither the appellation of "supreme" nor of "most proper"—in the same way, when he calls the substances simple, he thinks that the principle of simplicity should be granted to each according to the mode and measure of the dignity in which it excels. Thus, the first and most proper substance is constituted as if in the citadel and summit of simplicity; the second participates in the principle of simplicity by a certain proportion according to the measure of its distance from the first; and the third similarly recedes from perfect simplicity as much as is necessary for the proportion and state of dignity to be diminished. So that from this it follows that the substance of the Father is pure and merely simple; the substance of the Son is not simply simple, but has some mixture of composition; and the substance of the Holy Spirit C participates most in the nature of composition, since the principle of simplicity is gradually lessened in the last. For just as that which is not perfectly good is acknowledged to share in some part of the contrary state, so that which is not entirely simple cannot escape appearing to be composite.
That he uses this form of speech with these things in view becomes more manifest from what follows, where he leads the estimation due to the Son and the Holy Spirit more openly and clearly down to certain humble and abject opinions. For when he says that, as the works are circumscribed by the energies, D and he considers the substance of the Only-begotten as something other than the Father, and another substance of the Spirit as other than the Only-begotten, and speaks of "more" and "less" in them, let it not escape our notice that by appearing to bestow simplicity, in truth he is crafting composition.
A Since works are measured out by the energies of those who work them, it is necessary by all means that the energies which follow upon each of the substances should also be "less" and "greater," and that some should hold the first rank, and others the second. Even if he has laboriously veiled these things in the mist of his language, making their meaning difficult for the many to grasp, they will nevertheless be easily clarified from the sequence of the points examined. "Being encompassed," he says, "the energies by the works." He calls the Son and the Spirit "works," and "energies" the productive powers of these, through which they were wrought, which he says a little earlier follow upon the substances. But the term "to be encompassed" indicates the state of equality of the produced substance with the power that brought it forth—or rather, not the power, but the energy of the power, as he himself names it—so that the result might not be a work of the *entire* power of the one working, but of some partial energy, with only so much of the entire power having been moved as was to appear proportionate to the production of the thing coming into being. And again, repeating the same thing, he says, "And the works being measured out by the energies of those who worked them." The meaning of these things might become clearer to us through an example. Let us suppose the argument concerns some cobbler’s tool: let a chisel be fashioned in the shape of a circle; if it is pressed upon something in which one wishes to imprint its type and figure, then what is cut receives the form and shape of the iron, and the circle in the cut will be shown to be as great as it is in the instrument; and again, by whatever interval the instrument is moved around, by just that much it will describe the circle through the cut. Such is the thinking of this theologian concerning the divine hypostasis of the Only-begotten. B He says that a certain energy, like a tool following upon the First Substance, has made the Lord a work proportionate to itself. In this way he imagines he is glorifying the Son of God, who is now glorified in the glory of the Father, and will be revealed at the time of the judgment; he asserts that this One is a work, measured out by the energy that worked Him. What, then, is this energy, which C follows upon the God of the universe, but is conceived before the Only-begotten, and encompasses His substance? Is it some essential power, subsisting by itself, and working what it pleases through a free choice of will? If so, then it is the Father of the Lord; and why is the name of "Father" still dinned into our ears for the God over all, if it is not He, but some energy and operation following from without that produced the Son? And how is the Son the Son, whom he says to have subsisted through some other thing, and—the Lord pardon my speech—to have slipped into the partnership of the Father like some supposititious and spurious child, and to have been honored solely by the appellation of "Son"? And how will he place the Son after the God of the universe, D who numbers as third from the Father the One who numbers the Son from the Father, with that mediating energy being numbered in the second rank after the God of all—and following this sequence, the Holy Spirit, certainly, is no longer in
the third, but will be found in the fifth rank. A For if the energy concomitant to the Only-Begotten, by which the Holy Spirit subsisted, is, as the argument of Eunomius suggests, numbered as something intermediate, then the Holy Spirit is certainly no longer in the third, but will be found in the fifth rank. Moreover, by saying that "All things were made through the Son," he will be shown to be building on an untenable foundation; for he has B invented, as a new theologian, some other substance older than the Only-Begotten, to which, with better right, the cause of the creation of all things would be attributed, since, according to this opinion, the production of the Only-Begotten himself depends upon that energy and operation. But if, wishing to avoid these absurdities, he should declare that this operation is a non-subsistent thing, let him explain to us again how that which does not exist follows upon that which does exist, and how that which does not subsist brings about him who does subsist. For it is surely manifest from this that things that do not exist proceed from God, and that things that are not are the cause of things that are; and that things which do not subsist by their own nature circumscribe the nature of things that do subsist; and every power that is effective and productive of creation will be contained, according to its own rationale, within that which does not subsist. Such are the tenets of this theologian, who teaches that the Lord of heaven and earth, the Creator of all creation, the Word of God who was in the beginning, and through whom all things were made, subsists from a non-existent or C non-subsistent thing—or whatever else it is appropriate to call the energy and operation he has now fashioned from his own mind—and that he is circumscribed and enclosed on all sides by this non-existence, as if by a certain barrier and boundary. And he who boasts of seeing the invisible does not understand to what sort of end the sequence of his argument leads. For if the operation of God is non-subsistent, and the work produced from non-existence is encompassed by it, then it is absolutely necessary that the effect, according to its own nature, should be judged to be of such a kind as is the nature of that thing which he conceives to have produced the effect; for that which has been brought about from non-existence, and is enclosed and included by it, it is surely evident to everyone what it is understood to be: namely, not-being, or nothing. For it is not so constituted by nature that opposites can be encompassed and circumscribed by their opposites; for water is not held by fire, nor life by death, nor light by darkness, nor D being by non-being. But these things, due to his excessive wisdom, he either does not understand, or he is willfully blind to the truth.
Furthermore, he posits by a certain necessity a diminution in the substance and hypostasis of the Son; and again, he establishes a similar waning of perfection in the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son; for these are his words: "It is absolutely necessary that the operations which follow upon each of the substances should be greater and lesser." Now, as for this necessity, which forces these things upon the divine nature and assigns both a greater and a lesser degree,
we have neither learned it from Him, nor have we been able to understand it for ourselves up to this present time. For until now, among all who accept the simplicity of the evangelical preaching, there prevails the view that the divine nature is subject to no necessity which might force the Only-Begotten down and cast Him away like some purchased slave to the diminution of His substance. A But, setting this aside—though it is not a matter undeserving of inquiry—it only dogmatizes that one must conceive of a deficiency. Moreover, necessity does not lead the argument merely to this, but advances to an even greater impiety and blasphemy, just as has already been explained in detail. For if the Son did not originate from the Father, but grew out of a certain non-subsistent energy, He will not only be conceived as lesser than the Father, but one is forced by this doctrine to Judaize altogether. For the consequence of the non-existent, as that sequence of necessity shows, is no small thing. But it is not even safe for an accuser to speak of what follows. For just as it is necessarily agreed that that which has its generation from the Existent is, neither will the opposite be agreed upon by necessity, namely that which grows from the non-existent. For when that B itself is nothing, how shall it cause another to subsist from it? If, therefore, that energy which follows upon God, and produces the Son, does not exist in its own substance, who is so blind as not to perceive the structure of this blasphemy, in that his design aims at the very denial of our Savior? And if the sequence of their doctrine steals the Son's subsistence away from the faith, leaving Him nothing but the bare name, it would hardly be believed that the Holy Spirit subsists in His own proper subsistence, He who is genealogized through the sequence of non-existent things. For when an energy concomitant to God does not exist in substance, and reason necessarily captures its result as non-subsistent, and then another non-existence of energy follows upon this, and consequently the Spirit is constructed to have come into being, how is the blasphemy not manifest to all? C For after the ingenerate God, they construct nothing truly to subsist, since their doctrine proceeds through shadows and non-existent fabrications, and rests upon nothing that subsists in truth. But the construction of those who dogmatize such things casts the argument into such an absurdity.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this were not the case. For they do indeed pretend and make a show of human kindness in speech, by granting to the Only-Begotten Son and to the Holy Spirit a proper subsistence. But if, while confessing these things, they also agreed on the true opinion concerning them, they would certainly not contend against the Church's dogma, nor would they have separated themselves from the common hope of Christians. If, however, as if it were some matter, they provide for themselves a foundation for blasphemy D
A regarding the Son, and grant existence to the Spirit, perhaps—even if it may seem bold to say so—it would have been more advantageous for them to have defected to the Jewish cult, having renounced the faith, than to violate the name of Christians through a feigned confession. For those men B, being to this day strangers to this faith, are marked by impiety only in that they refuse to confess that Christ has already come, but hope that He will come; yet one cannot hear from them any perverse or soul-destroying conception that would take away the honor of the One whom they expect. But these men of the "new circumcision"—or rather, as the Apostle says, of the "concision"—do not indeed deny that the Expected One has come, but they imitate those who dishonored the presence of the Lord according to the flesh through their unbelief and insults. Those men attempted to stone the Lord; these men stone the word of truth with their impious and wicked voices. Those men were offended by the humble and lowly circumstances of His birth according to the flesh, not having advanced to that divine and pre-temporal generation; similarly, these men, denying the confession of that magnificent, sublime, and ineffable generation from the Father, maintain that He received His existence through creation, from which every human nature and all things that were made derive their origin.
The Jews were aggrieved that our Lord should be acknowledged as the Son of God C, to whom all things are subject. These men are likewise indignant against those who preserve this confession concerning the Son inviolate. The Jews thought they were honoring the God of all by excluding the Son from equality of honor and majesty; these men also believe they are doing a favor to the God of all if they remove and abolish this belief concerning the Son, reserving this honor to the Father alone—to say nothing of other things of this kind that one might recount according to their desert, by which they show their injury and insult against the Only-Begotten Son of God: they imagine a certain fabricated operation that brings forth the subsistence of Christ, affirming Him to be the work and effect of that operation—a thing which the Jews have not dared to do even until now. Furthermore, they circumscribe and limit the nature of the Lord within certain boundaries of the power that produced Him, and they measure Him, as it were, with a certain standard of quantity, by the power that brought Him into being; and as if by a cloak—the energy devised by them—they constrain Him on all sides. We cannot accuse the Jews of such things.
Furthermore, they conceive of a certain contraction D within His substance by way of diminution, since, I know not by what reasoning, they measure in their own thoughts and persuasions Him who is without bulk or magnitude. Yet how are they able to discover how much is lacking to the perfection of virtue in the Only-Begotten Son, so that, being destitute of it, He dwells in a lesser and more imperfect state? To say nothing of many other such things, of which
A many they clearly confess, while others they plot in secret; regarding the profession of faith in the Son and the Holy Spirit as if it were merely an exercise for their own wickedness. How then must they not be considered more miserable than the perfidious Judeans themselves, since they do openly and in the sight of all those very things which the Judeans dared not do? For whoever diminishes the substance of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, so that he merely says or hears something, perhaps he has not bound himself to a great crime of impiety. But he who does this with careful study and premeditation, may deservedly be considered to have reached the highest summit of impiety. Thus, let us truly institute our inquiry, and I ask first to be pardoned if, for the sake of better declaring and explaining those things which our adversaries mendaciously plot and put forward, I bring into the open an exposition of those things which we ourselves think and teach. B
The most common and general division of all things is into those which are perceived by the intellect and those which are perceived by the senses. And the sensory nature, in a general way, has been termed "visible" by the Apostle [a]. For since every body has color, and vision itself perceives this, he left aside other qualities which naturally inhere in the substance, and from that which is ready and obvious to sense, he called it "visible." But for the whole of the intelligible nature, the common name, as the Apostle says, is "invisible" [b]; for by the removal of the sensory nature, he leads the mind, as if by the hand, to the incorporeal and intelligible nature. Moreover, reason divides the notion of this again into two parts; the one, in the very sequence of the discourse, is to be called the increate, the other the created nature; the increate is the maker of the creation; the created is that which has its existence and power through the increate nature. C In sensible things, therefore, are numbered all those things which we perceive through the bodily senses, concerning which the differences of qualities admit the principle of greater and lesser, with the difference in these being observed according to quantity, quality, and other properties.
But in the intelligible nature—I mean that which is in the creation—such a principle of difference as is found in objects of sense has no place; yet another mode is found, which discerns the difference of greater and lesser. For since the fountain and source and outpouring of every good is found in the increate nature, and every creature looks toward it as if with intent eyes, hanging upon it through communion with the supreme good and being made a participant of the same, it is necessary to admit a "more" and a "less" among creatures, according to the proportion of their participation in sublime things, while some receive more and others less, in accordance with the freedom of their own will and counsel, and in proportion to the inclination of each. For the nature which is understood as existing in creation is situated on the boundary of good and evil, so that it is capable of both by its own authority, inclining itself to whichever it wills, as we have learned from the divine Scriptures. Therefore, by comparison and respect toward evil, or by proximity to the good, we may affirm the intensification D
A of things that are good, or the diminution, in that which excels in virtue. But the uncreated nature stands far apart from such a difference, since it does not have goodness as something acquired, nor does it receive the good in itself by participation in some higher beauty and excellence; rather, it is that which it is by nature, and is understood to be good, and is the fount of goodness, simple and uniform and uncompounded, a fact which is attested even by our adversaries.
It has, however, a distinction within itself that is appropriate to the majesty of its nature: not one which consists in intensification and remission, as Eunomius thinks (for he who diminishes the conception of goodness in any of those things believed concerning the holy Trinity, maintains nothing else than that something of a contrary disposition, in which a defect of goodness appears, is admixed—a thought which is not devoid of impiety regarding either the only-begotten Son or the holy Spirit), but one B established in supreme perfection and incomprehensible excellence, which is known to be present in the properties of each person, consisting in constant, unconfused, and discrete difference.
Hence, the divine nature, in the fact that it is uncreated, agrees with itself in a certain immutable communion; but it is joined by no communion in the peculiar properties of the individual persons. For the property which is understood to be present in any divine hypostasis and person clearly and purely distinguishes one from the other; as, for example, the Father is called uncreated and unbegotten, for he is neither begotten nor created. Therefore, the state of being uncreated he has in common with the Son and the holy Spirit; but to be unbegotten and to be Father—this is something peculiar and incommunicable, which is found in none of the others. The Son is joined with the Father and the holy Spirit in that he is uncreated; but the fact that he both is and is called the only-begotten Son, this he claims as his own property, which can be affirmed neither of the God of the universe nor of the holy Spirit.
The holy Spirit has communion with the Father and the Son, in this, that he is endowed with an uncreated nature; nevertheless, he is distinguished from the Father and the Son by his own proper notions. For his notion and most proper sign is that he is none of those things which reason dictates as being in the Father C and the Son. For the fact that he is neither unbegotten nor only-begotten, and yet truly is, represents his own peculiar property, by which he is distinguished from the aforementioned. For the Spirit is joined to the Father in that both are uncreated; yet he is distinguished from him in that he is not the Father, as the Father is. He is joined to the Son D both in that both are uncreated, and in that both have their subsistence from the first principle; yet he is distinguished from him by his property, which is that he is not produced from the Father as the only-begotten, and that he has been manifested through the Son. And since the creature has come into being through the Only-begotten, so that the Spirit may not be thought to have any communion with it, the Spirit is distinguished from the creation by the fact that he has been manifested through the Son in that which is immutable, unchangeable, and free from any need of goodness from elsewhere. For the creation does not possess immutability in its nature.
as Scripture testifies in recounting the fall of Lucifer, concerning whom the Lord also, explaining the mysteries to His disciples, said: "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven." A Yet by the very qualities in which he differs from the creature, he has a kinship with the Father and the Son; for there is one and the same definition of immutability and invariability for all those who are not by their nature capable of things inferior.
Having thus explained these matters, it seems the time demands that we examine the rest of the adversaries' argument. "It is necessary," he says, "that the substances of the Son and of the Holy Spirit be greater and lesser." B This is what he asserts in his dissertation on the Son and the Holy Spirit. Let us see, therefore, in what sense he conceives in his mind the necessity of such a difference: whether it is a certain bodily comparison made between things measured against one another, or a comparison instituted according to intelligence in terms of excess or defect of virtue, or in the substances of things themselves?
But it has been demonstrated by those who know how to philosophize about such things, that no such difference can be conceived in the substance if one examines it stripped and bared of the qualities and properties observed in it, according to the definition of its being. But to conceive of such a difference in the Only-begotten and the Spirit by the increase and decrease of virtue, C and for that reason to necessarily suppose their nature to be mutable in both directions, as being equally capable of opposites and placed on the boundary between good and its opposite, is the height of impiety. For he who talks like this tries to persuade us that it is one thing for it to be according to its own definition, and another for it to become so by participation in the good—or the inferior; as happens in the case of iron, which, having been for a long time associated with fire, takes on the quality of heat while remaining iron; but if it should be placed in snow or ice, it changes in accordance with what prevails, receiving the coldness of the snow into its own parts.
Just as, therefore, we do not name the substance from the quality observed in the iron—for we do not call it fire or ice D just because it has been affected by one of these—so if it were granted, according to the argument of the impious, that in that life-giving power the good does not exist by nature, but accrues to it by participation, it would no longer correctly be named from goodness. Instead, such a conception will force us to conceive of some other thing, namely that goodness does not belong to it from eternity, nor does its nature and essence, and this very thing which it is, consist in goodness, as if it were once without goodness and might at some future time be without it. For if it is by communion with the good that the Son and the Holy Spirit are counted among the good, it is clear
before this communion they were in no wise such: and if, being something else, they were tinctured as it were by a certain hue of the presence of goodness, it follows altogether that if they be separated from goodness, they must be accounted as something different from goodness. And if this opinion should prevail, the divine nature will no longer be considered as the provider and supplier of good things, any more than that which is itself, as being needy, affected by benefits. For how could anyone give to another that which he lacks himself? If, therefore, it possesses goodness perfectly, we admit no defect in this perfection, and he is deservedly judged a fool who places a diminution in perfection. But if the participation of good comes to them imperfectly, so that on that account they are said to be subject to remission, see what follows from that: namely, that a nature so constituted will confer no benefit upon one who is of an inferior condition, but will labor to dispel its own penury, and to supply that which is lacking to itself, so that, by the opinion of B these men, it must needs be false, whatever is handed down concerning providence, concerning judgment, concerning the incarnation, and all those things which either have been done by the Only-Begotten, or are believed to be yet to be performed: inasmuch as He, as is fitting, would be occupied in the procurement of His own private good, having dismissed the administration of this universe.
If, indeed, this persuasion should once firmly take root in the minds of men, that our Redeemer is not most perfect and most consummate in the abundance of all goodness, it will not be difficult to perceive whither this blasphemy will turn out. For if these things are so, faith is vain, the preaching is empty, our hopes are empty, which rely upon faith as upon a base and a certain foundation. For why are they baptized in the name of Christ, if He lacks the power of goodness itself? May God avert this blasphemy from my mouth! Why do they believe in the Holy Spirit, if they persuade themselves of the same thing concerning Him? How are they regenerated through baptism, and restored from that generation which is subject to corruption, if, as they think, the power and strength through which they are regenerated do not naturally possess immutability, without the defect and indigence of that good? How does He transfigure the body of their humiliation, when they think that He Himself also stands in need of a change for the better, and consequently has work to be done by another, by whom He Himself might be transfigured? For as long as it is of an inferior lot with regard to goodness, since the Supreme Being has naturally implanted in inferior things a certain unceasing and restless desire for Himself, in no way will the desire for excess come to rest; but since it is necessary that the desire should always be extended to that which it has not yet attained, it will perpetually burn with the desire for something greater and more excellent, and will D strive upward toward greater things without end, and will never reach perfection, because a limit is lacking, upon the apprehension of which the ascent and further progress might be prohibited. For since the supreme good is infinite by its own nature, it necessarily follows that the participation and fruition of this good is also infinite, inasmuch as there always remains more for him to perceive,
and there is always something further that remains, to which one cannot be made equal, because that which is participated lacks a limit, and that which increases through participation is by no means brought to a halt so as to rest.
A These, then, are those heads of blasphemy and impiety which, from this doctrine regarding the inequality of the divine goodness, rear their heads as if they were a principle. For if they regard the "greater" and "lesser" as existing within God in a certain corporeal manner, they sufficiently betray the absurdity of their own position and their own dogma, even without a more accurate scrutiny and refutation; for it is absolutely necessary that certain qualities, dimensions, masses, and shapes—and everything by which the definition of a body is fulfilled—be introduced by these conjectures into the divine nature as well. And where composition is spoken of, there the dissolution of that composite is also confessed. But from the absurdity of the dogma which dares to declare the "lesser" and the "greater" as existing in things that are without magnitude and incomparable, these and such like things are built up, as the discourse has indicated in a few points out of many. For it is neither easy to uncover with words all the guile hidden within this dogma; yet, from the few things mentioned, the absurdity of the things that appear as a consequence of this blasphemy will be demonstrated effectively, notwithstanding.
We, however, shall proceed to what follows in the discourse, having first corrected a few small points for the establishment of our own dogma. Since the divinely inspired testimony is a secure criterion of truth in every dogma, I think it well to corroborate our own discourse by the citation of the divine words.
We have, therefore, recognized these differences in the division of existing things. B First—in relation to our own perception—is the sensible, I mean; after this, that which is contemplated by the mind through the guidance of the sensible, which we say is the intelligible. And of the intelligible, we have again grasped another difference, [the division] into the created and the uncreated. And we have defined the Holy Trinity as the uncreated nature; and as the created, everything that is said, exists, and is named after it.
In order, then, that our definition may not remain without proof, but be secured by the testimonies of Scripture, we shall add this to what has been said: that the Lord was not created, but came forth from the Father; just as the Word of God Himself bears witness in person in the Gospel, according to that ineffable and indescribable manner of generation, or rather, of procession. And who could be found a more trustworthy witness than the voice of the Lord Himself throughout the whole Gospel, calling Him Father, and not Creator, C indeed, His own true Father; and naming Himself not the work of God, but the Son of God? For just as, in signifying His communion with humanity according to the flesh, He called Himself "Son of man," indicating His relationship according to the nature of the flesh to that from which He had taken it, so also, through the name of "Son," He makes clear His true and genuine relationship to the God of all, indicating the kinship according to nature through the voice of the "Son"—even if some, from that proverbial saying, [twist] those things which were spoken in a parable obscurely and through an enigma,
producing the voice of "created," which the Author of Proverbs uttered from the person of Wisdom, and A seizing upon it as an argument for the distortion of their dogma, saying, "The Lord created me," as if this were an admission that the Lord was created, and as if the Only-Begotten himself, by this very utterance, did not deny such a thing, we must not pay heed to their word. For they neither provide proofs that it is absolutely necessary to refer this saying to the Lord; nor will they be able to demonstrate that the meaning of the scriptural passage from the Hebrew points to this sense, seeing that the other translators rendered the word "possessed" or "constituted" instead of "created." But even if this expression had been explicitly set down in the original Scripture, the meaning would not have been B plain and easy, since the parabolic mode of teaching is accustomed to indicate the scope, force, and concept of what is said not manifesty, but occultly, and as if under a veil and with an oblique insinuation. And so, from the very context of the words that are used in this passage, it is easy for anyone to recognize the difficulty of the discourse. As when he says, "When he constituted his throne upon the winds," and things of that sort; for what is the throne of God, whether material or intellectual? And what are the winds—whether they are these familiar ones known to us, which those who study nature say are formed from vapors and exhalations, or whether those winds are to be understood in another way, which he says serve as a base C and fulcrum for the throne? And what is the seat of the incorporeal, uncircumscribed, and formless God? And who could understand all these and similar things from the customary meaning of the words?
It becomes clear, therefore, that these things which are said there are enigmas of some sort, and obscure coverings, containing a meaning that is more profound than that which is common and trite. Thus, there can be no reason for the suspicion to arise among those who piously consider and weigh these things—especially among those who have been taught by the Gospel that all things that were made, were made through Him and subsist in Him—that the Lord was created. "All things," he says, "were made through him, and without him was made nothing that has been made in him." The evangelist certainly D would not have said this if he believed the Lord, too, was one of the things that were made. For how are all things made through him, and how do all things subsist in him, if he who made all things, existing in a nature entirely different from the created things, made not himself, but a creature? For if the creature is through him, but the Lord himself is not through himself, it follows entirely that he is something different from the creature; the evangelist indeed openly affirming that "All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that has been made in him," and especially demonstrating that those things which were made were made in the Son, and do not derive their origin and principle from another.
To these, St. Paul excellently concurs, [taking] up this discourse; and as if
that no opportunity for evasion might be left to the impious A to number the nature of the Holy Spirit with created things, he reckons up one by one all those things which were spoken and comprehended by the evangelist under the name of "all." And just as the great David, after having said that all things were subjected to man, also added by way of species what those things were which he meant by the term "all"—that is, the land, water, and air animals—so also the interpreter of the divine oracles, the Apostle Paul, having said that all things were made in Him, defines the notion of "all" by the enumeration of the things themselves. For "visible," he says, "and invisible." By "visible," as has been said, he embraced those things which are known to the senses by that name; while by "invisible," he hinted at the nature of the intelligible. B But concerning the sensible things, there was no need to go through them in detail or by name. For no one is so carnal or stupid as to suspect that the Holy Spirit is contained within the order of sensible things. But since he had made mention of the invisible, and since the nature of the Holy Spirit is itself also intelligible and incorporeal, lest any one perhaps might suspect that the Holy Spirit was to be classed among these on account of the communion [shared] with things remote from the sight of the eyes, he makes a most evident distinction between those things which were produced by creation and that substance which is superior to creation. For he reckons up the things created in his discourse, naming certain Thrones, and Principalities, and Powers, and Dominions C; providing the doctrine of these invisible powers with certain general and comprehensive names; whereas those things which are elevated beyond the rank of creation, he separates from the number of created things by that very silence. Just as if someone, commanded in camp to state in detail and by name the minor and subordinate authorities—the captains, and lieutenants, the centurions and the chiliarchs, and whatever other local powers are named—having passed them all over in his speech, were to make no mention of the authority that rules over all and administers all power D; not out of contempt or forgetfulness of the superior authority, but because he was either commanded or had determined to list only the subordinate and subject order—he would indeed do an injury if he included the ruling authority in the memory of those subjects—so it seems to me also that Paul, taught the ineffable things in paradise, when he was snatched up into it and became a spectator of the celestial mysteries, both saw and heard things that are unlawful for man to utter; and this man, when he proposed to teach the things created in the Lord, since he had gone through these in his discourse with certain comprehensive terms, having run through the angelic and supermundane power, stopped his discourse at those things he had mentioned, without drawing any of those things which are above creation into the list of created things; so that from this it is clearly witnessed by the Scripture that the Holy Spirit is above creation.
A But if anyone should attempt to refute the argument, claiming that not even the Cherubim were mentioned by Paul, but that these too, along with the Spirit, were omitted in the enumeration of created things, and should therefore argue from this omission that either these [Cherubim] should be considered above creation, or that the Spirit ought not to be excluded from their order, let him, I pray, more carefully examine the sense of those things which are set forth in that enumeration; and he will discover that what seems omitted, because it was not explicitly named, is in fact included with those already mentioned. For he who named "thrones" signified the Cherubim by another name, expressing the more obscure Hebrew word with a clearer Greek one. For having read that God sits upon the Cherubim, he called these powers of Him who sits above them "thrones." B Similarly, the Seraphim in the account of Isaiah, from whom the mystery of the Trinity is clearly announced—when they marvelously sang that "Holy" hymn, being astonished at the beauty and adornment in each person of the holy Trinity—are included in the catalogue mentioned by the great Paul, having been designated by the title of "powers" both by Paul and, before him, by the prophet David. For the one says: "Bless the Lord, all you his powers; his ministers, you who do his will." And Isaiah, instead of saying "Bless," transcribed the words of the blessing: "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord of Sabaoth, the whole earth is full of his glory." That these powers, which do the will of God through the purification of sins according to the will of Him who sent them, are indeed ministers, was hinted at by one of the Seraphim; for this is the ministry C of these spirits, to be sent forth for the salvation of those who are being saved.
Which the divine Apostle seems to me to have observed, and to have understood that the same thing is signified by the two prophets under different titles. Having chosen the most appropriate of the terms, he called the Seraphim "powers," so that no occasion might be left for sycophants to assert that the Holy Spirit has been left behind, like one of these, in the order of created things. For they were named, as has already been shown; but those things were passed over in the way that it is possible to understand from the very series of the Pauline narrative, which enumerated every creature in the plural number, but made mention of those things which are spoken of singly, in the singular. For this is proper to the holy Trinity, to be declared in the singular: one Father, and one Son, and one holy Spirit. D But all the things enumerated above are listed in the plural number: Principalities, and Powers, and Dominions, and Virtues; so that no ground is provided for suspecting that the Holy Spirit is any one of these. But Paul passes over the inexplicable things in silence, and he does well; for he knows how to hear the unutterable words in paradise.
A and to refrain from announcing and speaking them when he is discoursing about matters of lower rank.
But the enemies of the truth do not abstain even from ineffable things, violating the majesty of the Spirit with the humble condition of the creature, as if they were unaware that God the Word Himself, when He was handing down to the disciples the mystery of the knowledge of God, directed that life be conferred and completed for those being reborn in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; and because He therefore joined the Spirit to Himself and to the Father, He set Him apart from the order of created things. So that from comparing these two passages together, a fitting and worthy estimation of the Holy Spirit might exist: B since Paul made no mention of Him in his enumeration of creatures; and the Lord, when He described those life-giving words of regeneration, coupled Him with the Father and Himself. Whence it comes about that reason, directed by the auspices and guidance of Holy Scripture, raises the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit above the lot of the creature, and, according to the Savior’s mandate, bids us contemplate Him by faith in that blessed, life-giving, and uncreated nature. Therefore, that which is believed to be one of those things that are above the creature, and of the primary nature, and absolute in all respects, can in no way undergo a reasoning of diminution, even if the author of the heresy wishes to circumscribe and as it were surround the infinite with the opinion of what is lesser, as if mutilating and contracting the perfection of the divine nature; while he teaches that more and less are to be considered C in it.
Let us examine, then, what he adds to the sequence of what has been said. After saying that by necessity one must think there are lesser and greater substances; and that some hold the first rank, arranged in preference according to a certain difference of magnitude and dignity; while others, because of the inferior condition of their nature and dignity, are cast aside, he adds these words: "To such a difference," he says, "does it reach, to as much as the works reach." Since it is not lawful to speak of the same operation by which He made the angels, or the stars and the heavens, or man. But by how much the works are older and more honorable than the works, by so much would one be able to say, while asserting this, that the operation rises above the operation; D inasmuch as the same operations produce the identity of the works, and the diverse works indicate diverse operations.
I, for my part, conceive these things to be such that the author himself could not easily say what in the world he meant when he wrote them; so much is the thought of what was said clouded by the muck of his phrasing, that no one could easily discern in the mire of his interpretation what his purpose might be. For "to reach to such a difference, to as much as the works reach," seems like the utterance of some Loxias, according to the outward myth, prophesying in an oblique manner, as is reported in the writings of outsiders, and as
A one might suppose it to be for the deception of the hearers; if, however, one must follow the points previously examined and conjecture about those things which he here craftily conceals, this is what he signifies: that the variation of the works is to be understood as being as great as the difference of the energies in relation to each other. Now, it is not easy to gather from what has been said about which works he is making his discourse here. For if he speaks of those things that are seen in the order of creation, I do not see what connection these have with what preceded. For since the inquiry concerns the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, what occasion is there to discourse upon the earth, and water, and air, and fire, and the differences of animals, and to pursue these things with words, and to describe some works as older and more honorable than other works, B and to speak reasonably of one energy having ascended above another? But if he designates the Only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit as works, what then does he call the differences of the energies by which these works are accomplished? And what are those energies themselves which transcend other energies in excellence? For he neither explains what he understands by the name of 'transcendence,' whereby one energy transcends another, nor has he handed down anything concerning the nature of the energies; but his discourse has proceeded thus far accomplishing nothing, since he neither demonstrates them to subsist according to their own essence, nor points to a certain motion of the will not subsisting by itself. For the opinion of those things he has discussed, fluctuating between each of these two ideas, and as it were suspended in the middle, inclines toward both persuasions.
He adds, indeed, that it is impious to think that the same energy is that by which He made the angels, or the stars, or the heaven, or human beings. Again, by what necessity or series of argumentation, he has, being compelled, joined these to the aforementioned things? Nor do I understand how it is fittingly concluded: that the energies differ from each other to the same degree that the works themselves disagree with each other, from the fact that he tries to prove that all effects have not come from the same source, but some from some and others from others. For we have been taught by the sacred Scriptures that the heaven, and the angel, and the stars, and the man, and all things that are numbered among creatures are the works D of one. But this man, with his dogma, endeavors to show that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not works of One; but that the Son indeed is the work of an energy that flows from the first substance; and that the Holy Spirit is, in turn, another work of this work. Let him, therefore, say himself, or if anyone else is a participant of that hidden wisdom of his, what connection and communion heaven and man, and angel and stars—which this man now assumes for the sake of proof—finally have with that construction of theirs? For in these things the impiety is manifest to those who have spoken; but the construction of the impiety is also inconsistent with itself. For the idea that there is such great difference to be perceived in the holy Trinity, as is to be understood by comparing the heaven, which encompasses the whole creation, with one human being by number, or the star appearing in the heaven, is clearly manifest
A from those things which shine in the ether; yet the connection of the argument and the order of the proofs—to conclude and demonstrate this very thing—I say neither to me, nor perhaps to the parent of the impiety himself, is sufficiently clear. For if he had decided thus regarding created things: that the heaven is the work of a certain supreme operation, but the star is the product of the operation that follows the heaven, and an angel that of this, and of this a human being, then his argument might perhaps have been able to prove something through the citation of similar things. But if he himself confesses that all these things were brought into being by one (unless he wishes to contradict the oracles of the Sacred Scriptures entirely), and yet introduces a different mode for the production of those things, it does not appear how these things cohere with what preceded.
B But let us grant that these things are apt for demonstrating the diversity of substances; for this is what he desires to obtain. Yet let us hear how the things which follow are connected with what he has discussed above. "By as much," he says, "as works are more venerable and honorable than works, by so much would anyone who thinks piously say that operation is also surpassed by operation." If he says this regarding sensible things, the argument is far from the proposed subject; for what is the necessity that compels one who sets out to speak about the doctrine of faith to philosophize about the order in which things were disposed at the beginning of the world, and to assert that the operations of the Creator were higher and lower for the perfection of created things? But if he is making his speech about those—and he calls the objects that he has now invented for the first time concerning the doctrine of faith, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit, C works more venerable and honorable than works—it would perhaps have been more worth the effort to execrate this opinion with silence, lest, by refuting it, it should seem to have some probability and reason. For how can something be found more excellent and more worthy in those things where nothing is found less excellent and less worthy? For if he has proceeded so far in his facility and readiness for iniquity as to admit even the word and notion of "less worthy" in any of those things which are believed to be in the most holy Trinity, it is right that, by stopping our ears, we should flee as much as is in our power from the evil listening, so D that no communion of such a great crime might be transferred to the listener by the speech, as if being poured out from a vessel full of all impurity into the souls of the listeners.
For how would anyone dare to invent such a thing regarding that divine and more-than-eminent nature, through which a "less worthy" thing is established by argument through comparison? "That all," he says, "might honor the Son, just as they honor the Father" (John v, 23). Since, therefore, this voice sanctions the equality of honor as if a law had been passed—for the divine voice is a law—he traduces both the law and the lawgiver himself, and he distributes greater honor to the one and lesser to the other, I know not where the measure of the greater and the lesser has been found; for indeed in the case of the...
A common society of men, differences of rank likewise measure out honors to those who hold office, so that subjects do not approach kings and lesser magistrates with the same gesture and countenance. But the greater and more submissive display of fear and reverence on the part of those approaching indicates the greater or lesser dignity and excellence of those who are being honored; and by this, most of all, it is possible to find who are the more honored in the judgment of the subjects, when someone is seen to be feared more by those near him, and to be deemed worthy of greater reverence than the others. In the divine nature, however, because all perfection according to goodness is equally evident in the designation of the Divine, it is not possible to find, according to our way of understanding, any measure of preference. For in those in whom there is no excess or defect of power, or glory, or wisdom, or benevolence, or any other perfection whatsoever according to goodness, but rather all the good things that the Son has are likewise the Father's, and all those the Father possesses are found in the Son: in what way shall we assign a prerogative of honor to the Father above the Son? If we frame in our minds royal power and excellence, the Son is King; if we think of a judge, all judgment belongs to the Son 18; if we conceive in our mind the greatness of creation, all things were made through him 19; if we call to mind the cause of our life, we know that true life which descended even to our nature; if we set before our eyes the translation from darkness, we do not ignore the true light by which we have been delivered from the gloom of darkness; but if to anyone wisdom seems honorable, behold, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God 20.
B Therefore, with our mind attending in such a way as is becoming and as far as it is able to these and similar miracles of Christ, what excess of honor and what preeminence can be left which belongs specifically and properly to the Father alone, and of which the Son is by right destitute? Nor is human honor towards the divine numen, when considered by right reason, anything other than a certain affection full of love, and a confession of those perfections that are in him, and it seems to me that the obligation to honor the Son just as the Father is honored has been indicated under the name of love. For the Law commands that we love God with our whole heart and strength, so that the honor befitting him may be rendered, and the precept which here confirms the equality of love as if it were a promulgated law, thus says that one ought to honor the Son just as the Father is honored. C This method of honor the great David also observed towards the Lord, in the preamble of a certain psalm 21, while he confesses that he loves the Lord and at the same time explains the causes of his love, because he was for him his strength, and firmament, and refuge, and deliverer, and God his helper, and protector, and the horn of salvation, and helper 22, and other things of that kind. If, therefore, the only-begotten Son of God neither is nor provides these things to men, D then let that honor surely be denied to him.
A Let the excess of honor be restrained in this case, according to the rule of the heresy; but if we believe the only-begotten God both to be and to be called these things, and even more than these, being equalled in every conception of good deed and thought to the majesty of the goodness that is in the Father, how could anyone say it is reasonable either not to love such a one, or to dishonor what is loved? For one could not say that love should come from the whole heart and power, but honor from only half. If, therefore, the Son is honored from the whole heart, by dedicating all love to him, what conception will find an excess of honor, when the whole heart, as much as it is able, bestows upon him such a measure of honor through love? So he is vain and foolish regarding those things that are honorable by nature, who dogmatizes about a preferred state, and by such a comparison introduces a notion of a lesser dignity.
B But also to speak of "the older" in the case of created things is true; for by the sequence of works being shown in the order of the days, one might say that the heaven is so much older than the creation of man, and he would measure the time in between by the interval of the days. But in the case of that primary nature, which transcends every notion of time and leaves far behind every intellective grasp, to think that one thing is "older" in terms of temporal precedence, and another "younger," belongs to the wisdom that has just now made its appearance. For he who declares the Father to be older than the substance of the Only-begotten, declares nothing other than that the Son himself is younger than the things that were made through the Son; if indeed it is true that all ages and every temporal interval were made after the Son, and through the Son. And furthermore, which convicts the absurdity of the dogma even more, by such reasoning not only will a temporal beginning of existence be constructed for the Son, but they will not spare the Father either from such a sequence, so as not to C construct that he too had his beginning from time; for if there is any mark or sign lying above that is characteristic of the generation of the Son, that obviously will also define the beginning of the Father's substance.
For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps not inopportune to examine the argument more painstakingly. He who dogmatizes that the life of the Father is older than that of the Son separates the Only-begotten from the God over all by some interval; and this intermediate interval will be supposed to be either infinite, or defined by certain and manifest limits. But the logic of an intermediary will not allow one to say it is infinite, or else it will completely destroy the conception of both Father and Son; and it will not be possible to conceive of a middle ground, so long as it is infinite and not concluded by certain terms on either side; neither the Father D above, as the infinite progression cuts off the conception, nor the Son below, as it cuts off the infinity; for this...
A conception of the infinite is that it is diffused by nature in every direction and is comprehended by no limit from any quarter.
Therefore, in order that the conception of the Father and the Son may remain fixed and immovable, there shall be no room for conceiving of an infinite interval, but they will, of necessity, separate the Only-Begotten from the Father by some finite distance. This, then, is what I assert: that this argument will ensure that the God over all is not from eternity, but has taken His beginning from some definite point. What I mean is like this: I will speak by means of familiar examples, clarifying the concept so that what is unknown may become evident to us through things that are seen. For when we say, on the authority of the writings of Moses, that man was created on the fifth day after the heavens, we also imply by this statement—in what is left unsaid—that before the number of these days, not even the heavens existed. Thus, that which comes into existence later defines and circumscribes B by an interval that which preceded it, namely, the substance and existence of that which is conceived and considered as prior. But if we have not sufficiently clarified the matter with this example, we can demonstrate the same thing more evidently. For when we affirm that the law given through Moses was four hundred and thirty years later than that divine promise made to Abraham, if we wish to traverse the preceding time in our thought by ascending from the law, and finally reach the end of the years we have counted, we clearly grasp that before this time that promise of God did not yet exist. There are many such examples of this kind to be found, which I shall decline to go through one by one, for fear of causing tedium.
Consistently, therefore, with the manner shown by the aforementioned examples, we must discuss the proposition at hand; and this is, as our adversaries persuade themselves, that "prior" and "posterior," or "older" and "more recent," are predicated of the substance of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. C When, therefore, we have passed by the generation of the Son, as this heretic babbles, and arrive at that interval placed in the middle (just as the vain persuasion of the heretics posits something between the Father and the Son), and when we have proceeded to that extreme point by which they terminate that interspace, there, at what is as it were the highest summit, we find the life of the God of the whole universe subsisting. From which it necessarily follows that we must also believe that God, who always is, did not exist before that point.
But if you are still in doubt, I will again explain it by examples. For just as when we have taken two rules, one greater and one lesser, and wish to make their ends equal, we recognize the excess at the extremity—for by placing the extremity of the lesser D alongside, we perceive the excess of the greater, and how much is missing from the shorter one is made clear by some measure, whether it be a cubit or something else, by laying the remainder alongside the end of the greater
A Thus, if there is, according to the argument of our opponents, an excess of the Father’s life with respect to the Son’s life, it must entirely consist in some definite interval; yet they must necessarily admit that this is not an excess of future duration. For even the enemies of the truth do not deny that both are equally immortal, but they conceive of this difference in terms of past duration, while they do not equate the Son’s life and existence with the Father’s, by extending and drawing out their thought and estimation of the Father through an interval of life. Since, therefore, every interval is circumscribed by two limits, it is absolutely necessary that the two points characterizing the ends of the interval devised by them also be grasped. Just as, then, one part, according to them, has its beginning from the birth of the Only-Begotten, B so too must the other extremity necessarily end at some other limit, in which the interval, being completed, circumscribes itself. What, then, is this limit? Let them explain it themselves, if they are not ashamed to follow their own arguments.
But the matter is free from all ambiguity. For they will not find the one part connected to the other in the interval fabricated by them, unless they admit and posit some beginning for Him who is altogether unbegotten and exempt from all coming-into-being, from which they might, in their thinking, produce and draw out the medium up to the generation of the Son. This, then, is what we affirm: that he who asserts the Son to be posterior, according to a certain extension of an interval, likewise restricts the life and existence of the Father to certain spaces and bounds, C inasmuch as it is circumscribed by an interval extended through the medium; and thus we see that famous and everywhere touted unbegottenness of the Father being overturned by this technique and machination by the very champions of unbegottenness, while they assert that God is not unbegotten, but has derived His beginning from a certain start. For that which has a beginning of its existence does not lack a beginning. But if it must be confessed in every way that the Father lacks a beginning, one must not engage in a labored investigation of some definite point in the Son’s life, from which, having begun to be, He is cut off from the life beyond that point. Rather, it is sufficient to conceive of the Father as existing prior to the Son solely by the account of cause, D and not as having a life separated and at some time peculiar to the Father before the Son’s generation, lest by this assumption there enter in some notion of an interval prior to the manifestation of the Son, measured by the life of the Begetter. This would necessarily be followed by the need to posit some beginning of life for the Father, at which the interval constructed before Him would, in proceeding upward, come to a halt, circumscribing the beginning of the Father’s life as previously conceived. But we, acknowledging that the Son is from Him—even if it seems somewhat daring—do not deny that He is with Him, being led to this conception by what the Scripture suggests in its teachings. For having heard from Wisdom that He is the “radiance of eternal light,” we contemplate along with the eternity of the prototype light the radiance, and the cause of the radiance in…
such a way that the logic of piety is preserved for us; so that neither is the life of the Son lacking in the heights, nor is the eternity of the Father diminished by the thought that He is the source of the Son, while we understand the prior element, and yet we do not admit it.
B But perhaps one of those who oppose the argument will say that the creation also has a confessedly certain beginning, and yet the things that have been made are not conceived of as co-eternal with their Maker, nor does the indefinite nature of the divine life halt because of its own beginning, as the argument showed the absurdity when examining the Father and the Son. Thus, it must necessarily be concluded from this that either the creature is co-eternal with God, or certainly it must be conceded without hesitation that the Son is posterior to His Father; for the logic of an interval brings the absurdity with it equally, when it is applied from the creature to the Creator himself.
C But he who objects to this, perhaps not looking at the dogma itself with sufficient accuracy and care, makes his battle against the things we have argued by using things that are foreign and entirely irrelevant to our purpose. For if he were able to demonstrate that something of those things which are above the creation derives the origin of its subsistence at a point of some interval, and if furthermore it were established for certain by the common approval of all that it might be possible to conceive of the logic of some interval even before the creation of the creature, then perhaps it would not be entirely beside the point to attempt to evade and oppose the eternity of the Son demonstrated by such arguments. But since it is evident by the votes and consensus of all those who think correctly that of existing things, one is created and another is uncreated; D and since we are taught by the discipline of truth and piety that the divine nature is uncreated, in which the logic of piety teaches that one is the cause, and the other receives its substance inseparably from the cause, while the creature is contained, represented in a certain interval; and since all temporal order and series of created things is comprehended by time, while that nature which exists before the ages, or before time, lacks all that diversity by which some things are accustomed to be older and others more recent, because in that divine and blessed life those things which our reason sees to exist in the creature are not to be sought or considered at all. For every creature, as has been said, is measured in the duration of time according to a certain order and series by which it was produced, and if anyone were to ascend by reason through the order of created things to the beginning of the same, he would circumscribe his investigation at the rise and condition of time. But the substance that is raised above the creature, being as it were free from every temporal gap, transcends the entire series of time, proceeding from no such beginning, in no manner according to order, or ending in any. For to one who has traversed the ages and all the things that have occurred within them, the contemplation of the divine nature, appearing to the intellect like a vast and fathomless sea, offers nothing
A that might serve as a sign of some beginning to one who would stretch his faculty of understanding towards those things that are beyond. Thus, he who busies himself with that which is older than the ages, and ascends toward the origin of beings, can nowhere find a place for his thought to settle, since the object of his search always escapes him, and shows no point of stillness for the restless activity of his mind.
But it is clear to one who has—even if only moderately—examined the nature of beings that nothing can be measured against the divine and blessed life. For that life is not in time, but time is from it. However, the creation is borne from a certain and known beginning toward the end set for it, traveling through the intervals of time; so that it is possible, as Solomon says somewhere, to discern its beginning, end, and middle, marking the sequence of the things within it by means of the divisions of time. But that supreme and blessed life, as no interval travels along with B it, has nothing to measure or divide it. For all things that have come into being are enclosed within their own measures according to the pleasure of the wisdom of the Creator; like some boundary or appropriate limit, they are encompassed for the harmony of the whole. For this reason, even if the approach to things seen in the creation is inaccessible to the weakness of human reasoning, it is nevertheless not to be doubted that all things are finite through the power of the One who made them, and are contained within the bounds of creation.
The creative power, C however, which encompasses within itself the nature of the things that have come to be, has nothing that contains it. It shuts up within itself every thought that hastens to ascend to the source of the divine life, and it escapes from all the curiosity and restless striving that contends to reach the end of the Infinite. For every upward movement and stretching of the mind, even after the ages, will be elevated only so far as to see the unsearchable nature of the object of its search; and the age, and the things within it, are like a sort of measure and limit of the movement and activity of human reasoning, while the things that are above these remain D ungraspable and inaccessible to human thought, being altogether removed from anything that can come within the reach of human understanding. For where there is no form, no place, no magnitude, no measure of time, nor anything else of the things that are grasped by conceptualization, necessarily the grasping power of the mind, while seeking to lay hold of something, will look for and grasp the ages and the creation within them, as if they were related and of the same nature as itself, while sliding away from the ungraspable nature on all sides.
For I think this is manifest to anyone who has examined beings—even if only moderately—that the Creator of all things, in laying down the ages and the place within them as a kind of receptacle for the things that are being produced,
A creates all things. For it is not possible that anything which is created or born should not have its existence either in place or in time. But that nature which is in need of nothing, which is eternal, and which encompasses all things by its own embrace, is neither in place nor in time, but is before these and above these by an ineffable reason, and is perceived in itself only by faith. It is neither measured by ages nor does it run alongside time, but it remains in itself and is established in itself, not being contemplated together with either the past or the future; nor indeed is there anything besides it, outside of it, by the passing of which one thing passes away and another is to come. For these are the proper affections of created things, which, on account of hope and memory, have life divided variously according to the division of time. But in that supreme and blessed Power, to whom all things are equally present as in the present—even that which is to come—is considered to be present, because of that infinite power of comprehension.
B This, therefore, is the Substance in which, as the Apostle says, all things consist, and we who are singular beings live and move and have our being; it is superior to every beginning, and it provides no tokens of its own nature, but is known only by the fact that it cannot be apprehended. For this is its most proper characteristic: that its nature is higher than every characteristical concept. Therefore, the creature, by the very fact that it does not have the same reason as the Uncreated, is separated by this very thing from comparison and communion with its Creator, I mean by the difference of substance, and by the fact that it possesses in itself a distinct reason demonstrating its nature, sharing nothing in common with that from which it came into existence. But the divine nature is far removed from all those properties and signs of knowledge which are considered to exist in creatures; hence, it leaves below itself all sections of time—I mean the "before" and the "after"—and all thoughts of place, so that not even "above" can be properly affirmed of it. For everything that is contemplated in that uncreated nature is above, and is a beginning, and possesses the reason of that which is most properly so called.
C Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated up to this point that the only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit are not to be sought among creatures, but must be believed to be elevated above all creatures; it may perhaps be possible that a creature, through the study and contention of those who laboriously occupy themselves with such matters, may have its own proper beginning discovered; but that which is above the lot of the creature can never fall under contemplation by this mode and medium, since there is no sign by which we might be led as if by the hand to knowledge, it being permitted to find nothing in that state before the origin of time. D If, therefore, in that uncreated nature there are thought to be not only marvelous things but also names—namely, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit—how is it possible that that which the curious mind, intent on more things than is proper, apprehends in these inferior matters by placing one thing in comparison with another through some interval of time, one should also think this concerning the uncreated and pre-eternal substance
A in which the Father is conceived as without beginning, unbegotten, and always Father; while from Him immediately and without interval the only-begotten Son is conceived together with the Father; and through Him and with Him, before any void and unsubstantial concept can fall in between, the Holy Spirit is also grasped as joined to them. He is not posterior in existence to the Son, so that the Only-begotten could ever be thought of apart from the Spirit; but as He is from the God of all, having from Him the cause of His being, from whom also the Only-begotten Light shines forth from the True Light, so He is severed neither by interval nor by difference of nature from the Father or the Only-begotten. For there is no interval in the pre-eternal nature, nor is there any difference according to substance. For it is not possible to conceive any difference of an uncreated thing from an uncreated thing; and the Holy Spirit is uncreated, as has been demonstrated in the preceding discourses. B
Since these things are assumed by all who accept the simplicity of the true and sound proclamation, what occasion is there to attempt to dissolve the union of the Son with the Father through [the concept of] the creature, as if it were necessary for this also to have something co-eternal, or certainly for the Son to be posterior to the Father? For neither is the generation of the Only-begotten concluded within the ages, nor is the creature prior to the ages; so that in no way does it befit the indivisible nature to be divided, or to insert some concept of an interval into the midst of the creative Cause of all, by saying that the One who gave existence to all things was once not. C
Therefore, the argument previously set forth is true, that with the unbegottenness of the Father, the eternity of the Only-begotten Son is conceived in a generated manner. But if any interval were to be imagined between them, by which the generation of the Son is cut off from the life of the Father, by this the beginning of the life of the God of all would also be defined, which is absurd. But nothing prevents the creature, being distinct in its own nature from its Creator, from being thought of as proceeding from a certain proper beginning, as we have said, which can in no way apply to that immortal and pre-eternal [divine] nature. For to say that heaven or earth or anything else seen in the creation came into being from non-existent things, or as the Apostle says, from things which do not appear (Heb. xi, 1), D brings no dishonor to the Maker of all; since we have learned from the divine Scripture that these things neither existed from eternity nor will they remain forever. But if any of those things which are believed to be in the Holy Trinity were believed not to exist always with the Father, and if, according to the reasonings of the heresy, some deliberation were conceived that at some time stripped the God of all of the glory of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, then nothing else would follow—according to the reasoning of the heresy—than that God would be shown to be separated from every good and divine thing and thought. But if the Father is always glorious,
will appear to be despoiled of his estimation, which is consistent with all goodness and divinity and with divinity itself. But if the Father, who is before the ages, always possesses his own glory, and the glory of the Father is the eternal Son, and in like manner the glory of the Son is the Holy Spirit, who is observed forever associated with the Son and the Father, whence does this wisest man—and from what kind of instruction—determine that one thing is prior, more ancient, more honorable, or more worthy than another among things that are by their nature equally honorable and worthy, preferring one to the other by comparison, when by the very fact that he awards the primacy of honor to one, he dishonors what follows and affects it with injury? For whither that distinction of "more excellent" and "more honorable" tends, escapes no one. A
Now, as to what kind of things he subjoins to these when he affirms that the same operations produce the same works, and that with changed works, changed operations are also to be seen? Opportune, indeed, is the refuge this distinguished man takes toward the unassailable defense of his discourse. "The same operations," he says, "produce also the same works." Let us see, therefore, how true this is, with examples brought forward. One operation of fire is to heat; let us therefore examine what consistency the works of this operation have. By heat, bronze is liquefied, clay is hardened, wax is consumed; the remaining living creatures, if they are in the fire, are destroyed, but the salamander is quickened; the tow burns, B while the asbestos (the name of a gem) is purged by the flame as if by water. Such is the similarity of the works of one and the same operation! And what of the sun? Does it not also, warming all things equally with that same virtue and power of its, cause one plant to grow while it dries up another, changing the end of the operation according to the condition and quality of the underlying material? For it dries up that plant which is upon the rock, but that which has struck its roots deep into the earth, it spreads out with sprawling branches everywhere. But if you wish to survey the works of nature with your mind, and to observe what nature is accustomed to do in bodies, you will understand more clearly how circumspectly this man has spoken, saying that the same operation produces the same works. C One operation is the cause of conception, but the composition of that which is formed and constituted within is various and multiform, so that it is not easy for anyone to enumerate the diversity of all those qualities that exist in the body. For infants, likewise, there is one operation, the drawing and suction of milk. But who could recount the variety of effects of such nourishment? For that which descends as if through a canal from the mouth into the destined passages, the faculty of nourishment and alteration brings to each of the limbs in a suitable manner, subduing and dividing that food in six hundred ways through concoction, and rendering it similar and akin to each of the subject limbs in a consistent manner. For from the same food, the arteries, veins, brain, meninges (or membranes), marrow, bones, nerves, muscles, tendons, flesh, D extremity or surface, cartilage, fat, hair, nails, sweats, breath, phlegm, bile, and whatever other superfluous and useless things exist, are nourished and grow from the same cause. And if you contemplate the members, of which some are organic, others serving the senses, others otherwise [constituting] this mass—
A [by the operation of nourishment], you will see that these also are altered into such and so great diversity. If anyone were to consider the arts as well, he would find through these, too, the matter of the dogma examined; for, as a rule, we see one operation in all those who produce anything by hand—I mean, the movement of the hand itself. But let us consider: what is the communion of the results? What has the construction of a temple in common with the making of a garment, though the art in each is operated by the movement of the hand? The housebreaker moves his hand, and the well-digger moves his hand; the earth is mined, and a man is killed—all are the works of the movement of a hand. For the warrior in battle operates the slaughter of his enemies by his hand; and the husbandman again, with his hand, breaks the clod with his mattock. How then does our dogmatist declare to us that the same operations produce B the identity of works? If anything true is to be granted in what has been said, then even by this, the affinity in substance of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Son, is more firmly established. For if there were some variation of the operations, so that the Father worked in one way and the Son supposedly in another, it would be well to infer, from the variation of the operations, a variation also in the substance of the one who performed them. But if, in the way that the Father works, the Son also does all things in like manner—according to the very voice of the Lord and according to right reason (for neither does the one work incorporeally and the other corporeally, nor the one from this matter and the other from that; nor does one C achieve the object of his will in time or place where the other does not; nor do differences in their instruments effect any variation; but only the movement of the will suffices, having with it, and following upon it for the subsistence of existing things, the power that gives reality to all)—and if in all things the Father alike, from whom are all things, and the Son, through whom are all things, work according to the same form of operation, how does this man think to demonstrate the difference in substance regarding the Son and the Spirit by means of the variation of the operations of the Father and the Son, which are separated from one another? On the contrary, as we have said, the opposite is prepared, since no mode of variation of the operations is witnessed in the Father D and the Son, and the fact that there is no distance between the substances of the Son and the Spirit is shown in the identity of the power that gave them subsistence, just as the testimony of the logographer also confirms the argument, being phrased as follows: "The same operations," he says, "producing the identity of the works." So if the identity of the works is achieved in the similarity of the operations—and, according to them, the Son is the work of the Father, and the Holy Spirit is the work of the Son—the similarity of the Father's and the Son's operation will surely point to the identity of the substance that has been produced.
But he also adds that varied works indicate varied operations. Let us then consider this again, by what strength
of logic he has—if it be pleasing—by these works proven his case. Is there not one energy of commanding that has established the whole world and the things therein through will alone? For He Himself spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. Was command not substantiated in all things equally, and did the will alone suffice to bring into being that which was not? How then, out of one energy that is through commanding, when such great diversity is seen, does this man say—as if not seeing the things themselves—that the variation in works indicates a variation in energy? For on the contrary, it should have been that all things in this world were of one kind, if, according to this dogmatist, a difference in works also signifies a difference in energies. Or does he see all these things as equal, while only in the Father and the Son does he perceive inequality? B
Therefore, if not before, let him look now at the difference that exists in the elements, and how each of the things that contribute to the constitution of the universe is directed toward the opposite of its nature. For light things are born to move upward, and heavy things to move downward; and some things are always stationary, while others are perpetually in motion. And among those that move, some have their movement fixed and immutable, like the heavens and the wandering stars, whose course revolves in the opposite direction to the universe; while others are carried about in every direction as chance occurs, like the air, and the sea, and the whole nature of liquid substance. And what is there to say of the opposition of hot to cold, or of the difference of moist to dry, or the distance of that which is above from that which is below? How many differences, furthermore, are to be discerned in animals by nature! And as for the diversities that present themselves in plants, in regard to figure, magnitude, and the differences of fruits and qualities, what human speech could recount them? C
But this wise master asserts that since the works are varied and diverse, the energies also are varied and diverse for us; either because he has not yet learned the form of the divine energy, concerning which holy Scripture testifies that all things have been created by the word of His command, or because he is dull-sighted regarding the difference of created things. And thus, speaking inconsiderately to us, he legislates regarding divine dogmas, perhaps never having heard that everything stated categorically, if it is not universally true and irrefutable regarding the matter in question, should not be asserted. But regarding those things to which any of the instructed would not agree, he dogmatizes with authority, which is no different from those who recount dreams or old wives' tales over their drink. And since there is such incoherence and absurdity in what has been said, it happens that just as those who, imagining that they see in a dream something they have busied themselves with while awake, eagerly think they possess that which does not exist, and are persuaded by their deluded vision through their longing for what is apparent; so also he, having imagined that he has strength in his own aforementioned and dream-like configuration of dogmas, maintains that these things are so. D
Since, therefore, it would not be out of place to set forth his very words, I shall do so.
A “Since these things are so,” he says, “and observe an invariable sequence in the relationship they bear to one another, it is right, I suppose, for those who conduct their examination according to the natural order of things, and who do not desire to muddle and confuse everything, that if a question arises concerning substance, they should derive the arguments for what is to be demonstrated and the solution to the matters in doubt from the operations that are primary and cognate to the substances; but, on the other hand, they should resolve any doubt concerning the operations from the substances.”
I, for my part, consider the very words of his impiety sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity contained in the aforementioned statements. For just as one who describes with words a face that is disfigured and maimed, B by stripping away the coverings, would rather expose the disease to the eyes of those who see it, so that there is no further need of words when the beholders are already looking upon the thing itself; so I think that the ugliness and jagged deformity of this heretical dogma will be sufficiently manifest to those who have the faculty of perception, and will be revealed through the mere reading of it. But since it is necessary that we should, like a finger, direct a demonstrative argument toward the rot in this doctrine, so that its vileness may become still more manifest to many, let us proceed in order and take up the words of Eunomius again. “Since these things are so,” he says. What are you saying, O dreamer? What are these things, and how are they so? That the substance of the Father alone is proper and supreme, while that which follows in order is strictly improper, and the third more improper still? For he sanctions these things as if by a law in these very words. C Is it because, by a certain operation following upon the primary substance, of which the only-begotten Son is the effect and work, He is bound by the measure of the operation that produced Him? Or is it because he conceives of substances as greater and lesser, as if they were included one within another, and the more vast and wide contains the lesser, just as happens with jars and vessels that are placed into one another, so that he perceives substances as greater and lesser, which are enclosed by no limit or definition whatsoever? Or is it because the differences in the things produced also indicate a diversity in the producers, as if it were impossible for different productions to consist of similar operations? D Can it be that someone is possessed by such a deep slumber of the soul’s senses that, upon hearing such dogmas, he would immediately agree with the one asserting that “since these things are so, and observe an invariable sequence in their relationship to one another”? For I think it is a sign of the same derangement to say such things, and to listen without investigation to those who say that things which are separated from one another by the dissimilarity of their nature are steered by a certain sequence and nexus through their relationship to one another. For either it is united through substance, according to our doctrine, and in this way will maintain an invariable sequence in their relationship to one another; or...
they are separated from one another by reason of the diversity of their nature, as he persuades himself. But what relationship can be found in such diverse things that would observe an invariable sequence? Moreover, what is this "innate order of things" by whose standard he bids us institute our inquiry? For if he had looked toward the doctrine of the truth, and had assigned the difference to the most holy Trinity on the basis alone of the order of those things we believe, without confusing or mixing the hypostases through the "innate" order (as he calls it), while preserving communion according to substance and distinction according to hypostasis, he would by no means have been numbered among the adversaries, as he would be thinking and teaching the same things as we do. B But his whole argument, tending elsewhere, makes it difficult to understand what on earth he means by an "innate order." For there is a great difference between those things that happen by design and deliberation, and those that arrive at their end spontaneously by a certain natural necessity. Heat is innate to fire, brightness to a ray of light, flowing to water, downward motion to a stone, not to mention many other things of this kind. But if someone has built a house, or entered an office, or begun a business, or undertaken any of those things that are wont to be assumed through deliberation and calculated preparation, it is not proper to say that an innate order resides in the things brought about by him. For the order is estimated by those who engage in any action according to the will of the one who undertakes the matter, and according to the utility of the thing being accomplished. Since, therefore, the heretic separates the Son from natural kinship with the Father, C and persuades himself of the same regarding the Spirit—as if He were altogether alien from the union with the Father and the Son—and since in his whole argument he labors for this one thing: to demonstrate that the Son is a work of the Father, and again the Spirit is a work of the Son, and since thus all works are achievements of choice or purpose, not of nature, how does he define the work of will to be a certain innate order of things?
I do not know what he means by his speech. Does he mean that God of the universe produced the same nature in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and effected such a disparity in natures that one should be subject to the other? If this is his intention, why did he not explicitly explain what he asserted—namely, for what reason it is necessary to consider these things in God? Is it because the greater power of God shines forth in the imperfection or diminution of the effects? And who will assent to this statement: that a great cause and power appears in the imperfection of the effects, as if He were unable to reach perfection in all things produced by Him? And how does that "Supreme and most proper" D title support Eunomius, if His power is less than he claims? Or will he say that the reason for imperfection is absent in that production, lest the honor and glory of Him who is worshipped above others by reason of His excellence be diminished and degraded? And who is so miserable that he would not even [confess that the divine and blessed...
nature is free from that passion which is reckoned as envy? What then is the fitting reason why these things have been thus ordained by God, the Lord of all, in the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit? “Not from that,” he says. Whence then, if a kindred order does not exist in them, is it that they are seen to harmonize in nature? But perhaps he calls the inferior or lesser status in the essence of the Son and of the Holy Spirit a “kindred order.” But I desire to know the cause of this very thing, through which the Son is rendered lesser in essence, since the essence or substance and the operation exhibit equal and the same marks and properties for the purpose of recognition. But if the account of the essence and that of the operation are not the same, but the meaning of each is different, how can he demonstrate the matters in question through foreign and extraneous things? He acts just as if, when a debate had arisen concerning man, and it were asked whether man is a risible animal or capable of grammar, someone should undertake to resolve the proposed doubt by bringing forward the construction of a house or a ship, which an architect or a shipwright had built, and should then B maintain with this “clever” statement that we recognize substances by their operations; and that the operation of man is the house and the ship. From these things, then, do we conclude, O most foolish one, that man is created with broad nails and the faculty of laughter? But someone will say that this is not what is being asked—whether man has some movement and operation—but what that which operates, or man himself who acts, is according to his nature; a thing which I am far from learning from your response. For if I wished to learn something about wind, you would not have given me a perfect account of the thing in question by pointing to a heap of sand which the wind had gathered, or a stack of straw, or a scattering of dust. For the account of the wind is of another kind, and these are different things shown in place of that which was asked. How then does he demonstrate substances through operations, and establish the account of the being of the existing One from the effects C produced by the One who is?
Next, let us consider this also: what is that work of the Father through which he says the essence of the One who operates is to be apprehended? He will certainly say it is the Son, if he wishes to be consistent. But he, O most wise man, being circumscribed by the operation through which He produced him, shows only that operation. But the matter in question nonetheless remains in obscurity, if it has been rightly asserted by you that some operation is inherent even in those things which follow upon the primary substance. For this operation is coextensive with the work effected by it, as you say, and by the effect, the nature of the operation itself—what it is—is not shown; but only its magnitude is seen in the work. For just as not the entire faculty of the coppersmith was put into motion to fashion a drill, but only as much as was required in proportion to the making of the object, so much did the art work through the hands of the craftsman, although it had the power to produce many and varied other things; so that which exists through the operation represents in itself the measure and mode of that operation. But the question is not what is the magnitude of the operation, but rather the essence itself of the One who has operated D.
A Likewise, if one were to say that the nature of the Only-begotten is comprehended and known through the Holy Spirit (for he calls the Holy Spirit the work of the operation that proceeds from the Son), how can his argument stand? For here, too, the operation is coextensive with the effect, but does not display the nature either of itself or of the One who operates through what has been produced.
B But let us grant even this: let it be conceded that essences are known from their operations. Therefore, the first essence is known through its work, and in like manner the work which proceeds from the second manifests it to us. Tell me, then, O wisest one, what will be the index of the third, when no such work of this third essence is to be observed? For if, as you say, essences are known by their operations, you must acknowledge that the nature of the Holy Spirit is incomprehensible, since there is no such operation at hand, nor has he pointed to one by which we might reason to the nature of the Holy Spirit. Either, then, show what is the essential work of the Holy Spirit by which you say the essence of the Spirit is comprehended, or your whole spider’s web of an argument will be torn asunder by the touch of reason. For if, according to our way of thinking, the essence is known from the immediate operation, and there is no essential operation of the Holy Spirit—just as you say that the Son is the work of the Father, and the Spirit the work of the Son—it follows in every way that the nature of the Spirit is unknown and incomprehensible, since there is no hypostatic operation of his by which he might become known. But if the Holy Spirit eludes comprehension, how can that more sublime nature be comprehended through that which cannot be comprehended? For if the work of the Son, which they say is the Holy Spirit, were unknown, no path would lie open to the knowledge of the Son, as one destitute of every sign of knowledge; and if the nature of the Only-begotten thus lies hidden, how will the supreme and most essentially proper nature be manifested through something latent and concealed, since the hiddenness of the Holy Spirit redounds to the Father through the Son? So that, by these means, it is necessarily proven, even by the testimony of our opponents themselves, that the essence of the Father is unknown. From where, then, does this sharp-sighted man, who sees things that do not exist, himself see the nature of the invisible and incomprehensible, and exhort us to comprehend essences from works, and works from them?
C But let us examine the following argument as well: he says that the uncertainty regarding the operations is to be resolved from the essences. How could anyone lead this man away from his most vain persuasions to human reason? He thinks that the uncertainties arising from the operations can be defined by the knowledge of the essences. How will he bring the matter in doubt to belief through things that are not comprehended by knowledge? For if the essence itself is unknown, what is the point of occupying oneself with the operation, as if we were, by its guidance, to be brought to the knowledge of that which is in doubt? But if the investigation of the operation is necessary so that through it we may be led to the understanding of the essence from which it flows, how, by what reasoning, will the nature which is not yet known to us be able to resolve the uncertainty concerning the operations?
A For proofs are made from things admitted when a subject is in doubt. But when there is an equal uncertainty in both things being inquired into, how does Eunomius claim that things unknown by means of these things are to be apprehended by one another? For he says that when the essence of the Father is being doubted, the matter being inquired into is made manifest by the operation that accompanies Him and by the work fashioned from this. Again, when the essence of the Only-begotten is being inquired into—whatever that may be (which he calls either an operation or an effect of the operation; for he employs either manner of speech)—he says it is easy to resolve the dispute concerning the Only-begotten from the essence of the Creator.
I would gladly learn this from him: does he assert that uncertainty regarding operations can be resolved from the essence of the one working only in the case of the divine nature, or B even in the case of every object to which some productive power belongs, that he also recognizes the nature of the things produced by means of the essence of the one producing? If, then, he maintains such a doctrine only concerning the divine power, let him demonstrate how he resolves the dispute concerning the works of God by means of the nature of the One who worked. For behold, an indubitable work of God is the heaven, the earth, the sea, the whole world. And let the essence of one of these be inquired into by way of hypothesis, and let the heaven be proposed for the contemplation of the argument. Since the essence of the heaven is doubted because of the various opinions of those who philosophize about it in diverse ways according to what appears to each, how does the contemplation of the One who made the heaven take away from us the uncertainty of the thing being inquired into? He is immaterial, invisible, C shapeless, unbegotten, and remaining forever, remaining incapable of corruption, and change, and alteration, and all such things. How, then, will one who has taken such a conception about the Creator be led to the knowledge of the nature of which the heaven consists? How will he draw a conclusion from the invisible to that which is visible, from the incorruptible to that which is subject to corruption, from that which exists unbegottenly to that which has its constitution from time, from that which remains forever to that which possesses ephemeral existence, and from all things that are opposites, will he form an understanding of the thing being inquired into? Let him say, who accurately examines created things; let him say, I ask, D how it is possible that things which are of dissimilar nature should be known by one another? And yet by those very things which he says, if he knew how to persist in his own arguments, he could be led to give assent to the ecclesiastical dogma. For if the nature of the Creator shows forth that which had its existence from Him, as he himself affirms, and if the Son, according to their opinion, is a product of the Father, then truly he who has understood the nature of the Father has also known through it the nature of the Only-begotten; if the nature of the producer indeed signifies that which is produced. Furthermore, by this doctrine of inequality, they exclude the Only-begotten from the works of Providence. Let there be no over-curious searching about His generation, nor let the inequality of the Son be violently refuted from that.
A For the difference of the wills is sufficient to notify the difference of nature; since, when the first essence is acknowledged by all, even by adversaries, to be simple, it is absolutely necessary that will and choice accompany nature; but when a good will is demonstrated through providence, the nature from which the will proceeds is also demonstrated to be good. If, however, the Father alone were to effect good things, and the Son did not will the same (I speak by way of hypothesis for the sake of the adversaries), the difference in nature would be evident, attested by the divergence of the wills. But if the Father provides for all things, and the Son likewise provides (for what He sees the Father doing, the Son also does in like manner), the identity of the wills, of those who desire the very same things, absolutely indicates the community of nature. Why then is the argument concerning providence disparaged, as if it contributed no help to the question proposed? Although many examples taken from this common life assist our argument—I speak of examples known to all. Whoever has seen the light of fire and has experienced its heating power, if he happens upon another light and heat of this kind, will indeed be led to the knowledge of fire, being advanced from the similarity of the things that appeared to him towards the kinship of the nature that produced them; for nothing would act in all respects as fire does, if it were not fire. B Thus, if we recognize in the Father and the Son a providence that is altogether similar and equal, then we gather, both through things that fall within our understanding and through those which surpass it, that in those things where the actions are altogether equal and similar, no diversity of nature is found. For just as the external signs of each thing stand in mutual relation to one another, so must the things that are underlying them. And if the signs are contrary to one another, it follows that the things which are revealed by these marks and symbols are also contrary. But if these stand in a like relation, those will not stand in an unlike one. And as the Lord says by an enigma, the fruits are the signs of the nature of which the trees consist, as if these things were not changed against nature, since neither do good fruits suit evil trees, nor conversely do evil fruits suit good trees—for, He says, the trees are known by their fruits—so also, since there appears no difference at all in the fruit of providence, we see one nature which has brought forth these fruits, C even if the fruits are brought forth from trees that are distinct in number. Therefore, through the things which are known to us (and the rationale of providence is known to us, being regarded in the same way in the Father and the Son), the similarity of nature and the communion of the Only-begotten with the Father is left beyond doubt, being manifested by the identity of the fruits of providence.
But lest this be thought, Eunomius occurs, reiterating that he had abstained from the works of providence due to a certain necessity D
and having been brought back to A the mode of generation, because, he says, the mode of likeness follows the mode of generation. O the necessity of the demonstrations! How violently the abundance of his art in speaking forces us to agree with his assertions! He says that the mode of likeness follows the mode of generation. How technical and circumspect his declaration is! Therefore, if the mode of generation is known, the mode of likeness is simultaneously demonstrated along with it. Since, then, for all animals born through the flesh, or at least for most of them, the mode of generation is the same, and according to them the mode of likeness follows the mode of generation, it follows that all things produced in the same way must stand in the same relation to those similarly generated; for things that are similar to the same thing are also similar to each other. If, therefore, the mode of generation, as the argument of the heresy contends, renders that which is generated similar to itself, and since this mode in the various animals changes not at all, but is found entirely the same in many, it must be that by his universal and undifferentiated statement, because of the similarity of generation, man, dog, camel, mouse, elephant, leopard, and all other things that are naturally born in a similar way, become similar to one another; or does he say that those things produced in a similar way are not similar to each other, but only each to that one from which it has its generation? But if he wished to say this, he ought to have declared that the offspring is similar to the parent, not that a mode of likeness follows a mode of generation. But that which is probable and observed in nature—that the offspring is of the same genus as the parent—he does not accept, for fear lest his own construction be overturned against him. For if he said that the offspring is similar to the parent, all those things that he so laboriously compiled regarding the dissimilarity of the substances would be proven null and void. B Now he says that a mode of likeness follows a mode of generation; but this, to those who have learned to examine the meaning of concepts accurately, will be found to be utterly unintelligible. For what should we understand when we hear "mode of generation"? It is a matter of great difficulty. Does he mean the form of the parent, or its impulse, or its disposition, or place, or time, or the fact that the embryo is perfected through conception, or does he refer to the generative organs themselves? Or does he not mean these, but something else of those things observed in generation? And how could we learn what is being said? For the impropriety and meaninglessness of the term "mode" causes us to hesitate regarding the things signified, as all meanings present themselves to the mind equally, and each one equally has no connection with the matter proposed. C So also that which he says, "mode of likeness," being put forward in this way, we learn is far removed from any understanding if we look toward the examples known from common custom. For it is not the species or the mode of birth that is "made similar" to the offspring; for birth in the case of generation through the flesh is a separation of the body, the perfected...
A which brings forth the animal in the forming of the entrails to the exterior. And the thing born is a human, or a horse, or an ox, or whatever comes into being through generation. How then does the mode of the likeness of the thing born follow the mode of the generation? Let him tell us this himself, or whoever has been taught the art of midwifery by him. For the birth is one thing, and that which comes from the birth is another, and the account of each is different. That the statement is false in the case of those things born through the flesh, no one of sound mind would deny.
If he truly calls "making" and "constructing" a mode of generation, to which the mode of likeness B of the thing born must follow, then his argument is removed from the probability of the case. But let us consider it through examples: Iron is beaten by the smith with blows, so that it may be formed and adapted for one of the needs of life by the one creating it. How then would the schema of the striking, if it so happens, be made similar to the hand of the craftsman, or to the mode of the construction, such as the hammers, and the coals, and the bellows, and the anvil by which the creator reshaped it, no one would be able to say. What has been said of one example applies to all things produced by some action, namely, that in the mode of generation, that which is generated is not at all made similar. For what does the form of a garment share in common with the warp, with the rods, with the comb, or with all that apparatus of the weaver? Or what has a bench in common with the C action which is exercised upon the wood, or any other effect with the form of the artisan? Therefore, I consider that the adversaries themselves admit that what he asserts is foreign to the truth in sensible and corporeal things.
It remains for us to examine what further he brings forward for the construction of his own blasphemy. What then was it that was being considered in the question? Clearly this: that it must be confessed whether the Son is similar or dissimilar to the Father in his own substance. And since, as he says, he could not learn this from the account of providence, he says he had recourse to the mode of generation, so that through its intervention he might know, not whether the begotten is dissimilar to the begetter, but whether he has some mode D of likeness, and because that mode is unknown to many, for that reason he says he has discoursed at length concerning the substance which begat. Has he then forgotten his own assertions, in which he says that substances must be investigated from their works? Since, therefore, it is not yet clear in any way how the generated substance, which he calls the work of the supreme substance, behaves according to nature; by what reasoning does he pass over what is lower—as he himself says—and therefore easier and readier to be known, and cling to the most proper and supreme substance; and while he wishes to be seen in his work as if he were very learned in the divine oracles, he now considers them of little weight, just as if he were ignorant that an access to the knowledge of the Father is not opened except through the Son? For no one, he says, has known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son is willing
A to reveal him. But this man, while he endeavors to diminish and erode the proper estimation which we have of the divinity of the Only-Begotten, asserts with mere words that the Son is less—though, whether he knows it or not, he makes him greater in the comparison of divine knowledge; for, taking the Father's substance as more readily accessible to understanding, he attempts to investigate and infer the nature of the Son through it.
He ascends, therefore, to the nature that begat, and through it he considers the one begotten, saying that the mode of generation is shown by the natural dignity of the begetter. Since this assertion of his has been brought forward so simply and indefinitely, he attempts to spread and divert the reader’s mind to everything alike. For such are the things that are affirmed in a general way, that they carry the thought toward all things and leave nothing outside their compass. B If, therefore, the mode of generation is entirely known from the natural dignity of the begetter, and the differences of those who beget are various and found according to the different concepts of dignity—for a Jew, a Greek, a barbarian, a Scythian, a slave, or a free man begets—what is concluded from this? That as many as are the differences of those who beget according to natural dignities, so many modes of generation will likely be found; so that generation is not fulfilled in the same way for all, but that natures are shifted along with the dignities of the begetters, and it is necessary that for each of those being born, according to the difference of their attributes, some peculiar mode of generation must be innovated. For there are some dignities inherent in all, which are always observed in every individual, differing from one another toward the better or the lesser C—as it may befall everyone: race, rank, religion, country, power, servitude, wealth, poverty, free will, subjection—all things that create some difference in life according to dignities. If, therefore, the mode of generation is shown by the natural dignity of the begetter, as Eunomius says (and there are many differences according to dignities), then according to this innovator, there will surely be many modes of generation, since the difference in dignity legislates for nature the manner of birth.
But if he should not admit that such dignities are natural, as being viewed outside of nature, neither do we argue against this; he will, however, surely agree with us that it is by some natural dignity that human life is separated from that which lacks reason. But the mode of birth has no variation at all in the difference according to natural dignity, since nature brings both rational and irrational beings into life D through generation in the same way. But if, only in the case of that substance which he himself names most proper and supreme, he locates this inherent dignity, let us see what it is he means by saying this. For as for our own reasoning, a certain dignity is inherent...
A to God—the very divinity, wisdom, power, goodness, judgment, justice, fortitude, long-suffering, truth, being creator, ruler, invisible, unbounded, and whatever else of this kind the divinely inspired Scripture has handed down for the glorification of God. All these things we assert to be inherent in the Only-begotten Son properly and by nature, and we confess a difference only in that which is "without beginning." Yet we do not entirely deny that the Son is also without beginning (let no one slanderously attack our discourse, as if we were attempting to show that he who is truly Son is unbegotten; for we define those who say such things as being no less impious than those who introduce inequality). But since the term "beginning" is multivalent and leads the mind toward many things, we say that there is also a sense in which it is fitting for the Son to lack a beginning. For when we signify by this word that which has its subsistence from absolutely no beginning, this we confess to be the unique property of the unbegotten Father alone. But when the inquiry is conducted regarding the other meanings of "beginning"—since there is a beginning to some creation, and time, and order—in these respects we also testify that the Only-begotten is higher than any beginning, in that we believe He through whom all things were made to be exalted above every beginning of creation, and B the sequence and order of time; so that while we deny that He—in the sense of His hypostasis—is without beginning, we acknowledge that in all other respects He possesses the "without beginning." And so we say the Father is both without beginning and unbegotten, but the Son is without beginning in the aforementioned manner, though not also unbegotten.
Looking then to what inherent dignity of the Father does he argue, through it, the mode of generation? He will answer, I suppose, to "unbegottenness." If, therefore, you think that all the other names we have learned for the glorification of the God of all are empty and devoid of meaning, then the enumeration of such terms will be superfluous, consisting in a bare and empty catalog, if indeed none of the other appellations presents to the mind the natural dignity of Him who is above all. But if, on the contrary, a proper conception, consonant with divine estimation, is posited under each of the terms we have reviewed, then C clearly, according to the number of the names, the inherent dignities of God are also contemplated; and through these the likeness of the substances is established, if indeed the dignities inherent to the substances are indicative of the underlying realities. When, moreover, the same dignities and excellences appear in both, the identity of substance in the things that underlie these dignities is most clearly demonstrated. For if the change of a single word is deemed sufficient to demonstrate a different substance, how much more will many thousands of words of the same kind indicate a communion of nature? What, then, is the cause why the rest of the names are overlooked, and generation is investigated by one alone? And why is only unbegottenness assigned to the Father as D an inherent dignity, as if
A by the opposition of the unbegotten and the begotten they might undermine the manner of equality, which itself also, when it is examined at the proper time, just like the aforementioned, will be found to be weak and baseless and amounting to nothing.
That all these fabrications look toward this end, the following text shows, in which he commends and praises himself, B as if he had used that path for the construction of his blasphemy properly and conveniently; and as if he had not immediately laid bare the intention of his discourse, nor, before weaving the fabric of the deceit, brought impiety into ears still untrained. Nor did he, at the very beginning of the disputation, define unbegottenness as a substance, nor prattle much about the diversity of substance: for these are the words of Eunomius: "Or as Basil prescribes, was it necessary to begin from those things which are in question, and without any connection ignorantly to prattle about unbegottenness, or about substance, and about the diversity and identity of substance?" C And after having proceeded through much in the middle with insults, and revilings, and outrages (for so the wise man knows how to contend for his own dogmas), he takes up the discourse again, and ostensibly directing himself toward his adversary, and attributing the cause of what is said to him, he says these things: "Since you yourselves are, above all others, guilty of these offenses, you who have assigned the same substance to the Generator and the Generated. Therefore, the reproach for which you are chided on this account, you have woven, as it were, an inescapable snare for yourselves, with justice, as was fitting, pronouncing sentence against you D from your own tenets. For either, supposing these substances to be separated from one another by the fact that they lack a beginning, and bringing one of them into the order of the Son through generation, you contend that he who is without beginning was born from that which is without beginning, you are caught by your own reproaches. For him whom you imagine to be unbegotten, you say is born from another; or, confessing one and only one substance without beginning, then circumscribing this into Father and Son by generation, you will assert that the unbegotten substance itself was born from itself."
Those things which were written by him before the read portions, as having only bare shamelessness against our teacher and father, and contributing nothing to the proposed purpose, I shall pass over. But in the things which have been said, since he has fiercely sharpened against us these two-edged reproaches, and sets them forth through his formulation of dilemmas, it is necessary that we also not receive in silence the war waged against the dogma, but as we have the power, to fight on behalf of the discourse, and to show that this fearful and double-edged sword, which he has sharpened against the truth, is weaker than the things that appear in shadow-paintings.
By twofold arguments he slanders the communion of substance, and says, that either we posit two unbegotten principles opposed to one another, one of which we name the Father, and the other the Son,
A or that we teach one and the same substance, which they share in part, so that the substance itself becomes both Father and Son, being produced from itself by generation. I wished to set these forth in my own words, not to interpret his meaning otherwise than is proper, but to correct that bombastic and exaggerated style of explanation, and to make Eunomius’s opinion manifest to all, as it has been exposed in clear and lucid language. For he, who derides our ignorance and objects that we have approached the argument without sufficient preparation, so adorns and combs his own discourse, and as he himself says, polishes all his words to a nicety, and decorates his writing with superfluous elegance, that he may immediately sweep away the hearer with the sweetness of his words—such as, among many others, are those we recited before and repeat now: *Wherefore the reprehension by which you complain of this cause, you have woven for yourselves like an inescapable snare, justice, as was meet, bringing sentence against you from your own decrees.*
B See the flowerets of ancient Attica. See how the discourse shines and glitters in the composition of its words. How beautifully and variedly it gleams and blooms! But let everyone judge and feel about these things according to his own opinion. Let us return to examine the meaning, and this by bringing forward the very words of Eunomius. For since you affirm that those substances are separated from one another by the fact that they lack a beginning, and you ascribe one of them to the Son by generation, and contend that He who is without beginning is born from Him who is without beginning. These things suffice. He says that two unbegotten substances are posited by us. How does he say this, who, because of our confession of one essence, accuses us of mixing and confusing everything? C For if we also posited two natures differing from each other in substance, after the example of those who devise inequality, it might perhaps not unreasonably be thought that we were leading the mind to two separated natures and two principles devoid of a beginning. But if we confess one nature in different persons, and believe in the Father and glorify the Son, how do our adversaries falsely imagine that two principles are constituted by such dogmas? Furthermore, out of these two principles he says that one is relegated by us to the order of the Son, and that He who is, from Him who is, has been born. Let him point out the author of this assertion, and we shall be silent; whether he refutes a certain person D who affirmed this, or knows such a thing to be taught and believed generally in the Church. For who is of such an insane and deranged mind that, when he names the Father and the Son, he conceives of two unbegotten principles, and again thinks one is born of the other? What necessity drives our dogma to such thoughts and suspicions? By what arguments, finally, did he make it out that this absurdity must necessarily spring from our doctrine? For if he were to bring forward anything of what is confessed by us, then, through this, he might advance whether by sophistry or else by some demonstrative power such a slander; he would have had—
A perhaps occasion to bring forward such things for the slandering of our doctrine. If, however, there is not—nor will there ever be—such a teaching in the Church, and if neither the author is reproved, nor is the one who heard it produced, nor does any necessity appear which might demonstrate such an absurdity by some logical consequence, I do not see to what end he aims with his shadow-boxing; much like if someone, raving in a frenzy, were to imagine himself engaged in combat with someone, when no one is fighting him, and then, having fiercely delivered an assault upon himself, were to think he is fighting an adversary—so it is with this wise spinner of tales, fashioning notions which we do not recognize and fighting against shadows which he has molded through his own private reasonings.
For let him say, what is the necessity for one who confesses that the Son was born from the Father to be carried away into assumptions of two unbegotten beings? Or rather, who is it that creates two unbegotten things? Is it he who strives to prove that the Son falsely bears the name of Son, or he who affirms that the nature also concurs with the appellation? For he who does not accept the true generation of the Son, yet confesses that He exists, would more justly be thought to call Him unbegotten—the one who is indeed, but does not have his existence through generation. But he who defines the revelatory characteristic and mark of the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten as being that He came to be from the Father by generation, how could he be expected to be carried over into the unbegotten? Although, according to you wise men, as long as it holds that the Son is not generated by the Father, He will also be properly named unbegotten, in one way or another, by those meanings which are signified by the term unbegotten. For since some things are born, and others are constructed, that which does not exist through generation, nothing prevents one from saying that it exists in an unbegotten manner, when only the meaning of generation is considered. B Yet this is the very goal at which your discourse concerning the Lord aims, as it defines Him to be a creature. Therefore, according to you, O wisest ones, the Only-Begotten will be named unbegotten by such a syllogism, not by our doctrine; and Justice, or Dike (for so you call it), is found by you to pass judgment against us out of your own opinions.
For it is now an opportune time to escape from the filth of the discourse there and spit upon the execrable doctrine; for the other part of the things brought forward by him in the dilemma is held by a similar C insanity. For he says, "Either you confess one and the only essence without beginning, and then, by generation, you circumscribe this into Father and Son, and you will say that the unbegotten essence itself was born from itself." What is this again, this new monstrosity of speech? How is someone born from himself, becoming his own Father, and in turn becoming his own Son? What is this nausea? What madness? To turn the roof upside down to the ground, and to have the floor over one’s head? As those who are heavy-headed from drunkenness suppose, shouting and insisting that the earth is not firm beneath them, and that the walls are fleeing, and while in the D turn of the circle, all things are going around, and what is seen has no stability. Perhaps, therefore...
agi, nor are those things that appear to be stabilized by any quiet. A Perhaps it was agitated by such a storm that this declaimer wrote what he wrote, a man who is worthy of pity rather than detestation. For who is so untaught in divine dogmas, who so alienated from the doctrine of the Church, as to admit into his soul such an estimation adverse to the faith? Nay, rather, it ought perhaps to be said that no one can be found in whom even a light suspicion of such absurdity arises: for who, in human nature or in any other thing known to us by the ministry of the senses, when he hears of the communion of nature, believes that all those things which are contained within the ambit of a substance are without a beginning, or asserts that anything is born from itself, and at the same time generates itself and is generated by itself?
B The first man, and he who was born from him (Abel), attained their being in diverse ways—the one from the coupling of parents, the other from the formation of the earth—and yet they are considered to be two, and in the reason and notion of substance they are not separated from one another, nor do we call them two substances without a beginning produced in opposition to each other, nor do we say that he who is is generated by him who is, nor do we hold one for two, as this teller of portents does, that we should esteem one and the same to be both his own father and his own son: for they are both men, and both this one and that; and the reason of substance is common to both. Each is mortal, each is equally gifted with reason, each is likewise capable of mind and knowledge. C If, therefore, the reason of human nature in Adam and Abel does not vary on account of the different mode of generation—since neither the order nor the mode of existence brings any mutation to the nature—but rather all things are found to be the same, by the common suffrage and assent of all who are sober; and no one who is not in dire need of hellebore would gainsay it: what necessity compels these men to construct this prodigious fabrication regarding the divine nature? When we hear "Father" and "Son" by the voice of truth, we are taught the unity of nature in the two subject persons, both from the terms which are naturally signified by their mutual relationship to one another, and from the testimony of the Lord himself. For he who said, "I and the Father are one" (John x, 30), what else does he indicate, except that by the mention of the Father he shows himself not to be without a beginning, and that he has a nature common with the same, by reason of the union with the Father? D So that I may judge that, by the aforementioned words of Christ, sound doctrine is preserved in its purity, avoiding error at either extreme, so that neither the error of Sabellius, taking away the distinction and property of the persons, finds a place, since the Only-Begotten openly distinguishes himself from the Father when he says, "I and the Father are one"; nor does the perfidy of Arius, introducing an alien and foreign nature, deserve approval, since the unity of either party admits no division whatsoever in nature. For there is nothing else signified in this utterance by the unity of Father and Son, except according to the substance itself; for as for the rest of the goods that are contemplated as belonging to the nature, even if one were to say they are proposed to all, and to things that have come to be through creation, he would not be wrong. For instance, "merciful" and
A the Prophet calls the Lord. The Lord wills that these things should again become ours and be named for us: "For be merciful," and "Blessed are the merciful," and all such things. Does it follow, then, that if someone, through attention and care, having conformed himself to the divine will, has become good or compassionate and merciful, or meek and humble of heart, as many of the saints are testified to have been, having attained these virtues, that by reason of this they are one with God, or are joined to Him through any of these gifts? It is not so. For what is not one in all respects cannot be one with another that is distinct by nature. For this reason, man becomes one with man when, through willing, as the Lord said, they are perfected into one, since the natural connection takes to itself the unity according to choice. And the Father and the Son are one, the communion according to nature and that according to choice concurring into the one. But if He were conjoined by will alone, while being divided B according to nature, how would He testify to Himself the unity with the Father, being cut off in that which is most essential?
Having heard, therefore, that "I and the Father are one," and having been instructed by the utterance both that the Lord is from a cause and that the Son is unchangeable according to nature with the Father, we do not conflate the understanding concerning them into a single hypostasis, but rather, while keeping the property of the hypostases divided, we do not divide the unity of the essence along with the persons, lest someone should constitute two things of a different kind as principles, and so open a window to the sect of the Manichaeans; for the created and the uncreated are diametrically opposed to one another according to their significance. If, therefore, two were posited as principles, the Manichaeism would subtly and silently creep into the Church of God. I say these things, examining the discourse more curiously out of zeal against the adversaries. And perhaps no one would easily gainsay that our contemplation does not lack plausibility: for since the created thing is powerful in strength, it will struggle against the uncreated with equal forces, as being diverse in nature, and as that which does not agree with it in nature, and as long as strength is supplied to each of them, these two will fall into an irreconcilable war. For it must necessarily be confessed that the will is consonant and conformable to the nature; and if they should not agree in nature, they differ also in their wills; and since there is sufficient power and faculty in each of these, neither will hesitate in the fulfillment of its own will; and if each is as able as it wills, the rule will become a contested matter for both, since the needlessness of power proceeds to the opposite. And thus the dogma of the Manichaeans will creep in, two things contrary to each other appearing in the doctrine of the principle, sliced apart by the changing of nature and of choice toward the opposite; and it becomes for them the D assertion of inequality and diminution.
A But perhaps many will complain that the structure of this absurdity is too violently gathered and deduced from this, and they will wish that these things had not been put into writing at all. Be it so; neither do we gainsay it; for it was not by our own impulse, but because of our adversaries, that we were driven to enter upon this digression. And if it is not proper to say these things, it was much more fitting that the adversaries should have kept silent, who by such discourse of theirs provide the occasion for a refutation of this kind. For he who refutes the wicked cannot be restrained in any other way than by the removal of the material for refutation. However, I would willingly persuade those who are so affected to place themselves a little outside the hazard of contention, and not to struggle too ardently for their own private persuasions, by which they are already preoccupied; nor to scrape together supports from everywhere, studying solely to obtain the better part over their adversaries; but rather, as if the race were for their very soul, to set their sights only on what is expedient and grant the victory to the truth. If, therefore, anyone would cease from the itch of disputing, and would look more closely at the discourse of Eunomius itself, and weigh it more accurately, he will easily detect the absurdity shining forth from this doctrine.
C Let us suppose, indeed, that innascibility is substance, as the adversaries wish; and again, in turn, that generation also must be numbered among substances. Therefore, if anyone would accurately weigh and examine the things that have been said, he will understand that the Manichaean dogma is renewed by them in this way; inasmuch as the Manichaeans teach that evil is opposed to good, light to darkness, and all things of this kind are mutually opposed by the very contrariety of their nature. And he who does not cursorily skip over the discourse will easily agree, I think, that these things are truly said by me. Let us institute the inquiry in this way: Each of the subjects possesses its own related and inherent signs and marks by which the properties of the underlying nature are recognized, whether you direct your mind and thought to animals or to other things. For wood and animal are not distinguished by the same marks and signs; nor does a nature lacking in reason share in those signs and indications that belong to man. Nor, again, do the same marks reveal life and death; but in all things, simply, as I have said, the distinction of the subjects is unmixed and incommunicable, and is in no way confused through a participation of signs and marks. D According to this rule, therefore, let the assertion of the adversaries be weighed. They say that innascibility is a substance; they refer generation also to substance. But just as the indications of man and of stone are different (for you would not offer the same definition if you were to undertake to describe the animate and the inanimate), so let them not begrudge granting that the innascible becomes known by certain signs and marks, and that which is begotten by others.
A Let us then consider the properties of the innascible God, which we have piously learned from Holy Scripture both to speak and to think concerning Him. What, then, are these? I believe no Christian is ignorant that these signs are considered to be: that He is good, that He is kind, that He is holy, just and pious, invisible and immortal, incapable of corruption, change, and alteration, powerful, wise, a benefactor, Lord, judge, and all things of this kind. For what need is there for one who lingers over things that are plain and fully explored to multiply words? B If, therefore, we perceive these things to exist in the innascible nature, and that which is begotten [is understood as] being opposed by conception to that which is not begotten; it is strictly necessary that those who define innascibility and generation as being the substance, according to the principle of the opposition of the begotten to the innascible, must also acknowledge that the signs characteristic of the begotten substance are opposed to those seen in the innascible nature. For if they claim they are the same, the distinction in the nature of the underlying subjects will no longer be established through the identity of the features observed. For of those things which differ, their distinguishing marks must also necessarily be thought of as different; while those things which, according to the principle of substance, have the same status, are obviously characterized by the same signs. If, therefore, they attribute the same signs to the Only-begotten, they imagine, as has been said, no difference in the underlying reality. But if they persist in their blasphemous words, and by the difference between the begotten and the innascible construct a difference of nature, it is easy to perceive what follows by logical necessity: namely, that since the natures of those things signified by these names are supposed to be opposed to one another in accordance with the opposition of the names, it is strictly necessary that the features observed in each also differ into their opposites. Thus, those things said of the Father must be adjusted into their opposites for the Only-begotten—opposite, I mean, to divinity, holiness, goodness, incorruption, eternity, and whatever else represents for us, through pious thoughts, the God of the universe; so that everything which is discordant, and which is differentiated from each of the concepts understood as superior, must be reckoned as proper to the begotten substance.
C For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to dwell a little longer on this point. Just as the hot and the cold, being by nature opposites (let us suppose for the sake of the argument fire and ice; the one is that which the other is not, and the things proper to each of these differ completely from one another; for the property of ice is to cool, and of fire to heat), so if, corresponding to the opposition in the names of the innascible and the begotten, the nature signified by the names also stands in opposition to its contrary, it is not possible that the powers of those which are by nature opposites should be similar to one another; just as it is impossible for coldness to arise in fire, or heat in ice. If, therefore, goodness is conceived to be in the innascible substance, but it is separated, as they say, by the principle of nature from the begotten—since the innasci- D
innascible is distinguished from the principle proper to the begotten—then if the good is in the former, that which is opposed to the good must A be conceived as being in the latter. And in this way, through these wise dogmatists, Manes will come to life again, setting the nature of evil in opposition to the good, and dogmatizing that which is contrary in their powers by the difference of their substances.
If, however, we must speak with boldness, concealing nothing, Manes might deservedly be considered more excusable than these men—he being the one said to be the first to have dared to forge the dogmas of the Manichaeans and to have named the heresy after himself. I say this as one might choose the more benevolent and gentle from among a viper and an asp, since there is a certain distinction even among brute animals. Do not the dogmas, when brought to the test, show those others (the Manichaeans) to be more tolerable than these men (the Eunomians)? For he (Manes) thought he was acting as an advocate for the author and principle of good, as if no cause of evils took its origin from Him. B And for this reason he attributed the cause of all things numbered among evils to another distinct principle, as if pleading the cause of the God of all, that it was not holy to accuse the fountain of good for matters committed beyond reason; for he did not understand, due to the narrowness of his mind, that it was possible for God not to be considered the author of evils, nor for any other cause without beginning to be introduced alongside God. Concerning this, the discourse is long, and not for the present time. The reason why we have made mention of them in this place is this: because Manes thought that the principle of evil ought in every way to be removed from the God of all. But these men (the Eunomians) forge a far graver and more absurd blasphemy against the Son than they do. For although they determine the nature of evils, as do those others, by opposition in substance, yet in that they declare the God of all to be the maker of such a fiction, from whom they say the generated substance possesses a nature alien to the nature of its creator, in this they far exceed the Manichaeans in impiety. C For not only do they grant a hypostasis to that which naturally opposes the good, but they also make the good God the progenitor of another God who is altogether different in nature, all but openly shouting in their dogma that there is something contrary to the nature of the good, which has received its hypostasis from the good itself. For since the substance of the Father is believed to be good, and the substance of the Son—because it does not, according to the opinion of the heretics, have the same relation to the Father according to the definition of nature—is found to be in the order of opposites by necessary consequence, what is constructed by these things? This, of course: that there exists something opposed to the good, and that that which is contrary to nature stands by the good itself. This, I say, is more horrifying than the extravagance of the Manichaeans. D But if they deny the blasphemy with words, which the sequence of the dogma clearly demonstrates, and say that the Only-Begotten has inherited the goods of the Father—not being truly a Son, according to the opinion of the impious, but through
A having received its subsistence from creation. Let us examine this again, to see if it is possible for such a supposition to stand according to sound reason. For if it were granted, as they wish, that he is Lord of the universe by inheritance, not being truly a Son but having been created and made to rule over those of the same nature, how will the rest of creation accept this, and not rise in rebellion, having been thrust into servitude to one of its own kind, if it is in no way inferior by nature—for it is created just as he is—only to be condemned to serve and be subject to one who is of the same genus and kindred? For such a course bears the appearance of tyranny, not to defer rule to one who is by nature more excellent, but, while the equality of honor and excellence remains, to distribute the creation into that which serves and that which rules, B so that in it there is both dominion and subject status, just as if this dignity had accrued by lot to one who happened to be preferred over the rest after the casting of lots. For man did not obtain rule over the irrational creatures as one who was of equal honor with the nature subject to him; but, excelling by reason, he rules over the others, having been set in order before them because his nature is distinguished toward the better. Human powers, for this reason, undergo sudden changes, because one who is of the same dignity and excellence by nature does not endure that another, who does not appear more honorable, should be preferred to him; but there is in all a natural desire to be equal to those who prevail, when they are of the same kind.
How will it be true that all things were made C through him, if it is also true that the Son himself is one of the things that were made? For he will either have made himself, so that the written word "All things were made through him" may not be false; and thus the absurdity which they devised against our dogma will prevail against them—that is, to say that he was made by himself. Or, if this is irrational and lacks any natural basis, then that which they assert—that the entire creation was made through him—will surely be shown to be untenable. For the exception of one makes the universal statement about all things false. D Therefore, from the premise that the Only-Begotten is a creature, reason will surely not escape one of two wicked and absurd conclusions: either that he is not the cause of all things that were made, if he is excepted from the number of all those things which they maintain he is one of; or that he is proven to be his own maker, if he who proclaimed that nothing of what has been made was made without him speaks the truth. Such, then, are the results from them.
If, however, one, attending to sound doctrine, should believe that the Son is from the divine and unblemished nature, all things will appear as harmonies in accordance with the doctrine of piety: that the Lord is the maker of all things; that he rules over existing things, not by allotment or by some tyrannical power set over those of the same nature, but by the excellence of his nature, having dominion over all. And further, in addition to these, that the monarchy is not divided into different powers by the diversity of nature,
A but that one should believe there is one divinity, one principle, and one authority over all things; since the divinity is contemplated in the harmony of those that are similar, and [the mind] is led through that which is similar to that which is similar, as the principle of all things, which is the Lord, shines into our souls through the Holy Spirit. For it is impossible, truly, to be contemplated in the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says, but through the Lord, who is the principle of all things, the one who is beyond every principle is found by us, who is the God over all; for it is not possible otherwise for the archetypal good to be known, unless it appears in the image of the invisible. Just as, in a reciprocal course, after we have reached the head of the knowledge of God—I mean the God over all—by running through the things that are near and familiar to the mind, we return from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit. For having settled on the perception of the unbegotten light, we have again conceived of the light that is from it, according to what is nearest, like some ray co-existing with the sun, the cause of whose being is from the sun, but whose existence is together with the sun, not added at a later time, but appearing forth from it at the very moment the sun is seen. Or rather—for it is not necessary, while serving the image, to give the calumniators an opportunity to contradict by a less suitable application of the example—we shall not conceptualize a ray from the sun, but from the unbegotten sun another sun, existing together B with the first by generation, equal to the first in all things—in beauty, power, splendor, magnitude, brilliance, and briefly, in all other things that are viewed in the sun. And again, another light of this kind, in the same manner, not separated from the begotten light by any interval of time, but shining forth through it, while receiving the principle of its hypostasis from the primal light; which is itself a light, shining according to the likeness of the light previously conceived, and illuminating, and performing all other functions of light. For there is no difference or variation between light and light in this respect, when it appears to be lacking or deficient in no way in the grace of illumination, but is raised to the highest point in all perfection, is contemplated with the Father and the Son, is numbered with the Father and the Son, and by itself grants access to the contemplated light, which is in the Father and the Son, to all those capable of participating in it. But so much for these things.
C Since, however, he (Eunomius) is profuse and, as it were, overflowing with insults, and for the beginning of every argument lays down contumely, and for every demonstration of the matter in controversy brings forward reproaches and calumnies, come, let us examine in a few words what detractions he has vomited forth against our teacher (Basil) and his dissertation regarding the term "unbegotten." He recited the very words of our master, which stand as follows: "As for me, even the appellation of 'unbegotten,' or 'innascible,' although it may seem in the highest degree to accord with our thoughts, yet since I do not find it anywhere in Scripture, and it is the first element D of his blasphemy"
I would have rightly judged it to be passed over in silence; A especially since the voice of the Father can convey that which is innascible, and at the same time, because of the relation of the Son conjoined to Him, it leads the mind toward that thought. For He who is truly Father, and solely Father, is not from anyone else; but that which is from no one else is the same as that which is innascible. B Let us hear, then, how he demonstrates that these things were wrongly spoken. He adds to his own arguments not less impudent impropriety than rashness, moved by the instability of his mind and the weakness of his thoughts. See how considerately he counters his adversary! How artfully, through his logical skill, he destroys the power of the things that were said, and introduces a judgment more in agreement with piety. He is unstable, he says, in discourse, no less precipitate and rash than he is malicious, unstable in mind, moved by the weakness of his own thoughts. Whence, and for what cause moved, does he who is so sound-minded and so healthy and sincere in his thinking utter such things? C What is it that he most of all finds fault with in the things said? Is it because he [Basil] has accepted the sense which is placed under the term 'innascible,' but judges the word itself—as having been poorly received by the depraved ones—to be passed over in silence? What then? Is the security and sincerity of the faith imperiled in words and in utterance? Or is there no account to be taken of accuracy where it comes from the sense? Does the reason of truth not study, primarily and above all, that the heart be cleansed of perverse opinions, and that it use words for the manifestation of the notions of the soul, by which the secrets of the mind may be laid open, with all anxious concern about the sound of the word set aside? D For it is not the case that this or that, or being uttered in this or that way, is the cause of our thoughts, but the hidden sense of the mind provides the cause for these or those words: for "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks." And speech is the interpreter of those things which we conceive in our mind; we do not, conversely, gather the sense from those things which are said, although both may occur, and it is the sign of a man complete and perfect to be able both to understand righty and to explain rightly; and if the one should be lacking, little loss threatens this simple and unlearned person, since his knowledge is ordered and composed toward that which is good. "This people," he says, "honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me." What did he mean to signify by this saying? That with God the Judge, who hears the groans that are not truly expressed, the soul's affection toward the truth is more acceptable than the ornament and eloquence of words. For these things can even be used for the contrary, according to the ability of the one who speaks, with the tongue easily subservient to what seems right. But the affection of the soul, whatever it may be, appears just so to Him who looks upon hidden things. Why, therefore, is he rash, and no less wicked, who receives and approves what is piously signified by the word innascible or unbegotten, but that which, for the impious, by the impious...
A source of ruin for their doctrines, he bids us abstain from? Yet he bids us retain in our minds the concept itself—that God is innascible—using other terms. For this, he deserves none of these invectives. For were we not taught by Truth itself to act in this way, never to cling even to things that are very precious if any of them lead to evil, since He orders us in like manner to cut off the right eye, the foot, and the hand, if any of these should cause us to stumble? What else does He suggest we do through this enigma, if not this: that even things which have the appearance of good, if through the thoughtlessness of those who use them they lead a man toward evil, are to be rejected, because it is more beneficial to be saved by amputating those things which provide an occasion for sin, than to perish by being attached to them and caught in them?
What, then, of Paul, the imitator of Christ? He, too, teaches the same things in the depths of his wisdom. For he who said that all things are good and that nothing is to be rejected which is received with thanksgiving, yet sometimes, for the sake of the conscience of the weak, rejects certain things which he had [previously] received and approved, and orders them to be rejected. For if, he says, my brother is grieved by food, I will never eat meat C for all eternity. The imitator of Paul (Basil) does the same: perceiving that the error of those who invent inequality in God is bolstered by the evil use the heretics make of the word "innascible," he advises that the true and pious thought concerning the Innascible be firmly retained in the soul, but that the word itself, as providing an occasion for destruction to those who are perishing, not be insisted upon too much. For the appellation of "Father," by its own meaning, is more than sufficient to bring the significance of the "innascible" to our contemplation. For when we hear "Father," we immediately conceive of Him who is the principle and cause of existence for all things; for if He had some other substance superior to Himself, He would not be truly called "Father," because the proper appellation of Father would belong to that superior substance. But if He is Himself the principle and cause of all, and all things are from Him, as the Apostle testifies, clearly nothing can be conceived as prior to His existence—and this is what it means to be believed to be without origin and without principle.
But he who desires to be considered worthy of belief more than Truth itself does not agree that these things are correct; rather, he struggles against them, speaks against them, and mocks our argument. But if you wish, let us examine those inescapable syllogisms and the various subtle webs and contortions of sophisms by which he thinks our argument is refuted. But I fear that their thinness and futility...
should they in any way cast suspicion even upon the truth itself, will only bring calumny upon it. For to join in hand-to-hand combat with children who provoke one to a fray brings more blame to men for engaging in such contests than it brings praise for seeming to have won. But let these things be said; for the things that he has uttered abusively—with that customary elegance of voice of his—we shall transmit to silence and oblivion, as being worthy to be brought forth by him, but set before us for the exercise of our patience. For I do not think it becoming for us to sprinkle the ridiculous things he has vomited forth into our own serious disputations, and so cause the defense of the truth to dissolve into disorderly and vulgar laughter. For it is not even possible to remain unsmiling upon hearing these things, if we hear someone speaking them from that high and magnificent eloquence. For where the addition of words results in an increase of blasphemy, it is in some respects easier to remain silent than to speak. But let these things be laughed at by those who know what things are to be approved and which are, in fact, to be laughed at. We, however, shall B examine the keenness C of the syllogisms by which he disparages our discourse.
For if the Father, he says, and the Unbegotten are the same in power, and names that have the same power necessarily signify the same thing; and if the Unbegotten, according to them, signifies that God is from no principle: then, by necessity, the name of Father also signifies that God is from no principle, and not that He has begotten the Son. By the name of Father, it is no longer signified, he says, if the same appellation also sets forth to us through itself the fact that the Father is without beginning. For if the one were destructive of the other, according to the nature of opposites, the positing of the one would necessarily result in the destruction of the other. But if nothing at all prevents the same one from being both Father and Unbegotten—if, through the name of Father, we understand, according to some conception, the Unbegotten as well—what necessity brings it about that the relationship toward the Son is no longer known through the name of Father? For neither do other names, which have a relationship toward one another, coincide in every conception; for we call the Emperor both "sovereign" and "without a master," and the very same one "ruler of his subjects." It is not false to say of him that the name of Emperor signifies that he is without a master; nor do we consider it necessary that, if by this very word it is signified that he is his own master and subject to no one’s rule, the power and dominion over his subjects is no longer to be signified by the word "Emperor." For the name of Emperor stands in the middle between both conceptions, and it hints at both that which is without a master D and that which is authoritative over those who are subject.
And here, then, if there is some other Father pre-conceived before the Father of the Lord, let them show it, those who insolently exalt themselves under the title of "hidden wisdom"; and then we shall agree that the conception of the Unbegotten cannot be represented by the appellation of Father. But if the first Father has no cause of his own subsistence lying above him; and if—
while the hypostasis of the Only-begotten is understood to be absolutely connected with the Father, why do they attempt to terrify us with these artificial entanglements of sophisms, desiring to persuade or rather to deceive us, A that if we concede that the unbegotten nature of the God of all is signified by the title of Father, the conception of the Father’s relation to the Son would be abolished?
But having spurned this childish and superficial objection of theirs, which they bring forward as if it were full of absurdity, we boldly profess this: that the name of Father signifies the same thing as the Unbegotten, and that the Unbegotten declares the Father to be from no principle; and that the Father, by means of that relation, brings with him into the minds of the hearers the conception of the Only-begotten. And indeed, because our master B (Basil) had expressly set this forth in his own exposition, this noble and invincible warrior furtively expunged it, by the removal of those things which were truly said, paving for himself an easier way toward refutation. For the words of our doctor have it verbatim: "I, for my part, even the appellation of the Unbegotten or the Ingenerate, although it may greatly accord with our thoughts, yet since I do not find it in any place in Scripture, and since it is the first element of their blasphemy, I would rightly judge it worthy of being passed over in silence, especially when the voice of Father can achieve that which the Unbegotten does, and in addition to this, because of the relation, brings with it the conception of the Son conjoined to itself." But this egregious champion of the truth, that which had been added for the sake of caution (I mean C the phrase, "especially when the voice of Father can achieve that which the Unbegotten does, and in addition to this, because of the relation, brings with it the conception or understanding of the Son conjoined to itself"), removed it with his inherent boldness; and having considered the nature of what was said, he contends with the rest, and having mutilated the sequence of the body, and having made it, as he thought, more rickety for himself and more susceptible to refutation, he deludes his followers with a cold and feeble sophism, wishing to demonstrate that that which has communion in some respect also has communion—in the whole of what is signified—thus winning over the light ears of his own followers. For when we had said that the voice D of Father has also the signification of the Unbegotten according to some respect, he, instituting a perfect participation of the signified from the customary usage of names, accuses our assertion, forsooth, of absurdity, as if the relationship of the Father to the Son were no longer indicated by this appellation, if the notion of the Unbegotten should present itself to us through it. Just as if someone, having learned two things about bread—that it consists of grain, and that it provides nourishment to the one who eats it—were to fight against one who says this, using the same manner of sophisms against him, that the reason for its composition of grain is one thing, and the reason for its being nourishment is another. If, therefore, we grant that the bread is made of grain, it can no longer be called nourishment. Such is the sense of the Eunomian syllogism. For he says: If the Unbegotten or the Ingenerate is signified by the vocabulary of Father, it can no longer by the same vocabulary signify the begetting of the Son or the
A truth in this utterance. But perhaps it may not be untimely for that grave period of the clause to be retorted by us upon the author himself. For such things are entirely fitting for such persons, since he would have had more assistance in establishing the reputation of a sober man if he had consulted his own interests by remaining in complete silence. For to whom the addition of words contributes to the addition of blasphemy, or rather of extreme madness, to him it is easier, not merely in part but in every way, to keep silent than to speak.
Perhaps someone might be more led to the truth of what is said by examples taken from himself. And so, leaving aside the tangled web of his sophisms, let us discuss the subject at hand more simply and in a more common way. B Your father, O Eunomius, was absolutely a man; yet he was also the cause of your own existence. Did you, then, make use of this clever invention of yours with regard to him, so that your father, if he should accept the definition of his nature, could no longer, by reason of being a man, signify the relationship to you? For it is absolutely necessary that one of two things be true: either he is a man, or he is the father of Eunomius. And yet it is not permitted to you not to apply the names of your own kin according to their proper meaning. But even if you were to charge someone with being insulting who, out of mockery C toward you, plays with the transposition of names, do you not shudder? And do you laugh without danger while mocking the dogmas of the mysteries? For just as your father shows his kinship to you, and his being a man is hindered by nothing because of this, and no sober person, if ordered to name the one who begat you, would instead provide the definition of "man," or, if asked about his genus and having confessed that he is a man, would say that he is prevented by this confession from also being your father—so too in the case of the God of the universe: the pious man will not deny that His being ingenerate is signified by the title of Father, and he gladly confesses that His kinship toward the Son is declared by the other signified meaning. D But the mocker of the truth no longer says that the title of Father signifies that He has begotten the Son, if we are taught by the same utterance that He is also the Ingenerate.
Furthermore, let us also add this to our refutation of the absurdity of the aforementioned claims, which I say no one, not even those who are infants and are being introduced to the art of nomenclature by a grammarian and a tutor, is ignorant of. For who does not know that some names are absolute and without relation, while others are named according to a certain relation? And of these very ones, there are again some which, according to the will of those using them, incline toward either side—those which, when spoken by themselves, show a simple power, but when transposed, often become relative. And that I may not make the speech longer by using examples far from the subjects proposed, what I mean will be made clear from the dogmas themselves. God is called both Father and King, and
he is affected by countless other names in Holy Scripture. A From these names, then, some may be used absolutely and without any reference to another, standing alone and by themselves, such as incorruptible, eternal, immortal, and whatever else is of this class; for these, even if no other idea is implied, inscribe in themselves a complete conception about God. But other names signify only B that which is useful in relation to something, such as helper, defender, and protector, and all that are found to be of this meaning; if you take away from them the one in need of help, the power indicated by the name becomes idle. But there are some names, as has been said before, that are used both absolutely and in relation to others, such as God, and good, and such like. For the idea of these does not always remain in the absolute. For the universal God often becomes the own God of the one who calls upon Him, as it is C possible to hear from the saints, who appropriate the nature that is subject to no lordship: "Holy Lord God." Up to this point, it is unrelated; but the one who adds "our" no longer allows the name to be thought of absolutely, having appropriated the meaning by the relation to himself. Again, the Spirit cries out: "Abba, Father" — this is a voice released from any particular relation. But we have also been commanded to call the Father in the heavens "our Father"; this, again, is the relative meaning. Just D as, therefore, one who makes the universal God his own has not in the least dimmed His worthiness over all things; so there is no obstacle to signifying the Father, and Him who is from Him, the firstborn of all creation, simultaneously with the generation of the Son, through the title of Father, and at the same time to explain through the same term that He is not from any superior cause. For he who says "the first Father" has indicated the One who is thought of prior to all things. He is transcendent, He is the One who is, having nothing that he could look upon before Himself, nor any limit into which He might terminate after Himself; but being at all times and from all sides equally, and advancing through the infinity of life past the limit of an end and the conception of a beginning, He also has eternity as something implied in every title, in that He transcends all by His infinity.
Yet the crowd A in those contemplations of things that are incomprehensible does not accept this common doctrine—Eunomius—nor does he set down that the meaning in the title of Father is twofold: one, being that all things are from Him, and before all things the only-begotten Son, through whom all things are; and another, that He has no cause superior to Himself. But even if he spurns the discourse, we, having made B nothing of his mocking laughter, confidently answer that which we have already said: namely, that "Father" and "unbegotten" are the same thing, and that [the title] signifies both that He has begotten the Son and that He is from nothing.
He also contends against what has been said, and says, and furthermore, the account turns back again to the opposite: "For if, because He has begotten the Son, God is Father, and the same meaning is Father and unbegotten, because of having generated..."
the Son, God is unbegotten." Let us therefore consider also the argument of his reversal, how, by resolving the composition of the former sophism into the opposite, he again enmeshes us A through this into inescapable necessities. The former syllogism held this absurdity: "If 'Father' signifies that God is from nothing, it will of necessity no longer indicate that He has begotten the Son." This one, through the reversal towards the opposite, proclaims to us another absurdity against our doctrine. What, then, is the resolution of what was there demonstrated? "If," he says, "because He has begotten the Son, God is Father." This, the former syllogism did not present to us, but the sequence of the syllogism supposedly showed that it was impossible for the term 'Father' to signify that the Father is unbegotten, and at the same time to signify the relation to the Son. But in the former sophism, it was not asserted that God is Father on the grounds B that He begot the Son. What, therefore, this reciprocal conversion, born of dialectical and artificial cleverness, is, I do not yet understand.
Nevertheless, let us examine the meaning of what has been said: "If because He has begotten the Son, God is unbegotten, before He begat Him, He was not unbegotten." Again, a ready and simple response to what has been said is available to the truth: namely, that the name of 'Father' indicates that He has begotten the Son, just as has been demonstrated to us in what was said before, and that the One who begets is not to be understood as being from any cause. For if you look at what is from Him, the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten C is made known through the appellation of 'Father.' If, however, you search for what is prior to Him, the naming of 'Father' shows that the Son was begotten by the Father who is without beginning. But to say that before He begat the Son God was not unbegotten, carries a double accusation for the writer: both of the calumny constructed against us, and of the insult brought against the doctrine itself; for he derides as if it were admitted what was neither said by our master nor by us; and he declares that God at some later time became Father, being something else before, and not Father. For through the things by which he mocks the absurdity of our argument, he makes manifest his own lawlessness concerning that very dogma. D For as if holding it as admitted, that being something else before, He afterwards through progress came to be and was named Father, he says this, that "Before He begat the Son, and therefore was called Father, He was not even unbegotten, if unbegottenness is recognized in the notion of the Father." How much folly this contains, I think there is no need for one to refute; for it sufficiently reveals its own insanity to those who have any sense at all. For if God was something else before becoming Father, what will the leaders of this doctrine say? In what state will they say He is to be considered? What name will they impose upon that condition of life—boy, child, infant, stripling? Or will they say none of these, perhaps blushing at the manifest absurdity, yet will they not deny that He was perfect from the beginning? Then how could He, being perfect, not yet be able to be Father? Or will they not take away his power, but will they say that it is not fitting...
for Him to have been the Father of such a Son from the beginning? Then how, as time went on, did He acquire what was not fitting? But now it is fitting, and worthy of the divine majesty, to become Father of such a Son. Therefore, they make God out to have been devoid of what is good from the beginning; and so long as God did not possess the Son (may God forgive my speech), they must say He lacked wisdom, power, truth, and all those other things which the only-begotten Son both is and is called according to different concepts. But let these things be turned back upon the heads of their authors.
We must now return to where we branched off. If, he says, God is Father because He begat the Son, and the word 'Father' signifies 'unbegotten,' then before He begat Him, He was not unbegotten. If these things were said according to the custom among men, among whom it is impossible for a person to acquire the habit of many pursuits at the same time, without some order and sequence of time, each of the things being studied being taken up B after another—if one had to reason in the same way about the God of all, so that now He possesses unbegottenness, but afterwards acquires power, then incorruption, then wisdom, and as time goes on becomes Father, and then again just, and thereafter eternal, and all the other things that are contemplated regarding Him, acquired in some order and series: perhaps it would not be absurd to think that of the names predicated of God, some are prior to others, and that He was first unbegotten, and afterwards became Father. But who is so abject in mind, and so ignorant of the divine majesty, as to conceive in his mind the Cause of all things, and yet not apprehend all the things that are piously affirmed of God simultaneously and, as it were, in one grasp of mind and thought, but instead think that one thing came to God later, another from the beginning, and another in between, as if by a sequence of order? For it is not possible that anyone who reviews and examines what is piously said of God could stumble upon another thing or concept that would surpass the antiquity of the aforementioned. But every divine name, and every magnificent concept, and every language and opinion fitting for the concepts regarding God, is connected and united to the other; and all of them, continuously and altogether, and knit together with one another, are apprehended as the conclusions regarding God: the fatherhood, the unbegottenness, C the power, the incorruption, the goodness, the authority, and all the other things. For not one of these attributes of God is contemplated as divided and cut off from the others, and separated by some interval of time, as if one were prior to or following another; but whatever name you might find that is congruent with divine magnificence and piety, that name corresponds to the eternity of God. As, therefore, it is never permissible to say that God was ever not good, or powerful, or incorruptible, or immortal, in the same way it is impious not to attribute fatherhood to Him—but D
A to say that it was added later. For He who is truly Father is always Father. And if that “always” be not joined to the confession, but some vain thought, preconceived beforehand, should cut away and mutilate the notion of the Father at its summit, the title “truly Father” will no longer be properly acknowledged, since that concept of the Son, preconceived, would mark off the eternal and continuous nature of the fatherhood. For how is it possible that what is said to be “now” should be understood as having become so at some time after? If, therefore, He was first unbegotten and later became and was named Father, He was not absolutely what He is now named; but God, being what He is now, and always is, becomes neither worse nor better by any addition, nor does He receive one thing from another to become changed, but is always the same unto Himself. If, therefore, He was not Father from the beginning, neither did He become so later. But if it is acknowledged that He is Father—I shall repeat the same argument—it follows that if He is now, He was always; and if He was always, He will be forever. Therefore, the Father is always Father, and the Son is necessarily conceived together with the Father; for it is not possible to affirm the title of the Father without the appellation of the Son being verified, and everything beheld in the Father is also beheld in the Son. For all things that the Father has are the Son’s, and the Father has all things that are the Son’s. The Father said, “The things of the Son,” so that it might not be possible for the slanderer to include in his abusive way all things, and say that the Son was not begotten, in saying that the Son has all the things of the Father, or conversely that the Father is generated, in that all the things of the Son are beheld in the Father. For the Son has all the things of the Father—does that mean He is not Father? And conversely, all the things of the Son are beheld in the Father—does that mean He is not Son? B If, therefore, all the things of the Father are in the Only-Begotten, and He is in the Father, and yet the fatherhood is not severed from the unbegottenness, I do not see what one could conceive separately, by itself, and according to some interval, prior to the notion of the Son, regarding the Father. Therefore, boldly and confidently approaching the arguments opposed to us in this sophism, and not at all retarded by the “bogeyman” of this syllogism—which was devised to frighten children—we affirm that God is holy, and immortal, and Father, and unbegotten, and eternal, and is all these things simultaneously; and if, by hypothesis, you were to remove one of the things that are orthodoxly said of God, all the other things are simultaneously removed with it. For it could not be that if He were not immortal, He could be the rest. And what has been said of one in particular, let it be understood of all universally. Therefore, there is nothing in Him more ancient, nothing more recent, nothing prior or posterior, so that He might thus be older and younger than Himself. For if God is not always all things, but is so according to a certain order and succession—that one thing is, and another becomes—yet no composition has place in Him, but whatever He is, He is wholly; and according to the logic of the heresy, being first unbegotten, He later becomes Fa-
verily, the heretical doctrine holds that he was first ingenitus, and later Father. With no collection of attributes observed in him, nothing follows but that he is, in his whole self, both prior and posterior to his whole self—being prior to himself according to the consideration of being unbegotten A, and posterior to himself according to the notion of the Father. But if, as the Prophet says concerning God, "He is the same," vain is he who asserts that before he begat, he was not ingenitus; because neither of these is found without the other—neither the name of the Father, nor that of the Ingenitus—but these two things are conceived together and conjoined in the minds of those who think rightly of God. For God is Father from eternity, and the Father is eternal, and all other things which are piously spoken of God are stated simultaneously, the temporal sequence and order, as we have said, being void with regard to that nature which precedes all ages.
Let us see also the rest of the dialectical acuteness, which he himself calls ridiculous and pitiable. And indeed, so it is. Truly, those things which he asserts contain a copious subject for laughter, or rather, cause for weeping, on account of the impious error which detains and occupies the soul. For since the "Father," according to a certain meaning, also embraces the notion of the *ingenitus*, as our argument holds, he, having seized upon the proper meaning of "Father," disputes against the *ingenitus* thus: "If the *ingenitus* and the Father are the same, it will be permitted for us, abandoning the term 'Father' and assuming the name 'ingenitus,' to say: The Ingenitus is the Ingenitus of the Son." For just as the Father of the Son is the *ingenitus*, so in turn the Father is the *ingenitus* of the Son. I am moved to admire Eunomius for his skill, whose abundance and variety regarding the knowledge of dogmas I judge to surpass the ability of many. Our teacher B said briefly in a few words that it is possible for unbegottenness to be signified even through the appellation of "Father": this man piles up so many and such great things, that the multitude is no longer in the difference of meanings, but in the circling and repetition of the same words. For just as those who, with eyes covered, run around a mill, with much labor exhausted, remain in the same place: so this man is always turned about the same things, and does not depart from them.
He said once, mocking us, that "Father" does not signify the act of begetting, but that which is from nothing. Soon the same chant is repeated: "If," he says, "Father signifies *ingenitus*, before he begat, he was not *ingenitus*." Then, thirdly, returning to the same things: "It will be permitted," he says, "having taken the *ingenitus*, to say: The Ingenitus is the Ingenitus of the Son"; and immediately he repeats what he had already often vomited forth: "Just as," he says, "the Father is the *ingenitus* of the Son, so in return the Father is the *ingenitus* of the Son." How many times does he relapse into the same vomit? How many times does he repeat the same things? How many times does he belch forth the same? Shall we not also C be troublesome to most people if we wish to discuss and refute, with our own speech, the vanity of the things which he adduces? And perhaps, concerning these things, it would be more fitting to be silent. But lest anyone judge that this happens from a weakness of speech and a poverty of arguments, these answers D
A we give: It is not permitted for you to say that the Father is the Unbegotten of the Son, even if the appellation of Father signifies the One who has begotten, in that He is not from any cause. For just as, according to the example brought forward by us, once the dignity of an emperor is heard we conceive two things from the name—both that he who excels by authority is subject to no one, and that he rules over those under his hand—so also the appellation of Father provides for us a double signification regarding God: the one understood in relation to the Son, and the other that He does not depend on any prior and superior cause. Just as, therefore, it is not possible in the case of an emperor to say that, if the two things mentioned are signified by the same appellation—namely, that he rules over his subjects and that he has no one superior—it is then permissible to address him not as ruler of the people, but as one without a kingdom B over the subjects; nor, by putting such things together, to say that just as he is called king of the people, so he will be named "un-kinged" of the people; in the same way, regarding the word "Father," which both indicates the Son and presents the notion of the Unbegotten, it is not permissible, by shifting the signification contrary to what is right, to ridiculously attach and impose the notion of the Unbegotten upon the relation to the Son, by saying "The Unbegotten of the Son."
But after these things have been said in this way, as if he had touched the truth and exposed the absurdity of his opponents to the eyes of all, he bursts out in these boastful words: "And who ever, of sober and sound mind, has judged that the natural intelligence should be suppressed in silence, and has honored insanity?" No one, O most wise man; and therefore neither does our argument, which said that the appellation of the Unbegotten corresponds to our notions, and that it ought to be held immovable in our hearts; but that in place of the word we have corrupted and distorted, the appellation of Father is able to suffice for generating the same notion. C For remember the words you yourself brought forward, that it did not judge that the natural intelligence should be concealed in silence, nor did it honor what you call insanity, but advised that the appellation of the Unbegotten alone—that is, the utterance placed in syllables—as being ill-received and understood, and at the same time not spoken in the Scriptures, could be kept silent; but it says that the thing signified agrees most of all with our notions.
But these things are from us so far. And this man, who slanders us as Sophists and arms his discourse with truth, and accuses us of our errors, does not blush to decorate his treatment of the articles of faith with sophistries, imitating those who in symposia are accustomed to provoke laughter through elegant witticisms. For behold the dread and elaborate nature of his syllogistic complexity: for I shall repeat the same things again. For if it is the same to say "Unbegotten" or "Father," it will be permitted to us, having left aside the word "Father" and having taken instead the name "Unbegotten," to say: "The Unbegotten is the Unbegotten of the Son." D For just as the Unbegotten is the Father of the Son, so conversely, the Father is the Unbegotten of the Son. This is exactly similar to this, if anyone, with good and sound
A reasoning, were to say that Adam does not differ, whether one calls him the father of all men, or the first man fashioned by God — since the same thing is signified by both terms. Then, if one of his dialectical followers, leaping upon these statements, were to imitate such a tangle of reasoning by saying that, if it is the same thing to say "first man fashioned by God" or "father of those who came after," it will be permitted to abandon the word "Father" and, taking up "first-fashioned," to say: "Adam is not the father of Abel, but the first-fashioned; just as the first-fashioned is the father of the son, so conversely, the father is the first-fashioned of the son." If such things were said in a tavern, what applause and laughter would be drawn from the carousers, as they murmur and cheer at B the cleverness of the invention! Our "clever theologian" assails us with such arguments, needing a schoolmaster, or rather a staff, so that he might learn that not all things that are predicated of someone point to one absolutely identical meaning, just as was demonstrated by the example brought forward concerning Abel and Adam. For it is true that Adam is the same, both father of Abel and the work of God. Therefore, since he himself is both, it is not the case that both are also true of Abel. So it is in God: the appellation of Father expresses what is properly signified by this word—namely, that he has begotten the Son—but it also indicates that no cause preceded him, the one who is truly called Father. Therefore, it is not necessary that, when we mention the Son, we must not call him Father, but instead call him the Unbegotten of the Son; nor, again, if through the relation to the Son the "without-beginning" is passed over in silence, is it necessary to expel from our C mind the "Unbegotten" of God. But he rejects such a use of words and, like those who are artificers of laughter, mocks our responses, exciting guffaws with the absurdity of his sophisms, and, like the mimics of buffoons, makes a mockery of the logic by making a farce of the dogmas with the strangeness of his sophistries.
For I will again recall the things he said: "If it is the same thing to say 'Unbegotten' or 'Father,' it will be permitted for us, abandoning the word of 'Father' and assuming 'Unbegotten,' to say: 'The Unbegotten is the Unbegotten of the Son.' For just as the Unbegotten is the Father of the Son, so conversely, the Father is the Unbegotten of the Son." But let us also return the laughter, if it seems good, and turn the sophism back upon him to the contrary: If the Father is not the same as the Unbegotten, the Son of the Father will not be the Son of the Unbegotten; for since he has the relation only to the Father, he will be entirely foreign in nature D to that which is something else and which does not coincide with the notion of the Father. So that if the Father is something else than the Unbegotten, and the appellation of Father does not include the meaning of "Unbegotten," he who is one cannot be divided into relationships to two things, and be the same Son of both the Father and the Unbegotten. And just as it is thought absurd to call God the "Unbegotten of the Son," so in the reversal will an equal absurdity be found in naming the Only-Begotten Son of the Unbegotten: so that it must be that one of the two follows, either that the Unbegotten and the Father are the same, so that the Son of the Father is also the Son of the Unbegotten,
and our logic has been mocked in vain; or, if the Father is something other than the Unbegotten, the Son of the Father is alienated from the relationship to the Unbegotten. And if this holds, that the Only-Begotten is not from the Unbegotten, the sequence of the argument will necessarily point to the Father as being begotten; for that which exists, but does not exist in an unbegotten way, necessarily has a begotten subsistence. B If, therefore, the Father is begotten according to them, being something else besides the Unbegotten, where is that much-celebrated unbegottenness? Where is the foundation and the base of the heretical tower-building? It has departed and vanished through the slippery nature of the sophisms, the Unbegotten having slipped from the grasp of those who thought they were holding it for the time being; and the structure of the "Unlike," like some dream, has melted away and escaped the contact of the argument, flying off together with the Unbegotten. Thus, when any falsehood is honored above the truth, even if it blooms for a little while through deceit, it quickly collapses into itself and is dissolved by its own mechanisms. But these things have been brought forward by us only to smile at the elegance of the response of the "Unlike." It would be time again to return the argument to its sequence.
Eunomius does not wish the meaning of the Unbegotten to be represented by the name of the Father, so that he may argue that the Only-Begotten did not exist at some point. For this is also a very common question among his students: "How is He who is begotten?" The cause of this, I think, is that they do not wish to depart from human usage of words even when dealing with divine concepts. But let us benevolently lead this fabricated suspicion into the right path, by stating what we know about this.
C Words, Eunomius, have one meaning among us, and provide a different meaning when applied to that supreme power. For in all other matters, the divine nature is separated from the human by a long interval, and experience shows nothing here that is like what is conjectured by certain guesses and suspicions in regard to that nature. In the same way, the matter stands regarding the things signified by names: even if there is a certain homonymy of human terms with the eternal, nevertheless, according to the measure of the distance between the natures, the things signified by the names are also separated. For example, the Lord calls God a man, a householder, by way of a parable; but the name is far different in this life. Is the meaning of the human being among us the same as that human being, D and is our house the same as that great house, as the Apostle says, in which there are vessels of gold and silver and as many of other material as have been numbered? Or are those things different, which one could not easily recognize, being contemplated in incorruption and blessedness, while other things are those from us, which are from the earth and are flowing down into the earth? Likewise, in almost all other things, there is a certain homonymy of our affairs with divine things, in the identity
of the names, while there is a great difference in the things signified; A for this reason, names of members and senses, just as they are used among us, are also found to be arranged [in Scripture] in reference to that divine life, which all men confess to be beyond sense; fingers, and arm, and hand, and eye and eyelids, and hearing, and heart, and feet, and shoes, and horses, and horsemanship, and chariots, and ten thousand such things from human life have been transferred by Scripture for the revelation of divine things through an enigma. As, therefore, each of these names is spoken humanly, but does not signify humanly; so also is the name of the Father, even if it is spoken alike of our own and of the divine nature, yet according to the measure of the difference of the things underlying the names, even the things signified by the words have a distinction: for we conceive of generation among men in one way, and we conjecture about the divine generation in another. Man is generated in time, and some place absolutely receives his life, without which B nature cannot exist. For this reason, then, temporal divisions are necessarily found in human life: I mean the past, the present, and the future. For it is true to say of someone who is generated, that at one time he was not, now he is, and at length he will no longer be. But these temporal notions do not concur with that pre-eternal generation, inasmuch as they have no kinship with that nature, to those who reason soberly. For he who contemplates the divine life, rising above the "when," and the "later," and the "earlier," and all those things which signify this temporal extent, will consider and survey the high things in a high manner, and will not think that the sovereign life is subject to all those things which he sees happening to human generation.
C Change precedes the human composition, and certain corporeal matters and dispositions are laid down for the formation of the living being; and under the divine nod, nature is present, which works all these things wonders, gathering from everywhere what is familiar and suitable for the perfection of the thing being brought forth: from the elements of the world, as much as suffices from each, and the measure of the completion from time, and from the nourishment of those who fashion and form the fetus, as much as is suitable to the one being fashioned; and, to express it in few words, nature, passing through all things by which the human constitution is perfected, thus brings that which was not into generation, and therefore we say that which D was not is "born," because that which at one time was not, at another time begins to be. But in the divine generation, there is no need of the ministry of nature, nor of the revolution of time for the completion of that which is generated, nor of other things which are seen in earthly generation, nor does he fall into any lowly and abject thoughts, whoever, stripped of all carnal sense, approaches the divine things; but he seeks a certain understanding [suited] to the majesty of the thing signified.
A For he will neither think of passion in the impassible, nor will he suppose that the Creator of all nature needs any natural aid or assistance, nor will he admit any temporal extension in eternal life; but, having understood the divine generation to be pure from all these things, he will acknowledge only that by the name of Father it is signified that the Only-Begotten Son is not without a principle, inasmuch as He has the origin of His subsistence from the Father, yet is lacking any beginning, since no sign of a beginning appears in Him, which is what is being sought. For "prior" and "posterior" and other successions, which are found in temporal intervals, if you remove time, are likewise removed, and together with time all other signs of this kind vanish.
B Since, therefore, He who exists with the Father before the ages according to the ineffable Word does not admit the "at some time," He is indeed by generation, but He never begins to be; for He does not have life in time, nor in place; and once place, and time, and every thought of this kind have been excluded from the subsistence of the Only-Begotten, what is conceived before Him is the Father alone. But since the Only-Begotten is in Him, as He Himself says, He has no nature to receive the suspicion of "at one time He was not." For if at some time He was not, and He were Father, necessarily even the eternity of the Son would be cut off upwards along with the non-existence of the Father. But if the Father always is, how is it that the Son is not at some time, who cannot be conceived apart by Himself without respect to the Father, but is always silently named with the Father? C For the title of Father signifies the two persons equally, the notion of the Son automatically accompanying this name. When was the Son not? In what was His non-existence detected? In place? Place was not. In time? The Lord is before times. If, therefore, He was before these, when was He not? And if He was in the Father, in what was He not—tell us, you who see the invisible? What has your reasoning fashioned in the interval? What void did you find concerning the Only-Begotten? Is it a thing, or a concept, which, being extended along with the Father, makes His life more prolonged than the life of the Only-Begotten?
And why do I linger on these things, since it is not even proper to affirm of men that he who is not is generated? For Levi, many generations before his birth according to the flesh, was tithed by Melchizedek; [45:446 D] for thus says the Apostle, that Levi, who received tithes, was tithed, and he added the proof to what was being said: because he was in the loins of his father when Abraham met the priest of the Most High (Gen. xiv. 18 sqq). If, therefore, man in a certain way exists when he is generated, according to the apostolic testimony, inasmuch as he pre-exists through the communion of essence in the one who generates him, how do they dare to utter this word concerning the divine nature, namely, that He who is in the Father was not generated, as the Lord says: "I am in the Father, and the Father in me"? Namely, by another and another com->
- A prehension of the understanding, the one is said to be in the other. The Son is in the Father, as the beauty of an image is in the elegance of the prototype; the Father is in the Son, as the beauty and charm of the primary exemplar itself is in the image. In human-made images, the time that intervenes completely separates the form received from the prototype. But here, one cannot be separated from the other, as the Apostle says; neither the character of the hypostasis, nor the radiance of the divine glory, nor the image of the goodness; but whatever of these you conceive in your mind, that which is understood with it will simultaneously enter into your mind and thought. For, he says, "radiance of the glory," being present—not having become so—clearly rejecting by this phrase the impiety of both opinions; so that one might neither think the Only-Begotten to be unbegotten, by the saying, "radiance of the glory" (for the radiance is from the glory, and not conversely, the glory from the radiance), nor that He ever began to be. For the testimony of "being" explains the continuous and eternal nature of the Son, and that which is superior to every designation of time.
B Therefore, completely inopportune and futile is that question accustomed to be cast by adversaries for the subversion of the faith and the establishment of their own error, as an invincible weapon, questioning: "If He who is, is generated?" To whom it must be answered fearlessly that He who was in the Unbegotten was generated from Him, having the cause of His being from thence—"For I live," He says, "because of the Father"—but a beginning it is impossible to state; for when neither a thing, nor a thought, nor an interval of time is interposed by which the being of the Son is separated and distinguished from the being of the Father, neither is any sign or indication conceivable from which the Only-Begotten, separated from the life of the Father, begins a proper initiation of existence. If, therefore, there is no other beginning that precedes the life of the Son, and since the reason and tradition of piety undoubtedly conceive only the Father before the hypostasis of the Son, while the Father is devoid of beginning and unbegotten, as the testimony of the adversaries themselves admits: how does He who we understand to exist in Him who is devoid of beginning have a beginning of being?
C But what detriment will the true and sound doctrine suffer if one admits the voices of the adversaries which they put forward as absurd, asking: "If He who is, has been generated?" For we do not mean that He who is generated essentially is generated in the mode which Nicodemus, speaking with the Lord, was imagining with a certain crude thought, thinking that one who was already born could not be born again; but because, having His being uniterally fitted and connected to Him who lacks a beginning, and accompanying him who always tracks down something prior or more ancient, and forestalling the curiosity of the mind ascending to higher things, and as it were admixed with all the notions of the Father, He neither begins to be, nor is He unbegotten, but is both generated and was; by the logic of the cause, He has that which is from the
Father, while at the same time He does not accept that He ever was not, as regards the eternity of life.
A But he who trifles about these things contradicts what has been said, and breaks the essence of the Only-Begotten off from the nature of the Father; because the one has been begotten, and the other is unbegotten. And although there are so many of the names that are piously contemplated in the divine nature, in which no difference or variation toward the Son is observed, and all of them apply equally to both—yet, neglecting all the others through which the communion of nature is made known, he clings only to the name of "unbegotten." And he does not even accept the usual and accepted implication of this, but innovates the concept of "the unbegotten," setting aside the common assumptions about this term. What, then, is the cause of this? For he does not divert his argument from the usual implication of names without some great cause, nor does he introduce a strange meaning by the variation of terms. He knows precisely that if the usage of the names were preserved according to custom, he would find no strength for the subversion of the sound doctrine; but if the words were displaced from their common and customary understandings, the doctrine itself could easily be corrupted by the perversity of the term. B For instance, let us come to the very words that are being wronged: if, according to the common assumption of doctrines, he had accepted that God is called "unbegotten" by virtue of not having been begotten, the whole structure of their heresy would have collapsed, for the sophism regarding "unbegottenness" would have been pulled away. For if he had been persuaded by this sequence, that by similarity—just as almost all who contribute to the Church of God consider the God over all to be invisible, and impassible, and incorporeal—so too He should be considered "unbegotten," while agreeing that each of these names signifies what in no way belongs to God (not body, not passion, not color, not having existence from a cause)—if he had supposed things to be thus, their argument of dissimilarity would have had no power, since in all the other things that are contemplated regarding the God of all, even the opponents grant that there is likeness between the Only-Begotten and the Father.
C But in order that this might not happen, of all the names concerning God—I mean those indicative of the transcendent power—he singles out the name of "unbegotten." And he has made this the base of operations for his attack against our doctrine, transferring to the persons to whom the names are applied the opposition that exists in the expression between "begotten" and "unbegotten." And through these things he sophistically reasons for the difference of the essences by the difference of the names; not that he agrees that it is called "unbegotten" because it has been begotten and is a "begotten thing," nor because it has not been begotten, but he says that the one is substantialized from the generation—I know not by what wisdom he is guided to such an understanding. For if anyone were to examine the implications of the names by themselves, removing in his mind the persons upon whom the names seem to be placed, he would find the folly of the thoughts spoken by him. D For he is not, because the Father, as the doctrine of the true faith...
A teaches, is conceived before the Son, for that reason also let someone deem it worthy that the order of the names be arranged according to the dignity and order of the persons underlying them. But let one consider these names by themselves: which of the two is placed before the other by the reasoning of conception—I say the name again, not the object signified by the name—and which of those already mentioned indicates the position of some notion, and which indicates the removal of what has been posited. For the sake of clarity, since I think it necessary to present the argument by means of similar cases, take instruction and lack of instruction, passion and impassibility, and all such things of this kind: which of these has priority in conception over the others? Those that indicate the removal of what is posited, or those that present the position of the underlying object? I, for one, say this: for instruction, and anger, and passion are understood first, and then the removal of what was understood; thus also with generation and innascibility. And let no one, through self-willed religiousness, calumniate the argument as though it were placing the Son before the One who begat Him. For we are not trying to show that the Son is placed before the Father, and is B conceived before Him, when we discuss the meaning of "begotten" and "unbegotten." Clearly, generation signifies the position of some object or notion, while innascibility signifies the removal of what was posited, as was said before; so that, consequently, it is necessary in every way that the name of generation be understood before the name of innascibility. Why then do they violently strive to adapt the second order, which is observed in the names, to the Father, and think that a notion which is privative of some object is able to demonstrate and embrace the essence of the name? And yet they are very angry and excited against those who C refute the folly and absurdity of their assertions.
For see how he rages against him who exposes the weakness and futility of his craftiness, and how he takes vengeance upon him, as far as he is able: and he is able only by means of reproaches and insults, of which indeed he has a most abundant treasury of supply at home. For just as for those who describe books elegantly, neatly, and clearly, there are certain connectors and as it were bonds by which they fill the empty spaces and procure beauty and elegance for the whole composition: so this man adorns most things with reproaches, being famously distinguished by an extraordinary faculty for calumny. For again he calls us "vain," as if we were straying D from correct cogitations, and had not approached the certain truths with sufficiently suitable preparation, nor were able to attain the force and mind of the disputant. For all these things, and more such as these, are cast by this modest and well-composed mouth at our teacher (Basil). And perhaps a just cause for anger exists, and the declaimer rightly grows hot. For what necessity was there to cause him distress by demonstrating the imbecility of the things he himself disseminated, and furthermore by manifesting and exposing to the eyes of all the blasphemy veiled by the plausibility of sophisms? Why does he not rather cover the fragility of this dogma with silence? Why does he everywhere traduce the miserable man, and display him as if to a public spectacle, when he ought rather to pity him, and by silence to cover the indecency of the discourse; the one who refutes and ...
who is honored by his own disciples for his wisdom and acumen. Eunomius said somewhere in his discourses: "Ingenitum [the Unbegotten] follows God." Our teacher, pressing upon this expression, objected: that which follows is of the number of those things which accrue from without; but the essence is not of those things which accrue from without, but contains the signification of the being itself, according to what it is. Here that modest and invincible man is inflamed with wrath and belches forth many disgraces, because, having understood the expression, he also perceived the meaning itself. What then did he sin, if he consistently followed the line of the written words? For if he had not apprehended the meaning according to the line of what was said, the things which you have said would be well, and we would be ignorant. But if you blush at the refutation, why do you not erase what you have written, instead of insulting the one who brings it forward? "Yes," he says, "but he did not understand the intention of the discourse." What wrong do we commit, then, if we, being men, have conjectured the meaning from what was said, having no grasp of the things hidden in the heart? B For to God it belongs to see even invisible things, and to examine the characters of things that are in no way grasped, and to know the inequality of invisible things; but we judge only from what we hear.
It has been said, therefore, "Ingenitum follows God," and we supposed him to say that innascibility is of the number of those things which accompany God. Again it is said, "But rather the Unbegotten is substance." We were no longer able to understand the sequence of this, having perceived much that is absurd and strange in the things signified. For if the "unbegotten" follows God, and the "unbegotten" is substance, the argument establishes by all means the concept of two substances in the same thing; so that God is indeed according to the same, as he was once and is believed to be; yet he has a substance following him, which they call innascibility, being something other than that of which it is a consequence, as the teacher says. And if he demands that these things be thought of in this way, let him forgive us unlearned ones, who are unable to attain to this subtlety of speculations. C But if he rejects this argument and says that he does not speak of a double essence concerning God—one known from the divinity, and another from innascibility—let the man, who is neither rash nor malicious, obtain of himself not to indulge much in insults in the struggles for the truth; but let him clearly explain to us how that which follows and that which precedes are one and the same thing, and not one thing and another. For even in the things which he now brings forward for his own defense, he accomplishes nothing, the absurdity persisting just as before, nor, as he himself says, does the roundness and harmony of that discourse so elegant remedy the discordant doctrine. For what erudition may be found in these things, I have not yet been able to perceive. But we shall render here verbatim those things which he wrote: "We said," he says, "‘But rather the Unbegotten itself is substance,’ D not reducing to being that which is shown
to follow. But the one [part], by reducing—perhaps some of the masters of riddles might say, instead of ‘connecting’—they have understood as belonging to it. But of the remaining [words], how might one gain an understanding of what is meant and what follows? The thing revealed, he says, from this sequence, does not befit the substance, but rather the appellation. O most wise one, what then is this appellation? Does it disagree with the substance, or does it correspond to it in conception? For if the name had no communion at all with the substance, how would the substance be characterized B by the appellation of the Unbegotten? But if it fits properly, as you yourself name it, and the substance is encompassed by the unbegottenness, how is it then divided here? And the name of the substance follows one thing, while the substance itself follows another. What, then, is the structure of this entire discourse? The name ‘Unbegotten,’ he says, follows God, since He is Himself unbegotten. Does he mean that this name follows God? And how does he define the Godhead by unbegottenness? Or does he say again that the ‘Unbegotten’ follows God who is unbegottenly? And who shall untie for us the knot of these riddles? ‘Unbegotten’ is the antecedent, and ‘unbegotten’ the consequent; and the appellation of substance is now applied properly, and again it follows as if it were of an alien lot. What is this great dread and stupefaction he has regarding the name of unbegottenness, such that he should ascribe the whole nature of the Godhead to it, asserting that if God C be affected by this name, all the laws of piety remain intact, but if not, the entire sum of the faith is endangered? But unless one should suppose it is entirely superfluous and fruitless to discuss these matters briefly, we shall conduct our disputation as follows.
The Eternity of Divine Life
The eternity of the divine life, if one wished to describe it by some definition, is of this kind: it is always captured in ‘being,’ and it admits no discourse of a ‘sometimes not being’ or ‘sometimes not going to be.’ But just as those who measure a plane surface from a circular figure say that the beginning of the figure—an equal distance from the center to the span of the line wound upon itself—is indefinite, with the line neither ending in an open termination nor proceeding from a manifest beginning, but joined to itself from every side at an equal interval from the center, so that it seems to lack both beginning and end: far be the slanderer who would claim I have compared the infinite nature to a circumscribed and D defined figure. For we have not looked to the circumscription of a circle, but to the likeness of that life or nature which is incomprehensible on every side, and thus we affirm this to be the notion of eternity. For from the present moment, as if from a center and a certain point, extending and revolving our mind toward the infinitude of that life, equally and similarly from the immensity
of its incomprehensibility we are drawn around in a circle, grasping that divine life as continuous and inseparable from itself on every side; and we can recognize neither end nor part. We say this concerning the eternity of God, which we have learned from the prophecy: that God is King before the ages, and reigns for the age, and unto the age, and beyond. And on this account we determine him to be higher than every beginning and further than every end. A Having, therefore, this conception as fitting for the God of all things, we express what is understood through two designations concerning him: by "unbegotten" and "interminable," we represent the infinitude, continuity, and eternity of the life of God. For if only one of these two were to be taken into this conception, while the remaining one were kept silent, that which is signified would certainly be lame in that which is left out. For it is not possible for one of these to represent rightly in itself the significance contained in the other; for he who says "interminable" has indicated only the removal of an end, but meanwhile he has asserted nothing concerning a beginning. And he who names "without beginning" shows that the thing signified is above a beginning, but leaves the account concerning the end ambiguous. B Since, therefore, as I said, these names equally represent the eternity of the divine life, it would be the time to examine how these men, having cut up the meaning of eternity, are able to say that the notion which removes every beginning (which they say is substance) is not to be contemplated in eternity, while they must reckon that which lacks an end among those things which are outside of substance. I do not know by what reasoning they follow such a notion and speculation, so as to posit that to be without beginning is to be substance, while the negation of an end is, as it were, to be banished outside of substance. For it was fitting, since these two are contemplated about the same thing, either to admit both into the account of substance, or, if they judged one to be rejected, to reject the other at the same time. But if it truly pleases them, having divided the notion of eternity, to assign one to the substance of the divine nature, but to reckon the other among things which do not exist (since they desire to judge such things by petty calculations; C not as birds with feathers, but as birds whose wings have fallen off, they do not fly up toward the height of the thoughts concerning God), I would advise them to transfer their doctrines to the contrary: so as to reckon "interminable" in substance, but rather to overlook that which is "without beginning," granting preference to the future and that which is by hope, rather than to what has passed by and is stale. For since (I say these things for those who are small in their tiny souls, voluntarily bringing down my discourse to the conception of infants)—since, therefore, the past of life is as nothing to one who lives, and all the concern of those who live is toward what is future and expected, it would be more precious to be "interminable" than to be "without beginning," because the immortal is borne toward the future and that which is expected. So that let the thoughts concerning the divine nature be god-befitting and sublime, or, if they judge such things by human calculations, let the future be to them...
and sublime conceptions of the divine nature, or if they wish to estimate such things in a human manner, they prefer the future to the past, and thereby circumscribe the divine essence: since whatever time has passed vanishes in the very passing, whereas that which is expected subsists by hope itself.
These things, however, I put forward as ridiculous and childish, suitable for boys sitting and playing in the market; for it cannot be otherwise than that it resolves into play, whoever looks more closely at the worthlessness of this sect and at its lowly abjection. It has seemed not irrelevant to add this: since the notion of eternity is fashioned from both of the aforementioned, namely from the negation of beginning and end, if they circumscribe the essence of God with only one, the account of the essence will be semi-perfect, inasmuch as it consists solely in the negation of a beginning, with the interminable excluded from the essence. B But if, having joined both, they compose the account of essence from both, let us again consider what absurdity follows from this assertion: for we shall see them fighting not only against the Only-Begotten Son, but also against themselves, which is plain and manifest, and needs no great proof. For the account of the beginning and of the end are mutually opposed to one another, and the signification of each is diverse, just as it is also in other things that are diametrically opposed to one another, between which no middle ground intervenes. For he from whom the definition of a beginning is required will not assign the definition of an end, but will bring forward an account that is entirely contrary, suitable to the beginning, and opposite to the end. Therefore, the things that are opposite to each of these will also stand apart from one another according to the mode of their opposition: and to be free of a beginning, which is opposite to that which is subject to a beginning, will be one thing, C but to be interminate, which signifies the negation of an end, will be something else.
If, therefore, they carry these two—I mean being free of beginning and lacking an end—and attribute them to the essence of God, they will show God to be a composition of two repugnant and discordant things. For the very notion inherent in each of these—the beginning and the end—makes their repugnance manifest of itself: for things that are opposite to opposites are also opposite to one another. It is true, moreover, that all things which are opposed to those that by nature oppose one another, these also oppose one another, as is clear from an inspection of examples. Water is opposed to fire. Therefore, the powers by which they destroy one another will also be contrary to one another: for if moisture extinguishes fire, and dryness removes water from the midst, the qualities inherent in themselves preserve the repugnance of water to fire, so that it is necessary to confess that moisture is opposed to dryness. So, therefore, since beginning and end are opposed, it is necessary that their names also be opposed in meaning, I mean the negation of a beginning and of an end. If, therefore, they contend that only one of these demonstrates the essence—for I shall resume what was said before—they will attribute a kind of half-measure to God, circumscribing His essence by the negation of the beginning alone, while not extending it at all to the negation of the end; but if they apply both to the account of the divine es- D
essence, they will effect nothing else than A to demonstrate that it is formed of incongruous elements, as exposed above, and that because of the repugnance that exists between the negation of a beginning and an end, it is rent asunder in its very substance by the interminate and the beginningless. And thus their God is found to be a certain variegated and composite thing, constructed out of contrary elements.
But such a doctrine neither is, nor may it arise, in the Church of God; so that we should declare the simple and incomposite to be not only multiform and various, but even conflated out of contrary things. For the simplicity of the doctrines of the truth posits God as He is: a Being who can be grasped neither by name, nor by thought, nor by any other apprehensive conception, B being higher than not only human, but even angelic and every supra-mundane grasp, ineffable and unutterable, and superior to any signification produced by words; having one name that is cognitive of His own nature—the one that He is above every name, which indeed has also been
granted to the Only-Begotten
, because all things that the Father has are also the Son’s. C But the discourse of piety confesses that these terms—I mean "unbegotten" and "interminate"—are indices of eternity, not of essence; so that "unbegotten" signifies that there is no principle or cause prior to Him, while "interminate" signifies that His kingdom will be brought to no end. 60 "For You," it says, "are the same, and Your years will not fail." By "You are," it signifies that He did not come into being from any cause, while by what follows, it delineates that ceaseless and interminable blessedness of His life.But perhaps someone even of the more pious, dwelling upon the things we have examined concerning the eternal, will say that it is difficult to pass by the account of the Only-Begotten through the things said without stumbling. For of two absurd dogmas, one must necessarily follow: for either we shall insist that the Son is also unbegotten, which is absurd, or we will not even grant Him eternity, which is characteristic of the blasphemers. For if eternity is recognized by the negation of a beginning and an end, it is a matter of absolute necessity either to be impious by not confessing the eternity of the Son, or to be carried toward the conception of unbegottenness in our thoughts concerning the Only-Begotten. What then of us? If he who considers the Father of the Son solely by the account of causality were to posit any temporal interval prior to the subsistence of the Only-Begotten, justly would the account we have concerning the eternity of the Son be endangered. But as it is, the "there was once" finds no place in the pre-eternal nature, and likewise in the confession of the life of the Father, and of the Only-Begotten, and indeed of the Holy Spirit. For where there is no time, the "once" is also excluded. And if, in the
understanding of the Father, the Son is perceived to appear along with Him, what is the fear A in attributing eternity to the Only-Begotten, who possesses neither a beginning of days nor an end of life? For just as there is light from light, and life from life, and from the good, one who is good, wise, just, and powerful, and everything else in the same way, one who is such from such a source, so too is the eternal in every way from the Eternal.
But the argumentative and contentious person might snatch at the word, as if this sequence also leads to the supposition of an unbegotten from an Unbegotten. But let the one who contends be sober in heart, and hold fast to his own expressions: for he who confesses that the Son is from the Father has by that very fact removed the notion of unbegotten from the Son, and there is no cause for us to fear B declaring the Son to be eternal and yet not unbegotten. For since the life of the Son is not limited by any interval of time, but his immensity of life is poured out in every direction both before the ages and after the ages were created, he is properly called by the name of eternal. But since he is and is named Son, and offers the notion of the Father to be contemplated conjunctively in himself, it is impossible for anyone to believe that he exists in an unbegotten manner—he, I say, who is always with the Father, and who, as that divine teacher of ours taught, is joined in a begotten manner to the unbegottenness of the Father. And we teach the same thing regarding the Holy Spirit, with the difference established only in the order. For just as the Son is joined to the Father, and, while possessing his origin from Him, is nevertheless not posterior C in hypostasis, so too does the Holy Spirit relate to the Son; for the Son is conceived before the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit only by the notion of cause: but temporal dimensions have no place in that life which precedes every age. So that, with the notion of cause removed, the holy Trinity is in all respects in perfect harmony with itself: to whom is due glory and dominion.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK TWO
CHAPTERS OR SUMMARIES OF THE SECOND BOOK
1. The second book explains the incarnation of the divine Word, and the faith delivered by the Lord to the disciples, and shows that the heretics who overturn this, and forge other dogmas, are from the father the devil.
2. Then it treats at length the eternity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
3. Then [it treats] the D of the unnameable one of the holy
A Trinity’s name, and the relation of the persons to one another, and further the unknown nature of the essence, and His condescension towards us, and His birth from the Virgin, and His second coming, and the resurrection from the dead, and the retribution. 4. After this, it most wisely refutes Eunomius’ partial and empty and blasphemous exposition concerning Being. 5. Then it wonderfully overturns the unintelligibility of Eunomius’ terms, which say that the essence of the Father is neither separated nor divided nor becomes anything else. 6. Then thus it demonstrates the unity of the Son with the Father, and Eunomius’ ignorance and lack of initiation in the Scriptures. 7. In addition to these, it shows that the Only-Begotten, being born not only from the Father but also from the Virgin without passion through the Holy Spirit, did not divide the essence. But the nature of men, when born, is not divided or split from their begetters; as it has been most wisely proven from the example of Adam and Abraham. 8. Following these, it expounds very fittingly the interpretation of "Only-Begotten" and "Firstborn," stated four times by the Apostle. 9. Then again, having philosophized on the birth of the Only-Begotten, and other diverse births both material and immaterial, it magnificently proves the Son to be the radiance of glory, and not a creature. 10. Next, having examined in various ways the saying, "The Lord created me," and the argument concerning the beginning of the Son, and the deceitfulness of Eunomius’ words, and the saying that declares, "My glory I will not give to another," it interpreted them well. 11. Then, having clarified the dignity of the Almighty, and the eternity of the Only-Begotten, and the, "Having become obedient," it shows the foolishness of Eunomius in saying that He did not receive being the Son from obedience. 12. Then thus it treats most beautifully the interpretation of the Mediator, and of the like, and of the unbegotten and the begotten, and the image and seal of the Almighty’s operation, and of the works. 13. After this, it interprets the Evangelical saying, "The Father judges no one." Furthermore, it clarified the taking up of the man with soul and body by the Lord, and the transgression of Adam, and the death, and the resurrection from the dead. 14. In addition to these, it sets forth the glory which the Church and Eunomius have concerning the Holy Spirit, and that there are not three gods, but one: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; to which it also sets forth diverse subjections. In which it also proved this subjection of the Son to the Father to be the same as the subjection of all things to the Son. 15. Then, having proved the unintelligibility of Eunomius, who at one time calls the Holy Spirit a creature and the most beautiful work of the Son, and at another time confesses Him to be God from His operations, it perfects the argument.
A The faith of the Christians, which has been preached to all nations according to the command of the Lord by the disciples, is neither from men, nor through men, but through our Lord Jesus Christ Himself; Who, being the Word, and Life, and Light, and Truth, and God, and Wisdom, and all things that He is by nature—for this reason, especially having become in the likeness of man,
A and having partaken of our nature in all things according to likeness, sin excepted. But according to the likeness of His having assumed the whole man with soul and body, so that by both, salvation might be accomplished for us. He was seen upon the earth, and conversed with men, so that men might no longer, according to their own opinions, conjecture about Him who is, holding those suspicions or opinions which they follow from certain slight conjectures as true and firm decrees. But, being persuaded that God truly appeared in the flesh, let us believe that to be the only true mystery of godliness, which was delivered by the Word and God Himself, who spoke to the apostles in His own person. But let us embrace the doctrine concerning the super-eminent nature, which has been fashioned from the more ancient Scripture, from the law and the prophets, and from proverbial teaching, as a testimony of the truth revealed to us through a certain mirror and enigma, receiving the meaning of what is said with piety, so that we may agree with the faith set forth by the Lord of all; which we keep pure and inviolate in the very wording, as we have received it; and we judge the perversion and depravation of the delivered words, even in a small measure, to be the ultimate blasphemy and impiety. We believe, therefore, just as the Lord set forth the faith to His disciples, saying: "Go, make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." This is the word of the mystery, in which, through the birth from above, our nature is transformed for the better, while it is renewed from the corruptible to the incorruptible, from the old man, according to the image of Him who at the beginning created the divine likeness. Therefore, of this faith delivered by God to the apostles, we make neither subtraction, nor alteration, nor perversion, nor addition; knowing clearly that he who dares to pervert the divine voice through malicious sophistry, this man is from the father of the devil; for he, having let go of the words of truth, speaks from his own, having become the father of a lie. For everything that is said contrary to truth is utterly a lie, and not truth.
B Since, therefore, this decree is set forth by Truth Itself, if they invent anything incorrectly through the contempt of this voice—the inventors of malignant heresies—so that in place of the Father they name Him [the Father] the creator and maker of the Son; and in place of the Son, a work and creature and something fashioned; and in place of the Holy Spirit, a creature of a creature, and a work of a work; and all such things as seem fit to the enemies of God to say about Him—all such things we call a denial of the divinity revealed to us in this dogma, and a transgression. For once we have learned from the Lord that upon which we ought to gaze with our thought and mind—through which the transformation of our nature from the mortal to the immortal occurs—this, indeed, is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Wherefore we declare it to be fearful and destructive both to pervert these divine voices malignantly and incorrectly, and to devise others D for the sake of the annulment of these.
A As if they would amend and correct the Word of God, who has legislated for us to hold these voices in faith. For each one of these appellations, when perceived by the mind in its native significance, becomes a rule of truth and a law of piety for Christians. Since there are many other names by which the Divine is signified in history, in prophecy, and in the law, the Lord Christ, having left all these aside, and being able to lead us to the faith which is concerning that which is, sets forth these voices, deeming that if we abide in the appellation of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, it suffices for the cognition of Him who truly is—which is both one and not one. For in respect of the Word of essence it is one; therefore the Lord also legislated that we should look to one name. But according to the properties by which the divine persons are distinguished, it is divided into the faith of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, being inseparably distributed and unconfusedly united. B For when we hear "Father," we receive this notion and understanding: that this name is not understood in itself alone, but also declares through its own force a mutual relation with the Son. For the Father could not be conceived of as separated in Himself, without the Son being joined through the utterance of the Father. Having, therefore, learned "Father," by the same voice we are also instructed in the faith concerning the Son. Since, therefore, the Divine by nature, in what it is and as it is, is always the same, not at any time being something that it now is not, nor at any time being something that it now is not yet; and since the true Father was named "Father" by the Word, and the Son is shown forth together with the Father, we necessarily believe that He who admits no mutation or alteration in His nature is, in what He now is, altogether what He always was—or, if there be anything that He was at some time not, then neither does He now in any way exist. Since, therefore, the Father is named by the true Word, He always and in every way was Father and is, and will be as He was. For it is not permitted to say concerning the divine and impassible nature that what is good is not always in it. For if what now is, was not always in it, it would have been changed either for the worse from the better, or for the better from the worse; and to say either of these regarding the divine nature is equally impious. But the Divine is indeed incapable of change or alteration. Surely, everything that is good and excellent is always considered in connection with the source of the good; and the Only-Begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, is good and beyond all that is good. C But He who is in the bosom, is He not begotten? Wherefore it has been demonstrated through these things that the Son is from eternity perceived in the Father in whom He is, being living life, and light, and truth, and every good name and notion; without which to affirm that the Father was at any time in Himself is of extreme impiety and at once of madness and stupid folly. For if the Son, as the Scripture says, is the power of God, and wisdom, and truth, and light, D and every good thing, how could the Father ever be without these?
A And if these did not exist, it would mean that the bosom of the Father must be thought of as void and empty of such goods. Therefore, lest the Father be thought of as destitute of His own goods, and lest our opinion fall into such an absurdity, it is necessary, according to the voice of the Lord, that the faith concerning the Son be contemplated along with the eternity of the Father. For this reason, leaving aside all names that are used to demonstrate His supereminent nature, He sets forth for us in the faith B the appellation of "Father," as being more indicative of the truth, which, as has been said, by its relative conception implies the Son along with itself. And since the Son, who is in the Father, is always what He is, as has been said in the preceding discourses—for God by nature does not admit of an increase toward something greater (for He does not see any other good outside Himself, through participation in which He could receive anything more; but C existing always in the same way, He neither casts away what He has, nor assumes from outside what He does not have; for He possesses nothing of the things that are to be rejected, and if there is anything blessed, and incorruptible, and immortal, and true, and good, it is altogether around Him and within Him)—we necessarily see that the Holy Spirit, who is the righteous guide, and prince, and director, vivifying, and the ruler of all creation, and sanctifier, who works and effects all things in all as He wills, does not come to Him by any adventitious or added power. D Do not imagine any interval between Christ and the chrism—that is, the anointing—any more than between a king and his kingdom, or wisdom and the spirit of wisdom, or truth and the spirit of truth, or power and the spirit of power. Rather, the Son is understood from eternity in the Father, being Himself both wisdom and truth, counsel and fortitude, knowledge and intelligence. From eternity, the Holy Spirit is also known along with Him, being indeed the Spirit of wisdom and truth, of counsel and intelligence, and all the other things that the Son both is and is named. For this reason we assert that the mystery of godliness has been handed down to the holy disciples, at once joined and distinguished, namely, that one must believe in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. For the property of the hypostases makes this distinction of persons clear and unconfused; but the one name set before our exposition of the faith clearly interprets for us the unity of the essence of the persons who are in the faith—I mean of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit—since by these titles we are not taught a difference of nature, but only the distinguishing properties of the hypostases. So that we may know that neither is the Son the Father, nor the Father the Son; nor is the Son either the Father or the Holy Spirit; but that we may know each one by the characteristic peculiar to his hypostasis, existing in indefinite perfection, and contemplated in himself, and not divided from that to which he is joined. What, therefore, signifies that unnameable name concerning which
the Lord thus spoke? That in baptizing them into the name, he did not add the very significant term that is declared under this name. We understand this in the following way: that all things that are created are comprehended by the significance of names. For he who said “heaven” led the mind of the hearer to that creature which is signified by this name; and he who A makes mention of man or any of the animals by name, immediately imprints the form of the animal in the mind of the one who has heard it; and all other things are likewise painted in the heart of the one who, through hearing, has received the designation applied to the thing, by means of the imposed names. But the uncreated nature alone, which is believed in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is superior to and better than any nominal significance. For this reason the Word, that is the Son of God, when he said “in the name” in the tradition of the faith, did not add what that name was. For how could a name be found appropriate for a thing that surpasses every name? But he granted the power so that, according to its capacity, our intellect, piously moved, might find some name that would show forth the pre-eminent nature, and would likewise apply it to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit—whether one calls it the Good, or the Incorruptible, or whatever each one might deem worthy to be assumed for the demonstration of the immortal and eternal nature. And this seems to me, according to this exposition, to be what the Word ordained by law, namely, to persuade us that the divine essence is something ineffable, indescribable, and incomprehensible. For it is B clear that the designation of the Father is not indicative of essence, but signifies the relation toward the Son. If, therefore, it were possible for human nature to be taught and to perceive the essence of God, He who desires all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. II, 4) would not have kept silent concerning the knowledge of this. But now, since he has said nothing concerning the essence, he shows that the knowledge of that thing is impossible; but having learned what we can comprehend, we stand in no need of the incomprehensible, having the faith of the handed-down doctrine sufficient for our salvation. For to learn that He is that which truly is—by which name also the magnificence of the Son is made to shine forth together through the relative concept—is the most perfect doctrine of piety, the Son, as has been said, being shown conjointly with himself as the Spirit of life and of truth, since He himself is life and truth.
These things C being thus distinguished, anathematizing every heretical opinion in the divine dogmas, we believe, just as we have been taught by the voice of the Lord, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; confessing along with this faith the dispensation also that was made by the Lord of creation on behalf of men: “Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant” (Phil. II, 6), and being incarnate in the holy Virgin, redeemed us from the death D in which we were held fast, being sold under sin.
A Having given His own precious blood as a price for the redemption of our souls, which He poured out through the cross, and having prepared for us through Himself the resurrection from the dead; for He shall come in His own times in the glory of the Father to judge every soul in righteousness, when all who are in the tombs shall hear His voice and shall come forth, they that have done good into the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil into the resurrection of judgment. So that the heretical discord which is now being disseminated by Eunomius may not, by falling unexamined into the souls of some of the simpler sort, injure the immaculate faith, we will attempt, by setting forth the exposition which is circulated by them, to refute the wickedness of their dogma.
The text of the dogma runs thus: “We believe in one and the only true God according to the teaching of the Lord Himself, not honoring Him with a lying voice (for He is devoid of all falsehood), but Him who truly is in nature and glory one God, without beginning, eternal, without end, alone.” B Let not him who has promised to believe according to the teaching of the Lord pervert the exposition of the faith made by the Lord of all to suit his own opinion, but let him follow the voices that have proceeded from the truth. Since, then, the word of the faith includes the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, what harmony do the words now composed have with the voices of the Lord, so that such a dogma can be referred to that teaching? Where has the Lord said in the Gospels that it is necessary to believe in one and the only true God? They cannot show this, unless they have some new Gospel among them. For the accounts that are read in the Churches from ancient times down to the present day by succession do not contain this expression, which says that it is necessary to believe or to baptize into “one and the only true God,” as these men suppose, but “into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.” C But as we have been taught by the voice of the Lord, we assert this: that the word “one” does not signify the Father alone, but also shows the Son together with the Father, as the Lord said, “I and the Father are one” (John X, 30). Furthermore, the title of divinity is equally applied both to the beginning in which the Word was, and to the Word Himself who was in the beginning; for He said that the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John I, 1). So that in the meaning of divinity, the Son is contemplated together with the Father. Moreover, that which is true in essence cannot be understood as anything other than the truth. That the Lord is the truth, no one will surely contradict, unless he be someone completely straying and alien from the truth. If, then, the Word is in the “one,” and is God, and is the truth, as is proclaimed in the Gospels, to what teaching of the Lord does the man who has used these distinctive phrases refer this dogma? D For the antithesis of “only” against “not alone” is also the antithesis of “God” against “not God,” and of “the true” against “the not true.” If, therefore, looking toward idols, they make this adverse division of words against them, we also agree. Since indeed, by…
via homonymy, the name of Divinity is attributed to the idols of the nations: “For all the gods of the nations are demons.” A And otherwise, he distinguishes the One against the multitude, and the True against the false, and those who are not gods against the God who is. But if this adverse division is made toward the Only-begotten God, let the wise know that truth has an adverse distinction only against falsehood, and God against him who is not God. But since the Lord, who is the truth, is God, and is in the Father, and is one with the Father, these distinguishing words have no place in the doctrine. For he who truly believes in the One sees in that One Him who in all things is united to Him, in truth and deity, and in essence, and in life, and in wisdom, and in everything absolutely. B Or if he does not see One who is these very things in the One, he has his faith in nothing; for without the Son the Father neither is, nor is He called such; nor indeed is the Powerful one without power, nor the Wise one without wisdom; for Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. So that he who imagines he is looking outside of power, or truth, or wisdom, or life, or the true light, either sees nothing at all, or else sees the evil; for the removal of goods becomes the position and existence of evil. “Not by a feigned voice,” he says, “worship Him,” for He is truthful. In this voice I pray that Eunomius may remain, bearing witness to the truth that God does not lie.
C If, therefore, he were to think that everything said by the Lord is separated from falsehood, he will surely believe that He who said, “I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me” (John x, 38; xiv, 10), speaks the truth, meaning the Whole in the Whole, neither the Father abounding in the Son, nor the Son lacking in the Father; and that in this way the Son must be honored just as the Father is honored (John v, 23); and that “He who has seen Me has seen the Father” (John xiv, 9); and that “No one knows the Son except the Father,” and that “No one knows the Father except the Son” (Matth. xi, 27). Through all of which, no difference of glory, or of essence, or of anything else, is supposed in Father and Son by those who have accepted these words as true.
“He who truly is,” he says, “is one God in nature and glory.” That which truly *is* is contrasted with that which does not *truly* exist. Now, that is truly *being*—each of the things that exist, insofar as it is. But that which seems indeed to be only up to a certain imagination and suspicion, but is not *being*, this does not truly exist; as with a dream, a phantom, or a man in a painting. D For these things and such like, existing only up to imagination, do not possess true existence. If, therefore, according to Jewish opinion, they maintain that the Only-begotten God does not exist at all, they rightly attribute "truly being" to the Father alone by their own testimony. But if they do not deny the Creator of all, that He is, let them be persuaded not to deprive Him who is of truly existent being; He who named Himself in the theophany that occurred to Moses as the one who is, when He said, “I am He who is” (Exod. iii, 14); just as Eunomius in the following passages continues to concur with this, testifying to the truth, that He is truthful.
A Then he says that God is one by nature and by glory. If, therefore, God is God apart from being God by nature—let him who says these things see to it; but if one who is not by nature God is not God, let them learn from the great Paul that those who serve those who are not by nature gods, do not serve God. We, however, serve the living and true God; as the Apostle says, “The one to whom we serve is Jesus Christ.” For even the apostle Paul boasts in serving Him, saying, “Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ.” We, therefore, who no longer serve those who are not by nature gods, have acknowledged Him who is by nature God, to whom every knee bends, of those in heaven, and of those on earth, and of those under the earth. Nor would we have served Him if we had not believed that this is the living and true God, to whom every tongue confesses that “Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.”
“God,” he says, “is one, without origin or beginning: eternal, alone without end.” “Understand again, O little ones, the craftiness,” says Solomon (Prov. viii, 5), “lest at any time, being deceived, you fall into a denial of the divinity of the Only-Begotten.” That is “without end” which is not subject to death and corruption. In the same way, that is called “eternal” which is not temporary. Therefore, that which is neither eternal nor unending—this is altogether viewed in corruptible and ephemeral nature. Consequently, he who attributes that which is without end and limit to the one and only God, but does not include the Son in the meaning of “unending” and “eternal,” C confirms by such a statement that He is corruptible and temporary, being contrasted with the eternal and unending. But we, even if we hear that “God alone has immortality” (I Tim. vi, 16), understand the Son through that immortality; for immortality is life. And even if it is said that He “dwells in light which no one can approach” (I Tim. vi, 16), we do not doubt that the true light, which is unapproachable to falsehood, is understood as the Only-Begotten, in whom we have learned from the Truth herself that the Father is. From these things let the hearer choose what is more pious: whether it is proper to think and feel thus concerning the Only-Begotten in a manner worthy of God, or to say, as the heresy suggests, that He is corruptible and temporary. He does not, he says, divide the essence, according to which He is one, into many, nor does He become something different at different times, nor does He depart from what He is, nor is He fashioned from one essence into a threefold hypostasis. D For He is, in every way and altogether, one, remaining alone, according to the same things and in the same way. From these things that have been set forth, it is fitting for the intelligent hearer to discern, first, the empty words cast forth in the discourse without sense, and to distinguish them from those that seem to have some meaning; and after this, to examine the understanding found in the remaining statements, to see if it concurs with the piety which is in Jesus.
The earlier words, therefore, which are set forth here, are altogether separated from any good or evil way of thinking. For what
A frame of mind does it contain, that it is not the essence according to which he is one that is being separated into several parts, or becoming one thing at one time and another at another, or departing from existence as it is? Neither could he himself say, nor do I think any of those who take his side can find even a shadow of a thought in what has been said. "Not the essence according to which he is one." He either says that he is separated from his own essence, not being separated, or he says that the essence is not divided from him. This talk is a noise B and a vain sound, rashly thrown together, signifying nothing. And why is it necessary to linger any longer in the examination of these senseless words? For how can anyone, when separated from his own essence, continue to exist? Or how is an essence, once divided, shown to be in itself? Or how is it possible for one who has departed from that in which he is, to become someone else once he has come to be outside himself? "But not even," he says, "from one essence is it fashioned into three subsistences." For he is, absolutely and entirely, one, remaining C alone in the same way and in the same state. Now, the lack of sense in what has been said is, I think, clear to everyone even before our own arguments; but let him who thinks there is any mind or thought in what is said argue against this. For anyone who has examined the power of language will disdain to entangle himself with things that lack substance. For what strength or weight does it have against our dogma, to say, "Not the essence according to which he is one is being separated, or divided into several, or becoming one thing at one time and another at another, or departing from existence as it is; nor is it fashioned D out of one essence into three subsistences"? Neither are these things said by Christians, nor are they believed, nor are they understood by consequence through those things that are confessed among us. For who has ever said this, or heard anyone saying in the Church of God that the Father, in regard to his essence, is either separated or divided, or becomes one thing at one time and another at another, becoming outside himself, or is fashioned into three subsistences? To himself Eunomius speaks these things; he does not fight against us, but weaves his own trifles, having mixed into his impiety a great deal of the madness of these things said. For we say it is an equally impious and godless thing for one to declare that the Lord of creation is a creature, and to think that the Father, as he is, is separated or dissected, or migrates out of himself, or is fashioned into three subsistences or persons, as if he were some clay or wax being molded into different shapes.
But let us consider the words that follow. "For he is in every respect and absolutely one, remaining alone in the same way and in the same state." If he says this about the Father, we also agree. For the Father is truly one, alone, and in every respect and absolutely, keeping himself in the same way and in the same state. And he is never that which is neither existing, nor not an existing thing, nor not to exist in the future. If, therefore, such a statement looks to the Father, let him not stubbornly oppose the dogma of piety, but let him agree with the Church in this part; for he who confesses that the Father always exists and in the same manner, being one and alone, upholds the doctrine of piety, looking in the Father
A at the Son; without whom the Father neither is, nor is he called, the Most High or the Almighty. But if he imagines any other God besides the Father, let him dispute with the Jews or with those who are called Hypsistians; for this is their point of divergence from the Christians, that they do indeed confess that there is a certain being whom they name the Most High or the Almighty, but they do not admit that he is the Father. Yet a Christian, if he does not believe in God the Father, is not a Christian.
The things which he adds to these are as follows: "Not having," he says, "a partner or associate of his deity, not a sharer of his glory, not an equal participant in his power, not a co-occupant of his throne in his kingdom. For there is one and only God the Almighty, God of gods, King of kings, Lord of lords." I do not know upon whom Eunomius is looking, that he should protest that the Father does not communicate his divinity to him. If he says such things with regard to vain idols and the misguided opinion of idolaters, as Paul also proclaims that "there is no agreement or convention B between Christ and Beliar, nor fellowship of the temple of God with temples of idols," we also agree. But if he separates the only-begotten God from the paternal deity by the things that are said, let him learn that he is constructing a dilemma of impiety against himself; for either he denies absolutely that the Only-Begotten is God, so as to preserve and vindicate for the Father that which is incommunicable with the Son in deity—and by this he is convicted as a transgressor and prevaricator, having denied the God of the Christians—or, if he grants that he is God, yet not according to a nature conformable to the true God, it is absolutely necessary for him to confess that he worships gods divided and separated from one another by the difference of their natures. Let him choose which of these he desires: either to deny the deity of the Son or to introduce C several gods into his doctrine; for whichever of these he chooses, it matters not, for it is an equal crime of impiety. But we, being instructed and taught by the God-inspired words of Scripture, do not see a "communion" of deity in the Father and the Son, but a unity; the Lord himself having taught this in his own words, where he says, "I and the Father are one," and, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." For if he were not of the same nature, how would he either have within himself that which is foreign, or how would he show forth in himself that which is unlike, since a foreign and alien nature does not receive the character or form of a thing of another kind? He says moreover that he has no sharer or associate of glory: he says this as it is, although he does not know what he is saying; D for the Son does not divide the glory with the Father, but has the whole glory of the Father, just as the Father has all the glory of the Son. For so he said to the Father, that "All mine are thine, and thine are mine." And for this reason he affirms that he will appear in the time of judgment in the glory of the Father, when he is to render to each according to his works; and by this utterance he demonstrates the unity of nature. For just as there is one glory of the sun and another glory of the moon, because they do not correspond to one another
A in the nature of their elements—for if the glory of both were the same, no difference in their nature would be supposed—so he who foretold that he would appear in the glory of the Father demonstrated, by means of that identity of glory, the communion of nature.
To say that the Son is not a joint-throne sharer of the kingdom with the Father bears witness to how much Eunomius has been exercised in the divine utterances, he who, from excessive attention to the divinely inspired Scriptures, has not yet heard: *Set your minds on things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father* B, and that *he has sat down at the right hand of the throne of God*; and many other such things, the multitude of which one could not easily number, which, not having yet learned, Eunomius forbids the Son to be a joint-throne sharer with the Father. But as for "joint-heir" (or "consort") of authority, one ought to pass over this as senseless rather than refute it as impious. For what conception the expression "joint-heir" holds, from the common usage of language, it is not possible to discover. *They cast lots for the garment of the Lord*, as the Scripture says, those who did not wish to tear the Lord's tunic, but to make it the possession of one of them C to whom the lot should grant it. Those, therefore, who cast lots with one another for the tunic can perhaps be called "joint-heirs" (consorts). But here, in the case of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since authority exists in the nature itself—for the Holy Spirit blows where he wills, and works all things in all as he wills; and the Son, through whom all things were made, visible and invisible in the heavens and upon the earth, did all that he willed, and gives life to whom he wills; and the Father has set the times in his own authority, and from the times we understand all things that have come to be in time to be subject to the Father—if, therefore, the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit as we have said, are shown to have the authority to do what they will, what sense does the expression "joint-heir of authority" have? It is not possible to discern. For the heir of all things, the creator of the ages, he who shines forth with the glory of the Father, and who characterizes D within himself the hypostasis of the Father, is Lord of all things that the Father himself has, and is Lord of all authority; not that dignity migrates from the Father to the Son, but it remains also with him and exists in him. For he who is in the Father is, with all his own power, clearly in the Father; and he who has the Father in himself encompasses all the fatherly authority and power. For he has the whole Father in himself, and not a part of him. And he who has the whole, also entirely has his authority. What, then, does Eunomius understand when he proclaims that the Father does not have a "joint-heir of power"? Perhaps his disciples of vanity might say—for he who knows how to understand words confesses that he cannot understand things said without sense. The Father, he says, does not have a "joint-heir of authority." For who is it that speaks of "by lot" instead of "joint-heir"? Joint-heirs,
A over whom the holy Eunomius acts as mediator through a friendly agreement, assigning the rights of authority B to the Father without any lot.
Observe the ridiculous, childish, vile, and abject exposition of these dogmas. Does He who bears all things by the word of His power, who says what He wills to come into being, and who performs what He wills in the power of His command—to whom power concurs with will, and whose will becomes the measure of His power: "For He spoke and they were created, He commanded and they were fashioned" [Ps. cxlviii, 5]; He who created all things through Himself and constituted them in Himself, without whom nothing of things that are either came into being or remains in being—does He await to obtain authority by some sort of "lot"? Judge, hearers, whether he who asserts these things is of sound mind. "One," he says, "is the one and only God Almighty." If indeed he indicates the Father by the name "Almighty," he speaks our language, not an alien one. But if he has in mind some other than the Father as "Almighty," let him also preach circumcision if he likes, he who is the leader of Jewish decrees, for the faith of Christians looks toward the Father. For the Father is everything: Most High, Almighty, King of kings, Lord of lords [1 Tim. vi, 15], and whatever has an exalted and eminent meaning is proper to the Father; and whatever things are the Father's, all those are also the Son's [John xvii, 10]. C If this is the case, we also admit these terms. But if, leaving out the Father, he assumes another Almighty, he puts forward Jewish decrees or follows the doctrine of Plato. For they say that that philosopher also declares that there is a certain supreme creator and maker of certain other inferior gods. Just as, therefore, in the Jewish and Platonic decrees, he who does not acknowledge the Father is no Christian, even if he worships some "Almighty" in his dogma, so too Eunomius lies against the name, Judaizing in his opinion, or preferring the divinities of the Greeks while wearing the name of Christians. D Nay, even concerning what follows, the same argument will apply. For he says, "God of gods." We, by adding the name of the Father, make the expression familiar and proper, knowing that the Father is the God of gods. But whatever things are the Father's are altogether the Son's also. And "Lord of lords"—the same argument applies to this as well; and "Most High over all the earth." For whomever you may conceive in your mind, He is Most High over all the earth. Similarly, there is a contemplation of the heavenly things over the earthly by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But also, as for what is added next to those statements: "Most High in the heavens," "Most High in the highest," "super-celestial," "true in essence," who is and remains "true in words," "true in works"—all these things the eye of Christians beholds equally in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. If [next page begins]
therefore, Eunomius assigns these things to only one of the Persons handed down in the faith, let him dare to say that He who said "I am the truth" A is not true in words, or let him refuse to acknowledge as true in works the Spirit of truth, or Him who works judgment and justice, or the Spirit who works all things in everyone as He wills. For if these things do not bear witness to the Persons handed down in the faith, he is completely erasing the faith of Christians. For how will anyone deem worthy of faith one who is false in his words and not true in his works?
But let us proceed to what follows in the discourse. He says: "He is superior to all rule, subjection, and power." This statement is also our own and proper to the Catholic Church: namely, to believe that the divine nature is higher than every rule, and that it has under its own control whatever is understood to exist among beings. The divine nature is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But if he ascribes this power by his testimony to the Father alone, and if he declares Him alone free from change and alteration, and if he says He alone is incorruptible, it is clear B from these things what is being constructed: that he who does not possess these things is altogether changeable, corruptible, and subject to destruction. Therefore, Eunomius puts forward these dogmas concerning the only-begotten God and the Holy Spirit; for he would not have employed this contrast, distinguishing the Father from them, had he not held this opinion concerning the Son and the Spirit. What remains, then, brothers? Test whether he who holds these views is not a persecutor of the Christian faith. For who would judge that which is subject to change, alteration, and destruction to be worthy of veneration for himself? Therefore, the whole goal of the one constructing such thoughts is to cast out from the Church the faith which it has in the Son and the Holy Spirit, since by these things he attempts to establish that neither the Truth itself nor the Spirit of truth is incorruptible, C unchangeable, or immutable.
Let us see also what he adds to what has been said. "Not by generating," he says, "does He divide His own essence, and the same one be both generating and generated, or the same becoming Father and Son; for He is incorruptible." Such, perhaps, is what the prophet says concerning the impious: "They weave a spider’s web" 98. For as in that case there is the appearance of a web, but no solid substance underlies the appearance—for he who touches it touches nothing that exists, as the threads of the spider perish by the touch of the fingers—such also is this futile and non-subsistent weaving of empty words. "Not by generating," he says, "does He divide His own essence, and the same be both generating and generated." Is it necessary to call what is said a discourse, or rather a mass of phlegm, D spat out from some dropsical accumulation? For what is it "to divide one's own essence in generating, and for the same to be both generating and generated?" Who is so out of his mind...
A in his thinking, as to say that this is the doctrine against which Eunomius seems to fight? For the Church believes the true Father to be truly the Father of His own Son, as the Apostle says, and not of someone else; for in one of the Epistles he declared: "He who did not spare His own Son" (Rom. viii, 32), contrasting by the addition of "His own" those who are deemed worthy of adoption by grace and not by nature. But what does he who calumniates this belief of ours say? "Not dividing His own essence in generating, nor is He who generates the same as He who is generated; nor is the same [Person] Father and Son; for He is incorruptible." Does anyone, hearing that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God" (Joan. i, 1), and that "the Word went forth from God the Father," thus besmirch and defile such a sincere and pure doctrine with these foul and stinking thoughts, while saying: "He does not divide His essence in generating"? O, the abomination of these filthy and corrupt notions! How does he who says such things not understand that, when God was manifested through flesh, He did not take on the passion of human nature for the formation of His own body, but rather "a child was born to us of the Holy Spirit and of the power of the Most High" (Matth. i, 18; Luc. i, 27); and neither did the Virgin suffer, nor was the Spirit diminished, nor was the power of the Most High divided? For the Spirit is whole, and the power of the Most High remained undiminished; and the child was born whole, and did not violate the integrity of the mother. Then, indeed, flesh was born from flesh B without passion; yet Eunomius does not wish this radiance of glory to be from the glory itself, since the glory that generates the light is neither diminished nor divided into parts. Indeed, the human word is generated from the mind indivisibly. But the Word of God, according to him, cannot be born from the Father unless the Father's essence has been sliced into parts! Who is so senseless and stupid as not to understand the absurdity and madness of this dogma? "Not in generating," he says, "dividing his own essence." For whose essence is divided into parts in the act of generation? For essence in humans is human nature. Among beings devoid of reason, it is, generally speaking, the irrational nature; and specifically, in the case of oxen, sheep, and all irrational animals, the nature viewed according to the differences of properties. Which of these, then, divides its own essence through birth or offspring? Does not nature C always remain whole in each of the animals through the succession of those born? Furthermore, when a human generates a human from himself, he does not distribute his nature, but it is whole both in the one who generated and in the one who is generated; it is not separated and relocated from the former to the latter, nor is it truncated in the one when it becomes perfect in the other. Rather, it is entirely present in this one and entirely found in that one. For even before he generated the one from himself, the human was a rational animal, mortal, capable of intelligence and knowledge. And when he generated such a human, so that all the properties of the nature were shown in him, he did not lose the being of a human D
that he would suppose that by such disconnected words he could corrupt the true doctrine of piety, or provide some strength for impiety, not knowing that by the very things through which he thinks to construct an absurdity, he is found to be a patron and defender of the truth? For we ourselves say that he who possesses all the things of his own Father is that whole thing, except for being the Father. And he who possesses all the things that are of the Son shows the whole Son in himself, except for being the Son. B Thus, the construction of absurdity which Eunomius now attempts becomes an ally of the truth, since our own understanding is clearer and more manifest, according to the induction of the evangelical word. For if he who has seen the Son sees the Father, the Father has generated another himself, without departing from himself, and appearing wholly in him. So that through these things, what seemed to have been said against the truth is shown to be an aid to sound teaching.
"But," he says, "not dividing his own essence in generating, and being the same who generates and who is generated, or the same being both Father and Son: for he is incorruptible." C Oh, the necessity of the conclusion! What are you saying, most wise sir? Because he is incorruptible, he does not divide his own essence while generating the Son; neither does he generate himself, and is generated by himself; nor does the Father at the same time become his own self and Son, because he is incorruptible. Therefore, if anyone is of a corruptible nature, he divides his essence when generating; and he is generated by himself, and generates himself, and becomes his own father and son, because he is not incorruptible. But if these things are so, then Abraham did not beget Ishmael and Isaac, because he was corruptible; but he brought forth himself D through the bondmaid and the lawful wife, or by some other portentous reasoning he diffused his essence by dividing it among the begotten. First indeed, in the birth through the bondmaid Hagar, having been divided into two segments, in one of the halves Ishmael is generated, and in the other half remains Abraham. After this, the remainder of Abraham's essence was divided into the double birth of Isaac, so that in each of the descendants there was an eighth part. How might someone dissect [this] into the twelve patriarchs, breaking down the eighth part into particles, or into the seventy-five souls with whom Jacob went down into
A Ægyptum? And why do I say these things, when the madness of these assertions should have been refuted, starting from the first man? For if it belongs to the incorruptible alone not to divide its nature in begetting, and Adam is corruptible—to whom it was said: "For dust you are, and to dust you shall return"—then, according to the argument of Eunomius, he must have divided his own essence into those who were begotten from him, being cut into pieces. For with the multitude of those coming after, the segment of essence found in each one would necessarily be divided according to the number of those being born; the essence of Adam would be exhausted before it reached the nature subsisting in Abraham, dispersed as it was by the infinite tens of thousands produced from him, through those thin and indivisible particles. Nor would any remainder of Adam's essence be found, which might be divided and diffused into Abraham and his sons and descendants; for the nature would have been consumed and exhausted long before, among the infinite and countless progenitors before him, through those minutiae of the segments of the nature. B Observe the folly of him who knows not what he says nor about what things he makes assertions. For by saying that, because He is incorruptible, He neither divides His essence, nor begets Himself, nor becomes Father of Himself, he indicated by way of consequence that in everything subject to corruption, those things must occur in generation which he maintained do not belong to the incorruptible alone. But although there are many other things that could refute the vanity of these sayings, I believe that what has been brought forward thus far is sufficient for the demonstration of this madness. It is certainly agreed among those who are learned and knowledgeable that one must look at what follows from each thing. He who attributes incorruptibility to the Father alone, confirms that all things discerned by soul and mind after the Father are corruptible, by the difference that exists in relation to the incorruptible. So that he does not even show the Son to be free from corruption. If, therefore, he makes the Son to differ from the incorruptible, he does not only define Him as corruptible, but also asserts of Him all other things which he says do not belong to the immortal alone. For of necessity, if the Father alone neither begets Himself nor is begotten of Himself, then everything that is not incorruptible both begets itself and is begotten of itself, and becomes both father and son of itself, being accommodated to both parts of the essence. C For if it belongs to the Father alone to be incorruptible, and it is proper to the incorruptible that these things do not exist, then according to the reasoning of this heresy, the Son is not at all incorruptible, and all these things are necessarily in Him: to divide the essence, to beget Himself and be begotten of Himself, and to become Himself both father and son of Himself. But perhaps it is vain to dwell and be detained longer with the senseless and the insane. Let us therefore pass on to the things that follow next in his discourse. To these, therefore, he adds: "Not in making does He need matter, or parts, or natural instruments (for He is in need of nothing)." Although Eunomius expounds this notion more remissly in its wording, D yet we do not reject it
for we have learned that "He spoke and they were made; He commanded and they were created." A We know that the Word is the Maker of matter, simultaneously perfecting the qualities along with the matter itself. Thus, to Him all things are present, and instead of all things, there is the impulse of His omnipotent will: matter, instrument, place, time, essence, quality, and everything that is understood to exist in creation. For as soon as He willed that which ought to be made, the power that produces existing things concurred with the thought, making the will a deed. For thus does the great Moses philosophize concerning the divine power in the account of the world's creation, attributing the production of each of the things that appear in creation to imperative commands. For He says, "God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light," and the same concerning the others; He mentions neither matter nor instrumental ministry. Therefore, in this part, the argument of Eunomius is not to be rejected. For God, in creating whatever had its origin through creation, felt no need of any underlying matter or instruments for their construction. For the power and wisdom of God is in need of no outside assistance. B And Christ is the power and wisdom of God, through whom all things came to be, and without whom there is nothing of the things that are, as John testifies. If, therefore, all things came to be through Him, both visible and invisible, and the will alone suffices for the subsistence of the things that are (for the will itself is power), Eunomius has brought forth our argument in a more remiss discourse. For if He "upholds all things by the word of His power," of what instrument or what matter would He have need while upholding through the omnipotent word the subsistence of the things that are? C But if he constructs for the Son that which we have believed concerning the Only-Begotten in the case of creation — namely, as if the Father created Him in a similar manner to how creation came to be from the Son — we repeat here again the argument stated previously: that such an opinion is a denial of the divinity of the Only-Begotten. For we have learned from the great voice of Paul that it is the characteristic of idolaters to "worship and serve the creature rather than Him who created," and from the word of David saying, "There shall be no new god in you, nor shall you worship a foreign god." We use this rule and standard for the recognition of Him who is worshiped, so as to be persuaded that this is truly God, who is neither "new" D nor "foreign." Since, therefore, we have been taught to believe that the only-begotten God is God, we confess that He is neither new nor foreign because we believe that He is God. If, therefore, He is God, He is not new; and he who is not new is in every way eternal. Thus, He who is eternal is neither new, nor is He foreign to the true divinity, being from the Father, and being in the bosom of the Father, and having the Father in Himself. Wherefore, he who separates the Son from the nature of the Father either altogether abolishes the adoration, so that he may not adore a foreign god, or worships an idol,
A setting up a creature and not God for his worship, and applying the name of Christ to the idol.
But that he looks to this idea in his assessment of the Only-Begotten will become clearer from those things which he sets forth concerning the Only-Begotten Himself, which are to this effect: We believe also in the Son of God, the Only-Begotten God, the firstborn of every creature, the true Son, not unbegotten, truly begotten before the ages: not without a generation before He was, named Son, begotten before every creature, not uncreated. I think that the mere reading of the stated words is sufficient, even without our examination, to declare the impiety of this dogma; for when he called Him firstborn, lest he should generate in the hearers any ambiguity as to His not being a creature, he immediately subjoined "not uncreated," lest at any time, the significance of the Son having been grasped as it is accustomed to be, some pious notion B should be inserted into the minds of the hearers. For this reason, although having confessed in the first place the Son of God and the Only-Begotten God, he immediately, through the things that follow, perversely turns the mind of the hearers from the pious opinion to the heretical understanding. For he who has heard "Son of God" and "Only-Begotten God" is necessarily raised to higher speculations, being guided as if by the hand through the significance of these terms, because no difference of nature is insinuated by the word "God" and by the significance of "Son." For how could anything else besides the nature of the Father be understood of Him who is truly the Son of God, and who is Himself God? But in order that the notions of piety might not first be impressed upon the hearts of the hearers through these names, he immediately says, "firstborn of the creature"; not without a generation before He was, named Son, begotten before every creature, not uncreated. As therefore it might appear that this wicked and crafty man holds out these first words as a lure C to men, in order that the deadly poison might be accepted, sweetened by being seasoned with more religious names like honey, let us dwell a little upon this discourse. Who does not see how great the difference between the Only-Begotten and the firstborn is according to what is signified? For neither is the Only-Begotten thought of as having brothers, nor is the firstborn thought of without brothers; but the firstborn is not the Only-Begotten; for he is altogether the firstborn of brothers: but the Only-Begotten has no brother: for He would not be the Only-Begotten if He were numbered with brothers. Furthermore, of whatever essence the brothers of the firstborn might be, the firstborn will necessarily be of the same essence. And not only is this signified by this term, but also that He has His being from the same source, both the firstborn Himself and those who were born after Him; the firstborn contributing nothing to the generation of those who are born subsequently: so that by these things the voice of John, which testifies that all things were made through Him, would be constructed to be false. For if He is the firstborn, He differs D only by the prerogative of time from those who came into being after Him; certainly another...
A by whom the power both for this one and for the rest to be, has come into existence. But that we may not give to any of the calumniators an opportunity of suspecting that we do not admit the divinely inspired utterances by which we make our stand, we shall first set forth our own understanding regarding these names; and then we shall add the judgment of the better sort for those who are listening. The great Paul, knowing that the Unigenite God is the Prince and Author of all good, and He who holds the primacy in all things, testifies to Him not only that the creation of the things that are came into being through Him, but that when the ancient creation of men had grown old and vanished, as he himself calls it, and another new creation had come into being in Christ, no other person was the Leader and Author of this, but He Himself is the Firstborn of all the creation which has come into being through the Gospel.
And so that the meaning concerning this may be clearer, we shall partition the argument as follows: The divine Apostle mentions this term four times. Once he has spoken thus: "That He is the Firstborn of all creation." Again, that He is "the Firstborn among many brethren." Thirdly, that He is "the Firstborn from the dead." After these he sets forth the term as absolute and unrelated, saying: B "But when He again brings the Firstborn into the world, He says: And let all the angels of God worship Him." Therefore, whatever understanding we discern concerning the other combinations of this name, we shall consistently apply the same to the Firstborn of creation. For since there is one and the selfsame term, it is absolutely necessary that the meaning signified by it should also be one. How, then, does He become the "Firstborn among many brethren," and how the "Firstborn of the dead," is this not entirely clear? It is because we were born of blood and flesh, as Scripture says, and He who for our sake became as we are, and partook of flesh and blood, being about to transform us from the corruptible to the incorruptible, through the birth from above, that which is by water and the Spirit—He Himself became the leader of such a birth, by drawing down, through His own baptism, the Holy Spirit C upon the water; so that He might be the Firstborn of all who are spiritually regenerated, and call those who have shared in the same birth as He, through water and the Spirit, His brethren.
And since it was also necessary for Him to bestow upon our nature the power for the resurrection from the dead, He again becomes the "first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep," and "Firstborn from the dead," as the One who was the first to dissolve by Himself the pangs of death; so that a way might be made for us also to rebirth from death, through the Lord's resurrection by which the pang of death, in which we were held, was loosed. As, therefore, by partaking of the regeneration through the laver, He becomes the Firstborn of brethren; and again, by making Himself the first-fruits of the resurrection, He is named the Firstborn from the dead, thus holding the primacy in all things. After all the ancient things have passed away, D
A as the Apostle says, He becomes the firstborn of the new creation of men, through the dual regeneration—that according to holy baptism and that from the resurrection of the dead—He becoming for us the leader of life in both respects, both first-fruits and firstborn. This Firstborn, therefore, has brethren, concerning whom He says to Mary: "Go, and tell my brethren: I am ascending to my Father and your Father, and my God and your God." For by these words, He summarizes in brief the whole scope of the dispensation according to man. For men, departing from God, served those who are not gods by nature; and being children of God, they attached themselves to an evil and falsely-named father. For this reason, the mediator between God and men, having taken upon Himself the first-fruits of all human nature—not from the divine Person, but from ours—sends these tokens of His own to His brethren, saying: "I am going to make for you a Father—the true Father from whom you were separated; and to make for you God—the true God from whom you stood apart." For through the first-fruits which I have taken, I shall bring the whole human race to God and the Father in Myself.
B The first-fruits, therefore, having made Him who is God its own God, and the good Father its own Father, the good is set right for the whole of nature, and He becomes Father and God of all men through the first-fruits. "For if the first-fruits are holy," he says, "so is the lump." Where the first-fruits are Christ, and Christ is the first-fruits, there also are they who belong to Christ, as the Apostle says. Therefore, in those places where he mentions the Firstborn by way of a pairing, having made mention of the dead and of creation and of brethren, he instructs us to understand these things and things of a similar nature. But where he speaks without such an addition, saying, "And again, when He brings the Firstborn into the world," the addition of the word "again" foretells the appearance of the Lord of all that will happen at the end. For just as, "In the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of those in heaven, and of those on earth, and of those under the earth"—even though the Son does not have a human name, because it is a name above every name—so he says that the Firstborn is worshipped by every supermundane creation, He who for our sake was named this; and C that He again enters into the world, when He shall judge the world in righteousness and the peoples in uprightness. Thus, by the word of piety, the meaning of "Firstborn" and "Only-begotten" is distinguished and adjudicated, with the appropriate meaning of each name being preserved. But he who reduces the name of "Firstborn" to that existence which is before the ages, how does he preserve the notion of "Only-begotten" once it has been perceived by the mind? Let the intelligent listener consider whether these things agree with one another, since neither is the Firstborn understood without brethren, nor is the Only-begotten understood with brethren. For when he said, "In the beginning was the Word," by this we understood the Only-begotten. But when he adds, "And the Word became flesh," by this we have in our understanding the Firstborn.
A And thus the word of piety remains unconfused, preserving the meanings naturally attached to each of the two names, so that we perceive the pre-eternal in the Only-begotten, and through the Firstborn of creation, we perceive the manifestation in the flesh of him who is before the ages.
Again, let us take up the word of Eunomius for examination. "We believe," he says, "in the Son of God, the Only-begotten God, the Firstborn of all creation, the true Son, not unbegotten, truly begotten before the ages." That he shifts the emphasis of generation to the meaning of creation is clear, from the fact that he explicitly called him a creature, having said he was made and not uncreated. B But we, so that his rashness and lack of instruction in dogmas might be most fully revealed, leaving aside lamentations over the obviousness of the blasphemy, shall distinguish the discourse regarding him with a certain technical division. For it seems to me to be well to look into the very meaning of generation with more careful examination. That this name signifies being from some cause is clear to everyone, and I do not think one needs to contend about this; but since the account of those things which subsist from a cause is different, I think it fitting that this be clarified by a certain technical division.
We have grasped these differences, then, of the things that have come to be from some cause. For some things are from matter and art, such as the constructions of buildings and other works, which come to be through matter combined with itself, over which some art presides as mistress, bringing that which is proposed to its own proper end. Others are from matter and nature. C For nature constructs the generations of animals from one another, accomplishing its own work through the material subsistence in bodies. Others are from a material effusion, in which that which precedes remains as it is, and that which flows from it is seen by itself; as in the case of the sun and the ray, or the lamp and the splendor, or in the case of aromatics and perfumes, and the quality emanating from them. For these, remaining undiminished in themselves, immediately have, each of them, the natural property emanating from them accompanying them; as the sun has the ray, the lamp the splendor, and the aromatics the scent diffused from them into the air. There is also another kind of generation besides these: one where the cause is immaterial and bodiless, D but the generation is sensible and through bodies; I mean the word generated from the mind. For the mind, being in itself bodiless, produces the word through sensible organs. We have surveyed as many differences of generation as these in a kind of theoretical contemplation.
Since, then, these modes of generation have been divided by us in this way, it would be time to see how the benevolent dispensation of the holy Spirit, handing down the divine mysteries through things we can grasp, makes the teaching that is above reason, for all of the
A kinds of generation that human intelligence knows, take hold for the demonstration of ineffable power, while omitting the corporeal implications of the names. For when it speaks of the creative and formative power, it certainly calls such an operation a generation, because the discourse must descend to the humble and weak grasp of our capacity and intelligence. Indeed, it does not demonstrate all the things that are seen among us to be associated with generation—not place, not time, nor preparation of matter, nor the kinship of tools, nor the goal toward which that which is born tends. Instead, leaving these for us to ponder, it magnificently and sublimely attributes to God the generation of things that exist, in which it says that "He spoke and they were created, He commanded and they were fashioned" 3. Again, when it explains B the ineffable and incommunicable existence of the Only-Begotten from the Father, which surpasses all human reason and discourse—because human poverty and lack of resources are not capable of those teachings that are far more sublime and higher than human discourse and intelligence—there too it makes use of our words and accommodates itself to our capacity, and calls Him Son, which is the name that is customary among us for those born from matter and nature. But just as when the divine discourse spoke of the generation through creation, because that came to be out of a certain matter, it did not add the essence of the matter, and place, and time, and all such things, declaring that the power belongs to the will of God; so too here, when it said "Son," it omitted all the other things that human nature sees in low, earthly generation: I mean passions and dispositions, and the cooperation of time, and the need for place, and before all, matter—without all of which the lower, natural generation cannot consist. C Since, therefore, all such material and spatial essence is not included in the signification of the Son, only nature is left behind. And for this reason, by the word "Son," the proper and genuine revelation from the Father in the Only-Begotten is interpreted. And because such a mode of generation was not sufficient to produce in us an adequate understanding of the ineffable existence of the Only-Begotten, it includes also another mode of generation for the signification of the theology of the Son, that from material emanation, and it says "Splendor of glory," and "Fragrance of perfume," and "Vapor of God," which our custom calls material emanation in the technical exposition set forth by us. D But just as in the aforementioned, neither the generation of creation, nor the signification of the Son, admitted either time, or matter, or place, or passion, so also here, with every material notion passed over, the discourse of the Holy Scripture, taking up only the signification of the splendor and the others mentioned—which is becoming to God and worthy of such a species of generation—shows what is required: that He must be understood as being from Him and with Him in the same way through the implication of this expression. For neither
does the vapor represent the diffusion into the air from the underlying matter, nor does the odor show the emigration that happens from the quality of the perfume toward the air, nor does the radiance A demonstrate the emanation that occurs through rays from the solar body. But this alone, of all things, as has been said, is indicated by such a mode of generation: that He exists from Him and is conceived with Him, with no interval of distance between the Father and the mediator who is from Him. Since, out of greater benevolence, the grace of the Holy Spirit has provided for us to form divine notions about the Only-Begotten from many places, it added also the remaining species of those things observed in generation, namely that from mind and word. But B the sublime John uses these with greater providence, so that the hearer might not, through languor and pusillanimity, fall to the common notion of speech, as if the Son were thought to be a sound of the Father; for this reason, he attests to the Word that it exists essentially in that first and blessed nature, thus crying out the proclamation: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was light, and life, and everything that is the beginning, and He was." Therefore, we must piously receive each of these—this mode of generation, or those things subsisting from a cause, which are known in our common custom and have also C been taken from Holy Scripture for the teaching of those things which are above—in such a way as is likely for the presentation of divine notions.
It would now be time to consider also, at what meaning Eunomius receives the expression of generation in his discourse. He says, "a true Son, not unbegotten, and truly begotten before the ages." I think it is proper to pass over the sequence corrupted in the distinction, as it is known to everyone. For who does not know that to the Son, in relation to the Father, and to the begotten, in relation to the unbegotten... of the antithesis, he, passing over the Father, antithesizes the unbegotten to the Son? It was necessary, if he had cared for the truth, not to overturn the account of the relative D sequence, but to say, "the true Son, not the Father." Thus, piety would have been preserved with the sequence of the discourse, and the nature would not have been sundered by the distinction of the persons. But he, changing the true and written use of "Father" handed down by the Word Himself in the discourse of faith, named "unbegotten" instead of "Father," so that, having separated Him from the natural affinity to the Son seen in the Father's title, he might make Him common to all things appearing in creation, to which the antithesis to the unbegotten is equal. "Truly," he says, "begotten before the ages." Let him say from whom; he will surely say from the Father, if he is not shameless toward the truth. But since it is not possible to separate the eternity of the Son from the eternal Father, because the significance of the Father also simultaneously indicates the Son, therefore the title of Father being repudiated, he transfers the word to the unbegotten, since the significance of this name...
is unrelated to and incommunicable to the Son. And thus, having led the hearers away from contemplating the Son with the Father, by the substitution of the name he gave a path to wickedness, paving the way for impiety through the interpolation of the "unbegotten." For those who, according to the command of the Master, have faith in the Father, at the same time as they hear "the Father," they also receive the Son into their mind, with no intervening interval of thought, the mind passing from the Son to the Father. But those who, instead of the Father, are led over to the title of the "unbegotten," receive only a thin notion of this name, being taught only that he is not begotten, but not that he is the Father. Yet from this, for those who perceive intelligently, faith remains unconfused even through this notion. For "not to be begotten" is said in the same way of the uncreated nature. And the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are equally uncreated. Because it is believed by those who follow the divine voices that every creature, both sensible and supermundane (or angelic), has its subsistence B from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For he who has heard that "by the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power," did not conceive in his mind "word" as some sort of utterance, nor "Spirit" as a breath; but he imprinted in his soul, through the things that were said, the God-Word and the Spirit of God. For the same thing cannot both create and be created. But since things are divided into that which creates and that which is created, each being different in nature from the other, so that that which is created is not uncreated, nor is that which produces the nature of created things created; those, therefore, who according to the dominical institution of faith have believed in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, confess equally that none of these is begotten, and the significance of "unbegotten" in no way harms the sound faith. But for the thick-skinned and dull, C who are not well-composed and coherent, this name becomes the beginning of the perversion from the sound doctrine. For not understanding the true sense of this name—namely, that this word "unbegotten" signifies only the "not being begotten," and that "not being begotten" is common to the whole supervening nature—they omitted the faith in the Father and set up the name "unbegotten" in place of the Father. And since, as has been said, the subsistence, or person, of the Only-begotten does not appear simultaneously with this name "unbegotten," they define the nature of the Son by a certain determined beginning, saying what this man just now added to his statements: that the Son is "named not without generation, which precedes his being." What is this monstrous assertion again? Does he not know that he is speaking about God? Who is in the beginning and is in the Father? And there is no time when he was not? He does not know what he says. He asserts nothing about anyone; D but as if he were describing the genealogy of some human being, he tries to adapt and attach to the Master of all nature things which are properly said of the lower nature. For example, Ishmael, to speak of such, was not before the generation of his...
A birth—I mean the temporal interval. But in the case of the radiance of the glory, the words "before" and "after" have no place. For before the radiance, there was absolutely no glory; for at the same moment that the glory exists, the radiance necessarily shines forth along with it, and one cannot be separated from the nature of the other. Nor is it possible to see the glory by itself before the radiance. For he who says this makes the glory out to be dark and blind in itself, if the radiance that comes from it is not shining forth with it. But this is the malice of the heresy, that by means of ideas and expressions understood of man, they might cut off the Only-begotten God from unity with the Father. B Therefore he says: "Before the generation that brings him into being, the Son did not exist." But are not the "sons of the rams," of whom the Prophet makes mention, also called sons after they have been begotten? Just as, therefore, the intellect observes in the sons of the rams that, before the generation which is the cause of their being, they are not sons of the rams—this very thing this grave theologian now attributes to the Maker of the ages and of all creation, to Him, I say, who has the eternal Father in Himself, and who is contemplated in the eternity of the Father, just as He Himself says: "I am in the Father, and the Father in me." But those who cannot perceive the malice in the argument, nor have been trained in any understanding of the consequence, follow these incoherent notions, accepting what is presented to them as if it were a logical consequence.
He says, indeed, that "he was made before all creation"; and as if this statement were not sufficient for the demonstration of impiety, he lies in wait with the following expression, having spoken the blasphemy with his mouth, that "He is not uncreated." How, then, does he name Him true Son of God, He who is not uncreated? For if it is proper to call the created son "true son," heaven is also surely a true son; for it, too, is not uncreated. Thus the sun would also be a true son, and everything that creation contains, both small and great, would be entirely worthy of the appellation of true Son. But how does he call the One who was made "Only-begotten"? For all things that were made are in every way brothers to one another, I mean according to the very principle of things being made. And by whom was it made? For everything that has been made was certainly made by the Son. For so John bears witness, saying: "All things were made through Him." C If, therefore, even the Son, according to the argument of Eunomius, was made, He is surely in the nature of made things Himself. If, therefore, all things that were made were made through Him, and the Word is also one of the things that were made, who is so senseless as not to perceive from these premises the absurdity, that this new teacher of heresy declares the Master of creation to have been made His own work, by explicitly saying that the Lord, the Creator of all creation, is not uncreated? Whence does he have the boldness to assert this? Let him say. From what God-inspired D utterance? What evangelist, what apostle has let forth such a voice? What prophet, or lawgiver,
A or patriarch, or any other of those inspired by the Holy Spirit, whose utterances are recorded, has introduced such a statement? We have learned from the Truth, in the tradition of the faith, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; or was it necessary to believe that he is a created thing? How could the Truth, while delivering the mystery to us, ordain faith in the Son rather than in a creature? And how does the divine Apostle, while worshipping Christ, define those who serve the creature rather than the Creator as idolaters? For he would either not have worshipped him if he were a creature, or he would not have classified those who serve the creature together with idolaters, lest he himself seem to practice idolatry by offering worship to a creature. But he knows that he who is worshipped by him is God over all; for thus he names the Son in his discourse to the Romans. Those, therefore, who alienate the Son from the essence of the Father, and who call him a creature, why do they mockingly bestow upon him that falsely-named title, vainly applying the name of "God"—a name foreign to the true Divinity—as if to Bel, or to Dagon, or to the dragon? Therefore, let those who define him as a creature either not confess him as God, so that they may appear to be Judaizing, or if they confess him to be God who was created, let them not deny that they are practicing idolatry. But they certainly bring forward that proverbial saying which states: "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways, toward his works."
B This matter could be explained more clearly and at greater length, yet it is possible even in a few words to convey the meaning to men of good will; for some of those who are accurately and diligently instructed in the divine Scriptures say that the word "created" is not written in the Hebrew; and we ourselves have read in older books that "possessed" is written instead of "created me." The "creation" in these proverbial riddles clearly signifies the "servant"—he who for our sake took on the form of a servant. If anyone should object concerning the reading that prevails in the churches on this point, we do not reject the word "created" either. For this also points, through the riddle, to the significance of the servant, since all creation serves, as the Apostle says. C For this reason, we declare that this word is piously accepted. For he who was born for our sake according to us was indeed truly created in the last days. He who in the beginning was the Word and was God, afterwards became flesh and man. The nature of the flesh, however, is created; and he became a participant in this in all things according to likeness, except for sin, created indeed according to God and not according to man, as the Apostle says, in a new way and not in the human manner. For we have learned that he was created of the Holy Spirit and of the power of the Most High—yet this new man was created, he whom the instructor D of the ineffable mysteries...
Paul, commands us to put on, calling that clothing by a double name: sometimes saying, "Put on the new man, which after God is created," and again, "Put on the Lord Jesus Christ." A For to us who have put him on, he who said, "I am the way," becomes the beginning of the ways of salvation, so that he may make us the work of his own hands, having refashioned us again from the evil figment of sin back to his own image. And the same one also becomes our foundation before the future age, according to the voice of Paul, who says that "other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid"; and, "Before the mountains were settled, and before the hills, was I brought forth." For it is possible for each of these things, being transferred according to proverbial usage, to be applied to the Word in a tropological B contemplation. For the great David calls the mountains of God righteousness, and the depths, judgments, and the fountains, the teachers in the churches, saying: "Bless ye God the Lord from the fountains of Israel"; and the hills, innocence, which he demonstrated through the leaping of the lambs. Before these things, then, is generated in us he who was created man for our sake, so that the creation of such things might also find place in us. But I think I should pass over the argument concerning these things, the truth having been sufficiently demonstrated in a few words to those who are fair-minded and sincere.
Let us pass on to the words of Eunomius that follow thereafter. C "In the beginning," he says, "he who was, yet is not without beginning." O, how does he understand the divine voices, he who wishes to be seen as surpassing others in intelligence? He interprets him who was in the beginning as having a beginning; and he does not know that if he who was in the beginning has a beginning, then the beginning itself must necessarily have another beginning. For whatever one says about the beginning, he will by necessity and altogether concede the same about him who was in the beginning. For how shall that which is in the beginning be separated from the beginning? And how shall one conceive of "it was not" before "it was"? For in whatever way one might extend his own intellect toward the understanding of the beginning, D he at the same time perceives in his mind that the Word who is in it cannot be separated from the beginning in which he is, nor can he ever have beginning or end within it. But let no one, through these things, divide the doctrine into two beginnings. For there is truly one beginning, in which the Word is perceived inseparably, who is united through all things to the Father. He who thinks these things will provide no opening for heresy to defile the piety of the faith through the innovation of the term "unbegotten." But in the words set forth subsequently, his discourse seems like bread having much mixture of sand. For having mixed heretical notions with things said soundly, he makes the food inedible by reason of the mingled stone. For he calls the Lord living wisdom, and working truth, and subsistent power, and life. Up to this point it is nourishing; but he inserts poison into what has been said. For having called the life "begotten," he understands something else by the contrast with the unbegotten life, and not the
A true life, the Son, he proposes. Then he says: the Son of God making the dead alive, the true light, the light that enlightens every man coming into the world, the good and the bestower of good things. Proposing all these things, as if it were a kind of honey, to the rather simple, he conceals the poison under the sweetness of these words. For he immediately adds to what has been said his own destructive understanding, saying: "Not having received a share of dignity with the One who begat; nor having been granted the paternal essence as to any other; but having become glorious through generation, and Lord of glory, and having received glory from the Father; not having had a share in His glory, for the glory of the Almighty is not to be shared, just as He said, 'My glory I will not give to another.'" These are the B deadly poisons, which only those who have exercised the instruments of the soul’s intelligence know.
The murderous vice of these things is revealed more clearly in the final things said. Having received, he says, glory from the Father, he did not share in that glory: for the glory of the Almighty is not communicable, as He himself said, "My glory I will not give to another." Who is that "other" to whom God said He would not give His majesty? For the prophet speaks of the adversary: but Eunomius refers the prophecy to the Only-Begotten God himself. For when the prophet had spoken from the person of God, that "My glory I will not give to another," he added, "and my virtues to sculptured images." For since, lured by fraud, men attributed the worship and adoration owed to God to the adversary, honoring the enemy of God by dedicating C sculptured idols, he being multiformly fashioned in men through the images. Having taken pity on the human loss, He who heals those who are ill, foretold through the prophet the benevolence that would arise from Him toward the human race in the last times, in the abolition of the idols, saying: "When the truth is manifested, no longer will my glory be given to another, nor will my virtues be dedicated to sculptured images." For men who have known my glory will not serve those who are not by nature gods. Whatever, therefore, the prophet says from the person of the Lord concerning the contrary operation, this rebel against God and fighter against Him directs at the Lord Himself, who uttered these things through the prophet. Who among the D tyrants is remembered to have been such a persecutor of the faith? Who ever attempted this: that He who appeared in the flesh for the salvation of our souls, as we have believed, is not the true God, but that one who is hostile to God, who in sculptured images and idols worked error and deception against men? For the things that were spoken about that one through the prophet, these Eunomius twists toward the Only-Begotten God. Nor did he understand even this, that the Only-Begotten himself is the one who spoke these things in the prophet, just as he himself asserts in the following passages, that he himself is the one who has spoken in the prophets.
A What need is there for me to speak at greater length about these things? For they hold to the same blasphemy as what was said before. He says that he received glory from the Father, not that he became a partaker or participant of his glory; for the glory of God the Almighty is not communicable. For even if the discussion had only been about Moses, who was glorified in the ministry of the law, I myself would never have uttered such a statement. For although he was not himself luminous with glory from within, nevertheless, through that gift which happened to him from God, he suddenly appeared illustrious and glorious to the Israelites. For that glory which shone forth in that lawgiver was not of any other, but of God himself—the very glory which the Lord in the Gospel commands all to seek, in those passages where he accuses those who value human glory and do not seek the glory that comes from God alone. For by the fact that he commanded them to seek the glory that comes from the one God, he surely promised that what is sought can be obtained. How, then, is the glory of the Almighty incommunicable, if it is necessary to seek the glory that comes from God only, and everyone who asks receives, according to our Lord's voice?
But he who speaks concerning the "radiance of his glory," saying that he B has received the glory, says nothing else than that the radiance of glory is in itself devious of glory; for it needs to receive glory from another, so that thus at some time he too might become a Lord of some glory. Where then shall we place the voices of the truth, both the one which says that he "shall be seen in the glory of the Father," and again, that "all things that the Father has are mine"? To whom ought the listener to pay heed? To him who says that he who is the heir of all things in the Father is a stranger to the glory of the Father, just as the Apostle says, or to him who confesses that he has all that the Father has? For in all things the glory itself is entirely contained. But he says that the glory of the Almighty is incommunicable; C this neither Joel nor the great Peter bears witness to, who claimed the prophetic word for his own in his speech to the Jews. For both the prophet and the apostle say from the person of God himself, "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh." Therefore, he who did not begrudge the communication of his own Spirit to all flesh, how does he not impart his own glory to the Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, and who has everything that the Father has? Or perhaps one might say that Eunomius speaks the truth in this, even if he does not wish it? For properly speaking, communication or impartation is used of one who does not have glory of his own-that is, to whom having it from elsewhere arises not from nature. But where one and the same nature is understood, he who is by nature that which the Father is believed to be does not need him who makes the communication in each individual case; D or rather, to speak more clearly and openly, he has it well. What need has he of the Father's glory, who has the whole Father in himself, with nothing of those things observed in the Father being withheld? And what, pray, is the dignity of the Almighty, of which Eunomius declares the Son to be a stranger? Let the wise men say among themselves...
does Eunomius affirm the Son? Those, therefore, who are wise in their own eyes and learned before themselves, let them bring forth earthly A doctrines: who, as the prophet says, utter their voice from the ground. But we, who adore the Word and are disciples of the truth—nay, who glory in being so—let us not pass by this expression, either, without examining it; for we know that of all the names by which the Divine is signified, some are demonstrative of the divine majesty, being spoken and understood in themselves; while others are named from the operations that occur for our sake and for the sake of the whole creation. For when the divine Apostle says, "to the incorruptible, invisible, only wise God," and such like, he indicates through these names the conceptions that represent the supereminent power. But when He is called in the Scriptures merciful, compassionate, of great mercy, truthful, Christ, Lord, physician, shepherd, way, bread, fountain, king, creator, founder, protector, who is in all and through all, who is all in all; these and such like contain the expression of those things which are brought to pass in the creation by the divine benevolence toward the human race. Therefore, the name of "the All-Holder" (Pantokrator), to those who examine it precisely, is found to signify nothing else in the divine power than that the force and operation which holds together all things that are considered in creation is, in a certain manner, relative to something. This illustrious appellation of the All-Holder shows this; for just as one would not be a physician but for the sake of the sick, nor would He be denominated merciful and compassionate and so forth, except for the sake of the one who is in need of pity and mercy; so neither is He the All-Holder, except for the fact that all creation stood in need of Him who might powerfully embrace and preserve it in its nature. Just as, therefore, the physician becomes such to him who needs healing, so the All-Holder to him who needs to be held; and as those who are in good health have no need of a physician, but those who are ill do; so, consequently, it is well to say that he who is in that state where the nature possesses steadfastness and immutability no longer needs the One who holds. When, therefore, we hear the word "All-Holder," we understand this: that God holds all things in their being, both those that are intelligible and those that are of a material nature. For this reason He holds the circuit of the earth, for this reason He has in His hand the ends of the earth, for this reason He encompasses the heaven with His span, for this reason He measures the water with His hand, for this reason He contains within Himself the whole intelligible creation, D so that all things may remain in their being by the containing power by which they are held.
Who, then, is He who works all things in all? Let us examine. Who is He that made all things, without whom nothing of the things that exist consists? Who is He in whom all things were created, and in whom things that are possess their permanence? In whom we live and move and have our being? Who is He that has all things in Himself, as many
A as the Father has? Are we still ignorant, from the things that have been said, that He is the One who is God over all, as He is named by Paul, our Lord Jesus Christ, who has in His hand everything that belongs to the Father, just as He Himself says? He has encompassed all things with His spacious palm, and He holds and governs what He has encompassed, and no one snatches from the hand of Him who holds all things. If, therefore, He has all things, and holds what He has, what else is He but the Almighty Lord of all, who holds all things powerfully and dominates them? B But if the heresy says that the Father holds the Son and the Spirit, let them first demonstrate that the Son and the Holy Spirit are of a mutable nature, and then let them set over Him who is turned and changed the One who holds Him, so that by the help that is supernaturally produced, that which is held may remain unchangeable toward evil. But if the divine nature is incapable of vice, unturnable and unalterable, and is always in the same state, for what purpose would it stand in need of one who holds it? That which by itself holds the entire creation, is itself not in need of a holder on account of its unchangeability. For this reason, at the name of Jesus, every knee bows, of things in heaven and on earth and under the earth. For it would not have bowed if it did not entirely recognize the One who holds for their salvation. C But to say that the Son was generated by the goodness of the Father is nothing else than to constitute Him and reduce Him to the same honor as the lowest creatures. For what is there that has not arrived at generation through the goodness of Him who made it? To whom is the construction of human nature imputed: to the wickedness or to the goodness of Him who made it? To what is the generation of animals, or the nature of plants and shoots? There is nothing that did not have its origin through the goodness of Him who made it. Therefore, that which reason perceives in all things, this Eunomius grants to the Son as a favor out of benevolence. But that the Son does not share the essence or majesty with the Father, and whatever other such things Eunomius pursues by trifling and blathering, have already been examined and refuted in the discourses concerning the Father, as things that he has cast forth in vain and without any understanding. For not even among us who are born from one another D does a division of essence take place; for the definition of essence remains whole in each, both in the one who is generated and in the one who generates, with the definition of the essence receiving neither diminution in the one who generates nor increase in the one who is generated. But division of dignity or of kingdom in the One who has all things that are the Father's has no understanding, but is a mark and argument of impiety. It would therefore be superfluous to extend the discourse to infinity by becoming entangled in such things.
Let us proceed to what follows these. Glorified, he says, by the Father before the ages. The argument of the truth has been demonstrated as being confirmed by the testimony of its enemies. For this is the head of our faith, that the Son is glorified by the Father from eternity. For "before the age" is identical in meaning to "from eternity," thus, with the prophecy interpreting for us that God's
A eternal nature is in those words where it says, "He who is before the ages." If, therefore, to exist before the ages is beyond every beginning, then he who attributes the pre-eternal glory to the Son has, much earlier, borne witness to His existence from eternity. For it is not that which is not, but that which truly is, that is glorified. After this, he sows for himself the seeds of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; not that he might glorify the Son, but that he might drunkenly rave against the Holy Spirit. For, wishing to show that the Holy Spirit is a part of the angelic power, he poured this forth, saying, "Being glorified by the Spirit throughout the age, and by every rational and created essence," as if there were absolutely no difference between the Holy Spirit and all that is brought into being, if the Holy Spirit thus glorifies the Lord. Just as all the other things of which the Prophet tells: the angels and powers, and the heavens of heavens, and the water that is above the world; and all things that are from the earth: dragons, abysses, fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of the storm, the mountains and all the hills, fruit-bearing trees and all cedars, wild beasts and all cattle, reptiles and winged birds 63. If, therefore, alongside these, he says that the Holy Spirit also glorifies the Son, the impious tongue that rebels against God declares that He is absolutely one of these and identical in nature.
The following points, which are connected in a disjointed manner, I say ought rightfully to be passed over—not because they are unanswerable and impregnable, but because they could be said by those who think piously, if only they were separated from his malignant mode of expression. C For if anything is put forward by him that pertains to piety, such a thing is offered to the simpler folk as bait and lure, so that the hook of impiety may be swallowed along with it. For after having said some things which an ecclesiastical man might also say, he adds: "Obedient to the creation and generation of beings, obedient to every dispensation, not having attained through obedience that He is God the Son, but because He is the Son and begotten One-begotten God, He became obedient in words, obedient in deeds." And yet, who among those conversant and experienced in divine utterances does not know when it was said by the great Paul—and this only once, regarding Him—that "He became obedient" 64? For when He came to fulfill the mystery through the cross, having emptied Himself in the form of a servant, and having humbled Himself in the likeness and figure of man, and having been found as a man in the humble nature of humans, then He becomes obedient—He who took upon Himself our infirmities and bore our diseases, healing the disobedience or contumacy of men by His own obedience, so that by His stripe our wound might be healed, and by His own death He might abolish the common death of men. Then, for our sake, He becomes obedient, just as He became sin and a curse on account of the dispensation undertaken for us, not being this by nature, but becoming so in His love for mankind. Now, the list of such acts of obedience,
from what Scripture was he taught it? On the contrary, every divinely inspired Scripture testifies to His authoritative and imperial power, saying, *He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created* A. For it is clear that the Prophet says these things about Him who carries all things by the word of His power, whose authority established every essence and nature, and all things understood and seen in creation, by the mere impulse of His will. From what source, then, is Eunomius moved to proclaim in myriad ways to the King of creation that He is "obedient," saying that He is "obedient to every act of creation, and obedient to every administration, obedient in words and works"? B Yet it is clear to everyone that such a person becomes obedient to another in words and works who has not yet perfected within himself the power to act or speak precisely and blamelessly, but who looks to his teacher and guide and is educated by his instructions in what is precise in words and works. But to think that Wisdom needs a taskmaster and a teacher—one who directs the sequence or the justice of what is required for It—is a figment of Eunomius's imagination alone. And he says regarding the Father that He is "faithful in words, and faithful in works"; but he did not testify to the Son that He is faithful in what is done and said, but declared Him to be obedient in words, and not faithful. So that, through everything he says, the impiety and blasphemy against Him stand equally; but it is perhaps better to pass over the foolishness and madness of the inserted words in silence, lest any of the thoughtless and imprudent should mock their vanity, when one ought rather to weep for the destruction of their souls than to laugh at the foolishness and fatuity of the words. C For this wise and circumspect dogmatist says that He did not receive His being Son from obedience. O his cleverness! How necessarily he discusses these things for us! That He did not first become obedient and then Son, nor is it right to think of His obedience as older than His generation. But if he had not distinguished these things, who would be so foolish and stupid as to think that His generation was given to Him by the Father as a reward for obedience—He who, before He was brought forth, had demonstrated His facility in obeying and His eagerness to be obedient? D But lest anyone be readily drawn into laughter by the madness of the things said, let him understand that there is also something in the foolishness of what is said that is worthy of tears. For what he wishes to construct through these claims is this: that obedience is His nature. So that even if He wished, it would be impossible for Him not to be obedient. He affirms that He has constructed Himself as something such that by nature He is suited only for obedience, just as that tool which has been shaped to a certain form stamps that shape by necessity onto the underlying material which the smith...
has placed within it—a tool which has no power by itself to draw a straight line if its action is circular, nor to demonstrate a circle through its form if the instrument happened to be shaped for a straight line.
How blasphemous and execrable in its impiety such a way of thinking and understanding is, what need is there for our speech to reveal, when the heretical voice itself proclaims its own absurdity? For if He is obedient because He was born such, then He does not have the same nature as humans at all. Since our B soul is free and its own master, subject to no dominion, choosing of its own accord and by its own will whatever is pleasing and acceptable to it; but he who is subjugated to the necessity of nature acts always—or rather, suffers obedience—even if he does not wish to do so, for his nature does not allow him to do otherwise. For from the fact that He is the Son and was born in such a way, they say He became obedient in words and obedient in deeds.
O, the amazement and the folly of this dogma! You make the Word obedient to words, and you conceive in your mind other "words" before the Word that is by essence; and between the Word who was in the beginning, and the Beginning, you place another mediator Word, conveying the will of the Beginning to Him. And this is not just one Word, but there are several "words" which are slipped in by Eunomius between the Beginning and the Word, and which they use to abuse His obedience as they please.
But why is it necessary to dwell any longer on the vanity of these sayings? For it is clear to everyone that when Paul said He became obedient, he meant it in the same way he said He became flesh, a servant, a curse, and sin for our sake. Nor did the Lord of glory, even then, despising the shame and taking upon Himself the suffering in the flesh, deprive Himself of supreme and free power, when He said, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." And again, "No one takes my soul from me; I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it up again." And when those armed with swords and clubs approached Him on the night that preceded His passion, He cast them all backward by saying, "I am He." And again, when the thief begged Him to remember him, D He showed His power over all things when He said, "Today you will be with me in Paradise."
If, therefore, He is not separated from His power even in the time of His passion, where on earth does this heresy see the subjection of the King of glory? Or what is this manifold mediation which it boasts of regarding God, speaking of a mediator in decrees, and a mediator in the law? We have not been taught these things by the high voice of the Apostle, who says that "by abolishing the law of commandments in his own decrees," this is the mediator of God and men. Having spoken this word—that "there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus"—he laid out for us the entire focus of the mystery through this term "mediator," and revealed it. And this *is* the focus: the human race had departed because of the malice of the adversary, and being enslaved to sin...
was alienated from the true A life. He who is the Lord of His own creature later calls back His creature, and becomes man while being God; and being that whole, He became this whole; and thus the human element was tempered with God, with the man who is according to Christ working the mediation. With the first-fruits taken from us, the *massa* was tempered with all power. Since therefore a mediator is not of one, but God is one, and He is not divided into parts in the persons delivered in the faith—for there is one Godhead in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—for this reason the Lord becomes one mediator between God and men, joining man through Himself to the Godhead. But even through the concept of the mediator we have been taught the piety of the faith: for the mediator between God and men, just as He accepted the communion of human nature—not being thought man, but having been born according to truth—so also is He true God, not honored by the mere designation of Godhead, as Eunomius would wish. B
Whatever else he adds to what has been said partakes of the same folly, or rather, malignancy. For having called Him Son—whom in what was said a little before he clearly and explicitly determined to be created—and having named Him Only-Begotten God—whom he numbered along with the rest of those who have come into being through creation—he said He is "similar" to the One who begot Him, only by an exceptional similarity, according to his own peculiar notion. It is necessary, therefore, first to distinguish the meaning of "similar," how many ways it is said in the misuse of common parlance, and then thus to proceed to the examination of the matters proposed. For first, as many things as deceive our senses, not being the same to each other according to nature, but by some of the accidents that happen to follow the subjects—I speak of shape and color and sound, and as many things as produce deception through taste and smell and touch—these, when they are of one kind according to their own nature, but act as another C than what they are by nature, common parlance says have this property "similarly." For instance, when inanimate matter is molded by art toward the imitation of some animal, through carving or painting or modeling, the imitation is said to be "similar" to the archetype. For here, the nature of the animal is one thing, and the other is that which falsifies the sight by color and shape alone. Of the same species of similarity is the image that appears in a mirror, bearing the evident appearances of the archetypal form, yet not being that in nature which the primigenial archetype is. In the same way, it is possible for hearing to experience the same thing, when someone, by imitating the voice of a nightingale with his own sound, persuades the hearing to think it is listening to a bird. The taste experiences such a deception, too, when the juice of the fruit of figs counterfeits the pleasure of honey; for the juice of D the fruit has something similar to the sweetness of honey. So also by similarity it is possible to deceive even the sense of smell, when the vapor of the camomile herb mimics the fragrant apple itself with its aroma-
A and deceives the sense. The same thing happens also in the sense of touch, for by similarity B in various ways the truth is falsely represented. For a silver or copper coin, equal in size to a gold one and of the same weight, will be thought to have something in common with the gold one, because the sight does not discriminate the truth.
These things have been said briefly in general regarding those things that, because of a certain similarity, deceptively mislead the instruments of the senses, while they are thought to be something other than what they are. Yet it would be possible, through a more careful investigation, to extend the discourse through those things which, though they are of a different kind among themselves, yet by reason of some of those accidents which follow the thing, one is thought to be similar to another. Is there perhaps some such kind of similarity that Eunomius boasts of in the Son? But he would not have reached such a pitch of madness and insanity as to contemplate a fallacious and fraudulent similarity in the truth. Again, we have learned of another similarity in the divinely inspired Scripture from Him who said: Let us make man after our image and likeness 68. But I do not think that Eunomius considers this species of similarity in the Son and the Father, so as to proclaim the Only-Begotten God to be the same as man. We know also another species of similarity, which in the creation of the world the discourse affirms concerning Seth: Adam begat Seth after his image and after his likeness 69; which, if Eunomius is speaking of this, we do not think his speech should be rejected. For here, neither is the nature of those things which agree with one another in similarity different, and the character and species have communion. These and such like things are what we have understood concerning the difference and discrimination of similar things. Let us see, therefore, to what Eunomius is looking when he attributes to the Son that C exceptional similarity with the Father, saying that He is similar to the One who begat Him by an exceptional similarity according to a peculiar notion, not as Father to Father—for there are not two Fathers. Promising to show the exceptional similarity of the Son to the Father, he constructs by his discourse how it does not befit one to understand Him as similar. For when he said that He is not similar to the Father as Father to Father, he established by his discourse that He is not similar. And again, when he added that neither as the unbegotten to the unbegotten, for that reason he denied the similarity in the Son with the Father; then, adding that neither is it as Son to Son, he introduced a third notion, by which he utterly perverts the account of the similar. He, therefore, follows his own reasonings, making the demonstration of the similar through the construction of the dissimilar. But let us examine his wise and simple statement, which he demonstrates by his determinations. For when he said that the Son is similar to the Father, he makes the hearing secure, that it is not necessary to understand the Son as similar to the Father as a Father is to a Father. But who among men is so foolish as to, having learned that the Son is similar to the Father, be led by his reasonings into the similarity of a Father to a Father? Neither as Son to Son, he says; again, the subtlety has the equal in the determination. Having said that the Son is similar to the Father, after having said that it is not necessary to have a similar relation as toward a Son
A — or that a similarity to the Father should be brought to the Son? And yet he does not urge us to understand the Father as such. Nor have we had any need for this superfluous wisdom, such that he should suppose two Fathers and two Sons through the Father and the Son, as if it were a duality of unbegotten ones.
What Eunomius aims at in his great zeal regarding the "unbegotten" has been declared often, and now it will be stated again in a few words. For since the significance of the Father indicates no difference in nature from the Son, if he had stopped his discourse at this point, his impiety would have had no force; because the natural knowledge of these names does not admit what is alien according to essence. But now, by saying "unbegotten" and "begotten," since there is an immediate contrariety between these names—just as between mortal and immortal, or rational and irrational, and all those things that are expressed in a similar way, which, through the meanings of their opposites, are set over against one another—he has opened a path for blasphemy through these names, so that we might contemplate between the begotten and the unbegotten the B same difference as that between the mortal and the immortal. And just as the nature of the mortal is one thing and that of the immortal another, and the properties of the rational and the irrational cannot in any way harmonize according to their essence, but differ most of all, so Eunomius wishes to establish one nature for the unbegotten and another for the begotten. Just as the irrational nature was created subject and enslaved to the rational, he wishes to demonstrate that the begotten is, by natural necessity, subjugated and enslaved to the unbegotten. Therefore, he joins the name of "Almighty" to the unbegotten, which, as the discourse has previously shown, is not for providential activity, but he transfers the interpretation of "Almighty" into a C tyrannical power. So that he might make even the Son a part of the nature that is subject and enslaved, serving together with all creatures the One who rules all equally by tyrannical power. And that he uses such verbal distinctions with this in view will be made clear from what follows. For when he put forward those learned and well-considered words, that "neither does the Father resemble the Father, nor the Son the Son"—although there is no necessity at all that compels one to say that a father is necessarily perceived as similar to a father, and a son to a son; for there is a father among the Ethiopians, and a father among the Scythians, and a son of each of these, the one the black son of the Ethiopian, and the other the white-skinned Scythian with hair tending toward gold. And none the more, because each is a father, does the Scythian turn black because of the D Ethiopian, nor does the body of the Ethiopian turn white because of the Scythian. Nevertheless, when Eunomius had said these things as it pleased him, he added that he is similar as the Son to the
Father. But since the reasoning of such a likeness demonstrates what is proper according to nature, as the divinely inspired doctrine testifies in the case of Seth and Adam; the dogmatist, making little of and holding for nothing those who listen intelligently, subjoined an empty interpretation of the appellation of the Son, defining him as the image and seal of the Omnipotent operation. The Son, he says, is the image and seal of the operation or efficacy of the Omnipotent. B Let him who has ears to hear consider this very thing first. What is that seal of operation? For every operation is beheld in him who works, in that which is being worked. But when that which is being performed has been completed or finished, the operation itself does not subsist by itself; just as the operation of running, which is the movement made by the feet: when the movement has ceased, the operation no longer exists by itself. The same can be said of every matter that is undertaken to be done or handled, namely that the action itself ceases at the same time as the work and effort of him who labors about it; and that the action itself does not subsist in itself, if there is no one who operates in the work and study proposed to him, or if he who labors has ceased from his work. What, therefore, does he say is the operation in itself, which is neither essence, nor character or figure, nor substance? Therefore he says that its image C is of that which does not subsist; but this, which is similar to a non-existent thing, is not itself at all: this is the portentous vanity of empty decrees, to believe in that which is not. For what is similar to non-being is not in any way whatsoever. O Paul, and John, and the rest of the chorus of evangelists and apostles! Who are they who sharpen their virulent tongues against your voice? Who are those who thrust their frog-like voices, raised from the Stygian swamp, against your heavenly thunders? What, then, does the son of thunder say? *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.* What of him who came after him, or that other who was snatched into the heavenly inner sanctuaries and shrines, who, having been initiated in paradise, learned things not to be uttered to the common crowd? He says thus: *Who, being the brightness of his glory and the figure or express image of his substance.* What does this ventriloquist say after these? A seal, he says, of the operation of the Omnipotent: he makes him third after the Father, mediated by that non-existent operation, or rather, if you will, formed from non-existence. D The seal of the operation is he who is in the beginning, the Word God, and who is seen in the eternity of the beginning of those things that are, the Only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, who bears all things by the word of his power, who is the creator of the ages, from whom are all things, and through whom are all things, who contains the circuit of the earth, who measures the heaven with a span, who measures the water with his hand, who has embraced all things that are, who dwelling in the heights looks upon the lowly, or rather, has looked so as to make the whole orb of the earth his footstool.
A It is the radiance and seal of God's operation. Oh that impious ignorance! What is the medium between God and the eternal form? By what is the substance of the Father mediated to its own character? And what is understood to exist between the glory and the radiance? But since there are such and so many things through which the magnificence of the Lord of creation is proclaimed by those entrusted with the gospel, how does this herald of apostasy describe Him? What does he say? He says, "As an image and seal of all the operation and power of the Almighty." How does he distort the words of the great Paul? He says that the Son is the power of God, but this man asserts that He is a seal of power, not the power itself.
B And again, resuming the argument, what does he add to the things already said? He calls Him the seal of the Father’s works and counsels. To what works of the Father is He similar? He will certainly point to the world and all things in it; but the Gospel testifies that all these are works of the Only-Begotten. To what works of the Father, then, was He made similar? Of what works did He become a seal? And what Scripture has called Him the seal of the Father’s works? But if one were even to grant this to Eunomius—that he may fashion arguments at will according to his own pleasure, even if Scripture does not concede it—let him say, I pray, what works of the Father are separate from those made by the Son, of which he says the Son has become the seal? The works of the Word are all things visible and invisible; among the visible are the whole world and all that is in it, and among the invisible is the super-mundane creation. What works of the Father, then, remain outside the visible and invisible, considered in themselves, of which he says the Son has become a seal? Perhaps he will again return to the foul vomit of his heresy, being hemmed in, and will say that the Son is a work of the Father? How then does the Son become the seal of these works? Since He is himself, as he asserts, a work, does he call the same being both a work and a likeness of a work? Let these things be granted; let him name the remaining works, of which he says the Father is the creator, to which the Son was made similar, if indeed by "seal" he intends "likeness." And what other words of the Father does Eunomius know, besides the Word who is always in the Father, whom he calls a seal, the one who is properly, truly, and primarily existing and named the Word? And to what counsels does he look, separate and divergent from the wisdom of God, to which the wisdom of God is made similar, becoming a seal of the counsels? C See the undigested, inconsiderate, and drossy nature of his discourse, the kind of mystery he constructs! He neither knows what he is saying, nor about what he makes his speech. For He who has the whole Father in Himself, and is wholly in the Father, as Word and Wisdom and Power and Truth and Character and Radiance, He Himself is all things in the Father; with no other things being considered in the Father before Him; becoming image and seal and likeness. D Then he grants to Him the
gratifies Him with the destruction of men by water that occurred in the time of Noah, and with the fiery rain that fell upon Sodom, and the just punishment and retribution of the Egyptians, attributing these great deeds to Him who holds the ends of the earth in His hand, in whom all things consist, as the Apostle affirms; as if he were unaware that for Him who embraces all things, and moves and carries toward His own purpose both things already passed and things to come, the two or three miracles mentioned do not bring so much an addition of glory as their omission brings a loss and detriment to the rest. But even if these are passed over in silence, one word of the divine Paul is sufficient to demonstrate comprehensively of itself all that it asserts of Him, both through all things and in all.
Deinde A, inquit, “Legem fert secundum Dei æterni mandatum.” Who is the eternal God? And who is it that ministers to Him in the establishing of the law? But it is clear to everyone that it is God who establishes the law through Moses for those who receive the law. Since, however, Eunomius previously confesses that it is the Only-begotten God who performed the miracles in Moses: how does his present discourse forcibly reduce the Lord of the universe to the rank of Moses? He assigns the meaning of the “eternal God” to the Father alone. So that, by this distinction from the eternal, the Only-begotten God—the Creator of the ages—is shown to be not eternal, but recent. But it seems to me that he, who is so eager to learn and yet so forgetful, has forgotten that all these things are said by Paul about himself, as he announces to men the proclamation of the Gospel according to the command of God. Therefore, Eunomius does not blush to attribute to the Lord of the prophets and apostles what the Apostle relates about himself, in order to make the Lord equal in honor to Paul, his own servant. What need is there for me to bring in a multitude of speech while refuting each point? In these matters, one who reads his writings more simply and carelessly will think that he is saying things permitted by the Scripture; but one who is able to weigh each point with diligent examination will find that in no respect is it separated or different from heretical malice and perversity. For both the churchman and the heretic say that the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son. C But each of them does not understand the statement in the same way. For by the same words, the churchman understands the authority over all; while the heretic constructs a sense of deficiency and subjection.
But that must be added to what has been said, which they serve as a sort of foundation for their impiety in their discourse concerning the dispensation; namely, they determine that not the whole man was saved by Him, but only the half of man, by which I mean the body. For the aim of such malice for them in this teaching D is to show that the more humble expressions, which the Lord utters out of human nature, seem to have been made by the Divinity Itself, in order that through these they may show a stronger blasphemy,
A confirmed by this very confession of the Lord: for this reason he says that He who in the last days became man, did not assume man consisting of soul and body. But I, having searched through the entire divinely inspired and holy Scripture, do not see this statement written, that He who made all things assumed only flesh without a soul at the time of the dispensation according to man. Therefore, necessarily looking towards the goal of our salvation, and the decrees of the Fathers, and the divinely inspired voices, I shall try to refute the impiety being constructed in this regard. The Lord came to seek and to save that which was lost; and it was not [merely] a body that was lost, but the whole man, composed of soul [and body]. And if one must speak more truthfully, the soul had perished before the body. B For disobedience is a sin of choice, not of the body; and choice is proper to the soul, from which the entire calamity of our nature had its beginning, as the truthful threat of God testifies to these words: that on whatever day they should touch the forbidden things, death would without delay be joined to the eating. Since the human composition is twofold, death is fittingly wrought upon each, the double life working the deprivation for the one who dies. For the death of the body is the extinguishing of the senses, and the dissolution into the related elements. But the soul, it says, that sins, shall itself die. Sin, however, is alienation from God, who is the true and only life. Therefore, the first-formed man lived for many hundreds of years after the transgression, yet God did not lie when He said: On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death. For because he was alienated and turned away from the true life, on that day the sentence of death against him was confirmed and made valid. But afterward, as the years passed, physical death also followed Adam. Therefore, He who came for this reason, to seek and save that which was lost, which in the parable the shepherd calls a sheep; and he finds what was lost, and takes the whole sheep upon his own shoulders, and not merely the sheep's skin: C in order that he might make the man of God whole, tempered by soul and body to the Divinity. And thus He left nothing of our nature which He did not assume, He who was tempted in all things by likeness, without sin. Now the soul is not sin, but has become capable of sin through lack of counsel and lack of foresight; which He therefore sanctifies through the blending with Himself, that through the first-fruits He might sanctify the whole lump. For which reason also the angel, announcing to Joseph the destruction of the enemies of the Lord, says that those who were seeking the soul of the child are dead. And the Lord says to the Jews: Why do you seek to kill Me, a man who has spoken the truth to you? But "man" is not called the body of a man, but that which consists of both. And again He says to them: You are angry with Me, because I have made the whole ho-
A man healthy on the Sabbath. But He revealed the meaning of "the whole" in other Gospels, saying to the paralytic who was let down in the midst [by way of] the bed, "Your sins are forgiven," which is a healing of the soul, and "Arise and walk," which looks to the flesh. And in the Gospel according to John, after He gave health to the body and liberated the soul from its own disease—in the words where He says, "You have become healthy; sin no more, lest something worse befall you"—thereby the one who was healed was cured in both parts, I mean in soul and in body. For so also Paul says, in order that He might create the two in Himself into one new man. And thus, at the time of the Passion, He foretells the voluntary departure of His own soul from His own body, saying: "No one takes My soul from Me, but I lay it down of Myself; I have authority to lay My soul down, and I have authority to take it up again." B And also the prophet David, according to the interpretation of the great Peter, looking toward Him, said: "You will not abandon My soul to Hades, nor will You give Your Holy One to see corruption." Thus the apostle Peter interpreted the saying, that neither His soul was abandoned to Hades, nor did His flesh see corruption. For the Divinity, both before the flesh, and in the flesh, and after the Passion, has itself in the same way, being always in its nature and remaining unto eternity. But in the Passion of human nature, He fulfilled the economy for us, detaching the soul for a time from the body, yet He was not separated from either piece to which He was once tempered together; and He joined again those that were separated, so as to give a sequence and a beginning to all human nature for the resurrection from the dead, in order that all C that is corruptible might put on incorruption, and what is mortal [might put on] immortality; our first-fruits, by the tempering with God, having been transformed into the divine nature, just as Peter said, that God made this same Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ. And many [passages] of such a doctrine can be taken from the holy Gospels in support [of this]: how the Lord, by the humanity of Christ, reconciling the world to Himself, distributed the benefit proceeding from Himself into men, to the soul and to the body, willing indeed through the soul, but touching [us] through the body. But it would be superfluous for one going through everything to heap up a crowded multitude in this discourse. D I will add that to the things said, and then I will pass on to what follows: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." Just as we, through soul and body, become a temple of God dwelling and walking within us, so too the Lord names the temple that which is fashioned from both, the dissolution of which signifies the severance of the soul from the body. But if they bring forward the voice of the Gospel, that "The Word became flesh," as if for the reason that the [soul] not being mentioned...
the flesh alone is assumed, let them learn that it is customary for Holy Scripture to include the whole by a part. For he who said, "To Thee shall all flesh come" (Ps. LXIV, 3), does not mean that the flesh will come to the Judge separated from the souls. And when we hear from history that Jacob went down into Egypt with seventy souls (Gen. XLVI, 27), we understand the flesh along with the souls. Thus, therefore, the Word also, having become flesh, assumed the whole of human nature along with the flesh. Hence, hunger and thirst, and being afraid and fearing, and desiring and sleeping, and being troubled and weeping, and all such things had a place in Him; for neither does the Godhead according to its own nature receive such an affection, nor is the flesh in those things of itself, if the soul is not joined with the body. B
And so much for the blasphemy, that is, the impious railing against the Son of God. Let us see also what he sets forth regarding the Holy Spirit. "After this," he says, "we believe in the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth." But I think it is clear to all who read these things, to what end he looks in perverting the exposition of the faith delivered by the Lord in his discourses concerning the Son and the Father. Although the absurdity of this has already been sufficiently refuted, I shall nevertheless endeavor in a few words to make manifest the scope of his deceitful craft. For just as there he did not say "Father," lest by the eternity of the Father he should at the same time point to the Son, nor did he name the "Son," lest he should represent by this word the familiarity and relationship that exist according to nature; so also now he does not say "Holy Spirit," lest he should be compelled to confess by this very name the majesty of His glory and that which is in all respects united to the Father and the Son. For since both the name of "Spirit" and the name of "Holy" are applied by Scripture to the Father and the Son equally with the Spirit (for "God is a Spirit," and "Christ the Lord is a spirit before our face," and "holy is the Lord God," and "one is holy, one is Lord Jesus Christ"), C lest any pious and religious opinion concerning the Holy Spirit should be engendered in the hearers by these words, from the fact that the Holy Spirit has a glorious appellation in common with the Father and the Son, for this reason, deceiving and eluding the hearing of the ignorant and foolish, he changes and inverts the words of the faith set forth by God in the tradition of the mystery, as if here paving a way through this consequence to impiety against the Holy Spirit. For if he had said, "We believe in the Holy Spirit," but "Spirit is God," he who is instructed in divine things would have suspected, "If one must believe in the Holy Spirit, and Spirit is named God, it is by no means anything other according to nature than that which is properly named by the same names." For whatever things are not falsely, nor by misuse, but properly signified by the same names, it is absolutely necessary that there be one and the same nature confessed for those signified by the same names. On account of this, having passed over in silence the...
A voice established by the Lord in the faith, he says: We believe in the Paraclete. But I have learned from the divinely inspired Scripture that this very name is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For the Son likewise calls both himself and the Holy Spirit "Paraclete." And the Father, through the things by which He works "paraclesis" (consolation), altogether claims the name of the Paraclete for Himself. For certainly, He who performs the work of the Paraclete does not disdain the name of the work. For David says to the Father: "You, O Lord, have helped me and comforted me"; and the great Apostle recounts the same things regarding the Father, saying: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who comforts us in all our tribulation." John, in one of his Catholic Epistles, openly names the Son as Paraclete; and the Lord Himself, by the words in which He said that another Paraclete would be sent to us, speaking of the Spirit, entirely confessed this name for Himself beforehand.
Since the meaning of this word "to comfort" (παρακαλεῖν) is twofold—one kind being done through honorable words and gestures, by which we move to compassion one whom we need and win him over; the other being a healing and curative concept for pains of soul and body—the holy Scripture B attributes the notion of the Paraclete equally to the divine nature according to each of these significations. For now Paul presents to us the curative power of God toward us through "paraclesis," saying: "He who comforts the humble, comforted us in the presence of Titus." Again, writing to the Corinthians according to the other understanding, he narrates these things, that "we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God were pleading (comforting) through us. We implore you on Christ’s behalf, be reconciled to God."
Since these things are so, however you may understand the name "Paraclete" in the Spirit, you will not depart from the communion of the Father and the Son, according to either of the meanings. Therefore, not even in this part was he able, though wishing to, to diminish the glory of the Holy Spirit, attributing to Him that which is ascribed by the holy Scripture to the Father and to the Son.
When Eunomius said "Spirit of truth," he himself, as I suppose, wished to establish something subordinate through such a voice. Since Christ is the truth, and he named that one the "Spirit of truth"—as if one were to say being a possession of the truth and subordinate, not knowing that God is called "righteousness," and we do not, of course, understand God to be a possession of righteousness—therefore, when we learned "Spirit of truth," we received an understanding of the word worthy of God, being led as if by the hand by the succeeding discourse toward the better. For when the Lord said, "The Spirit of truth," He immediately added, "who proceeds from the Father." Which, to none of those things C understood in creation, does the voice of the Lord attribute, neither to things that are seen, nor to those that are beyond the gaze of the eye. D
A nor to thrones, nor to principalities, nor to powers, nor to lordships, nor to any other name that is named, neither in this age nor in the age to come. Since, therefore, the whole of creation is devoid of this, it would be manifest in every way that this is the peculiar and B exceptional characteristic of the uncreated nature. But he commands us to believe in “the guide of piety.” Let him, then, believe in Paul, and Barnabas, and Titus, and Silvanus, and Timothy, and all those through whom we were led to the faith. For if one ought to believe in that which leads to piety along with the Father and the Son, then all the prophets and lawgivers, patriarchs, heralds and evangelists, and apostles, pastors and teachers, are to be honored on an equal footing with the Holy Spirit, because they were the providers and teachers of piety to those who were born after them. “Made,” he says, “by God alone through the Only-Begotten.” He brings his whole impiety to a summary and head through these statements. C Again, he calls only the Father God, having used the Only-Begotten as an instrument for the construction of the Spirit. What shadow of such a notion has he found in Scripture to dare these things? From what principle has he led his impiety by sequence to such a conclusion? Which of the evangelists says this? Which apostle? Which prophet? On the contrary, every Scripture inspired by God, being written through the inspiration of the Spirit, testifies to the divinity of the Spirit. For instance (for it is better to prove the argument by the testimonies themselves), those who received D the power to become children of God bear witness to the divinity of the Spirit. For who is ignorant of the voice of the Lord, that those born of the Spirit are children of God? For thus He expressly testifies to the birth of the children of God by the Holy Spirit, saying: “As that which is born of the flesh is flesh, so also that which is born of the spirit is spirit”; and as many as were born of the Spirit were called children of God. Thus also, when the Lord had given the Holy Spirit to the disciples through His breathing, John says, “Of his fullness have we all received.” But the great Paul testifies that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him. But further, through the prophet Isaiah concerning the theophany that occurred to him, when he saw Him sitting on a throne high and lifted up, the older tradition says that He who was seen was the Father; but the evangelist John refers the prophecy to the Lord, saying concerning the Jews who did not believe the words which were said to the prophet concerning the Lord, that “these things said Isaiah, when he saw His glory and spoke of Him.” But the great Paul attributed this same word to the Holy Spirit, in the address which he himself had to the Jews at Rome, when he says, “Well did the Holy Spirit speak concerning you,” showing, as I think, by this holy Scripture, that every divine vision and every manifestation of God, and every word which is spoken in the person of God, is understood of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
For this reason, because David says that they provoked God to anger in the desert, and embittered Him in a land without water, the Apostle refers to the Holy Spirit those things which were done by the Israelites against God, writing to the word thus: “Therefore, as the Holy Spirit says: Do not harden your hearts as in the provocation, in the day of temptation in the desert, where your fathers tempted me,” and he attributes to the person of the Holy Spirit all other things which prophecy attributes to God. B But those who boast that we, by such doctrines, fashion three gods, have perhaps not yet even learned to count. For if the Son and the Father are not divided from one another into a dual signification (for they are one, and not two, according to the voice of the Lord; and the Holy Spirit is also one), how is that which is conjoined with the one split into the number of three gods? Or is it not altogether manifest that no one would cast the charge of a number of three gods upon us, unless he had first established a duality of gods in his own doctrine? For that which adds one to two creates a trinity of gods; but where one God is worshipped in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, what place has the accusation of three gods?
But let us resume the whole discourse of Eunomius. “Made,” he says, “by the only God through the Only-Begotten, and this one also.” C What then is this demonstration, and this? Whether this one is to be counted among those things which were made by the Only-Begotten? They will altogether say that all things were made through Him, and that this one also is included in all things. To whom we will say: “All things were made through Him.” But as Paul says, there were made things visible and invisible, thrones, powers, principalities, dominions, virtues; and in those things enumerated through the thrones and the powers, Paul has included the Cherubim and the Seraphim: up to this point, all things. But the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He is above the nature of those things which were created, he has tacitly passed over in the enumeration of beings; neither demonstrating to us through his own words that He was made, nor that He was subject; D but as the Prophet names the Holy Spirit good, and right, and guiding, indicating by the word guiding the sovereign power: so also the Apostle declares that all things are wrought in all by the same Spirit, as He wills, and attributes full authority to the dignity of the Spirit. But the Lord declares His free power and operation in the discourse with Nicodemus, saying that “the Spirit blows where He wills.” How then does Eunomius assert that this one is of those things which were created by the Son, condemned to eternal subjection? “For once,” he says, “having been made subject.” I do not understand by what species of subjection he subjects Him who has dominion and principality; for this word is manifold in the Holy Scripture, and is understood and said in many ways.
A For the Prophet says that even nature devoid of reason is subjected, and he subjects those who have been conquered in war by the same term; and the Apostle ordains that slaves be subject to their own masters, and commands those who are set over the priesthood to keep their children in subjection, since the disorder occurring from them, after the likeness of the sons of the priest Eli, passes over to the fathers. B But the Apostle also speaks of the subjection of all men to God, when all, having been united to one another through faith, have become one body of the Lord, who is in all; and he speaks of the subjection of the Son to the Father, when the adoration offered by all with one accord to the Son—by those in heaven, and those on earth, and those under the earth—passes over to the glory of the Father, as Paul says: *That at His name every knee of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth should bow, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father*. By which it is established, in the great wisdom of Paul, that the Son who is in all is subjected to the Father through the subjection of all, in whom the Son is. What kind of total subjection, then, does Eunomius prate of regarding the Spirit? It is not possible to learn from the voice he has cast forth, whether it is that of those lacking reason, or of captives, or of household servants, or of children being disciplined, or of those being saved through subjection. For the subjection of men to God is salvation to those who are subjected. According to the voice of the Prophet who says, *Shall not my soul be subject to God? for from Him is my salvation*, subjection is an antidote to destruction. As, therefore, medicine brings aid to the sick, so does subjection to those in need of salvation. But the Holy Spirit, who makes all things live, of what life is He in need, so that through submission He might acquire salvation for Himself? Since, therefore, he has neither any divine utterance to support such prating about the Spirit, nor any sequence of probable reasoning for it, he has uttered this blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; it must be obvious to those who have a mind that the impiety he sets forth against Him is indefensible, supported by neither the testimony of Scripture nor the logic of reason.
D Furthermore, he adds to these things that He is neither ranked according to the Father nor enumerated with the Father—for there is one and only Father, the God over all—nor is He equaled with the Son, for the Son is only-begotten, having no one of the same birth. For my part, if he had only added this to his discourse, that the Holy Spirit is not the father of the Son, I would have thought it vain to dwell upon these things which no one disputes, since they prevent us from thinking things about Him that not even the most foolish would suspect. But because he attempts to construct his impiety through things absurd, inappropriate, and incoherent—by saying that the Holy Spirit is not the father of the Only-begotten—by these very things he demonstrates...
his own folly. For he thinks he can prove that the Spirit is subject to the Father, because the Spirit is not the father of the Only-begotten. But by what necessity is such a conclusion established, as if, were He not the Father, He must necessarily be subject? If it had been demonstrated that "father" and "tyrant" mean the same thing, it would follow that, once the idea of tyranny was understood as belonging to the father, the Spirit must be spoken of as subject to him who was superior in power. But if by the word "father" the relationship to the Son is understood alone, and no tyrannical or despotic notion is introduced by this term, how does it follow B from the fact that the Spirit is not the Father of the Son that the Spirit is subject? "Neither," he says, "is He made equal to the Son." How does he say this? For that which is immutable, and entirely incapable of evil, and ever remains the same in goodness, has no difference in the Son and in the Spirit. For the incorruptibility in the Spirit is equally alien from perishing or corruption, and that which is by nature good is in the same way separated from its opposite. And that which is perfect in every good likewise possesses what is greater, without deficiency.
All these things, moreover, the God-inspired Scripture affirms and teaches concerning the Holy Spirit, assigning to the Holy Spirit the attributes of good, wise, incorruptible, and immortal, and all lofty and God-befitting conceptions and titles. If, therefore, He is not diminished in any of these, in what respect does Eunomius measure out the inequality between the Son and the Spirit? "For the Son," he says, "is the Only-begotten, having no brother of the same kind." But we have discussed in the discourse regarding the "firstborn of all creation" C that the Only-begotten should not be understood in relation to brothers. But we must not let what has been cast out by him through malice and wickedness in this discourse pass by unexamined. For whereas the ecclesiastical dogma proclaims one power, and goodness, and essence, and glory—or majesty—and all such things in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, apart from the difference that exists according to the persons, this man, when he wishes to make the essence of the Only-begotten common with the creature, calls Him the "firstborn of all creation" according to His pre-eternal existence, declaring through this term that all things understood in the creation are brothers of the Lord. For the firstborn is entirely the firstborn not of those of a different kind, but of those of the same kind. But when he separates the Spirit from the connection—or cohesion—that exists with the Son, he calls Him Only-begotten, not having a brother of the same kind—not so that he might understand Him as without brothers, but so that by this he might construct the notion that the Spirit D is alien in essence. For we have learned from Scripture not to call the Holy Spirit a brother of the Lord; but that one should not call the Spirit of the same kind—that is, of the same substance—as the Son is not demonstrated anywhere by the divine words. For if the life-giving power is proved to be in the Father and the Son, it is proved also to be in the Holy Spirit, according to the voice of the Gospel. If the incorruptible, and the immutable, and that which is entirely incapable of evil, and that which is good, and straight, and...
that which has authority, and that which works all in all as it wills: if all such things are to be seen in the same manner in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, how is it possible to conceive of a difference of kind from this very identity? Therefore, the discourse of piety agrees that no fraternity ought to be perceived in the Only-begotten. But that the Spirit is not of the same kind as the Son—that is, strictly speaking, not of the same substance, not the straight with the straight, not the good with the good, not the vivifying with the vivifying—this has been clearly demonstrated to be the product of heretical malice, following the consequence of the argument. B
What, then, is diminished in the majesty of the Spirit through these things? For there is nothing in these God-befitting concepts capable of producing either a redundancy or a diminution. Since all these things are predicated equally by the Holy Scripture of both the Son and the Spirit, in what does he see inequality? He would have nothing to say. But he brings forward an impiety against the Holy Spirit that is naked, unconstructive, and hangs upon no sequence. "Nor," he says, "is it ordained with any other." For it has transcended all the created works brought into being through the Son—in generation, and nature, and glory, and knowledge—as the first and most perfect work of the Only-begotten, and the greatest and most beautiful. For my part, I will leave the unlearned and sordid nature of his language to be mocked by others; for I judge it unbecoming for a man with the white hair of an elder to use such unlearned language against the one who acts impiously toward the Word who is worshipped. But I will add this to the examination: If the Spirit has transcended all the works of the Son—for I will use his own solecistic and senseless utterance, or rather, I will express the meaning more clearly through my own language—if it surpasses all the things that came to be through the Son, the Holy Spirit is unranked with the rest of creation. And if it has the advantage, as Eunomius says, in having been generated before the others, it is absolutely necessary to confess that, in the case of all other creation as well, those which, according to the order of generation, are prior, are to be deemed more honorable than those that follow. C But, indeed, the nature of irrational creatures existed before the formation of man. Therefore, through these things he would surely conclude that the irrational is more excellent than the rational essence. Thus, according to the argument of Eunomius, Cain would be shown to be better than Abel, being prior in time according to birth. Thus, all things that grow from the earth would be shown to be less and more inferior to the nature of the stars. For the former sprouted from the earth on the third day, while the great luminaries and all the stars are recorded by Moses as having been created on the fourth. But surely no one is so senseless as to deem the earthly grass more excellent than the heavenly wonders on account of the seniority of time; or to award the victory to Cain against Abel; or to subject the man who was born after them to the irrational animals. Therefore, that which is proposed by him has no D sense.
A The statement, therefore, that the Spirit has a more honorable nature than the things subsequently created because it was created before the others, is devoid of reason.
Let us see, however, what kind of glory is bestowed upon the Spirit by the one who has separated Him from communion with the Son. For, he says, this one also, being both first and alone, and excelling all the works of the Son according to essence and natural dignity, accomplishing every operation and doctrine according to the will of the Son, being sent by Him, and receiving from Him, and announcing to those who are instructed, is the guide of truth. All operations and doctrine, he says, the Holy Spirit accomplishes: what operation? Is it that which the Father and the Son also effect, according to the word of the Lord, who operates human salvation even until now, or some other operation besides this? If, indeed, He operates that same one, He possesses entirely the same power and nature as the Father and the Son, and a nature of a different kind has no place in God. For just as, if something were to produce the same effects that fire produces—shining and heating in the same way—it would be fire in every respect; so, if the Spirit performs the works of the Father, it must necessarily be confessed that He is of the same nature as He is. But if He operates something else besides our salvation, and if He manifests His operation in something of the contrary sort, He will be shown by these things to be of another nature and essence. Yet the Word Himself testifies that the Spirit vivifies just as the Father and the Son do. Wherefore, B by these same works and effects, it is proved that the Spirit is not alien to the nature of the Father and the Son. And that the Spirit fulfills the operation and doctrine of the Father as it seems good to the Son, we do not deny. For the communion of nature testifies to the one will of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, if the Holy Spirit wills that which seems good to the Son, the communion of will clearly demonstrates the unity of essence. But as for the words, "He is sent by Him, and receives from Him, and announces to the instructed, and is the guide of truth," if he had not said these things concerning the Spirit, one hearing this would clearly have thought that they were spoken of some teacher among men. For it is the same thing to be sent and commissioned, and to have nothing from one's own house or from oneself, but to receive from the grace of the one sending or commissioning, and to minister the words to those who are taught, and to offer oneself as a guide of truth to those who wander. For all these things belong even now to pastors and teachers—to be sent, to receive, to announce, to teach, and to establish the truth: these are the things which Eunomius bestows upon the Holy Spirit. But when he had said before these things that He is also one and first and alone and excelling all: if he had ended his discourse at this point, he would have seemed a champion of the decrees of the truth. For one is truly He who is considered inseparably in the One, and first in the First, and alone in the Alone. For just as the spirit of a man which is in him, and the man himself, is one man, so also the Spirit of God which is in Him, C and God Himself, is truly and properly called one God: and first and alone, in that He could not be separated from Him in whom He is. But now when he added, "excelling all,"
A he showed his own speech to be a muddy subversion against Him who "blows where He wills," and who "works all things in all," in that he provides to Him a more honorable rank or place by comparison with the rest of the creatures.
Let us see, however, what he has also added to these: B "Sanctifying," he says, "the saints." Anyone saying this of the Father and the Son would speak truly. For in whomsoever the Holy One is, He makes them holy, just as the Good One also makes them good. And the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are holy and good, as has been demonstrated. "Initiating," he says, "those who approach the mystery." This he may well say regarding Apollos, who watered the planting of Paul. For the Apostle plants through teaching or instruction, but Apollos waters by baptizing, bringing those who were catechized by Paul to the mystery through mystical regeneration. He therefore makes him equal in honor with Apollos, insofar as he initiates men through baptism. "Distributing," he says, "to each every gift." To this we also agree. For whatever is good is a part of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. "Cooperating," he says, "with the faithful for the understanding and contemplation C of what has been commanded." But since he did not add by whom they were commanded, he left the statement ambiguous, whether the matter stands rightly or otherwise. But we shall apply what has been said to piety with a brief addition. For since it is written that "the word of wisdom, or the word of knowledge, or faith, or healing, or government, or any other thing" among those which save us, "all these one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each one individually as He wills," for this reason we do not reject Eunomius's statement when he said the Spirit cooperates with the faithful for the understanding and contemplation of those things which have been commanded by the Spirit Himself, because all good teachings have been commanded and ordained for us by Him. "Echoing," he says, "to those praying." The meaning of this utterance would be foolish to refute with earnestness, since from the very form of the expression it is quite apparent to all to be both ridiculous and senseless. For who is so headlong and deranged in mind as to wait to learn from us that the Holy Spirit is not a bell or an empty jar, which rings back and resounds, being agitated as if by some blow from the voice of the one praying? D "Leading," he says, "on the way," but to that which is profitable: this both the Father and the Son do likewise. For He leads Joseph as a sheep, and He led His people as sheep. And the good Spirit leads us in a straight path. "Strengthening," he says, "unto piety." David says it is the work of God to strengthen a person in piety. "For You are my strength and my refuge," says the Prophet, "and the Lord is the strength of His people; and He shall give strength and strengthening to His people."
If these things are spoken according to the prophetic mind, they are testimonies to the divinity of the Holy Spirit; A but if they are opposed to the prophecy, by this very fact the blasphemy is condemned, because it maintains opinions contrary to the holy prophets in its discourse. Then he says: *Illuminating souls with the light of knowledge.* The discourse of piety ascribes this grace to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. For that illumination is named by David, and from there the light of knowledge arises in those who are illuminated. Likewise, the purification of the mind is the property, as the Word says, of the Lord’s power; for the *brightness of the glory and the stamp of the substance* accomplished the purification of our sins. As for driving away demons, which Eunomius says is the property of the Spirit, this the Only-begotten God also does, who, saying to the demon, "I command you," attributes it to the power of the Spirit, saying: B *If I in the Spirit of God cast out demons.* So the removal of demons is not an abrogation of the glory of the Spirit, but a confirmation of his divine and transcendent power. Healing the sick, curing the infirm, comforting the afflicted, raising up the falling, refreshing those who labor—these are the words of those who think piously concerning the Holy Spirit. For no one would assign the efficacy of each of these to any other than to God. If, therefore, the heresy confirms that those things which no one can perform except God alone are performed by the power of the Spirit, we obtain, for those things for which we strive with effort and zeal, a testimony even from our enemies. In what way does the Prophet seek healing from God, saying: *Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak; heal me, O Lord, for my bones have been troubled?* Isaiah says to God that C *the dew from you is a medicine to them.* And the prophecy bears witness that the turning back of those who have wandered is the work of God: *for they wandered in the desert in a waterless place.* And he added: *And he led them into a straight path, so that they might travel to a city of habitation.* And: *When the Lord turned back the captivity of Zion.* Likewise, the comfort of the afflicted is referred to God, as Paul says: *Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who comforts us in all our tribulation.* And the prophet, from the person of God, says: *In tribulation I called, and I found you.* The raising up of those who are stumbling is referred in countless ways by Holy Scripture to the power of the Lord: *I was pushed and overthrown D that I might fall, and the Lord took me up;* and, *When he falls, he shall not be bruised, for the Lord supports his hand;* and, *The Lord sets upright those who are crushed.* The recovery of those who are suffering has in it the confession of God’s love for man: if what we learned from the prophecy, he also understood, just as the discourse says: *You laid tribulations upon our backs; you made men mount upon our heads; we passed through fire and water, and you brought us out into a place of refreshment.*
A Up to this point, therefore, the majesty and magnificence of the Spirit are demonstrated through the testimony of the enemies; but in what follows, the purity of piety is again defiled by the heretical mire. For he says concerning the Spirit that He "calls out to those who are struggling."
This assertion bears the charge of the utmost folly and impiety. For in the stadiums, some preside over the games for those who intend to display their athletic strength, while others, excelling others in strength and skill, struggle for victory, stripping themselves for the contests against one another; the rest, divided in their good wishes toward the combatants according to the zeal and disposition each may have toward one of the athletes, call out during the time of the engagement, whether from foreseeing a injury, or from remembering a wrestling maneuver, or to guard themselves through their skill from falling. By what rank, therefore, does Eunomius appoint the Holy Spirit? Understand it from what has been said: for in the stadiums, among those who preside over the games, those who judge the lawful contests, those who are struggling, and those who call out to those who are struggling—who are admitted to be much inferior to those who are contending—Eunomius sees the Holy Spirit as one of the spectators from the crowd, or as one of those who serve the athletes; B who neither presides over the games, nor judges the victory, nor struggles against the opponent, but through the calling out, helps nothing toward the victory. For He neither struggles along with them, nor does He instill the power for this very struggle; He wishes only that he whom He favors should not be shown to be second to his opponents. And yet, Paul struggles against principalities, against powers, against the world-rulers of the darkness of this age, and against spiritual wickedness in the heavenly places. But the Spirit of power does not strengthen the athletes, nor does He distribute the gifts to the athletes, dividing to each individually as He wills, but has the power only to call out to those who are engaged in the conflict.
C Again, he says, "encouraging those who are faint-hearted." This man indeed follows in his own discourse the preceding blasphemy against the Spirit, but the Truth also manifests itself through the mouth of the enemy. For it belongs to no one else to instill boldness into those who are struck with fear, D except to God alone, saying to the one who is fearful: *Do not fear, for I am with you; fear nothing*; as the Prophet says: *For even if I walk in the midst of the shadow of death, I will not fear evils, because you are with me.* But also the Master Himself says to those who are fearful: *Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid*; and, *Why are you fearful, O you of little faith?* and, *Be of good cheer, I am; do not fear*; and again, *Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.* Therefore, even against the will of Eunomius, by means of the very voice of the enemy, piety demonstrates itself. And the discourse that follows also agrees with the preceding one: *Taking care, he says, of all things, and bringing in every care and providence.* For it belongs to God alone, as it is truly, to care for
A all things, as the great David says: *I am poor and needy, and the Lord will take care of me.* But if what remains has been rattled off without intelligence, in a noise of empty words, let no one blame the one who sees him in most places destitute of every intelligent perception and instruction. For what sensible person, he says, for the sake of winning the favor of benevolent people and the custody of the faithful, would say what neither would he himself say, nor would those who senselessly admire his decrees and writings? In Christ Jesus, to whom be glory and power for ever and ever. Amen.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK III
CAPITA OR SUMMARIES OF THE THIRD BOOK
1. This third book shows the third B fall of Eunomius, how he convicts himself, and sometimes says that the Only-Begotten must be named Son, because he was born according to nature from the Father, as the Holy Scripture, he says, declares this from above; but sometimes, because he was created, he is no longer called Son, but a creature. 2. Then again, he expounds in a very beautiful, appropriate, and accurate manner the passage, *The Lord created me.* 3. Then he shows that the non-alienation of essence between the begotten and the unbegotten is no foreign nature, judging by the examples of Adam and Abel and others. 4. Thereafter, he demonstrates the unity of the eternal with the Father, and the identity of essence, and the communion of nature, in which there is also a discussion about the generation of wine, and that both Son and begotten, when stated of the Only-Begotten, have a kinship with one another. 5. In addition to these, he goes through the incomprehensibility of the divine essence, and interprets what was said to the Samaritan woman: *You worship what you do not know.* 6. And after this, he expounds the appellation of Son and of begotten, and the many differences between sons of God, and men, and rams, and perdition, and light, and day. 7. Finally, having interpreted the divine and human appellations of the Only-Begotten, and having carefully discussed the begotten and the unbegotten, he completes the book.
For the one who struggles lawfully, the end of the labors endured in the contests is either that the adversary, worn out by toil, broken and languid, of his own accord offers the grass to the one who has overcome and yields the victory, or that according to the athletic law he is thrown to the ground three times; through which, to the victor, by the judgment of the umpires, with the clear proclamation of the herald, glory accrues as illustrious for the crown obtained. Since, therefore, Eunomius, having already been thrown twice in the previous discourses, does not yet yield to the truth, nor does he allow it to carry off the prizes of victory against the lie, but once again rages against piety through his writing in the customary
A wrestling-ground of falsehood, bracing himself for the contests on behalf of deceit. Necessarily, therefore, also now the word of truth rises up through us for the overthrow of falsehood, having committed its hopes to the Victor and the Agonothete (that is, the establisher of the contests), and at the same time drawing strength from the deceptive craft of the opponent's wrestling. For we confess without shame that we have neither prepared any speech sharpened by rhetorical art for the contests, nor do we bring forward for our defense any sharpness of dialectical sagacity against those things which have been set in array against us, and which further bring the truth into suspicion of falsehood among the unlearned. But the one power of the Word that is in us is against falsehood. B First indeed, the true Word himself, the strength of our own, commands a person to embrace education, but a wise one from antecedent discipline, and then thus to pursue the discipline from the Proverbs. For he says that it belongs to prudence to have words that reveal their purpose through an inversion. For that which is not understood in a straight sense requires a kind of inversion for the grasping of what is hidden. And just as Paul promised that he would change his voice, about to transfer history into tropological contemplation; so here this manifestation of hidden things is called by Solomon an inversion of speech, as if the beauty of the notions could not be understood unless someone, having turned back the outward appearance C of the speech, should see the hidden radiance of the notion. As happens in the case of the feather with which the peacock is adorned at its tail. For if one has looked at the back of the feather, on account of I know not what ugliness and deformity that appears in it, he will altogether despise it as a cheap and worthless spectacle. But if one, having inverted the feather, should show its other aspect, he sees the varied painting of nature, and the half-circle in the middle shining with purple dye, and the gold-colored air around the circle, girt and gleaming with multicolored rainbows at the tip. Since, therefore, there is no beauty in the ready-at-hand nature of the expression—for, he says, "All the glory of the daughter of the king is from within," D shining in a hidden ornament in golden notions—Solomon necessarily enjoins those who encounter this book to invert the speech, so that through this they may understand a parable and a dark speech, the sayings of the wise and their enigmas.
Since, therefore, this Proverbial teaching contains these things, no one of sound mind will accept what is brought forth from this book without examination and without contemplation, even if it happens to be most clear and familiar at first sight. For certainly there lies beneath even those things which seem to be manifest a contemplation according to anagogy. But if the ready-at-hand things of Scripture...
A necessity demand a more detailed examination, how much more so do those things in which there is much obscurity and difficulty, by means of that knowledge and understanding which is derived from it? Let us therefore examine, from the context of the words in that passage, if the reading of the matters set forth contains any manifest sense. The discourse describes Wisdom B recounting certain sayings from her own person. Now, the studious person understands well what is said in that place—where Wisdom declares that she dwells in counsel, calls upon knowledge and discernment, and says that she possesses strength and prudence; and she is herself called insight, and says that she walks in the ways of justice, and moves in the midst of the paths of judgment. She says also that by her kings reign, that potentates decree justice, and that tyrants lord it over their own land. For that he who has used the judgment of right reason will not admit anything from the C sense that is ready at hand and appears at first glance without examination, is manifest to everyone. For if through her kings are promoted to power, and if from her tyranny has its strength, it is strictly necessary that Wisdom appear to us to be a maker of tyrants, and that she transfer to herself the crimes of those who rule wickedly in a kingdom. But we know other kings, who are led by Wisdom truly to an eternal and endless empire, namely, the poor in spirit, whose possession is the kingdom of heaven: just as the Lord, who is the Wisdom of the Gospel, D promises. We likewise understand such "potentates"—those who exercise power against the appetites and passions, who do not serve the power of sin, but who, as if on a tablet, inscribe justice upon their own life. In this way, also, a praiseworthy tyranny, having with the aid of Wisdom converted the democracy of the passions into the monarchy of the mind, brings into servitude those things that poorly bite the bridle toward freedom and exult too ferociously; I mean all bodily and earthly thoughts. For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and rises up against the authority of the soul. Therefore, this kind of tyrant rules over this land, whose prince was ordained by the Word according to the first creation.
As, therefore, these things are conceded by all who think rightly, that they are to be read with such an understanding rather than with that which appears at first glance on the surface of the words, so it is consistent from the sequence that this voice which is written—connected to these things—should not be admitted simply and without investigation by those who think rightly: "If I shall declare to you," she says, "the things that happen daily, and if I shall call to memory to recount the things that have been from the beginning, the Lord created me." What is this voice to me? the servant of the diction will say, who adheres to the sound of syllables in the Jewish manner. Does not this construction of words seem, to the hearing of those who are more attentive, to produce I know not what of something strange and new? "If I shall declare to you the things that happen daily, the Lord created me." As if, if she did not declare the things that happen daily, it would follow...
that she would absolutely deny having been created. For he who said, "If I shall declare," has given us to understand, by the implication of silence, that he would not have been created if he did not declare. "The Lord," he says, "created me, the beginning of his ways for his works; before the age he founded me in the beginning, before he made the earth, before he made the abysses, before the fountains of waters came forth, before the mountains were settled; but before all the hills he begets me." What is this strange order of the construction of this creature? First it is created, and after this it is founded, and then it is begotten. "The Lord," he says, "made the non-habitable regions, and the extremities of the earth that are inhabited under heaven." What sort of Lord does he call the maker of the non-habitable region and of the inhabited world? Surely, the one who also made the Wisdom. For this word and that word are from the same person—both he who says, "The Lord created me," and he who adds, "The Lord made the non-habitable regions." Therefore, the Lord will be equally the creator of two things: of the Wisdom itself, and of the land that is inhabited and that which is not inhabited. How, then, were all things made through the Son, and without him was not one thing made? B For if the same Lord creates both the Wisdom (which they counsel us to understand to be the Son) and each of the things that have been created individually, how then does the sublime John speak the truth when he says that all things were made through him? For this Scripture contradicts the voice of the Gospel, by assigning the creation of the non-habitable and the inhabited region to the one who created Wisdom. And so, too, all the things that follow—that there is a certain throne of God established upon the winds, that the clouds above are made firm, and the sub-celestial fountains are secure, and many such things—are included in the context of the speech, which require a refined and discerning mind to find the underlying meaning in the aforementioned things. What is the throne established upon the winds? What is the security of the fountains that are under heaven? How do the clouds above become firm? For if someone were to judge the account according to things that appear, he will find a great contradiction between the facts and what is asserted. For who is ignorant that the extremities of the earth beneath the heaven are uninhabitable due to the immoderation of either extreme, whether by being too close and proximate to the heat of the sun, or by being excessively distant? Some parts, indeed, are dry and burning beyond a moderate temperature, while others, abounding in moisture, have grown rigid through cold and frost. But only those places are inhabited which are equally removed and set apart from either extreme. But if the middle of the earth is occupied and inhabited by men, C how does the Proverb say that the extremities of the world beneath the heaven are inhabited? Furthermore, what strength can be observed in the clouds, so that the statement might be true according to the meaning that occurs at first sight, which asserts that the clouds above are made firm and strong? For the nature of a cloud is a certain rather rare vapor, diffused through the air, which is carried upon the aerial spirit, becoming light on account of its great thinness. But when it gathers in upon itself from compression, it escapes from the supporting spirit, becoming a heavy drop. What then is the strength in these things, in which no perception arises for those who touch them? For the rarity of the air
A and its diffusion are easy to see in a cloud; how then, once again, is the divine throne defined by the unstable nature of the winds? And as to the assertion that it is first created, then later said to be generated, and between these two is founded—what account could one say this has that corresponds to common and readily available notions? And furthermore, regarding the issue already raised earlier in the discourse: how does the announcement of things that happen daily, and the record of the enumeration of those things that are from ages past, become a sort of cause for saying that Wisdom was created by God?
Since, therefore, it has been clearly demonstrated from what has been said that there is nothing of the sort in these things, why should this statement be accepted unexamined and inconsiderately? It will be worth the effort, as with the rest, to interpret the statement "The Lord created me" not according to the intelligence that is generated in us by the literal force of the word, but to inquire with all attention and diligence into what is piously understood by these words. But to grasp precisely and exactly the meaning of the proposed statements would belong only to those who, led by the Holy Spirit, search the depths and know how to speak in the Spirit of divine mysteries. But our discourse will linger on these words currently under discussion only as much as is sufficient, so that their aim is not passed over undiscussed and unexamined. What then is our own discourse? It is, I think, in no way possible that the wisdom which comes from divine illumination should be present to anyone as this single thing alone, without the remaining gifts of the Spirit, but it is C necessary that with it the grace or gift of prophecy should certainly concur. For if it is the property of wisdom to grasp the truth of things that are, while prophecy contains the declaration of things that are to come, no one would have attained the perfect gift of wisdom who had not attained the knowledge of the future through the cooperation of prophecy. Since, therefore, Solomon claims for himself no human wisdom, when he said, "God has taught me wisdom," and attributes all his own discourses to God, when he says, "My words have been spoken by God," we shall do well if we investigate the prophecy admixed with wisdom in this part of the proverb. We say, therefore, that in the words preceding this place, when he said that "Wisdom has built her house for herself," he hints through this statement at the construction of the Lord's flesh; for true Wisdom did not dwell in an alien dwelling, but built for herself a dwelling-place from the virginal body. But here he adds that which is united from both to the Word—I mean from the house and the Wisdom that built the house—that is, from the humanity and the Godhead tempered or joined with the human; and he adapts to each of these the appropriate and fitting expressions, as it is possible to see happening also in the Gospels, in which the discourse, conducted according to what is appropriate D to the subject, through...
A the more exalted and God-befitting meaning points out what is divine, while through the humble and lowly, it points out what is human. Thus it is possible to see, in this part as well, Solomon moving prophetically and having delivered the whole mystery of the economy. For he speaks first of the pre-eternal power and operation of Wisdom, in which he is in a certain way in agreement with the Evangelist in the very words themselves. For just as that one by a comprehensive utterance proclaimed Him the author and creator of all things, so Solomon says that the individual things enumerated in the universe were brought into being by Him. For he says B that God founded the earth in His wisdom, and He prepared the heavens in prudence, and whatever follows these, holding to the same line of thought. And so that he might not seem to overlook the gift of virtue which is in men, leaving it unmentioned, he proceeds again from the person of Wisdom, saying what we mentioned a little before: "I had counsel and knowledge and understanding as a companion," and whatever belongs to the instruction of the mind and of science.
Having gone through these and such like things, he adds also C the teaching concerning the economy according to man, why the Word became flesh. For it is clear to all that the God who is over all has in Himself nothing created or adventitious—not power, not wisdom, not light, not word, not life, not truth, nor in general anything at all of those things that are contemplated in the fullness of the divine bosom, all of which is the only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father. To none of those things contemplated in God could the name of "creation" be rightly and fittingly applied, so that it might fit to say of the Son who is in the Father, or the Word who was in the beginning, or of the light the light, or of the life the life, or of the wisdom the wisdom, that "The Lord created me." For if the wisdom of God is created, and Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, then God certainly possessed wisdom as an adventitious thing, having acquired it later through creation, which He did not possess from the first. But surely He who is in the bosom of the Father never allows the Father's bosom to be understood as empty of Himself; therefore it is not of things born from without that the bosom consists. But being the fullness of every good, He D who is in the beginning is altogether understood to be in the Father, not waiting to come into being in Him through creation, lest the Father ever be thought of as empty of goods. But He who is understood to be in the eternity of the paternal deity is always in Him; being power, and life, and truth, and light, and wisdom, and such things. Therefore, the voice "He created me" is not from the divine and uncorrupted [nature], but, as has been said, from that which was combined by economy out of our created nature. How then does the same one also found the earth, and prepare the heavens, and break open the abysses, being called wisdom and prudence, and even here is cr-
Aeated for the beginning of works? Not, he says, without a great cause is such a dispensation, that is, the human nature of Christ, brought in as a sharer in the work. But since men, having received the commandment of what they ought to observe and keep—having through contumacy and disobedience expelled it from their memory—became forgetful of the good things, for this reason [I did this], that I might announce to you again the things that happen daily for your salvation, and might remind you of those things which are from of old, enumerating to you those things whose memory you have lost. For I do not now announce some new Gospel, but I am working for your restoration to your pristine state; for the sake of this I, who always am, was created, who needed no creation in order to exist. So that I might be the beginning of the ways for the works of God, I mean mankind. For since the first way had been corrupted, it was necessary for a new and living way to be innovated again for those who were wandering, namely myself, who am the way.
As regards the humanity to which the sentence of the Word, "He created me," refers, the divine Apostle makes this clearer to us through his own words, in which he commands, "Put on the Lord Jesus Christ"; B and furthermore, where he repeats the same language, he says: "Put on the new man, who is created according to God." For if there is but one saving garment, and this is Christ, one could not say that any other than Christ is the new man who is created according to God. But it is clear that he who has put on Christ has put on the new man who is created according to God. For he alone is truly and strictly called the new man, who did not appear in human life through the known and accustomed ways of nature, but a certain unusual and peculiar creation was made new in him alone. Therefore, the Apostle, looking to this admirable and unheard-of mode of generation, names him the same new man created according to God, and looking to the divine nature mixed with the creation of this new man, he calls him Christ. And so it is certain that two terms are used for one and the same person, this term, I mean Christ, and that of the new man created according to God.
Since, therefore, Christ is wisdom, let the intelligent hearer examine the argument C both of those who oppose us and our own, and let him judge which is more congruent and consistent with piety. Which one preserves more God-befitting thoughts in the saying? Is it he who defines the Creator and Lord of the universe as having been made, and constructs him as equal in honor to the serving creation? Or rather he who, looking to the dispensation of the Incarnation, preserves what is appropriate to the estimation of both divinity and humanity, and fits it aptly together? The great Paul especially confirms this doctrine, who in the new man sees the creation, and in true wisdom the power of creation. Moreover, the order of the discourse accords with the contemplation of this doctrine. For if the beginning of the ways had not been created in us, the foundation of the ages which are hoped for would not have been laid, nor would the Lord have become for us the Father of the age to come, had he not, according to Isaiah, been born as a child. D
And his name was called, and all the other things which the prophet named; and with all of these, A *the Father of the age to come*. Therefore, the mystery concerning the virgin birth took place first, and the dispensation regarding the passion. And then the wise architects of the faith laid the foundation of the faith. This is Christ, *the Father of the age to come*, upon whom is built the life of the ages that will never end.
This having come to pass, so that the divine will of the Gospel law and the various gifts of the Holy Spirit might exist in each of the believers—all of which divine Scripture designates tropically according to a certain natural significance as mountains and hills, calling justice the mountains of God, and judgments the abysses, and the earth that which is sown and fructified by the Word into a many-fold harvest. Or, as we are taught elsewhere by David, peace through the mountains and justice through the hills; it is necessary that wisdom be born in the faithful, and the true Word. For he who is in those who have received him, has not yet been born in those who do not believe.
In order, therefore, that these things might also come to be within us, it is necessary that their Creator be born within us. Thus, we shall understand what follows these things by this same logic. For if wisdom is born in us, then by God there is constructed in each person both a region that is inhabited and one that is not. The inhabited region is that which receives the sowing and ploughing of the Word; the uninhabited is the heart which is separated from evil occupants—and thus our dwelling will be in the *highest parts of the earth*. B For since one part of the earth is deep and another is at the surface, when one is not subterranean nor cavernous in thinking the things below—such as the life of those who live in sin, those who are fixed in the unstable mud of the abyss, for whom life is truly a pit, according to the psalm which says: *Let not the pit shut its mouth upon me* (Ps. LXVIII, 16).
If, therefore, someone, having had wisdom born within him, thinks of the things which are above, touching the earth only as much as is necessary, he dwells in the outermost parts of the earth under heaven, not delving deep with a worldly mindset. Wisdom is present to him who prepares for himself heaven in place of earth. And when he makes the teaching of the heavenly clouds powerful for himself, putting the commandments into action, and separating the great and wide sea of wickedness with an accurate way of life like some shore, he prevents the murky water from issuing from his mouth. C And if he should be led to the springs by the gift of teaching, he pours forth the stream of the word with safety, so as not to offer a muddy overturning instead of pure water to anyone for a drink. And if, having been raised above every earthly footing, he becomes aerial in his life, having entered upon the spiritual way of life which the divine word has called "winds," so that he is set apart for the throne of the One established within him—just as Paul was set apart for the Gospel, so as to become a chosen vessel, to bear the name of God, as he became another throne for the Word, bearing the One seated within him. When these things and such as these are brought to perfection, so that one may rejoice D
that he has become a father not to certain wild and irrational beasts, but to men—these being the godlike thoughts that are formed according to the divine image through faith in Him who was created and born within us. Faith, according to the word of Paul, is understood to be the foundation through which wisdom is generated for believers, and it works all that has been mentioned. Then, truly, the life of him who has reached perfection becomes blessed, to whom wisdom conforms and in whom it rejoices at every moment, for he delights in it alone every day. For the Lord rejoices in his holy ones, and there is joy in heaven over those who are saved; and Christ, as Father, celebrates over the son who has been saved. B Having spoken of these things in passing and briefly, let the industrious and alert reader, who traverses the pavements of divine Scripture, adapt these insights—or commentaries—to the riddles (that is, the obscure coverings that present one thing in words but hold another in their meanings), testing whether it is not much better to believe that the meaning of the riddles looks toward this, rather than to the sense that first occurs. For it is not possible for the theology of John to be considered true, which hymns all created things as the work of the Word, if it were believed that He who created wisdom had made all other things along with it. For then all things would no longer be "through it," but it would be numbered together with all created things. C That the enigmatic expressions do look toward this is clearly unfolded in the next discourse, which says: "Now therefore, my son, listen to me," and, "Blessed is he who keeps my ways"—calling "ways," clearly, the approaches toward virtue, the beginning of which is the acquisition of wisdom. Who, therefore, looking at this divine Scripture, will not judge the enemies of the truth to be both impious and slanderers? Impious, because they destroy the ineffable majesty of the only-begotten God, as far as it depends on them, and attach Him to the creature, striving insistently to demonstrate as one of the things produced by Him the Lord, whose only-begotten rule is over all. And slanderers, because, while sacred Scripture offers them no occasion at all for such opinions, they arm themselves against piety as if drawing testimony from it. Since, therefore, they are unable to show from any of the holy Scriptures a voice that advises us to view the pre-eternal glory of the only-begotten God together with the subject creation, now that these things have been demonstrated by us, the discourse of piety D well deserves to adjudicate the prizes of victory against falsehood, and having rejected all these artificial impositions of names, by which they couple the creature with the Creator and the work with the Maker, to confess as is taught by the…
A Gospel, heard from heaven, that he is the beloved Son, not spurious, nor supposititious; and simultaneously, by the voice of the Son, accepting all natural kindred, to say that He is true God from true God, and to believe all things in Him likewise which are seen in the Father; because they are one, and in the one the other is perceived: not supervening, not diminished, not changed or altered according to any character befitting God and good.
A Since the manifest self-contradiction of Eunomius has occurred, in which he is refuted for saying things contrary to himself, now indeed that because He is begotten by nature, I say He must be named Son: but again, because He is created, He is no longer to be called Son, but a creature. I think it behooves him who listens attentively and with understanding, since it is not possible for two battling arguments to have truth found equally in each, to reject from both that which is impious and blasphemous—I mean that which concerns the creature and the work—but for the one who looks only to piety, to assent to the one who admits that the title of Son belongs to the Only-Begotten God by nature, so that even through the voice of enemies the word of piety may have its foundation and validation.
But again, repeating the argument of his which I set forth from the beginning: "Being begotten," he says, "we do not refuse to call the Son and the offspring; since the begotten essence itself, and the title of Son, can vindicate for themselves such a relation of names." So far, indeed, let him who with judgment hears what is said remember this: that he speaks of the begotten essence, so that we may no longer take either the unbegottenness or the generation as a substitute for essence; but that we may understand the essence separately, and separately the fact of its being begotten, or not being begotten, through the properties which are observed in it. C But let us consider more accurately the argument about this. He says that the essence is begotten, but that Son is the name of the begotten essence. But in this, the argument from us will refute his argument by two contraries: one is the attempt at malice; the other is the weakness of the attack against us. For he acts maliciously, while saying "generation of essence," so that he may establish a contrariety of essences among themselves, dividing them into that which is begotten and that which is unbegotten, for the difference of nature. And the weakness of his aggression against us is refuted by the very things through which his malice is framed. For he who said that the essence was begotten, clearly defines generation as something else besides the essence; so that what is signified by the name of generation would not correspond to the definition of essence. For that which he established in many places, he did not do here: so that he might say the essence itself is the generation, but he confesses the essence to be begotten, so that by each word a distinct notion might be produced in the minds of the hearers. For a different notion is formed in the mind of him who hears that He is begotten, and a different one through the name of essence. But the argument might be clearer to us through examples. He said in the
Gospel A: "When travail approaches, the woman is in pain, or has sadness; but afterwards she rejoices for joy, because a human being has been born into the world." As, therefore, we learn from the Gospel in this passage two distinct ideas, one indeed, the travail which we have understood through the generation; and the other, that which is born from the travail: for the travail is not the human being, but through the travail, the human being—so also here, since Eunomius has granted that the essence is begotten, by the first word we are taught that it is "from something"; but by the following, we have understood the subject itself, to whom the subsistence is "from something."
If, therefore, the meaning of "essence" is one thing, and the utterance of "generation" is supposed to signify another, their wise contrivances have suddenly collapsed, like earthen vessels dashed together and broken into pieces against one another. B For it will no longer be permitted to them, while they transfer the distinction between the begotten and the unbegotten to the essences of the Son and the Father, to transfer with it the strife of names upon the things themselves. For since it has been granted by Eunomius that the essence is begotten, just as the evangelical example explains such an understanding—in which, having learned that the human being is generated, we have not understood the human being to be the same as the generation, but we have received a proper meaning for each of the names—the heresy that ordains the difference of essences through such terms will no longer have any place at all.
But so that the discourse regarding these matters might be revealed to us more clearly, let us again dissect what is proposed. C The Creator of the universe made human nature from the beginning with all things, and after Adam was made, he then instituted for humans the generation which comes from mutual union, when he said, "Increase and multiply." Since, therefore, Abel subsisted through generation, who of sound mind would not say that, according to the same meaning of human generation, Adam subsisted without generation? Yet the first human possessed in himself the whole limit of human essence; and he who was generated from him is in the same way inscribed with the same definition of essence. But if a begotten essence were being constructed as different from that which is not begotten, the same definition of essence would not fit both. For of those whose essence is different, the definition or account of the essence is not the same. D Since, therefore, both the essence of Adam and the essence of Abel are characterized by the same properties, it is necessary by all means to confess that the essence is one in both, yet that one and another is shown in the same nature. For Adam and Abel are two in the definition of nature, but they have an unconfused distinction between themselves in the properties discerned in each of them. It cannot, therefore, be said correctly that Adam generated an essence other than himself, but rather that he generated from himself another himself: with whom also the whole account of the essence of the one who generated was passed on. What, therefore, we have learned regarding human nature, through the
guidance demonstrated by the Word before us, I think we must also take as guidance for the understanding of immaterial divine A doctrines. For by shaking off all carnal and material thought of divine and lofty doctrines, we shall have, through the remaining concept once it is purified of such things, the most secure guidance towards things lofty and inaccessible. For it is confessed even by our opponents that God, who is over all, is and is called the Father of the Only-begotten; and furthermore, they name the Only-begotten God, who is from the Father, as "begotten" because He is begotten. But since the name of "father" among men has certain implications entwined with it—from which the immaterial nature is entirely B alien—it is fitting to leave behind all material thoughts that slip in concerning the carnal significance of "father," and to imprint a certain god-befitting understanding that is expressive of pure genuineness upon God and Father. Since, therefore, not only what the flesh suggests to be understood is included in the thought of a human father, but also a certain concept of interval is entirely added to human fatherhood, it would be well, along with the bodily filth, to cast away the concept of interval also from the divine birth, so that, the material property having been washed away on all sides, the supereminent birth may be pure not only of all passible but also of all interval-bearing thought.
Therefore, he who calls God "Father" will also include the "what it is" in the thought of God's "being." For whatever has its being from some beginning, to that thing the "what it is" also necessarily begins from some beginning; but that in which the "being" did not begin, and of which nothing else is contemplated concerning it, has its beginning from nothing. But indeed, God is Father; therefore, what He is, He is from eternity. For He did not "become," but "is" Father; for in the case of God, He was, and is, and will be; and if there were any time when He was not, He neither is nor will be; for He is not believed to be the Father of any such thing, apart from which it is pious to say that God at any time is in His own self. For the Father is the Father of Life, and of Truth and Wisdom, and of Light and Sanctification and Power, and of all such things as the Only-begotten is and is called.
When, therefore, it is contrived by the enemies that there was a time when the Light was not, I do not know whose loss is greater: whether that of the Light itself, when it is not Light, or that of the one possessing it, when he does not have the Light. So also concerning Life and Truth and Power, and all other things which the Only-begotten fills the paternal bosom with, being all things in His own fullness. C For the absurdity is equal on both sides, and the impiety against the Father is equivalent to the blasphemy against the Son. For in saying that the Lord at one time was not, you will not simply grant that the Power was not, but you will be saying that the Power of God, of the Father of the Power, was not. Therefore, the contrivance through your argument that the Son at one time was not, constructs nothing else than a desolation of every good thing around the Father. See to what the sharpness of the wise leads. How, through these things also, the voice of the Lord is verified, which says: *He who rejects Me, rejects Him who sent Me* (Luke 10:16); for through the things by which the being at some time of the D
Only-begotten is rejected, they dishonor the Father, by this speech robbing the Word of all that is good in name and notion pertaining to the Father's glory. A
From these things, then, which have been said, the weak and languid malice of the writer is evidently detected; for while he attempts to construct a difference of essence for the Only-begotten from the Father's essence, by calling the one unbegotten and the other begotten, he is proved to contradict himself—a futile and vain babbler, who invents what can in no way exist. For from his words it has been demonstrated, first, that the name of essence is one thing, and that of generation another; and second, that no new and separate essence, distinct from that of the Father, subsists in the Son. But what the Father is in the definition of nature, this also is He who exists from Him, since nature is not changed into otherness in the person of the Son, according to the truth of the argument already demonstrated to us. In the subsistence of Abel, the natural difference did not create a change of nature; so also in the incorruptible dogmas, the Only-begotten God did not, through His own generation, alter in Himself the essence of the Unbegotten; B coming forth from the Father and being in the Father, as the Gospel says. But according to the simple and proper language of our faith, He is *light from light, true God from true God*, and is everything that He is, except that the Other is the Father. But the aim for which he pursues these matters sophistically, I do not think it necessary to state at present. Whether it is bold and dangerous, or permitted and free from danger, to fashion from one thing to another the significant terms used of the divine nature, and to call the One who is begotten a "progeny."
I pass over these things, lest my discourse, while contending over lesser matters, be occupied beyond what is proper and neglect what is greater. But I say that it must be accurately and diligently known and discussed: whether the relation according to nature introduces the use of these names; for he himself absolutely says this: C that with the propriety of the appellations, that which is according to essence is also introduced. For one would not say that the bare names, separated in themselves from the emphasis of what is signified, have any relation and familiarity with each other; but in the things which are indicated by the words, we discern the familiar and the alien in the appellations. Therefore, if he confesses that the Son has a natural relation with the Father, let us leave aside the appellations and consider the force that is in the things signified. Is that which is alien to the essence recognized in the proximity and propriety of the names, or that which is cognate and proper? But to call it alien is manifest madness. For how can anyone preserve an orderly sequence that is contiguous and adjacent in names for things that are foreign and have no communion, when it is the very begotten essence (as he says) and the appellation of the Son, which yet claims for itself the relation of the names as proper? D
A If he says that property or propinquity is signified by these appellations, he will necessarily be shown to be a patron of the common essence through the customary use of names. And he does not realize that, while establishing that these meanings signify the propinquity or cohesion of the subjects, he does so in many places in the book he has written. For through those things by which he attempts to abolish the truth, he often arrives, against his will, at the patronage of the doctrines he opposes. We have heard of a certain instance from history regarding Saul, who, having been stirred to anger at one time against the prophets, was overcome by grace, and became one of those who were moved by the divine power—the prophetic spirit, I suppose, wishing to instruct the apostate through himself. Hence the proverb came to be in the life of those who followed, with history wondrously relating this thing that was unimaginable and contrary to expectation: "Is Saul also among the prophets?" B In what, then, does Eunomius agree with the truth? In those things where he says that the Lord himself, being the Son of the living God, not being ashamed of the birth from the Virgin, frequently called himself the "Son of Man" in his own discourses. For we also bring forward this statement for the demonstration of the common essence; because the name of the Son designates an equal communion of nature in both respects. Thus also the "Son of Man" is understood on account of the conjunction he assumed with the human essence, and this word is the greatest weapon of the truth. For as the great Apostle named him the mediator of God and men, nothing demonstrates this as much as the name of the Son, which is equally accommodated to both natures, the divine and the human. C For the same one is both the Son of God, and has become the Son of Man through the economy, so that, by the communion he has with each, he might through himself unite those things which are distant by nature. If, therefore, upon becoming the Son of Man, he were devoid of human nature, it would follow that, even if he were the Son of God, he should not be said to have communion with the divine essence. But if the entire human composition was in him (for he was "tempted in all things according to the likeness, without sin"), it is absolutely necessary to believe that every property of the supereminent essence is in him, since the voice of the Son attributes both to himself: the human in the man, and the divine in God. D If, therefore, the appellations, just as Eunomius says, demonstrate what is proper and familiar; and if this propriety is seen in the actual things, not in the mere sounds of names—and by things I mean those understood in and of themselves (unless it happens to be bold and rash to speak thus of the Son and the Father)—who would deny that the very author and leader of blasphemy is drawn, of his own accord, to the defense of the truth, overturning his own arguments through himself, and proclaiming the communion of essence in the divine doctrines? For the word, having been cast forth from him for the truth against his will, does not lie, because if it were not called
A Son, the natural understanding of the names would not verify the designation. Just as a footstool or a bench is not called a son of the craftsman, nor would anyone of sound mind say that the builder "fathered" the house, nor do we call the vineyard the "offspring" of the vine-dresser—but we call the construction the work of a man, while we call him who is begotten from him the son of a man—so that, I suppose, the appropriate meaning might be signified through the names regarding the subjects. Thus, having been taught that the Only-Begotten is the Son of God, we have not understood this appellation as a creature of God, but as what the voice of the Son truly indicates to the one being signified.
And if water or wine is called the "offspring" of the vine by Scripture, even so, the argument will not be led astray from the dogmas of piety by this homonymy. For we do not say that wine is the offspring of an oak, nor an acorn that of a vine. But there is a certain communion according to nature B of the offspring with that from which it is: for the dew in the vine, being drawn up through the base of the root by the pith, is in power water, but proceeding through the ways of nature by a certain sequence, and flowing from the lower parts to that which is above, it changes into the quality of wine; the solar ray also contributing something, which, through heat, draws the moisture from the depth to the growth, and through the proper and suitable maturing, makes the moisture into wine. So that, according to nature, there is no estrangement between the moisture lying in the vine and the wine begotten from it—for this moisture comes from that moisture—and no one could name another cause for the humidity of the wine C than the moisture naturally present in the sprigs. The differences of qualities do not bring about a change according to the moisture, but rather some property distinguishes the moisture in the wine from that in the sprig by astringency, or sweetness, or humidity—one of these accompanying it—so that in subject it is the same, but it differs by the differences of the qualities.
Therefore, just as, having heard from Scripture that the Only-Begotten God is the Son of man, we have learned through the relation of the name the intimacy toward true man; so also, if the Son is called an "offspring" according to the logic of the adversary, nonetheless we learn through this also His kinship according to essence toward Him who begat, because even the wine, being called the offspring of the vine, is not found to be D alien according to the principle of the humidity of the power naturally present in the vine. But the things said by the adversaries, if one examines them soundly, look toward our dogma; yet their thought speaks in contradiction to their own constructions, because they are contentious to establish everywhere that which is alien according to essence. And yet it is entirely beyond surmise whence they were led to such assumptions. For if the appellation of "son" does not signify simply that it is from something, but especially sets forth the kinship according to nature through what is signified, as Eunomius himself says—and wine is not called an offspring of an oak, and the "offspring of vipers," as the Gospel says, are snakes and not sheep—
it is clear that in the case of the Only-Begotten, the appellation of "Son" and "offspring" does not have an affinity toward that which is of a different genus. But if, according to the pattern of opposites, it is called an offspring, and according to nature, as they confess, it is the naming of the Son, then the Son is entirely of the essence of Him who begat, not of any other of those things considered outside the nature. And if He is truly from thence, He is not at all alienated from that whence He is, as has been demonstrated in other matters; for everything that is begotten and subsists from something is entirely of the same genus and nature as that from which it has come into being.
But if anyone should demand an interpretation, description, or explanation of the divine essence, we shall not deny that we are unlearned and ignorant of such wisdom, confessing only this much: that which is B infinite by nature can be comprehended by no concept of words. For that the divine majesty has no limit and cannot be circumscribed, the prophecy cries out and declares clearly: that of His magnificence, glory, and sanctification there is no end. And if the things concerning Him are infinite, much more is He Himself, according to His essence, whatever He may be, not comprehended by any limit or in any part. If, therefore, an interpretation made by names and words somehow grasps its subject by its signification, but that which is infinite cannot be comprehended, no one can justly blame our ignorance for not speaking audaciously of things that should not be spoken of. For by what name shall I grasp that which is C incomprehensible? By what voice shall I proclaim that which is ineffable? Since, therefore, the Divine is better and higher than nominal signification, we have learned to honor and adore in silence those things that surpass speech and thought.
And if one who is "wise beyond what he ought to be wise" should insult this pious caution or reverence of speech, mocking our ignorance concerning things incomprehensible—recognizing difference according to dissimilarity regarding what is devoid of form, what is infinite, what is without magnitude, what has no quantity, I mean the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—and should put this forward for the reproof of our ignorance, which is continually D brought forward by the disciples of error, namely: "You worship what you do not know," if you ignore the essence of the One who is worshiped: we shall not, according to the counsel of the prophet, fear the reproach of the foolish, nor because of their contempt shall we speak audaciously against things that cannot be expressed by voice, making a teacher of the mysteries that are above knowledge out of Paul, who was unskilled in speech. He is so far from thinking that the divine nature can be comprehended by human intelligence and mind that he even says the judgments of God are unsearchable and His ways past finding out.
A And the ways of His knowledge, even until now, remain untrodden and unapproachable. For we believe that the Apostle signifies this by wishing to say that the ways are unsearchable, which lead to the incomprehensible, showing by this phrase that that knowledge is inaccessible to human reasoning, and no one has ever yet directed his mind upon such a path of discourse, nor has he pointed out any footprint or mark of a seizing approach to those things which cannot be seized.
Having learned these things, then, from the greatness of Pauline genius, we conclude from what has been said that if the judgments of God cannot be searched out, and the ways cannot be tracked, and the promise of blessings surpasses every conjectural guess and probability, how much more is the divine Being itself, according to the ineffable and inaccessible way, superior and higher than all things that are conceived about it—things of which the God-taught Paul declares there is no knowledge? And for this reason we confirm within ourselves the doctrine that is mocked, confessing that we are inferior in knowledge to those things that surpass knowledge, and we say that we truly worship what we know. We know the height of the glory of Him who is worshipped, by the very fact that we cannot comprehend it by reasonings, estimating the greatness to be beyond thought; and what was said by the Lord to the Samaritan woman, and is brought against us by the adversaries, might more properly be said against them. B For "Ye worship ye know not what," says the Lord to the Samaritan woman, who was preoccupied with bodily notions in her thoughts about God, whose speech is excellently rebuked: because the Samaritans, thinking they worship God, but then thinking that the Divine is bodily seated in a place, worship only in name, worshipping something else rather than God. For nothing that is understood as circumscribed by a place is the Divine. But it is the property of the Godhead to be everywhere, and to pass through all things, and to be circumscribed by nothing. Thus, the argument that is brought against us in accusation turns into an accusation against the Christ-fighters themselves. For just as the Samaritans, by thinking the Divine is contained by some local description, were rebuked by what they heard—"Ye worship ye know not what," and your worship looking toward God becomes useless: for God, being thought to be seated in some place, is not God—so it would be possible to say properly to these new Samaritans that, by suspecting the divine essence to be circumscribed as if by a certain place by the name of ingenerateness, D "Ye worship ye know not what," as though serving God indeed, but unaware that the indefiniteness of God exceeds every significance of names and comprehension.
A But the discussion has been drawn out further than the matters proposed, following those things which are always discovered by consequence: therefore, let us resume the sequence. Since I believe the expression proposed to him has been sufficiently clarified by what has been said, not only with regard to the truth, but also that it is consistent with itself. For if, according to them, the natural relationship is established by the title of "Son" in relation to the Father, and the relationship of the "offspring" to the one who has begotten, by some grammatical trifling which molds the expressions significant of the divine nature into a figure of names, then no one would any longer doubt that the relationship of these names to one another, established by nature, is a demonstration of their relationship according to essence, or rather, of their identity.
B But let not our discourse alter the opposing voice, so that the doctrine of piety may not seem to be strengthened merely by the weakness of its adversaries, but rather to have strength in itself. Therefore, as far as it is possible, let the argument of the adversaries be confirmed by us ourselves through a more vigorous defense, so that our superiority in strength may be recognized through our great confidence, by bringing forward also those things which were omitted by our opponents for the exact examination of the truth. For perhaps he who contends with the arguments of the opposites will say that the title of "Son" and "offspring" does not altogether represent what is proper according to nature. For in Scripture, one is also called a "child of wrath," and a "son of perdition," and an "offspring of vipers," C and surely no community of nature appeared with such names. For Judas, who is named the "son of perdition," is not the same as the subject, perdition itself, according to what is understood. For the meaning of the man Judas is one thing, and the meaning of perdition is another.
Similarly, the discourse may also have an equal construction from the opposite. For those who are called "sons of light" and "sons of day" are not the same as the light and the day according to the reason of nature; and the children of Abraham become stones when, through faith and works, they appropriate kinship with him; and those who are led by the Spirit of God, as the Apostle Romans viii, 14 says, are called "sons of God," not being the same as God by nature. And many such things can be gathered from the divinely inspired Scripture, by which the deception, like an image blooming forth from the testimonies of Scripture, mimics the likeness of the truth.
D What, then, do we say to this? The divine Scripture knows how to use the word "son" in both senses, so that for some this title is by nature, but for others it is added and acquired. For when it speaks of "sons of men" and "sons of rams," it signifies the relationship according to essence of the begotten to him from whom it has come to be. But when it speaks of "sons of power" or "children of God," it indicates the kinship that comes about through free will and choice. Moreover, in the opposite sense, the same persons have also been named "sons of Heli" and "sons of Belial," according to either notion the title of "sons" is applied
A For in that they were called sons of Heli, they were testified to have a natural kinship with him. But in that they were named sons of Belial, they were accused for the depravity of their moral choice, insofar as they did not imitate their father in their way of life, but rather applied their own counsel and mode of living to wickedness. In inferior nature, therefore, and in these human affairs of ours, because the human state has an equal propensity toward both—I mean toward vice and virtue—it is in our power to become sons either of the night or of the day, while our nature nonetheless remains, according to what is primary, within its own proper bounds. For neither is he who has become a child of wrath on account of vice alienated from human generation, nor has he who has attached himself to the good through moral choice ceased to be said to have been born of men through the refinement of his character and the honorable formation of his morals; but while nature remains in both cases, the differences in moral choice take on these names of kinship, whether they become children of God through virtue, or of the adversary through vice.
B Now, in divine matters, Eunomius, who observes the natural order—for I shall use the very words of the writer—and abides by what was known from the beginning, and does not refuse to call that which is begotten a "progeny," since, as he says, the begotten essence itself and the title of "Son" appropriate to themselves such a relationship of names: how does he alienate and disjoin what is begotten from the Begetter by that relationship which exists according to essence? For it is not permitted to say, regarding those who are called sons or progeny because of their crimes, or again regarding those whom praise accompanies for such names, that anyone is truly begotten by wrath and called a "child of wrath." Nor, conversely, has anyone had the day as his mother after the flesh, so as to be named its son; but rather the difference in moral choices produces names of such kinship. C Here Eunomius says: "We do not refuse to call the Son 'progeny,' since, he says, the begotten essence and the child's title appropriate to themselves such a relationship of names." If, therefore, because the Son is true progeny, he acknowledges that he appropriates such a relationship of names, how does he find the occasion to apply such a cause of naming to those things which are spoken of by way of metaphor and misuse, and to those where the natural relationship, as Eunomius says, appropriates such a title? This, therefore, is true only in those whose nature is a boundary between virtue and vice, in whom one often assumes the opposite names, becoming a child now of light and again of darkness, on account of the affinity and kinship one has with the honorable or its contrary. D Wherever, however, there is no place for contrariety, let no one anymore declare that the word "son" is celebrated by way of metaphor, after the manner of those who acquire this title for themselves by resolve and choice. For the same is not...
A a ratio, just as a man who has laid aside the works of darkness becomes a child of light through an honorable life, so also the Only-begotten God does not receive what is more honorable by a change from a worse state. For since any man becomes a son of God by being united to Christ through spiritual generation, He who makes man a son of God through Himself does not stand in need of another son by whom adoption might be granted to Him, but is also named that which He is by nature. A man indeed changes himself, exchanging the new for the old. But God, to what will He be changed, so that He might acquire what He does not have? A man strips himself and puts on the divine nature. But He who is always existing in the same way, what does He lay aside or what does He put on? A man becomes a son of God by B acquiring what he does not have and casting off what he does have; but He who was never in vice has neither what he might take nor what he might leave behind. Again, a man can in one way be said to be naturally the son of someone, when one looks toward his nature, and in another way by metaphor, when the resolve of his life imposes the name. But God, being one good in a simple and incomposite nature, always looks toward the same thing, and is never changed by the impulses of choice, but always wills what He is, and what He is He also fully wills. So that by both He is called Son of God properly and truly, since His nature has the good in itself, and His will has not been severed from the better. So that this term would not be invoked for Him by metaphor. Therefore, the things which we set forth from the perspective of the adversaries C have no place to be brought forward by the adversaries against the Scripture of natural kinship.
But I do not know how or why, since they hate and turn away from the truth, they name Him son, yet in order that the commonality according to essence might not be testified through this word, they separate the word from the meaning inherent in the name, and they leave the name of son empty and insignificant for the Only-begotten, granting Him only the sound of the word. And that I say these things truly, and do not stray from the aim of the adversaries, is manifest from the very things by which they attempt to learn of the truth. For such are the things which are brought forward by them for the construction of their blasphemy, that we have been taught many names of the Only-begotten by the divine Scripture: stone, axe, D rock, foundation, bread, vine, door, way, shepherd, fountain, wood, resurrection, teacher, light, and many other such things; but none of these is it pious, when thinking of the Lord, to speak of according to the ready meaning. For it would be of the most absurd things to think that that which is incorporeal, without matter, simple, and without form, is fashioned by the meanings of certain names that appear. So that upon hearing "axe," we should imagine such a shape of iron, or light as that which is in the air, or vine as that from the planting of branches, or each of the others, just as custom suggests to the mind. Instead, we translate the significance of these names to what is more becoming to God, and we understand something else, even if
they say that such names are truly attributed to the Only-Begotten God, and yet do not contain a demonstration of his nature; it follows, they say, that we should not take the meaning of the name according to prevailing custom for the interpretation of his nature, but should discover some meaning of this word other than that which is common and ready to hand. These things and others of this kind they philosophize, in order to argue that the Son is not what he is and is said to be. But our discourse was hastening to a different purpose, namely, to show that the recent composition of Eunomius is false and groundless, and consistent neither with the truth nor with itself. B Since, however, through the points by which we accuse their dogma, a kind of defense of their blasphemy has been introduced into our discourse, it would be well to discuss this briefly beforehand, and then to return to the sequence of the written work.
It is right, therefore, to speak something about these matters, and not to stray from the appropriate purpose. For since there are many names, as they themselves say, which are attributed to the Only-Begotten by Scripture, we say that none of the others has [the same] relation and connection to Him who begat, as the name Son. For we do not say "Son of the Father" in the same way that we refer to God the stone, or the resurrection, or the shepherd, or the light, or any other of these universals. C But it is permitted, as if by a certain art and rule, to distinguish the meaning of divine names in two ways. For some have an indication of lofty and ineffable glory or majesty; others, however, demonstrate the variety of the providential dispensation; so that, according to the hypothesis, if that which is benefited did not exist, neither would these terms, which indicate the benefit, have been applied to Him. But those which declare what is convenient and decorous to God are attributed to the Only-Begotten God in a kindred and proper manner, even apart from those for whose sake the dispensation occurs. D But that this opinion may be more evidently unfolded to us, let us contemplate the names themselves. The Lord would never have been named the Vine, unless for the sake of the planting of those who are rooted in Him; nor the Shepherd, had the sheep of the house of Israel not been lost; nor the Physician, had it not been for the sake of the sick; nor would He have accepted the rest of the names upon Himself, had He not, through some providential active power, appropriately taken these titles to Himself as His own for the sake of those who are affected by the benefit. For what need is there, while running through each one, to prolong discourse on things that are certain and conceded? The Son, and the Right Hand, and the Only-Begotten, and the Word, and the Wisdom, and the Power, and all things of this sort which are spoken as relative to something, are spoken in a kind of relative conjugation with the the Father of all, while being named together. For He is named the Power of God, and the Right Hand, and the Wisdom of God, and the Son of the Father, and the Only-Begotten, and the Word with God, and all such things. It is therefore a consequence of these statements that we should observe a meaning for each of the names that is appropriate and fitting to the subject, so that we may not err from the correct understanding and commit a fault in the discourse of piety. Just as, therefore,
A when we have transferred each of the other names to what is fitting for God, we reject the notion that appears at first sight—so that we understand neither material light, nor a path trodden by feet, nor the bread which comes from agriculture, nor the word which is made of syllables, but instead of these we conceive those things which represent the majesty of the power of the Word of God—so also, if anyone should reject the usual and natural signification of the Son, through which we learn that He is from the essence of the One who begat Him, he must necessarily transfer the name to some interpretation more fitting for God. For since the transfer of each of the other names to what is more glorious was adapted to the demonstration of the divine power, it is altogether logical that the signification of this name also should be transferred to what is higher. What, then, could be a conception of the designation of the Son that is more fitting for God, if the natural relationship to the One who begat Him is rejected according to the argument of the adversaries? B For perchance no one is so bold and headlong into impiety as to suppose, in the discourses concerning the divine nature, that what is base and lowly is more appropriate and fit for what is high and great. Therefore, if they are discovering some conception of this matter that is more magnificent, so that it seems unworthy to think that the Only-Begotten is from the nature of the Father, let them say, if they know anything according to their own ineffable wisdom that is higher than the Father's nature, so that they may raise the Only-Begotten God to that, thus exalting Him above the relationship which He has to the Father. But if the majesty and greatness of the divine nature is elevated above every height and surpasses every wonderful power, what argument is left that exalts the interpretation of the name of Son to something greater? C Since, therefore, it is admitted that every expression by which the Only-Begotten is signified—even if it is named from ordinary usage—is strictly spoken when transferred in our thoughts to a more magnificent sense; and since it is shown that no one can find a conception of the designation of the Son more magnificent than that which demonstrates the genuine relationship to the One who begat Him; I do not think it necessary to spend more time on this point, as it has been sufficiently demonstrated by what has been said that it is not fitting to interpret the designation of the Son just like the rest of the names.
But let us transfer our contemplation to his book again. It is not for the same men to say that they do not refuse to call the begotten "offspring"—for I shall use their own words—when both the begotten essence itself and D the designation of the Son claim for themselves such a relationship of names; and again to transfer genuine and natural appellations to metaphorical shifts, so that one of two things must happen: either their former argument has collapsed, and they have recourse in vain to the order of nature to construct the necessity of calling the begotten "offspring," or, if this is done conveniently
A in a manner consistent with what has already been established, even the other argument will be dissolved. For he who is termed "offspring" according to them, because he was begotten, has not the nature, by reason of this very fact, to be called a "product" or a "creature." For the meaning of each of these names differs greatly; and it is fitting that he who uses words with sound reasoning, looking to the subject matter, should use his terms so that we do not suffer any confusion in our notions by improperly interchanging words with their meanings. For this reason, we call that which is wrought by art the work of an artisan, but we address as a son of man him who is born from him. Yet no prudent person would call a work a "son," nor a son a "work." For it is the mark of one who confuses and muddies true significance through the erroneous use of names, so that it is necessary, concerning these two, to affirm one true term regarding the Only-Begotten: if indeed He is the Son, He is not to be called a creature; but if He is a creature, He is alienated from the appellation of Son. Just as heaven, and earth, and sea, and all things that are individual creatures, do not assume the name of son. But since Eunomius testifies that the Only-Begotten God is begotten, and the testimony of enemies is more powerful for the establishment of the truth, by saying He is begotten, he has also borne witness that He is by all means not a creature. B But concerning these things, enough. For since many arguments are flowing toward us, lest the multitude exceed measure, it will be sufficient to have said this concerning what has been proposed.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK FOUR
CAPITA OR SUMMARIES OF THE FOURTH BOOK
1. The fourth book expounds the natural philosophy concerning the offspring, and concerning the impassible generation of the Only-Begotten, and that saying, "In the beginning was the Word," and furthermore, it clearly explains the birth from the Virgin. 2. Then it demonstrates how Eunomius, by fitting to the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten those things which are appropriate to the earthly hypostasis, attempted to show the Only-Begotten as mutable and to relegate Him to the census of creatures. 3. Then it marvelously explains the discourse concerning the Firstborn, as it is mentioned four times by the Apostle. 4. Again, it treats of the impassibility of the Lord's generation, and refutes the foolishness of Eunomius, who says that the generated substance is affected by the appellation of Son, yet is soon unmindful of his own words, denying the relationship of the Son to the Father; where discourse is also held concerning the drug of Circe and the Mandragora. 5. Again, it shows Eunomius, compelled by the truth, lending support to the orthodox doctrine, when he confesses the substance not only of the Father, but also of the Only-Begotten, to be most proper and primary.6. Furthermore, he discourses on [the subject of] the begotten, the product, and the creature, and he demonstrates that what is taught by Eunomius and Theognostus regarding A the immediateness and indivisibility of the substance, and the relation to the Creator and Maker, is taught impiously.
7. In addition to these points, he clearly and skillfully demonstrates the incomparability of those things that came into being after the Son, and the idolatry, cunningly devised by Eunomius under the name of the Only-Begotten and the Son to deceive the simple-minded, which he had concealed.
8. Then, in the same manner, he shows the substance of the Father and the Son to be unchangeable; in which [part] he teaches about many differences and harmonies, explaining the form, the seal, and the character.
9. Afterward, having clarified [the nature of] the substance and the generation, he calls the empty talk and garrulity of Eunomius similar to a cymbal. Then, having clearly refuted those things said by the great Basil concerning the generation of the Only-Begotten—which had been wrongly criticized by Eunomius—he brings the book to an end.
Book IV
It would also be worth our while to examine in our own discourse the natural philosophy concerning the offspring, which he has diligently and philosophically treated; he says, therefore (and I will relate word for word the discourse he has written, marvelously against the truth): "For who is so negligent and such an improvident observer of the nature of existing things, as to be ignorant that, of bodies which are A around the earth, in the act of begetting and being begotten, in acting and suffering,—when they are examined—those that beget communicate their own substance to those that are begotten, and those that are begotten are accustomed to participate in the same, inasmuch as there is a common material cause and an influence of supply from without? And those that are begotten are begotten according to passion, and those that beget do not possess a pure exercise of activity according to nature, because their nature is bound up with passions of every kind." B Observe how becomingly and reverently he, who with such precision examines the nature of existing things, comprehends in his contemplation the pre-temporal generation of the Word of God, who was in the beginning: [by comparing it to] bodies around the earth and a material cause, and the passions of those who beget and are begotten, and all such things, of which any man of sense would be ashamed if they were said even about us, as our passible nature is branded and depicted in his discourse! However, the brilliant description of the nature of the Only-Begotten God by this writer is such. But we, leaving aside lamentations (for what more would groaning or sighing profit us for the destruction of the malice of our enemies?), will treat of the meaning of what has been said, as much as we are able.
Of what offspring is the contemplation proposed? Is it of that which is constituted according to the flesh, or of that which is according to the Only-Begotten God? For since the contemplation is C twofold—both of the divine and simple and immaterial life, and of a material and passible subsistence—and since "generation" is said similarly of both, it would have been necessary to make a clear and unconfused distinction of the things signified, lest the homonymy of "generation" lead the truth into error. Since, therefore, that which is through
A the flesh is a passing into being that is material and brought about by passion, while the incorporeal, intangible, and formless, being free from material admixture, is removed and alienated from every passionate state: it is fitting to consider which generation the inquiry is about—whether the incorrupt and divine, or the passionate and filthy. But no one would say that the eternal existence of the only-begotten God is not set before the contemplation of this discourse. Why, then, does he dwell upon this physiological account of the body in the loathsome apparatus of his argument, defiling nature and making public the passions regarding human generation, while abandoning the subject proposed? For we were not in need of learning about this animal generation which is brought about through the flesh. For who is so foolish as to look at himself and, understanding what is human within himself, seek out another interpreter of his own nature, or require knowledge of the necessary passions that are observed in the generation of the body? Or how he who begets is affected in one way, and he who is begotten in another, so that a man might learn from this instruction that he himself begets through passion, and that passion was the beginning of his own generation. For as regards these facts, whether they be kept silent or spoken of, it is the same; whether one recounts them by making public what is hidden, or covers with silence what should not be uttered, we are not ignorant that our nature is moved by passion or appetite. But we seek to have the discourse clearly treat of that high and ineffable existence B of the only-begotten God, according to which he is believed to be from God the Father.
Since this investigation, therefore, has been proposed, this new theologian adds to the discourse flux, passion, a material cause, a certain operation not free from filth, a contribution flowing in from without of seed, and all such things. I know not what has befallen him, a man who, because of his excessive knowledge, boasts that nothing of those things which are beyond comprehension is left outside his own cognition, and who proposes to interpret the ineffable generation of the Son—yet, departing from the matters at hand, like an eel he slips into the filthy mire and most vile mud of thoughts, not unlike that Nicodemus by night who, when he was being taught the generation from above by the Lord, was dragged in his thoughts to that which takes place in the folds of the womb, and was in doubt, saying: "How can this be?"—thinking that he would refute the spiritual generation, as if it could not come to pass or exist, because an old man could not enter again into his mother's womb and be carried there. But the Lord corrects his erroneous opinion, saying that the properties of the flesh and the spirit have no association C nor can they be commingled. And let this man also correct himself in similar matters if he wishes. For, I think, one who cares for the truth ought to contemplate the subject proposed from its own proper characteristics, and not slander Him who is without matter through an accusation of material things. For if man, or ox, or any other of those things born through the flesh is not free from passion when begetting or being begotten, what is this to the impassible and incorrupt nature? For not even the fact that we are mortal D invalidates the immortality of the Only-Begotten; neither does the turning of men toward wickedness…
render the immutability of the divine nature doubtful; nor is anything of ours transferred to God. But there is a certain property of human and divine nature that is distinct, unsociable, and immutable; but these properties of such a kind, by which each nature is distinguished and discerned from the other, stand at a long interval, so that neither are the former comprehended in the latter, nor conversely are the latter comprehended in the former.
How then, when Eunomius has proposed to explain the divine generation, does he, omitting his purpose, pursue B that which happens on earth, when there is no dispute between us regarding these things? But the scope of the crafty and cunning artificer is evident: that by the calumny of that generation which occurs from affection or appetite, he might pervert the generation of the Lord. In which things I, passing over the blasphemy, admire the genius and cleverness of the man, how he is mindful of his own study, who having established from the things said before that the Son must exist and be called a 'gennema' (offspring) or progeny, now contends that one should not understand generation in Him. For if every generation, as he himself asserts, has joined with it a disposition according to affection, it is by all means necessary to confess through these same arguments that what is alien from affection is also altogether alienated from generation. For if these things are understood linked together one with the other, both the affection and the generation, he who is devoid of one of these can have no communion C with the other. How then, through generation, does he call Him a 'gennema' (offspring), whom he demonstrates by the things just now said by him not to have been generated? And for what cause does he fight against our teacher, who counsels that in divine doctrines one should not dare to forge names, but should confess that He is generated, yet not forge this notion for the form of a name: so that we should call the One generated a 'gennema' or progeny, when this word is assigned by sacred Scripture properly to inanimate things, or metaphorically to those who fashion their habits to the image of wickedness? But when it is said by us that the word 'gennema' (offspring) should be passed over in silence, he brings forward that unassailable rhetoric, taking in as an ally even the cold and empty grammatical discourse, and through the technicality of names—whether derivation, or denominative, or I know not how these are to be spoken of—he concludes his syllogisms, not refusing to call the One who is generated a 'gennema' or offspring. But then, if upon receiving this name we examine the notion of it, so that the communion of essence might thereby be demonstrated, he again lays out his own words, and contends that the 'gennema' was not generated, by describing the pure and divine and passionless generation of the Lord with the sordid physiology of bodily birth; as if these two, according to his opinion, cannot concur in God: both that which is genuine with the Father, and the vacuity of the nature from affections; but if that which is passionless exists, there is no generation, and if one should confess that which is genuine, he must in every way admit affection into the generation.
B Not so the sublime John, A not so that thundering voice proclaims the mystery of theology, who even names the Son of God and purges his proclamation of every opinion clinging to passions. For observe how he prepares the hearing and heals it in advance in the introductions of the Gospel. How great, moreover, is the providence in the teacher, that none of those hearing should fall into humble and abject opinions, having slipped through ignorance into some absurd suspicions! For, as one who would lead the untrained hearing as far as possible from passion, he did not say "Son" in the introduction, nor "Father," nor "generation," lest anyone, hearing "Father" at the very beginning, should be dragged toward the ready and familiar meaning of this name, or having learned that a Son was being proclaimed, should comprehend this name according to common and customary significance and fall into the term "generation" as if upon a stone of stumbling; but in place of "Father," he names "Beginning," and instead of "was begotten," he put the word "was," and in place of "Son," "the Word," and says: *In the beginning was the Word*. Where is there passion in these? Tell me: "was" and "Word"—was the beginning passion? Was the "was" in passion? Was the "Word" through passion? Or is it because there is no passion in what is said, nor is that which is proper and genuine to this proclamation declared? But how could that which is common and genuine according to essence, and that which is co-eternal with the Word and the beginning, be more clearly expressed than through these words? For he did not say, "The Word was begotten from the beginning," lest by some extended notion he should disjoin the Word from the beginning; but he proclaimed the commonality along with the beginning when he said, concerning both the beginning and the Word, namely, "was," so that the Word might not follow after the beginning, but that he might anticipate the hearing with the proclamation before it should admit only the beginning in itself, having joined in faith concerning the beginning. Then he says, *And the Word was with God*. Still our Evangelist fears our C rude and unexercised understanding; still he fears our childishness and inexperience. He does not yet entrust the name of "Father" to the hearing, lest some of those who savor more of the flesh, having heard "Father," might consequently imagine and imprint a mother in their mind. But neither does he yet name "Son" in this proclamation; for he still suspects our habit toward the lower nature, lest anyone, having heard "Son," might reduce the Divine to human form through a passion-filled opinion. Therefore, repeating the proclamation, he named "Word" again, describing these things to you, the faithless one, in a natural way. For as your word proceeds from your mind and is mixed with no passion, so also in that case, when you heard "Word," and lest you should understand passion from anything, for this reason with/by the repeated proclamation he says, *And the Word was with God*. O how he attaches the Word to God, or rather, how he extends the infinite with the infinite! D The Word was with God; the Word was entirely with the whole of God. Therefore, as great as God is, so great is the Word who is with Him; so that if God is bounded, the Word is surely within a boundary. But if the infinity of God surpasses the boundary, then the Word, being contemplated with this, [is not]...
comprehended by limit or measures. For no one would deny that the Word is viewed together with the entire deity of the Father, lest any part of God be argued to exist in the Word, while another part remains naked of the Word. B Again, the paternal voice of John once more nourishes the hearing of those who are as infants with his proclamation; we were not yet so advanced by those first words that, had we heard "Son," we would not have slipped into our customary and familiar understanding. For this reason, the herald, crying out again in his third statement, still proclaimed "Word" and not "Son," saying: *And the Word was God.* First he stated in whom He was, then with whom He was, and now he says what He is. Through this third repetition he completes the purpose of his proclamation. For he says, I am not proclaiming, by the title of "Word," any one of the things understood in an ordinary sense, but I proclaim God; for this "Word" which was in the beginning, and was with God, was not something other than God, but He Himself was God. And continuously, through repetition, the herald, becoming more forceful with these magnificent terms, identifies this same subject as the God previously declared in his proclamation. He says this is He through whom all things were made, and who is Life, and the Light of men, and the true Light shining in darkness, and not obscured by the darkness, dwelling among His own, and not received by His own, and becoming flesh, and through flesh taking up residence in human nature. And having first gone through such things as these, only then does he say "Father" and name the "Only-begotten," since there is no longer any danger for one who has been purified by so many statements, of slipping into some sordid C thought at the mention of the Father; for he says: *We saw His glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father.*
Against Eunomius, Book IV
Say to this, O Eunomius, say to the evangelist those clever inventions of yours: how do you name the Father, and how do you name the Only-begotten, in your discourse, when every corporal generation is produced through passion? Truth answers you on His behalf: that the mystery of theology is one thing, and the physiology (the study of nature) of fleeting bodies is another. These things are separated from one another by a great intervening space, as if by a wall; why do you stitch together by your discourse things that cannot in any way be mixed or associated? How do you pollute the purity of divine generation with an impure discourse? How do you construct that which is incorporeal through the passions of the body? Do not philosophize about things on high from those things which are lowly and fall downward. I proclaim the Lord as the Son of God, because the Gospel from heaven also proclaimed Him thus through the luminous cloud: *This, he says, is My beloved Son.* Yet, because I have been taught "Son," I have not been dragged down by the name to the vulgar meanings held by men here, but I know Him from the Father, and I do not know Him from passion. But I will also add this to what has been said: that I know of some corporal generation that is free from passion, such that even in this, the physiology of corporal generation according to Eunomius is proved false.
A For tell me, was the Word made flesh, or not? You will not say it was not made. It was made, therefore, nor is there anyone who denies it. How, then, was God manifest in the flesh? By birth, you will surely say. Of whose birth, then, do you speak? It is manifest that it is the Virgin's, and that it which was begotten in her was of the Holy Spirit, and that the days were fulfilled for her to bring forth, and she brought forth, and nevertheless incorruption or integrity was preserved in the birth. Do you then believe—if you do believe—that the birth from a woman is pure from passion, yet you do not admit that the divine and uncorrupted generation from the Father is so, lest you should conceive of passion in the generation? But I know clearly that he does not flee from passion in his doctrine, who sees no beginning in the divine and incorruptible nature, but who, in order that the Creator of all creation may be thought to be a part of the creation, builds up these things for the denial of the only-begotten God, using as an aid the caution feigned regarding passion.
B And this he demonstrates clearly through the things with which he contends against what has been said, saying that the essence of the Son is begotten from the Father, not put forth by extension, not torn away by defluxion or division from the conjunction of Him who begat, not perfected by increase, not transformed by alteration, but obtaining existence solely by the will of Him who begat. For who is ignorant, unless he has the eyes of his mind completely closed, that by these things said by Eunomius C the Son is built up to be a part of the creation? For what forbids us to say all these same things, just as they are in the phrasing, concerning each of the others which are understood to be in creation? And if it seems good, let us adapt the word to one of those things which are seen in creation; and if it does not have the same consequence, we will pass judgment against ourselves, as though we were examining the discourse in the manner of those who play and not with the exactness and care becoming to the truth. Having therefore changed the name of the Son, let us read the whole discourse word for word. For we say the essence of the earth is begotten by the Father, not torn away by abscess or division from the conjunction of Him who begat, nor perfected by accretion, not put forth by alteration, but obtaining existence solely by the will of Him who begat. D Is there anything among the things said which does not agree with the subsistence of the earth? I think no one would say so; for God did not spread forth the earth by being extended, nor by flowing or dividing Himself from the conjunction which is with Him did He cause its essence to exist; nor did He perfect it from small to great by that accretion which happens gradually; nor, undergoing any change or alteration, was He transformed into the form of the earth; but to Him, for the subsistence of the essence of things that were begotten, the will sufficed. For He spoke, and they were made; so that the name of generation does not conflict with the subsistence according to the earth.
A If then it is true to say these things concerning the myriad parts of the world, what doubt still remains regarding the dogma of our adversaries? For while they rename the Son only in words, they maintain that He is one of those things that have come to be through creation, placed before the others only by the privileges of order as a firstborn and greatest son. Just as in a smithy one might say that all things manufactured from iron are from the same shop, but that the instruments of the coal-tongs and hammer—through which iron is fashioned for use—were forged before the rest of the works; yet because this one takes precedence over the others, one should not therefore seek any difference in matter between the instrument that fashions and the iron that is shaped by the instrument: for both this and that are iron, and the shape of one was produced before the other.
Such is the theology of this heresy regarding the Son: that it considers there to be no difference in essence between the Lord Himself and the things that have been produced by Him, except for the difference in order. Who then of those who are in any way numbered among Christians would consent that the account of the essence is the same for the parts of the world and for Him who made the world? I indeed shudder at the blasphemy, knowing that for those whose account is the same, their nature also does not differ at all. For just as the account of the essence of Peter and John and the rest of men is common, and the nature one, in the same way, if the Lord were B similarly related to the parts of the world according to nature, they would necessarily have to confess that He is subject to the same things that they understood to be true of them. But the world does not remain forever; therefore, according to their opinion, the Lord will also pass away with the heaven and the earth, if indeed He is of the same kind as the world. But if He is confessed to be eternal, it is absolutely necessary not to think that this world is devoid of the divine nature, if this were to happen to the Only-Begotten through creation.
You see to what point the argument is carried by this fine consequence, like some stone broken off from a mountain peak and driven downward by its own weight. For it is necessary either that the elements of the world be seen as worshipful and venerable according to the Greek vanity, or that the Son not be worshipped at all. Let us consider it thus: we say that creation—both the intelligible and all that is of the sensible nature—came to be out of nothing; these same things they also preach concerning the Lord. We say that all things that have come to be have been established by the will of God; these same things they allege concerning the Only-Begotten. We have not believed that either the angelic creation or the nature that is in the world consists from the essence of Him who made them; they likewise alienate Him also from the essence of the Father. We confess that all things serve the will of Him who made them; they hold the same opinion concerning the Only-Begotten. Therefore, of necessity, whatever else they might understand regarding this, they apply all the same things to the Only-Begotten, and what they believe of Him, this they will also suppose regarding creation; so that if they confess the Lord to be God, they would also deify the rest of creation. But if they define these things as being devoid of the divine nature, they maintain the same conception also concerning the Only-Begotten. C D
A I will not, however, pass over what remains in silence, lest I seem to lend my tongue to the blasphemy and impious insults of my adversaries. Let those whose mouths are exercised for blasphemy declare what follows from these premises. The logic is clear, even when men are silent. For by necessity, one of two things must follow: either they will openly vote against the Only-Begotten God—so that among them He is no longer confessed to be what He is, nor even called by such a name—or, if they do attribute divinity to Him, they will equally attribute it to the entire creation. Or, finally, fleeing the manifest impiety present in both, they will have recourse to the pious argument and will surely agree that He is not created, in order that they may confess Him to be truly God.
Why is there a need to dwell longer, recounting the other impious insults that necessarily follow from this principle? B One who looks to what is logical will perceive from what has been said that the father of lies, the author of death, the inventor of sin, being created in an intelligent and incorporeal nature, was not prevented by his nature from becoming what he is through a change. For that which consists of a mutable essence, being moved toward either side by the freedom of its own will, has the power of its nature accompanying the inclination of its choice, so that it becomes that to which its choice has led it. Therefore, those who drag the Lord down to an equality of honor with the angels through the concept of creation are also defining Him as capable of contraries. C But let them hear the great voice of Paul, how he says that only this One has been called Son, because He is not of the nature of the angels, but of a superior nature. For to which of the angels did He ever say, "You are my Son"? And again, when He brings the Firstborn into the world, He says, "And let all the angels of God worship Him." And to the angels, indeed, He says: "Who makes His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire." But to the Son: "Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of your kingdom," and whatever else the prophecy D continues in speaking of God along with these things. Moreover, He adds from another hymn matters that are appropriate: "You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of your hands," and all that follows, up until "You are the same, and your years will not fail"—by which words the immutability and eternity of the divine nature are depicted. If, therefore, the divinity of the Only-Begotten so far surpasses the angelic nature as the possessor is more excellent than his servants, how do they make common either the Lord of creation with the sensory, perceptible creation, or Him who is worshipped by the angels with the nature of the angels themselves? Discussing as they do the mode of His existence, these things will be properly applied to each of those things seen in creation, just as the discourse of the heresy has already been alleged concerning the Lord's creation of the earth.
A And we have shown that the doctrine concerning the Lord, which has already been given, fits the construction of the heretics naturally and appropriately. But lest anything ambiguous or doubtful be left for those who encounter our efforts—some of which provide a defense for the heretical dogmas—it would be worthy for this also to be proposed to those who have been examined by us, from the divinely inspired Scripture.
For perhaps they will say, from those same apostolic words which we mentioned: "How could he have been named 'firstborn of creation' if he were not that which creation is?" For every firstborn is the firstborn not of things of a different kind, but of those of the same kind; just as Reuben, being the first in birth among those counted after him, was the firstborn human among humans. And many others of the brothers who are counted with them are called firstborns. They say, therefore, that whatever essence of the whole creation we conceive in our minds, it is necessary that the firstborn of this should also be of the same essence. If, therefore, all creation is consubstantial B with the Father of all, we will not deny that he is also the firstborn of it. But if God is different from the creation in essence, it is absolutely necessary to say that his firstborn also does not share in essence with God.
The construction of the objection is such as this; nothing more ignoble, I think, has been set against our argument, which it was natural should be brought against us by those who fight us. But what one needs to know in response to this, will now be clarified by our discourse as far as we are able. The name "firstborn" is mentioned four times by the Apostle in all his writings, but differently, and the mention of this name is not made in the same way. For at one time the Apostle says, "Firstborn of all creation"; again, "Firstborn among many brothers"; then, "Firstborn from the dead." C But in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the name of the firstborn is mentioned absolutely, by itself. For he says thus: "And when he again brings the firstborn into the world, he says, 'And let all his angels worship him.'" With these thus distinguished, it would be well to examine each of these separately by itself: how he is firstborn of creation, and how among many brothers, and how, being mentioned by itself without each of these, when he is again brought into the world, he is worshipped by all his angels. Let us, therefore, if you please, begin the speculation of the matters proposed from the last of these.
"When he again brings," he says, "the firstborn into the world"; the addition of the word "again" indicates, through the meaning of this expression, that this does not happen for the first time. For we use this word D regarding the repetition of things that have happened once. Therefore, he signifies by this word his terrifying appearance at the end of the ages: when he is no longer seen in the form of a servant, but sitting magnificently upon the throne of
A For this reason, He who once entered into the world, having become the firstborn from the dead, and of brothers, and of all creation, when He shall again enter into the world, judging the world in righteousness, as the prophecy says, does not cast off the name of the firstborn, which He once accepted for our sake. But just as in the name of Jesus every knee bows—to Him who is above every name—so also the whole fullness of the angels, when they meet Him who comes in the name of the firstborn, worships Him, feeling joy over the recall of men, which, through His becoming our firstborn, He recalled back to the grace that was from the beginning. For since there is joy among the angels over those who repent from sin—because until now that creation groans together and travails in pain with our vanity, judging our destruction to be its own loss, when the revelation of the sons of God shall occur, which they always watch for and await on our behalf, and when the sheep is saved along with that heavenly hundred—now we, being the whole of human nature, are this sheep which, because He became the firstborn, the good Shepherd saved; B then especially, in vehement thanksgiving on our behalf, they shall offer to God their worship of Him who, through the firstbornship, recalled him who had departed far from his paternal home.
These things being understood by us in this way, let no one further doubt for whose sake He becomes the firstborn from the dead, or of creation, or among many brothers. For all these things look to the same aim, even if in each case some distinctive meaning appears according to its proper character. For He becomes the "firstborn from the dead" as the one who first by Himself loosed the pangs of death, so that He might also make a path for all to the birth that comes through the resurrection. C And again, becoming "firstborn among brothers," He is the one born first in the water through the new birth of regeneration, whose birth the flight of the dove acted as midwife. Through whom He makes those who share with Him the same birth to be His own brothers, and He becomes the firstborn of those who are born after Him through water and the Spirit. And to speak summarily, since there are three births in us, by which human nature is brought to life—the one from the body, the second according to the mystery of regeneration, and the third through the hoped-for resurrection from the dead—in these three He is called the firstborn. D Being indeed the double regeneration which is brought about through both, through baptism and through resurrection, He Himself became the leader and prince according to each; but in the flesh He becomes the firstborn as the first and only one to have fashioned in Himself, through the Virgin, a birth unknown to nature, of which no one in so many generations of men was the author. If these things have therefore been understood according to reason, neither will the meaning of "creation," of which He is the firstborn, be unknown. For we have recognized a double creation of our nature: the first, according to which we were formed, and the second, through which we were reformed.
A We were indeed created in the first instance, but there would have been no need for a second creation had we not rendered the first useless through disobedience. Once that had grown old, faded, and vanished, it was necessary for a new creation to come to be in Christ, as the Apostle says. He does not desire that anything of the old things be seen in the new creation, saying, "Clothe yourselves with the new man, who has been created according to God," after having put off the "old man with his deeds and desires." And, "If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new." For one and the same is the Maker of human nature, both of what was in the beginning and of what followed thereafter. Then, taking dust from the earth, He fashioned the man; again, taking dust from the Virgin, He did not simply fashion a man, but fashioned it unto Himself. At that time He created, and after that He was created; at that time the Word made flesh, and after that the Word became flesh, so that He might transform our flesh unto spirit by participating with us in flesh and blood. Therefore, of this new creation in Christ, of which He Himself was the leader, He was named Firstborn, becoming the firstfruits of all—both of those who are born unto life and of those who are made alive from the dead through the resurrection—so that He might be Lord of both the dead and the living and sanctify the whole mass through the firstfruits within Himself.
B That the name of "Firstborn" is not applied to the Son according to His pre-eternal existence is testified to by the designation of "Only-Begotten." For He who is truly the Only-Begotten does not have brothers. How, then, could someone be "only-begotten" if he is numbered among brothers? But just as He is said to be God and man, Son of God and Son of man—since He is the form of God and the form of a servant, being the former according to His existing nature and having become the latter according to the merciful economy—so too, being the only-begotten God, He becomes the firstborn of all creation. He is "Only-Begotten" in the Father’s bosom, but in those who are saved through the new creation, He becomes and is called the "Firstborn of creation."
C If, however, as the heresy wishes, He is called "Firstborn" because He was created before the rest of creation, this title does not harmonize with those things which they themselves construct regarding the only-begotten God. For they do not say this: that both the Son and all other things were made by the Father in the same way; rather, they call the only-begotten God a creature [or: a work] of the Father, and all other things the creatures of the Son. Therefore, by the same logic by which they dogmatize that the Son was created and call God the Father of the creature, by that same logic, if they claim that all things were constructed by the only-begotten God, they would call Him not the "Firstborn" of the things produced through Him, but rather, more properly, their "Father," since the same relationship towards the creatures in both cases creates the same designation by logical consequence. For if God, who is over all, is not called the "Firstborn" of His own creature, but its "Father," by that same logic, the only-begotten God would certainly not be called "Firstborn" of His own creatures, but D
A Thus, the title of "first-born" would be, in the strict sense, inappropriately and superfously applied; for it would possess no place within a heretical conception, as the term would be entirely hollow and redundant.
But we must return to those who attach passion to the divine generation and, for this reason, deny that the Lord was truly begotten, lest they should conceive of it as involving passion. For the argument that passion is bound up with all generation—and that therefore one must think of the Son as altogether foreign to the notion of generation, so that the Divine might remain purely beyond passion—may perhaps appear to have some validity to those who are easily deceived and incautious. However, to those who are educated and schooled in the divine mysteries, the refutation presents itself readily from agreed-upon premises. For who does not know that there is a generation which leads us toward the true and blessed life, B which is not the same as that which is composed of blood and the will of the flesh—in which there is flux, and change, and a gradual process of perfection, and all those other things which are observed in such generation? But the other generation is from God and is heavenly, and as the Gospel says, it is believed to be from above; this does not admit the passions of flesh and blood.
Let the adversaries, then, dare to affirm one of two things: either that the generation from above does not exist, or that if it does exist, it occurs through the passion of the flesh. Yet they admit that it does exist, and they do not find passion within it. Therefore, not every generation is naturally coupled with passion, but only that which is material and subject to C passions, whereas that which is immaterial is pure and devoid of passion. What necessity, then, what force compels them to smear and sprinkle the properties of the flesh upon the incorruptible generation of the Son, and, by mocking this base and bodily generation with improper physiological speculation, to exclude the Son from his paternal kinship? If among us, too, generation is the guide and teacher of both lives—but that which is through the flesh is carnal and subject to passion, while that which is spiritual is pure—then no one who is in any way numbered among Christians could contradict this argument, nor could it be right for one contemplating generation in the divine, incorruptible nature to suspect passion.
Let us examine this further point in addition to what has been said: If, because of the passion associated with the flesh, they disparage the impassibility of the divine generation, then, using the same examples—those which are within us, I say—they must likewise not believe that the Creator, God himself, D is free and empty of all affect or passion. For if they judge the divine majesty after the manner of men, they will confess that God neither begets nor creates, for neither of these is brought about in us [without labor and matter]. Therefore, let them either separate both from the divine nature—both creation and generation—so that they may preserve impassibility for God in both instances, and by their doctrine wholly remove faith in the Only-Begotten, as though the Father were kept beyond all passion and not defiled in his begetting; or else let them concede that both may be performed impassibly by the divine power, rather than struggling over one while the other remains.
A For if He creates without labor and matter, He certainly also begets without labor and flux.
I have, however, Eunomius himself supporting me again in this argument. I shall cut short his tiresome babbling and summarize his entire meaning in a few words: that men do not construct the materials for us, but only fashion the form within the material. This is the sense of the many trifles spoken by them. If, therefore, because he understands conception and conformation in generation here below, he rejects the pure intellectual concept of generation, then by the same logic he should also forbid us from considering the Father the creator of the world, on account of the creation that occurs here through art, which labors upon the form and species but is unable to provide the matter for the form. But if he does not wish to conceive of creation in God according to the human measure of power, let him not slander divine generation by comparing it to things that happen to men. But in order that his subtlety and accurate consideration B in what he says may be made more manifest and clear, we shall repeat a little of what has been said by them.
For he says that things which act and are acted upon share a common nature with each other, and after the generation which occurs from bodies, he sets forth the technical productions upon materials. Let the sharp-witted hearer, therefore, consider through these things how he always misses the mark of his own purpose, wandering off into things that happen by chance and accident. He sees the actor and the one acted upon in things born through the flesh as being of the same essence, since the one communicates its essence, and the other participates in it. Thus he knows how C to discern the truth in the nature of things with such accuracy that he separates and draws away from the essence him who makes it a participant, and him who is made a participant; and he says that each of these two is something else in itself, apart from the essence. For he who participates or he who communicates is entirely different from that which is participated in or communicated. So that it is necessary, he says, for someone to be understood first in himself, seen in his own proper subsistence, and then for one to speak of him as either giving, or having, or desiring what he does not yet possess. And having spewed forth this ridiculous argument, the wise man does not perceive that he is immediately D overturning himself again in the next breath. For he who fashions the subject material through art into what he devises, does something entirely by that action or operation, and the material, in being acted upon by him who exercises the art, receives the conformation. For the material does not receive the form from the art while remaining impassible and resistant. If, therefore, in things brought about by art nothing can come to be unless both [the] passion and action concur together for what is being made, how can we suppose that the writer is consistent in his words, who, in declaring that the communion of the essence [exists] in passion and action, runs the risk of not only...
A For if the one who acts and the one who is acted upon are defined as having fellowship with one another according to nature, does he not, by means of that through which he constructs what he desires, dismantle what he is striving for, making the glory of the *homoousios* stronger by his own opposition? For if birth from someone exhibits the essence of the begetter in the begotten, while artificial construction—which is accomplished through energy and affection—leads, according to his reasoning, both the maker and the one made into a communion of essence; and if the writer frequently insists in his own writings that the Lord was generated—is it not the case that through the very means by which he alienates the Lord from the essence of the Father, B he bears witness to his connection to Him? For if, according to his reasoning, no separation of essence is perceived either through generation or through construction, then whatever he might concede the Lord to be—whether created or a product of generation—he has, by both, attested to their kinship regarding essence, having taught that there is a communion of nature in the agent and the patient, the begetter and the begotten. But let us turn to what follows in the discourse.
I request that readers not be annoyed by the profundity of this investigation, which of its own accord draws the argument out into a great length. For the danger is not regarding ordinary matters, such that by skipping over things requiring more strenuous contemplation we might suffer only a slight loss, but rather we are at risk regarding the very head of our hope. C For the issue at stake is for us to be Christians, without being led astray by heretical destruction, or else being dragged down into Jewish and Hellenic opinions. Therefore, in order that we might suffer neither of these things—neither by the denial of the truly begotten Son, being brought into agreement with Jewish doctrines, nor through the worship of a creature, falling into the ruin of those who worship idols—it is necessary that we dwell upon the argument regarding these things, having set forth the very statement of Eunomius, which is as follows:
Lib. IV
"With these things thus divided, one might reasonably say that the most principal and primary and only essence subsisting D by the energy of the Father receives into itself the names of 'offspring' and 'product' and 'creature'." And after a few words: "But the Son alone," he says, "having subsisted by the energy of the Father, possesses an incommunicable nature and the relationship toward the One who begot Him." And in the preceding: "He says it should not be refused to call the generated one a 'generation,' since the generated essence itself and the appellation of the Son claim for themselves such a relationship of names, and render it proper."
Since, therefore, the contradiction in these statements is so open and clear, it occurs to me to marvel at the cleverness of the admirers of this dogma. For it would be a challenge to see to which of the things stated by him they might turn, without failing in the remainder. The fore-
τAοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειοῦσθαι σχέσιν· ἡ νῦν τεχνολογία τὸ ἐναντίον φησίν, Ἀκοινώνητον ἔχειν τὸν Υἱὸν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν. Ἐὰν τῷ πρώτῳ πιστεύσωσιν, οὐ παραδέξονται πάντως τὸ δεύτερον· ἐὰν πρὸς τοῦτο ῥέψωσι, κατὰ τῆς πρώτης ὑπολήψεως στήσονται. Τίς αὐτοῖς διαλύσει τὴν μάχην; Τίς μεσιτεύσει τῷ ἐμφυλίῳ πολέμῳ; Τίς συμβιβάσει πρὸς συμφωνίαν τὴν στάσιν; αὐτῆς τῆς εὐχῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων μεριζομένης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῶν δογμάτων διελκομένων. Ἢ τοῦτο τῆς προφητείας ἐστὶ τάχα αἴνιγμα, ὃ περὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων φησὶν ὁ Δαβίδ· ὅτι Διεσχίσθησαν καὶ οὐ κατενύγησαν. Ἰδοὺ γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν δογμάτων διασχιζόμενοι τὴν τοῦ πλημμελήματος αἴσθησιν B ἔχουσιν. Ἀλλὰ φέρονται διὰ τῶν ὤτων, ἀμφορέων δίκην πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ μετατιθέντι περιαγόμενοι. Ἤρεσκεν αὐτῷ τὴν γεννηθεῖσαν οὐσίαν προσφυῶς τὴν τοῦ Υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, εὐθὺς καθάπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπένευσαν· μετέθετο πάλιν πρὸς τοὐναντίον τὸν λόγον· καὶ ἀρνεῖται τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν· πάλιν οἱ φίλτατοι καὶ τούτῳ συννεύουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν σωμάτων σκιαί, τῇ αὐτομάτῳ μιμήσει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προάγοντος συμμετασχηματίζονται κίνησιν. Ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ πρὸς τοῦτο ῥέποντες, κἂν ἑαυτῷ μάχηται, καὶ τοῦτο καταδεχόμενοι. Ἄλλος τις οὗτος Ὁμηρικὸς κυκεών, οὐ τὰ σώματα τῶν φαρμακευομένων ἀλλάσσων εἰς ἀλόγων μορφάς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐνεργῶν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλογον αὐτῶν μεταμόρφωσιν. Περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ λόγος φησίν, ὅτι βέβαιος αὐτῶν ὁ νοῦς ἦν, ἀλλοιωθέντος πρὸς τὸ θηριῶδες τοῦ εἴδους. Ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διαμενόντων, πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον αἱ ψυχαὶ μεταπλάσσονται. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φησιν ἡ ποιητικὴ τερατεία, εἰς διαφόρων θηρίων εἴδη τοὺς φαρμακευθέντας ἀλλάσσεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον τῇ παρασοφιζομένῃ τὴν φύσιν· τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ νῦν γίνεται παρὰ τοῦ Κιρκαίου τούτου κρατῆρος. Οἱ γὰρ ἐμπίνοντες τῆς γεγοητευμένης ἀπάτης ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματος, εἰς διαφόρων δογμάτων μορφὰς ἀλλοιοῦνται, νῦν μὲν τούτῳ, πάλιν δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ μορφούμενοι. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ γλυκύτατοι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μύθου διασκευήν, ἀγαπῶσιν ἔτι τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀλογίας αὐτοῖς ἐξηγούμενον. Καὶ οἷόν τινα καρπὸν κρανίας, ἢ βάλανον, τοὺς διαῤῥιπτομένους παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγους ὑποκεκυφότες ἐκλέγουσιν· συῶν δίκην πρὸς τὰ χαμαιῤῥιφῆ τῶν δογμάτων λαιμάργως ἐπιτρέχοντες, τοῖς δὲ ὑψηλοῖς τε καὶ οὐρανίοις ἐνατενίζειν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες. Διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ λόγου παρατροπὴν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐλθὸν ἀνεξετάστως ἁρπάζουσιν. Οἷον δ᾽ ἂν ἦν καὶ καθάπερ φασὶ τῶν διὰ μανδραγόρου κεχαρωμένων χώματί τινι καὶ δυσκινησίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τούτοις διάκειται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθητήρια, πρὸς τὴν σύνεσιν τῆς ἀπάτης ἀποναρκήσαντα.
A Δεινὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς κεκρυμμένοις δόλοις ἔκ τινος παραλογισμοῦ κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς ἐνσχεθῆναι. Πλὴν ἀλλὰ συγγνωστὸν τὸ ἀτύχημα, ὅταν ἀκούσιον ᾖ, τὸ δ’ ἐκ προνοίας τινὸς καὶ σπουδῆς τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν πεῖραν ἐφέλκεσθαι, μὴ ἀγνοοῦντα τὴν συμφοράν, πᾶσαν ὑπερβολὴν δυστυχημάτων παρέρχεται. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιον σχετλιάζειν, ὅταν ἀκούομεν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ λίχνοι, γυμνὸν μὲν προσεγγίζοντα τὸν σίδηρον φεύγουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δέλεαρ ἀπατώμενοι, τροφῆς ἐλπίδι κατασπῶσι τὸ ἄγκιστρον; Ἐν οἷς δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστι τὸ κακὸν, αὐτομολεῖν ἑκουσίως ἐπὶ τὸν ὄλεθρον τοῦτον, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰχθύων ἀλογίας ἐστὶν ἀθλιώτερον. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν κεκαλυμμένον διὰ γαστριμαργίας ὑπήχθησαν ὄλεθρον· οἱ δὲ γυμνὸν περιχαίνουσι τῆς ἀσεβείας τὸ ἄγκιστρον· διά τινος B ἀλόγου προσπαθείας ἀγαπῶντες τὸν ὄλεθρον· τί γὰρ ἂν ταύτης τῆς ἐναντιότητος γένοιτο προδηλότερον, ἢ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐγεννήθη, καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ προσφυὲς ἔχει τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ κλήσεως, καὶ πάλιν ἀλλοτριοῦται τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ σημασίας;
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τοσοῦτον. Χρήσιμον δ’ ἂν ἴσως εἴη, τῆς παρατεθείσης ἡμῖν τοῦ Εὐνομίου ῥήσεως πᾶσαν ἀκολούθως ἰδεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναδραμόντας τοῦ λόγου. Τὰ γὰρ νῦν ἐξετασθέντα, διὰ τὸ προφανὲς τῆς τῶν εἰρημένων ἐναντιότητος, προχείρως ἡμᾶς ἐκίνησεν ἐκ τῶν τελευταίων τῆς ἀντιῤῥήσεως ἄρξασθαι. Εἴρηται τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου ταῦτα· C «Οὕτω δὲ τούτων διηρημένων, εἰκότως φαίη τὶς ἂν τὴν κυριωτάτην καὶ πρώτην καὶ μόνην ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν, εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας.» Πρῶτον τοίνυν ὑπομνησθῆναι τοὺς τῷ λόγῳ προσέχοντας βούλομαι, ὅτι κυριωτάτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίαν, ἐν τῇ πρώτη λογογραφία φησί· διὰ τούτων προαγαγὼν τῶν ῥημάτων τὸν λόγον, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς δογμάτων συμπληροῦται λόγος ἐκ τῆς ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτης οὐσίας. Καὶ ἐνταῦθα κυριωτάτην λέγει καὶ πρώτην τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν οὐσίαν. Οὐκοῦν συνθέντες ἀφ’ ἑκατέρου βιβλίου τὰς Εὐνομίου D φωνάς, αὐτὸν τοῦτον παραστησόμεθα μάρτυρα τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν ἑτέρωθι που τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποφηνάμενον· ὅτι ὧν αἱ αὐταὶ προσηγορίαι, τούτων οὐδὲν ἡ φύσις διάφορος. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστῶτα τῇ φύσει τῇ ταυτότητι τῶν προσηγοριῶν διεσήμαινεν, ὁ ἑαυτῷ μαχόμενος. Ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ εἷς ἐν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος, διὰ τοῦτο πάντως κυριωτάτην μὲν ἐκείνην, κυριωτάτην δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶναί φησι. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνήθεια, μηδενὶ τὸ κυριώτατον ἐφαρμόζουσα, ᾧ μὴ συναληθεύεται τῇ φύσει τὸ ὄνομα. Ὅλως ἄνθρωπον ἐκ καταχρήσεως τὸ ὁμοίωμα λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κυρίως τῇ φωνῇ ταύτῃ κατονομάζομεν τὸ ζῶον τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει δειχνύμενον. Καὶ Θεὸν ὡσαύτως εἴδωλον ὅταν καὶ δαιμόνιον, καὶ κοιλίαν οἶδεν ὁ τῆς Γραφῆς λόγος προσαγορεύειν· ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ κύ-
κύ- ριον ἔχει καὶ τὰ ἄλλο πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Βεβρωκέναι τις κατὰ τὴν ἐνύπνιον φαντασίαν λέγεται· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι κυρίαν βρῶσιν τὴν φαντασίαν εἰπεῖν. Ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἐπίσης δύο τινῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ φύσιν ὑφεστηκότων, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν κυρίως τῇ φωνῇ προσαγορεύομεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ἄψυχόν τις εἰκόνα πρὸς τὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπον συνθεὶς ἀριθμήσειεν, δύο μὲν ἂν εἴποι, τόν τε ἀληθῶς ὄντα καὶ τὸ ὁμοίωμα, οὐκέτι δ’ ἂν καὶ τὸ κύριον ἀμφοτέροις προσμαρτυρήσειεν. Οὕτως εἴπερ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίαν ἡ τοῦ Μονογενούς φύσις ὑπενοεῖτο, οὐκ ἂν κυριωτάτην ἑκατέραν τῶν οὐσιῶν ὁ λογογράφος ὠνόμασε. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ διαφέροντα τῇ φύσει, τῇ ταυτότητι τῶν ὀνομάτων σημάνεις; B Ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ διὰ τῶν πολεμούντων αὐτῇ φανεροῦσθαι, μὴ δυναμένου καθάπαξ μηδὲ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν φωναῖς ὑπερισχύειν τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ ψεύδους. Διὰ τοῦτο τῷ στόματι τῶν ἀντικειμένων καὶ μὴ εἰδότων ἃ λέγουσιν ὁ τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀνακηρύσσεται λόγος· καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Καϊάφα τὸ σωτήριον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοῦ Κυρίου πάθος προηγόρευτο, οὐκ εἰδότος ἃ λέγει. Οὐκοῦν εἰ κοινὸν ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κυριώτατον, τοῦ Πατρὸς λέγω καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ· τίνα χώραν ἔχει τὸ παρηλλάχθαι τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλήλων λέγειν; Ἢ πῶς ἐν αὐταῖς ἡ πρὸς τὸ δυνατώτερόν τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ προτιμότερον ἐνθεωρεῖται διαφορὰ τῆς κυριωτάτης οὐσίας οὐδεμίαν παραδεχομένης ἐλάττωσιν; Τὸ γὰρ ἀτελῶς ὂν, ὅτι περ ἂν ᾖ, κυρίως οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ φύσις, οὐ δύναμις, οὐκ ἀξίωμα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον θεωρουμένων οὐδέν· ὥστε ἡ κατ’ οὐσίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑπεροχή, καθὼς ἡ αἵρεσις βούλεται, τὸ ἀτελὲς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Μονογενούς διελέγχει. Εἰ οὖν ἀτελής, οὐ κυρία· εἰ δὲ κυριωτάτη, καὶ τελεία πάντως. Τέλειον γὰρ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς ὀνομάζεσθαι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ συγκριτικῶς ἀντιπαρατιθεμένου τελείου πρὸς τέλειον, διαφοράν τινα κατὰ πλεονασμὸν ἢ ἔλλειψιν γινομένην δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι. Μία γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κανόνος, ἡ τελειότης, οὔτε κοιλαινομένη τῷ λείποντι, οὔτε ἀνωμαλοῦσα τῷ πλεονάζοντι. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς δόγματος τοῦ Εὐνομίου συνηγορίαν, ἱκανῶς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σπουδήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν μάχην. Δι’ ὧν γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα τοῖς ἰδίοις συνίστησι λόγοις, καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ τρέπει τὰ μηχανήματα. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν ἀκολουθήσομεν, ὡς ἂν φανερὸν γένοιτο πᾶσιν, ὅτι πλὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι κακουργεῖν, οὐδεμίαν ἰσχὺν πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ὁ παρ’ αὐτῶν λόγος ἔχει. D Ἀκούσωμεν τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων. Εἰκότως φαίη τις ἂν τὴν κυριωτάτην καὶ πρώτην καὶ μόνην ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιο-
καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας. Τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ χωρίζον ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, ἡ τοῦ κτίσματός ἐστι φωνὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λεγομένη ; Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογουμένης παρὰ πᾶσι τῆς κατὰ τὸ δόγμα διαφορᾶς, τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα δεικνύειν τῶν ἡμετέρων τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἀληθεστέρας, τί πράττειν εὐλογώτερον ἦν ; Κατασκευάζειν δηλονότι τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, δι' ὧν οἷόν τε ἦν, ἀποδεικνύντα κτιστὸν τὸν Κύριον εἶναι δεῖν οἴεσθαι ; Ἢ τοῦτο παρέντα, νομοθετεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ὡς ὁμολογούμενα τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα λέγειν; Ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκεῖνο φημί· τάχα δὲ καὶ πάντες οἷς μέτεστι διανοίας, τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἐπιζητήσουσι, τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου πρῶτον ἐπὶ τινος ἀναντιῤῥήτου βάσεως στήσαντας, οὕτω τοῖς ἀκολούθοις ἐναγωνίζεσθαι. A Οὗτος τοίνυν ἀφεὶς τὴν περὶ τοῦ χρῆναι κτιστὸν αὐτὸν οἴεσθαι κατασκευὴν, τὰ ἐφεξῆς διεξέρχεται, τῷ ἀνυποστάτῳ λήμματι τὴν τῶν λογισμῶν ἀκολούθειαν ἁρμόζων· οἷόν τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ταῖς ματαίαις ἐπιθυμίαις κατὰ ψυχὴν ἐμβαθύνοντες, ἢ πρὸς βασιλείαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν σπουδαζομένων ταῖς ἐννοίαις διαχεόμενοι. Οὐχ ὅπως ἂν γένοιτό τι τῶν σπουδαζομένων αὐτοῖς ἐπινοοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τούτου παρόντος διατίθενται ἑαυτοῖς καὶ οἰκονομοῦσι πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν τὸ εὐτύχημα, διά τινος ἡδονῆς τοῖς ἀνυπάρκτοις ἐπιπλανώμενοι. Οὕτως ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ σοφὸς λογογράφος τὴν πολυθρύλλητον ἑαυτοῦ διαλεκτικὴν οὐκ οἶδα ὅπου κατακοιμήσας, πρὶν ἀποδείξῃ περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου, καθάπερ τισὶ παιδίοις διαμυθολογεῖται τὴν ἀπατηλὴν ταύτην καὶ ἀκατάσκευον τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν δόγματος φλυαρίαν, οἷον διήγημά τι παροίνιον ἐκτιθέμενος. Λέγει γάρ, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν δέχεσθαι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν. Τίς ἀπέδειξε λόγος ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ κατασκευαστικῇ τὸν Υἱὸν ὑποστῆναι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀνενέργητον ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεῖναι; Τὸ γὰρ ἀμφιβαλλόμενόν τε καὶ ζητούμενον, τοῦτο ἦν· εἴτε ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐγέννησε τὸν Υἱὸν, εἴτε τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρεπομένων, τῇ φύσει τοῦτον εἰργάσατο. B Τῆς τοίνυν Ἐκκλησίας κατὰ τὴν θείαν διδασκαλίαν ἀληθῶς Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν Μονογενῆ πιστευούσης, τὴν δὲ πολύθεον δεισιδαιμονίαν βδελυσσομένης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰν οὐ προσδεχομένης, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν ὑπὸ ἀριθμὸν αἱ θειότητες πίπτοιεν· ὅπερ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον, ἢ τὴν πολύθεον πάλιν ἐπεισάγειν τῷ βίῳ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἰδιωτικῶς διδασκούσης, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ Μονογενής ἐστι Θεός. Τὸν ἀντιβαίνοντα τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις, πῶς ἀνατρέπειν ἔδει τὴν προειλημμένην ὑπόληψιν; Οὐχὶ τὸ κατασκευάζειν τὸν ἀντικείμενον λόγον διά τινος ὁμολογουμένης ἀρχῆς συναποδεικνύοντα τὸ ἀμφίβολον; Οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί τινα τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ζητῆσαι. Ἀλλ' οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἄρχεται, καὶ ὡς ἀποδεδειγμένων, ἀρχὴν τῷ ἐφεξῆς δίδωσι λόγῳ. Ἀποδειχθέντος γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι διά τινος ἐνεργείας ὁ Υἱὸς ὑπέστη, τίς ἂν ἦν μάχη πρὸς τὸ ἐπόμενον, τὸ
τὸ A εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος προσηγορίαν λέγειν, τὴν δι' ἐνεργείας τινὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν; Ἕως δ᾽ ἂν ἀκατάσκευον ᾗ τὸ προηγούμενον, πῶς ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ ἐφεπόμενον, εἰπάτωσαν οἱ τῆς ἀπάτης συνήγοροι. Καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις πτηνὸν γενέσθαι καθ' ὑπόθεσιν δοίη τὸν ἄνθρωπον, περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς οὐκ ἔτι δοθήσεται. Καὶ πτήσεται γάρ πως ὁ πτηνὸς γενόμενος, καὶ ἄνω τῆς γῆς ἑαυτὸν ἀνάξει μετάρσιος ἐπὶ πτερύγων δι' ἀέρος φερόμενος· ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον πῶς ἂν γένοιτο πτηνός, ὁ τὴν φύσιν οὐ λαχὼν ἐναέριον. Τούτου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, μάταιον τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διεξιέναι.
Κακεῖνος τοίνυν τοῦτο πρῶτον ἐπιδειξάτω, τὸ μάτην πεπιστευκέναι τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν ἀληθῶς εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ Υἱόν, οὐ κατὰ θέσιν εἰσποιηθέντα ψευδωνύμῳ Πατρί· ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν γεννητῶς ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ὄντα, μὴ ἀπεξενωμένον B τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος φύσεως. Ταῦτα πρῶτον ὡς ψευδῆ διελεγξάτω, καὶ τότε περὶ τῶν ἀκολούθων διεξιών πιθανὸς ἔσται. Ἕως δ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ἀναπόδεικτον ᾖ, φλυαρίας ἐστὶν ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν τοῖς δευτέροις. Καί μοι μηδεὶς ὑποκρουέτω καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν διομολογούμενον διὰ κατασκευῆς κυρωθῆναι· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου τὸ ἔχειν πατρόθεν ἤκουσαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν παράδοσιν, οἵόν τινα κλῆρον δι᾿ ἀκολουθίας ἐκ τῶν ἀποστόλων διὰ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἁγίων παραπεμφθέντα· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν καινότητα ταύτην μετατιθέντες τὰ δόγματα, πολλῆς ἂν δέοιντο τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας, εἰ μέλλοιεν μὴ τοὺς κονιορτώδεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ εὐριπίστους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς C ἐμβριθεῖς τε καὶ βεβηκότας ταῖς διανοίαις προσάγεσθαι· ἕως δ᾽ ἂν ἀκατάσκευος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ λόγος προφέροιτ᾽ ἂν, τίς οὕτως ηλίθιος καὶ κτηνώδης, ὡς τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων, καὶ τῶν καθεξῆς ἐν ταῖς Ἐκκλησίαις διαλαμψάντων, ἀσθενεστέραν τὴν διδασκαλίαν διὰ τῆς ἀναποδείκτου φλυαρίας ποιήσασθαι;
Ἴδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὸ διαφορώτατον τῆς ἀγχινοίας τοῦ λογογράφου, ὅπως τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμπειρίας πρὸς τοὐναντίον εὐμηχάνως τοὺς ἀκέραιοτέρους ἐφέλκεται. Προσέβριψε τῇ τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίᾳ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ γεννήματος, εἰπών, εἰς ἑαυτὴν D δέχεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθυόντων συνεδρίῳ δημηγορῶν οἴεται μηδενὶ κατάφορον ἑαυτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸ δόγμα κακουργίαν γενήσεσθαι. Τῷ γὰρ συνάψαι τὸ γέννημα τῷ κτίσματί τε καὶ τῷ ποιήματι, ἐκκλέπτειν ἡγεῖται τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφοράν, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων συντάξεως. Ταῦτα τὰ σοφὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς μηχανήματα· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οἱ ἰδιῶται τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν, ὅπερ ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν
ἡμῶν δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα. Ὦτα δὲ, καθώς φησιν ὁ A Προφήτης, κατηρτίσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀκοὴν εὐσύνετον, ὁμολογοῦμεν. Διόπερ οὐδὲν διὰ τῆς συναφείας τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων ὀνομάτων εἰς τὴν τῶν σημαινομένων σύγχυσιν ὑπαγόμεθα· ἀλλὰ κἂν ὁ μέγας Ἀπόστολος κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὀνομάσῃ ξύλα καὶ χόρτον, καὶ καλάμην, χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ λίθους τιμίους· καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν μνημονευθέντων ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου συλλογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου τῶν κατωνομασμένων ἰδιαζόντως οὐκ ἀγνοήσομεν· οὕτω καὶ νῦν γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος κατὰ ταὐτὸν μνημονευθέντων, ἐκ τῶν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα μεταβάντες, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνθεωροῦμεν διάνοιαν. Ἄλλο γάρ τι τὸ κτίσμα, καὶ ἕτερον σημαίνει τὸ γέννημα· ὥστε κἂν ἐκεῖνος μιγνύῃ τὰ ἄμικτα· ὁ συνετὸς ἀκροατὴς διακεκριμένως ἀκούσεται καὶ δείξει τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ τὴν τοῦ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν, μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύοιτο τούτων, ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον. Ὥστε εἰ κτίσμα εἴη, μὴ εἶναι γέννημα· καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ γέννημα λέγοιτο, B ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ κτίσματος. Ἀλλὰ φησὶν ὁ Εὐνόμος, εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας.
Μή τι διὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων κατησφαλίσατο τὸν ἀκέφαλον τοῦτον καὶ ἄῤῥιζον λόγον, ὃς οὐδεμιᾷ διὰ τῶν πρώτων κατεβλήθη πρὸς τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον δυνάμει; Ἢ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται ματαιότητος, οὐκ ἀπό τινος τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας τὴν ἰσχὺν προλαβόντα· ἀλλὰ διεξοδικήν τε καὶ ἀκατάσκευον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνείρων διηγήσεως τὴν τῆς βλασφημίας ἔκθεσιν ἔχοντα; Λέγει γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπισυνάψας ταῦτα· ὅτι Ἀμεσίτευτον μὲν ἔχουσαν τὴν γέννησιν, ἀμερίστως δὲ σώζουσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ πεποιηκότα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀμεσίτευτόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον καταλιπόντες, αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρήσαιμεν τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων διάνοιαν, εὑρήσομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ τὸ ληρώδες τῆς διδασκαλίας δι' οὐδενὸς ἰσχυροποιούμενον λόγου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τῶν ἀπατωμένων προσρίπτεται. Τὸν γεγεννηκότα, φησὶ, καὶ κτίσαντα καὶ ποιήσαντα. C Ταῦτα κἂν τρία δοκεῖ, δύο νοημάτων ἔχει τὴν σημασίαν, τῷ τὰς δύο φωνὰς ἰσοδυναμεῖν ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν. Τὸ γὰρ ποιῆσαι τῷ κτίσαι ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἕτερον δὲ τὰ παρὰ εἰρημένα ἡ γέννησις. Τῆς οὖν κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεως, πρὸς διαφόρους ἐννοίας ἐκ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων σημασίας μεριζομένης, τίς ἡμῖν ἐπέδειξε λόγος ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ γεννήσει τὸ ποίημα· D ἵνα τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν τῇ τῶν ῥημάτων διαφορᾷ, προσαρμόσωμεν;
προσαρμόσωμεν; Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἡ A συνήθης κρατῇ σημασία τῶν λέξεων, καὶ μηδεὶς εὑρίσκεται λόγος ὁ μετασκευάζων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεις· οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μίαν τινὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ γεννήματος ἔννοιαν διασχισθῆναι. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενον τούτων ἑκάτερον, ἰδιάζουσαν ἔχει τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, οἰκείαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνεπινοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σχετικὴν συζυγίαν. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ἀκατάλληλον ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα. Ἀλλὰ κἂν σιωπηθῇ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, αὐτομάτως μετὰ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου καὶ τὸ συνεζευγμένον ἀκούεται· οἷον δημιουργός, δοῦλος, φίλος, υἱὸς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφορᾷ θεωρεῖται, τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστον, καὶ συνημμένην τοῦ δηλουμένου συγγένειαν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας παρίστησιν, ἄμικτον ἔχοντα τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἑτερογενὲς κοινωνίαν. Οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὸ ὄνομα τῷ υἱῷ συνέζευκται, οὔτε ἡ τοῦ δούλου φωνὴ πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναφέρεται, οὔτε ὁ φίλος τὸν δοῦλον ἐδήλωσεν, οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς τὸν δεσπότην· ἀλλὰ φανερὰν καὶ διακεκριμένην τούτων ἑκάστου τὴν πρὸς τὸ κατάλληλον συζυγίαν ἐπιγινώσκομεν, νοοῦντες διὰ μὲν τοῦ φίλου ἕτερον φίλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ δούλου τὸν κύριον· τὸ δὲ ἔργον διὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ B γέννημα πρός τι τὴν κυρίαν ἔμφασιν ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν συνέζευκται τῷ μὲν γεννήματι ὁ γεννήσας, τῷ κτίσματι ὁ κτίσας. Καὶ δεῖ πάντως, εἴγε μὴ μέλλοιμεν σύγχυσίν τινα τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλαγῆς ἐμποιεῖν, σώζειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων τὸ οἰκείως συσσημαινόμενον.
Φανερᾶς οὖν οὔσης τῆς τῶν λέξεων τούτων ἐννοίας, πρὸς ὅ τι βλέπει, πῶς ὁ διὰ τῆς λογικῆς τεχνολογίας προάγων τὰ δόγματα, τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν πρός τι διάνοιαν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων οὐ κατενόησεν; Ἀλλ' ἁρμόζειν οἴεται τῷ πεποιηκότι τὸ γέννημα, τῷ γεγεννηκότι τὸ ποίημα, λέγων τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας· ἀμέριστον δὲ σώζειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ ποιήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν. Τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρᾶγμα πρὸς διαφόρους καταμερισθῆναι, φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. C Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Υἱὸς τῷ Πατρὶ προσῳκείωται, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν τῷ γεννήσαντι· τὸ δὲ ποίημα πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει· πλὴν εἰ μή τινα κατάχρησιν ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ τινὶ συνηθείᾳ ῥημάτων κυριωτέραν ἡγοῖτό τις εἶναι τῆς προσφυοῦς σημασίας.
Τίσι οὖν λογισμοῖς, καὶ ποίοις, κατὰ τὴν ἄμαχον διαλεκτικὴν ἐκείνην εἰς τοὐναντίον τὰς δόξας τῶν πολλῶν μεταστήσας ταῦτα κατεξουσιάσας διέξεισιν· ὅτι τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεοῦ καὶ κτίστου καὶ Πατρὸς νοουμένου τε καὶ λεγομένου, ὁ Υἱὸς πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς D τοῦ γεννήματος προσηγορίας…
προσηγορίας B aptly and congruously comports himself, being called both creature and offspring alike. For while the custom and the exact form of speech aptly distinguish these terms, utilizing the name of "generation" for those born from the very essence, and the name of "creature" for those that consist outside the nature of the maker, the tradition of the knowledge of God has handed down to us the divine dogmas of "Father" and "Son," not "creator" and "work," lest any erring, alienated mind should lapse into blasphemy by relegating the Son to a designation of this sort, which is foreign and alien to Him, and lest those impious dogmas which separate and detach the Only-Begotten from the intimacy or connection with the Father which exists according to essence, should find any access. For he who says that the designation of "creature" is appropriate for the Son will, without doubt, also say by consequence that the designation of "creature" suits the nature of the Son. Wherefore, if the Son is a creature, then even heaven is a son, and every single thing that has been made by the Lord is, according to this writer, surnamed by the designation of "son." For if he—not because he has a common nature with Him who begot him—is called by this name, but is called "Son" because he is created, the same reason will dictate that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and everything that has subsisted by the will of the maker, should be named by the designation of "son." But if each of these is not a son because it is outside the nature of the Son, then neither is he called God; consequently, he who is truly and properly the Son, because he consists of the same nature as He who begot him, is the Son and is asserted to be God. But he abominates the concept of "generation," and incriminates this name by the reasoning of carnal nature, separating it from the divine mysteries; but the discourse has already shown abundantly enough in what preceded that, according to the Prophet, C *They trembled for fear where there was no fear*. For if it has been demonstrated that not every generation among men consists of affection or passion—but one is material, through passion, while another is spiritual, pure, and incorrupt—shall we not say that what is born of the Spirit is spirit, and not flesh? For in the spirit, no passible affection is observed. Since, therefore, it appeared necessary to this most vain writer to consider the divine power and capacity through our own examples, let him learn and persuade himself to understand, from the other mode of generation, that in the divine generation there is an absence of affection. But by confusing these three designations with one another, when two of them have equal force, he thinks to seize his hearers through the communion of the two terms in their meaning, so that they might think the third signifies the same thing. For because the designation of "facture" and "creature" indicates that what is made is outside the nature of Him who made it, he attaches the term of "geniture" to these, so that this, too, might be interpreted along with the aforementioned. But such a type of discourse D is called chicanery, deceit, and trickery, not a well-considered and technical demonstration. For only that which reveals the unknown through things admitted is a valid demonstration.
A But to produce something through malice by using false argumentation and to surreptitiously inject an argument, and through superficial deceits—as the Apostle says, of those whose mind is corrupted—to confuse the intelligence of those who have a depraved and wicked mind, no one among those who are moderately wise would call a technical demonstration.
But let us pass on to what follows. He says that the generation of the essence is immediate, and that it preserves without division the relation to Him who begot, made, and created. Now, if, in saying that the essence is indivisible and immediate, he had stopped his discourse there, he would not have deviated from a pious and religious opinion. For it is also confessed by us that the connection of the Son to the Father is immediate, in such a way that nothing is inserted between them that is found as a medium of the connection of the Son to the Father, no concept involving interval, B nor even that very instantaneous and indivisible point which, as time is divided in two—into the past and the future—is perceived in the present indivisibly in itself, being unable to become a part of the past or the future, because it is altogether indivisible and atomic, and whatever might be added to it is imperceptible. We say, therefore, that what is purely immediate is not mediated by anything of that kind. For that which is hindered by some medium would no longer be immediate. If, therefore, he too, in saying that the generation of the Son is immediate, had not appended any of the things mentioned, he would have dogmatically asserted the connection of the Son to the Father as it is piously understood. But since, as if repenting for what he had said, he immediately appended that He preserves the relation to Him who begot, made, and created, C he defiled the former things with the latter, by spewing forth a blasphemous utterance over a pure argument. For it is clear that there, too, he does not look to the pious meaning of "immediate." But as one might say that the hammer mediates between the nail and the smith, and that its construction is "immediate," [reasoning] that before the tools were invented by art, by some conception the hammer was produced first by the smith through no other tool, and thus through it the others [were produced]. This is what the word "immediate" indicates the author of the discourse means regarding the Only-Begotten. And Eunomius is not alone in being led astray by the absurdity of this D doctrine; but it is also possible to find the same in the writings of Theognostus, who says that God, wishing to construct this universe, first posited the Son as a kind of rule for the creation. Nor did he perceive the absurdity in his argument, that what is not for its own sake, but is for the sake of something else, is entirely of lesser honor than that for the sake of which it comes into being, just as we employ an agricultural tool for the sake of life; yet the plow is not honored equally with life. Thus, therefore, if the Lord exists for the sake of the cosmos, and not all things for His sake, then all things—for whose sake they say He was brought into being—would be more precious than the Lord. This is what they presently construct through their argument, by using the term "immediate" to have
A a relation with Him who created and made.
But he acts kindly and gently in the rest, and says: "With none of those things that came to be through Him and after Him is He to be compared." Such are the things with which the enemies of the truth surround the Lord as if they were satellites, through which blasphemy—that is, impious insult—is more clearly constructed. B Tell me, of the remaining things that exist within creation, what has a comparison with another? Since, in general, the property appearing in each one does not admit of communion with things that are of a different kind. For there is no comparison of heaven to earth, nor of this to the stars, nor of the seas to the stars, nor of stone to water; nor of trees to animals, nor of winged creatures to land animals, nor of swimming creatures to four-footed beasts, nor of irrational to rational beings. And why should anyone waste time discussing each one, showing that the same thing must be said of every one of the things seen in creation? Which C is cast at the Only-Begotten as something exceptional: that He has no comparison with any of the things after Him and which came to be through Him. For it is plain that whatever you might consider by itself is incomparable to the whole and to each individual part. And what it is true to say of any given creature, as being appropriate and sufficient for honor and glory, is assigned to the Only-Begotten God by the enemies of the truth. And having constructed such things, again in the remaining empty honors he makes Him venerable, calling Him Lord and Only-Begotten; but so that no pious mind might be begotten in the hearers through these names, he immediately mixes in blasphemies with the more honorable titles. The text reads as follows: "Inasmuch as," he says, "the generated essence leaves no room for communion with any other—for it is only-begotten—neither is the energy of the One who made it seen in common." O what insolence! As if speaking to irrational and senseless men, in whom there is no understanding, he leads the argument around by means of [his] core premise; rather, he suffers the same as those deprived of sight, since they too often act indecorously in the eyes of those who can see, because they neither see themselves nor suspect that they are seen. For who is there who cannot perceive the contradictoriness in what has been said? Because it is generated, he says, the essence leaves no place for communion with others; for it is only-begotten. And having said this as if it were the truth, he either not seeing [it] himself, or not thinking he is seen, adds the things that have no communion as if they were consistent with what had been said, [namely] by applying the energy of the One who made to the essence of the Only-Begotten. For the one who has been generated [relates] to the one who generated, and the Only-Begotten D to the Father, following necessarily in [their] relationship; and looking to the truth, it is not the energy of a maker, but the nature of the one who generated that is contemplated in the sequence of the Son. But the one who, like a man who has remembered plants or seeds or anything else in creation, applies the energy of the One who made to the...
subsistence of the Only-Begotten. For if a stone or a piece of wood, or anything of that sort, were proposed for contemplation, it would be logical to perceive in the mind the action of Him who made it. But if the adversaries also confess that the Only-Begotten is God and Son and subsists as begotten, how do the same expressions apply to Him and to the lowest parts of creation? And what can truly be said regarding an ant or a gnat, they also think is pious to say regarding the Lord. For if one were to examine carefully the nature of the ant, and the properties by which it is specifically distinguished from the remaining animals, he would not speak outside the truth if he said that the operation of Him who made it is not seen to be common with others. A Therefore, what is said regarding such things, these things they proclaim regarding the Only-Begotten. And just as hunters are said to anticipate the approach of wild beasts with certain pits, and to hide their treachery by covering the mouths of the pits with certain rotten and unsubstantial materials, so that the pit might appear level with the ground lying adjacent to it: some such thing does the heresy contrive against men, covering the pit of impiety by means of these auspicious and pious names, as if with some superficial roof, so that those who are less competent in the judgment of reason might think the proclamation of these men to be the same as the true faith, through the confession of the words, and running toward the bare name of the Son and of the Only-Begotten, they might walk into the abyss, the meaning of the denominations not supporting their footing, but driving them headlong into the chasm of the denial of Christ. For this reason, he makes mention of a begotten essence, leaving no room for communion, and he names Him Only-Begotten. These are the coverings of the pit. B When, however, someone standing by, before being snatched away by the chasm and the abyss, extends to the argument, as it were, a hand—namely, the experience made through the word—he perceives the destruction of idolatry undermined within the dogma. For, as if approaching God and the Son of God, he finds a creature of God set before him for worship. For this reason, they carry the name of the Only-Begotten up and down, so that the destruction might be easily accepted by the deceived, just as if someone, having mixed poison into bread, were to invite with his right hand those in need of food to their death; they would not have accepted the deadly poison if they had not been lured toward what was visible. Therefore, he looks wisely, according to his own purpose, toward what is being sought. C For if he had entirely cast the word "Son" out of his own dogma, the deception would not have been acceptable to men, with the denial clearly protesting in an open and manifest proclamation; but now, having left only the name, while having transferred the signified meaning to the notion of creation, he both establishes idolatry and evades the reproach. But since we have been commanded not to honor God only with our lips, nor is piety judged by the sound of a voice, but it is necessary first to believe in the heart unto righteousness in the Son, and then to confess with the mouth unto salvation—and those who say in their heart that there is no God, even if they confess "Lord" with their mouth, have been corrupted, as the Prophet says—for this reason I say that it is necessary
A that the mind should look through the diction; our discourse is this, and not that of our adversaries. If anyone applies the name of Son to a creature, he shall be ranked among idolaters; for they too used to call Dagon, and Bel, and the dragon, God, but they did not on that account worship God. For neither wood, nor bronze, nor a beast is God. But what need is there, by conjectures, to reveal B the hidden deception in the discourse, and perhaps to offer occasions to the hearers, as if we were not truly directing these things against the enemies? For behold, he exposes the blasphemy to us naked, concealing the guile by no veil, but speaking absurdities boldly with a free voice; for the writings have it thus: "We indeed, therefore," he says, "finding nothing else besides the essence of the Son that receives generation, think we must arrange the appellations upon the essence itself, whether we call Him Son and begotten in bare and thin words, or whether we tear these away from the essence; incited by these, we firmly hold that the essences are separated and distant from one another." I do not think there is any need for the absurdity that is in these words to be refuted by our discourses. For the very reading of the writings is sufficient to mark the blasphemy; for so let us scrutinize it: He maintains that the essences of the Father and the Son are separated and differ from each other. What, then, is signified by C (that is, discrepant and diverse)? Let us first examine the force and meaning of the term separately, so that the impious reproach may be more fully exposed through the interpretation of this word. Therefore, in the abuse of common usage, this name is spoken in the case of bodies, when by paralysis or some other affliction a limb is turned aside from its natural harmony. For from the comparison of the afflicted limb with that which is sound, we name the turning for the worse of that which has suffered this; and among those who differ in their morals according to virtue and vice, when the intemperate life is compared with the pure and temperate, or the unjust with the just, or the irascible, bellicose, and one who cannot restrain his anger with the meek, D and peaceful, and quiet; and whatever in general is blamed for being in vice by the comparison of the better, is said to be (that is, to differ). Because those manifest marks which are in both—I mean of the good and the worse—do not agree with one another. Furthermore, we say that qualities which are considered in the elements are (discrepant), which meet one another by contrariety, having a corrupting power against one another, such as the hot and the cold, or the dry and the moist, or in general if anything is opposed to its opposite; and we interpret that which cannot unite in these by the name of (that is, difference, or discrepancy). And whatever in general dissonates from the other in those marks from which
its power and nature are known, is set as something distinct—as health from disease, and life from death, and war from peace, and virtue from vice, and whatever things are of this same kind; all these things stand in disagreement with one another.
Having distinguished these things for ourselves in this way, let us also consider in the case of the logographer, how he says that the essences in the Father and the Son are B (disjunct/different) from each other. Why does he say this? Is it because the Father exists according to nature, but the Son is B (discrepant) from that nature? Or does he interpret by this word the B (perversion) of virtue, separating by the name of B (difference) that which is evil from that which is better, so that he may contemplate the essence in what is beautiful and honorable, but the other in its contrary? Or does he, according to the principle of the contrariety of the elements, also affirm that the divine essence is B (discrepant) from the other? Or does he behold in the essences a conflict in the same way that war stands toward peace, and life toward death, and the struggle toward all such things? B So that they cannot combine with one another, because the mingling of contraries has a power that is consuming to those things which are mixed. Just as the proverbial Wisdom says regarding such a dogma, that water and fire will never say, "It is enough" 37; signifying through this enigma the nature of contraries that is equal in battle and counterpoise, and their destruction of one another. Does he say that he perceives C (difference) in those essences according to none of these? Let him then say that which is understood beyond these things. But he could not say it; even if he says the customary things, namely that the Son is C (different) from Him who begat Him. For by this, the absurdity of the things said by him is even more refuted. For what is so naturally and fittingly produced and joined to another, as the relative significance of the Son toward the Father? C Proof of this is that even if these two names were not spoken, the one is co-signified by the one that is placed beside it; thus the one is laid and fitted into the other, and both are contemplated in the one, so that neither of these could be understood of itself without the other. But that which is C (discrepant), is necessarily understood and spoken of as being from the contrary of that which is fitting. For instance, a string fits well toward a straight line, but if a crooked one is placed against the straight, it does not fit; and it is customary for musicians to call the symphony of tones harmony, but what is wayward and discordant is unharmonious. Therefore, it is the same D to say D (discrepant) and unharmonious. If, therefore, according to the discourse of the heresy, the nature of the Only-Begotten God is D (disjunct) from the essence of the Father, it does not fit at all; and that which is fit cannot exist in that with which it cannot accord nor be adapted. For just as when there is one and the same form, both on the wax and on the engraving in the seal-ring, when it is inserted back into the seal, the wax impressed by it adapts the character around itself to that which contains its own types in the engraving, penetrating both the hollows and receiving the protrusions of the engraving by its own types. But if a strange and alien type were inserted into the engraving of the seal, it roughens and confuses its own form with the unfamiliar ones.
A Yet truly, He who is in the form of God is formed by no other character than the Father, being the character of the Father's substance; for the form of God is entirely identical with the substance. For just as when He became in the form of a servant, He was formed in the essence of a servant, not having assumed a naked and simple form in Himself, separate from the essence, but the essence is signified together with the form; so precisely He who said that He is in the form of God, indicated the essence by means of the form. If, therefore, He is in the form of God, and being in the Father, He is stamped B by the paternal glory, as the voice of the Gospel says, which declares: *Him hath God the Father sealed* (John vi, 27); wherefore he who has seen the Son, sees the Father: the image of goodness, and the brightness of glory, and all things of this sort, testify that the Son’s essence has no discrepancy with the Father.
Therefore, the instability and futility of the blasphemy of our adversaries is openly and clearly refuted by what has been said. For if things that are separated do not fit together, He, however, who has been sealed by the Father, and shows the Father in Himself, and is in the Father, and has Him in Himself, shows through all things that the nature is conjoined, concordant, and harmonious. Through these things, therefore, the absurdity of the adversaries is vehemently refuted: for as it has been demonstrated that the C separated (that is, what is distant) is incongruous and dissonant; so, conversely, it is concede entirely that what is well-conjoined and apt is (indivisible or immutable). For just as that which is separated does not fit, so that which fits and coheres is not disjoined: but he who says that the nature of the Only-Begotten (differs or departs) from the Father's good essence, sees in the good itself a discrepancy. But what is that which departs from the good? *Notice, O good men, the craftiness,* the proverb says.
But these things, as having an obvious absurdity, I shall pass over in the course of my discourse; but let us examine what precedes them. He says that nothing else is found besides the essence of the Son that admits generation: D what does he understand when he says this? For he distinguishes two names from one another, and separating what is signified through them in his discourse, he sets forth each one properly and separately in himself; one name is generation, the other name is essence. He says, the essence receives the generation, as being something obviously other than the generation. For if generation were essence—which he indeed assiduously affirms—so that the two designations had an equal force according to signification; he would not have said that the essence receives the generation; for it would be equal to saying that the essence receives the essence, or that the generation receives the generation, if essence and generation were the same thing. Therefore, he understands one thing as the generation, and another thing as the essence which receives the generation. For the thing received would not be the same as the thing receiving it. This, indeed, is the wise technique of the logographer.
says. But if any mind is intent upon what has been said, let him who has resolved to judge carefully examine the argument. I shall take up the statement again.
A He says that he finds nothing else besides the essence of the Son that receives generation. But that there is no meaning underlying these statements is clear to anyone who is in any way sensible to logical argument. It would remain to bring into the open the blasphemy which he constructs by means of these unintelligible phrases. For he wishes, even if he cannot, because of his interpretive weakness, to instill this thought into his hearers: that the significance of the Son is "constructed," that is, indicating something created. He calls this construction "generation," covering the horror of the blasphemy with a most specious term, so that the endorsement of the Lord’s having been created might become more readily acceptable, the word "generation" declaring the construction. He says, therefore, that the essence receives generation, so that all construction might be viewed as if in some underlying subject. For no one would say that what does not subsist has been constructed, thus extending the making to the nature of the Only-Begotten God as if it were a sort of construction of a discourse. If, therefore, he says, it receives this generation, wishing to signify that it would not exist if it had not been constructed—what else among those things perceived in creation is not made? Heaven, earth, air, sea, everything that is, is by all means made; none of which would exist if it were not made. How, then, did he perceive as something exceptional in the nature of the Only-Begotten that it receives generation into its very essence? For he calls construction by this name, just as the bumblebee and the gnat B receive generation, not into themselves, but into something other than themselves. Therefore, it is confessed through what has been written that the essence of the Only-Begotten is made common by him even with the smallest particles of creation, and every argument by which the alienation of the Son from the Father is constructed has equal force in the case of every individual thing. What need, then, was there for him to use this complicated artifice to construct an alienation from nature, when he ought to have taken the short path of denial, to openly deny and say that the name of the Son ought not to be confessed, nor the Only-Begotten God preached in the Churches, but that the Jewish worship should be judged more authoritative than the confession of the Christians, and that since they confess only the Father as Creator and Maker, they should subject everything else to the name and concept of *creature*; and among these things, to call the work placed before others a "poem" C produced through some constructive activity, and to address him as "first-created" instead of Only-Begotten God and true Son?
For if these things prevail, it is very easy for their dogmas to be concluded toward their purpose, with all things naturally being led from such a principle to the corresponding consequence: that he who is neither begotten, nor is Son, but who subsists through some operation...
cannot partake of the essence with God. But as long as the voices of the Gospels prevail, through which the Son and the Only-Begotten, and [He who is] from the Father and from God, and similar things are proclaimed, he will rave in vain, deceiving both himself and those who follow him with such babblings. For since the appellation of "Son" loudly proclaims a true relation with the Father, who is so stupid and witless as to see John and Paul and the rest of the choir of the saints proclaiming these genuine voices, which are indicative of kinship, and not look to them, but instead, beguiled by the empty rattles of the sophistries of Eunomius, embrace his doctrine and consider Eunomius himself a truer teacher than those who, moved by the Spirit, speak mysteries and carry Christ within themselves? Who is this Eunomius? From where was he exalted to lead Christians? But let these things be passed over; and as much as possible, let the zeal B concerning the matters proposed soften our heart, which is swelling beyond measure with the fervor of faith against those who blaspheme. For how is it possible not to be moved to anger and hatred, seeing our God and Lord, and Vivifier, and Savior, treated with mockery and befouled like filth by these petty men? For if someone were to revile my father according to the flesh, or act with hostility toward my benefactor, would it be possible to restrain anger with an imperturbable mind, and bear with an equal mind an insult against those who are loved and dear? But if the Lord of my soul, who caused it to exist when it was not, and redeemed it when it was reduced to servitude; who provided a taste of the present life, and prepared the future one; who calls to the kingdom, and commands how we might flee the judgment of Gehenna—I speak of these things as small and not yet worthy of the greatness C of the common Master: who is worshipped by every creature, celestial, terrestrial, and subterranean, to whom ten thousand myriads of celestial ministers have stood by; to whom all that is here administered is turned and held by the desire for the good; if this [Lord] is exposed to insult by men to whom it is not sufficient only to attach themselves to the portion of the apostate, that is, the defector, but who consider it a loss not also to have dragged others with them into the pit or abyss by their writings, so that for those who come after, the path leading to destruction might not be wanting—is there anyone who blames the anger conceived against them? But let us hasten back to what follows.
For in what follows, he accuses us again of dishonoring the generation of the Son by human D comparisons, and he mentions what was written by our father regarding these things: in which, he says, when two things are signified by the term "Son"—namely, that which occurs through passion as a production, and that which intercedes with the one who begat as kinship—the former, which is unbecoming and carnal, is not to be admitted into divine discourse; but the latter, in as much as it is for the testimony of the glory of the Only-Begotten, this alone is to be accepted in the sublime doctrines. Who, therefore, dishonors the generation of the Son by human notions, he who banishes from the divine generation that which is passible and human, and impassibly connects the Son with Him who begat; or he who makes common with the lower creation the…
being that brought all things into existence? But such as this, as it seems, this new wisdom appears to look to dishonor, namely, to reconcile the Son to the majesty of the Father, but to bring Him, the great and high, down to an equal honor with the creation that is his fellow-servant alongside us. O empty accusations! Basil is maligned as if he were dishonoring the Son, he who honors Him just as the Father is honored. And Eunomius fights for the honor of the Only-Begotten, he who deprives Him of the good nature of the Father. Such was the indictment Paul once encountered among the Athenians, when he was accused of preaching foreign divinities, while he was in fact refuting the error concerning the demons of those who were addicted to the insane worship of idols and was guiding them to the truth, proclaiming in the Areopagus the resurrection. These things even now the new Stoics and Epicureans throw at the imitator of Paul, having time for nothing else, as history relates concerning the Athenians, than to tell or to hear some new thing. For what could be found newer than these? A Son of operation, and a Father of creation, and a God appearing recently, springing up from non-being, and a good departing or diverging from the Good? These are they who, through saying that He is not that which the nature of the Begetter is, pretend to honor Him with fitting honors. Does Eunomius truly respect the form of such an honor, if one should say He is not united by nature to the Father, but has communion with one of those things that are of a different kind? For if one who makes the Master of creation common with the creation is judged to be honoring Him in these things, let this one also be honored by being made common in nature with the irrational or the insensible. But if to this man, communion with the inferior seems harsh and insulting, how can it be an honor for Him who rules in the power of His own age, as the Prophet says, to be classed together with the subordinate and enslaved nature? But these things are enough thus far. A
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK FIVE
CHAPTERS OF THE FIFTH BOOK
1. The fifth discourse promises to speak upon the words of the Apostle Peter, but postpones it. And first it discourses concerning the creation, that nothing of it is to be worshipped, but that men, having been led astray by an uninstructed and weak mind, and having admired its beauty, have deified the parts of the world. In which he also beautifully interpreted the saying of Isaiah: "I am God the first."
2. Then he discusses the saying: "God has made Him Lord and Christ." In which he also [recounts] the rebuttal of Eunomius, which, on account of this saying, he directed against the holy
A Basil, and sets forth the revilings and vulgar insults vomited forth by Eunomius.
3. Against this he provides a wonderful and strange answer and demonstration regarding the power of the Crucified one, and [shows] that the subjection belonged to the human nature, not to that which the Only-Begotten received from the Father. Therein you may also find explained the sign of the cross, the title of Christ, and the gifts granted to humanity through the union of the divine nature with the human.
4. Then he proves false the calumny of Eunomius, who claims that the great Basil asserted that "man was emptied into man," and declares that the emptying of the Only-Begotten took place for the restoration of the man who had suffered.
5. After this, he teaches that there are not two Christs, nor two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord; and he demonstrates that the divine nature, having been mingled with the human, preserved the properties of each nature without confusion or mixture, and that, because of the union, he affirms that the operations are called common, the Divine [nature] taking upon itself the sufferings of the servant, and the human being glorified together with the Master's honor; and he sets forth with great wisdom and erudition how the divine nature, having been united [to it], has, as it were, translated the human nature into itself by the power of its intermixture. B
Now it is time for us to examine with greater care and more vigilant industry the voice of the apostle Peter, and to scrutinize what has been said on this subject by Eunomius himself and by our father. If an accurate and diligent investigation carries the argument into a lengthy discussion, the kind and candid hearer will surely forgive us, not accusing us of trifling or babbling ignorantly, but laying the blame upon him who provided the cause. May I be granted leave to run through a few brief points prior to the examination of the matters proposed; nor are these things, perhaps, out of tune with the intended scope of these serious matters. The divine word has legislated that nothing which has been made by creation is to be worshipped by man; as it is possible to learn this from almost every part of the divinely inspired Scripture. Moses, the tablets, the law, the prophets that follow them, the Gospels, the decrees of the apostles—all of them equally forbid looking toward the creation. And it would be long to set forth each thing in order that pertains to this, but even if we produce only a few out of many testimonies drawn from divinely inspired witness, the discourse nevertheless contains a witness worthy of belief, because each of the divine truths possesses an equal power for the manifestation of the truth, even if it be very small. For since the opinion concerning things that are is divided into two parts—that is, into the creation and into the uncreated nature—if that which is now contended for by our adversaries should prevail, so that they say the Son of God is a creature, it is altogether necessary either that the evangelical proclamation be spurned, and God the Word, who was in the beginning, not be worshipped, because it is an impiety to offer the worship of *latria* to a creature; or, if indeed from shame they dare not deny C
A that the created must be offered equal honor with the uncreated, if indeed according to the dogma of the adversaries even a created God were to be worshipped, he would have no prerogative in nature over the rest of creation; and if this were to prevail, the dogmas of piety would be transferred into a certain absolute anarchy and a democratic autonomy. For when men do not believe that there is one nature to be worshipped, but are carried away by their conceptions into diverse divinities, there is no one who will arrest the opinion regarding the divine as it proceeds through creation; but that which is deemed divine in creation will become an occasion for an equal opinion regarding that which is considered after it, and that again for the next, and so through all, the error will be carried on by this sequence, the first deception passing through things adjacent even to the uttermost.
And that I am not conjecturing anything outside the bounds of probability, B I shall produce a witness worthy of belief, namely the error prevailing among the Greeks up to this present time. For since they were affected with wonder at the beauties of creation with an uninstructed and small-minded way of thinking, they did not use the wonder of things seen as a guide and leader to the knowledge of the beauty that is above; but they halted their mind at the things that are grasped, and admired each part of creation specifically. For this reason, they did not fix their understanding regarding the divine in one single thing among those that are seen; but everything that is seen in creation they deemed divine. And thus among the Egyptians, the error having been more energetic regarding intellectual natures, the myriad forms of demons were numbered among the natures of gods. But among the Babylonians, the inerrant revolution of the pole was deemed God, whom they also named Bel. Thus also, the seven orbs that follow, which Greek vanity had individually deified, it subjected C one to another according to some certain principle of deception. For having perceived all these orbs revolving within one another, since they erred regarding the highest, they consequently preserved the same error even to the last and lowest. Moreover, they taught that the ether itself, and the air spread out beneath it, and the earth and the sea and the subterranean lot, and even those things of the earth itself which are useful and necessary for human life, were not exempt from the divine nature; but they worshiped each of these as God, and by reason of one of these things which shine forth in creation, they enslaved themselves to all the subsequent parts of creation in order. But if from the beginning it had appeared impious to look toward creation, they would not have fallen into this deception and imposture of a D multitude of gods. So that the same things may not happen to us, who are taught by sacred Scripture to look toward the true divinity, we have been instructed to think of everything created as outside the divine nature, and to worship and venerate only the uncreated nature, for which this is the character and mark: neither to have a beginning of being at any time, nor to cease to be. Thus, of the great
A Isaiah, having theologized concerning these dogmas with his lofty voice, speaks from the divine person: "I am the first, and I am after these things, and before me there was no God, and after me there shall be none." For as the great prophet, who was more exact and perfect in his knowledge of the mystery of evangelical piety than all others, who also signified that distinct and unexpected sign of the Virgin, and proclaimed the birth of the Son, and clearly set forth that name of the Son—he, then, having grasped all truth through the Spirit within himself, so that the character of the divine nature might be most known to all, by which we distinguish that which truly exists B from that which has come into being, says this from the person of God: "I am the first, and I am after these things, and before me no God has come into being, and after me there is none." Since, then, neither that which is before God is God, nor that which is after God is God—for that which is after God is a creature, and that which is beyond God is nothing, and that which is nothing is not God; or rather, that which is beyond God is He Himself in eternal beatitude, defined by nothing—since, therefore, this spiritual voice has been uttered by the prophetic mouth, we learn through this the dogma: that the divine nature is one, continuous with itself and indivisible, admitting in itself neither "before" nor "after," even if it is proclaimed in the Trinity; having nothing that is considered in it as older or younger. Since the voice is God's, whether you grant that the discourse is the Father's C or the Son's, the dogma of piety is equally strengthened by either. For if the Father says these things, He testifies to the Son that He does not exist after Him. For if the Son is God, and whatever is after the Father is not God, it is clear that the discourse testifies that the Son is in the Father, and not after the Father. Or if one should grant that this voice is the Son's, the saying, "There has not come into being before me," will be a clear teaching that He who is considered in the beginning is included together with the eternity of the beginning. Therefore, if anyone is after God, he is found by the things that have been said to be a creature and not God. For "that which exists after me," He says, "is not God."
Having, therefore, first set forth for us this speculation D concerning existing things, it is now time to examine the proposed discourse. It has been said, then, by Peter to the Jews, that "God made Him both Lord and Christ, this same Jesus whom you crucified." But it is said by us that it is not pious to refer the word "made" to the divinity of the Only-Begotten, but rather to the form of a servant, which according to the time of the advent in the flesh came to be dispensationally; but those who violently twist this argument to the contrary say that the eternal generation of the Son is signified by this word "made" [uttered] by the Apostle.
A Having therefore set the discourse in the midst, and having examined both opinions with precision, we shall leave the judgment of the truth to the hearer. But Eunomius himself would be a sufficient advocate for the opinion of our opponents, as he has contended not unnobly in these matters; so that when we have gone through his discourse word for word, we shall then fully set forth the argument for those who contend on our side. For the confirmation of our own dogma, we shall, as far as we are able, follow in the footsteps of those things previously set forth by the great Basil. But those who judge for the truth through reading, as one of the prophets says, "Judge a righteous judgment," not with contentious preoccupations, but by granting the victory to the truth which is shown through examination. And let the first accuser of our positions come forward, as if in a court of law, reciting what is written: B "Furthermore, refusing to take this word 'made' as referring to the essence of the Son, and at the same time blushing at the cross, he indeed blames the apostles—and no one, not even those who have striven vehemently to attack them with wicked blasphemies—and he introduces two Christs and two Lords into his own doctrines and discourses; for he says: 'God did not make the Word who was in the beginning Lord and Christ, but [He made] Him who emptied Himself into the form of a servant and was crucified out of weakness.' And the great Basil writes this expressly: 'Furthermore, the sense of the Apostle does not represent to us the subsistence of the Only-begotten which is before the ages, concerning which the discourse is at present; for he speaks not concerning the essence itself of the Word of God, who was in the beginning with God, but concerning Him who emptied Himself in the form of a servant, and was made conformable to the body of our humiliation, and was crucified out of weakness.' C And yet this is manifest to everyone who pays even a little attention to the intent of the apostolic expression, that he does not hand down to us a manner of theology, but introduces arguments concerning the economy. 'For,' he says, 'God made this same Jesus, whom you crucified, Lord and Christ,' clearly pressing with a demonstrative voice upon His humanity which was visible to all." These things, then, are brought forward by this man, who has subverted his own mind to the intent of the Apostles—for it is not right to say he understood it, lest someone should accuse such holy men, and those selected for the preaching of piety, of such great folly, so as to dare to assert that their doctrine was so deficient. D Who, therefore, are these men who attribute their own nonsense and delirium to the memory of the saints—of what confusion are they not full? Of what absurdity are they not replete, who think that [the] man was emptied into [the] man, and because of this, they contrive that He who out of obedience humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant, was conformable to men even before taking on this form? And who,
A O you, who are the most sluggish of all, being in the form of a servant, takes on the form of a servant? How could anyone humble himself into that which he already is? You will find no device for these things, even though you are daring enough to speak and think of the impossible. But how are you not of all men most miserable, supposing that a man suffered on behalf of all men, and attributing your own redemption to him? For if the blessed Peter is not discoursing B about the Word who was in the beginning and who was God, but about the one who was seen and who humbled Himself—as Basil says, "For the man who was seen humbled himself into the form of a servant; but the one who humbled himself into the form of a servant, humbled himself into the generation of man; for the man who was seen humbled himself into the generation of man"—yet the very nature of things fights against these, and the one himself who celebrated this dispensation in his Theology speaks contrary to them, saying that not the man who was seen, but the Word Himself who was in the beginning and who was God, took on flesh: which is equivalent in other words to saying that He took on the form of a servant. You, therefore, who think such things credible, depart from your error; cease to imagine that a man was humbled into a man. But if you cannot persuade the unbelieving, resolve your disbelief with a second voice and a second testimony. Remind yourselves of Him who said: C "Who, being in the form of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant." For there is no man who would claim this for himself and make it his own word. No one of all the saints who have ever existed was the Only-begotten God, becoming man. For this is what it means to be in the form of God and to take on the form of a servant. If, then, the blessed Peter is discoursing about the One who humbled Himself into the form of a servant—and the Word, who was in the beginning and who was the Only-begotten God, humbled Himself into the form of a servant—therefore, the blessed Peter is discoursing about the One who was in the beginning and who was God, and he teaches that this One became Lord and Christ. Basil himself wrestles with this struggle, and it is clearly shown that he aligns his own mind neither with the intention or the opinion of the apostles, nor does he preserve the consistency of his own words; from which, either perceiving the inconsistency, he will concede that the Word who was in the beginning and was God became Lord, or by stitching together contradicting things for those who are fighting, and remaining contentiously in these, D he will add other things more hostile, constructing that there are two Christs and two Lords. For if one is the God Word who was in the beginning, and another is the One who humbled Himself and took the form of a servant; and the Lord and God Word is He through whom are all things; but the Lord and this Christ is Jesus who was crucified after all things had come to be; then according to him, there are two Lords and Christs. Now no one will be able to avoid this account of such an obvious blasphemy. But if one, while maintaining this, were to say that the one is the Word in the beginning and the One who became Lord, but that He became Lord according to the manifestation in the flesh,
then he will certainly be forced to say that before His coming in the flesh the Son was not Lord. But even if two Lords and two Christs are falsely proclaimed to Basil and those who are faithless according to him, for us, at any rate, there is one Lord and Christ, through whom all things were made, not having become Lord by A advancement, but being the Lord Jesus who existed before all creation and before all ages, through whom are all things; all the saints teach us this in harmony, and they have proclaimed this as the most beautiful of doctrines. For both the blessed John teaches that the Word who is God, through whom all things were made, came to be in the flesh, saying: "And the Word became flesh"; and Paul, most wonderful of all, leading those who apply their minds to him toward humility, speaks of Christ Jesus as the One existing in the form of God, and having emptied Himself into the form of a servant, and having been humbled even to death, B even death on a cross; and again in other places, he names the One crucified as the Lord of glory. For, he says, "If they had known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." And he names the very essence itself as Lord much more clearly than this, having said: "Now the Lord is the Spirit." If, therefore, the Word who was in the beginning, in as much as He is Spirit, is Lord and the Lord of glory, and God made this One Lord and Christ, then God made that very same Spirit and God the Word, and not some other Lord whom Basil dreams of.
The accusation, then, is of such a kind. But it seems to me necessary first, C point by point, to run through each of the things that have been brought forward in a brief discourse, and then so direct the words to what has been said, that the writing brought against us may be easy to remember for those who judge the truth—the writing to which a defense must be made—and that we may, in order and with the best sequence, dissolve each of the accusations. He says that we are ashamed of the cross of Christ, and that we accuse the saints, and that we say that a man has been emptied into a man, and that we imagine that the Lord had the form of a servant before His coming through the flesh, and that we attribute redemption to a man, D and that we declare two Christs and Lords in our doctrine; or, if we do not declare this, that at least we do not say that the Only-begotten was Christ and Lord before the passion. Therefore, in order that we might flee from this blasphemy, he says that we must confess that the essence of the Son was made, since the Apostle Peter also confirms such a doctrine with his own voice. These are the heads of the accusation; for as many things as have been labored over for the sake of insult against us, since they contribute nothing to the point, I shall pass over in silence. For perhaps such a flow of words, according to some technical theory, is customary for those who use rhetoric, for
A a greater bulk of accusation is devised. Let this sophist behave insolently and let him grow vigorous in the reproaches against us; let him, in the midst of the contests, show off with his denunciations; let him call us the most sluggish and most miserable of all, and full of confusion and absurdity; and let him disparage us as he wishes, with full authority—and we shall endure it. For it is a disgrace for a man of sense not, indeed, to hear one who is hurling abuse, but to return to what has been said. Perhaps there is some use in his having employed his own nature against us; for by B occupying his slanderous tongue with us, he will perhaps provide a short truce in the war against God. Therefore, let him be sated and filled with his insults as he pleases, and there will be no one to contradict him. For even if someone were to breathe a foul and stinking odor on account of some physical intemperance, or because of some pestilential and disagreeable disease, he would not provoke a healthy man to an emulation of his misfortune, so that he would wish to return like for like and, by his own sickness, to repel the unpleasantness of the one who stinks. For common nature advises us to pity, not to imitate, such people. Therefore, setting aside all the things that he has mixed into his discourse with effort and study—jeering, lamenting, taking it offensively and heavily, and heaping abuse—let us consider only the discussion regarding the doctrines. Repeating, therefore, from the beginning, we shall take our stand against the individual charges in turn.
The beginning of the accusation was that we are ashamed of the cross. For it would be more C appropriate for those who have turned to such an opinion to attempt to make the cross something shameful. For if the dispensation of the passion is believed in like manner by both parties, but we think that God, who was revealed through the cross, must be worshiped and honored just as the Father is worshiped and honored, whereas for them the passion becomes an obstacle to glorifying the only-begotten God equally with the Father who begot him—then the charges are turned against the sophist, and by the very things through which he thinks he is accusing us, he makes public his own impiety concerning the doctrines. For it is clear that for this reason he places the Father above the Son and honors him with greater honors: because the shame of the cross is not seen in him. And for this cause he argues that the nature of the Son has been changed for the worse, because the reproach of the cross is referred to him alone, and does not touch the Father. And let no one think that I am saying these things following only the sequence of the writing according to his intent. For when I had read through his entire discourse, which he had composed with such pains, in the subsequent parts I clearly found this same blasphemy set forth by him in plain language. And, if it seems good, I will append to the sequence of my own words the things written by him, which are as follows: for he says: "If he can indeed prove that even God, who is over all, who is inaccessible light, has become, or could become, in flesh, and has come under authority, and has obeyed commands, and has been governed by human laws, and has endured the cross, let him say..."
"Let the light say to the light." A Who, then, is he who is ashamed of the cross? Is it he who, even after the passion, worships the Son as equal to the Father? Or is it he who, even before the passion, treats Him contumeliously, not only by equating Him with the creature, but also by asserting that He is of a nature subject to passions, as if He would not have come to the experience of sufferings unless He had a nature capable of such things? For we say that even the body in which He received the passion, having been tempered with the divine nature, was made by that tempering to be that which the nature that assumed it is. So far are we from thinking anything lowly about the Only-Begotten God that, even if something of the lower nature was assumed on account of the economy that is benevolent to the human race, we believe B that this too has been transformed toward what is divine and incorruptible. But he makes the passion that He endured on the cross a sign and argument of a change in essence toward something more humble. I do not know how he makes that superabundant efficacy of power, by which He was able to do even this, a certain proof of infirmity; nor does he understand this, that nothing that moves according to its own nature is wondered at as a paradox. But whatever transcends the limits of nature, these are, above all things, a source of wonder, and to these every ear is turned, and every mind is stretched, wondering at the paradox. Therefore, all who preach the Word reveal the miracle of the mystery in this: that God was manifested in the flesh, C that the Word became flesh, that the light shone in the darkness, that life tasted of death; and all such things do the heralds cry out, through which the miracle abounds of Him who manifested the superabundance of His own power through things that are outside of nature. But even if it seems to those men that, because of these things, one ought to offer insult, and they dissever the Son from the equal honor with the Father on account of the economy of the cross, we, as those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word have handed down to us, have believed through the Holy Scriptures that He who was in the beginning God, appeared afterwards on earth, as Baruch prophesies, and conversed with men, D becoming an exchange for our death, and through His own resurrection He loosed the bonds of death and paved the way of resurrection for all flesh through Himself, while being co-throned and co-glorified with His own Father, and according to the merit of the deeds lived, He will on the day of judgment pass sentence upon those who are to be judged.
These things we have believed concerning the Crucified; and for this reason we do not cease to extol Him according to the measure of our ability; for He who can be contained by no one because of His ineffable and inaccessible majesty, except by Himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit, He was also able to descend to fellowship with our infirmity. But those men use this as a demonstration to prove that the Son belongs to a different nature from the Father, because, indeed,
A the nature of the Father remains pure in impassibility, while the Son, because He was changed to a more humble nature, was not unable to come to the experience of flesh and death; as if the change were not great, but rather that He passed in some way into a kin and related nature, and from the similar to the similar. By this reasoning, they posit that the human nature is created, and that the nature of the Only-Begotten is also created. Who, therefore, is justly accused of being ashamed of the cross? He who speaks lowly things about himself, or he who contends for higher things? I do not know if this accuser has heard the great voice of Paul, who, while thus speaking lowly of the God recognized upon the cross, narrates such and so great things about the cross with a magniloquent mouth. For he who is able to make Himself known through such and so great miracles, says: "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of Jesus Christ" B, and to the Corinthians he says that the word of the cross is the power of God to those who are being saved. And to the Ephesians, he describes the power that holds and contains all things by the figure of the cross, in which he desires them, being exalted, to know the surpassing glory of this power, naming its height and depth, and breadth and length, calling each tip of those things which are seen in the figure of the cross by its own proper names, so that he calls the upper part height, the depth that which is placed below the joint, and the transverse part at each tip, he signifies by the name of length and breadth C. So that through this, the great mystery might be manifested, that both the heavenly and the subterranean, and all the ends of things that exist, are held and controlled by Him who showed this ineffable and great power in the sign of the cross. But I do not think it necessary to contend further on these charges, judging it superfluous to struggle stubbornly and vehemently with arguments against slander, especially when the truth has been demonstrated in few words.
Let us therefore pass on to the other head of the accusation. He says that the saints are brought into odium by us and are attacked by calumny. But if he himself has heard it, let him report the words of the accusation; but if he asserts that we said it to others, let him show the true guilt through witnesses: if, however, he demonstrates it from those things which we have written, let him recite the statements, and we will acknowledge the guilt; but he can produce nothing of the sort. For our writings are proposed to anyone who wishes to examine and prove them. If, therefore, it has neither been said to him, nor has he heard it from others, nor can he convict us from our writings as if they were sealed tablets, I think he who has undertaken the defense ought to be silent. For against a crime that subsists on no proof, silence is a truly excellent defense. Peter the apostle says: “God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ” D. We have these things from
A what he has taught us, and we say that the phrase of what has been spoken looks toward one thing: the cross itself, the human name, and the demonstrative force of the word. For the discourse of Scripture asserts that two things occurred regarding one person: from the Jews, the passion; and from God, the honor—not that one suffered and another was honored through exaltation, which he interprets more clearly by the words that follow, saying, “having been exalted by the right hand of God.” Who, then, was exalted? The humble one, or the Most High? And what else is the Most High but the Divine? But surely God, being the Most High, is in no need of being exalted. Therefore, the apostle says that that which is human is exalted. And it was exalted through becoming Lord and Christ. And for this reason it happened after the passion. Therefore, the apostle does not represent the pre-eternal existence of the Lord through the word “made,” but B the transformation of the humble one toward the exalted one, which came to pass through the right hand of God. For through this word also the mystery of piety is clarified. For he who said that he was exalted by the right hand of God clearly unfolds the ineffable dispensation of the mystery. Because the right hand of God—which is the maker of all things that exist, which is the Lord, through whom all things came into being, and without whom nothing that exists has stood—this same hand brought up into its own height, through the tempering, the human being united to it, making him in nature what it itself is. And it is itself Lord and King; for Christ is called king, and it made him these things. For just as by being in the Most High he was superexalted, so also all other things came to pass: in the immortal, immortal; in light, light; in the incorruptible, incorruptible; in the invisible, invisible; in Christ, Christ; in the Lord, Lord. For it is natural in bodily temperings that when one part abounds by a great measure, the one that is lesser is entirely transformed C into the prevailing part. We are clearly taught this also in the mystical discourse through the voice of Peter: that the humbleness of him who was crucified out of weakness—and the weakness denotes the flesh, as we have heard concerning the Lord—this, through the tempering with the infinite and boundless Good, no longer remained in its own measures and properties, but was lifted up on high by the right hand of God, and became, in place of a subordinate, Christ the King; in place of the humble, the Most High; in place of a man, God. What, therefore, has he who pretends to wage war against us on behalf of the apostles found in the writings to seize upon against the saints? But let this charge also be passed over in silence; for I consider it a small and ignoble thing to oppose oneself to claims that are both false and supported by no demonstration. But let us pass on to the more vehement and forcible weapon of the accusation. D He says that we say that the man was emptied into man, and that he who lowered himself through obedience by taking the form of a slave was conformable to men even before he took on this form. No
person should accuse the speaker of slander; A I ask for full concern for the truth, and we shall provide testimony. But if there is nothing of this in what is written, the discourse does not bring some trivial blame; rather, he becomes indignant and angry as if the matters were clearly demonstrated, calling them prodigious babblings, full of trifles and confusion and unevenness, and the like. I do not see what must be done. Just as those who are helpless before the unprovoked rages of the frantic and the delirious have no counsel to take, so I myself find no advice or remedy for this hopelessness. The master says (for I shall repeat his discourse word for word) that he is not handing on to us a mode of theology, but the reasons for the dispensation. But this accuser, impelled by these things, contends that we assert that a man is emptied into a man. What fellowship is there between these and those? If we say that the apostle did not hand on to us a mode of theology B but revealed in his discourse the dispensation concerning the Passion, are we therefore condemned for saying that there is an emptying of a man into a man, and a form of a slave existing before the ages, and a man from Mary older than the coming in the flesh? But I think it is superfluous to dwell on things that are admitted, since the truth itself frees us from the charge. For it is then that one ought to stand against the accusers, when one has provided an opportunity for the slanderer against oneself; but in cases where there is no danger of suspecting anything absurd, the accusation is established not as a proof of the crime falsely attributed to the one slandered, but as a proof of the madness of the accuser. And just as we showed that the crime of being ashamed of the cross, when falsely C attributed to us, was turned against the accuser by the things we examined, so too shall we show that this charge also reverts to the accusers, since it is they, not we, who dogmatize a change of the Son from one like to another in the dispensation of the Passion. For we shall examine the things said by both parties, placing them side by side in summary. We say that the only-begotten God brought all things into being through himself, and that human nature is one of the things that came to be through him, and that since it had fallen into wickedness and for this reason had fallen into the corruption of death, he again drew it back through himself to immortal life by means of the man in whom he dwelt, having taken up the whole of humanity into himself, and having mingled his life-giving power with the mortal and perishable nature, and having transformed our deadness into living grace and power by the tempering of it with himself. D And we assert this to be the mystery concerning the flesh of the Lord: that he who is unchanging is born in that which is changing, so that by transforming and changing what is worse into what is better, he might abolish the wickedness mixed into the changing disposition, having consumed the sin caught in his nature within himself. For our God is a consuming fire, by which all the material of wickedness is consumed.
A Hic noster est sermo. But what does the accuser say? That he who is immutable and uncreated was not mixed with him who was made through creation and for that reason had changed toward wickedness; but that he, being himself created, came to what was akin and of the same nature to him—not, he says, that he had undergone the more humble nature out of a supereminent nature because of benevolence toward the human race, but that he became what he was. For by the general appellation, the name of "creature" is one for all those things which have come to be from non-being; but the particular differences of those things which are considered within creation differ from one another by the variations of their properties. Therefore, if he is created, and man is created, he "emptied himself" according to the word of Eunomius; and he did not pass from the supereminent to the humble, but from the similar to the equal in honor, except for the property which belongs to the body compared with that which is devoid of body. To whom, therefore, will the just vote of those who judge be carried? Or who will be revealed as liable to those accusations? Is it he who says that the created is saved by the uncreated God, or he who assigns the cause of our salvation to a creature?
B But the judgment of those who think piously is not obscure. For he who accurately knows the difference between the created and the uncreated—whose disparity is marked by lordship and servitude, since the uncreated God rules in the power of his authority for ever and ever, as the Prophet says, while all those in creation serve according to the voice of the same Prophet, who says: "All things serve thee" [(Ps. CXVII, 91)]—he who diligently considers these things is by no means unaware of him who causes the Only-Begotten to migrate from servitude into servitude. For if all creation serves, as Paul says, and the essence of the Only-Begotten, as Eunomius thinks, is created, the adversaries by their own decrees C necessarily construct that it is not the Master who is mixed with servants, but that the servant has been made among servants. But yet, to say that the Lord was in the form of a servant before his advent in the flesh is just the same as calumniating us by saying that the stars are black, the sun is murky, the heaven is low, the water is dry, and saying all things of that kind. For he who constructs something, not from what he has heard, but creates whatever seems good to him by his own impulse, let him not spare to aim at us with accusations of this kind. For it makes no difference whether we undergo judgment for these things or for those, because none of these things can have its origin from what we assert. D For he who determines that the true Son is in the glory of the Father, how would he insult the eternal glory of the Only-Begotten in the form of a servant? Since, however, it pleases this writer to assail us with abuse, and it is his concern that his accusations appear plausible and speciously constructed, it will not be superfluous and useless to resist unstable and false charges. For the following accusation contains a similar absurdity; for it [claims that we] speak of two Christs and two Lords.
Since it is in his power to say whatever he pleases, why does he lie so sparingly and strictly, by asserting that only two Christs are introduced by us? Let him say by his own authority, if he sees fit, that we assert ten Christs, and ten times that many, and let him extend the number to a thousand, so that he may tackle the calumny more youthfully and inconsiderately. For the blasphemy is of equal weight whether regarding two or more Christs, and the crimes, being unproven and undemonstrated, are likewise equal. Let him therefore show that we assert two Lords and two Christs, so that he may pass B judgment against us as if having made a refutation of ten thousand charges.
But he insists on convicting us from our own writings. Let us again consider the things said by the Master, by which he thinks he brings charges against us. He does not deliver a way of theology to us, he says, but the accounts of the economy or dispensation, he who says that "God made this same Son whom you crucified both Lord and Christ," directing his demonstration to that which is human and which is visible to all. These, then, are the things that were written. But from whence have these two Christs been intruded by Eunomius through what has been said? Is it the case that to say a demonstrative word presses upon that which is apparent, has the certainty of proof for the constitution of two Christs? Therefore, one ought to deny this as well, namely, that the Lord was superexalted by Him C after the passion, lest we be accused of speaking of two Most Highs; since the Most High is indeed the Word, God in the beginning, but the One who rose from the dead after the passion is superexalted, as the Apostle says. For of the two it is necessary to choose one: either by saying He was superexalted after the passion, which is equal to this assertion—that the Lord became Christ—to be called guilty of impiety by Eunomius, or by avoiding the accusation, to deny the confession of the superexaltation of Him who suffered.
But it is necessary once again to set the words of the accuser as a support for our own defense. Therefore, we will recite verbatim the things put by him, through which our own argument is established, in this manner: The blessed John, he says, teaches that God the Word, through whom all things were made, was made in the flesh, while saying: D "And the Word was made flesh." Does he, understanding what he writes, add these things to his own argument? For my part, I do not believe that he himself knows the meaning of these words. For if anyone were to examine accurately what is said, he would find no contradiction between these things and what is said by us and what is said by him. For we view the things dispensed through the flesh separately, and we understand the divine power in its own nature. Likewise, he, just like us, says that He who was in the beginning the Word has been manifested in the flesh, and neither did anyone else accuse Him, nor did He ever accuse Himself, as
as two Words, both that which was in the beginning, and that which became flesh. For he knows entirely that the Word is the same as the Word which appeared in the flesh A along with Him who was with God. But the flesh is not the same as the divinity, before this too had passed over to the divinity, so that of necessity certain things are fitting for the divine Word, and others for the form of a servant. If, therefore, he does not accuse himself of introducing a duality of Words by such a confession, how are we slandered as dividing our faith into two Christs? We, who assert that He who was superexalted after the passion was made Lord and Christ, through the union with the true Lord and Christ, knowing from those things we have learned that the divine nature is always one and the same and exists in the same way; but the flesh in itself is B that which reason and sense perceive regarding it; yet when tempered with the divinity, it no longer remains in its own limits and properties, but is taken up into that which prevails and surpasses. Yet the contemplation of the properties of the flesh and of the divinity remains unconfused, as long as each of these is considered in itself; such as when one says: The Word was before the ages; but the flesh came to be in the last times. And no one, reversing this, would say either that the latter was before the ages, or that the Word came to be in the last times. The flesh is of a passible nature; but the Word is of an active C nature. And neither is it the creator of things that exist, nor does the divinity possess a passible power. In the beginning was the Word with God: in the experience of death is the man; and neither is the human nature from eternity, nor is the divinity mortal. And all other things are observed in the same way: neither does the human nature give life to Lazarus, nor does the impassible power weep for one who lies dead, but the tear is the property of the man, and the life is [the property] of the Life which truly is. The human poverty does not feed the many thousands, nor does the omnipotent power run to the fig tree. Who is it that is wearied from the journey, D and who is it that, without labor, causes the whole world to subsist by his word? What is the radiance of the glory? What is that which is pierced with nails? What face is struck with blows in the passion, and what face is glorified from eternity? For these things are clear, even if one does not explain them by speech, that the wounds and stripes belong to the servant, in whom is the Master; but the honors of the Master belong to Him, around whom is the servant: so that through the joining and the natural union, both become common to both, the Master taking the servile wounds upon Himself, and the servant being glorified by the Master’s honor; for this reason the cross is also called the cross of the Lord of glory, and every tongue confesses that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.
If it is necessary also to distinguish the remaining things in the same way, let us consider what it is that dies, and what it is that destroys death; what it is that is being renewed, and what it is that is being emptied. For the divinity is emptied, so that it may be contained by the human nature; but [index: entries preserved]
A that which is human, through mixture with the divine, becomes divine. For just as air or spirit is not contained in water when it is dragged down by some heavier body and left in the depths of the water, but runs back to its own kindred principle, while the water is frequently lifted up by the return of the spirit, being curved into a circular shape in a thin, membrane-like airy surface; so too, when the true life that was positioned within the flesh returned to itself after the passion, the flesh around it was also lifted up by the divine immortality, being pressed upward from corruption to the incorruptible. And just as fire in wood, often hidden within the surface, escapes the senses of those who see or touch it, but is manifest when it is fanned into flame; so too in the death which He brought about by His own authority—He who separated His soul from the body, when He said to His own Father, "Into Thy hands I commend my spirit" (Luc. xxiii, 46; Psal. xxx, 6)—He, as He said, possessing the authority to take it up again, B even He who despised the shame among men because He is the Lord of glory, as if covering the spark of life within the nature of the body during the dispensation concerning His death, again ignited and fanned it into flame by the power of His own divinity. Having warmed what was dead, and thus having poured that brief first-fruit of our nature into the infinite power of the divine, He made whatever He Himself was—this too—the servile form, Lord; and the man born from Mary, Christ; and the one crucified out of weakness, life and power; and everything that is piously considered in God the Word, He also made to be in that which was assumed by the Word. So that these things should not seem to be, through division, in each separately, but, by the mixture with the divine, the perishable nature, being recreated according to that which is more powerful, became a participant in the power of the divinity. It is as if one were to say that a drop of vinegar, mixed into a vast sea, had taken on the qualities of the sea because the quality of this liquid no longer remains in its natural state within the immensity of the prevailing element. Thus our discourse, not asserting a number of Christs, as Eunomius accuses, but advocating the union of man with God—the transformation of the mortal with the immortal, of the servant with the Lord, of sin with righteousness, of the curse with the blessing, and of man with Christ—names this a C making. What discourse then remains for the calumniators who claim we preach two Christs in our doctrine, if we do not say that He who is from the beginning uncreatedly in the Father, the Lord and Christ and Word and God, was made? As for the blessed Peter, we define that he speaks of the mystery concerning the flesh briefly and in passing, according to the understanding previously demonstrated: because that which was crucified out of weakness, that very thing, through the prevailing power of the One who indwelt it, became that which He who indwelt it is and is named—Christ and Lord, as we have said.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS, BOOK VI
CAPITA OR SUMMARIES OF THE SIXTH BOOK
1. A The sixth book shows that He who came for the salvation of men was not a bare and mere man, as Eunomius falsely slanders the great Basil for having said, but that the Only-begotten Son of God clothed Himself in human flesh, and became the mediator of God and men, proving Himself passible in the flesh, but impassible in deity; and it demonstrates Eunomius acts as a slanderer. 2. B Then, again, it mentions the saying of Peter, "He has made…," and that from the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says: "Christ was made Apostle and High Priest by God." Having sufficiently apologized against the charges brought against him by Eunomius, it shows that Eunomius himself subscribes to the words of the great Basil, and affirms that the Only-begotten Son, having assumed flesh, became Lord. 3. C Then it marvelously explains what was said by the Lord to Philip: "He who has seen me, has seen the Father," who is in the transformed body. Where also it most beautifully teaches concerning the benign Passion of the Lord, the impassibility of the Father, His creative power and providence, the communion of men, and the resolution into those things from which they were composed. 4. D Then, again, taking up the saying of Peter, that "God Himself made Him Lord and Christ," and having most wisely clarified this through many syllogisms, it shows in this that Eunomius also agrees with correct doctrine; and finally, by applying both divine and human names to each nature on account of the union of the natures, it concludes the book.But I perceive that we have indulged longer than is necessary in this place, and have lingered here more willingly, as the necessity of the concepts has carried us forward to this contemplation; however, the sequence of the accusations must be resumed, so that we may not pass over anything that has been charged and brought against us without defense. And first, if it seems good, let us consider how he accuses us of saying that a common [or "mere"] man worked the salvation of the universe. For even if this has already been moderately demonstrated through the things which have been examined and discussed, nevertheless, so that the opinion of those who judge from calumny may be completely purged, we shall discuss it again in a few words. So far are we from attributing the cause of this great grace, which surpasses all reason, to a common man, that even if anyone were to refer such a work to Peter or Paul, or to a heavenly angel, we would say that such a one, according to the law of Paul, is anathema. For neither was Paul crucified for us, nor were we baptized into [the name of] a human being.
A Yet because we acknowledge that the saving power of Christ B is superior to human nature, it does not follow that the dogma of the adversaries C gains strength against the truth. For their goal is to establish by every means that the essence of the Son is alien to and different from the essence of the Father; and they strive persistently to demonstrate that it is unlike in essence, not only by the distinction between the begotten and the unbegotten, but also by the opposition between the passible and the impassible. And this is set forth more plainly in the later parts of the discussion.
It is also no less manifest from what is currently being said. For if it accuses those who attribute suffering to human nature, it surely wishes to subject the divinity itself to suffering. For since the opinion is twofold and ambiguous—whether it was the divine or the human that underwent suffering—the accusation of the one becomes a construction for the one that remains. If, therefore, they accuse those who see the suffering in the human, they will certainly praise those who say the divinity of the Son is passible. But that which is being constructed becomes a defense of the absurdity of their own dogma. For if, according to their argument, the divinity of the Son suffers, while that of the Father is preserved in complete impassibility according to its essence, then the impassible nature is kept alien from that which is subject to suffering. Since, therefore, that which is said, however brief it may be in the description of the words, provides the principles and hypotheses for all the perversity concerning the dogma, it would be just for readers to demand not a concise and brief response, but one that is sound and safe. We therefore do not attribute our salvation to a human being, nor do we admit that the incorruptible and divine nature is passible and corruptible; but since it is necessary to have complete and indubitable faith in the divine utterances, which proclaim that the Word was God in the beginning, and afterwards that the Word became flesh and was seen on earth and lived with human beings, we receive the notions appropriate to the divine voice by faith. D For when we hear that He is light, and power, and justice, and life, and truth, and that all things were made through Him, we hold all these and similar things to be certain and worthy of faith, referring them to the Word who is God. But when we hear of sorrow, and sleep, and need, and agitation, and bonds, and nails, and the spear, and blood, and wounds, and burial, and the tomb, and whatever else of this kind there may be—even if they seem to be in opposition to what was previously stated—we nevertheless accept them as certain and true, looking toward the flesh which we have received by faith along with the Word. Just as it is not permissible to contemplate the properties of the flesh in the Word who was in the beginning, so, conversely, it is not right to understand those things which are proper to the divinity in the nature of the flesh. Wherefore, since the evangelical teaching concerning the Lord is mixed, consisting both of high things appropriate to God and of humble things, we appropriately assign each of the perceptions to each of those things understood in the mystery— the human to the human, and the
excelsum is assigned to the divinity; and we assert that, inasmuch as the Son is God, He is entirely impassible and incorruptible. But if any suffering or affection be mentioned in the Gospel concerning Him, it is through the humanity that received such an affection that He wrought it. For the Divinity truly works salvation through the body assumed about It; the suffering is indeed of the flesh, but the operation is of God, B even if certain people drag the Apostle into an alliance with a contrary dogma, saying that *He spared not His own Son*, and *God sent His own Son*, and other things of this sort which seem to look toward the divine nature in the dispensation of the Passion, and not toward the human. Nevertheless, we will not depart from the sacred decrees, with Paul himself having just explained this mystery to us. For everywhere he assigns the dispensation of the Passion to the human part of Christ, when he says: *For since by man came death, by man also came the resurrection of the dead*. And, *God having sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin in the flesh*: in the flesh, he says, not in the divinity. And, *He was crucified through weakness*, signifying the flesh by the weakness; but *He liveth by the power*, demonstrating the divine through the power. And, *He died unto sin*, that is, in the body; *but He liveth unto God*, that is, in the divinity. Wherefore, it is established by these things that the man tasted death, but the immortal nature did not receive the suffering pertaining to death. And, *Him who knew no sin, He made sin for us*: once again calling the flesh "sin."
This, although we say it in passing, will perhaps not seem less useful than the matter proposed as an incidental digression. For since holy Peter said, *He made Him Lord and Christ*; and again the apostle Paul to the Hebrews [said] that *He made Him a priest*; Eunomius snatches at the word "made" as being demonstrative of an existence before the ages. And through this he thinks it necessary to construct that the Lord is something created. Let him hear, then, Paul saying that *Him who knew no sin He made sin for us*. If the word "made" regarding the Lord, C as taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews and from the voice of Peter, remits to an eternal conception, he would be doing well; and let him try to refer also that statement here, where he says that God "made Him sin," back to the primary subsistence of the essence, and from this testimony, as he has already done with the others, try to demonstrate that He is something created. So that he might refer the expression "made" to the essence, making himself consistent, and see sin in the essence. But if he is ashamed to say this because of the obviousness of the absurdity, and instead says that the Apostle is showing the dispensation made in the last times by the fact that he said He "made Him sin," let him persuade himself, through that same consequence, that the word "made" there also looks toward the dispensation.
A But let us return again to where we turned aside. For it is possible to gather from the same Scripture countless other things toward this end. And let no one think that the divine Apostle is divided against himself, as if he felt things contrary to one another, or that he provides materials equally to those who fight over doctrines to argue on either side through his own writings; for one who examines this strictly would find that the discourse consistently looks toward one thing in him. He is not inconsistent in his thoughts or his notions; for while he everywhere proclaims the blending of the human with the divine, he nonetheless perceives what is proper to each in both, as both the human weakness is changed for the better through communion with the incorruptible, and the divine power, without falling from its own dignity, remains through the connection it has with that which is humble. B When therefore he says that "He did not spare His own Son," he distinguishes the true Son from those who are generated and exalted and have attained their being—those, I say, who were brought into existence by a command—marking what is natural to Him by the addition of the word "own." And so that no one might attribute the passion of the cross to the impassible nature, he corrects such an error through other clearer statements, naming Him the mediator of God and men, and both man and God, so that though two things are said of the one, what is appropriate may be understood regarding each: regarding the divine, impassibility; regarding the human, the dispensation in the passion—the intellect thus dividing what has been united for the sake of kindness, but distinguished and separated by reason. When he preaches what is superior to and surpasses all intellect, he uses higher names, calling Him "God over all," and "great God," and "power of God," and "wisdom," and the like. C But when he describes in his discourse, out of necessity for our weakness, the whole experience of sufferings that was assumed, he names the composite by our name, calling Him man, not making Him common with the rest of nature through this term, but in order that piety might be preserved: the human being glorified through the assumption, and the divine being emptied through the condescension, but rather assigning the human part to the sufferings, while performing the resurrection of the one who suffered through the divine power. D And thus the experience of death is referred to the one who has shared in the passible nature through the union of man with Him; and those high and God-befitting names descend upon the man. So that the Lord of glory is named as the One who appeared on the cross, because of the blending of His nature with that which is humble, and because the grace of the names passes over from the divine to the human. For this reason he hands Him down in varied and different ways, now as the One who descended from the heavens, now as the One born of a woman, and as God before the ages, and as man in the last days, and thus...
the impassible Only-begotten God and the passible Christ are believed to be; and the Word does not lie by means of opposites, applying and adapting to each of the two names that which is appropriate according to the sense. If, therefore, we have learned to think these things from divinely inspired teaching, how do we attribute the cause of our salvation to a common man? B But if we determine that the utterance of the blessed Peter, "He made," looks not to the eternal subsistence, but to the recent economy, what commerce has this with the charge? For this great Apostle says that what is seen in the form of a servant came to be through assumption, which indeed He who assumed was according to His own nature. For in the Epistle to the Hebrews one may learn the same thing from Paul, when he says that Jesus was made by God an apostle and high priest of our confession, being faithful to the One who made Him. For there, too, having named Him high priest, who propitiated for our sins in a priestly manner by His own blood, he does not by the word "made" announce the first subsistence of the Only-begotten, but, wishing to represent the grace commonly named at the installation of priests, he says "made." For Jesus, as Zacharias says, the great high priest, who offered His own lamb, that is, His own body, for the sin of the world, who for the sake of the children who have partaken of flesh and blood, Himself likewise became a partaker of the blood, not in so far as He was in the beginning Word and God, and existing in the form of God, and being equal to God; but in so far as He emptied Himself in the form of a servant and offered an oblation and sacrifice for us; this One became high priest, many generations later, according to the order of Melchizedek. C He who has not conversed frigidly and languidly in the discourse to the Hebrews knows the mystery concerning this. Therefore, similarly, there He is said to have been made priest and apostle, and there Lord and Christ: partly as regards the economy for us, and partly because of the transformation and restoration of the human into the divine; for the Apostle calls the restoration a "making." The calumny of the adversaries, therefore, is manifest, who abusively snatch the terms of the economy for the pre-eternal subsistence. For we have not learned from the Apostle to know Christ in the same way now as we did before, Paul saying thus: "Even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we no longer know Him," as if that knowledge declared the temporary economy, but this one indicates the eternal existence. Therefore, our argument has brought us no small defense for the refutation of the charges, in that we neither think there are two Christs or Lords, D nor are we ashamed of the cross, nor do we deem that a common man suffered for the world, nor again do we think that the word "made" serves for the construction of the essence. And for such a supposition of ours, our argument has no small alliance from the accuser himself, in those places where, in the midst of his vehement attack upon us, he brings forward this: that Basil himself refers this battle to himself, and shows...
clearly that he neither applies his mind to the intent of the apostles, nor preserves the sequence of his own words; from which, if he were conscious of the inconsistency, he would concede either that the Word who was in the beginning and was God became Lord, or that he is joining battle with those fighting. For this is also our argument, which Eunomius brings forward, saying that he who was the Word in the beginning and was God, became Lord. For if that which was both God and Word, and life and light, and grace and truth, and Lord and Christ, and every exalted and divine name, [was manifested] in the assumed man—who was none of these—and became all the other things that the Word was, and was together with the rest also Christ and Lord according to the teaching of Peter and according to the confession of Eunomius (not by the divinity receiving something through progress, but by the divine nature being seen in all high dignity), thus he becomes also Lord and Christ, not by the divinity coming to an addition of grace—for the nature of the divinity is confessed to be lacking in no good thing—but it is signified through Christ and the Lord that he brings the human into the participation of the divinity.
And concerning these things, this is sufficient. But what is said by Eunomius to calumniate our dogma, that Christ emptied himself into himself, has already been sufficiently examined through what has been said, through which it is demonstrated that he is attributing his own blasphemy to our dogma. For he who confesses that the immutable nature has undergone a created and mortal change does not speak of a transition from like to like, but he who conceives of no migration at all from the magnificence of the nature to that which is more humble. For if that one is created according to their argument, and the man is also created, the miracle of the preaching of the Word is utterly stolen away, and there is nothing admirable or unexpected in what is said, if the creature itself was made within itself. But we, having learned from prophecy of the change of the right hand of the Most High, say that the right hand of the Father is the power or virtue of God, the creator of the universe, which is the Lord himself, not as a part depending from the whole, but as being from Him, yet contemplated for itself according to its own C subsistence. We say this, that neither has the right hand changed according to the definition of the nature of Him whose right hand it is, nor is there any change of it other than that of the flesh, as seen by those with discerning sight; insofar as he performed the works from the Father, he was and was understood to be the right hand of God, but in that he was contained by the veil of the flesh, according to what was seen by the eyes, he was viewed as other or different from what he was by nature. Therefore, he says to Philip, who was looking only at what was changed: "Look through the changed at that which is immutable, and if you see this, you have seen the Father himself whom you seek to see." For he who has seen me—not the one appearing in the change, but the one truly D
in the Father—will see him in whom I am, because the same character of divinity is discerned in both. A Since we believe that the immortal, impassible, and uncreated nature has come to be in the passible nature of creation, and since we perceive the alteration in these things, how is it that we are accused by those who trumpet their own logic against our dogmas of asserting that he has emptied himself into himself? For the communion of the created with the created is no alteration of the right hand. To speak of the right hand of the uncreated nature as created belongs only to Eunomius and those who think as he does. For one who has an eye gazing toward the truth, just as he sees the Most High, so also will he behold the right hand of the Most High—uncreated as that of the Uncreated, good as that of the Good, eternal as that of the Eternal—with nothing B harming the eternity of it being in the Father by way of generation. So the accuser has deceived himself, using his own insults against us, while he directs them instead against those who collide with passion and thereby construct the distinctness of the essences: as if the Father, on account of the excellence of his nature, did not admit passion, while the Son, on account of his inferiority and divergence, descended into the communion of sufferings.
I wish to add this to what has been said: that in truth there is no passion which does not lead to sin. Nor would one properly call the necessary sequence of nature "passion," looking at the composite nature proceeding on its way in a certain order and succession. For the confluence of elements of different kinds with one another, according to the construction of our body, is a composition joined together from many dissimilar things. When the harmony binding the confluence of elements has been dissolved at the appropriate time, C again the composite is resolved into those things from which it consisted. This, therefore, is an operation of nature rather than a passion. For we properly call only that which is conceived as contrary to the impassibility based on virtue a "passion"; and we have believed that he who bestows salvation upon us has remained free from this, even in the communion of our nature, having been tempted in all things according to our likeness, apart from sin. He did not, therefore, share in the passion that is in truth a disease of the will; for, it says, "he did not commit sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth." But we do confess that the Lord participated in those properties of our nature which, through a certain usage and misuse, are homonymously called passions: birth, and nourishment, and growth, sleep, and D labor, and whatever things the soul is naturally disposed to be affected by in relation to bodily distresses—the longing for what is lacking, which extends from the body to the soul by way of appetite, and the perception of pain, and fear of death, and all such things, provided that none of them leads to the consequence of sin. Just as, therefore, [he took] those passing through all…
things, in heaven and in the air, and on earth and in the sea, and if there be anything supercelestial or subterranean, we believe Him to be everywhere and through all things, yet we do not say that He is any of those things in which He is. For He is not heaven, who has grasped it with the palm that contains the universe; nor is He the earth, who holds the circle of the earth; nor again the water, He who encompasses the moist nature; and so, likewise, we do not say that He who came through the aforementioned affections of the flesh is subject to these affections. But as the Author of all things that exist, and He who encompasses the universe, and who by the ineffable power of His own majesty governs whatever is moved, and preserves what is established on a fixed and stable base, B so we say that He was born among us for the healing of the disease of sin, fittingly and congruously adapting the efficacy of His medicine to the affection or passion, bringing about healing in the way He knew would be beneficial to the ailing part of creation; for it was beneficial to heal the affection by touch, and so He healed it. Yet, because He heals the infirmity, one should not for that reason think that He Himself has become subject to the passion. For neither does custom allow such a thing to be said of men. For we do not say that he who touches the sick in order to heal them is a partaker in the sickness, but rather that he grants to the one who is ill a return to health, and we do not say he is a partaker in the sickness; for the sickness is not his, but on the contrary, he touches the infirmity. If, therefore, he who by his art works some good for bodies is not described as sluggish and sick, but as humane, a benefactor, and by such terms; why, by slandering the dispensation concerning us C as humble and ignoble, do they claim that by this the essence of the Son is diminished, as if the nature of the Father were superior to sufferings and affections, but that of the Only-Begotten were not free and pure from passion? For if the goal of the dispensation through the flesh is not that the Lord should become subject to sufferings, but that He should be shown to be a lover of humanity and benevolent; and it is not doubted that the Father is also kind and benevolent toward the human race; then the Father is in the same condition as the Son, if one is willing to look to the goal. And if the Father did not Himself work the dissolution of death, do not be surprised. For He "has given all judgment to the Son," Himself judging no one, not because He is unable either to save what had perished or to judge the one who had sinned, by doing these things through the Son, but because He does these things by His own power, through which He works all things; and the power of the Father is the Son. D Therefore, those who have been saved through the Son have been saved by the power of the Father. And those who are judged by Him undergo judgment by the righteousness of God. For Christ is the righteousness of God, which is revealed through the Gospel, as the Apostle says; and whether you look to the whole world, or to the parts of the world that complete the whole, all these things are works of the Father, works brought about by His power, and thus truth is proven through both.
A For since the Son is the power of the Father, all the works of the Son are works of the Father. For that He does not come to the dispensation of the Passion through any weakness of nature, but by the authority of His will, ten thousand voices from the Gospel could be cited, which I shall pass over because it is clear, lest by lingering on acknowledged truths the discourse be unnecessarily lengthened. If, then, what was done is evil, one must separate not only the Father, but also the Son from that evil. But if the salvation of those who were lost is good, and what was achieved was not a passion but philanthropy, why do you alienate the Father from the thanksgiving due for our salvation, when it was He who, through His own power, which is Christ, wrought the deliverance of men from death? B But we must return again to the vehement writer and take up that heated rhetoric of his against us. He accuses us of not saying that the essence of the Son was made, as if we were acting in opposition to the voice of Peter, who says, "God made this Jesus whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ." He is greatly indignant over these things, reviling us and constructing arguments by which he thinks he refutes our discourse.
Let us see, therefore, the power of these arguments. C "And who," he says, "O you most slothful of all, possessing the form of a servant, assumes the form of a servant?" We will answer him that no one possessing a sound mind would say such a thing, unless they were some who were altogether alienated from the hope of Christians. Yet you are the ones who accuse us of sloth and stupidity because we do not admit that the Creator is a creature. For if the Holy Spirit does not lie, speaking through the prophet, that "all things are Thy servants" and "every creature serves," and if, according to you, the Son is a created being, then He is surely a fellow-servant with all things, being drawn into the communion of slavery by His sharing in creation. D Yet upon Him who serves, you yourselves impose the servile form. For you ought not, while confessing He is a servant by nature, to be ashamed of the mask of slavery. Who then, O most acute of orators, is shifting the Son from the form of a servant into another form of a servant? Is it he who attributes an uncreated nature to Him, by which it is simultaneously demonstrated that He does not serve? Or is it rather you, who by shouting proclaim that the Son of the Father is a servant, and subject to His command even before the form of a servant? I do not need other judges; I entrust the verdict regarding these matters to you. For I do not think anyone could be so shamelessly disposed against the truth as to oppose with impudence things that are acknowledged and conceded. For it is clear to everyone that what is a servant by nature is characterized by the properties of slavery, for to be created is proper to slavery. Whoever therefore says that He, who has assumed our form, is a servant...
moving from slavery into slavery, is the one who makes the Only-Begotten migrate from slavery to slavery. A But he struggles against what has been said, and says a little further down: "For the things that are intermediate, because they have been moderately examined in the preceding points, I shall now pass over." And, insulting us as bold in speaking and pondering impossible things, and calling us most worthy of pity, he adds these words: "For if blessed Peter does not discourse about the Word that was in the beginning and was God, but about Him who was seen and who emptied Himself, as Basil says—*the visible man emptied himself into the form of a servant—*and He who emptied Himself into the form of a servant, emptied Himself into the generation of man."
B Perhaps the craftiness and folly of this construction of discourse have been detected immediately by the judgment of the hearers from what has been read. Nevertheless, we shall submit a refutation of the things said by him in a few words: not for the overthrow of such an unlearned and ignorant fabrication, which of itself is already overthrown among those who listen attentively; but so that we might not appear, under the pretext and guise of despising the meanness of the discourse, to overlook the matter proposed without examination. Let us, therefore, consider the discourse in this way: What is the voice of the apostle? "Let it be known," he says, "that God has made Him Lord and Christ" (Acts 2:36). Then, as if someone had asked in whom such grace had been wrought, he points to the subject as if with his finger: "This Jesus," he says, "whom you crucified." What does Basil say about this? That the demonstrative utterance of the discourse declares that C this one—the one who had been crucified by the very hearers—has been made Christ and Lord. "For you crucified him," he says; and it was likely that those who had demanded the murder against Him were the hearers of the discourse. For the time from the cross to the speech of Peter was not long. What then does Eunomius bring forward against this? "If blessed Peter does not discourse about the Word that was in the beginning and was God, but about Him who is seen and who emptied Himself, as Basil says—*the visible man emptied himself into the form of a servant—*stop! Who says this, that the visible man emptied himself again into the form of a servant, or who constructs that before the appearance through the flesh, the passion on the cross had occurred? For neither was the cross before the body, nor the body before the form of a servant. D But God is manifested in the flesh; and the flesh, which showed God in itself, after it had fulfilled by itself the great mystery of death, is transformed into the high and divine through the tempering, having become Christ and Lord, having been moved and changed into that which He was who manifested Himself in that flesh. But if we were again saying these things, that He who was demonstrated on the cross was emptied into the generation of another man—which this champion of truth claims that we say—he composes this sophistry in his discourse: "If the visible man," he says, "emptied himself into the form of a servant; who..."
emptied himself into the form of a servant, he emptied himself into the generation of man; the visible man emptied himself into the generation of man." B O how mindful he is of the proposed study! How he draws his conclusion according to his aim! Basil says that the apostle spoke of Christ being made also according to the man who is seen; but this vehement and clever subverter of statements says: "If Peter does not say that the essence of him who was in the beginning was made, [then] he who is seen by the eyes as man emptied himself into the form of a servant. But he who emptied himself into the form of a servant, emptied himself into the generation of man." O Eunomius, we are defeated by this unassailable wisdom! Refuted are we mightily, by those things from which we learned that the speech of the apostle does not look to him who was crucified out of weakness. But if we believe that this is so, then again the visible man becomes someone else, being moved into a different generation of man. Will you never cease to play against what should not be dared? Will you not blush to dissolve the fear of divine mysteries in such ridiculous cavils? Will you not be converted now, at least, if not before, to acknowledge that the Only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, being the Word and King and Lord, and every lofty name and concept, has no need to become any of these good things, being himself the plenitude of all good things—and into what can he be changed, to become that which he was not before? Therefore, just as he who knew no sin becomes sin, that he may take away the sin of the world, so again the flesh which received the Lord becomes Christ and Lord, that which it was not by nature being changed into this by the mingling. From which we learn that God would not have been manifested in the flesh, if the Word had not become flesh; nor would the flesh of man which surrounded him have been changed into divinity, if what appeared had not become both Christ and Lord. But they despise the... C of our preaching, those who rush into the essence of God by way of syllogisms, and wish to demonstrate that he who brought all things that are into generation is himself a part of creation; and in aid of such an endeavor they drag in the voice of Peter for the construction of their blasphemy, he who said to the Jews: "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ," pretending with this voice to demonstrate that the essence of the Only-begotten God is created. What then, tell me, were the Jews to whom the word was spoken before the ages? Was the cross before the world? Was Pilate before every creature? Was Jesus first, and then the Word? Is the flesh older than the divinity? Did Gabriel announce the good news to Mary before the world? Does not the one, the man according to Christ, receive his beginning through generation in the reign of Caesar Augustus, while he who in the beginning was the Word, God our King, is before the ages, even as the Pro—
Aphet testifies? Do you not see what confusion you introduce into the Word, mingling all things topsy-turvy according to the proverb? It was the fiftieth day after the Passion when Peter addressed these words to the Jews, saying, that this very Jesus whom you crucified, God made Lord and Christ. But the one whom you, he says, crucified, him God made Christ and Jesus, so that it might be evident from these words that Peter is not speaking of that which is before the ages, but of that which came to pass after the dispensation.
How then do you not see that the whole meaning of the discourse hinges on the subject being demonstrated, but you appear ridiculous in the childish weaving of your sophism, saying that if we believe that the visible Christ and Lord was made by God, it is necessary for the Lord to be emptied again into man and to undergo a second generation? How does your dogma gain strength through these things? How, by the words cited, is the nature of the King of creation demonstrated to be created? I, for my part, say the opposite, namely, that our position is defended by those things that are opposed to us, and that the excellent orator, through excessive attention, has failed to notice that in pushing the argument toward the absurd, he provides help to those he endeavors to overthrow, by means of those very things with which he wages war. For if the migration of Jesus is to be believed as being from that which is transcendent to that which is humble: and only the divine and uncreated nature transcends the creation, while man is created: perhaps, discerning the truth through his own logic, he will change his position, admitting that the uncreated was made in the created out of benevolence and kindness toward men. But if he thinks that he demonstrates the Lord to be created by the fact that he has demonstrated Him who was God to have become a partaker of human nature, many such things will be found to support the same proof, filling out the speech with similar patronage. For since the Word was and was God: but afterward, as the prophet says*, "He appeared upon the earth and conversed with men," it will be demonstrated through these words that He is one of the creatures. But if these things are far from what is sought, then neither are the similar cases at all appropriate to the matters proposed. For it is identical in meaning to say that He who was in the beginning the Word has afterward been manifested to men through flesh, and that He who was in the form of God took the form of a servant. If one of these is useless for the construction of blasphemy, it is necessary to reject the other as well. But he kindly and benevolently advises us to depart from error, and he immediately indicates the truth which he himself constructs: he says that the Apostle Peter teaches that the One who was in the beginning, the Word and God, was made this. If he were feigning dreams for us and recounting the divination that occurs in dreams, there would perhaps be no danger in granting him permission to bring forward the enigmas of his imagination at his own discretion. But since he claims to be expounding divine voices, it is no longer safe for us to indulge him at his own caprice to interpret the words falsely. What does the Scripture say? That God made this Jesus, whom you crucified, Lord and Christ.
God has made this Jesus whom you crucified. A Since everything there concurs—the demonstrative voice of the one humanly named, the accusation of those who committed the slaughter, and the suffering according to the cross—of necessity, the mind looks to what is apparent. But he says that Peter says these things, and he indicates the pre-eternal essence through the word "made." But while it is harmless to allow nurses or old women to play with little children and to transfer the images of their dreams to whatever they please, when the God-inspired voice is set before us for interpretation, the great Apostle forbids us to accept old wives' tales and empty sounds. For when I hear "cross," I think of the cross, and having been taught the human name, I see the nature made manifest by that name. B Having learned, therefore, that the One who was manifested before our eyes was made Lord and Christ by Peter, I do not hesitate to speak. For the saints agree with one another, both in all other things and regarding this part. For just as he himself says that the crucified One was made Lord, so also Paul says that He was highly exalted after the passion and the resurrection—not that it is in His character as God that He is exalted (for what is higher than the divine height, so that one could say God is exalted toward it?), but he says that the humble aspect of the human nature is exalted, the discourse, I think, demonstrating the assimilation and union of the assumed man with the height of the divine nature. C This, therefore, we have believed the great Peter to signify, in saying that the Lord came to be on the cross, because, through the union with the Divine in all things, that which is God was accomplished. And if one were even to allow that the divine voice is to be misinterpreted in him, not even thus will the argument be concluded toward the goal of the heresy. For let it be granted that Peter is speaking about the One who was in the beginning, that God made this Jesus whom you crucified Lord and Christ. For we find that not even through this does the blasphemy gain any strength against the truth. God, he says, made Him Lord and Christ. To which, therefore, of the things mentioned is it necessary to refer "made"? To which of the things positioned in the phrase shall we apply the word? For there are three things set forth: "this," and "Lord," and "Christ." D To which of these does he contrive to apply the word "made"? But no one is so bold against the truth as to say that "made" does not look to the Christ and Lord. For Peter says that He, being whatever He was, was made Christ and Lord by the Father. The argument is not mine, but that of the one contending against the argument.
For he says in these very things which are proposed to us for examination, speaking in these words: "The blessed Peter discourses about the One who was in the beginning and was God, and teaches that this One came to be Lord and Christ." Therefore, Eunomius says that the One who was, whatever He was, came to be Christ and Lord, just as the history concerning David also says, that being the son of Jesse and presiding over the flocks, he was anointed as king; not…
that the anointing made him a man at that time, but that he, being by his own nature what he happened to be, was transferred from a private citizen to a king. A Why then is it rather argued through these things that the essence of the Son was created, if, as Eunomius says, God made Him—who was in the beginning, and was God—both Lord and Christ? For Lordship is not a name of essence, but of power; and the designation of Christ indicates kingship; yet the discourse about kingship is one thing, and the discourse about nature is another. But indeed, Scripture says that these things came to be concerning the Son of God. Let us therefore consider what is more pious and consistent. Whom is it right and pious to say, through progress, becomes a participant in some higher goods: God or man? Who is so childish in mind as to think that the Divine is carried to perfection by addition and increase? But to think such a thing concerning human nature is not inconsistent, since the evangelical voice clearly attributes increase to the Lord according to his humanity. For Jesus, it says, increased in age and wisdom and grace. B What then is more reasonable to suppose from the apostle’s voice: that the God who was in the beginning became Lord through progress, or that the humble human nature, through communion with the Divine, is taken up to the height of dignity? For indeed the prophet David says as if from the person of the Lord: "I have been established king by Him," saying something similar to, "I have been made Christ." And again, as if from the person of the Father to the Son: "Rule in the midst of your enemies," saying the same thing as Peter: "Become Lord of your enemies." Just as, therefore, the establishment of a kingdom signifies not the construction of an essence, but a promotion to dignity; and He who commands to rule does not command [Him] to become then what He was not, but gives to Him who already is authority over those who disobey: so also the blessed Peter, when he says that Christ—that is, the King of all—has been made [so], added "that same [man]," that he might separate the discourse from [His] essence and those things contemplated in it. C For being what He is, He performed the things mentioned. If, therefore, it were pious to say in the super-eminent nature that something comes to be through progress and increase—such as from a private citizen a king, and from a humble man exalted, and from a slave a lord—perhaps it would even be fitting to accommodate the voice of Peter to the divine essence of the Only-Begotten. But since the Divine nature, whatever it is believed to be, always exists in the same way, being superior to all addition and incapable of diminution, it is absolutely necessary to recall the discourse to that which is human. For the God Word, what He was in the beginning, that He also is now, and remains for eternity. Always King, always Lord, always Most High and God, having become none of these things through progress, but being everything in the power of nature, as much as is said of Him. But human nature, having been exalted through assumption to the Divine, being one thing while yet another, is properly and truly said to have become Christ and Lord. For He [is said] to have become Lord from a slave.
and Christ from one obedient; and He has superexalted what was humble [and lowly], and to Him who possessed a human name, He has granted the name which is above every name. And thus was effected A that ineffable mixture and union of human brevity tempered with Divine greatness. Wherefore both the great and God-befitting names are properly adapted to human nature, and conversely, through human [names] the Godhead is named. For the Same One both has the name which is above every name, and in the human name, that of Jesus, is worshipped by all creation. For, He says, in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth; and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father B. But thus far let this suffice.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS, BOOK VII.
SUMMARIES OR CHAPTERS OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.
[1.] In the seventh book, he demonstrates that the name of Lord is not a name of substance, as Eunomius supposed, but of dignity, through various sayings to the Corinthians and to the Hebrews, and from the utterance of the Lord Himself. And after having discoursed in a wonderful manner about the Spirit and the Lord, he shows from his own words that Eunomius, even if unwilling, is fighting for correct dogmas, being struck down by his own weapons.
[2.] Then he says that the appropriate relationship of names to things is unchangeable; and after that, he discusses the question of the begotten and the unbegotten in a most excellent manner.
[3.] After having explained the change of names and things, he discourses concerning that which is unbegotten and non-subsistent without a cause, such as the *scindapsus*, the Centaur, the *blituri* (nonsense words), the Cyclops, and Scylla—things which were never produced at all—and he shows that those things which are mutually opposed in their substance corrupt one another, just as fire corrupts water, and so on. But since the nature is common in the Father and the Son, and the properties are in one another, no injury is brought upon the nature.
[4.] Then he says that all things that exist in creation have been named by men; even if they are called differently by each nation, just as the term "unbegotten" has been named by us. But the proper name of the Divine essence itself, which expresses the force of the Divine nature, either does not exist at all, or is unknown to us.
[5.] Having discoursed at length concerning the Existent, the unbegotten, and the Good, and also concerning consubstantiality, and further regarding the heavenly powers, having shown that there is no variation of substance, but only a difference of dignities, he brings the discourse to an end.
A Since, however, Eunomius says that this name "Lord" is predicated of the essence of the Only-begotten, and not of his dignity, and cites the Apostle as a witness to these things, saying to the Corinthians, "Now the Lord is the Spirit," it would be appropriate not to leave even this error of his unrefuted. He maintains that the term "Lord" is indicative of essence, and to prove this assumption he brings forward the aforementioned statement. Let us see, therefore, if there is anything common in what is proposed. "The Lord," he says, "is the Spirit." But he, interpreting Scripture according to his own whim, calls "Lordship" an essence, and thinks that by these words he is bringing forward a certain proof for his account. But if it had been said by Paul, "The Lord is essence," we also would have agreed with what was stated. Since, however, the divinely inspired discourse says that the Lord is the Spirit, and Eunomius says that lordship is essence, I do not know whence his discourse can have force and strength, unless perhaps he says again that the word "spirit" is used by Scripture for "essence." Let us, therefore, diligently inquire whether the Apostle, having used the word "spirit" anywhere, indicated the essence by this term. "The Spirit itself," he says, "bears witness to our spirit," and, "No one knows the things of man except the spirit which is in him," and, "The letter kills, but the spirit gives life," and, "If by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live," and, "If we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the spirit." Who could enumerate the Apostle's sayings regarding this matter, in which we nowhere find the essence indicated by this term? For he who says, "The Spirit itself bears witness to our spirit," indicates nothing but the Holy Spirit, which is implanted in the mind of the faithful. For he often calls the mind itself, by his own words, "spirit," which, when it has received the communion of the Spirit, brings to those who have received it the dignity of adoption; and [concerning] this, "No one knows the things of man, except the spirit which is in him." If also man is [spoken of] regarding his essence, and the spirit likewise, then it would be established from what has been said that there are two essences in man. B But he who says that the letter kills, and the spirit gives life, I do not know how he contrasts essence with the letter; or again, how he thinks Paul, in saying that one must remove the deeds of the body by the spirit, is leading the meaning of "spirit" to essence. Moreover, to live by the spirit and to walk by the spirit—this would be entirely beyond understanding if the meaning of "spirit" were referred to essence. For by what other thing, if not by essence, are we all who live participants in life? Then, indeed, the Apostle gives us advice on this: to live by essence; as if he were saying, "By your own selves, and not by others, are you participants in life." C If, therefore, it is nowhere possible to perceive this meaning properly, how does he, here again, imitating the interpreters of dreams, order "spirit" to be taken for "essence," so that he may conclude syllogistically that the term "Lord" is to be interpreted as "essence"? For if the spirit is essence, and the Lord is the Spirit, the Lord...
is absolutely found to be essence. Oh, how irresistible is the power of this argument! How is it possible to strip away and resolve this impregnable necessity of demonstrations? The Lord is said to be of the essence: how does he construct this? Because, he says, the Apostle says, "The Lord is the Spirit." What has this to do with essence? But the arts of demonstrative logic command that "spirit" be set in the place of "essence." These are the brilliant proofs of Aristotelian artifice! For this reason, we are indeed miserable according to your logic—we who are not initiated into the mysteries of this wisdom (though that man is not entirely blessed who tracks down the truth through such a procedure)—that we should understand the Apostle in such a way as to imagine that the spirit was placed by him in the place of the essence of the Only-Begotten. B
How, then, will you adapt what follows? For the meaning is not circumscribed by these things. For after Paul said, "The Lord is the Spirit," he added, "And where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." If, therefore, the Lord is essence, and the Spirit is essence, what, then, is the essence of the essence? For there is but one essence of the Spirit, according to your logic, which is the Lord. Yet again, he speaks of a "Spirit" of the Lord who is Spirit, meaning another essence according to your interpretation. Therefore, according to your argument, the Apostle means nothing else than the essence of the essence, since he explicitly writes "the Lord the Spirit" and "the Spirit of the Lord." But as for Eunomius, let the writings stand as he pleases; however, what we think concerning this C is as follows: The God-breathed Scripture, as the divine Apostle names it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit. Its intention and purpose is the benefit of men. "For every Scripture," he says, "is God-breathed and useful." And the benefit is varied and manifold, as the same Apostle says, "for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." Such profit is not readily taken by anyone who happens upon it; but the divine element is hidden as if by a certain veil beneath the body of the Scripture, D which is placed before those things that should be understood by the mind, as some legislation or history. For this reason, the Apostle says that those who look only to the body of the Scripture have a veil over their heart, and are unable to gaze at the glory of the spiritual law, being hindered by the veil laid over the face of the lawgiver. Therefore he says, "The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life," showing that in many places the primary interpretation of the written words, unless it is taken according to the fitting sense, produces the opposite of the life that is demonstrated through the Spirit: for the Spirit—that is, the spiritual...
A sense of the Scriptures—commands men to possess perfection of virtue in the complete emptiness of the passions. The letter, however—the historical narrative of the Scriptures—contains in some places even the exposition of things that are contradictory or discordant; and it appears to run together with the affections of nature, whereby, if one should attend to it readily, the letter will produce a doctrine of death. Therefore, he says that, for those who fall into reading the scriptures in a more bodily manner, a veil is drawn over the perceptive faculties of the soul; but for those who turn their speculation toward that which is understood by the mind, as if stripped of a certain mask, the glory wrapped up in the letter is revealed. B But that which is found through higher understanding, he says, is the Lord, who indeed is Spirit: for "when one turns to the Lord, the veil is taken away," he says, "and the Lord is the Spirit." He says this, opposing the dominion of the Spirit to the servitude of the letter; for just as he opposes that which vivifies to that which kills, so he makes the Lord to be opposed to servitude. And lest we suffer any confusion regarding the Holy Spirit when we are taught through the voice of the Lord—being led toward an assumption (concerning) the Only-Begotten—for this reason he fortifies the discourse with a recapitulation, saying both "the Lord is the Spirit" and calling "the Spirit the Lord," so that by the dignity of lordship he might demonstrate C the excellence of nature, and not confuse the particularity of the hypostasis or person in his discourse. For he who calls both the Lord Himself and the Spirit of the Lord, teaches us to understand something proper besides the Only-Begotten: just as he says elsewhere "the Spirit of Christ"; he points this out clearly and mystically—that is, in a hidden manner—and in a way that is piously consistent, according to the evangelical tradition. Thus we, who are said to be the most pitiable of all, having been instructed by the Apostle, pass from the letter which kills to the life-giving Spirit, having learned from him who learned in paradise the ineffable mysteries, that whatever the divine Scripture says are the utterances or pronouncements of the Holy Spirit. Truly, the Holy Spirit D spoke well through the prophet Isaiah, prophesying to our fathers. This, when he spoke to the Jews who were in Rome, he introduces as the words of Isaiah. And when he had set the Spirit before the Hebrews, in which he says, "Therefore, as the Holy Spirit says," he subjoins the words of the psalm, spoken at length and in detail from the person of God. And from the Lord Himself we learned the same, that David, not remaining in himself—that is, not speaking according to human nature—was setting forth the heavenly mysteries. For how could any man, being human, have known the heavenly dialogue of the Father with the Son? But being in the Spirit, he said that the Lord spoke to the Lord such things as He said. "For if David in the spirit," he says, "calls Him Lord, how is He his Son?" Therefore, the holy prophets, brought by the divine, are inspired by the power of the Holy Spirit; and for this reason all Scripture is called "God-breathed," because it is a doctrine of divine inspiration. If the bodily covering of the word is taken away, what remains is the Lord, and life, and spirit, according to the great Paul, and according to the voice of the Gospel. For Paul, for the one who has turned from the letter to the spirit, (says that) no longer does the slavery that destroys, but
the Lord is comprehended, who is the life-giving Spirit. The sublime Gospel indeed says: "The words that I speak are spirit and life," as being naked and void of a bodily covering. A To understand the essence of the Only-Begotten as spirit, we would call those who interpret dreams; or rather, we will use their own abundance and arm the truth with the arrows of our adversaries. For it is permitted to plunder the Egyptian from the Israelites, and to make their wealth our own adornment. For if the essence of the Son is called spirit, and God is spirit—for thus the Gospel says—and the essence of the Father is also altogether called spirit, then only their argument stands: that things spoken of dissimilarly also have dissimilarity according to nature; it results, therefore, that those things which are spoken of in the same way are not alienated and different from one another according to nature. Since, therefore, according to their own reasoning, the essence of the Son and of the Father is called spirit, that there is no difference of essence is clearly demonstrated by these things.
B For a little after these things, Eunomius says that, "Of differing essences, the appellations signifying the essence are also entirely different. But in those in which there is one and the same voice, that which is declared by the same appellation will also be entirely one." Wherefore, the One who catches the wise in their craftiness has directed the long labors of this writer, and the countless sweats expended on his toil, to the establishment of our dogma. For if God is called "spirit" in the Gospel, and the essence of the Only-Begotten is constructed by Eunomius as "spirit," there being no difference between the name and the name, the things signified by the names will not at all differ from one another according to nature. And it seems good to me to pass over this idle and C bloodless shadow-boxing which follows in his writing, meant as an accusation of the teacher's words, without examination. For the argument itself is a sufficient refutation of the vanity of the statements as cited, crying out its own weakness. But to become entangled with such things in a struggle and contest is equal to that which is called insulting the dead. For when, with much confidence and persuasion, he had set forth a certain passage of the teacher, and had previously slandered and mocked it, and had promised to show that it was for nothing, the same thing happened to him as happens to foolish and infant children, to whom the incomplete and immature state of their understanding, and the lack of training of their senses, D does not give an exact perception of the things that appear. For this reason, often thinking that the stars are sharp objects above their heads, they pelt them, out of childish folly, with clods of earth. Then, when the clod has fallen, with applause and laughter they boast to their peers, with neck held high, as if the strike had reached the stars themselves. Such is this man, who has struck at the truth with the weapon of infants; he who, as if they were certain stars,
A having set forth those resplendent utterances of the teacher, thence from the trampled and earth-crawling intellect cast forth earthly and unstable words. These, having been raised up only so far as to have nowhere to fall from of their own accord, were overturned by their own weight. For the statement of the great Basil runs thus word for word: "And yet, who that is of sound mind would agree with this argument, that it is necessary that those whose names are different should also differ in their essences? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and, to speak once for all, of all men, are indeed different; yet the essence of all is one. Wherefore we are the same as one another in most respects, but we differ from one another only by those properties which are observed in each individual. Hence, appellations are not significant of essences, but of those properties which characterize each one. When, therefore, we hear 'Peter,' we do not conceive his essence by this name—and by 'essence' I mean now not the material subject, but we form a notion of the properties observed in him." These things the Great Basil says. But what kind of shrewdness, of the sort that is at leisure to waste time and leisure on useless and frivolous things, the one who opposes these statements uses against us, may be learned from the very writing of Eunomius. C
For it is not pleasurable to me to insert into my own labors the nauseating loquacity of this orator, nor to mark and attack his ignorance and madness in the midst of my own discourses. For he sets forth a certain encomium and praise of those words which are more significant and which better declare the subject, and with his usual style he composes and patches together, as if at a crossroads, certain base and tattered shreds of vocabulary. And again the hapless Isocrates is consumed and gnawed away, as he plucks and strips words and figures [of speech] for the composition of the discourseset before him. Sometimes even the Hebrew Philo suffers the same thing, smoothing out for himself little words from his own works; but not even thus was the tapestry of his speeches, depicted and distinguished with various colors, perfectly elaborated by him. Rather, every argument, every postulate or intention of ideas, and every artificial structure, flowed away around itself; and just as is wont to happen with bubbles, when drops falling from above into some collection of water create foamy eruptions, which, as soon as they have risen, suddenly collapse and fall, leaving behind no trace of their own formation in the waters—such are the bubbles of this writer’s ideas, which, as soon as they are cast out, are extinguished with D nothing touching them. For after those indissoluble preparations and that dream-appearing philosophy, through which he asserted that a divided essence is grasped by the differences of names, just as a certain foamy swelling carried along by a current, having struck against some harder body, slips away—so in vain does this argument, carried along automatically and unexpectedly brought against the truth, destroy this unsubstantial and bubble-like constitution of falsehood
A For he speaks in these words: "Who is so stupid, and devoid of human condition, as to be discoursing about men, and to call one a man, but the other a horse, making a comparison?" I would say to him: You rightly call him stupid who so errs regarding words, and I shall use you yourself as a witness for the defense of the truth. For if it is of the utmost stupidity to call one a horse and the other a man, if indeed both were of the same human nature, it is by all means of equal madness, when God the Father and God the Son are believed to be, to call the one created and the other uncreated, as in that case human nature, so here divinity, does not admit the redirection of the name to what is of a different kind. For what the irrational is to man, this also is the creature to the divinity, being equally unable to admit the same account as the one who brought it forth. And just as it is not possible to apply the same definition to that which is rational and to the quadruped (for each is naturally distinguished from the other by its own peculiarity), so neither will you interpret the created and uncreated essence by the same terms, since what is said of this essence is not found in the other. For just as the rational is not found in a horse, nor the solid hoof in a man, so neither is divinity in the creature, nor in the divinity is that which is found to exist through creation; but if He is God, He is by all means also uncreated, and if He is created, He is not God. B Unless perhaps, through some use and custom of speech, one might drag the empty name of divinity onto the creature, just as even to certain horses human names are applied by those who deal with horses. But neither is the horse a man, even if it is called by a human appellation, nor is the creature God, even if some bear witness to it with the term of divinity, granting it a hollow sound in a duality of syllables. Since, then, the discourse of the heresy has, by chance, joined itself to the truth, let it advise itself to remain within its own limits, and not to assign its own terms by way of trope, but to consider him to be truly and really stupid and out of his mind who does not name what is underlying as it is, but instead of a man calls it a horse, and instead of the heaven says the sea, and instead of God speaks of the creature. C And let no one think that the creature is opposed to God contrary to reason, but let him look to the prophets and to the apostles. For the prophet says from the person of the Father that, *My hand has made all these things* (Isa. XLVIII, 13), by “hand” signifying in a riddle the power of the Only-Begotten; but the Apostle says that all things are from the Father, and all things through the Son (1 Cor. VIII, 6). The prophetic spirit thus happens to agree with the apostolic teaching, which was also brought about through the same Spirit. For there, too, the prophet, having said that all things are the works of the hand of Him who is over all, distinguishes the nature of things that have come into being from Him who made them. He who made them is, through His own hand, the all—the God who is over all; having the hand, yet working all things through it. And here again the Apostle makes the same division of things that are; all things indeed of the
to the productive cause, yet not enumerating the producer among all things: so that the difference of nature between the created and the uncreated might be clearly and lucidly taught through these matters, and it might be shown that one thing is the producer according to its own nature, and another is that which is brought into being. Since, therefore, all things are from God, and the Son is God, the creation is rightly distinguished from the Godhead; and the nature of the Only-Begotten is something else beside the nature of all things that exist; nor do even those who oppose the truth stand against this. There is every necessity that the creation be equally set over against the Son, if indeed the voices of the saints are not lying when they testify that all things were made through Him.
Since, therefore, God the Only-Begotten is proclaimed in the divine Scriptures, let Eunomius understand his own language and condemn all the B folly of him who divides the divine into the created and the uncreated, after the likeness of him who divides man into a horse and a man. For he himself says, after some intermediate chatter, progressing a little, that the relation of names to things is immutable. To this he himself adds his vote, for the sake of the argument, because the familiarity of the titles with the subject is firm and true. If, therefore, the name of Godhead is attached and conjunctively imposed upon the Only-Begotten God, he will necessarily agree—even if he wishes to wrestle and contend with us—that the Scripture does not lie, and that the title of Godhead was not imposed upon the Only-Begotten incongruously with His nature; let him persuade himself through his own writings. For if the relation of names to things is immutable, and He is called God and C Lord, he cannot conceive any difference in the knowledge of the Godhead between the Son and the Father; since this name is common to both. Or rather, not this alone, but there is a long list of names by which the Only-Begotten is called in common with the Father without difference: Good, Incorruptible, Just, Judge, Long-suffering, Merciful, Eternal, Everlasting—all those that indicate the significance of the greatness of His nature and power, with no subtraction being made regarding Him in any of the names according to the sublimity of the conception. But passing over such a number of divine titles as if with eyes closed, he looks only to one, the begotten and the unbegotten, committing his dogma to a thin and weak thread, which floats and is carried about by the winds of error. D
For he says that no one who has a care for the truth names anything of those things that are begotten "unbegotten," nor does he name God who is over all, "Son" or "begotten." This no longer requires our words for refutation; for he does not cover his deceit with some veils after his custom, but he makes an inversion similar to the absurd, when he says that neither is any of the begotten things said to be unbegotten, nor is God who is over all named Son or begotten: nothing [is assigned] properly and particularly to the Godhead of the Only-Begotten Son beside the...
A rest of those things which exist by creation, separating and distinguishing them; but he renders the difference of all things which exist by generation from God equal, in respect of all things, not excepting the Son. And by the inversion of absurdities, he manifestly abstracts the Son from the divine nature, when he says that neither is any of the begotten things unbegotten, nor is God [to be called] Son or begotten, B by this division of opposites clearly revealing the horror of his blasphemy. For when he had distinguished those things which were made from the Unbegotten, presently, in the induction which occurs by inversion, he no longer said "unbegotten," but "God," saying that the Son or the begotten cannot be called [God], demonstrating through these things said that that which is not unbegotten is not God. And he goes so far as to imply that the Only-Begotten God, because He is begotten, is not God, to the same extent as the Unbegotten [is held to be] begotten, or is called so. For it is not through ignorance of the consequence according to reason that he makes the inversion of the propositions dissonant and incongruous, but, craftily perverting the argument of piety, he opposes the Godhead to the begotten, establishing by that which he says that that which is not unbegotten C is not God. For a certain true consequence of the argument would have been to say that none of the things generated are unbegotten, and to infer from this that neither, if anything is unbegotten by nature, can it be begotten. For such an argument both possesses the truth, and is separated from blasphemy. But now, by proposing first that nothing of those things which are generated is unbegotten, and then inferring that neither is God begotten, he clearly separates the Only-Begotten God from being God; by the fact that He is not unbegotten, he sets up the conclusion that He is not God Himself. Are we then still in need of other proofs for the demonstration of this outrageous blasphemy? And is this alone not sufficient to serve as a pillar of infamy for this opponent of Christ, who establishes by the things said that He who was in the beginning, the Word, is not God? What is it then that still makes it necessary to be involved with such people? For we do not involve ourselves D with those who are occupied with idols and the filth upon the altars—not that we assent to the destruction of those who are held by the insane cult of idols, but because their disease is heavier than any remedy of ours. Just as, therefore, the work itself declares the idol worship, and the judgment of the accusers anticipates the crime which is boldly committed in free defiance; so I think that here the patron of piety ought to hold his peace in the face of one who loudly proclaims his own impiety in public against himself. Just as also in the case of those who are seized by the cancerous malady, the medicine remains idle and unavailing, because the evil is stronger than the practiced art. Nevertheless, since after the things mentioned he promises to say something even stronger, so that we may not appear to relax our contradiction for fear of the more powerful, let us examine that too alongside what has been said. "It was necessary," he says, "omitting all else, to come to the stronger argument." I would say to those things, that even when the names brought forward by him for our refutation have been correctly demonstrated, our own argument will none the less be manifested as the truth. Since, if the variation of the names signifying the properties [makes] the variation...
of the things, it is absolutely necessary to concede that the variation of the names signifying the essences also demonstrates the distinction of the essences. And one might find this to be the case in all things—I mean in essences, in actions, in colors, in shapes, and in other qualities. For we signify fire and water, which are different essences, by distinct appellations, as also air and earth, cold and hot, white and black, B or triangular and round. For what need is there to speak of the intelligible essences, which the Apostle, listing them, through the difference of the names declared the difference of the essences? Who would not be struck with astonishment at this impregnable power of the argument? Truly, this discourse exceeds its own promise; this undertaking is more formidable than the threat! "I will come," he says, "to a stronger argument." What is this? "Because," he says, "since through all things that signify properties the difference of the properties is known, it is necessary to concede that the differences of the essences are also denoted in the differences of the names." C What, then, are these appellations of the essences by which the difference of nature in the Father and the Son has been demonstrated? He names fire and water, and air and earth, and cold and hot, and white and black, and triangular and circular. He has conquered with his examples, he has surpassed with a valid and powerful reason; and I myself do not contradict him, that through unchangeable names the difference of natures is indicated. But this alone the man who is so sharp and perspicacious for understanding did not see: that in this case both the Father is God and the Son is God, the Just and the Incorruptible, and all the names of theology are said equally of the Father and the Son. So that if the variation of the appellations signifies the difference of the natures, the commonality of the names will surely indicate the commonality of the essence. And if it must be granted that the divine essence is signaled through names, it would be more fitting to apply these lofty and God-befitting expressions to the divine nature D rather than the appellation of "begotten" or "unbegotten." For "good" and "incorruptible," "just" and "wise," and all such things, belong properly and fittingly only to the nature that surpasses every mind. But "begotten" has a communion of name even with those things that are more vile among the lower creatures, since we say that both a dog and a frog are "begotten," and everything that has its coming forth through generation. But even the name "unbegotten" is stated not only of that which subsists without cause, but it also has an affinity with that which does not exist; the scindapsus is also called "unbegotten"; the Minotaur, Scylla, and the Chimera are "unbegotten"—not because they exist in an unbegotten manner, but because they do not exist at all. If, therefore, the more divine of the names are common to the Son with the Father, but those that have a communion of name either with that which does not exist at all or with the humble and abject are distinct, the strong argument of Eunomius against us actually strengthens the dogma of the truth, testifying that there is no difference according to nature, because [it is not found] even in the names
A If, however, the difference of essence is placed in the begotten and the unbegotten, as in fire and water, and [Eunomius] thus thinks that the names are disposed according to the similarity of those things mentioned in the examples, as fire and water are to each other, then here again the horror of his blasphemy will be manifest, even while we remain silent. For fire and water have a nature that is destructive to one another, and perhaps, when either is in the other, it is destroyed by the prevailing of the one that is in excess. If, therefore, he dogmatizes that the nature of the Unbegotten is thus distant from that of the Only-Begotten, he necessarily grants as a consequence that this destructive contrariety resides in the difference of the essences, so that on account of this their nature cannot meet or be joined, and the one might be consumed by the other if both were made to be in or with one another. B How, then, is the Son in the Father and not destroyed, and how does the Father, who is in the Son, endure forever without being consumed, if the property of fire in relation to water is preserved also in the relation of the begotten to the unbegotten, as Eunomius says? But reason does not see a communion of earth with air either; for the earth is stable, solid, resistant, heavy, and tending downward, whereas the nature of air is from the contraries. Similarly, white and black are found in the contrariety of colors. And it is agreed that a circle is not the same as a triangle; for in the definition of the figure, the one is what the other is not. But in God the Father and God the Only-Begotten Son, I do not find to what degree one should look for contrariety. There is one goodness, wisdom, justice, prudence, power, immortality, and all other things that are of high significance; they are spoken of in the same way for each, and in a certain manner the one has the power in the other. For the Father does all things through the Son, and the Only-Begotten, being the power of the Father, works all things in Himself. C What need, therefore, do fire and water fulfill for the demonstration of the difference of essence in the Son and the Father, and what is that strong and unassailable argument which is demonstrated through these things? But he calls us bold for maintaining both the unity of nature and the difference of the hypostases, and he says that heavy things are dared by us if we lead the discourse to the contemplation of intelligible things by means of material examples. The marvelous corrector of our faults rightly accuses us of boldness and temerity because we explain the divine nature through material examples. What then will you say about the elements, you who are so firm and circumspect? That the earth is immaterial, the fire intelligible, the water incorporeal, the air outside of sensory perception? Is your intellect so ordered toward your goal, and do you perceive so sharply from every side, conducting a discourse that is incomprehensible to your opponents, that you do not see in yourself the very crimes that are cast against the accused? Or does D the material furnish you with...
A examples taken from material things wherewith to construct the diversity of essences? Are we to concede this to one who constructs what is alien to the substance? But we, who demonstrate the property and communion of nature B through examples that can be grasped by us, are we to be rejected?
But Peter, he says, and Paul were named by men, and for this reason their appellations could be changed. And yet, what among existing things has not been named by men? I bring you forward as a witness to this argument. For if you make the change of names a sign and proof that things have been named by men, by this you will entirely confess that every name has been given to existing things by us, from the fact that the same words and appellations for things have not prevailed among all. For just as Paul, who was formerly Saul, and Peter was from Simon, so earth and heaven, and air, and sea, and all the parts of creation, have not been named similarly among all; but they are named differently among the Hebrews, differently among us, and are called by differing appellations among each of the nations. If, therefore, the argument of Eunomius is valid, which constructs that Peter and Paul were so called later because these names were imposed upon them by men, our argument, proceeding from similar premises, will be entirely valid, which says that all things have been named by us, because their appellations have been utterly transformed according to the differences of the nations. And if all things are so, neither the begotten nor the unbegotten is otherwise; for these also are among the things that are named. For the conception that arises in us concerning the subject, taking the form of a name, we sometimes express what has been conceived in other terms, not changing the thing, but the words by which we name the thing. For the things themselves remain in themselves as their nature dictates, while the intellect, reaching the things themselves, opens its own meaning with what words it can. And just as the essence of Peter is not changed by the change of his name; so neither is anything else of those things considered to be changed by the variety of names. Wherefore we say that the term "unbegotten" is given by us to the Father, the true and first author of the universe, and that no harm comes to the signification of the subject if we recognize the same thing from another word. For it is permitted, instead of saying "unbegotten," to call Him the first cause, D or Father of the Only-Begotten, or Him who subsists from no cause, and many other things that lead to the same understanding. So that by the very arguments with which he institutes an accusation against us, he confirms our dogmas: that we have not learned a name that is significative of the divine nature. But we have been taught that it does exist; yet we assert that the power or force of such an appellation, by which the ineffable and indefinite nature is comprehended, either does not exist at all, or is clearly unknown to us. Wherefore, leaving aside the trifles and fables familiar to him, let him show the appellations significative of essences and, through the discrepancy of the names, let him divide and pull apart the subject. But as long as the speech of Scripture is true, that Abraham and Moses did not grasp the knowledge of the Name; and that God
no man has seen at any time, A and no man has seen Him, nor can he see Him; and that the light about Him is inaccessible, and there is no limit to His greatness, so long as these things are spoken by us and believed. How is the discourse that promises some comprehension and interpretation of the indeterminate nature through the significance of a name similar to one who supposes he can embrace the whole sea with his own palm? For what the hollow of the hand is to the entire ocean, that is the entire power of language to the ineffable and incomprehensible nature.
We say these things, not because we deny that the Father is unbegotten, nor because we do not agree that the Only-Begotten God is begotten. But He is indeed begotten, and the Other is not begotten. But what that which exists according to nature is, which is believed to be without generation and to be begotten, we have not been taught from the significance of "begotten" and "not-begotten." For when we say that this one is either begotten or not begotten, we form a twofold understanding through the things said: by the demonstrative part of the discourse we look to the subject, while by "is begotten" or "is not begotten," we are taught what is considered in addition to the subject. So that we understand one thing regarding that which is, and another regarding that which is considered in what is.
Moreover, B with every name that is spoken regarding the divine nature, this verb "is" is always altogether understood, such as just, incorruptible, immortal, and unbegotten, and if anything else is said, even if this word "is" does not happen to accompany it in speech. But the intelligence and mind of the speaker and hearer attach the name to the verb "is," so that if this were not added, the appellation would fall into a vacuum; for instance (for it is better to set forth the argument with an example), when David said that "God is a judge, just and strong and long-suffering," if the "is" were not understood with each of the nouns contained therein, the enumeration of the appellations would be a vain and unsubstantial opinion, resting upon no subject; but when "is" is understood with each of the names, the things said will definitely have power when considered in what is. C Just as, therefore, when we say that He is a judge, through "judge" we have conceived of a certain operation regarding Him; but through the "is" we have applied the mind to the subject, being clearly taught through these that one should not consider the reasoning of existence to be the same as the operation. So also from saying that He is begotten or unbegotten, we divide the intelligence into a twofold apprehension; for through "is" we understand the subject, and through "begotten" or "unbegotten" we grasp what is present in the subject. Just as, therefore, when we are taught by David that God is judge or long-suffering, we have not learned the divine essence, but something of the things considered about it; so also here, hearing that He is not begotten, we have not known the subject through this negation, but we have been guided as to what one must not think regarding D the subject. But that which is according to essence, whatever
it is in the end, still remains in obscurity. Thus also, when the holy Scripture announces other divine names concerning that which is, it hands down to Moses that it is in itself unnameable. He, therefore, who professes to uncover the nature of that which is, let him not go through the things about that which is; rather, let him reveal to us the nature itself through the things he says. For whatever name you might speak, it is about that which is, but it is not that thing itself; "good," "unbegotten"—it is not that, but that which is; it does not fall short of any of these. Therefore, he who promises to give an account of this that is good, and that is unbegotten, as it is, would be vain, since he speaks of things that are considered in that which is, but of the essence itself, which he promises to explain by discourse, not even a word. For "to be unbegotten" is one of the things that are considered in that which is. For one discourse is that which speaks of "being," and another is that which speaks of "how it is." What is up to this point is ineffable, nor is it explainable through the things that have been said. Therefore, let him first make manifest to us the names of the essence; then, at last, let him divide the nature by the fallacies of appellations. For as long as what is sought remains unexpressed, these things artfully devised by him concerning names will have been in vain, since they are not names.
Such, then, is that stronger handle of Eunomius against the truth, B while many doctrines in this part of his writing have been passed over in silence. For it seems to me fitting for those who engage in this curricular field of arms against the enemies of the truth, that they should indeed be armed against those who seem to be fortified with a certain specious plausibility of falsehood, but that they should not contaminate their discourse with the cadaverous and putrid notions of others. For to think that all things that are united by the rationale of essence are entirely bound up with bodily corruption—for this which he says in this part, in order to pass over the cadaverous stench willingly—is, I think, readily seen by anyone possessing a mind to be dead and collapsed in his discourse. For who is ignorant that the multitude of human souls is infinite, yet one essence underlies them all; and that what is the subject in them is removed from the contagion and corruption of bodies, so that the statement is known even to small children? It is not because they are of the same essence that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, but because they have obtained a composite nature. For the rationale of the composite is one thing, and that of the underlying essence is another. Wherefore, to say that bodies which are of the same substance are subject to corruption is true, but the converse does not hold true; that whatever is of the same substance is entirely corruptible, as is shown in the case of souls, the essence of which is one, C yet no extinction inheres in the communion of their essence. And what we have defined regarding souls can also be truly and properly said of every intellectual substance that is observed in the creation. D For not, as Eunomius wishes, do the terms collected by Paul signify certain natures of supramundane powers that are different and disparate from one another; but the significance of the appellations clearly indicates that it is not differences of natures, but the varied peculiarities of the activities of the heavenly host that are being set forth by the discourse. For "Principalities," he says,
"and authorities, and powers, and lordships"—and these names are of such a kind that it is obvious to anyone that the things signified are ordered according to some activity. For to rule, and to exercise authority, and to lord it, and for one to be a throne—whoever has considered these things would not refer them to differences of essences, when the function of the duty is clearly signified by each of the names. So that he who says that differences of natures are signified in the names listed by Paul deceives himself, as the Apostle says, "neither knowing what he is saying nor about what he is making assertions," B since the meaning of the names clearly indicates that the Apostle knows of differences of certain dignities among the intellectual powers, and does not point out through these names the properties of essences.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS, BOOK EIGHT
SUMMARIES OF THE EIGHTH BOOK
1. The argument refutes in a most wonderful way the blasphemy of the heretics, who say that the Only-begotten is from things that are not, and that there was when he was not; and it demonstrates that the Son is not recent, but from eternity, from the words to Moses: "I am who I am," and [the response] to Manoah: "Why do you ask my name, which is wonderful?" In addition to these, David also says to God: "But you are the same, and your years will not fail." And also Isaiah: "I am the first God, and I am after these things." And the Evangelist: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"—neither having a beginning nor an end; and he proves that those who say he is recent and from non-being are idolaters; amongst which he also interprets most beautifully the "radiance of [his] glory" and the "character of his substance."
2. Then, C discussing the will of the Father regarding the generation of the Son, he shows that the good will, which is the Son, exists from eternity, subsisting in the Father, and, like the radiance to the flame and the power of sight to the eye, being connatural with the will.
3. Then, passing over the matters concerning the essence of the Son as having been previously examined, he goes through the meaning regarding the generation, having spoken of various generations: from matter, and from art, and from buildings, and from the succession of animals, and from emanation, as from the sun and ray, from a lamp and radiance, from spices and ointments, and from their quality, and the word from the mind, and from the rotting of wood, and the condensation of fire, and has exhaustively discussed countless other things.
4. In addition D to these, he shows the activities concerning God from human examples; for whatever are the hands and the feet, and the remaining parts of the body, by which human beings accomplish something; that lo-
- A B C D that alone, in the case of God, is His will. And so it is also with the difference of generation; it is for this reason that He is called Only-Begotten, because His generation has no communion with any other; but being called the radiance of glory and the fragrance of ointment, He shows by the very name the union and co-eternity of His nature with the Father.
5. He shows that the hypostasis of the Creator and the Only-Begotten has no beginning, like created things, as Eunomius thought, but is without beginning and eternal; and that the Only-Begotten has no communion with created things, neither in respect of essence nor in respect of names, but that He exists from eternity with the Father, as the all-virtuous Wisdom says, being the beginning, the end, and the middle of times; and having spoken many things concerning the divinity and eternity of the Only-Begotten, and further concerning souls, and angels, and life, and death, he brings the discourse to its conclusion.
The strong arguments of Eunomius are indeed such as these. I, however, since the strength of the arguments which he had undertaken to provide has been shown in the discourse to be so rotten and baseless, think that I ought to pass over the rest in silence, because with the more powerful arguments cast down, the others are at the same time overthrown by the same force; just as happens in wars, when the part of the army more powerful than the others has fallen, the remaining part is no longer held in any value by the victors. A But the main point of the blasphemy, which is proposed in the following series of the discourse, does not allow me to be silent. For this passage of the Only-Begotten from what is not into that which is—this surely is the horrific and godless dogma of Eunomius, and one more to be shunned than all impiety, which is now being constructed in the sequence of the discourse. B And since for all those bewitched by this deception, it is ready on their tongue, as a premise to establish that the Only-Begotten is from what is not, and that He who created all creation from non-existing things, to say: “If He was, He was not begotten; and if He was begotten, He was not;” and because this deception has much reinforcement from this source—the weaker-minded being constrained by this superficial plausibility and dragged into the acceptance of this blasphemy—it is necessary not to pass over the root of the bitterness of this doctrine, so that, as the Apostle says, it may not sprout upward and cause trouble. First, I say that it is necessary to consider the argument in itself, apart from the battle against the opponents; and then, in this way, to proceed to the investigation and refutation of the points set forth. C One sign and mark of true divinity holy Scripture indicates, which Moses learned through the voice sent from above, when he heard Him who said: I am who I am. Therefore, we think we must believe that this alone is truly divine, which according to eternity and infi-
infinity is comprehended in being; and whatever is considered in it always exists in the same way, neither becoming nor passing away. A Wherefore, if anyone should say concerning God that He formerly existed but now does not, or that He now exists but formerly did not, we judge either of these statements to be equally impious; for the account of eternity is equally mutilated by both, being cut off on either side by non-existence. If anyone should wish to behold "that which is not" in "that which is," or should pronounce that "that which is" fails into "that which is not," he in no way helps the impious opinion concerning the Divine, which is whispered into the minds—whether in the first or the last instance—by asserting that which does not exist throughout God. For this reason, we define the fabrication concerning the One who truly is, that He was ever not, as a denial and abrogation of the true Deity.
For since He who revealed Himself B through the light to Moses names Himself "the Being," saying, *I am who I am* [Ex. 3:14], and Isaiah, having become like an instrument of Him who spoke within him, says from the person of Him who is, *I am the first, and I am after these things* [Is. 44:6], as if through this the eternal in God is to be understood according to either notion. Similarly, also, the voice that came to Manoah indicates that the Divine is incomprehensible through the significance of the Name, when Manoah, desiring to learn the name—so that, the promise having been fulfilled, he might glorify the benefactor by name—He says to him: *Why do you ask this? And it is wonderful* [Judg. 13:18]. And this itself is a marvel, so that from this it might be learned that there is one name indicative of the Divine nature, which is that a wonder ineffably C occurring in the soul concerning it.
Likewise, also, the great David, in the accounts concerning Him, cries out the same thing, that while every creature was brought by Him into generation, God alone is always in the same way, and exists forever; in which he says: *But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail* [Ps. 101:28]. Hearing these things and such like from those who were borne by the Spirit of God, how can we fail to leave to the idolaters the worship of that which is not from eternity, as being recent and alien to the true Deity? For whatever is now but was not before, is altogether recent and D not eternal; and to look to any of the recent things, Moses calls the worship of demons, saying: *They sacrificed to demons and not to God; to gods whom their fathers did not know, new and recent they have come* [Deut. 32:17]. If, therefore, that which is recent in the things that are worshipped is the worship of demons and is alien to the true Deity, and that which is now but was not always is recent and not eternal, it is necessary for us who look to Him who is, to count those who contemplate "that which is not" along with "that which is," and who say that at some time He was not, among the worshippers of idols. For the great John, proclaiming the only-begotten God in his own preaching, fortifies his discourse in every way, so that there may be no access for forming an opinion against Him who is, that He was not at some time: for he says, *In the beginning was* [John 1:1],
being the fullness of A Him who is, and in the bosom of the Father. If, therefore, Moses has decreed for us, as it were, a certain character of the true Deity, and to know nothing else of God but this alone, that He is—for this is what the expression *I am who am* [Exod. 3:14] signifies—and Isaiah proclaims by his preaching the infinity of the Being from every side, beholding in God that which is defined neither by a beginning nor by an end; for he who said, *I am first, and after these things* [Isa. 45:5], sets in neither [case] a limit of eternity, so that we neither, by looking toward the beginning, find any sign from which He began to be and after which He was not, nor, by invoking our understanding toward that which follows, cut off the progress into eternity of that which is by any boundary;—especially since the prophet David forbids us to adore a recent and foreign god [Ps. 80:10]: into both of which errors the dogmas of heresy strike. For in saying that He is not eternal, they clearly demonstrate [Him to be] recent, and in [saying He is] abhorrent to the nature of the true God, they clearly demonstrate [Him to be] foreign.
These things being so, we define whatever is constructed by them through quibbles—namely, that He who truly is at some time was not—as nothing else than a transgression of Christianity and a turning back to the worship of idols. For since the Evangelist, through his theology, has in every way banished that which is not from Him who is, and by the continuous repetition of the word *was*, has diligently erased the occasion for suspecting that He B is not, and has everywhere named the Only-Begotten both God and Word of God and Son of God and equal to God, and all things of this sort, we have this firm and immutable judgment within ourselves: that if the Only-Begotten is God, we must believe that He who is believed to be God is eternally so. But indeed He is truly God, He is always everything, and is never apprehended as not being. For God, as we have often said, if He exists now, certainly always was; and if at any time He was not, then He does not exist at all even now.
But since it is conceded even by the enemies of the truth that the Son is the Only-Begotten God and remains forever, we say this: that He who is in the Father is not in Him in one respect only, but according to all things that the Father is understood to be, He is in Him through all things. As, therefore, being in the incorruption of the Father, He is incorruptible, and in the good, good, and in the powerful, powerful, and being in each of those things C which are understood as more excellent in the Father, He is that very thing—so too is He who is in the eternity of the Father entirely eternal. Now the eternity of the Father is known from this: that it neither began from that which is not, nor does it end in that which is not. Therefore, He who has all things that are the Father’s, and is beheld in all the glory of the Father, just as, existing in the life of the Father which is devoid of an end, He has no end of life; so too, being in the Father who has no origin, He *has no beginning of days* [Heb. 7:3], as the Apostle says, but He is also of the Father, and is beheld in the eternity of the Father, and in this way especially is the immutability of the image through all things, in relation to Him of whom He is the image, discerned. And true is the word D
A which says: *He who has seen me, has seen the Father* (John 14:9). But this also, which was spoken by the Apostle, may be understood in this way, being excellently and aptly stated: that the Son is indeed the *radiance of [His] glory and the stamp of the Father’s substance* (Heb. 1:3). For to those who are unable to bring their reasoning up to the height of the knowledge of God through the contemplation of intelligible things, the Apostle produces in the minds of the hearers a certain vision or imagination of the truth from things that appear to the senses. For just as the solar body is shaped by the entire surrounding circle, and he who has seen the circle infers the subsistence of the whole object lying within it through the visible depth; so he said that the magnificence of the Father is characterized in the magnitude of the Son’s power, so that as much as this is known, so much that also is believed to be. And again, just as the solar disk shines forth with the radiance of light—for no part of the circle shines while another part is dark—so the whole glory which the Father is, is illuminated from every side by the radiance proceeding from Him, that is, by the true light. And as the ray comes from the sun—for it would not be a ray if there were no sun, B nor is the sun ever thought of by itself without the radiance of the ray—so the Apostle, handing down the connection and the eternity of the Unigenitus’s existence from the Father, named the Son the radiance of glory.
These matters having been thus distinguished by us, no one should any longer doubt how it is believed that the Unigenitus is both from the Father and is eternal, even if according to a superficial notion the word saying that He is from the Father seems not to agree with the word that attributes eternity to Him. But if there is need to confirm the argument with another proof, the truth of this assertion could be understood from certain things known to us through the senses. Let no one treat the argument with laughter or mockery, because one cannot find in the nature of things an image of the object of our inquiry which is sufficient in all respects to represent the proposition by some analogy and similitude. For we wish those who say that the Father first willed, and then came to be a Father, and thereby attribute posteriority C to the Word, to be persuaded—by the examples we are able to bring forward—to transfer their thinking to what is pious to hold concerning God; for this immediate connection is not such that it excludes the will of the Father, as if He had the Son without choice by some necessity of nature; nor does the will separate the Son from the Father, as if some interval fell between them. So that we neither exclude from the doctrine the will of the Begetter in the generation of the Son, as if it were straitened by the cohesion of the unity of the Son with the Father, nor on the other hand do we dissolve the inseparable connection when the will is considered in the birth. For this is proper to our own heavy and sluggish nature: that not many things are present in us at once, both to have and to will. D
A But now indeed we wish to have something which we do not have, and later we attain those things which we did not wish. But in the simple and omnipotent nature, all things are understood simultaneously and at the same time: both the willing of the good and the having of that which was willed. For the good and everlasting will is considered in the eternal nature as entirely active, essential, and subsistent, neither coming into being from some separate principle, nor being able to be conceived apart from the willing one. For it is not possible before God that the good will should not be, or that it should not be present with the will; for there is no cause that would diminish the fact that all things belong to the Father, nor anything that hinders the having of what is willed. Since, therefore, the Only-Begotten God is by nature good, or rather is above all good, and the good is clearly shown by these arguments not to be unwilled by the Father, it follows that the union of the Son with the Father is immediate, and the will, which by nature always exists in the good, is not thrust out nor barred by the indivisible union. If anyone listens to this discourse without prejudice, I wish to add a certain something to these things already said.
Just as if someone—let us take it as a hypothesis—were to grant to a flame some elective or voluntary power, it would be clear that as soon as the flame began to be, it would also will to shine forth from itself; and being willing, it would certainly not be powerless, since its natural faculty would be able to bring it about that, as soon as the flame existed, it would also have the will to shine; so that, without contradiction, if this were granted, that the flame is moved by an act of will, all these things are understood to occur simultaneously: the kindling of the fire, the will to shine, and finally the radiance itself, since this voluntary movement of the B radiance in no way hinders the dignity of its subsistence. Just as through this example which we have brought forward, even if you confess that a good will is present in the Father, you will not for that reason separate the Son from the Father; for it is not consistent that that which is indeed the Son himself, having been begotten by the will of the Father, should be a hindrance to his being begotten together with the will.
But just as in the eye, seeing and willing to see—the former is an operation of nature, but the will is of the choice; nevertheless, this movement of the will is not a hindrance, but produces a plan in the activity of seeing toward this very thing of the choice—for each of these is considered individually and by itself, and one is not a hindrance to the other's being, but the two are in a certain way with one another, since the natural act of seeing follows the will, and again the will is not abandoned by this movement of seeing which is according to nature. C As, therefore, the comprehension is innate to the eye, and the will to see has brought no delay to the act of seeing itself, but desires it to be present with it, and what it wills is: so also in the ineffable nature that surpasses all thought, the mind conceives for us all things simultaneously and at the same moment: both the eternal existence of the Father, and the will concerning the Son, and the Son himself, who, as John says, is in the beginning, and is not conceived as being after the beginning. The Father is the beginning of all things; but in that D beginning also the Son is proclaimed to be, being by nature that which the...
A beginning is. For God is the Beginning, and the Word who is in the Beginning is God. Since the Beginning indicates eternity, John rightly joins the Word to the Beginning, saying that the Word is in it; doing this, I suppose, to prepare the way, lest the auditor, being forestalled, should understand the Beginning to exist solely by itself, but that before the Beginning itself is impressed upon the mind of the hearer, the Word also should be understood together with the Beginning, that being which is itself the Beginning entering the mind of the hearer simultaneously with it, and being implanted in the hearing together with the Beginning.
Having thus defined our doctrine, B it would be timely to set forth the contrary argument and to examine it, comparing it side-by-side with our own hypotheses. He speaks as follows: "For since," he says, "we have truly said two things—that the essence of the Only-Begotten did not exist before His own generation, and that it was begotten before all things—he disproves the falsehood of neither of these. For neither did he dare to say that it existed before the supreme generation and constitution, as the nature of the Father resists it, and the judgment of sensible men opposes it." For who of sound mind and judgment would admit that the Son both exists and is begotten before the supreme generation, as if He who is without generation did not require generation in order to be what He is? If, therefore, it is true what he asserts, that our master did nothing against his oppositions, let all those who are versed in his writings judge for themselves. But for my part—since I consider it of little value to demonstrate his malice to prove him openly guilty of slander in these matters—I will omit showing that our master did not leave this part unexamined, and I will turn my discourse to examining those things which are proposed by him, as far as it is possible. He says that he stated two things in his own discourse: one, that the essence of the Only-Begotten did not exist before the generation which is proper to Him; and another, that it was begotten before all things. But that no new essence was begotten by the Father outside of that which is contemplated within the Father Himself, I think has been abundantly demonstrated by what we have already said, and that there is no need for us to grapple with such blasphemy as if the argument were brought to us for the first time. But toward this alone, I say, it is necessary to apply our effort in this disputation: namely, to contend strenuously against his horrible and impious utterance, which openly said concerning the Word of God that "He was not." But since we have already discussed this blasphemy in the preceding sections, perhaps it would be superfluous to construct again by similar theorems the things which have been demonstrated beforehand. For this reason those things were premised by us in the preceding discourses, so that to those who read these [things] the blasphemy against the C adversaries might become more evident, those who—
in the case of the Only-begotten God—assert that not-to-be is older than to-be. B It seems to me proper, however, to investigate through a more accurate examination what the term "generation" signifies by way of discourse. That this name signifies to be from some cause is evident to everyone, and I do not think there is any need to contend about this. But since the account of those things which exist from some cause is various, I think it appropriate that it be clarified by some technical division. We have therefore grasped these differences among things which arise from something. For some things are from matter and art, as the constructions of buildings and of other works, which are made from suitable material; over these presides some art, which concludes and brings to completion the proposed object of the things being made relative to its proper purpose. Others are from matter and nature; for nature constructs the successive generations of animals, working its own [work] through the material subsistence in bodies. Others are from material efflux, in which the primary subject remains what it is, and that which flows from it is considered in itself; as in the case of the sun and the ray, or the lamp and the radiance, or in that of aromatics and perfumes, and the quality imparted from them. For these, while remaining undiminished in themselves, immediately have, concomitant with each, the natural property emitted from them: thus the sun [has] the ray, the lamp the radiance, and the aromatics the fragrance produced from them into the air. C There is also another species of generation besides these, of which the cause is immaterial and incorporeal, while the generation is perceptible and through a body; I speak of the word generated from the mind. For the mind, being incorporeal in itself, brings forth the word through perceptible organs. We have thus grasped such differences of generation, as if in a general investigation. For whatever things are brought about in a wondrous and prodigious way by nature—whether it transforms the bodies of certain animals into another different species, or produces certain animals from some alteration of fluids, or from the corruption of seeds, or from the decay of wood, or from the condensation of fire, turning the cold vapor left in the depths from the brands into the generation of an animal, which they call the salamander—even if they might appear to be outside the species of generation we defined above, they are nevertheless able to be comprehended within them. For nature produces these various kinds of animals through bodies; for whatever the transformation of the body might be, nature, having been affected or disposed in such a way, causes a certain kind of animal; D which is no other species of generation than that which is completed from nature and matter. Since, therefore, these modes of generation are known to human beings, the benevolent dispensation of the Holy Spirit, in handing down the divine mysteries to us, constructs the teaching of those things which are beyond speech through the things that are comprehensible to us, as it does also in all other matters, when it depicts the Divine in a bodily way—the eye, and eyelids, and ears, and fingers, and hand, and right hand, and arm, and foot, and sandals, and such like.
A Nothing of these is found in the divine nature according to our customary understanding. But leading the teaching to what can be easily discerned by us, it determines things that transcend all signification by means of terms worn smooth by the usage of men, lifting us, by an analogy or certain proportion, through those things which are said about God, to some higher thought.
Thus, therefore, the divinely inspired teaching adopts many species of generation for the representation of the ineffable subsistence of the Only-Begotten, taking from each of them only so much as is pious to assume for those opinions which are held about God. B For just as the mention of fingers in regard to God, and of the hand and the arm, does not describe in the discourse the constitution of a limb—made of bones, nerves, flesh, and sinews—but signifies by such a name His active and energetic power; and by each of the others, those things which are understood about God are indicated through corresponding names, without, however, admitting at the same time the corporeal signification of the terms: so too it speaks of these species of generation strictly in relation to the divine nature, yet it does not speak of them in the way our usage knows how to understand. For when it speaks of that power that fashioned all things, it calls such an operation a “generation,” because the discourse must needs descend to the humbleness of our divine power; C yet it does not indicate all those things which, among us, are observed in that generation by which something is constructed—not place, not time, not the preparation of the discourse, not the cooperation of instruments, not the turmoil that accompanies what is done in human fashion—but leaving these aside for us, it gloriously and loftily attributes the generation of existing things to God; as when it says that *He spoke and they were made, He commanded and they were created.*
Again, when it interprets the ineffable and transcendent subsistence of the Only-Begotten from the Father, because human poverty is incapable of those teachings that are above discourse and thought, it employs our terms there and names Him “Son,” a name which our usage imposes on those who are born from matter and nature. D But just as when the divine discourse spoke of the generation of creation, it did not add that it was made from some matter, but declared that the essence of matter, and place, and time, and all such things, were nothing other than the power of the will, so also here, when it said “Son,” it omitted all other things which human nature sees in the lower generation—I speak of passions, and dispositions, and the operation that comes from time, and the necessity of place, and before all, matter, without all of which the lower generation from nature cannot consist. But since no such material and spatial thought is brought along in the signification of “Son,” only the nature is left behind; and for this reason, by the word “Son,” the proper and genuine [nature] of the manifestation from the Father is shown forth in the Only-
-begotten Son of God. B And since this species of generation was not suitable for conveying to us a sufficient conception of the ineffable existence of the Only-begotten, theology simultaneously adopts another species of generation to signify the generation of the Son, namely that which occurs by material effusion, and calls Him “the splendor of glory,” “the fragrance of ointment,” and “the vapor of God,” things which, as we set forth in the previous tract, our common usage calls material effusion. But just as in those matters which we previously reviewed, neither the generation of a creature nor the meaning regarding the Son admitted time, or matter, or struggle, or passion; so, too, in this case, purifying the meaning of “splendor” and the remainder of what was mentioned from every material thought, the discourse, when it has adopted only what is fitting to God and becoming in this species of generation, shows forth by the emphasis—or rather, the clear significance—of this expression, that He is from Him and subsists with Him. For neither does the vapor or breath represent to the mind a diffusion into the air from an underlying material substance, nor does the odor [represent] a transmutation into the air from the quality of the ointment, nor does the splendor [represent] an effusion from the solar body through rays; but this alone of all these things, as has been said, is declared by such a mode of generation: that He is from Him and is thought of with Him, with no interval placed between the Father and Him who is from Him. C And since, due to greater benevolence toward men, the grace of the Holy Spirit has dispensed that divine opinions about the Only-begotten should be ingrained in us from many sources, He has also added the remaining species of those which are considered in generation, I mean that which is from the mind and from speech. But the sublime John uses greater foresight, so that the intelligence of the hearer, through languor and the weakness of a small mind, might never fall toward a common notion of a word, so as to think the Son of the Father is a sound; for this reason, he instructs us to look at the Word in the essence [of the Father], and not in some essence that is strange and severed from that which is God, but in Him and in the first and blessed nature. For these things he teaches, saying: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” and all things that the beginning is, He also is. For thus he discourses concerning the eternity of the Only-begotten as a theologian. Since, therefore, such are the modes of generation, or at least of those things that exist from a cause, which are known in our common usage, but which have also been taken up by Holy Scripture for the doctrine of things that surpass us—each of which ought to be taken as is appropriate for confirming and establishing the knowledge of divine things—let him who reads this discourse now judge with a right judgment if any of those things brought forward by heresy have any strength against the truth. D But I will again add the very word of the adversary
A, which is as follows: “There are two points,” he says, “which we have stated: that the essence of the Only-Begotten does not exist prior to the generation that is proper to Him, and that He was begotten before all things.” What kind of generation is this dogmatist putting forward to us? Is it what is fitting to conceive and say concerning God? And who is so godless as to conceive that non-being exists before God?
But it is clear that, having regard to this material generation, he makes the lowest nature the teacher for his assumption concerning the Only-Begotten God. And because an ox, or an ass, or a camel does not exist prior to its own generation, he wishes to assert this also in the case of the Only-Begotten, which the succession of the lowest nature allows one to see in animals. Nor does this carnal theologian notice that when the term "Only-Begotten" is spoken of regarding God, by that very word He signifies what has no communion at all with any [other] generation and is peculiar to Himself. For how could this generation be "Only-Begotten" if it has communion and identity with another generation in its significance? For only that which is superlative and pre-eminent in Him is intended, which is not grasped in any other generation, and it is interpreted properly and aptly by the very term "Only-Begotten." So that if some part of this lowest generation is viewed in Him, He would no longer be "Only-Begotten," being made common with the rest of those who are begotten by certain properties of generation. For if the same things were to be said of Him that are said of the rest of those who advance into being through generation, the argument would transform the meaning of "Only-Begotten" into some kind of fraternal relationship.
If, therefore, the meaning of "Only-Begotten" is shown to be that which is unmixed and without communion with the rest of the things that come into being, we shall not allow ourselves to conceive of anything observed in the lowest generation in the subsistence of the Son which is from the Father. But yet it is proper to all those who subsist through generation not to exist prior to their generation; this, therefore, is foreign to the property of the Only-Begotten, to whom the title of "Only-Begotten" bears witness that nothing of the vagueness of the common species and mode of generation attaches to Him. Therefore, let this man, who is of the material and a friend to the senses, be persuaded to correct the vague error of his opinions by the other species of generation.
D But perhaps you will say, when you hear of the "radiance of [His] glory" and the "scent of the ointment," that the radiance did not exist before its own generation. But when you say this, you will grant that there is absolutely no glory, nor any ointment (for it does not exist); or [you must believe] that the glory was at some time blind in itself and devoid of light, or the ointment sterile of its sweet fragrance. Therefore, if there was no radiance, there was no glory at all; and if there is no odor, it has now been demonstrated that there is no ointment. But if these examples taken from Scripture terrify anyone, as not exactly expressing the magnificence of the Only-Begotten because they are not identical with the subject in essence—neither the vapor with the ointment, nor the ray with the sun—let the true Word remove his fear; He who was in the beginning, and is all that the beginning is, and exists prior to everything, as John cried out in his preaching, that the Word was with God, and the Word was God. If then God
is the Father, and God is also the Son, what ground for doubting remains regarding the precise theology of the Only-Begotten, when by the signification of "Son" the property of his nature is made known, by "radiance" his cohesion and inseparable union without any interval is signified, and by the divine name, which is equally applied to Father and Son, equality of honor in all things is indicated? A Moreover, the "character," or image, of the entire substance which is contemplated in the Father signifies the perfect fullness of his own magnitude, and the "form of God" reveals the identity in all things, by showing everything in itself through which the position is characterized.
Again, therefore, let us set forth the discourse of Eunomius. "He was not," he says, "before his own generation." Who is this, whom he claims not to be? Let him recount the divine names by which he who—according to the opinion of Eunomius—at one time was not, is called. He will say, therefore, light, and blessedness, and life and incorruptibility, and justice and sanctification, and power and truth, and things of this sort. He, therefore, who claims that he was not before his generation, proclaims openly and without doubt that "truth" did not exist when he did not exist; there was no life, there was no light, there was no power, there was no incorruptibility, nor anything else of those things which are understood in God. B Furthermore, what is more absurd and more bitter in its impiety, there was no radiance, there was no character or image. For in saying that there is no radiance, he also constructs the argument that there is no force that radiates, just as can be seen in the example of a lamp. For he who mentions the brightness of a lamp indicates at the same time that the lamp is shining; and he who says that the brightness does not exist signifies at the same time the extinction of that which illuminates. So when the Son is said not to exist, the non-existence of the Father is also established by necessary consequence. For if one thing holds consistently to another, according to the apostolic testimony—both the "radiance of glory," and the "character of his substance," and the "wisdom of God"—he who denies that one of these conjoined things exists, by the removal of the one has utterly destroyed the remainder. C Therefore, if there is no radiance, it must be confessed that there is also no nature that radiates; and if the character does not subsist, neither does the person that is figured. If, furthermore, the wisdom and power of God does not exist, neither must we confess that He exists Who is not understood in himself apart from wisdom and power. If, therefore, the Only-Begotten God did not exist before he came to be, as Eunomius says—yet Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and the character and the radiance—therefore the Father did not exist at all, whose Son is the power and wisdom and character and radiance. For it is in no way possible to conceive by reason either a substance without a character, or glory without light, or an unwise God, or a creator without a hand, or a beginning devoid of reason, or a Father without a Son. D But all things of this sort are declared to exist together for both those who confess and those who reject them. And through the removal of the one, what is conjoined is also removed. Since, therefore, it is established by them that the Son did not exist before his birth, which is the radiance of glory (the consequence removing along with the Son the things that are conjoined to him—
namely A the non-existence of his radiance and the eternity of the glory; for the Father is the glory, from whom the only-begotten light shone forth)—let those who are over-abundant in wisdom realize that they have appeared as patrons and manifest defenders of the Epicurean dogmas, and under the pretext and guise of Christianity are championing atheism (that is to say, impiety or the denial of God). Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated by this sequence that a double absurdity arises—either to say that God does not exist at all, or that he does not exist without a beginning—let them choose from these things that have appeared what they think best: either to be called atheists, or to say no longer that the essence belonging to the Father is without beginning. But indeed, it is likely that they would shrink from being considered atheists. Therefore, it remains for them to argue that God is not eternal. But if the consequence of what has been B proved necessitates this, where are the various and irrefutable inversions of terms? Where is the inescapable necessity of the syllogisms, which beats about the ears of old women by means of the distinction between the unbegotten and the begotten?
But this is enough for the present. However, it would be well not to pass over what follows without examination; but let the games played in between be passed over in silence, with which this impetuous orator exults in a boyish manner, whether in jest or in earnest in the insults cast against us, as if he were to be superior in the argument by means of these. For no one will force us, either to twist our eyes sideways and obliquely along with him, or to be shaken together with those struck by a demonic illness, to leap and fall to the ground with the body. But we shall pity them, while we shall not be moved from our composed state of mind. He says, therefore, having turned his argument toward our master as if actually struggling against the person, that he was captured by his own wings. For since he had said that the good is always present to God who is over all, and that it is good to be the Father of such a Son; C therefore, never is the good absent from him, nor did the Father desire to be without the Son; and having desired, he was not unable, but being able and willing, he was according to his will and always had the Son, because he always wills what is good—for the mind of the things said by our father looks to this—Eunomius, having first mocked these things as brought in from outside wisdom, puts forward a certain such expression for the overturning of the things that were said, and says, "Who will generate?" (when one of those who are practiced in such arguments had said: "Just as if it is good and proper for God to create and to fashion, how was it that the good and proper was not present to him who is without beginning, if God is without beginning?" And these things, when neither ignorance hinders, nor weakness prevents, or age in relation to creating, and all the things that you have heaped together and poured out badly upon yourself; for it is not right to speak this of God). If, therefore, it were possible for the master himself to answer the question, he would have shown to Eunomius who he would have been, as he asked through his God-taught tongue, both uncovering the divine mystery and whipping with refutations the leaders of the deception, so that it might become clear D
A to all how great is the distance between a minister of the mysteries of Christ and a ridiculous mime, or a composer of new and strange dogmas. But since the one, as the Apostle says, speaks as having died to God, while the other puts forth such things as if there were no one to contradict him—even if our answer does not have the same weight as the voice of the great Basil—nevertheless, for the present, we shall say this to him who asked: your own word, which is brought forward for the subversion of our words, becomes a testimony that we are speaking the truth in those things in which we refute the dogma of impiety. For we do not complain of anything else so much as your thinking that the Master of creation does not differ at all from those things which are common to creation; and we complain of what is proposed by you against the Only-Begotten. For if you think that what you see in creation must also be applied to the Only-Begotten God, our efforts reach their end; for by your own words the absurdity has been refuted, B and it has become evident to all that we are indeed correcting the word in truth, and that your notion concerning the Only-Begotten God is such as it is concerning the rest of the creatures—that the dispute was about something, not about the Only-Begotten Son of God, the Creator of all creation, whether He was always or whether He was added later to the Father. What then does the voice of the teacher say concerning this? That because it is good by nature, it is not pious to believe that it is not always in God. For one should not see any cause according to which it is likely that the Good was not present with the Good, neither through a defect of power nor through a barrenness of will. What does he who contends against these things say to this? That if you grant that the God Word must be believed to be from eternity, you will grant the same regarding the creatures. Oh, how he knows to distinguish by reason the nature of creatures and the divine majesty! How he knows what is fitting for each, both what it is pious to think regarding God, and what regarding creation! If, he says, the Creator begins the act of creation from time. For it is not possible to note a beginning for any of the things that have been made, except that time defines the beginnings and the ends for things coming into being in its own interval.
Therefore, he says, must the Creator of times also have begun from a similar beginning. But while creation indeed has the ages as its beginning, what beginning will you imagine for the Creator of the ages? For if one speaks of that in the Gospel, which is that which is declared, C to which the confession of the Son is also concurrently shown to be linked, it is not possible for Him who is in the Father, as the Lord says, to have begun from some temporal point. But if one asserts that there is another beginning besides that one, let him state the name by which such a beginning is signified, since nothing is comprehended before the constitution of the ages. Therefore, such a word will in no way move us from our pious and religious opinion concerning the Only-Begotten God, even if the old women applaud this question as if it were a strong D problem. For we remain on that which was known from the beginning, having fixed upon the truth the
AGAINST EUNOMIUS, BOOK VIII.
A ...the argument holds that whatever the discourse of piety suggests ought to be said concerning the Only-begotten God, it has no kinship with the creation; rather, by a great interval, it is separated from the Creator of all things, and the marks of His works are likewise distinct. If, then, the Son had any communion with the creation in other respects, one would necessarily have to say that He did not differ in the mode of His existence either. But if the creation is devoid of such things as we have learned concerning the Son, it is absolutely necessary to say that He has no communion with it in this respect either. For the creation was not in the beginning, nor was it with God, nor was it God, nor life, nor light, nor resurrection, nor any other of the names befitting God—such as truth, righteousness, sanctification, B judge, just, maker of the universe, He who exists before the ages, reigning through the age and unto the ages and beyond. The creation is not the radiance of glory, not the character of the essence, not the image of goodness, nor grace, nor power, nor truth, nor salvation, nor redemption, nor is there anything at all of such things as are spoken of by Scripture to the glory of the Only-begotten that is either in the creation or said of it—to set aside those more sublime utterances, namely: *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, and, *He who has seen me has seen the Father*, and, *No one has seen the Son except the Father*. If, then, the discourse could bear witness to such and so great things concerning the creation, one might well think it necessary to apply to it what is observed in it while forming conceptions of the Only-begotten, by making a comparison of those things that are of the same kind.
But if all such thoughts and names have their communion with the Father, while they transcend any conception regarding the creation, is not that wise and clever man overcome with shame, while he discourses C about the Lord of creation as if by natural reasoning, through those things which are observed in the creation, not yet understanding that the marks by which the creation is known are of another kind? For the supreme division of all things that exist has its boundary in the created and the uncreated—the one as the cause of what has come to be, the other as coming from thence. Since, therefore, the created nature and the divine essence are divided, and have no intermingling according to the identifying properties, it is absolutely necessary neither to conceive of each by [the same] similar things, nor to seek the same marks for those things that are separated according to the logic of nature.
Since, therefore, the nature in the creation, as the discourse of the all-virtuous Wisdom says, exhibits in itself a beginning, an end, and a middle of times, and is extended with all temporal intervals, we take this property as a certain character of the subject, in that we see in it D a beginning of its constitution, and we behold a midpoint, and we extend ourselves in hope toward the end. For we have learned that neither was the heaven and the earth from eternity, nor will it be into eternity, so that it is clear from this that things that exist began from some beginning, and will certainly end at some limit. The divine nature, however, is not bounded in any part, but is everywhere in the infinite...
earth, nor will it be in eternity, so that it may be clear from this that things which are in the nature of things began from some principle, and will altogether end in some extreme. But the divine nature, terminated in no part, but everywhere permeating every limit to infinity, is far removed from these signs and marks which are found in the creature. For, being devoid of dimension, without quantity, and of incircumscript power, embracing in itself the ages and every creature contained in them, and in every respect surpassing the infinity of the ages by the eternity of its own nature, it either has no sign that signifies its nature, or it has something else entirely, which the creature does not have. Since, therefore, it is proper to the creature to have a beginning, that which is proper to the creature is altogether alien to the uncreated nature. For if anyone should think to suppose A that the existence of the Only-Begotten also began from some comprehensible beginning, after the likeness of the creature, he will necessarily accommodate to his reasoning the remaining things also which are found in the creature. For it is not upright, once a beginning is given, not to confess also that which follows.
For just as if one were to concede that a man exists, he has annexed to this confession the things that belong to human nature, by calling him both an animal and rational, and whatever else is understood in man: in the same way, if we have understood one of the things that are properly attributed to the creature in the divine essence, it will no longer be free for us to any longer not apply to the immortal nature the reasoning of those things which are considered in it. For a beginning will violently and necessarily demand that which follows after it; for a beginning that is understood in this way is the beginning of those things which are after it. Wherefore B if those things were to exist, this also must necessarily be; but if those things were removed, that which precedes would not remain either. Since, therefore, wisdom places both a middle and an end before a beginning, if in the nature of the Only-Begotten we have assumed some beginning of his subsistence determined by some point, as heresy dogmatizes, wisdom will undoubtedly concede that both the end and the middle be coupled to the beginning. But if this were to happen, this theologian will be found to us to be demonstrating by these arguments that God is mortal. For if, according to the reasoning of wisdom, an end necessarily follows a beginning, and a middle is also considered between the extremes; he who has granted the one, by that power at the same time establishes the others, determining the measures and the final limit of life for an infinite nature. But if this is impious and absurd, it is also worthy of equal or even greater accusation to give a beginning to a discourse that ends in impiety: the beginning of this absurdity, moreover, is revealed from the fact that they think the life of the Son to be concluded by another circumscribed beginning. C Wherefore, one of two things: either they will be changed to sound speech, compelled by the things that have been said, and will contemplate him who is from the Father along with the eternity of the Father; or, if they do not wish this, they will terminate the eternity of the Son with both extremes, namely with a beginning and an end, leading the infinity of his life to that which does not exist. But if the nature of both souls and angels lacks an end, nor is it forbidden to be perpetual in eternity, because it is
A created and has the principle of its subsistence from someone, so that by this, the adversaries can say the same thing of Christ, that although He is not from eternity, yet He extends Himself into eternity. Let him who brings forward these arguments also reflect with himself how far divinity stands apart from the creature by the properties which are in it. For the property of divinity is to lack nothing of any conception viewed in terms of goodness; but the creature comes into being in the good through participation in the better; it not only began to be, but is always found to be beginning to exist in the good, on account of the increment by which it always tends toward the better. Wherefore it never rests in the comprehension of the whole of the good, but everything that has been brought into being through participation becomes a beginning of an ascent toward that which is better. And according to the voice of Paul, it never ceases extending itself to the things that are before and forgetting the things that are behind. B Since, therefore, the divinity itself is life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and Life, and Truth, and every concept that is lofty and worthy of God, while the creature receives the supply of good things from Him, it should be manifest from these things that if it is a participant of life, it truly lives; and if it were to cease from that participation, it would undoubtedly also cease to live. If, therefore, they are bold enough to say these things about the Only-begotten God, which it is true to say about the creature, let them also add this to everything they say: that in the same way as the creature, He also began to exist, and remains in life after the likeness of souls. But if He is Himself life, neither is it necessary that He should have life in Himself from elsewhere as an adventitious thing; while all other things are not life, but become participants of life. C What necessity compels us, because of the things seen in the creature, to prescribe limits to the eternity of the Only-begotten? For that which always exists in the same way according to nature is incapable of its opposite, and is not susceptible to change into the other state. But for those to whom nature is an intermediate boundary, or who are constituted on the border of good and evil, the inclination of these is ambiguous, veering toward either one or the other according to the free power of those who are moved by the volition of their own minds. If, therefore, true life is contemplated in the divine and supereminent nature, its slipping away toward the opposite will necessarily end just as is reasonable. D Yet the concept of life and death is manifold, and is not understood in the same way. For in the flesh, the function and motion of the corporeal senses is called life; and conversely, the quenching and dissolution of these is named death. But in the intellectual nature, the drawing near to God is the true life, and the falling away from this bears the name of death. Wherefore also the primordial evil, the devil, is called death and the inventor of death; but he is also said by the Apostle to have the power of death.
Lib. IX
Since therefore, as has been said, death is understood in a twofold signification in the Scriptures, He who is truly immutable and unchangeable alone has immortality, and dwells in light that is inaccessible and unapproachable to the darkness of vice. But whatever is subject to death, as it falls away from immortality on account of the inclination which it ha-has toward the participation in the worse—which is nothing else than death, having a certain proportion to bodily death. For just as in bodies the extinction of natural functions is called death, so also in a spiritual essence, to be unmoved toward the good is death and a withdrawal from life. A Thus, the heretical absurdity is not at variance with the argument that argues concerning what is understood in the incorporeal creature. For the death that pertains to a spiritual nature is this separation from God, which we do not call life, nor is it separated from this nature by its own power. For the transition from non-being to being indicates mutability of nature. But that to which alteration is akin is warded off from the association of the contrary by the grace and favor of the One who strengthens it; it does not remain in the good by the power of its own nature. But whatever is of such a sort is not eternal. If, therefore, it is true to say that the divine essence and the created nature are not to be measured by the same standards, nor is it fitting to circumscribe the essence of the Son by any beginning, so that, were this granted, the properties of the rest of the creation might not also be conceded to be present through the same confession—for the absurdity of him who separates the only-begotten God from the eternity of the Father through those things which are said about the creature is openly refuted. For just as nothing else of those things which mark the creature is observed in the maker of the creature, so neither can it be demonstrated from the fact that this is from some beginning B that the Son, who is wisdom and power and light and life and all things that are contemplated in the paternal bosom, is not always in the Father.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK NINE
CCAPITA OR SUMMARIES OF THE NINTH BOOK
1. He says that the ninth book speaks well up to a certain point regarding the theology of Eunomius. Then, having detested the immense absurdity, he marvelously refutes that which was transcribed by Eunomius from the words of Philo the Jew (on account of the affinity of their minds): God is before all things that are generated, with the addition of this also: Who properly dominates by power. 2. Next, he demonstrated most wisely that the generation of the Son is not according to the voice of Eunomius, who says: The Father begat the Son when He willed, and not before; but [he showed] that the Son, being the fullness of all good and beautiful things, always exists and is contemplated in the Father, having taken Eunomius’ own statement for the confirmation of the demonstration. 3. And [he showed] that the generation of the Son, having preceded all ages, should not be estimated from common and carnal generation, but that it is devoid of beginning and end; neither...how Eunomius foolishly fabricates his account from things said by Plato concerning the soul, and from the rest of the Sabbath among the Hebrews, not knowing its power.
8. Then, having proved false the calumny against the great Basil by Eunomius—as if he called the Only-Begotten unbegotten—he completes his discourse by discussing very wisely, again, the eternal and being, and the endlessness of the creation of the Only-Begotten, and of light and darkness.
A But he passes on to loftier arguments, and having exalted and puffed himself up with empty wind, he attempts to say something worthy of the majesty of God. What he says is this: “God,” he says, “being the most eminent good of all, and the best of all and most powerful, and free from all necessity.” The noble fellow, like a ship without ballast, brings his discourse into the port of truth, automatically, by the waves of deceit. “God is the most eminent of all that is good.” Excellent is this confession! Certainly he would not charge great John with writing a lawless text, by whom the Only-Begotten God is announced in the lofty proclamation: who was also with God, and was God. Therefore, if that herald of the Only-Begotten's divinity is trustworthy, and God is the most B eminent good, then the Son has been testified to by his enemy as the most eminent good. Since this expression is also fitting for the Father, the superlative of the "most eminent" emphasis admits no diminution or super-elevation from comparison.
Having taken these things from the testimony of enemies for the proof of the Only-Begotten's glory, we must add to the support of sound doctrine the argument that follows his. For he says that the most eminent good, God, since neither nature hinders, nor cause compels, nor need urges, begets and creates according to the superiority of his own authority, having a will which is sufficient power for the constitution of things that come to be. If, therefore, everything good is good according to his will, he defines not only the thing that comes to be as good, but also "when" it is good to come to be; since it is [a sign] of weakness to do what one does not will. C Up to this point, the discourse of the adversaries, stitched together from dirty and utterly cut-up little words, is to be adopted by us for the establishment of pious dogmas; for if, according to the superiority of his own authority, the one who created all things, having a will that is sufficient power for the constitution of things that come to be—with neither nature hindering nor cause compelling—defines not only the thing that comes to be as good, but also when it is good to come to be. But the one who does all things is the Only-Begotten God, as the Gospel proclaims; when he willed, then he also made the creation; then he encompassed with the celestial body, through the circulating substance, the whole world enclosed within the frame;
A then he revealed the dry land, then he enclosed the waters in the hollow places; then also the plants, then the fruits, then the birth of animals, then the formation of man; whenever each of these seemed timely to the wisdom of Him who created. But He who made all things (for I will take up the same argument again) is the Only-Begotten God, who made the ages; for with the interval of the ages having been laid down before created things, it is not right to use this temporal adverb, "when He willed, then He also made." But since the age did not exist, nor is any notion of interval understood concerning the divine nature, which is devoid of quantity and lacking dimension, it is entirely necessary that the meanings of temporal adverbs remain idle and empty. Therefore, to say that a temporal beginning was given to the creature, as it pleased the wisdom of Him who made all things, is not outside the plausible. But to contemplate the divine nature itself in some extended interval belongs only to those who have been taught this new wisdom. For as I intentionally passed over even that which is attached to what has been said, hastening to the subject at hand, which I shall now recite, repeating it for the demonstration of the writer's cleverness.
B For "most eminent God himself," he says, "before all other things that are generated, dominates his own power." The discourse, indeed, is transferred word for word from Philo the Hebrew by the writer into his own language. And to whomsoever it is a concern, from the very works of Philo, the theft of Eunomius will become manifest. But I have noted this for the present, not so much to reproach the writer for a scarcity of his own words and notions, as because I wish to show to those who read it the affinity of the dogmas of Eunomius with the discourses of the Jews; for his speech would not have agreed word for word with the notions of Philo, unless there were also some kinship and association of intelligence between this man and that one. C For thus it is permitted to find the discourse set down in the Hebrew: "God before all other things that are generated." But that which follows was cast in from the new Jewish doctrine: "He dominates his own power." But what absurdity this possesses, the discourse will show clearly when it has been examined. God, he says, dominates his own power. Tell me, what existing thing is it that he dominates? Is it some other thing existing besides power, or is it that he dominates his own power, which is indeed some other thing than what he himself is? Therefore, power is overcome by powerlessness. For whatever is something else besides power is by no means power. And thus it is found, in so far as it is not power, to be dominating power according to that. But if God is power, he would again have another power in himself, and by this he dominates the other. And what is this battle and dissension, such that God, having divided the strength existing in himself, should make one segment of power wrestle down the other? For he would not retain power in himself, unless some greater and more violent power were struggling with him for this. Such is the God of Eunomius, I know not what biformis, or twofold in nature, or much compo-
composited, A divided against himself, having a power at variance with power; so that one part of it is carried away toward disorder, while the other prevents the excess of the movement. And what is he thinking of when he says that he holds back the power that is rushing toward generation? Is it lest some evil should arise from the generation not being prevented? Or rather, before this, let him explain what that is which is held by nature. For the term used indicates a certain impulsive and elective motion, viewed peculiarly by itself; for that which restrains is one thing, and that which is necessarily restrained is another. Therefore, God restrains a power that is something of a nature of free-will, or something else besides this, which either rushes toward action or is at rest. For if it is supposed to be at rest, that which is quiet has no need of a restrainer. But if he says that he restrains it, clearly he restrains it as it is moving and rushing. But he will by all means say that this is something else in nature than the one who is holding it in check. What, then, does he mean? Let him make this manifest in argument; something else in essence besides God is being considered. And how could anything alien be in God? Or is it some habit considered to exist B in the divine nature as something without subsistence? But he would not say this. For that which does not exist is nothing; and that which is not, is neither held nor released. What, then, is that restrained power which is prevented from its own operation, until the time of the birth of Christ had arrived, to let the power go freely to be carried toward its natural operation? And what is the cause of the delay in the middle, on account of which God postponed the birth of the Only-Begotten, thinking it was not yet good to have become Father? And what is this medium that is inserted between the life of the Father and the Son? It is not time, not place, not any notion of interval, nor anything else of this kind. Toward what, then, is that sharp and piercing eye gazing, that it perceives a distance of the life of the Son from the life of the Father? But being constrained and examined from every side, he himself necessarily agrees that there is nothing in between.
But since there is no medium C intervening, he does not admit that the communion is immediate and continuous, but descends to the measures of our knowledge, and after the human manner he debates with us as if he were one of us; acknowledging quietly the weakness of his arguments, and fleeing for refuge to a reason which Aristotle and his followers did not teach. "Then," he says, "it was good and fitting to beget the Son, when he willed." And no question arises among the prudent from this, "Why not before?" What is this, Eunomius? Do you too walk on foot against us, the rude and unlearned, and having abandoned your artificial circuits, do you also flee for refuge to an irrational assent, you who cast many reproaches upon those who undertake to write without rational diligence? You who say to Basil that, by the things which you say are impossible for men to render accounts concerning spiritual discourses, you are exposing your own ignorance. And again, elsewhere, bringing forward the same thing: that you attribute your own weakness D to
A all men, you who say these things and such like, so you approach the hearing of the one seeking the cause why the Father delays becoming the Father of such a Son. Do you think it sufficient for a demonstration to say, "Then he begat when he willed," and let there be no questioning concerning this? Has your apprehensive vision or imagination become so weak for the construction of dogmas? Where are your dilemma-propositions? Where are the violent constructions? Where have the formidable and inevitable conclusions of your art vanished away for you, having melted into nothingness? "Then he begat the Son when he willed," and let there be no questioning about this. Are these the results of many toils, these the results of your puffed-up promises? What was the question? If it is good and becoming to God to have such a Son, why is it not believed that the Good is always with Him? What is the answer that has been made for us from the very shrines or sanctuaries of philosophy, binding the discourse with insoluble necessities? "Then he made the Son when he willed, and let there be no questioning about this." Why not earlier? But if the consideration were proposed regarding any of those things which are devoid of reason, which operate by a certain natural impulse—for what reason did it not act earlier upon what it pleased, whether the spider [making] its webs, or the bee its honeycomb, or the turtledove its nest—what else would you have to say? Would not this be the ready answer: that it made it then, when it willed, and let there be no questioning about it? Furthermore, regarding even some sculptor or painter, working on whatever it may be through imitative art, whether in paintings or in clay figures, when he is not enslaved to B any power that drives his art toward operation: I think such a statement is fitting for the one who wants to learn why it was that he did not make his art operative earlier; [namely,] that not being under any necessity, he made [his] choice [as to] the time of the operation. For humans, because they do not always will the same things, nor do they often have the power acting in concert with their will, perform something according to their intention when their choice inclines toward the work, and nothing from without prevents them. But for that which always has [existence] in the same way, to which nothing of good is adventitious, in which there is no room for any difference of counsels—such as arises in the opposite direction on account of some error or ignorance—to which nothing comes by way of change, which it did not recognize from the beginning as good: to say of this that it does not always possess the good, but that it chose later to have something that it did not choose before—these things belong to a wisdom that surpasses us. For we have learned that the Divine is always full of every good; or rather, it is itself the fullness of goods, even if it needs no addition for perfection, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of the good. Now that which is perfect is equally estranged from increase and decrease. And for this reason, we say that the perfection of the goods contemplated in the divine nature is always the same; according to [whatever measure] we stretch our understanding, we grasp it as such. Therefore, the Divine is never empty of the good. But the Son is the fullness of every good; therefore, He is always beheld in the Father, to whom the nature that is in every good [is] perfect
perfection. But, he says, let there be no inquiry as to [A] why not earlier. To whom we shall say: It is one thing, O most wise one, to enact and proclaim something according to mandate from the things the mind brings forth, and another to establish faith concerning doubtful and controversial matters through reason. Therefore, as long as you can provide no reason why it is pious to say that the Son was generated by the Father later, your edict will be idle and void among the sober and prudent.
Thus, Eunomius brings the truth into the light for us through an artificial insinuation. We, however, according to our custom, will apply the discourse of that man to the construction of the doctrines of the truth, so that it may be clear even from this that they are everywhere, even involuntarily, compelled by the truth itself to support our discourse. For if He generated the Son when He willed, as the refractory one says, and He always willed the good, and power concurs with the will, B then the Son will always be understood with the Father, who always wills the good and is able to have what He wills. But if it is necessary to bring his subsequent discourse also to the truth, it is easy to adapt this to our dogma, that there should be no controversy among the modest concerning this, "Why not earlier?" For the word "earlier" has a certain temporal indication, which is contrasted with these words: "after that" and "later." When, however, there is no time, the names of temporal distinction are altogether removed at the same time. But the Lord is before times and before ages: therefore, the question of "prior" and "posterior" is useless to those endowed with reason in the Creator of the ages. For such terms are void of all meaning C when they are not spoken of time. Since, therefore, the Lord is before the times, "prior" and "posterior" certainly have no place at all in Him. Perhaps these things suffice for the subversion of those things that do not need an opponent, but which collapse by their own imbecility. For who has so much leisure from the cares of life as to provide himself as a listener to the vanity of words that contradict themselves, and even to our battle or disputation against vain and futile things? But since, in those preoccupied by impiety, the deception is like a certain dye that cannot be washed away, and an inexpiable fraud is burned deep into their hearts, we will linger a little longer in this discourse, if by any means we might be able to wash and cleanse their souls from this stain of theirs. For when he had brought forth the things that have been said, and D had added to these, according to his instructor Prunicus, certain disconnected and incongruous octads of insults and revilings, then at last he passes over to the final stroke of his arguments, and having left behind the exposition of vanity devoid of reasoning, he again arms his discourse with the stings of dialectic, and syllogistically, as he thinks, constructs this absurdity against us.
For the diction is as follows: "Since every generation is not extended to infinity, but terminates at some end"
, it is absolutely necessary that those who admit the generation of the Son must acknowledge that he ceased to be generated at that time, and they must not remain in unbelief concerning the inception of those things which ceased to be generated; for stillness confirms the principle of generation and the generator: nor is it permitted to detract from the faith in these matters, both from nature itself and also from divine laws. Since, therefore, according to the wisdom of those skilled in such things, having set forth a universal proposition, he attempts to construct what is proposed by induction, A including in the general proposition a particular demonstration, let us first understand the universal, and then examine the force of the matters introduced. Is it pious to infer from every generation the pre-eternal generation of the Son? And is it necessary to propose the common nature as a teacher of the existence of the Only-Begotten? I, for my part, would not have expected anyone to come to such a pitch of madness as to imagine such a thing regarding the divine and uncorrupt generation. "Every generation," he says, "is not extended to infinity." What is the meaning of "generation"? Does he speak of fleshly and bodily conception, or the construction of inanimate things? B But for bodily generations, the sufferings are manifest, which no one would transfer to the divine generation. And so that our account might not seem superfluous by describing the works of nature, we shall pass over such things in silence; for I suppose that anyone endowed with a mind can perceive for himself the causes according to which generation is extended, namely those which begin and cease; for it would be long and superfluous to set forth at once with accurate subtlety and diligence the meeting of those who generate, the formation in the viscera of the one being generated, the birth pangs, the delivery, the place, and the time, without which the generation of a body cannot exist. C All of which things are equally alien to the divine generation of the Only-Begotten. For if one of these things were granted, all the rest would necessarily follow. Therefore, that the divine generation may be purged of every thought immersed in passions, let us not conceive of an extension distinct by intervals in it. For that which begins and ceases is indeed seen in some extension. But every extension is comprehended by the measure of time. Since, however, there is no time in which we might note the end and the beginning of the birth, it would be vain to conceive of an end and a beginning in a generation that lacks dimension, D since no notion is found which might mark either in what it begins or in what it ends. But if he looks to inanimate creatures, and in those likewise, both place, and time, and matter, and apparatus, and the faculty of the one working by art, and many such things concurring, bring that which is made to perfection. And since time is strictly extended along with all things that come to be through generation, and the materials preparatory to that which is effected are conceived simultaneously with that which is created, whether it be something animate or inanimate, it is possible to find manifest both the beginnings and the ends of their constitution. For the provision of matter becomes the beginning of the structure, and a certain local sign, and the consequence of time. All these things define the beginnings and ends for the things that come to be, and one could not say…
A that these things have any communion with the pre-eternal subsistence of the Only-Begotten. So that by these things observed in this way, one must consider in one’s mind a beginning and an end in that generation.
These things being thus distinguished by us, let us again consider the argument of our opponents. "Every generation," he says, "does not extend to infinity, but rests in some end." Since, therefore, the meaning of "generation" has been understood in both senses—whether one wishes to signify by such a name the birth of bodily things or the construction of things made by art—of which neither has any communion with the incorruptible nature, the proposition has been shown to be alien to the subject. For it is not because every making and generation ends in some limit that it is absolutely necessary, just as he constructs, for those who acknowledge the generation of the Son to describe it with two limits, conceiving in their mind a beginning and an end. For only those things that are circumscribed by some quantity both begin when they are made and end in a limit. And the measure from time, extending along the quantity of that which is being generated, separates the beginning from the end by an intermediate interval. But that which is without quantity and without interval, how could one either measure or separate it? What measure could one find for that which is without quantity, or what interval for that which is without interval? Or how will anyone divide that which is indefinite by an end and a beginning? For a beginning and an end are the limits of things that have intervals. But since there is no interval, there is not even a limit; yet the divine nature is without interval, and being without interval, it has no limit. B That which is without limit is infinite, and is so called. It is vain, therefore, to circumscribe the infinite with a beginning and an end; for that which is circumscribed cannot be infinite. Whence, then, does this Platonic Phaedrus stitch together awkwardly with his own tenets the things philosophized there by Plato concerning the soul? For just as that one there called a "pause" of motion—that is, rest—so this one, too, desired to speak of a rest or end of generation, that he might buzz into the ears of those unversed and ignorant of these things with these elegant Platonic expressions. "And it is not possible," he says, "to disbelieve these things, both from nature itself and from the divine laws." But nature, from what has been said, has been shown by us to be a witness not worthy of trust for the doctrine of the divine nature. Nor if one brings forward the world itself as an example of these things of which we speak; for with its creation, as we learned in the *Cosmopoeia* from Moses, the measure of time runs concurrently, distributed by appointed days and nights for each of the things that come to be, according to a certain order and sequence. Which, in the case of the subsistence of the Only-Begotten, C not even the argument of the opponents themselves admits, confessing the Lord to be before the eternal ages.
It would remain to understand the advocacy from the divine laws of the matter proposed, by which he promises to demonstrate both an end and a beginning of the generation of the Son. He assigned a day to the end of the creation, and
A gave the seventh day, in which He rested from His works, as a reminder of creation. Would anyone be persuaded that these things were written by him, and not that those remarks were inserted by us to slander the treatise, so that he might appear ridiculous to readers, dragging in for the demonstration of the things in question matters that have no connection with them? For what was being sought was to show, as he had promised, that the Son, not being, came into existence; but that He took a beginning of generation and an end, being begotten, as if it were some labor extending the generation over time. And what is the argument for this? That the Hebrew people, by law, keep the Sabbath on the seventh day. Oh, what a harmony of the testimony with the matter proposed! Since the Sabbath is honored by the Jew with rest, it is proven, B as he says, that the Lord took a beginning of birth, and upon being born, ceased. How many other testimonies to this were passed over by this writer, which are in no way inferior to the one mentioned for the constitution of the inquiry? The circumcision occurring on the eighth day; the week of unleavened bread; the mystery celebrated on the fourteenth day of the lunar cycle; the sacrifices of purification; the observation of lepers; the ram, the bullock, the heifer, the scapegoat, the kid. But if these things are far removed from the matters proposed, let the zealots of the Jewish mysteries say how that one is within the inquiry. For we, thinking it base and unmanly to dwell on matters that provide, if there is anything similar, only a sweat for the one struggling, will pass over whatever he pursues in the following sections concerning the fact that we should not conceive of any middle ground between the Father and the Son, as if it were somehow consistent with our dogma. For it would be both inconsiderate and likewise C unjust and cruel, in what is said, not to distinguish what is innocent and blameless, and what is criminal. Since, when fighting against the Jews, he does not agree with the concessions, speaking of the 'unmediated' and not admitting the 'conjoined,' and thinking that there is nothing before the Only-Begotten, and suspecting [that there is a state of] being Son, but struggling over the fact that He, who was not, came to be. Having spent a little time on these things, because the discourse has already been sufficiently prepared in what preceded, we will adhere to the matters proposed. It is not the same thing to posit that nothing is superior to the subsistence D of the Only-Begotten, and to say that He was not before the generation, but that He was begotten then, when the Father willed. For these adverbs, 'then' and 'when,' appropriately and naturally refer to a temporal demonstration, according to the common custom of those speaking, and according to the customary meaning in Scripture: 'Then they will say among the nations,' and, 'When I sent you,' and, 'Then the kingdom of heaven will be likened.' And it is possible to take countless such things throughout all of Scripture for the confirmation of the matter proposed, that it is by such particles of speech that the custom of Scripture marks time. [Index: entries preserved]
A If, therefore, there was no time, as the adversary agrees, then the temporal significance is fundamentally taken away as well; and when this is removed, eternity necessarily occurs to the mind and understanding. For the word "when" is entirely implied by the expression "was not." For if he were to say "was not" without this particle "when," he would not grant that He is now. And if he provides "now" [only] to fight against that which is eternal, it is understood that he does not mean a general "was not," but a "was not at some time." But since this expression can in no way subsist unless it relies upon the significance of time, it would be foolish and vain to maintain that there is anything before the Son, just as it is to argue that the Son is always. For if there is no place, nor time, nor any other creature in which the Word who was in the beginning does not exist, then this notion—namely, that the Lord was not at some time—is excluded from the dogma of piety on all sides. B Therefore, he contradicts not us, but himself, he who teaches that the Only-Begotten both is not, and is. For by acknowledging that the connection of the Son with the Father is divided by nothing, he has completely attributed eternity to Him by his own testimony. But if he were to say that the Son is not in the Father, we shall not contradict such a statement ourselves, but we shall set against it Scripture, which asserts that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son, not attaching to the statement the particle "at some time," or "when," or "then," but by this affirmative and absolute voice, assigning eternity to Him. But as for what he himself asserts—that we call the Only-Begotten God "unbegotten"—it is equal to defining that we also say the Father is "begotten." For both are of the same absurdity, or rather, blasphemy. C Wherefore, if he has determined to calumniate, let him add the other crime as well, sparing nothing, so that he may be able to exasperate the listeners against us more bitterly. But if he does not accuse us of one of these because it is a manifest calumny, let him also dismiss what remains; for the impiety is equal, as has been said, to call the Son unbegotten, or also the Father begotten.
If, therefore, any such expression is found in our writings whereby the Son is named "unbegotten," we shall pass the final judgment against ourselves. But if he is fabricating false accusations and calumnies at will, composing whatever he pleases for the slander of our doctrines, perhaps for those who have understanding, even this will be proof of our piety. D Because, with truth fighting on our behalf, he has brought forward a lie for the accusation of our dogma, constructing a document of impiety foreign to our discourse. But it is possible to defend against these charges in few words. For just as we judge him accursed who maintains that the Only-Begotten God is unbegotten, so let him also be abominable who defines that He who was in the beginning was not at some time. For in the same way shall he be demonstrated, both he who proceeds according to truth, and he who brings forward charges calumniously. But if we deny the crimes, and saying "Father," we simultaneously conceive the Son in our mind by that word, and naming "Son," we say that He truly is what is spoken of—as shining forth by way of generation from the unbegotten light—how is not the calumny evident?
A Yet, because we say He is by way of generation, we do not therefore admit that He was not at some time. For who does not know that the opposition between being and not-being, according to their meaning, is immediate? So that the positing of one of the things mentioned is necessarily the removal of its opposite. And just as being is the same in every time in which one might suppose any of the things that exist to subsist—for the heaven, the stars, the sun, and the rest of existing things are no more now than they were yesterday, the day before, or in all preceding time—in the same way, the meaning of "not-being" equally contains non-existence in every time. Whether one speaks of the "before" or the "after." For something that has existed is no more "not existing" now than if it had not existed before; rather, the principle of non-being is one and the same in every interval of time for that which is not. Therefore, in the case of living things, we signify non-existence—whether referring to the dissolution of what once was into non-being, or to that which has not yet gained passage into being—by different names, saying that what is begotten has either "not yet existed from the beginning" or has "died." B Yet by either expression we represent non-existence in our discourse. For just as the day is contained by night on either side—yet the parts that contain it are not spoken of in the same way, but one is said to be "after evening" and the other "before dawn," while "night" is what is meant in both cases—in the same way, if one were to consider "not-being" in comparison with "being," one would indeed name differently that which is before constitution and that which is after the dissolution of what had been constituted. But if one grasps the meaning through both, he understands one and the same thing: both that which is before constitution and that which is after the dissolution of what had been constituted. For "not-being" is the same for that which never existed and for that which has died, except for the difference in names, if you exclude that which is in the hope of the resurrection. C Since, therefore, we have learned from Scripture that the Only-Begotten God is the author of life and life itself, and light, and truth, and whatever is honorable in name and concept, we say it is absurd and impious to contemplate alongside Him who truly is that which is understood by its opposite—either dissolution into destruction or non-existence before constitution. Instead, extending our thought on all sides toward that which precedes the ages, we nowhere define by our thoughts that which is not, judging it an equal impiety to circumscribe the divine nature by non-existence at any time whatsoever. D For it is the same to call immortal life mortal, and truth false, and light dark, and that which is "not-being." He, therefore, who does not concede that He will not be at some time, will likewise not agree that He was not at some time, according to our reasoning, avoiding the same absurdity on either side. For just as death does not interrupt the ending of the life of the Only-Begotten, so neither will non-existence, viewed from above, bring to a halt His life proceeding toward eternity; so that the truly Existing One may be pure on all sides from communion with that which does not truly exist. Therefore the Lord wishes His disciples to be far from such error, so that they, too, while searching for what is prior to the subsistence of the Only-Begotten, might not be carried off to the...
and would even at some time consent that it is not, according to our argument, which avoids the same absurdity on both sides. For just as death does not cut off the perpetuity and eternity of the Life of the Only-begotten, so neither will the non-existent stand above His life progressing into eternity. So that everywhere that which truly is may be pure from communion with that which is not truly. Therefore the Lord, wishing for His disciples to be far from this error, so that they themselves, by inquiring into what is more ancient than the subsistence of the Only-begotten, might not be transferred in their thoughts to that which does not exist, says: *I am in the Father, and the Father in Me*, A not as non-being in being, or being in non-being. And the order of this discourse explains the piety of the dogma. Since indeed the Father is not from the Son, but the Son from the Father, for this reason He says first: *I am in the Father*, pointing out that He is not from another, but from Him. Then He reverses the discourse: *And the Father in Me*, signifying that anyone who, through curiosity, goes beyond the Son, at the same time passes by the knowledge of the Father; for he who is in something cannot be found outside Him in whom he is. Wherefore it is in vain for one who, while not denying that the Father is from the Son, imagines in his mind that he has grasped something of the Father outside the Son. B And furthermore, the shadow-boxing of our adversaries concerning the word "unbegotten" wanders in vain, walking through things that cannot subsist. Indeed, if it is necessary to bring forth into the light the entire absurdity of their argument, let them grant us to tarry a little longer in this examination. For since the Only-begotten God is said by them to have been generated after the Father, of necessity the Unbegotten Himself—whatever they happen to imagine and dream this unbegotten nature to be—is found, I say, to reveal the notion of all evils along with Himself. For who does not know that just as non-being is distinguished as the opposite of being, so also to every good thing and name, that which is understood from the opposite—as evil to good, falsehood to truth, darkness to light, and all things which in a similar way are set against each other towards their contrary, in which the opposition lacks a middle, C and it is not possible for the two to be in the same subject at the same time in the same way, but the presence of the one removes the opposite, and in the withdrawal of the one, the generation of the contrary takes place—is likewise opposed?
These things having been thus agreed upon by us, it is also manifest to everyone that, just as Moses says darkness existed before the creation of light, so also in the case of the Son, if according to the reasoning of the heresy the Father made Him when He willed, before He made Him that light which is the Son did not exist; but when light did not yet exist, it is not possible for the opposite not to exist. For we have learned through other things that nothing of the things made by the Creator is in vain, but that which is lacking is added to existing things through creation. It is therefore absolutely clear that if God made the Son, He made Him D because of that which was lacking in the nature of existing things. Just as, therefore, when sensible light was lacking, there was darkness; and if the light had not been made, darkness would have entirely prevailed; so also, when the Son was not yet, the true Light Itself, and all things which the Son is, did not yet exist. For that which is, even by the testimony of the heresy, does not need to be generated. If, therefore, He made [Him], He certainly made what was not. Before therefore the Son was made, according to them, not even the truth
A had come to be, nor the intelligible light, nor the fountain of life, nor any nature at all of what is honorable and good. Yet, by the removal of each of these things, that which is understood from its opposite comes to subsist. And if light is not, it is not possible that there should not be darkness; and in the case of other things in the same way, in place of each of those things understood as better, when any of these is absent, it is not possible that the opposite should not entirely exist in the place of that which is lacking. It is therefore absolutely necessary, if the Father were going to will to make the Son according to the account of the heresy, when none of the things that the Son is existed, to say that all the opposites were with Him: instead of light, darkness; instead of truth, falsehood; instead of life, death; instead of good, evil. For he who creates, creates things that are not; for as Eunomius says, that which is, does not need to be generated. But of those things which are contemplated by way of opposition, there is no other way for the better things not to exist, than from the fact that the worse things exist. This, then, is the wisdom that the heresy presents as a gift to the Father, through which it disgraces the eternity of the Son, bringing forward a catalogue of evils to God B and Father before the manifestation of the Son.
And let no one think that by taking an argument from another creature, one can overturn the absurdity of the dogma demonstrated from this logical sequence. For perhaps someone will say that, just as when the heaven did not exist, there was nothing contrary to it, so also when the Son had not yet been generated, who is the truth, we are not absolutely compelled to acknowledge that there was an opposite. To whom it must be answered C that there is nothing opposed to heaven, unless perhaps someone were to say that its not-being is the opposite to its being. But to virtue, that which is according to vice is entirely opposed. And the Lord is virtue. Wherefore, if the heaven did not exist, nothing existed; but if good did not exist, its opposite existed. He, therefore, who claims that the good does not exist, will, even against his will, concede that the evil exists. But, he says, the Father also is entirely perfect virtue, and life, and unapproachable light, and all high thoughts and names; so that there is no necessity, when the Only-begotten light did not yet exist, for the darkness—which occurs on the opposite side—to be understood as from an opposite. But this is my statement, that there never was darkness. For the light was never not; for always in the light all things are light, just as the prophecy says. But if, according to the doctrine of the heresy, there is one light that is unbegotten, and this is from eternity, while another is that which is later generated, it is absolutely necessary for the eternal light never to find a place for an opposite to be set against it; for while the light is always shining, the operation of darkness has no time in it. But in that which came to be later, as they say, it is impossible that the light should not shine out of darkness, but it will be found that darkness uniformly and absolutely occupied the space between the eternal light and that which was made later. For there would have been no need to found this later light unless that which is created were useful for some purpose. Now the one utility of light is that the prevailing gloom be dissipated by it; but the light that is uncreated, itself is what it is by nature, through itself. But that which is created is made for some D reason—
and without a doubt exists for the sake of something else; therefore, it was necessary for the darkness to have pre-existed, for whose sake light is necessarily established and created. Nor is it right, by any discourse, to mitigate the fact that darkness preceded the appearance of generated light, since it is believed to have been constructed after it. But such a position is indeed beyond all impiety. A Therefore, it has been clearly manifested that the Father of truth did not make the truth that did not exist before; but being the fount of light, of truth, and of every good, He caused the only-begotten light of truth to shine forth from Himself, by whom the glory of His own substance is always characterized. Thus, the blasphemy of those who claim that the Son was later added to God through creation is refuted from every side.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK TEN
CHAPTERS OR SUMMARIES OF THE TENTH BOOK
1. The tenth book explains how the discovery and comprehension of existing things are impossible. In it, the nature and formation of the ant are also described in a remarkable way, along with the exposition of that evangelical saying: "I am the door, and the way," bringing forward at the same time the appellations and interpretations of the divine names, and the history of the sons of Benjamin. 2. Then, he wonderfully points out the eternal life—that is, Christ—to those who do not acknowledge Him, and he dramatically recites against them the lamentation that Jeremiah sang over King Jechoniah, because they are like Montanus and Sabellius. 3. B Afterward, he demonstrates the eternity of the birth of the Son, and the inseparability of the same substance with the Begetter; and he compares the foolishness of Eunomius to infants playing in the sand. 4. After this, he proves that He who is truly the Son, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and not mastered by the Father, nor enslaved—He who delivered us from slavery. And if this be not so, not only the Son, but also the Father, as being in the Son and with Him, would be a slave; for it is established that the appellation of "being" descends from the essence of the One who is. Having discussed all these things boldly and wonderfully, he puts an end to the book.
But let us hold to the matters proposed; for, having progressed a little, he struggles against those who admit that human nature is weak toward the full intelligence of incomprehensible things, and, boasting magnificently, he sets forth such things, and with these words disparages and obliterates our dogma: "For neither if anyone's mind is darkened by malevolence, and for this reason, he cannot see anything, neither what is before his feet, nor that which is attainable by other men…"
A nor can he reach anything that is above his head, it is therefore logical that the discovery of those things which exist cannot be attained by other men.» But we would say to him that he who asserts that the discovery of things can be comprehended has advanced his own intelligence through a certain way and series of consequences through the knowledge of things. And having been exercised through things that can be more easily perceived and are lesser, he eventually applied his own comprehensive vision or imagination to those things which surpass all cognition. Therefore, he who boasts and brags that he has attained the knowledge of things that are—let him interpret for us the nature of the smallest of those things which appear before our eyes, that through the known he might provide proof concerning the hidden. And let him interpret by words what the nature of an ant is: whether its life is sustained by breath and spirit, whether it is governed by entrails similarly to other animals, whether its body is constructed of bones, whether the cavities of its bones are filled inside with marrow, or whether its structure is held together by nerves and ligaments; whether the position of the nerves is held by coverings of muscles and of glands; whether the marrow extends from the crown to the tail through the dorsal vertebrae; whether it inserts an impelling force into the limbs that are moved by the complex of a nervous membrane; whether it has a liver and a gall bladder—that is, a receptacle for the yellow bile purged from the liver—and kidneys and heart, and arteries and veins, and membranes and precordia, or a transverse septum; whether it is smooth or covered in hairs; whether it is distinguished into male and female; in which part of the body the power of sight resides; whether it is endowed with a sense of smell; whether it has a single hoof or bases divided into many toes; how long it lives; what is the manner of its generation from itself; for how long the fetus is conceived; and how it is that not all ants are terrestrial, nor are all winged, but some are seen crawling on the ground while others are aerial. Therefore, he who boasts that he has attained the nature of things that are, let him first declare to us the nature of the ant. Then, let him analyze physically B that Power which surpasses all intellect. But if he has not yet attained in his nature the knowledge of even the smallest ant, how does he boast that he has comprehended by a comprehensive reason Him who within Himself embraces all creation? And meanwhile, he says that those who feel and confess the infirmity of human nature in themselves have the instruments of the soul’s perception covered and shrouded in darkness and gloom, such that they cannot attain anything of those things which are before their feet, nor those which are above their head.
But he who possesses the knowledge of things that are—let us see what he knows beyond others. Let us hear his tumid and inflated voice. "Or in vain," he says, "did the Lord call Himself the door, if there is no one who enters to the knowledge and contemplation of the Father? And in vain is He the way, providing no ease to those wishing to come to the Father. For how would He be the light, if He did not lighten and illuminate the eye of the mind to the knowledge both of Himself and of the supereminent light?" If, indeed, he were explaining certain reasonings brought from his own home, escaping the intelligence C of the hearers by their subtlety,
A it might perhaps happen that one would be deceived and misled by the cleverness of the argument, as the meaning often eludes the hearer. But since it is divine words that are put forward, surely no one finds fault with those who have believed that the divinely inspired teaching is set forth as common to all. Since, therefore, the Lord is called "the door," he concludes from this that the essence of God is comprehensible. But the Gospel does not admit this understanding. For let us listen to the divine voice itself: "I am," He says, "the door; if any one enter by Me, he will be saved, and will go in and go out, and will find pasture." What then is the knowledge of the essence to be derived from these things? For since there are many things said, and each has its own proper meaning, it is not possible that all should be applied to the definition of essence, lest the divine nature be thought of as something compounded of different elements. And it is not easy to find from what has been enumerated that which might more properly correspond to the proposed subject: "The Lord is the door." "By Me," He says, "if any one enters, he will be saved, and will go in and go out, and will find pasture." Shall we say that by the door He means the essence, or the salvation of those entering, or the pasture, or the going out, or the finding? For each of these is peculiar to what is signified and does not agree with the other. For to be within is perceived at first glance as the opposite of going out, and the others likewise. For in proper speech, "pasture" B is one thing, and "finding" is something else besides this. What then is considered to be the essence of the Father from these? For one who asserts that everything, even things not in agreement with each other in meaning, points to the simple and incomposite essence through these discordant and mismatching terms, would not be proving his point. But how would the Word be true, saying that "no one has ever seen God," and, "Whom no one of men has seen, nor can see," and that "No one shall live and see the face of the Lord," if either that which is within the door or that which is outside of the pasture or the finding is considered to be the essence of the Father? But because this is not the case, we shall not for that reason suspect that the name of "the door" in the Lord is idle and devoid of meaning. For He is truly both the door of refuge, and the house of shelter, as David calls it, and He admits those who enter through Himself, and He preserves in Himself those who have come inside, and again through Himself He leads them to the pasture of virtues. And He becomes all things to those who are being saved, in order that He may make Himself suitable and fitting for each one: both way, and guide, and door of refuge, and house of shelter, and water of rest, and place of green grass, which He calls "pasture" in the Gospel. C But this novice theologian says that the Lord is named "the door" for the sake of the knowledge of the essence of the Father. Why then does he not also draw the "rock," and the "stone," and the "fountain," and the "wood," and the rest of the names to the same understanding, so that he might confirm his own opinion by the multitude of strange testimonies, since he could adapt the same reasoning to each of these as he went through concerning the "way" and the "door" and the "light?" D
A I, however, having been taught this by Scripture divinely inspired, dare confidently to assert that He who is above every name becomes many-named to us, being named according to the varieties of His benefits: light, when He disperses and scatters the darkness of ignorance; life, when He bestows immortality; way, when He leads by the hand from error to truth. Thus, He is also called tower of strength, city of habitation, fountain, rock, vine, physician, resurrection, and all such things relative to us, distributing Himself in diverse ways through His benefits toward us. But those who interpret essences through these names are those who see keenly beyond human nature, perceiving that which is incomprehensible, but looking past that which can be comprehended. For Him whom no one of men has ever seen, nor can see, they assert not only that they see, but that they even measure; yet they do not look with the eye of the soul upon faith, which is the only thing commensurate and accommodated to our understanding, but they place the knowledge that proceeds from discursive reasoning before this. I have heard the history accusing the sons of Benjamin, who did not look to the law, but aimed at a hair [* Judic. xx, 16], the narrative, I think, declaring their occupation in vain and futile matters; for they were certain sharp-shooters and skillful marksmen of useless and hollow things that have no stability, but were unskilled and neglectful of those things which clearly benefit. For the history immediately adds the calamity that befell them, how, having been driven mad toward the Sodomitic lawlessness, they were utterly destroyed by the entire army of the Israelite people armed against them. And it seems to me to be a humane suggestion to advise the young archers not to wish to shoot an arrow at a hair, while failing to see the door of faith, but, having abandoned that vain labor which they spend on that which cannot be comprehended, B they should not suffer the loss of the immediate gain which is found through faith alone, which can be secured in readiness.
But considering the remaining parts of that empty writing, I am loath to carry the discourse further, a certain horror running through my heart at the things which are said. For he wishes to show that the Son is something other than eternal life; and if this is not looked upon in the Only-Begotten, faith will be shown to be vain, the preaching empty, baptism superfluous, the labors and torments of the martyrs undertaken and endured in vain, and the sweat of the apostles useless and unfruitful in the life of men. For why did they announce Christ, in whom, as Eunomius supposes, the power of eternal life is not? To what end do they call those who have believed by the name of Christ, if they are not to obtain eternal life through Him? C For the mind, he says, of those who have believed in the Lord, having raised itself above every sensible and intelligible essence, is not able to stand even at the generation of the Son; but it strives to go beyond this, yearning to encounter the first thing desired—the desire for eternal life. What is more to be lamented in these sayings? Is it that he makes the eternal life [in the Son... D
not to be, as these wretches think, or that he views the subsistence of the Only-Begotten so humbly, abjectly, and earth-bound, that, having surpassed its beginning with the agitations of his intellect, he fashions and dreams that he can lift himself up above the life of the Son by his own thinking, and, leaving the generation of the Lord somewhere below, is carried beyond it by a desire for eternal life? For this is the meaning of what has been said: that the human mind, while searching out the knowledge of things that are, and having risen above both the sensible and the intelligible creation, like the rest, leaves behind as something lower than itself the Word, who was God in the beginning; and he enters into that in which the Word of God was not, becoming, through the curiosity of the mind, one who treads upon things that are above the life of the Son, searching there for the eternal life where the Only-Begotten God is not.
For "by the desire for eternal life," he says, "the mind is carried beyond and above the Son," as if it had not found what is sought in the Son at all. If, therefore, eternal life is not in the Son, then he who said, "I am the life," is caught in a lie; or, if it is indeed life, it is not eternal. But what is not eternal is, without doubt, temporary. And this kind of life is common even to irrational animals. Where, then, is the pre-eminence of the life that is truly life, if an irrational nature also partakes of it? And how will the Word be the same as the life, if He is introduced into the same house—that is, the irrational nature—by means of a temporary life? For if, according to the great John, the Word is life, but this [life] is temporary and not eternal, as the heresy maintains—and yet this temporary life is also produced in others—what follows as a logical conclusion? Either that irrational creatures are rational, or that the Word is confessed to be irrational. B Do we still need arguments to refute their abominable and wicked blasphemy? For do not such things, when said, have the hidden design of denying the Lord? For if the Apostle clearly says, "What is not eternal is temporary," and these men see the eternal life only in the essence of the Father, while they alienate the Son from the nature of the Father and cut Him off from the eternal life: what else is this but a manifest negation and rejection of the faith in the Lord, when the Apostle clearly says that those who have hoped in Christ only in this life are the most miserable of all? If, therefore, the Lord is life, but not eternal, then the life that is active according to the present time—which the Apostle deplores as those of the faithful—is indeed temporary and ephemeral, as if they had fallen away from the true life.
But those who have been "enlightened" according to Eunomius, having gone beyond this, are carried by their reasonings to what is beyond the Son, seeking the eternal life in that which is contemplated outside the Only-Begotten. What is there to be said concerning such evils, other than that which calls forth lamentation and tears? Oh, how we should groan over this wretched and pitiable generation, [to be] D [subjected to] such evils...
The zealous Jeremiah once lamented the Israelite people, when they conspired with Jechoniah, who led them in idolatry; and, on account of their illegal rebellion against true religion, they were condemned to captivity among the Assyrians, exiled from the sanctuary and cast far from the inheritance of their fathers. It seems to me that these lamentations are more appropriately sung by us now, since the imitator of Jechoniah drags those who have been seduced into this new form of idolatry, alienating them from their paternal inheritance—by which I mean the faith. For these, the transition is, according to the history, exactly like the [exile] to Babylon, as they migrate from the Jerusalem above—that is, from the Church of God—to this confusion of wicked doctrines. For "Babylon" is interpreted as "confusion." And, like the cast-off Jechoniah, this man also, having of his own accord deprived himself of the light of truth, has become prey and spoil for the Babylonian tyrant, failing to grasp, wretch that he is, that the Gospel teaches us to perceive eternal life equally in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. B Regarding the Father, the Word says: "To know Him is eternal life"; regarding the Son, that "everyone who believes in Him has eternal life"; and regarding the Holy Spirit, that "for one who has received the grace, there shall be a fountain of water leaping up into eternal life." Therefore, everyone who desires eternal life, once he has found the Son—I say the true Son, not one falsely named—has found in Him everything he desired; for He Himself is life, and in Himself He has life. But this man, gifted with a subtle mind and a sharp heart, because of his keenness of sight, does not find eternal life in the Son; but, passing Him by and abandoning Him as if He were some sort of obstacle to what is sought, he goes searching for eternal life there, where he does not even suppose true life to exist. What could one imagine that is more horrific in its blasphemy, or more mournful as an occasion for lamentation? C And yet, for anyone to claim that the dogma of Sabellius and Montanus is being foisted upon our decrees is the same as if one were also to rub the blasphemy of Eunomius against us. For if anyone accurately examines the deception of these heresies, he will find that they possess a great affinity with the error of Eunomius; for each of them judaizes in its very dogma, admitting neither the Only-Begotten God nor the Holy Spirit to a communion of the Godhead with the One who is by them called great and first God. For He whom Sabellius terms "trinominous" (having three names), this same one Eunomius calls "unbegotten." But neither of these observes the Godhead in the Trinity of persons. Who, therefore, holds an affinity with Sabellius let the judgment of those who read this discourse determine. But of these matters, let this suffice.
Since, however, he is long-winded in what follows, D stirring up the foul stench of abominable arguments by which he contends that the Only-Begotten was never God, I say it is well to proceed, now that we have sufficiently [dealt with] these matters from what has gone before...
things, so as not to taint our discourse any longer with similar evils, except for this one final point which, being selected from many, perhaps it will not be untimely to add. He says that the unbegottenness is joined to the essence of the Father on equal terms. Through similar things the argument proceeds, just as he concluded regarding the Son, for by the construction of the opposites the dogma of piety is fortified: namely, that we are not to think that unbegottenness and generation are the same as the essence, but rather that these are contemplated as accessories to the subject, while the subject itself is something else beyond these in its own definition; and since no difference is found in this, because the difference according to the begotten and the unbegotten is separate from the essence, it remains by necessity that the essence must be joined as identical and in no way different in both.
Let us also examine this in addition to what has been said: How does he claim that the generation is separated from the Father—does he understand it as essence or as operation? But if he thinks it is an operation, it is altogether joined equally with the thing operated and the one operating; just as in every construction of work, it is possible to see the operation B similarly in the thing being made and in the one performing the operation, neither separated from the artificer nor appearing in the structure of the works. But if he should call it an essence separated from the essence of the Father, and confesses that the Lord is from this, it is manifest that he is looking at this as a substitute for the Father in the Only-Begotten, so that two Fathers are conceived in the Son: the one only in name, whom he also calls unbegotten, having no communion with the generation; and the other, acting as the Father’s attributes in the Only-Begotten, which he names generation. And this is proven more by Eunomius’s own words than by our own.
For he says in the following: “But God, who is without generation, is also before that which is begotten”; and a little later: “For to whom being is from the fact of being begotten, this one did not exist before he was begotten.” Therefore, if the generation is separated from the Father, but for the Son existence is from having been begotten, then the Father is idle regarding the subsistence of the Only-Begotten, C acting in nothing, since he is separated from the generation from which the Son has his existence. If, therefore, the Father is alienated from the generation of the Son, then these wise men, through the things that have been said, either fabricate some other father of the Son through the name of generation, or they demonstrate that the Son is someone self-begotten and self-originated. You see the captured state of the mind of the one who brings against us the accusation of ignorance, up and down, throughout his own words; how his blasphemy wanders through many paths, or rather, through pathless and devious places, advancing toward its goal with no firm and certain step. Just as it is possible to see in children, when, playing from their age, they imitate the construction of buildings in some sand—for whom the imitation is not technically assimilated to the archetype according to a goal, but rather, out of silliness, they have first built something by chance, and then deliberate on what they ought to name the structure—I see this same cleverness in this writer. D For just as some heap of sand, according to what comes to his mind, the things of the impiery...
impiety A he piles up, afterwards he does not note his own insane blasphemy, sprouting forth without any logical consistency, by chance and accident, through what has been said by him. For I do not think that the subsistence of generation was devised by him with any specific purpose, as taking the place of the Father for the essence of the Son. Nor was the scope of the orator, I think, to demonstrate that the Father is foreign to the generation of the Son, nor was this self-generated monstrosity brought in through any prior deliberation. But all such things were vomited forth by this writer without sense, so that in these matters he is not worthy of any long accusation who errs in his teachings, and does not know, as the Apostle says, B neither what he says nor about what he asserts.
For he says, "He to whom it happens to have being from the fact that he is begotten, this one did not exist before his generation." If he says this thinking of generation in place of the Father, I also agree, and there is no one to gainsay it; for it is permitted to signify the same thing through either expression, both by saying that "Abraham begat Isaac," and, in place of "begat," that he became the father of Isaac. Since, therefore, it is the same thing to have begotten and to be a father, if anyone should transpose the words into another form, paternity will be shown to be the same as generation. If, therefore, Eunomius speaks in this way, that "he for whom being is from the Father, this one did not exist before the Father," the discourse is sound, and we cast our white stone C in favor of what has been said. But if he recurs to that generation in his discourse, and contends that it is separated from the Father and joined with the Son, I think it is vain and empty to linger longer in the speculation of things empty and futile and straying from reason. For whether he thinks of generation as a thing beheld in its own subsistence, or whether he is dragged by this name toward something that does not subsist in our conceptions, we have not yet been able to see from what has been said: for the discourse is driven toward either of these opinions, not well compacted nor rooted in firm foundations, inclining toward that which might please the mind of the one understanding it.
But the bitter parts of the blasphemy have not yet been examined, which he adds in his subsequent writings; but let us now examine his words D word by word. I do not know indeed how it is permitted to dare to bring forth through the mouth the horrific and impious writing of this heretical Christ-fighter. For I fear lest, after the manner of deadly poisons, it might deposit in the mouth, through which the word passes, the remnants of a death-dealing bitterness. "It behooves," says the Apostle, "him who comes to God to believe that He is" (Heb. xi, 6). Therefore, the proper mark of divinity is to truly be. But this man argues that He who truly is, either does not exist properly, or does not exist at all; which is the same as if one should say that He does not exist at all and entirely; for he who does not exist properly does not exist at all. Just as a man is said to run in the fantasy of a dream, who imagines that he is running in the zeal of a race. But because he falsely feigns the phantom of a true course, for this reason the
A fantasy is not a course. But even if it is said so by abuse of language, it is named by a false appellation. Therefore, he who dares to say that the only-begotten God either does not exist, or does not exist properly, clearly annuls the faith of the dogma concerning Him. For who would any longer believe in one who does not exist? Or who would give assent to him whose existence has been demonstrated by the enemies of the true Lord to be improper and unsubstantial?
And so that it may not appear to any that this account is brought forward by us by way of some calumny against our adversaries, I shall set forth the utterance of the impious as it stands: "He who is not," he says, "nor is He properly, who is in the bosoms of Him who is, and is in the beginning, and is with God," although Basil, having neglected this definition and addition, perverts the appellation of being beyond the truth. What are you saying? He who is in the Father does not exist, and he who is in the beginning and in the Father’s bosoms does not exist, because he is in the beginning, and is in the Father, and is seen in the bosoms of Him who is; and for this reason he does not exist properly, because he is in Him who is? B O vain, futile, and absurd dogmas! Never before have we heard this emptiness of words or this vain chatter: that the Lord, through whom are all things, is not properly. And this is not yet the grave part, but that which is far more absurd than this, to say not only that He does not exist, or does not exist properly, but that He is also seen in a composite and varied nature: for He is not, he says, nor is He a simple being. For to that to which simplicity does not belong, that which is variegated, of course, is attributed, and that which is composite. How therefore is the same being both not existing at all and composite according to its essence? For it is necessary to hold to one of these two: either, by attributing non-existence to Him at all, to avoid calling Him composite, or, by calling Him composite, not to exclude Him from that which is. But as if the blasphemy were to be brought forth by them in manifold and varied ways, he hallucinates with all manner of impious notions; for by the comparison made to the "Being," he says the Lord is not, and by the relation to that which is simple, he deprives and strips Him of simplicity. He is not, he says, nor is He simply, nor properly, a being. Who among those who have transgressed the word and abjured the faith has been so C generous and liberal in pouring forth the expressions by which the Lord is denied? With ambitious contention he sets himself in opposition against this divine proclamation of John. For as often as that holy man attributed the "was" to the Word, so often did this man obstinately struggle to oppose the "was not" to Him who is. And he fights against the holy mouth of our Father, bringing forward these charges against him: that Basil, forsooth, neglects these definitions, saying that He is who is in the Father, and in the beginning, and in the bosoms, as if such an addition, "in the beginning" and "in the bosom," were to annul the existence of Him who is. O empty teachings! What sort of things do the teachers of deceit instruct! What sort of dogmas do they become the introducers of to those who listen! They teach that that which is in something does not exist. Therefore, since your heart and your brain are within you, O Eunomius, according to your definition, neither of these two
A is truly itself. But indeed, the heart and heart —which are within yourself—are entirely excluded from existence. However, the ignorance and blasphemy in what he has said are so great and of such a kind that they are manifest even before our arguments to those who have intelligence. But that his mind, along with his impiety, may be even more exposed, we shall add this to what has been said: If it is permitted to say that only that exists properly to which the discourse of Scripture attributes an absolute and free existence, why then, like water-carriers who have the power to drink but are destroyed by thirst, does he—having at hand an immediate remedy against the blasphemy directed at the Son—shut his eyes and pass by, as if fearing to be saved? Moreover, he finds fault with Basil, alleging that he passed over the distinctions in silence and only explained "The Word was in the Unigenite" as being in Himself. And yet, it was possible for him to see what Basil saw, and what everyone who has eyes sees. B It seems to me that the exalted John, moved by divine inspiration and impulse in order to block the mouths of those who oppose Christ and who attempt to render Christ's true and proper existence void on account of these additions, spoke simply, absolutely, and indefinitely: "The Word was God," and was "life," and was "light"—and not only "in the beginning," "with God," and "in the bosom of the Father," in such a way that by such a relation the Lord's proper existence would be taken away, but by saying that He "was God," with this free and absolute expression, he cuts off all the circumlocution of those whose thoughts run toward impiety. Furthermore, what confutes the malice of the adversaries even more is this: if they make being in something a sign of not being [properly], they surely cannot maintain that the Father is truly [properly], having learned in the Gospel that, just as the Son remains in the Father, so too the Father remains in the Son, according to the Lord's own voice. For it is equivalent to say that the Son is in the bosom of the Father as it is to say that the Father is in the Son. By the way, let us also examine this: When the Son was not, as they say, what did the Father's bosom contain? C For they will surely grant that it was either full or suppose it to be empty. If, therefore, the bosom was full, the Son was surely the fullness of the bosom. But if they contemplate some emptiness in the Father's bosom, they assign to Him nothing other than perfection by way of increase, because He moves from an empty and deficient state to a full and perfect one. "But they have not known nor understood," says David concerning those who walk in darkness; for he who has brought war upon the true light cannot have his soul in the light. Therefore, the statement follows as a consequence that they did not understand this impiety, and, as if struck with blindness like the Sodomites, they did not perceive it. D Furthermore, he also claims that the Son's essence is ruled by the Father, or is subject to the Father's dominion, saying thus, word for word: "For he who is and lives through the Father does not claim this dignity for himself as his own, since the essence that holds dominion over him also draws the conception of the 'existent' to itself." For if...
these things appear to any of the wise men of the world, let him not be disturbed by the Gospels, nor by the rest of the teaching of the divinely inspired Scripture. For what communion has the Christian word with that wisdom which has been turned into foolishness? But if he relies on the writings, let him show such a pronouncement from the holy Scriptures, and we shall be silent. I hear Paul crying out that "there is one Lord, Jesus Christ." A But Eunomius cries out against Paul, calling Christ a slave. For we acknowledge no other mark of slavery than to be subject and to suffer dominion; he who is such is certainly a slave. But a slave cannot be Lord by nature, even if he is called so by catachresis. And what need is there for me to bring in the Lord's lordship as testimony to the words of Paul? For the Lord of Paul himself says to the disciples that he is truly Lord, accepting the confession of those who named him B master and Lord; for he says, "You call me Lord and Master, and you speak well; for I am." And he also legislated for the Father to be called the same by them, saying, "Do not call anyone master on earth; for one is your master, the Father who is in heaven." To whom, therefore, are we to attend, caught in the midst of these? On one side the Lord himself, and one who has Christ speaking within himself, commands that he ought not to be thought of as a slave, but that he should be honored just as the Father is honored. From the other side, Eunomius imposes the charge of slavery upon the Lord, saying that he who has taken hold of the power of all things is subjected to dominion. Is the choice of what must be done ambiguous to us then? Or is the distinction of what is more beneficial slight? Shall I despise the counsel of Paul, O Eunomius? C Shall I not consider the voice of the truth more credible than your error? "If I had not come and spoken to them," he says, "they would not have sin." Since, therefore, he himself spoke to them, truly saying that he himself is Lord, not being named falsely—"For I am," he says, "I am not named"—what is it necessary to do, for whom, from that which he had foreknown, punishment is inevitable?
But perhaps the refractory man will again oppose our usual wisdom with these things, and will say that the same one is both serving and Lord; being ruled by him who has power, but ruling over the rest. These wise things are said to be circulated at the crossroads by lovers of error, who confirm their vain opinions about the Divine through human circumstances. D For since the chances that occur in this life furnish us with examples of such things, such as can be seen in a somewhat wealthy household, where one of the fellow-slaves, more prompt to act and more well-disposed to the task, is set over the commands of the master, having obtained a superiority over his peers, they transfer this conception to the divine dogmas; so that nothing stands in the way of the only-begotten God being subjected to the power of the superior one, provided he obtains the prefecture of the inferiors by the authority of the one who rules. But
A let us dismiss such wisdom and consider the argument concerning this matter according to the measure of our own understanding. Do they confess the Father to be Lord by nature, or to have attained to this by some appointment? But I do not think that anyone who has even the slightest share of intelligence has reached such a pitch of madness as not to attest that the lordship over all things belongs to God by nature. For that which is simple of nature, without parts, and uncompounded—whatever it should happen to be—is entirely and wholly this very thing, not having been made by the change of some other thing, but remaining forever in that in which it is. What, then, have they supposed concerning the Only-Begotten? Do they confess his essence to be simple, or do they conceive of some composition in it? If, therefore, they think him to be something varied and manifold and consisting of many parts, they will by no means grant even the name of Godhead to him, transferring their doctrine concerning Christ to certain material and bodily surmises B. But if they agree that he is simple, how is it possible to perceive the concurrence of opposites in the simplicity of the subject? For just as the opposition of life and death to their opposite is immediate, so lordship has no fellowship with servitude, and is alienated from things contrary to its own properties. For if anyone were to consider both of these in themselves, he would not adapt an equal definition to both. Now, those whose definition is not the same, their nature also differs entirely. If, therefore, the Lord is simple according to nature, how could there be a duality of opposites in the subject, with servitude being mixed together with lordship? But if he is acknowledged as Lord according to the teaching of the saints, the simplicity of the subject testifies that he is devoid of the opposite. But if they declare him to be a servant, they attribute to him in vain the name of lordship C. For that which is simple by nature is not split into contrary properties. But if they say that he is both, in such a way that he is one thing and is called another—that he is a servant by nature but Lord by name—let them demonstrate such a claim with boldness, and they will permit us to rest from our long labors of refutation. For who is so at leisure in these vanities as to refute plain, clear, and indubitable things by arguments? For if someone were to confess the crime of his own murder, no labor is left for the accusers to bring the slaughter to proof through certain demonstrations and to convince that it was committed. Thus, we shall no longer reproach our adversaries with arguments sought out through careful reasoning, since they have proceeded to such a point of impiety. For he who asserts that D the Only-Begotten God is a servant by nature establishes him as his own fellow-servant by what he says; and from this a twofold absurdity will necessarily be brought in: for either he will scorn his fellow-servant and deny the faith, having shaken off the yoke of Christ's lordship, or he will worship a servant, and, having turned away from the nature that is its own master and free, he will in a certain way worship himself instead of God. For if he sees himself in servitude, and in servitude also sees that which is worshiped, he plainly looks at himself, seeing another self in that which is adored. Indeed, all other things which necessarily are contemplated along with this error of doctrine, what speech could recount? For who...
are looked at from the perversity of these people, who can recount them? For who is ignorant that he who is a slave by nature and occupied by the necessity of a master cannot be free from the perturbation of fear? For fear is in a certain way conjoined and yoked to the nature of servitude. The divine Apostle is witness to this when he said: "You have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear" (Rom. viii, 15). So that, according to the likeness of men, they have proclaimed concerning the fellow-servant God the affection of fear.
B But enough of the god of their heresy. As for us, we who according to the Apostle have been called unto liberty by Christ, who has delivered us from servitude (Gal. v, 13), I shall briefly set forth the things which we have been taught by the Scriptures to consider and believe. For I, moved by divine instruction, confidently declare that the divine Word does not even wish us to be servants, since our nature has been restored for the better. And He who took upon Himself all our plight, in order that He might give us back His own—just as He took our diseases, and death, and the curse, and sin—so also did He take our servitude: not that He might possess what He took, but that He might purify nature from such things, with those things that are ours C being blotted out and extinguished in that incorruptible nature. As, therefore, in the life that is hoped for there will be no disease, no curse, no sin, no death, so also towards abolition will servitude depart along with these. And that I say these things truly, I call to witness the Truth Itself, which says to the disciples: "I will no longer call you servants, but friends" (Joan. xv, 15). If, therefore, that which concerns us will at some time be free from the reproach of servitude, how is the Lord of the universe reduced to servitude by the perversity and madness of these crazed subjects? For they, in accordance with their sequence of reasoning, determine that He does not even know the things of the Father, because of the pronouncement concerning servants, which says that the servant does not know what his master is doing. But when they say these things, let them hear that the Son has all things of the Father in Himself, and observes all things that the Father does, and nothing of the Father's goods is outside the knowledge of the Only-Begotten. For how could He not have something of the Father, D who has the whole Father in Himself? Therefore, if a servant does not know what his master is doing, but He has all things of the Father in Himself, let those who are distraught by drunkenness finally become sober, and let them turn their eyes, at least now, to the truth. For he who has all things in his own character, and who is King of the universe, does not have a form in Himself that is not equal in honor to Himself. Or how can ignominy shine forth from true glory? For servitude is ignominy. But how is the Son of the King born into servitude? These things are not, these things are not; but as light from light, and life from life, truth from truth, so also from Lord is Lord, King from King, from God is God, from the Free One is the Free One; for having the whole Father in Himself, if the Father has anything in Himself, He by all means has it. And since all things that the Son has are the Father’s, it is necessary by all means that by the enemies of the glory of God, if the Son is a slave, and...
even the Father should be dragged down into slavery. For there is nothing of those things which are seen in the Son that is not entirely of the Father. For all things, he says, are mine, and yours are mine. What then will the wretches say? What then is more reasonable, for the Son to be glorified by the royal power of the Father, He who said, “Yours are mine; and I have been glorified in them,” or for the Father to be insulted by the ignominy of the Son’s slavery? For it is not possible that He who contains in Himself all things that are the Son's, and who is Himself in the Son, should not also be, by all means, in the slavery of the Son, and have the slavery in Himself. Such are the brilliant proofs of Eunomius's wisdom, through which, while he insultingly deforms the Lord with slavery, he brands that same ignominy upon the incorruptible glory of the Father.
But let us return again to the sequence of the things written. What does Eunomius say concerning the Only-Begotten? That he does not claim this dignity for himself; for he calls "dignity" the designation of "the Existent." O admirable philosophy! Who ever, since the memory of man, whether among the Greeks or in barbarian philosophy; who among us, who in all the ages of men, applied the name of dignity to the Existent? For whatever is considered as existing in the nature of things, the common habit of speech calls "being." From the verb "to be," the denomination of "the Existent" is formed. But now, by a new kind of expression, instead of the meaning of "the Existent," the term "dignity" is used; for he says that the Son does not claim for himself the dignity, he who is and lives through the Father; who neither has Scripture for the support and defense of his discourse, nor has he brought forth his speech through any sequence to this madness, but as if inserting some flatulent food into his own bowels, undigested and not concluded by reason, like some foul-smelling wind, he belches out his blasphemy. B "He does not," he says, "claim this dignity for himself." Let it be granted to him that "the Existent" is named a dignity. What then? Does he who is, not make "being" his own property? Because, he says, he is through the Father. Therefore, do you say that he who does not claim "being" as his own does not exist? For not to claim as one's own means the same as to be estranged, and the differentiation of the understood meanings is clear. For that which is proper is not alien, and that which is alien is not proper. He, therefore, who does not claim "being" as his own is entirely estranged from "being." But he who is alien to "being" does not have his existence in "being." But he added the necessity of this absurdity then and there, when he said: "When the essence that dominates this has drawn to itself the notion of the Existent." The disjointedness of this part regarding the synthesis may be passed over in silence; but let that which is being urged in the statements be examined. By what demonstrated reasoning does the essence of the Father dominate the Only-Begotten? C Again, out of his excessive repletion, he belches out for our benefit: What evangelist is the author of this discourse? What dialectical incursion? What propositions, what constructions have proved that the Only-Begotten God is dominated through some sequence of reasoning? But, he says, "The Lordship of the Son draws to itself..." D
the notion of the Existent." And how was the term "drawing" cast upon the aforementioned things? One who has considered the power of words will certainly judge; but we shall pass over this in silence. Let us return, however, to the previous argument: that he does not grant being in essence to anyone to whom he does not leave the name of "the Existent," and why he shadowfights in vain, struggling over what does not exist, as if it were such a thing as existent? For what does not exist is neither entirely like anything nor unlike. But while conceding "to be," he forbids it from being spoken of. O empty precision! To be meticulous about the sound of a word while conceding the greater thing. And how does he who is lord, as he says, of the Son, draw to himself the notion of the Existent? For if he says that the Father draws his own essence, this drawing is superfluous. For being is present to him even if it is not drawn. But if he says that the being of the Son is drawn from the Father, how will the being be torn away from the Existent and shift over to the one who draws it? I have no way of seeing. Does he perhaps dream of the error of Sabellius? As if the Son were not existing in himself, but merged with the hypostasis of the Father. And this is what he wants, for the notion of the Existent to be drawn [away] by the essence of the Son that is lorded over, or, not denying that the Son exists according to hypostasis, he claims that the significance of the Existent is separated from the Son. And how can the Existent be detached from the concept of being? For as long as everything that exists exists, it does not have the nature not to be what it is A.
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK ELEVEN
CHAPTERS OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK
1. The eleventh book shows that the appellation of the Good is not owed to the Father alone, as Eunomius, the imitator of Manichaeus and Bardesanes, says, but that the title of the Good is also owed to the Son, who through philanthropy and goodness fashioned man, and through his cross and death refashioned him.
2. And that there are not two gods, one of the good and one of the evil, as Marcion, his like-minded peer, thinks, he proves most wisely from the evangelical utterance that says, "Good Teacher," and from the parable of the vineyard, and from Isaiah and Paul; and that the Son does not reject the appellation of the Existent or of the Good, nor is he alien to the Father, but rather he claims that authority over created things belongs to him.
3. Then he sets forth the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherent and ridiculous nature of his arguments, in that he calls the Son an angel of the Existent, and lower than the divine nature, by as much as the Son himself excels his own creatures. Towards the... B
A end, the opposition is noble and vehement, and the refutation more indignant, and that he who addressed Moses is indeed the Existent One, the Only-begotten Son, who said to Moses when he asked, "If you do not go with us yourself, do not lead me away from here," saying, "I will also perform this word of yours": who is also called an Angel by Moses and by Isaiah, in whom it was proclaimed that "A Child has been born to us."
4. After this, fearing the prolixity of the refutation, he passed over many arguments of his adversary, as having already been overturned. The remaining ones, for the sake of those who thought them to be most powerful, he cut short and refuted the blasphemy of Eunomius, who says that just as in every genus of things there are animals and plants, which were not before their own generation; so also is the Lord Christ, and he does not differ from the generation of frogs—oh, the blasphemy! B
5. Again, Eunomius calls Him Lord and God, the creator of every intelligible and sensible creature, having received from the Father the power of creation and the commission and care, just like a hired craftsman who is entrusted with the work by the one who hires him; who has received a borrowed capacity for working, one coming from the outside, from the power appointed to him according to the revolutions and positions of the stars, fate distributing to each of those born C its apportioned lot. Having passed over many things, he refutes the blasphemy from the very things which Eunomius himself wrote; for he says that the creator of all things was generated similar to the earth and the angels; and that the hypostasis of the Only-begotten in no way differs from the generation of all other things; fearing neither the divine mystery nor tradition, nor following the footsteps of any teacher of piety, except those of the Manichaeans, Coluthus, Arius, Aetius, and those of their school; by whom all things that belong to Christians are reckoned as a delirium, and all the customs of the Church D and her venerable mysteries as trifles. Nor does Eunomius differ from the pagans, who from our doctrine fashioned for themselves a certain great God, superior to the rest. Thus, then, this new idolater similarly preaches, and that baptism should take place in the name of the Creator or Maker; not fearing the curse that awaits those who either add to or subtract from the holy Scriptures; and having pronounced this man an Antichrist, he puts an end to the book.
Enimvero ad ea quae deinceps sequuntur, pergamus. Cum ipse Unigenitus, inquit, reddat Patri quae soli pro dignitate debetur cognominationem. Qui enim boni appellationem illi soli convenire docuit, qui et suae et omnis bonitatis est auctor, etiam quodcunque bonum et quod est, et quod sit, in illum refert: vix enim eorum quae fiunt, potestatem et entis nomen sibi vindicavit. Quod usque igitur quibusdam velamentis suboccultans blasphemiam ratiocinationum ambagibus et circuitibus sensim et latenter in errorem et fraudem incautos pellexit, mentem oportere adhibere putavi his quae clam dolose et maligne ageret; et quoad fieri potest, oratione interitum et perniciem nudare ac detegere. Quoniam autem omni fallaci larva mendacio denudato, claram in dictione blasphemiam exponit; supervacaneum arbitror adversus eos qui impietatem non negant, per ratiocinationes factas B contentiosa decertare.
But let us proceed to the next part of the discourse. The Only-begotten Himself, he says, renders to the Father the appellation which is owed to Him alone in accordance with His dignity. For He who taught that the title of "Good" belongs only to Him who is the Author of His own and of every goodness, refers to Him everything that is good, both that which is and that which comes to be. For with difficulty would he have claimed for himself the power and the title of "the Existent" among the things that come to be at that time. As long, therefore, as he was hiding his blasphemy under certain veils by means of complicated and circuitous lines of reasoning, and was gradually and secretly leading the unwary into error and deception, I thought it necessary to apply the mind to those things which he was doing secretly, deceitfully, and maliciously, and, as far as possible, by my speech to uncover and reveal the destruction and ruin. But since, every deceptive mask of falsehood having been stripped away, he exposes his blasphemy in plain language, I consider it superfluous to contend through fabricated arguments against those who do not deny their impiety.
A XI. What more could be found on our part for the demonstration of their malice, than that which is readily shown by them in their own writings? He says that only the Father is worthy of the appellation "Good," and that such a title is owed to Him alone, as if the Son also agreed that goodness belongs to Him alone. The accuser has pleaded our case; for perhaps I was thought by readers to be a certain caviler and slanderer in the things I wrote previously, wherein I demonstrated that the opponents of Christ were preparing to represent the Lord as alien and remote from the Father's goodness. But now, I think, it has been demonstrated through the confession of our adversaries that we do not bring such a charge B against our enemies maliciously and calumniously. For he who asserts that the appellation of "Good" is owed by right to the Father alone, and who said that such an expression belongs to Him alone, now makes public with open and revealed speech the wickedness that was concealed in previous statements. He says that the denomination of "Good" belongs to the Father alone. Does he mean this with the signification inherent in the word, or indeed detached from its proper meaning? If, therefore, he attributes the name of "Good" to the Father alone by way of excellence, he would be wretched on account of his folly, offering the Father a hollow clamor of words. But if he thinks the notion signified by "Good" belongs to God and the Father alone, he would be execrable and abominable on account of his impiety, as one who renews the malady of the Manichaeans in his own tenets: for as health and disease, so goodness and C wickedness subsist by the mutual exclusion of one another; so that the absence of the one becomes the existence of the other. If, therefore, he says that goodness belongs to the Father alone, he excludes from it everything that is understood to exist besides the Father, so that the only-begotten God is also excluded from the Good by all things. For just as he who says that man alone is capable of laughter has simultaneously indicated that none of the other animals shares in this property; so he who has proclaimed that the Good is in the Father alone separates all things from the property of the Good. If, therefore, the Father alone has the appellation of "Good" due to Him by right, as Eunomius says, such an expression will be properly applied to none of the others. But every choice that is carried along by a voluntary impulse D either acts entirely according to the good, or is carried toward the opposite. For to incline toward neither is peculiar to things that lack a soul, or to those that are deprived of sense. If, therefore, the Father alone is good, possessing goodness not as something acquired but as inherent in his nature, and the Son does not share in this nature with the Father, as the heresy wills, then he who is without part in the good essence is also entirely alienated from the appellation of "Good." But he who participates in neither the nature of the Good nor in the appellation of it—it is not at all ignored who he is, even if I should spare the blasphemous name. For it is manifest to everyone that Eunomius struggles to subjoin the evil and the opposite into the notion of the Son. For by what name he is properly to be called who is not good is clear to anyone who participates in reasoning. Just as he who is not brave is a coward, and he who is not just is unjust, and he who is not wise is foolish; so also he...
who is not good, it is manifest that he possesses the name corresponding to the opposite. To this A point the opponent of Christ violently struggles to push the concept of the Only-Begotten, having become another Manes or Bardesanes to the Church. These are the things in which we say that no speech of ours is more effective than silence. One could speak infinite things and urge all lines of reasoning, and yet not express such an accusation as that which is freely proclaimed by these men themselves. For what could one find more bitter toward wickedness than to deny that He who exists in the form of God, and who did not B consider equality with God a prize to be grasped, but descended to the humility of human nature, and did this solely out of His benevolence toward the human race, is good? For whose sake, tell me, do you render these things to the Lord? For I shall use the voice of Moses to the Israelites. Is He not good who, when you were inanimate dust, adorned you with divine beauty and raised you up as a living image of His own power? Is He not good who for your sake took the form of a servant, and in exchange for the joy set before Him, wiped away the afflictions and torments of your sin, and gave Himself as a ransom for your death, and for us became a curse and sin? C Nor would Marcion, the leader of your doctrines, correct you in this part; to whom the duality of gods is common with your opinion, as is the belief that each differs from the other in nature. But it is more humane that he attributes the goodness of the Gospel to God, while you separate the Only-Begotten God from the nature of the Good, so that you even surpass Marcion himself in the wickedness of your dogma. But they defend their writings, and deny that they suffer rightly when they are accused regarding the words of Scripture. For they assert that the Lord Himself said: "No one is good but one, D God." Therefore, so that calumny may not have power against divine words, let us briefly examine the Gospel account itself. History knows this rich young man to whom the Lord spoke this voice. I suppose this to have been someone who enjoyed these worldly comforts in a pleasant way, and who loved his own wealth; for Scripture testifies that he grieved at the counsel to relinquish the riches which he possessed, and was unwilling to exchange his wealth for eternal life. Since he had heard that a teacher of eternal life had arrived, in the hope of enjoying delights forever, if life were extended for him into infinity, he approached the Lord, craftily addressing Him with the title of "good"—or rather, not the Lord whom he understood to be such, but the One he saw in the form of a servant. For he was not such a one as to be able to rend the covering of the flesh and look into the interior of the divinity. Therefore, the Lord, who looks upon hearts, knew to what the young man was looking when he prayed; that he did not have his mind's eye intent upon the divinity, but was beseeching a man, whom he called a "good master" through
A his hope of learning such a doctrine, by which he expected that death might be prevented and warded off. Rightly, therefore, he who was called by him also answers; for since the conversation was not directed toward God the Word, consequently the response was made from his humanity to the one beseeching him, introducing a double instruction to the young man. For by the same discourse he teaches that it befits one not to honor and worship God with fine words, but with a right life—in fulfilling his commandments and in selling all one's possessions, so that one might thereby purchase eternal life—and also that human nature, having been established in evil because of sin, is separated from the proper title of "good." B And for this reason he says: "Why do you call me good?" By saying "me," he pointed out to the discourse the human nature that encompassed him; but when he attributed goodness to the divinity with his word, he at once proclaimed himself to be the Good, who is truly preached by the Gospel as God. For if the Only-begotten Son were severed from the title of God as if by a cord, it would perhaps not be absurd to think him a stranger to the title of "good."
But if the prophets, and evangelists, and apostles celebrate the divinity of the Only-begotten, and the Lord himself testifies that the name of goodness belongs to God, how is he who is a sharer and partaker of the divinity not a sharer of the goodness? For that even the prophets acknowledge the Lord as God, and the evangelists, and the disciples, and the apostles, no one is so uninstructed and ignorant of C divine matters, and so uninitiated, as to need to be taught about these things in a discourse. For who is unaware, in the forty-fourth Psalm, that the Prophet proclaims Christ as God anointed by God? And again, as regards Isaiah, who cries out so openly and clearly the divinity of the Son, who among those conversant with prophecy does not know it? Among other things, he also declares this: "Sabaem, men of stature, shall pass over to you, and they shall be your servants; and they shall walk behind you, they shall go in chains, and they shall worship you and pray to you, because God is in you, and there is no God except you. For you are God." For who else is God, who has God in himself, and is himself God, besides the Only-begotten? Let those who are deaf to prophecy speak. But I shall keep silent regarding the interpretation of Emmanuel, and the confession of Thomas after his D recognition, and the sublime voice of John, as being plain even to those who are outside the faith. Nor do I think it necessary to set forth the words of Paul with exact precision, as they are almost in everyone's mouth; for he calls the Lord not only God, but also "great God," and "God over all." To the Romans he says: "Whose are the fathers, and from whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all, God blessed forever." And to his own disciple Titus he writes: "According to the appearance of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ." And to Timothy he cries out expressly: "That God was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit." Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated from every side that the Only-begotten is God, how is it that [the one who is] to God...
A attributing goodness, demonstrates that the deity is alien to the Son? Especially when the Lord Himself attributes goodness to Himself in the parable of those who were hired into the vineyard. For when those who were hired first were exhausted by labor, and were indignant at the equality of the wages, and judged the prosperity of those who came last to be their own loss, the just judge said to one of those who were complaining: "Friend, I do thee no wrong; didst thou not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is thine; I wish to give to this last even as I do to thee. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with what is mine? Is thine eye evil because I am good?" Certainly no one will contentiously argue about this, that distribution according to merit and dignity is the proper function of a judge; and all the disciples of the Gospel agree that the Only-begotten God is the Judge. "For the Father," He says, "judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son."
But they do not resist the Scriptures; for they say that the addition of the word "one" specifically relates to the Father. For "None," He says, "is good save one, even God." Will the truth, therefore, languish in the defense of itself? Or is it possible in many places, with very little effort, to refute this deceitful and captious reasoning of error? For He who said these things regarding the Father, also says those things to the Father: "All mine are thine, and I am glorified in them." If, however, He says that all things which belong to the Father are the Son's, and goodness is one of the things considered in the Father, either He does not have all things—if He does not have this—and they will say that the Truth lies; or—if it is impious to suspect that the Truth itself B is carried into a lie—he who says that all things of the Father are his own, has confessed also that he is not outside of goodness. For He who has the Father in Himself, and has embraced all things that are the Father’s, clearly has all things, and together with all things, goodness; therefore, the Son is good.
"But," he says, "none is good save one, even God." This is brought forward by the adversaries, and I do not reject the statement myself, yet I do not for that reason deny the goodness of the Son. For he who confesses the Lord to be God, also attributes that which is good C to Him through this very confession. For if goodness is proper to God, and the Lord is God, then the Son is shown to be good through the things that have been set forth. "But," he says, "the expression of the 'one' separates the Son from the communion of the good." But it is easy to show that this "one" does not divide the Father from the Son. For in all other things, "one" carries the significance of being uncombined; but in the case of the Father and the Son, "one" is not seen in solitude or singularity. "For I," he says, "and the Father are one." If, therefore, there is one who is good, and a certain unity is understood in the Son and the Father; therefore the Lord, having attributed goodness to the one, has also attributed this appellation to Himself by means of the "one," inasmuch as He is one with the Father, and not severed D from the unity of the Father according to nature.
A But so that the lack of learning and the ignorance of this distinguished writer may be made manifest through all things, let us examine the syntax of what has been written. "The Son," he says, "does not claim for Himself the dignity of the 'Being,' by dignity naming the very act of existing." How well he knows how to apply words properly to things! And because He is through the Father, he says that He is alienated from Himself, since, forsooth, the dominant essence of the Father draws the concept of "Being" to itself. B This is just as if one were to say that someone purchased with silver, in so far as he is, according to his own subsistence, is not the one he is, but is the one who has been purchased, his subsistence having been assumed—according to his essence—into the nature of the one who has the mastery. These are the lofty notions of this theologian, but what—pray—is the demonstration of the foregoing statements? "The Only-Begotten himself," he says, "renders to the Father alone the appellation owed to Him by dignity." And having said this, he adds that the Father alone is good. Where, then, in these things does the Son deny to Himself the appellation of "Being?" which Eunomius attempts to establish, adding these words: "For he who taught that the appellation of 'Good' is proper only to Him who is the author both of his own goodness and of every goodness, and to Him who always is, and who refers the goodness that comes to pass back to Him—he would hardly have claimed for himself the power over things that come to be, and the appellation of 'Being.'" What does "power" have in common with what was said? C And how has the Son been alienated from this, and from the appellation of the "Being," along with it? But I do not know what one ought to do more in these matters: whether to laugh at such ignorance, or to bewail such ruin. For both his own phrasing—not taken as it is by nature customary to use in the speech of those who know how to use language—bears witness to his great expertise in that art of substitution, a small glory which even children pursue without labor at the hands of the grammarians. And that he is ridiculously led away from his proposed topic to things that have no communion with the reasoning and the figure by which it ought to be concluded that the appellation of "Being" is not common to the Son—[a position] which he strives to support with absurd and monstrous proofs—these and such like things are put together as if on purpose to excite laughter. So that it may even happen that the more simple-minded might be moved to do something, and to laugh at the awkwardness of his discourses. D But that God the Word is not, or that He is not altogether good—for these are the things he prepares by his assertion that the appellation of "Being" and the appellation of "Good" cannot properly belong to the Son—and that he prepares [the argument] that the power over the things that come to be does not belong to Him, these things are worthy of tears and of a mournful dirge.
For he does not—by some rash and inconsiderate impulse, having once uttered such a thing in error—subsequently amend his mistake in what follows, but he lingers in his wickedness, striving ambitiously in the latter points to surpass what went before; for he says, as he proceeds, that He is as much inferior to the divine nature as the nature of angels has fallen away from Him to a more lowly state; he does not write this in these very words, but by what he says he constructs such an opinion. It is permitted to those who read it to judge the discourse, for the written words stand thus: "He, to whom an angel has been named..."
A clearly taught by whom he announced the discourses, and who he is; but from the fact that he was named God, he showed that eminence which is proper to him above all things. For he who is God of those things which were made through him, is an angel of the God who is over all, who is in all. B Anger falling into the heart interrupts the discourse in the middle, and the reason is poured out into wrath at the passion, moved by the things that have been said. And perhaps such a passion of the soul does not seem to me undeserving of pardon. For to whom would not anger boil up from these things? Especially since the Apostle cries out that the whole angelic nature is subject to the Lord, and takes along as a testimony to the dogma the prophetic sublimity of speech. For when, he says, he brings the firstborn into the world, he says, "And let all his angels worship him," and that: "Your throne, O God, is for the age of the age," and that: "But you are the same, and your years will not fail." When the Apostle goes through all these things for the demonstration of the Only-Begotten God, what do I suffer when I hear from the Christ-hater that the Lord of angels is an angel, who does not cast out such a statement rashly and by chance, but who labors anxiously in absurdity in order that he may construct that he has nothing more than John and Moses? For the discourse says about him: "This is he of whom it is written: Behold I send my angel C before your face." John, therefore, is an angel. But although this enemy of the Lord names the Lord God, he nevertheless thinks that he corresponds in a certain proportion to the divinity of Moses; since he also is a servant of Him who is in all, but was ordained a god for the Egyptians. Moreover, the fact that God is in all (as was also said in what precedes) is common to the Son with the Father, and this can be proven by the testimony of the Apostle, who attributes such a statement to him, while saying: "From whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all." But this man reduces to the order of an angel him who is the Lord of angels, just as if he had not heard that "the angels are ministering spirits, and flames of fire." For through these things the Apostle makes an inconfused and manifest distinction D of the subjects. Defining the subject nature as being spirits and fire, but signifying the ruling power by the name of divinity. And although there are so many who announce the glory of the Only-Begotten God, Eunomius alone clamors against all these, while he says that he is the angel of the God who is over all, by this difference, whereby he distinguishes him from Him who is over all, determining that he is one of all things: but while he communicates the name of angels to him, he constructs it so that he in no way differs from them in nature. For he asserts such a thing often in what precedes, that whatever things have the same appellation in common, are not diverse according to nature. Does the discourse, therefore, still need those who would refute it, in that he stubbornly cries out that he is an angel who announces not his own discourse, but that of the One who is? For by this it is demonstrated that the Word who was in the beginning, the God Word, is not the Word himself, but becomes the Word, the minister, and the angel of someone else.
A And who among all men is ignorant of the fact that that which does not exist is the only thing contrasted with that which does exist? So that he who distinguishes the Son from Him Who Is, clearly Judaizes, stealing away the substance of the Only-Begotten from the dogma. For he asserts that he is outside the title of Him Who Is, and he contrives that he should be entirely excluded from being. For he will not differ in his discourse by granting being to the mere sound of a word. But he even attempts to strengthen this absurdity by means of Scripture, and puts forward Moses as an advocate against the truth.
As he there discourses to us, he passes on his own fables with authority, saying that, "He who was sending Moses was himself He Who Is, through whom also he was sending and speaking; the angel, however, of Him Who Is, but the God B of all other things." But that this statement is not from the written words is possible to know from the Scripture itself. But if he says that this is the meaning of the writing, the original word of Scripture must be examined by us. And first, let us consider this, that Eunomius, by calling the Lord, who is God after Him, gives him nothing more than an angelic nature. For not even Moses, when hearing that he was god of Pharaoh, departed from his humanity; but while having an equal rank in nature, he was exalted over his peers by the preeminence of his authority, nor did anything hinder him from being a man, that he should be called god. Thus also C here, having contrived that he is one of the angels, Eunomius heals such an error of the Godhead by a name according to the account given, having made the designation of God common to him by a certain homonymy.
Let us again examine these very words of the blasphemy set forth. "He who was sending," he says, "Moses, was He Who Is; but he through whom he sent was the angel of Him Who Is," thus naming the Lord. Therefore, by the Scripture itself, the absurdity of the writer is refuted, in those places where Moses implores the Lord not to set an angel over the leadership of the people, but for Himself to lead them on their journey. The passage from the person of God D is as follows: "Go, descend, and lead this people into the place which I told you of; and behold my angel goes before thee, in the day that I shall visit; and after a little, he says again: And I will send before thee my angel." Then a little after the continuity, the supplication of the servant to God occurs, having this manner: "If I have found grace in thy sight, let my Lord go with us; and again, If thou thyself do not go with us, do not lead me up from here." Then the answer of God to Moses: "And this word which thou hast spoken, I will do for thee; for thou hast found grace before me, and I know thee above all." Therefore, if Moses refuses the angel, but He who speaks to him becomes his companion and leader of the army, it is clearly demonstrated by these things that He who made Himself known by the title of Him Who Is, is the Only-Begotten God.
A But if anyone should contradict this, he will be an advocate for the Jewish opinion, by not including the Son in the salvation of the people. For if the angel does not go along with the Israelites, and he who is indicated by the title of "Him Who Is" is not the Only-Begotten, as Eunomius wishes, then nothing else is being done but transferring the decrees of the Synagogue into the Church of God. Therefore, they must necessarily confess one of two things: either that the Only-Begotten God was nowhere present to Moses, or that the Son Himself is "He Who Is," from Whom the discourse to the minister proceeds.
But he contradicts what has been said by producing the Scripture itself, which says that the voice of the angel preceded, and afterward the dialogue of "Him Who Is" followed. This is not a contradiction, but a confirmation of our position. For we also clearly say that the prophet, wishing to make the mystery concerning Christ manifest to men, called "Him Who Is" an angel, so that if only the title of "Him Who Is" were found in the dialogue, their understanding of what is said might not be referred to the Father. But just as our speech becomes an index and messenger of the mind's impulses, so we also say that the true Word, Who is in the beginning, announcing the counsel of His own Father, is called an angel because of the office of announcing which He performs. And just as the sublime John, having first called Him Word, thus adds that the Word is God, so that if the title of God had preceded, we might not be driven in our thoughts toward the Father; B so also does the great Moses, having first named Him angel, teach in the words that follow that He is "Him Who Is," so that the mystery concerning Christ might be clearly proclaimed—Scripture teaching that, through the angel, the Word is the interpreter of the Father’s counsel, and through the title of "Him Who Is," the natural property of the Son’s essence in relation to the Father.
But if he should also object by citing Isaiah, who said that His name is called the Angel of Great Counsel, not even that would overturn our argument. For it is clear and indisputable that the dispensation according to humanity is signified by that prophecy. "For a child," he says, "is born to us, and a Son is given to us, Whose rule is upon His shoulder, and His name is called the Angel of Great Counsel." C To this, I think, David also had regard when he related the establishment of the kingdom. Not that He was not King, but that the servile humility which the Lord underwent according to the dispensation was to be exalted to kingly power. "I have been established," He says, "King by Him, upon Sion His holy mountain, announcing the command of the Lord." D Therefore, both "angel" and "Word," "seal" and "image," and everything of this kind, are spoken with the same meaning—He who makes the Father’s goodness known through Himself. For when an angel becomes a messenger of someone, the Word likewise reveals the hidden thought; and the seal, in its own form, shows the archetype, that is, the original form; and the image interprets by itself the beauty of Him who is depicted. Thus it is that all these things, in their meaning, [are] mutually...
are equivalent to one another. For this reason, He is set before us under the title of "Angel," being called "Angel" as the announcer of the Father, but [as] the "Being," because He does not possess a name that makes His essence known, but is one who is above every significance of naming. Wherefore it is also confirmed by the Apostle’s Scripture that His name is above every name, not as if one thing were preferred in honor over others, but because He who truly is, is above every name.
But I see that I am already drawing out my discourse to an immeasurable length, and I fear that I may appear a certain prattler and trifler, and superfluous in word, by bringing the refutation out into a multitude. Yet I have deliberately passed over many things which B the adversary has inserted here and there in his writings, lest the discourse be extended into countless lines. For, to those who are more laborious and diligent, that which is not concise and brief is turned into a pretext for slander, so that one must look not to necessity, but to the desire of the idle and slothful, who wish, if it were possible, to complete a long journey in a few steps. What, then, must be done when blasphemy draws us forward? Or is it perhaps superfluous and trifling to contend with similar arguments? For all their effort, and in the discourse that follows, is consistent with those things previously examined, having nothing new for the proof of the earlier arguments beyond what has gone before. If, therefore, the overthrow of what has been previously set forth is strong for us, let us leave aside those things which have been refuted along with the things previously examined. But if, to the contentious and stubborn, the best [course] seems to be in what has been omitted, it would be necessary for their sake to go over the remainder in a few words. He says that the Lord did not exist before His own generation, [a point] which he is unable to demonstrate as being separated from anything of the Father. And he asserts this, not by confirming his discourse from Scripture, but by constructing his premise from his own reasonings. C But this has been demonstrated to be common to all parts of creation. No frog, no worm, no beetle, no grass, no thorn, nor anything else of the vilest things in the nature of things existed before its own constitution. So that which he constructs with sweat and labor through logical artifice concerning the Son, this is also conceded beforehand in the case of any of the particles of creation; and there is much labor for this writer to show that the only-begotten God is equal in the communion of properties to the lowest of things in creation. Wherefore it is a most certain indication that they think wrongly concerning doctrines, in that the same opinions befall them concerning the only-begotten God and concerning the generation of frogs. Then the same person says that it is equal in truth and power, not to be unbegotten, [as] not to be before generation. Again, the same argument of mine will fit this too, that even if one said the same of a dog and a soul, and a snake, and any of the lowest things, he would not be wrong. Since it is equal in truth and power to
that which states that a dog is not unbegotten, namely that it does not exist before its generation. And if, according to the definition they have laid down in many places, whatever shares in properties also shares in nature—and it is a property both of the dog and of each individual thing not to exist before coming into being—which he thinks one should also establish in the case of the Son, the listener will surely see the remainder of the argument from the consequence.
But he speaks more moderately, attributing some bit of humanity to him, and says: "We say that the Son is not only Being and above all beings"—he who a little before disjoined him from the name of Being—"but we also say," he says, "that he is Lord and creator and God of every sensible and intelligible essence." What does he suppose this to be? Created or uncreated? For if he confesses Jesus to be Lord and God and creator of every intelligible essence, it is absolutely necessary, if he says this is uncreated, that he be lying, since he attributes the creation of the uncreated nature to the Son. But if he believes it to be created, he establishes that he is his own creator. For if he were not distinguished from the intelligible essence by the fact of being created per se, no criterion would be left to distinguish them, since both the sensible creature and the intelligible essence would be conceived by a common notion of the mind.
But he adds to these that in the creation of things, the making of all visible and invisible things and the providence of those that have been made was entrusted to him by the Father, the power distributed to him from above being sufficient for the generations of the things created. This collection of writings compels one to run through them cursorily. But meanwhile, the blasphemy holds back the discourse, enclosing a dense swarm of thoughts like certain poisonous wasps. "It was entrusted to him," he says, "by the Father, the creation of things." If the discourse were being held about some craftsman who fashions a work with his own hands, treating the creation according to the will of the one providing it, would he not use the same words? For we would not be wrong if we said the same of Bezalel, that because the construction of the tabernacle was entrusted to him by Moses, he became the creator of the things mentioned there; he would not have come to the deed had he not first acquired the knowledge by divine D inspiration, and had he not dared to undertake the work by the entrustment of Moses. Therefore, the word "entrusted" indicates that the creative power and authority became something adventitious to him; so that before the creation was entrusted, he neither dared nor was able; but after he received the authority for the works to be done, and the power sufficient for effecting the works, then he became the creator and maker of the things that are; since, as Eunomius says, the power entrusted from above is sufficient for him. Is he not, according to some portent of the horoscope-tellers, positing the birth of the Son also in some fate, just as those who have practiced this vain
A deception, concerning the various conjunctions and distances of the stars, suggest that the lots of life happen to those who are born, with the power distributed from above and allotted to those things that come into being by some chain of rotation? Perhaps the wise man is thinking something of this sort and says: regarding him who is above every rule, and authority, and power, and every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in the age to come, as if in some hollow places confined, has the power that is measured out according to the quantity of the things that come into being, been allotted from above? I will pass over this argument also briefly, dropping seeds for the more intelligent of those who read, from the small beginning of the things already examined, for the understanding of the blasphemy. Then, through what follows, a certain defense for us ourselves is written. For we would no longer seem to those who read to be misinterpreting the meaning of the discourse, and interpreting the words unto a criminal sense, unless his own voice confessed the absurdity. For the writings have it thus: "For was not the earth, and were not angels, which did not exist, brought into being?" Observe the lofty theologian, how he is not ashamed to apply the same language to the earth, and to the angels, and to the Creator of the universe himself. Therefore, if he thinks it suitable to say the same things about the earth and about the Lord, he will either surely deify the earth, or else he will dishonor Him along with it.
B Then he adds to these things by which the blasphemy is more plainly stripped bare, so that the absurdity is not difficult to perceive even for a child. For I say that it would be a long task to go through the generations of all intelligible things, or their essences, to all of which there is not some common nature of existence, but rather the difference lies in the operations of the Creator. For these things, even while we are silent, have a blatantly clear and manifest blasphemy against the Son, since he confesses that what is said concerning every generation and essence is not at all different from the things said concerning the divine subsistence of the Only-Begotten. But it seems to me worthwhile to pass over the proof which he attempts to construct through the midst of blasphemy—which we have already in some way refuted in the things that were examined previously—and to arrive at the main heads of the accusation against their dogma. For it will be found that he demonstrates the mystery of regeneration to be vain, and also the mystic offering of the gifts to be worthless, and their participation to confer nothing more upon those who partake. For he says that after those long ages in which he set up Valentinians, and Cerinthians, and Basilidians, and Montanists, and Marcionites to slander our dogma, and having built up the [position] that those who declare the divine nature C to be unknown, and likewise the mode of generation to be unknown, have no affinity even with the name of Christians; and having numbered us along with those who are slandered, he thus brings in his own discourse with these words: "But we, obeying the holy and blessed men, say that the [mystery] of the [faith] is not confirmed either by the gravity of names, or by the uniqueness of habits and mystical symbols.
A That he does not write these things persuaded by the evangelists, nor by the apostles, nor by any of those who were teachers of the older Scripture, is plain to everyone who is not ignorant of the holy and divine Scripture. It would follow, therefore, that he considers holy and blessed men to be Manichaeus, Nicolaus, Acoluthus, Aetius, Arius, and all those of that same choir, whose lead he follows in decreeing that neither the confession of names, nor the habits of the Church, nor the mystical symbols confirm piety. B We, however, having learned from the holy voice that "unless one is born again from above of water and the Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of God," and that "he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood shall live forever," are convinced that the mystery of piety is confirmed by the confession of the divine names—I mean of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit—and that salvation is strengthened by the communion of mystical habits and symbols.
Dogmas are often examined accurately and discussed subtly even by those who are outside the mystery; and one may hear many who put forward our dogma for themselves as a hypothesis for a debate of words. Some of them often stumble upon the truth, yet are none the less alienated from the faith. C Since, therefore, he scorns the august and venerable names through which the power of the diviner generation bestows grace upon those who partake through faith, and despises the communion of mystical symbols and habits in which Christianity has its strength, let us say to the hearers of this error and imposture, having digressed a little, that which the Prophet says: "How long, O you dull hearts? Why do you love vanity and seek after a lie?" How do you not see that the persecutor of the faith is provoking those who believe in him to the transgression of Christianity? D For if the confession of the venerable and honorable names of the holy Trinity is useless, then the habits of the Church are also useless. Yet in these habits is the seal, the prayer, the baptism, the confession of sins, the readiness for the commandments, the emendation of morals, living temperately and soberly, looking toward what is just, not becoming accustomed to desires, neither being conquered by pleasure, nor failing in virtue. If, therefore, he maintains that none of such habits contribute to the well-ordered life, and that the mystical symbols are not, as we believe, the best remedies for preserving the goods of the soul—that is, the warding off and expulsion of the allurements which are insidiously constructed by the evil one for those who believe—what else is he openly shouting to men, if not that the mystery of the Christians ought to be considered rubbish; that the dignity of the divine names should be mocked; that the habits and institutions of the Church should be considered a mockery; and that all things performed concerning the mystery are mere trifles and foolishness? What more do those who remain in Hellenism bring forward for the disparagement of our dogma? Do not they themselves also make the majesty of the names a pretext for mockery,
A What more do they offer to slander our doctrine, those who remain in Hellenism? Do they not also make the venerable dignity of the names, in which the faith is confirmed, an occasion for mockery, and deride the mystical symbols, rites, and observances that are kept by the initiated? But to believe that piety consists solely in dogmas—who is this so characteristic of as the Greeks? For even they say that, according to their own opinion, something is more plausible than our proclamation; some of them suppose a certain great God among themselves, supereminent over others, and confess certain powers subject to him in a certain order and sequence, differing among themselves according to greater or lesser, but all subject equally to him who is supereminent. These things, then, the teachers of this new idolatry proclaim, and those who follow them do not fear the condemnation impending upon transgressors. B As though they do not understand that to perform something absurd in deed is much more grievous than to sin by word alone. Those therefore who by their deeds deny the faith, and make light of the customs, and disregard the confession of the names, and judge the sanctification from the mystical symbols to be of no account, but are persuaded to look to sophisticated words, and believe that salvation consists in the terminology of the unbegotten and the begotten—what else are they but transgressors of the saving doctrines?
If anyone thinks that these things are brought against them by us out of some slander, let him consider for himself what has been written by him, both those things proposed to us for examination, and all that follows logically from what has been said. For he says, perverting the law of the Lord (for the tradition of divine initiation is a law), that baptism does not take place into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as he commanded the disciples when handing down the mystery, but into the artificer and creator, and not only the Father, he says, of the Only-Begotten, but his God as well. C O man who makes his neighbor drink a turbid ruin! How he stirs up and muddies the truth with a miry addition! How does he not fear the curse imposed upon those who add anything to the divine voices, or who dare to subtract? Let us read over him the very voice of the Lord's words. "Go," he says, "make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." Where did he call the Son a creature? Where did the discourse teach that the Father is the creator and maker of the Only-Begotten? Where in what has been said is the Son taught to be a servant of God? Where is the God of the Son proclaimed in the tradition of the mystery? D Therefore, recognize and understand, you who have been dragged through error and imposture toward destruction, what kind of guide for your souls you have set over yourselves—one who adulterates the Holy Scriptures, who transmutes the divine voices, who pollutes with his own mire and filth the pure dogmas of piety, who not only arms his tongue against us, but also attempts to transform the very holy voices themselves, and ambitiously contends to demonstrate that his own perversion is more ratified and firmer than the Lord's teaching.
A Do you not see how he excites himself against the Name which is adored? So that as time passes, the name of the Lord, wrapped in silence, might fade away, and instead of Christ, Eunomius might be celebrated. Do you not yet understand, by the judgment of reason, that this impious dogma and proclamation is the meditation, preparation, and beginning of the coming of Antichrist, planted beforehand by the devil as a kind of foundation? For he who struggles ambitiously to show that his own words have more authority and power than the sayings of Christ, and who eagerly endeavors to change the faith from the divine names and from the mystical rites and sacraments to his own error—what else, fittingly, should he be called than Antichrist?
AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK TWELVE
HEADINGS OR SUMMARIES OF THE TWELFTH BOOK
1. The twelfth book marvelously interprets that saying of our Lord to Mary: "Do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father." 2. Then, commemorating the blasphemy of Eunomius refuted by the great Basil—the blasphemy of assigning the only-begotten Son of God to the realm of darkness—and setting forth also the apology or dissolution of the blasphemy spoken by him, he proves from the Apology that his new blasphemy is even greater than his former one; wherein he also discourses most wisely concerning the unapproachable and true light. 3. In addition to these points, he explains the evangelical text, "In the beginning was the Word," and "the life," and "the light," and that saying "The Word was made flesh," which was poorly and strangely interpreted by Eunomius; he overturns the blasphemy and shows that the incarnation of the Lord occurred by benevolence, not by impotence or infirmity, and by the cooperation of the Father. 4. Furthermore, he exposes Eunomius for having learned his unbegottenness from hieroglyphic writings and from the myths and idolatry of the Egyptians, seeing that he introduces Anubis, Osiris, and Isis into the doctrine of Christians; and for laboring to ensure that men owe no gratitude to the Only-Begotten for His passion, as one who underwent the passion not voluntarily, but forced by necessity; just as we owe nothing to fire for its heat, or to water for its flow: so he refers all these things not to free power, but to natural necessity. 5. Then, again discoursing concerning the true and unapproachable light of the Father and the Son, of their property and community, and of essence, and concerning the begotten and the unbegotten, he concludes the book by showing that these contain no contradiction in their meaning, but signify a certain immediate opposition and distinction.
B But let us see also what follows, in consequence, upon the blasphemy; which is the very chief argument of the defense of their dogma. For they think
that they have a most powerful demonstration of what they say, those who bring down the greatness of the glory of the Only-Begotten to humble and servile opinions, by pointing to the word of the Lord spoken to Mary after the resurrection, before his ascension, saying: "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but go to my brethren and say to them, I ascend to my Father and your Father, and my God and your God." Now, I believe that the pious meaning of these statements, according to which we believe these things to have been said to Mary, is clear enough to those who have truly embraced the faith; nevertheless, we shall add our own discourse on this matter in its proper place. But in the meantime, it is worth while to learn from those who put such phrases before us, whether they suppose that that which ascends, and which is seen, and which is known by touch, and furthermore, that which is made familiar to men through the relationship of brotherhood, is B peculiar to the divine or to the human nature. For if they see in the Godhead all these things—that which is palpable and visible, and that which is sustained by eating and drinking, and that which is of the same genus and a brother to men, and all else that is perceived with regard to bodily nature—then let them say these things concerning the Only-Begotten God, and let them attribute to him whatever they wish, including the act of walking and local migration, which is proper to those things that are circumscribed in a body. But if he who speaks with his brethren through Mary is the one in question, yet the Only-Begotten has no brethren—for how could the "Only-Begotten" be preserved if there were brethren?—and he who said, "God is a spirit," is the same one who says to the disciples, "Handle me," in order to show that C while human nature is palpable, the divine is intangible. And he who said, "I am going," signifies a local movement. But he who has embraced all things, in whom, as the Apostle says, all things were created, and in whom all things consist, has nothing among existing things outside of himself to which he could move by any motion. For it is not possible for motion to occur in any other way than that the one who changes leaves the place in which he was, and occupies another. But he who passes through all things, and is in all things, and contains all things, and is circumscribed by none of the things that exist, has nowhere to move to, because there is nothing empty of the divine fullness. How, then, do these men, D neglecting the fact that these words proceed from what is visible, apply them to the divine nature which surpasses all understanding? Especially when the Apostle in his discourse to the Athenians clearly forbids having such a thought about God. For the divine power is not found through palpation and touch, but through intellectual contemplation and faith. Or again, he who ate in the eyes of the disciples, and who promised that he would go before them into Galilee and be seen, whom does he signify as the one to be seen by them? Is it God, whom no one has ever seen, nor can see? Or is it the bodily figure, that is, the form of a servant, in which God was? Since, therefore, it is manifest from the things said
A that the meaning of what is expressed refers to that which is seen and tangible and movable, and which is homogeneous to the nature of the disciples, while nothing of this sort is seen in Him who is invisible and incorporeal, and who can neither be grasped by touch nor figured by form; how do they reduce the Only-begotten God Himself, who was in the beginning and is in the Father, to an equal honor with Peter, and Andrew, and John, and the rest of the apostles? While they even say that they themselves are brothers and fellow-servants of the Only-begotten. And all their zeal looks to this goal, to show that the Father is as far removed in majesty of nature from the dignity and power and essence of the Only-begotten, as He has exalted Himself above human essence. And they make this argument a patron of their opinion, which makes the nature of the Father and of the Lord and of the disciples of the Lord equal in common, so that no difference is understood between them according to natural dignity, since He is considered to be their Father and God in the same way as He is His.
And such is the construction of blasphemy which is elicited by consequence. So that it either attributes to the disciples, through a relative signification, a communion of essence with the Father, or it does not even lead the Lord, by this term, into the communion of the Father's nature. And just as it proves the servitude of the disciples from the fact that He who is over all is named their God, similarly it also confesses that the Son serves God through the things that have been said. That the words spoken to Mary, therefore, do not befit the divinity of the Only-begotten can be understood from this sense of the words. For He who, through all things, had humbled Himself to the equality of human lowliness, is the one who speaks the things that have been said. But what the understanding of these words is, those who search out the depths of the mystery through the Spirit B would know exactly. And whatever we have been able to perceive from these things, we shall, according to the exposition of the Fathers, append here in few words. He who by nature is the Father of things that are, from whom all things have their origin, is proclaimed as one by the great eloquence of the Apostle: "One," he says, "God and Father, from whom are all things" C (I Cor. VIII, 6). Therefore, human nature did not come into creation from elsewhere; nor was it produced into the nature of things accidentally or by its own power, but it has not obtained any other creator and founder of its own nature than the Father of all. And the very name of divinity signifies nothing else than that power by which He contemplates all things and provides for all, which He also properly possessed towards the human race. For He who gave to the things that are the faculty and power to be, is God and the inspector of those things which have been made by Him. But since, through the snares of him who sowed in us the tare of contumacy or rebellion, our nature no longer preserved within itself the image of the paternal character, but was deformed into the filth of sin; for this reason, through that likeness which comes about by choice, and from free D
A choice of mind, it was admitted into an unseemly relationship with the father of sin. So that he who has been disowned in his own sin is no longer a son of the good and true Father and God; but instead of him who is God by nature, those who are not gods by nature are worshipped, as the Apostle says, and instead of the true Father, a false one is supposed, just as the prophet Jeremiah says somewhere by way of an enigma: *The partridge has called, she has gathered what she did not bring forth.*
Since, therefore, this was the chief point of our calamity—namely, that human nature had been disinherited by the good Father and was excluded from divine oversight and providential care—for this reason, He who shepherds every rational creature, having left the unerring and supermundane flock in the heights, comes down out of benevolence toward the human race to the wandering sheep, by which I mean our nature. For human nature is an infinitesimally small part, if compared B to the whole, the only one which, according to the enigma of the parable, departed from the rational hundred because of vice. Since, therefore, it was utterly impossible that our life, once alienated from God, should again by itself be taken up to the high and heavenly place, for this reason, as the Apostle says, *He who knew no sin, became sin for us*, and frees us from the curse, by making our curse His own, and by taking up our enmity which had been caused toward God through sin, and killing it within Himself according to the word of the Apostle (for sin was the enmity), and by becoming what we are, He joined humanity to God again through Himself. For that new man, who is created according to God, in whom the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily, having through purity brought this man into relationship with the kinship of the Father of our nature, He drew along with Himself the entire nature that is a participant of His body and related to it into the same grace. C And this is evangelized through the woman, not only to those disciples, but to all who even until now are being taught by the Word: that man is no longer among the disowned, nor cast out from the kingdom of God; but is again a son, again set under God, the lump having been sanctified through the firstfruits of humanity. *Behold, for He says, I and the children whom God has given me*; from where you departed, having become flesh and blood through sin, thither he who for our sake became a participant of flesh and blood has again taken you up and led you back. And thus He has become our Father and God, from whom we were formerly alienated through our defection. Therefore, the Lord evangelizes this good benefit through the things that have been said. And these words are not proof of the Son's abasement, but are the good news of our reconciliation with God. D For what was done in the humanity assumed by Christ is a common grace of the faith of men. For just as when we see that which by its own nature tends downward and leans toward the earth by its own weight, being carried through the air to the heavens, we believe that according to
the word of the Apostle, we too shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air A. Having heard thus, that the true God and Father has become the Father and God of our firstfruits, we no longer doubt that He has also become our Father and God, having learned that we shall come into the same place where Christ, our forerunner, has entered on our behalf. And that this grace is announced through a woman is also consistent with the meaning already given. For since, as the Apostle says, the woman being deceived was in the transgression, and was the leader of the departure from God through disobedience; for this reason she becomes the first witness of the resurrection, so that she might correct the destruction which followed from the transgression through faith in the resurrection. And just as she, having at the beginning become a minister and counselor of the serpent's words to the man, brought in the beginning of evil and the consequence for life; so, by conveying the words of Him who put to death the apostate dragon to the disciples, she becomes the leader for men of the faith, through which the first sentence of death is rightly dissolved. But it is likely that a more useful explanation of the things proposed B might be found by the more diligent; yet even if nothing were found, I believe that every pious person would agree that the one brought forward by the adversaries is utterly idle and vain when compared to the one that has been found. For that one is contrived for the destruction of the glory of the Only-Begotten, and nothing more, whereas this one contains the goal of the economy, that is, the dispensation according to man. For it was demonstrated that it was not He who cannot be touched, nor changed, nor seen, but that which can be discerned and moved and handled—which is proper to human nature—that was giving the command to Mary to carry the word to the brothers. C
Furthermore, let us also examine what sort of defense he makes for the points in which he was rebuked by the great Basil, assigning a portion of darkness to the Only-Begotten God, while he says: "As much as the begotten is distant from the unbegotten, so much does light differ from light." For since the latter had demonstrated that the distance between the begotten and the unbegotten is not according to some remission and intensity, but that there is an opposition between the meanings strictly by diametric contradiction; and had concluded from the consequence of the things posited that, if the paternal light differs from the light of the Son in the same proportion as the unbegotten is distant from the begotten, it is absolutely necessary that a diminution of light should not be understood in the Son, but a complete alienation or privation. For just as it is not permitted to say that generation is a remiss ungeneratedness, but the meanings of ungeneratedness and generation stand entirely opposed to one another; so if the paternal light and the light understood in the Son preserve the same discrepancy, it follows that the Son will no longer be considered to be,
A equally, as much by the Unbegotten himself as by the light that is in him, when he is instead set apart and placed outside. But he who is something other than light, by consequence, will be akin to the opposite. Now that this absurdity has become clearly apparent from the things set forth, Eunomius tries to unravel it with the artful approaches of his demonstrations, speaking thus: “For we know, we know the true light, we know him who created the light after the heaven and the earth; we have heard the Light and Truth himself, Christ, saying to his own disciples: *You are the light of the world* [Matt. 5:14]. We have learned from the blessed Paul, who terms God who is over all *inaccessible light* [1 Tim. 6:16], and by that very addition defines it and teaches the superexcellence of the light.” Having learned, then, such a difference of light, shall we not be able to tolerate, even to the level of a meager report, that the concept of light is the same? Is he seriously putting forth such things through his arguments against the truth? Or is he attempting to cause stupor among his followers with his fallacies? Are they able to perceive the childish paralogism of the sophism, or are they so lacking in sense that they grow dull at so patent an error and fallacy? For my part, I think that no one is so senseless and stupid as not to understand the error arising from the equivocation, through which Eunomius B trips up and overthrows both himself and his own followers. The disciples, he says, were called light, and that which was made in the creation is also called light. Then who does not see that the name alone is common, while the meaning in each case is different? For the solar light is a discriminator of sight, but the discourse of the disciples' teaching introduces into souls the illumination of the truth. If, then, he recognizes this difference even in that [divine] light—so as to think of the one as light of the body and the other as light of the soul—there will no longer be any dispute between us and him, since his own defense will condemn him before our words can. But if he cannot find such a difference in that light by means of the manner of its operation—for it is not the case that the one is illuminative of the eyes of the flesh and the other of the intellect, but the operation of both this light and that is one and the same, working upon the same things—how, through solar rays and apostolic discourses, C does he demonstrate that the Only-begotten light differs from the paternal light? “But the Son,” he says, “is called true light, while the Father is called inaccessible.” Therefore, the definitions added interpret the difference regarding the paternal light in terms of a greater degree, for he thinks that "true" is one thing, and "inaccessible" is another. Then who is so foolish as not to perceive the identity of the things signified? For that which is "true" and that which is "inaccessible" is, in an equal manner, inaccessible to those who think in terms of the contrary; for just as the true does not admit the mixing of the false, so too the inaccessible does not invite the approach of its opposite. For to evil, that which is inaccessible is absolutely inaccessible. But the light of the Son is not evil; for how could anyone see the truth in vice? Since, therefore, truth is not evil, who would say that the light which is in the Father is inaccessible to truth? If indeed it were to repel the truth, it would certainly D adhere to a lie.
For such is the nature of opposites, that in the absence of the better, that which is understood from the opposing side is made manifest. If, therefore, someone were to say that the light in the Father is considered far from that opposite comparison, he would interpret the phrase regarding the A “inaccessible” in a manner aimed at the Apostolic intention. But if he were to say that “inaccessible” signifies an alienation from the good, he would be positing nothing else than that the good is hostile and alien to itself, being at once good and contrary to the good. But surely this is among the impossibilities. For the good is naturally akin to the good. Therefore, this light has not deviated from that other. For both the Son is the true light, and the Father is the inaccessible light. I would even say, with confidence, that he who interchanges such appellations for either one will not err. For both the true is inaccessible to the false, and the inaccessible, in turn, is grasped in sincere and pure truth. Therefore, the true and the inaccessible are the same; for by the equal force by which it is signified in both, the inaccessible is B alien to evil. What difference, then, does he who cheats himself and his hearers through the equivocation of “light” imagine in these things? But let us not pass over this unexamined, that having distorted the Apostolic phrase according to his own fancy, he sets forth the discourse as if from him. For Paul says, *dwelling in light inaccessible* [1 Tim. VI, 16]. But it is a very different thing to say that a thing *is* this, and to say that it is *in* something. For he who said *dwelling in light inaccessible*, by the word "dwelling," did not indicate Him himself, but that which is around Him, which is, according to our discourse, the same as the evangelical utterance that says the Father is in the Son. For the Son is the true light, and the truth is inaccessible to C what is false: therefore the Son is the inaccessible light, in whom the Father dwells, or rather, in whom the Father is.
12. 12. Arguments of the adversary against the truth, refuted by the light of Scripture.
But he struggles with vain and empty things, and says: “I offer the proof of the things spoken from the things themselves and from the believed oracles.” This, then, is his promise; but whether he advances the discourse in accordance with the dignity of what he has promised, the intelligent listener will surely examine. The blessed John, he says, when he said that the Word was in the beginning, and called Him Life, then named the Life "light," and proceeding a little further, he says, *And the Word was made flesh* [Joan. I, 14]. If, therefore, the light is the Life, and the Life is the Word, and the Word was made flesh [id. ibid.], it becomes manifest from this that the light has come to be in the flesh. What then? Since the light and the Life, and God, and the Word, appeared in the flesh, is it for this reason that the true light is different from the light which is in the Father? And yet, does not the sacred Gospel testify that even when it was in the darkness, it remained inaccessible to the contrary nature? *For the light*, it says, *shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it*. If, therefore, it had been changed into the opposite, and the light that was in the darkness had been subdued by the gloom, it would be a valid point for those desiring to demonstrate
how much this light has changed for the worse A in comparison to that which is contemplated in the Father. But if the Word, even though He becomes in the flesh, remains the Word, and if the light, even though it shines in the darkness, is no less light, not admitting communion with its opposite; and if the life, even though it should come to be in death, is preserved in itself; and if God, even though He assumes the form of a servant, does not Himself become a servant, but rather raises up that which is subjected to dominion and kingdom, making that which is humble and human Lord and Christ; how through this does he demonstrate the variation of the light for the worse, since each possesses that which is unturning toward evil and unalterable? He does not even pay attention to this, that he who looked upon the incarnate Word—who was both light, and life, and God—recognized through the glory that was seen the Father of glory, saying, "We beheld His glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father."
B But he has come to the refractory and contentious argument, detected by us long ago from the consequence of his sayings, but now brought forward in naked speech. For he wishes to demonstrate an essence of the Son that is subject to passion, liable to death, and in no way different from the material and flowing nature, so that through this he might prove the difference from the Father. For he says: "If he is able to demonstrate also that the God who is over all, as He is inaccessible light, has become or is able to become in the flesh, to come under authority, to obey commands, to live according to human laws, and to bear the cross, then let him declare the light equal to the light." If these things were being put forward by us, by those who think out what follows from what has been previously established, without being in agreement with his own words, who would not have accused us of attacking him with slanders, and of driving the dogma of our adversaries toward this absurdity by a certain artfulness of words and crafty commentary? But now it is a kind of protection that we prudently and carefully correct the discourse of the heresy with the truth, because the absurdity that appears from the consequence is not even veiled in silence by them themselves. For behold how open and free is the battle against the Only-begotten God. Moreover, the work which the Redeemer accomplished for His own benevolence toward the human race is turned by the enemies into slander and reproach of the nature of the Son of God, as if He had not lapsed into the life in the flesh and the passion of the cross through His own providence, but rather by a certain natural propensity. And just as it is natural for a stone to have a downward motion, and for fire the opposite, and the materials do not exchange each other's properties—so that the stone should be light-moving or the fire should be heavy toward the earth and moving downward—so they devise that passions should be associated with the nature of the Son, and that for this reason He came to that which was akin and familiar to Himself; but that the nature of the Father, since it is free from such passions, is inaccessible to the approach of evils. For he says D that the God who is over all, inasmuch as He is inaccessible light, has neither become in the flesh, nor is able to become; the former of the said
A assertions having been already stated, it would have been enough to say that the Father did not become in the flesh; but now there is a kind of double construction added, which is contrary to reason. For he either accuses the Son of wickedness, or the Father of impotence. For if communion with flesh is an evil, he attributes evil to the only-begotten God; but if such benevolence is a good, he demonstrates the Father to be impotent toward the good, saying that He was not able to work such grace through flesh. Yet who is there among all men who does not know that *as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, even so the Son also gives life to whom He will*? Meaning, of course, ourselves, who are dead, having fallen away from the true life. If, therefore, just as the Father gives life, so and in no other way the Son works the same grace, how does this fighter against God vibrate his impious and blasphemous tongue against both, insulting the Father with impotence toward the good, and the Son with a base familiarity toward evil? B But, he says, one light is not equal to the other light; because the one is called true, the other inaccessible. Is the true light, then, judged by a diminution? For what reason? And yet it is their own argument that the divinity of the Father is understood to be greater and more exalted than that of the Son, for this reason: that the former is called the true God in the Gospel, while the latter is so called without the addition of "true." How, then, does the same reasoning signify an increase in the case of the divinity, but a diminution in the case of the light that is understood? For if they assert for this reason that the Father is greater than the Son, because He is the true God, by the same reasoning the Son would be confessed to be greater than the Father, because the one is named the true light, C whilst the other is not so named. But this light, he says, worked the things of benevolence, whereas that one remained inactive toward such grace. A new method of preference! That which was inactive toward benevolence, they judge to be superior to that which has worked. But there is not, nor will there ever be among Christians, a notion by which it is established that every good—insofar as it consists in such things—does not have its cause from the Father; and the chief of our good things is believed, among those who are prudent and hold correct opinions, to be the return to life; and this has been perfectly accomplished and fulfilled through the economy of the Lord, or incarnation, while the Father did not, in the meantime, remain inactive and ineffectual during the time of the economy or dispensation, as the heresy D eagerly contends. For He does not demonstrate this who said: *He that sent me is with me*; and, *The Father abiding in me doeth these works*. How, then, does the heresy, by attributing the grace which was wrought for our sake to the Son alone, make the Father destitute of thanksgiving for the benefits conferred upon us? For the retribution of thanksgiving is due by natural reason only to those who are benefactors; but he who is impotent to confer a benefit is altogether outside the number of those to whom thanks are rendered for a given benefit. You see how, in all things, the scope of their blasphemy against the Only-begotten turns to the contrary for them, since, by consequence, it passes over to the Father. And it seems to me that such a thing must necessarily happen. For if he that honoreth the Son honoreth the Father, according to the divine pronouncement, it is clear that also the zeal directed against the Son to the contrary
has a relation to the Father. I say, however, that it is necessary for those who have received the proclamation concerning the cross and the resurrection more simply, to offer equal thanksgiving to both the Son and the Father, and to make the grace the same, and [to look to] the paternal will which the Son fulfilled; for this is what it means that "all men should be saved," as A the Apostle says. Likewise, in this grace, one should honor both the Father and the Son, as salvation would not have happened for you unless the good will of the Father had proceeded to us for action through His own power. And we have learned from the Scriptures that the Son is the power of the Father.
Again, let us consider what has been said: "If he is able to demonstrate, he says, that the God over all—as He is inapproachable light—was made in flesh, or could have been made, let him say that the light is equal to the light." B The purpose of what has been said is clear from the very construction of the words: for he does not think that the Son, through His omnipotent divinity, had the strength for such a kind of philanthropy, but that He underwent the passion of the cross because He was of a passible nature. But as I consider and diligently inquire whence it happened that such opinions concerning the Divine, that the unbegotten light is inapproachable to the contrary and is purely impassible and incorruptible, while they think the begotten [light] sways in its nature in two directions, so as not to preserve the Divine C as pure and undefiled in impassibility, but as having an essence that is mixed and compounded from opposites, which both desires participation in the good and flows down toward a passible disposition—since it was not possible to find the foundations of such an absurdity in Scripture, the thought occurred to me: whether perhaps, having admired the mythologies of the Egyptians concerning the divine, he mingles their notions into his arguments about the Only-Begotten? For they say that the strange idolatry of those people, when they apply the forms of certain irrational beasts to human limbs, is an enigma of a mixed nature, which they call a demon. This nature, they say, is more subtle than that of humans and is in power far superior to our D nature; yet it does not possess the Divine as unmixed or unalloyed, but as mingled with the nature of the soul and the perception of the body, capable of both pleasure and pain—none of which is true of the unbegotten God. For even they use this name, attributing unbegottenness honorifically to the God who, according to their notions, is supreme. Therefore, it seems to us that this wise theologian introduces Anubis, or Isis, or Osiris from the Egyptian sanctuaries into the proclamation of the Christians, except for the confession of the names; but it makes no difference at all to impiety whether one confesses the names of the idols, or one keeps within himself the opinions concerning them while refraining from the names. If, therefore, it is not possible to find any defense of this impiety from divine Scripture, and the discourse from the hieroglyphic riddles...
or the wrappings of the Egyptians, has its strength—not, in truth, that it is obscure what those who think aright ought to consider concerning these things. A And that we do not bring this accusation slanderously or insolently, Eunomius himself shall be our witness through his own words, for he calls the Unbegotten "unapproachable light," and one who is unable to come to the experience of sufferings, while he defines the begotten nature as having a disposition of a similar and cognate kind. So that, if according to their argument, man is "fallen" into the experience of sufferings and torments by a spontaneous [process]—his passible essence being naturally dragged toward this—the human race owes no gratitude at all to the only-begotten God for the things for the sake of which He suffered; for this is worthy of no thanksgiving. For who would accept it as a part of grace or as a benefit, that which happens by necessity, even if it be profitable and useful? For we do not give thanks to fire for its heat, nor to water for its flow, tracing what occurs back to the necessity of nature, because the fire cannot be deprived of its heating operation, nor can water remain steady on a level surface, as the local inclination spontaneously draws its movement forward. B If, therefore, they say that the benefit of the incarnation was brought about for men by the Son through the necessity of nature, they do not acknowledge any grace at all, because they refer what happened not to a free and absolute power, but to a natural necessity. But if, while sensing that it is a gift, they disparage the benefit, I fear lest the impiety may turn back upon them in the opposite direction, and they may value the passible disposition of the Son more than the impassibility of the Father, making their judgment of the "good" based on what contributes to their own advantage. For if it had happened that the Son, just as they decree and teach regarding the Father, were incapable of suffering, our misery would have remained incorrigible and irreparable, since there would be no one to raise up man to incorruptibility through His own experience. And thus the subtlety of captious and deceitful masters does not notice that, by the very means through which it strives to destroy the majesty of the unbegotten God, it actually leads Him around to greater and more honorable opinions; for he who can effect the good is more excellent than he who is powerless toward the good. C But I realize that the course of the discourse is disordered; for it does not remain in its proper course, but, as is wont to happen with fiery and spirited colts, it is carried along impetuously by the impious revilings of our adversaries toward pursuing the absurdities of those premises they set forth. Therefore, it must be checked and restrained, lest, rejecting the bridle, it range beyond measure into the demonstration of absurdities. But the gracious and candid hearer will surely grant forgiveness for what has been said, not imputing to us the absurdity arising from this investigation, but to those who lay down the evil principles. For us, however, our speculation must be moved to another part of what has been said. For he says that *it makes the God who is common to us appear composite, because they suppose the light to be common, but [distinct] in certain properties and varied differences, dividing the one from the other.* For that which is brought together in one commonality, but by differences... D
and separated by certain concurrences of properties. A But our discourse on these matters is brief and easily untangled. For as for him who accuses our dogmas, if he does not establish his argument through his own words, we confess the crime against ourselves; let us therefore examine the things written by him. He calls the Lord the true light, but the Father the inaccessible light. Therefore, he himself also confesses a communion according to light, by naming both in this way. Moreover, since appellations are correctly applied to realities, as he has defined in many places, we understand that the thin and naked word of light is not spoken regarding the divine nature without some meaning, but is enunciated concerning some subject. Therefore, by the communion of the name, they also confess the identity of the things signified: since they have asserted that things whose names are the same do not have different natures. Since, therefore, that which is signified by “light” is one, the addition of “inaccessible” and “true,” according to the argument of the heresy, distinguishes the common from the identifying characteristics; so that the light of the Father is understood to be one thing, and the light of the Son another, separated from each other by their properties: either, therefore, let him overturn his own tenets, so that he may not, through the things he says, construct that the Divine is composite, or let him not accuse us of those things which he sees in his own arguments. B For speech does not corrupt simplicity through these things, since community and property are not essence, such that the concurrence of these should prove the subject to be composite. But essence, whatever it may happen to be, remains in itself according to nature, being that which it is. And that these things are among those things understood and contemplated about it, anyone possessing reason and mind would say. For even among us men, it is possible to perceive something common with the divine nature, but not for this reason is humanity the Divine, or divinity the human. For believing God to be good, we know that this name is also ordained by Scripture in the case of man. But the identifying property of the meaning in each case separates the commonality arising from the equivocation. For the one, being the source of goodness, is named from it; whereas the other (namely, man), being a participant in goodness, becomes also a sharer of the name; and God is not for this reason composite, because He shares with man the appellation of “good.” Therefore, it is clearly confessed from these things that the argument of community is different from that of essence, and that by this fact no composition or multiplicity of parts is constructed regarding the simple and non-quantitative nature, even if something of those things which are contemplated regarding it be viewed either in terms of property or have its significance from something common. C But let us pass on, if it seems good, to another of the matters spoken of, letting the drivel in between go. This man, carefully promulgating the Aristotelian division of beings, has appended to our discourse genera, and species, and differences, and individuals, and the entire artifice of the categories, for the sake of slandering our D
A tenets. Having passed over these, therefore, let us proceed to his grave and irresistible stronghold of argument. By bracing his own discourse with a Demosthenic fury, another Paeanian, a certain Exoltiseridus, has appeared to us, imitating the acrimony of the orator in the contest he has undertaken against us. I shall set forth the very words of the logographer verbatim. "Indeed," he says, "but if the begotten to the unbegotten stands in an opposite relation, if the begotten light were to descend by an equal measure to the unbegotten light, the one would become light, the other darkness." Now, he who is at leisure may learn through his own words the sharpness and accuracy of his response to the opposition. For my part, I would demand of this actor of ours that he speak our own views, or else advance an imitation of our discourse as close as possible, or at least, as he is trained and able, make use of speech in his own person and not discourse as if he were us. For never would any of B our side be so deceived as to imagine that, because the begotten is related to the unbegotten in a way that is contrary in its signification, one is therefore inferior to the other. For every opposite holds its difference, not in a remission of intensity, but in an absolute contrariety of meaning. For example, we say that someone is sleeping or not sleeping, sitting or not sitting, having been begotten or not having been begotten, and all other things follow the same pattern, where the removal of the one becomes the positing of the opposite. As, therefore, living is not a remission of what is called not-living, but an absolute contrariety, so we have understood the state of having been begotten not as a remission of that which is not begotten, but as a certain opposition and a direct contrariety without an intermediary, so that what is signified by the one in no way has any commonality with the other, neither in a small degree nor in a greater one. He, therefore, who asserts that that which is understood as being the opposite is inferior to that to which it is opposed, let him bring forth this argument in his own person. For our common mode of speech declares that those things which belong to opposites are equally distant from one another, just as the original terms themselves differ. Wherefore, if Eunomius also observes in the case of light the same difference that exists in the begotten in relation to the unbegotten, I shall repeat our argument: that as in that case the one part of the contradiction remains incommunicable with the opposite, so, if light were to be joined to one part of the opposites, the remaining part C linked to it will certainly be shown to be darkness, by the necessity of opposition, in proportion to what has preceded, and by the rational principle that causes the rationale of light to differ from its opposite. These things we, who attempt to write without the subtle art of dialectic, as he says who attacks us with slanders, speak in a somewhat rustic fashion to this new Paeanian through our native tongue. But how did he struggle against this opposition, he who poured forth against us those heated and fire-breathing speeches with Demosthenic intensity? To those who find pleasure in laughing, let them rush upon the very writings of the orator. For what is ours is not very slow or sluggish for the refutation of the decrees of impiety, but for mocking and biting the ignorance of the uneducated, as if in a comedy, it is entirely inappropriate and in no way suitable. D
AGAINST THE SECOND ORATION OF EUNOMIUS BOOK XII. LATER PART OF THE TWELFTH BOOK, OR IN SOME MANUSCRIPTS, THE THIRTEENTH BOOK.
A The first struggles against Eunomius have already been sufficiently completed, through divine assistance, in the preceding labors; just as those who wish to learn from the works we have produced may see how, in the previous section of our discourse, the error was powerfully refuted, and how falsehood no longer possesses any strength against the truth in those matters which have been examined and investigated, at least among those who are not being excessively shameless against the truth. Since, however, a second discourse has been assembled by him against piety, like some sort of predatory host, again, with God as our ally, the truth is armed through us in battle array against the enemies, and as a commander of our arguments, it leads the way and directs the battle against the foes as it sees fit. Following in its footsteps, we shall confidently dare to enter upon these second struggles, fearing not at all the marshaled host of lies, even if it appears to exceed our own in the number of its words. For faithful is He who promised that a thousand shall be put to flight by one, and ten thousand by two; because piety does not derive its strength for war from a numerous hand. B Just as that corpulent Goliath, brandishing that heavy spear against the Israelites, inspired no terror in the shepherd, a man untrained and unskilled in the maneuvers of war, by whom, once engaged in battle, he was decapitated, his hope having been turned to the contrary, in exactly the same way this Goliath of ours, who is the leader and author of a strange and foreign knowledge, brandishing his blasphemy as if it were a drawn and naked sword—stretching it out against those arrayed against him and gleaming with newly-sharpened sophistries—did not appear terrible or difficult to encounter to us simple and uneducated men, such that he could, at his own whim, boast insolently due to a lack of opponents. Instead, he found us to be, as it were, irregular and makeshift warriors from the Lord's flock, who neither have learned how to engage in word-battles, nor consider it a loss that we have not learned, hurling the plebeian and rustic speech of truth against him just as if we were slingers. Since, therefore, that aforementioned shepherd, having struck down the alien with a sling, and having shattered his helmet with the stone, and because of the force of the blow the stone having penetrated deep within, did not make that the limit of his valor...
A to see the enemy lying fallen; but running up and stripping the enemy of his head, he returns to his own side as a trophy-bearer, parading that boastful head before the army of his fellow-tribesmen. For this reason, it is fitting that we, too, looking to this example, should not grow soft toward our second discourses; but as far as possible, we must imitate the valor of David, and after the first blow, in like manner to him, rush upon the one lying fallen, so that the enemy of the truth might appear most truly deprived of his head. For he who is severed from the faith has his head cut off and torn from his neck more truly than did that foreigner. For since Christ is the Head of every man, as the Apostle says, and it is entirely reasonable that the believer be called a man—for Christ cannot be the head of the unbelievers—he who is cut off from the saving faith lacks a head, no differently than that Goliath, slaughtered by his own sword which he had sharpened against the truth, being severed from the true Head; and it is our task not to cut off that head, but to reveal it as having been cut off from his shoulders.
B Let no one think that I am descending into this perpetual and implacable war against adversaries out of any ambition or desire for human glory and engaging in combat with them. For if it were permitted to pass a quiet and peaceful life removed from business and anxieties, it would certainly have been far from my purpose to disturb my tranquility voluntarily, and to stir up against ourselves a war undertaken of one's own accord from provocation. But since the city of God, that is, the Church, is besieged, and the great wall is shaken by the engines of heresy being wheeled around it, and there is no small danger C that the word of the Lord, being snatched away by the assault of the demons, might be carried off as a captive; for this reason, judging it to be a fearful thing not to be a participant in the anxiety of Christians and a companion in their labor, I did not decline toward leisure and rest, but rather deemed the sweat flowing from labors to be preferable to the relaxation of a life of leisure, knowing perfectly well that just as "each one will receive his own reward according to his own labor," as the Apostle says, so too will all, regarding the labors they were able to endure according to their strength, if they have despised and abandoned them, suffer punishments. Wherefore, I boldly undertook the first battle of the discourse from the pastoral jar—that is, from ecclesiastical doctrines—sending forth these unrefined and unpolished discourses, which flowed spontaneously, for the overthrow and ruin of the blasphemy, needing no armor from profane and external literature for the intended contest. D And now, I do not refuse to come to the second contests, placing my hope, like the great David, in "Him who teaches my hands for battle and my fingers for war," if only it might be granted to us also, by divine power, for my writing hand to be directed toward the destruction of the heretical dogmas, and for my fingers to serve the overthrow of their wicked array, skillfully and competitively...
A disposing the argument against the enemies. Just as in human wars those who excel the rest in courage and strength, and who are protected by their arms and have acquired experience in fighting through their practice in facing dangers, stand in the front of the phalanx and face the dangers on behalf of those stationed in the depths; while the remaining group, looking only to the appearance of a multitude, seems to contribute some benefit to the common cause through mutual defense and the locking of shields: so too in our own struggles, the noble and strenuous soldier of Christ, and the fierce combatant against the aliens, the great armed soldier of the Spirit, Basil, who has put on the whole apostolic armor and is protected by the shield of faith, holding forth the defensive weapon—I mean the sword of the Spirit—at all times: he, as the standard-bearer B of the Lord's army, fights in the discourse which he has fashioned against the heresy, raging and defending, and acting most bravely and excellently against the enemies. But we, as a nameless mass and like common soldiers, covered and protected by the shield of that standard-bearer and champion, according to how our leader in the war advances against the enemies, will not abstain from those struggles that are within our power. Since, then, he has refuted the deceived and unsubstantial fantasy of the heresy, saying that the appellation of "unbegotten" is attributed to God in no other way than by human conception, and has brought forth demonstrations confirmed by both common notions and the testimonies C of Scripture; and the inventor of the error, Eunomius, neither agrees with what has been said, nor is he able to overturn it, but is constrained by the truth—insofar as the dogmas of piety shine forth more brilliantly, so much the more, like nocturnal animals, he is blinded and hallucinates at the light, and finding none of the customary hiding places of sophistical arguments, he wanders in vain, and entering into the dead-end of falsehood, he revolves around the same things. And all his second effort is almost entirely occupied with the same trifles. For this reason, it is fitting that the battle against the adversaries be engaged in by us in this D very area, in which our champion also led the way by his own discourse.
I say, first of all, that we ought to run through our entire opinion concerning the dogmas as a summary, and the disagreement of the enemies against us, so that the consideration of the matters before us may proceed for us correctly and in order. The head and sum of Christian piety is therefore this: to believe in the Only-begotten God, who is truth, and true light, and the power of God, and life; to believe that He is truly everything He is called, and—before other things—these: God and truth, that is, that He is always God in truth, which is what is understood and signified; and that He never did not exist, and will never at any time not exist. Whose being—whatever it may be in its essence—escapes every grasp of comprehension and curiosity. As for us, just as the discourse of Wisdom says [Sap. xiii, 5], from
A the magnitude and beauty of created things, according to a certain proportion of those things which are known, one comes to knowledge of the fact that He exists—granted through works only, not knowledge of what He is. Since, therefore, this understanding prevails among all Christians—those, at least, who are worthy of this name, who have learned from the Law to worship nothing that is not the true God—as they worship the Only-Begotten God, they confess in truth that He is God and not falsely named. Then there grew in the Church the corrupting rust which renders pious seeds useless, being a patron of Jewish error and containing also something of Greek impiety. For in that it imagines God is a creature, it acts as a patron of the error of the Greeks; but in that it does not accept the Son, it supports the Jewish delusion. B This heresy, therefore, which obliterates the true divinity of the Lord and argues that He is not to be thought of as uncreated, nor is that which indeed in essence and power and dignity is the Father: since the truth shines everywhere, these nebulous inventions have no support. Having disregarded all the names discovered in Scripture for a glorification worthy of and fitting to God, which are used equally of the Father and of the Son, they arrived at that which is called *agennesia* [unbegottenness], a name fabricated by these very people to the contempt of the majesty of the Only-Begotten. For since the pious confession teaches faith in the Only-Begotten God, so that all may honor the Son even as they honor the Father, they push aside all these pious expressions by which the greatness of the Son is signified to be of equal honor with the dignity of the Father, and from this they C conjure up for themselves the principles and foundations of an impious and God-denying dogma. For since the Only-Begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is from Him, by transmuting the understanding of this into other names, they tear apart the true faith through them. For when the truth teaches that the Father is from no superior cause, they named this idea *agennesia* [unbegottenness], and they signify the subsistence of the Only-Begotten from the Father by the term *gennesis* [generation]. Then, putting together the two terms, *agennesia* and *gennesis*, as contradictorily opposed to each other, they drive those who are ignorant and unskilled in consequences into error. D For as one might declare, for example, that one is generated and is not generated, it is similar to saying "he sits and he does not sit," and whatever else is uttered in such a way. But these men, moving or twisting these terms from the genuine signification that they have according to nature, perversely strive to apply to them a different understanding for the overthrow of piety. For since, as has been said, the meaning of these words is equivalent to what is said: "he sits and he does not sit" (for in some way the one is removed by the other of the meanings), they sophistically contend that this contrariety according to the form of utterance is an indication of a difference according to essence; determining that generation is the essence for the one, namely the Son, and non-generation for the other, namely the Father.
As it is not possible to think of the essence of man as sitting or not sitting—for no one would give the same definition by defining man's chair and man himself—so the ungenerated essence, according to the analogy of the example given to us, is something else entirely in its own definition compared to that which is indicated by the fact of not having been generated. A But they, looking toward that wicked goal, so that the denial of the divinity of the Only-Begotten might be most securely established by them, do not say that the essence of the Father is non-generation, but, having inverted the argument, they define non-generation as the essence, so that by the differentiation with respect to that which is generated, they might construct a difference of nature through the contrariety of terms. And while they look with countless eyes toward impiety, yet toward the impossibility of this labor they are as if blinking, with the eyes of the soul made dim. For who, unless his soul’s instruments of perception are altogether bleary, does not discern the instability and groundlessness of the beginning of their dogma, and how their argument, which makes non-generation an essence, rests on nothing at all? For thus is their deception constructed. I will speak, as I am able, forcefully with my own voice, subjecting the argument of the adversaries. B
They say that God is named "ungenerated," but that the Divine is simple by nature; and that which is simple admits of no composition. If, therefore, God is by nature incomposite, to whom the name "ungenerated" belongs, then "ungenerated" would be the name of that very nature. And there is nothing else, they claim, that the nature is, except non-generation. C To these we say this: that the signification of "incomposite" is one thing, and that of "ungenerated" is another. For the former represents the simplicity of the subject; the latter represents its being without a cause. Furthermore, the nuances of the terms are not interchangeable, even if both are spoken of one and the same thing. For from the title "ungenerated," we have learned that the one so named is without a cause; but from the title "simple," we understand that he is free and pure from every composition. Neither of these, however, is spoken in place of the other. There is, therefore, no necessity that, because the Divine is simple by nature, non-generation should be named as his nature. But insofar as he is without parts and incomposite, he is called simple; whereas, insofar as he was not generated, he is called ungenerated. D But if the term "ungenerated" did not signify "being without a cause," but rather simplicity were what entered into the meaning of such a name, and therefore he was called "ungenerated" according to the logic of the heresy because he is simple and incomposite; then, if the meaning of "simple" and "ungenerated" were one and the same, the simplicity of the Son would absolutely be named "non-generation." For they will not deny that the Only-Begotten God is simple by nature, unless perhaps they would also deny that he is God. Therefore, simplicity will have no communion with "ungenerated" according to their meaning, such that the nature should be thought to be non-generation because of the incomposite nature, lest they draw upon themselves one of two absurdities: either by denying the divinity of the Only-Begotten, or...
even in Him celebrating the notion of the ingenerate. For if God is simple by nature, and the name (according to them) of this simplicity is "ingenerate," then they will construct it such that the Son is composite, whereby it is demonstrated at the same time that He is not God; or if they confess the divinity in Him, and God is simple, as has been said, they will inevitably construct it such that the same is also ingenerate on account of the simplicity, if indeed simplicity is considered the same thing as ingeneracy. But in order that what is said may become clearer, I shall repeat what has been said. We say this, that in each of these names there is something proper underneath which is signified; and neither is that which is indivisible interpreted by "ingenerate," nor is "ingenerate" interpreted by "simple." But in the "simple," we conceive of that which is not composite, and in the "ingenerate," we have been taught that it is to be from no cause. We believe that we must hold that the Son, being God from God, is also simple, because that which is God is pure from all accretion. B And in the same way also in this case: we do not signify the simplicity of the essence through the name of "Son," nor do we represent what is signified by "Son" through simplicity itself. Rather, let the subsistence which is from the Father be made manifest from this, namely, the name of "Son"; and let that which such a term declares be made manifest from the "simple." Since, therefore, the account of the simplicity according to essence is one and the same, and is said both of the Father and of the Son, differing neither by any diminution nor by redundancy, while the "begotten" differs greatly in its signification from the "ingenerate"—for it is possible to understand this in one of the names, which in the other is not—on this account we say there is no necessity, since the Father is ingenerate and His essence is simple, that His essence be called ingeneracy. For neither, since the Son is simple and is believed to be the same and begotten, do we call His essence simplicity. But just as the essence is simple, and not simplicity, so also the essence is ingenerate, and not ingeneracy. In the same way, while the Son is also begotten, the argument is entirely separated from any necessity that His essence be defined as His generation because His essence is simple; but here, too, each of the names has its own proper significance. For the designation of "begotten" suggests to one's mind that He is from something, and [the designation] of "simple" suggests that which is alien to and free from composition. But these things do not seem so to them; for they wish, since the essence of the Father is simple, for it to be thought that it is nothing other than ingeneracy, and therefore He is also called ingenerate. To whom it is permissible to say this as well: that since they also name the Father Creator and Maker, and he who is called by these names is simple according to essence, it is time for these wise men to declare that the essence of the Father is creation and craftsmanship, since the account of simplicity carries every signification of the name said concerning Him away into the essence. D Therefore, let them either separate ingeneracy from the definition of the divine essence, leaving it to its own proper significance alone, or, if on account of the simplicity of the subject they define the essence by ingeneracy, let them, for the same reason, contemplate creation and craftsmanship also in the essence of the Father, as if the power in the essence were not creating and making, but itself [the essence].
A If they reject this as wicked and absurd, let them be persuaded by the logical consequence to reject that doctrine along with it; for just as the craft is not the essence of the craftsman, so neither is the unbegottenness the essence of the Unbegotten. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I shall resume the same argument. If the Father is called unbegotten not because he was not begotten, but because his essence is simple and incomposite; then for the same reason the Son also will be considered unbegotten, for he too is an essence uniform and incomposite. But if we must necessarily confess the Son to be begotten—since he was begotten—then it is clear that we shall call the Father "unbegotten," since he was not begotten. And if this—both the truth and the sequence of the propositions—compels this, it is clear that the term "unbegotten" is not that of an essence, but is significant of a certain difference of concepts that distinguishes what is begotten from what is not begotten. B
Then let us also examine this in addition to what has been said: If they say that the name "unbegotten" signifies the essence, and not that the hypostasis exists without a cause, by what name will they establish that the Father is without a cause, since they have set aside "unbegottenness" for the indication of the essence? For if we are not taught by the term "unbegotten" the difference that distinguishes the hypostases, but are to suppose it to be indicative of the nature itself—as if it were flowing somehow from the underlying reality, and by the utterance of the syllables revealing what is sought—it is absolutely necessary either that God is not unbegotten, or that he is not called so, given that no term provides such an emphasis specifically C in his case. For if, as they say, unbegottenness does not mean being without cause, but indicates the nature, their sophistry will necessarily be overturned against them to the opposite conclusion, and it will be found that "the unbegotten" escapes their dogma regarding God. For if no other word or name represents that the Father was not begotten, and if, according to their wisdom, "unbegotten" interprets nothing else but "not having been begotten," their argument slips away and flows towards Sabellius. For it is absolutely necessary by this consequence that the Father be thought to be the same as the Son, the difference regarding "begotten" and "unbegotten" having been stolen from their dogma. So one of two things must be the case: either they will retract their opinion about the name, acknowledging it as a difference of the property of each and not signifying nature; or, remaining in their stated positions regarding this term, they will agree with Sabellius. For there is no way in which the difference of the hypostases can preserve what is unconfused if it is not distinguished by the begotten against the unbegotten. So if the name signifies D a difference, the essence will be...
A insignificant, for the account of the difference is one thing and the account of the essence is another. But if they drag the meaning of the word towards the nature, they will be consistently dragged into the deception of those called Patripassians, the clarity of the account regarding the Divine hypostases being removed. But if they say that nothing prevents the difference between the unbegotten and the begotten from being signified by "unbegottenness," and that this word also represents the essence, let them distinguish for us the relative meanings of the name, so that they may be able to be properly fitted to each of the two definitions into which the concept of the "unbegotten" has been split. For the declaration of the difference from the name has no ambiguity, being established by the principle of contrast. For we also agree that, instead of "the Son has been begotten and the Father has not been begotten," the one is called unbegotten and the other begotten according to a certain paronymy of words. But from what concept will the indication of the essence be clarified through this name, they would not be able to say.
But the new theologian, wrapping this in silence, weaves together other trifles for us, B following up on his previous writing: "Because," he says, "God is simple, He is called unbegotten, and therefore unbegottenness is God." What does the discourse of simplicity have in common with the concept of the unbegotten? For even the Only-Begotten is both begotten and is not doubted to be simple. But he says, "also indivisible and incomposite." What is this to the matter in question? For the Son is not multiform and composite, yet He is not thereby unbegotten. But he says, "He is devoid of quantity and every magnitude." Let these things be so. For the Son also cannot be defined or circumscribed by quantity, and is devoid of all quantity, and is nonetheless the Son. But this is not what falls into question; for the proposal is to demonstrate by what meaning of "unbegotten" the essence is recognized. C For since the principle of the difference of the idioms was grasped from this word, they wished it to be ambiguous as well as an indication of the nature, from some one of those things which are signified by this same designation.
But he passes over this in silence. He says, however, that "the unbegotten is not to be attributed to God by concept." For things spoken of in this way, he says, are naturally dissolved along with the words themselves. But what is there that is not dissolved at the very moment it is spoken? For we do not, like those making vessels from clay or bricks, preserve the things uttered through the voice as indissoluble, according to the formation of speech once made in the mouth; but as soon as the word is uttered through the sound, the thing spoken D no longer is. For again, the breath of the voice having been poured out into the air, no trace of the things spoken is imprinted in the place where the diffusion of the voice has occurred. So if he characterizes the word "by concept" with this—the fact that the word does not remain but vanishes together with the voice of the speaker—he would not stop naming every word a "concept," since no hypostasis remains in any word after its utterance. For not even the unbegottenness itself,
A which he removes from the concept, will he be able to show as indissoluble and fixed after it has been brought forth, since the speech brought forth by the sound from the mouth does not remain in the air. And thus one might learn the instability B of what is said: that even if we are silent and commit the thoughts of the soul to writing, that which is not subsistent will be lacking the notation that comes through letters, whereas the existing realities of our thoughts will receive that notation. For it is possible for everything that comes into the mind—whether it subsists according to understanding or is otherwise—to be entrusted to letters by one’s authority. Furthermore, sound is the same as the letter for the manifestation of the mind, for we declare what is thought through both in equal measure. Why, then, he sees fit to dissolve the concept by the voice alone, I cannot perceive. For in every word uttered through C some sound, the breath which conveys the voice migrates toward its kindred, but the mind of the things said is imprinted through hearing upon the memory of the listener’s soul, whether it should happen to be true or false. Therefore, the writer proposes to us this frigid interpretation of the concept, characterizing and defining it by the dissolution of the voice. And for this reason, that intelligent listener, as Isaiah says, strikes out this unintelligible physiology of the concept, proving it to be truly dissoluble and D unsubstantial according to his argument. He technicalizes concerning the power inherent in the expression through familiar examples, leading the argument forward by the contemplation of the dogmas. Against whom Eunomius, exalting himself through this solemn writing of words, attempts to dissolve what had been clearly explained concerning the concept, in this manner.
It is perhaps better, before scrutinizing what has been written, to examine the purpose: what is his intention in avoiding the calling of "the unbegotten" as belonging to God
by concept
? A common dogma has prevailed among all who have received the word of piety, that one must place all hope of salvation in Christ. As it is impossible to attain among the goods otherwise, if the faith in Christ does not provide what is sought. Since this thought is firmly fixed in the souls of believers, and all honor, worship, and glory is laid up for the only-begotten God by all as the author of life, who performs the works of the Father, as the Lord Himself says in the Gospel, and who is inferior to the Father in no excellence according to every notion of a good thing—I do not know whence they were moved by hostility and envy against the Lord’s honor, judging the worship offered to the only-begotten God by the believers as a loss and detriment to themselves, they contradict the divine honors, and attempt to persuade others that nothing of what is said about Him is truly spoken. For neither is He God, if He be named—A with a certain qualification by Scripture, in truth God; nor, if He is called Son, does He have the nature that is declared by this name, nor is there any communion of dignity or nature between Him and the Father. For they say it is impossible for the one who has been begotten to be equal in honor with Him who made him, as regards dignity, or power, or nature. For to Him, life is without limit, and His existence is from eternity; but as for the Son, His life is in a certain way circumscribed, since the beginning in which He was begotten terminates the forward movement of His life, and prevents it from extending along with the eternity of the Father; so that even for this reason His life is thought to be imperfect and not integral. And they say that the Father was not always what He now is and is called, but that, being something else before, He afterwards deliberated upon becoming Father—or rather, not upon becoming, but upon being called so. For He was not in truth named Father of a Son, they say, but the name of a creature was substituted B under the name of Son. Everything, they say, that is posterior to the more ancient, and that which is defined to that which is eternal, and that which is begotten according to the will of Him who made it, must necessarily be surpassed by Him who made it in power, and dignity, and nature, and by the prerogatives of time, and all other rights of honor. But if that which is perfect in the more divine conceptions is absent from Him, how could anyone properly revere Him with the honors of the true God? Thus, by their own principles, it is constructed that the Son is imperfect in power, destitute of the perfection of life, subject to the powerful one, and doing nothing of His own except what is ordained by the decree of the sovereign; and that one ought not to believe that such a one is worthy of any God-befitting honor or conception, but that, while calling Him God, they are merely carrying around a name void of every magnificent meaning. And as these things are spoken thus, without the interweaving of reasonings, it somehow provokes the hearer to anger and makes him shudder at the exotic nature of the statement. For who would accept a wicked counselor who, bare and unvarnished, advises the overthrow of the majesty of Christ? On this account, having covered over this wicked ambush of their discourse with certain persuasive enticements and deceits, they lead astray the foolish among their hearers with external and profane reasonings. For, having prepared the other things through which it is possible for the intelligence of the hearers to be dragged spontaneously to these conclusions, they leave to the auditor the end of the catastrophe, or the final act of the drama. For when they have said that the only-begotten God is not the same in essence as the true Father, and have concluded this captiously and fallaciously D through the opposition of the unbegotten to the begotten, they complete what follows from this while keeping silent, the impiety prevailing of its own accord through the logic of the consequence. And just as a poisoner makes the lethal poison easily acceptable to the one whom he maliciously wants to kill, by sweetening the destruction with honey—and he indeed merely provides it, but the substance, once mixed into the internals, works the death and destruction even if the poisoner does nothing further—something similar is accomplished by these men. For by the pleasant seductions of their sophisms, the soul-destroying doctrine
like some honeyed poison, is poured into the mind of the hearer to deceive him, namely, that the Only-begotten God is not the true God. Through this, they quietly accomplish all the rest. For once they have persuaded them that he is not truly God, it follows that nothing else spoken of God in a divine manner is said in truth either. For if he is neither Son nor God by nature, but each of these is used only by catachresis A, then surely all the other names by which he is named in Divine Scripture are also separated from the truth. It is not possible that the one thing would be spoken of him in truth, while the other lacks truth; rather, all things surely follow one another. Therefore, if he is truly God, it is necessary that he be also judge and king and whatever else is individually said of him, just as it is said. But if the divinity were falsely B attributed to him, then nothing else said of him would be stated in truth. Since, therefore, those who have been deceived and led into error have been persuaded that the title of divinity is falsely named in the case of the Only-begotten, it has at the same time been prearranged that one should neither worship him nor pay him the honor owed to God. Therefore, that their attack against the Savior might be effective, they devised this method of blasphemy: they advise that one should not observe the communion found in other names, through which the equality of the Son’s dignity with the Father is signified, but from the opposition of the Unbegotten to the begotten, to collect by syllogism the difference and distinction of nature—for this is what they claim the divine nature is, which the name of "unbegottenness" signifies.
Then, though all people possessed of a mind suppose it impossible for the ineffable nature to be expressed by any power of words, since our knowledge does not extend so far as to be able to reach those things that surpass everything that is known, nor has the ministry of words attained such power in us as to be sufficient to express what is conceived by the mind, if indeed anything C at all lofty and divine enters our thought, these wise men, on the other hand, accusing the many of great sluggishness and lack of skill in logical reasoning, confirm that they themselves know this, and that they are able to instill knowledge about these things in whomever they wish. And for this reason they say that the divine nature is nothing other than unbegottenness itself, and by declaring this to be the most sovereign, the highest, and the most supreme thing, they enclose the entire majesty of the divinity within this single word; so that from this it results: if unbegottenness is the most sovereign part of the essence, then the rest D of the divine names are linked to it—the divinity, the power, the incorruptibility, and all the rest. If, therefore, this and such things are unbegottenness, then surely if this is not said of someone, then neither are those things. For as being rational, capable of laughter, and capable of knowledge are proper to man—and if something is not a man, then neither will it be among the properties of that nature—so too, if unbegottenness is the true divinity, then for whom this name does not apply, neither will anything else characterizing divinity be found in him. Since, therefore, unbegottenness is not said of the Son, it follows that none of the other lofty and divine names are said of him.
A This, then, is what they define as the comprehension of the divine mysteries: that the divinity of the Son should be annulled. They shout this almost openly and publicly to everyone who will listen, that it is permitted for you to be "perfect in knowledge" while not believing that the Only-Begotten God is truly God, and while not honoring the Son as the Father is honored, but while thinking that the Son is by nature a creature, not Lord or Master, but a slave and a subordinate. For the end of their counsel aims at this, even if the blasphemy is cloaked in other words.
Because of this, B in his previous composition, as he dances about with the trickery of sophisms and treats the "unbegotten" with varied technical definitions, he pilfers the understanding of those being deceived, where he says: "If, then, it is neither by mental concept, nor by privation, nor in part—for it is simple and there is nothing else in it, for it is one and alone unbegotten—it itself would be an unbegotten essence." Seeing, therefore, the loss that necessarily results for those who have been led astray, and that it is a transgression of the confession unto the Lord, namely, an assent to this proposition that He is not truly God, to which the sequence of these words twists the dogma: for this reason, he [our author] does not oppose the claim that unbegottenness should not be applied to God as a part, C agreeing himself that the divine is simple, without quantity, without dimension, and incomposite; but he both opposes and proves that this name ought not apply to Him by way of mental concept. Not abiding by these [points], the word-writer again sets forth his own wisdom against us in the second of his discourses, fighting against the things that were said regarding [mental] concept.
But it will be a fitting time henceforth to recall to the memory of these men the construction pertaining to this, adding only this: there is no power in human nature for the exact comprehension of the essence of God. D Perhaps, however, it is a small thing to assert this of human power alone; but if one were to say that even the incorporeal creation is too small to grasp and contain in its knowledge the infinite nature, he will not be altogether wrong, as one can surmise from examples familiar to us. For as there are many and diverse living things that have obtained life through flesh—some winged, others terrestrial, and that which dwells above the clouds by the power of wings, and that which is situated in the hollows and dwells in hiding—if they were judged against each other, the aerial [creature] would appear to be not a little removed from the terrestrial. But if the comparison were made with the stars and the unmoving sphere, the creature that floats through the air by flight would be considered no less separated from the heaven than the animals of the earth. Thus also, the power of the angels, when compared to our own, seems to surpass it greatly, because, with no sensation to disturb it, naked and unconcealed in its cognitive power of the high things...
A that are sublime and eminent. But if, along with the majesty of Him who truly is, the comprehension of them were to be examined, perhaps he who dared to say that their power does not differ far from our own brevity in respect to divine knowledge would not venture this without some probable reason. For the gulf that separates the created nature from the uncreated nature, by which the latter is walled off and fortified, is great and impassable: the former is finite and bounded, but the latter has no boundary; the former is circumscribed by its own measures as it pleased the wisdom of the Maker, but the measure of the latter is infinity itself. The former is stretched out by a certain interval-based extension and constrained by time and place, but the latter surpasses every conception of an interval. Whoever directs their mind to this, avoiding curiosity in this life B, is permitted to understand both the beginning and the end of the things that are: this beatitude, which is above the creature, seeks neither beginning nor end, but is beyond what is signified by either; it is always in the same state, having entered into itself, and does not perform a life-journey from one thing to another through intervals. For it is not brought into being in the act of living by the participation of another life, such that it would be a logical consequence to conceive of a beginning and an end to that participation. Rather, that which it is, is life operating within itself, which becomes neither greater nor lesser through addition or subtraction. For, in the infinite, there is no place for increase toward something greater. Indeed, that which is by nature impassible is not capable of a conception involving diminution. Just as when we look at the sky C and, as it were, through the instruments of the senses of sight, attain to the beauty that is on high, we do not doubt that what appears exists, but when we are asked what it is, we are unable to define its nature in words; but we only gaze in wonder at the circular revolution of the whole, and the harmonious motion of the planets in the opposite direction, and the circle which is called the Zodiac, inscribed obliquely upon the pole, in which those who are learned and wise in these matters observe the motion of those things that are revolving in the contrary direction; and the differences of the luminaries according to their magnitudes and their own properties, their risings and settings in the circular period of the year, occurring always at the same times without any error or deviation, and the conjunctions of the wandering stars, and the returns of those that go beneath, and the eclipses of those that are above, and the shadows of the earth, and the restorations of those that D were eclipsed, and the multiform change of the moon, and the motion of the sun in the midst of the poles, as being full of its own light and crowned in a circle with its rays, and embracing all things with its illuminating power, while sometimes it also is eclipsed, when the lunar body, as they say, meets it and casts a shadow; and as it ever completes its own course according to the will of the One who ordained it, and travels through the ordered progress and the regulated place, rolling together the four seasons of the year within itself: seeing these things, we do not doubt that the things which appear, through which we see, do exist; but we are so far from grasping the essence of the reasons for each of the things that exist, that it is as if we had not even recognized the beginning of the phenomenon with our sense. So also, regarding the Maker of the cosmos, that He exists we know, but we do not deny that we are ignorant of the account of His essence.
A Those who boast that they know these things should first speak about the things of a lower nature: what do they think the celestial body is? What is the mechanism that carries the orbs through the universe? In what does the motion occur? For whatever one may calculate with their intellect, the reasoning, as it proceeds, will surely end up in doubt and uncertainty and incomprehensibility. For if one should say that some other body of a similar shape, fitted to the form, holds the orbit—just as the course, being always bent, circles around itself in a similar way—by the necessity of that which encloses it, it is prevented from moving in a straight line: how will he say that these bodies endure, not being consumed by the constant friction among themselves? And how is the motion effected, as two bodies of the same nature are fitted to each other according to a pattern, when the one remains B motionless? For by the immobility of that which holds/encloses, that which is held within will be rendered entirely impotent with respect to its own activity. And what is it that secures the solidity of that enclosing body, so that it remains unshaken, not being agitated by the motion of that which is fitted to it? And if, according to the curious investigation of the intellect, some seat might be imagined for that too, which preserves its position in firmness, the reasoning, proceeding according to logical sequence, will surely investigate also the base of that base, and then another, and another after that. And in this way, the inquiry, proceeding through similar steps, will advance into the infinite and end in an inextricable impasse, as it investigates something further and further beyond the body situated at the final level as the foundation for the constitution of the universe, so that the reasoning that always seeks the "enclosing" shell of that which encloses can never stand still.
But some deny that this is so. According to the hollow suspicion of those who have philosophized much on these matters, a certain void is poured around the celestial surfaces. And the vertigo of the universe, gliding into this, turns back upon itself, finding no repulsion from any solid thing that could stand on a contrary base and strike against the circular motion C as it proceeds. What then is that void, which they say is neither body nor concept? And up to what point does it stand? And what does it contain? What is the kinship of the solid and resistant with that void and non-subsistent thing? What is the medium between things that are disjoined in nature and differ? And how is such great concord of the universe constituted through things of diverse nature? And what would one say the heaven itself is? Is it a mixture of the elements contained in it, or one from among all, or something else beyond these? And what are the stars themselves? From where would one say that brilliance shines upon them? And what is this brilliance? And how is it constituted? And what is the reason for their difference according to beauty and magnitude? And as for the inner circles, which carry around the motion contrary to the whole, what are they, or by what necessity are D they driven? And what of that immaterial and ethereal fire, and the air poured through the middle, acting as a sort of partition wall for the heating and consuming nature against the moist and liable-to-be-consumed? And how, at the lowest extremity, is the earth...
is subjected to everything, and what keeps its position in the firmament? What is it that checks its downward motion? If one were to cross-examine us on these and similar questions, who would be so bereft of his senses and so beside himself as to dare promise knowledge of such things? For the upright and candid there is no answer left but this: that He who made all things in wisdom alone knows the rationale of creation. But we understand by faith that the worlds were framed by the word of God, as the Apostle says. B
If, therefore, the lowly creation, which reaches as far as our senses, is beyond the measure of human knowledge, how could He who by His will alone constituted the universe be contained within our comprehension? This is vanity and false madness, as the Prophet says, to think that understanding of the incomprehensible is granted to anyone. It is possible to see this in young children, who, owing to the ignorance of their age, are simultaneously playing and studying. For often, when a sunbeam shines in through a window, they are delighted by its beauty and approach the appearance, striving to take the ray in their hand and vying with one another; they grasp at the light with the encircling of their fingers, thinking they have bound the radiance. But when the knot of their fingers is loosened, the capture of the ray slips through their hands, appearing to cause laughter and clapping among the toddlers. So it is with the children of our generation, as the parable says, sitting in the marketplaces and playing. C They who see the divine power shining into their souls through the rationale of Providence and miracles—like a ray or heat flowing from the solar nature—do not marvel at the grace or worship Him who is understood through these things; rather, having overstepped the capacity of the soul, they grasp with the handles of sophistries at the One who flees all touch, and they imagine that by their arguments they hold what they opine. But when reason has penetrated and unfolded the tangle of sophistries and traps, those who are capable in mind and in the judgment of reason discover that nothing has been grasped. Thus, with a small-minded and infantile spirit, laboring in vain over the impossible, they enclose the ungraspable nature of God within a child's palm—the few syllables of "ingenerate"—and support their own dementia, imagining God to be only so much and such a kind of being as to be capable of being contained by human reason through a single appellation. And while they pretend to follow the voices of the saints, they do not fear to exalt themselves above them. D For what no blessed man is shown to have said, of whom some account is recorded in the divine books, these men—as the Apostle says—neither knowing what they say nor of what they affirm, nevertheless profess themselves to know, and boast of being guides of knowledge to others. And on this account, they claim to have truly comprehended that which is called the Only-Begotten God.
A For the necessity of their syllogisms demands this. Wretched, indeed, they are in their keenness of mind; how miserable and ruinous to them is their studied philosophy! Who so zealously rushes headlong into the abyss as these men who, with labor and effort, have dug for themselves the pit of blasphemy? By what a measure have they been severed and cut off from the hope of Christians! By what a gulf have they been walled off from the saving faith! By what a distance have they departed from the faith of our father Abraham!
He (if it is right, according to the greatness of spirit of the Apostle, to change the tone and understand the mind of the story allegorically, while the historical truth, of course, remains) went forth by divine command from his own land and his own kindred—a departure fitting for a prophetic man pressing toward the knowledge of God. For it does not seem to me that some local migration is what reconciles the comprehension of things found intellectually; rather, he departed from himself and his own land—that is, from an earthly and humble way of thinking—and, as far as possible, rose above the limits of common nature in his understanding, leaving behind the affinity of the soul with the senses. B Being hampered by none of the things that appear to the senses, he would not be obscured or darkened toward the understanding of invisible things; neither did the surrounding noise of hearing, nor the sight seducing his understanding toward visible things, hinder him. As the Apostle says, walking by faith and not by sight, he was so exalted by the greatness of his knowledge that he is considered the boundary of human perfection, having attained as much knowledge of God as it is lawful for this brief and mortal power to stretch and grasp.
Wherefore, the Lord of all creation, as if he had become some discovery of the patriarch, is called, in a special sense, the God of Abraham. But yet, what does the scripture say about him? That he went out, not knowing whither he was going. But not even the name of the One whom he loved was he permitted to learn; nor, however, did he fret or blush because of this ignorance. This, therefore, was his secure and safe guidance toward what was being sought: that he was not led by the hand, as it were, by any of those things that are ready at hand for understanding—in those notions concerning God—and that his intelligence, moved by nothing whatsoever of those things which can be comprehended, did not halt its progress. C But just as he had surpassed, by reasoning, his native wisdom—I mean the Chaldean philosophy—which stands only at the level of visible things, and, becoming higher than those things known through the senses, he desired to see the unformed beauty from the splendor of the things that are contemplated and from the harmony of the heavenly wonders, so also did he treat all other things that he grasped as he advanced in his reasoning—whether power, or goodness, or the fact of being without origin and beginning, or of being limited by no boundary, or any other such thought concerning the divine nature—as provisions for the upward journey and as steps, D always using the things that are discovered as a base for that which surpasses all things that are known.
A Since he has run past every conjecture about the nature of God that arises from names within the assumptions regarding Him, and has cleansed his mind of such suppositions, having taken up faith—a thing unmixed and pure from every concept—he has made this an unerring and manifest sign of the knowledge of God: to believe that God is, which is better and higher than any sign given for knowledge. Therefore, after that ecstasy which fell upon him from those lofty spectacles, B he again bowed down to human weakness: "I am," he says, "dust and ashes"; that is, speechless and inactive in relation to the interpretation of the Good which had been conceived in his mind. For earth and ash seem to me to signify what is lifeless and barren at once, and thus the law of faith becomes for the life that follows, teaching through that history to those who approach God that it is not possible to approach God otherwise, unless faith mediates and joins through itself the mind that seeks the incomprehensible nature. For having left behind the meddlesomeness that comes from knowledge, "Abraham," he says, "believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness." C But it was not written for his sake alone, the Apostle says, but for our sake, because God reckons faith, not knowledge, to men as righteousness. For knowledge has a certain mercenary disposition, assenting only to what is known; but the faith of Christians is not so. For it is not the substance of things known, but of things hoped for; and that which is grasped is not hoped for. "For what a man has," he says, "what does he even hope for?" But faith makes that which escapes our comprehension our own, by its own certainty guaranteeing that which is not seen. For thus the Apostle says regarding the faithful one, that "he endured, as seeing Him who is invisible." Vain, therefore, is he who speaks through the knowledge that puffs up in vain, saying that it is possible to know the divine essence. D For neither is man so great that he can equal his own power of comprehension to the Lord—"For who among the clouds will be likened to the Lord?" says David—nor is the object of the search so small as to be contained by the reasonings of human brevity. Hear the Ecclesiastes advising: "Do not utter a word before the face of God, because God," he says, "is in heaven above, and you are upon the earth below." He shows, I think, through the connection—or rather the distance—of these elements to one another, how much higher the divine nature is than the comprehension of human reasonings. For by as much as the stars are higher than the touch of his fingers, by so much, or rather by many times more, does the nature that surpasses all mind stand above the reasonings of the earth-born.
A Therefore, having learned how great is the difference of nature, let us remain within our proper bounds in peace and tranquility. For it is safer at the same time and more pious to believe that the majesty and magnificence of God is more than what B is understood, than by circumscribing His glory with certain opinions, to imagine nothing exists beyond that; especially since no one would say it is safe not to leave the divine essence unscrutinized, as it is ineffable and untouchable by human reasonings. For to wish to reach toward the obscure by conjecture, and to pry into some knowledge of the hidden things from the meditation of human reasonings, offers a passage and consequence even to erroneous assumptions. Because he who has conjectured about things that are unknown will assume not only the true, but often even the lie itself, as true. But the disciple of the Gospels and the prophecy believes both that He who is, is—as much from the holy Scriptures which he has heard, as from the fitting arrangement of those things which appear, and through the works of Providence. But what He is and how He is, as useless and profitless, he does not inquire, nor will he give any entrance to the lie against the truth; for in being overly anxious and curious in inquiring, perverse and fallacious reasoning finds a place, but by all curiosity ceasing, every necessity of going astray is absolutely hidden. And that true reason is present may be learned from this, how the heresies of the Churches have swerved into various and discordant opinions about God, when one person has deceived himself according to one motion of the mind, and another C according to another. How did these very people, about whom the discourse is, slide into this abyss of impiety? Was it not safer for all, according to the counsel of Wisdom, not to seek the deeper things? But rather, in peace, to keep the simple deposit of the faith for themselves inviolate and intact? But since the baseness and vanity of men has begun to walk recklessly through those things which cannot be comprehended by the mind, and to confirm with decrees the inventions of their own vain opinion: thence comes the long catalog of those who wage war against the truth, among whom are these very people of whom the discourse is, who have appeared as dogmatists of error and fraud, who, circumscribing with a certain definition what God is, almost openly fashion their own opinion like an idol, while they D deify this comprehension which is in them, as if it were something that is perceived in the divine nature by some reasoning, but rather being God Himself, or the essence of God. And yet perhaps it was fitting, while looking toward the choir of the saints—I mean the prophets and patriarchs, to whom the Word of truth sounded forth in many ways and in many forms—and after them those who became eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word, both to revere the authority of those who were testified to and confirmed by the Spirit Himself, and to insist within the bounds of their doctrine and knowledge, and not to dare those things which the comprehension of the saints did not affirm. For they, while the God unknown to human life was then—on account of the error prevailing about idols—making Himself manifest and known to men both from the miracles which appear in those things that were done by Him, and from the names through which the variety of the divine power is understood...
A they lead them as if by the hand to an understanding of the divine nature, making known to men only the magnificence of those things which are contemplated regarding God; but they have left the account of the essence, as that which can in no way be grasped, and which brings no profit or advantage to those who inquire too anxiously and curiously, as ineffable and uninvestigable. For they indeed recounted that all other things have been made—heaven, earth, sea, times, ages, and the creatures that are in them—but what each of these is, and how, and from whence, they passed over in silence. Thus also concerning God, they advise us to believe that He is, and that He becomes a rewarder to those who seek Him; but the nature itself, which is above every name, they have neither named nor cared to investigate.
For if we have learned any name for the declaration of divine knowledge, all these names have a communion and proportion with such names as demonstrate the property of any human being. For just as those who describe an unknown person by certain indications and signs—saying, if it so happens, that he is of noble, well-born parentage, brilliant in wealth, conspicuous in dignity, flourishing in his prime, and in such and such a state of body—do not by saying such things demonstrate the nature of the one who is described, but rather signify certain signs and marks of those things which are known about him; for neither his nobility, nor his wealth, nor the brilliance of his rank, nor his appearance in his prime is the human being himself, but each of these things is observed in someone—so too, B all the words of the holy Scripture, having been found for divine glorification, signify something of those things which are declared regarding God, each offering its own proper meaning, through which we are taught either that He is2 power, or that He is insusceptible to anything inferior, or that He does not exist from a cause, or that He does not come under the circumscription of an end, or that He has dominion over all things, or in general something of those things which are contemplated regarding Him. But the essence itself, as neither graspable by any intellect nor expressible by speech, it has left uninvestigated, ordaining that it be honored in silence, while forbidding the inquiry of profound matters and while decreeing that one must not utter a word before the face of God. C
For this reason, whoever might wish to search every divinely inspired voice will not find the doctrine of the divine nature, nor indeed of any other of the things that subsist according to essence; whence we live in ignorance of all things, first, we humans, being ignorant of ourselves, and then of all other things besides. For who is there who has attained to a comprehension of his own soul? Who has understood its essence? Is it material, or immaterial? Purely incorporeal, or is there something corporeal about it? How does it come into being? How is it tempered? From whence is it instilled into the body? How does it depart? What is it that has the binding and middle connection to the nature of the body? How is it, though untouchable and without form, D enclosed in some particular circumscription? What is the difference according to the activities? How is the same thing both above…
the heavens, while it investigates with curious inquiry the things that are invisible, and yet glides down to material affections, being dragged down by the weight of the body, `B` having anger and fear, grief and pleasure, mercy and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and boldness, friendship and hatred, and all things that are wrought in opposition to the faculties of the soul? Who then, having considered this, has not thought that he holds within himself a kind of people of souls gathered together, of which each one of those things mentioned differs greatly from the rest? And in what part it prevails, and has command over the remainder, so that even the rational power itself succumbs to the dominations and empires of such movements and is subjected to them, and brings its own cooperation to such impulses as if to some tyrannical master? Who, therefore, from the divinely inspired Scripture has taught us about this manifold and multiform power of the things that are understood in the mind? Is it one thing tempered out of all, and what is the tempering and conspiracy of opposites among themselves, so that what is one may be many? But is each of these, understood separately, enclosed within the soul as if in some spacious vessel? And how is it that we do not always have a sense of all of them pressing upon us, being confident and fearful at the same time, hating and loving, grieving and rejoicing, and having within us a confused and mingled motion of all other things, but rather acknowledge their dominion bit by bit, when one of these prevails while the others are quiet? What deeper composition and arrangement is this, and what is this spacious capacity empty in us, so that to each one its own proper place is assigned, as if prohibited by certain means and intervening partitions from being carried to the commerce and commingling of its neighbor? And if this very thing, anger or fear or the rest of the things mentioned, subsists by essence, or if they are non-subsistent motions, what discourse has explained it? For if they subsist by themselves, there is not one soul, as has been said, but a certain gathering of souls is contained within us, since each of these is a `D` secret and distinct thing in a peculiar and circumscribed soul. But if we must think that these are some motion which cannot subsist, how does that which does not exist essentially dominate and command us, dragging us into slavery as if by tyranny, whichever of these happens to prevail? And if the soul is something that is perceived by the mind, how can that which is composed and built up of many parts be considered in the intelligible, when such a notion ought properly to be viewed without these corporeal qualities? And the power of the soul—the appetitive, and the nutritive, and the alterative—and the fact that while all the members of the body are nourished, the sense does not nevertheless penetrate through everything, but just as those things which are inanimate, some things in us lack sense, such as bones, cartilages, nails, and hair, which are nourished but do not feel. Who, then, [can explain] the semi-perfect activity of the soul in these things?
And what shall I say regarding the soul? Neither has anyone yet attained to any clear grasp of the bodily qualities of the flesh itself. For if anyone by theory dissolves that which appears into the elements of which it is composed, and, having stripped them of their qualities, strives to perceive the underlying subject by itself, I do not see what will be seized by such speculation. For when one has taken away from the body its color, its shape, its solidity, its weight, its size, its position in space, its motion, its capacity to be affected and to act, and its relation to something else—of which each taken by itself is not a body, though all are beheld in the body—what then will remain that receives the definition of a body? We are able neither to perceive this by ourselves, nor have we learned it from the Scriptures. But he who is ignorant of himself, how would he know anything that is above him? And is not he who has become accustomed to ignorance of himself clearly taught by this very fact not to be surprised at the things hidden and concealed from without?
For this reason, even the elements of the world we know through B sense only so far as to receive from each what is useful for our life. But the account of their essence we have neither learned, nor do we consider our ignorance a loss. For what profit is it to me to inquire curiously and anxiously into the nature of fire: how it is produced, how it is kindled, how it seizes the material placed before it and does not depart before it has consumed and exhausted the underlying subject; how the spark lies hidden within the stone; how iron, though cold to those who touch it, brings forth and generates flame; how wood rubbed against wood ignites a fire; how water shining in the sun creates a flame? And as for the cause of its upward movement, and its ever-moving power, and all such things, passing over them as matters to be investigated with anxious curiosity, we have perceived only what is useful from them for our life; knowing that he who C receives the benefit without fuss has nothing less than the one who busies himself with useless inquiries.
For this reason, Scripture has passed over the rambling talk about the essence of created things, as something superfluous and useless. And it seems to me that the son of thunder, John, having echoed the preceding proclamations with the greatness of his own dogmas, understood this when he said at the end of the evangelical history 19: "There are many other things which Jesus did, which, if they were written one by one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that would be written." In saying all this, he does not mean the miracles of healing, for the history has not left any one of these unrecorded, even if it has not made mention of every one of the healed by name. For when he says that the dead are raised, the blind sight is restored to, the deaf hear, the lame walk, and again that He healed every disease and every infirmity, he has left no miracle unrecorded; having included the particulars in these general notions. But perhaps the evangelist, out of D the depth of his knowledge, says that the...
majesty of the Son of God is not A to be known only from the miracles wrought through the flesh; for these are small when examined in comparison with the rest of the magnitude of his works. But do you look up to heaven, behold the beauties within it; transfer your thought across the breadth of the earth, to the depths of the water, and having taken hold of the entire world with your mind, and having understood by reason the transcendent nature, know that these are the true works of him who dwelt among you in the flesh. Which, he says, if they were written down each one, what and how, and whence, and how much, the fullness of the teaching about the world itself would be beyond the capacity of the world. For since God made all things in wisdom, and the wisdom of God has no limit—for "of his understanding," he says, "there is no number" (Ps. CXLVII, 5)—the world, finished with its own measures, will not contain within itself the discourse of infinite wisdom. If, therefore, the whole world is too small to contain the teaching of the works of the Lord, how many worlds will contain the narration concerning the God of all? For perhaps not even the blasphemous tongue will deny that the maker and author of all things, which were brought into existence by his will alone, is greater by infinite parts. If, therefore, every creature is incapable of containing the discourse about itself—for this is what the great John testifies, according to our argument—how would human brevity contain the whole discourse about the Lord of creation? Let these loud-talkers say what man is, when considered in comparison to the whole; what geometric point is so indivisible? What Epicurean atom is so thinned out by the vanity of those who contemplate these things C and becomes almost that which is not, as human brevity is nothing when judged against the universe? Just as the great David also says, having well contemplated the infirmity of mortals, "For my substance is as nothing before thee" (Ps. XXXVIII, 6), not saying that it is absolutely nothing, but signifying one like to nothing, being extremely short when compared to that which does not exist.
Nevertheless, urged on by such a nature, they widen their mouths against the ineffable power, and with one appellation they measure the ineffable nature, restricting the essence of God by the name of unbegottenness, that they may pave for themselves D through these things a path of blasphemy against the Only-Begotten. Although the great Basil had corrected this deceived and false opinion, and explained a few things about names—that they are not from nature, but are applied to things by human invention or conceit—they are so far from returning to the truth that, as if by some bird-lime, they stick to what has been said by themselves, nor do they cease from their captious and fallacious argumentation, nor do they define the "unbegotten" as being spoken by conceit, but as representative of nature. To pursue and review the whole argument, and to attempt to overturn that raving and long-winded garbage they have appended, word for word, would require much leisure and much time and much
B exemption from business and from the management of affairs. Just as I hear that Eunomius, during the Trojan war—having applied himself laboriously and sedulously throughout the multitude of years, and in much tranquility—composed this long dream for himself in much sleep; seeking dilligently and skillfully, not how he might interpret any of the things understood, but how he might drag forced meanings against the words, and collect the more sonorous terms from certain writings. And just as beggars, through a lack of clothing, stitch together tunics for themselves from certain rags by pricking them with a needle: so also does he, plucking one word from here and another from there, weave for himself a patchwork of this discourse through them, not without misery joining and composing the seam of words, whose slippery and youthful ambition is as much to be rejected by a man looking toward the truth, as it is incumbent upon some strong and more mature athlete, no longer suited for youthful passions, to flee from the superfluous and polished finery and adornment of a woman.
But having briefly run through the scope of the whole undertaking, I adjudge the long circumlocutions and détours of words to be dismissed. Therefore, it has been said by us (for I make the discourse of my teacher my own and domestic one) that we have a very faint and brief perception and comprehension of the divine nature through reasonings: nevertheless, being content with the scantiness of our ability, we glean a sufficient knowledge through those names which are piously spoken concerning it. We say, however, that the significance of all these names is not uniform, but that some have an indication of things present in God, while others have an indication C of things absent from Him; for example, when we call Him just and incorruptible, we demonstrate with "just" that justice is present, but with "incorruptible," that corruption is not present.
It is possible, however, to change the meanings and, conversely, to apply the names to God in a fitting manner; so that through that which is not present, the appropriate [quality] is represented, and through that which is present, the alien [quality] is represented. For since injustice is understood as contrary to justice, and eternity as opposed to corruption, it is possible to use opposites appropriately regarding God, and not to err from what is fitting, by saying that He is always and that He is not unjust: which is equal to saying that He is just and does not admit of corruption. Thus, we say that the rest of the names also, by a certain exchange of meaning, are suitably disposed toward either indication, such as "good" and "immortal," and all things expressed according to a similar form. For each of them, being interchanged in D one way or another, can indicate both what is present and what is not present in the divine nature; so that while the figure of the names is changed, the pious understanding regarding the subject remains immovable. For it is the same thing to call God not capable of wickedness, and to name Him good; and to confess Him immortal, and to call Him always living. For we perceive no difference in these according to their meaning, but we signify one thing through both expressions, even if the one seems to have a positing, and the other a removal, of something.
In the same way, when we call God the beginning of all things, and again name Him "without beginning" A, we do not contend regarding the concepts, since in both cases we are declaring Him to be the originator and cause of the universe. So whether we say "without beginning" or "originator of the universe," by the former we have presented what is not present, and by the latter what is present. Since it is permitted, as has been said, to transpose the perceptions of the names through an exchange of the things signified, and to change them to the contrary, it is possible for what is present to be made known through a certain transformation by a name that otherwise seems discordant, and conversely for the other. For it is permitted instead of saying that He has no beginning, to define that He is the beginning of the universe, and again instead of this, to confess that He alone subsists in an unbegotten manner. So that while the words seem to differ from one another by a change of form, the thought B in what is said remains one and the same. For the thing earnestly sought in discourses about God is not to devise a smooth, sweet, harmonious, and lyrical sound of words, but to discover a pious understanding through which what is fitting to the conception concerning God may be preserved. Since, therefore, it is pious to consider the originator of the universe as not having a cause superior to Himself, this understanding being fixed and remaining with us, what contention and conflict of words still remains for those endowed with mind and judging rightly? Since every utterance by which such a mental sense is expressed conveys the same thing. For whether you call Him the beginning and cause of the universe, or name Him as without beginning, or as being unbegotten, or as subsisting from eternity, or as the originator of the universe, or as from no cause alone, all these things C are in some way equal to one another as far as the power of the things signified is concerned. And vain is he who struggles and contends over such a sound of a word, as if piety consisted not in the mind and the intent, but in syllables and sounds. Therefore, this understanding having been articulated by the teacher, by which it is allowed to those who are not covered and veiled by a heretical covering to clearly see that the Divine, however it exists according to its nature, escapes every touch and perception of sense, and surpasses the intellect, and is more sublime and higher than every comprehension which consists in reason; human intelligence, however, curiously and solicitously investigating and searching out the inaccessible and high nature with such arguments as it can, D and reaching out for it, is neither so keen-sighted as to clearly and evidently behold what is invisible, nor yet so entirely cut off from approach and closeness as to be unable to receive any shadowed image of what is sought; but it has attained a certain part of what is sought by the touch of reasoning by conjecture, and in part, from the fact that it cannot behold Him, it has in a certain way known Him, or rather, has known that what is sought is beyond all knowledge. For it has understood the things that are discordant concerning the divine nature, and it has not understood the things that it is fitting to suppose concerning it; yet it was not able to behold it—that which is, concerning which it reasons these things—but it saw from the knowledge of the things that are present and not present, which is the only thing that is possible to be seen. That, being established far from all evil, in
every good is understood. Which indeed is altogether such as I say: ineffable, and by the movements of reason incomprehensible and inaccessible. Since, therefore, our master and teacher has purged away all indecorous notions which the mind might suspect concerning the divine nature, and has counseled and taught us to think concerning it whatever is laudable and becoming to God, so that neither anything corruptible, nor anything of those things which have been brought into the nature of things through generation, is the first cause, but it is understood as outside of any such suspicion—and by the negation of those things which do not belong to it, and by the affirmation of those things which are piously understood concerning it, it is comprehended that it exists. A
But this vehement opponent of the truth struggles against what has been said, and desires that such a sound of words—I refer to the term "unbegotten"—manifestly demonstrate the essence B of God. And yet, it is obvious and clear to anyone who has considered even slightly the uses of names that "incorruptibility," by means of the privative particle, signifies that nothing of these things belongs to God: neither corruption, nor birth. For many other names also are spoken in like manner, indicating the removal of that which does not belong to it, not the position of that which is. C For example: "innocent," "harmless," "without evil," "imperturbable," "without anger," "impassible," "irreproachable," and all such things. These indeed are spoken truly, and it is as if there were a certain catalogue and enumeration of things thought of as worse, from which the Divine is separated. Yet the discourse does not by these names express what that which is spoken of is. For what is not sound has been taught through what we have heard, but the power of what has been said has not indicated what it is. D Just as if someone wishing to say something about the nature of man were to say that it is neither inanimate, nor devoid of sense, nor winged, nor four-footed, nor aquatic; he has not indicated what it is, but has clarified what it is not—and he does not lie while recounting these things about man, nor yet does he clearly demonstrate the subject. By the same reasoning, when many such things are spoken about the divine nature, we learn in what things we ought to suppose God to be, but what it is in essence we are not taught by the things said.
Fleeing, however, with all caution from being carried away into any absurd notions in the opinions we must have concerning God, we have made use of many and various titles for him, fitting the appellations according to the difference of our conceptions. Since no name has been found comprehensive of the divine nature, which is ordained to declare the nature of the subject itself, therefore by many names, according to different conceptions, making a certain peculiar notion of him for each, we address the Divine, hunting for some names from the multiform and various signification concerning him for the understanding of that which is sought. For in questioning and examining ourselves as to what the Divine is, we declare it in different ways: for instance, that which is pre-eminent
A over the constitution and administration of the things that are; which does not have its existence from a cause, but is the cause of being for all other things; in which there is no birth or beginning, no destruction or end, nor change toward the opposite, nor diminution of any excellence. As such, neither does evil find a place in it, nor is the good absent from it. But if anyone wishes to grasp such concepts by means of names, it is entirely necessary to call Him immutable and unchangeable, as He does not admit of any change for the worse. And to call the first cause of the whole "unbegotten"; and "incorruptible," as being unsusceptible to corruption; and "immortal" and "never-ending," as terminating in no end; and to explain Him as the "Almighty," as ruling over the whole. And thus, fashioning names for all other things according to pious conceptions, we address Him in different ways through the differences of our perceptions, signaling through these names either His power, or His sovereignty, or His goodness, or the fact that He exists without a cause, or that He abides B forever.
I say, therefore, that men are the masters of such name-fashioning, fittingly applying to the subject the appellations that appear appropriate to each. And there is nothing absurd in what the writer puts forward, which he presents as something formidable and terrifying, that is, to admit that the assigning of names is more recent than the very thing itself that is being named, even in the case of God Himself. For God is not a word, nor does He have His being in voice and sound. But God is what He is in Himself, as He is believed to be. Yet He is named by those who call upon Him—not what He is (for the nature of Him who truly is is ineffable), but He has names derived from those things which He is believed to perform and effect in our life, such as this very name that is readily spoken. For when we call Him God, we are thinking of Him as the Observer and Watcher and the Discerning Knower of hidden things, and we call upon Him. But if C the essence precedes the operations, and we understand the operations through those things we perceive, and we declare them in words as we are able, what fear remains in calling the names more recent and younger than the things themselves? For if we do not first explain any of the things said about God before we have conceived them in our mind—and we conceive them through the things by which we are taught from His operations, and the power precedes the operation, and the power depends on the divine will, and the will is deposited in the power of the divine nature—are we not clearly taught that the appellations significant of the things that occur are born *after* the things, and that vocal utterances are like shadows of the realities, fashioned according to the movements of the things that exist? And that this is so is clearly persuaded by the divine Scripture through the great David, who, as if through certain proper and innate names—those which were known to him D from the operation—invokes the divine nature. For, he says, "The Lord is compassionate and merciful, long-suffering and rich in mercy." What then are these, that they should be said to have the significance of operation, or of essence? One could not say anything other than operation.
A When then did God perform mercies or mercy, and obtain this name from that operation? Was it before human life? And who was there that was in need of mercy? It was only after sin: but sin is after man. Consequently, both the operation of showing mercy and the name of mercy are after man. What then? Will he also condemn David, B who is wise above the prophets, because he named God by those things through which he perceived Him? Or will he even kick against him, bringing forward that noble expression as if from a tragedy, that one must not say the most blessed life of God exults in names derived from human reasoning, which was exulting in itself alone even before the origin of those who conceive it? For he who would undertake the cause of the Prophet will surely say that the divine nature was indeed exulting in itself alone, even before the generation of those who conceive it; but the human mind, in as much as it is capable of being taught through these operations, speaks no more than that. For Wisdom says that from the greatness and beauty of created things, the Creator of all is proportionably considered. But C as regards the divine essence, which exceeds every intellect, we celebrate such titles, not praising it with exultation through the things by which we name it; but guiding ourselves through what is said toward the knowledge of hidden things. Then the Prophet says to the Lord: "You are my God, since you have no need of my goods." How then do we thus adorn the most blessed life of God, as this man supposes, which the Prophet declares to be in no need of human goods? Or did he conceive "to exult" in place of "to name"? And yet we hear from those who use language correctly, and who, through the exactness of names, have been trained in their usage, that the word "to exult" is not placed there for a bare indication; but that such a term means either to make known, or to declare, or to signify, or something else of that sort said in such a way. D To name, to exult, is the same as to boast, and to rejoice, and whatever partakes of such an emphasis. But he says that we "exult" the blessed life with the names of conception. We, however, do not deny that we attempt to recognize some of the things concerning the divine nature through piously conceived words and names, although we think it is greater than human weakness to add any honor to the divine nature, which is above every honor. And for this reason, as far as is possible for us, tracking piety, we understand that the first cause does not have its subsistence from a cause that is over and above it. If one were to accept this as true, it would be praiseworthy for the sake of truth alone. But if one should judge it to be greater than the rest of those things understood about the divine nature, and for this reason should say that God is exulting and rejoicing in this opinion alone, as one of those who exult in things that are superior, this would belong to the muse of Eunomius alone, who says that it exults in its own unbegotten state, which he indeed calls essence, and names a blessed and divine life.
If, however, anyone should say, regarding the divine nature, that God is joyful and rejoicing, as though exulting in some of those things which are pre-eminent, this belongs to the sole Eunomius
A but let us hear how, according to the manner fitting for the need and the preceding pattern—for thus it flourishes again for us and displays itself in names formed in the same way—how he says that through these things he dissolves the opinion formed about Him, and restrains the ignorance of the deceived. For I shall use the very same terms of the dithyrambist that end in like manner. "Having said," he states, "that those things which are spoken by an operation of the mind are naturally dissolved along with the words," we added these things: "But God, both when those who are in the nature of things are silent and when they are speaking, and before names had been made, was and is unbegotten." Let us learn, therefore, something common to the excogitation of words or the positing of names, in relation to the things themselves which we mark by any utterance of names and verbs. Wherefore, if God is in an unbegotten manner before the human constitution, it is necessary to judge the utterance that declares such an opinion as being, as it were, diffused in sound, to be improper if it should happen to be named according to human notion; for it is not the same thing to be, as it is to be called. But God is by nature that which He is. He is spoken of by us, however, as far as it is possible to declare it, because of the poverty of our nature, which has affections in the soul that are hidden and not manifest, unless they have been unfolded through voice and reason. Therefore, understanding Him to be without a cause, we declare this concept by an operation of the mind through the utterance of "unbegotten." What harm, then, is it to Him who is such, that He should be named by us as what He is? For it is not from being called "unbegotten" that He exists in an unbegotten manner, but from His being, the being called so also accrues to Him. This, however, he who is subtle and clever in his ingenuity has not understood, nor has he clearly perceived the things posited by himself. For he would certainly have ceased to reprehend those who construct the name of unbegottenness through an operation of the mind. For consider, he says: "Those things which are spoken by an operation of the mind are dissolved along with the words; B but God, both before those who were generated and before names were created, both was and is unbegotten." Do you see that His being what He is, He has before the existence of all things, even when they are silent and when they are speaking, neither more nor less being what He is? But the usage of verbs and nouns was thought out after the production of men, who were adorned by God with the faculty of reason and speech. If, therefore, the creature is posterior to the Creator, and man is the last of all creatures; and speech is proper to man; and the parts of speech are nouns and verbs; and "unbegottenness" is a noun; how does he not understand that he is contradicting the things he is building up? For we both affirm that names have been invented by human ingenuity to declare and signify things, and he himself confesses that those who use language have been shown to be posterior to the divine life; and that the divine nature is as it now is and always was, unbegotten. If, therefore, he confesses that the blessed life existed before men were born—for I shall again turn back and use the same argument—we do not argue against the fact that men were born at a later time, but we say that they have used verbs and nouns from the time we came into being and were created as rational. C
A For "ingenerateness" is a name indicative of its own notion; and every name is a part of human speech. If, then, he confesses that the divine nature existed before men, he must agree that the appellation invented by men is later than that nature. For it was not reasonable that the use of speech should have been in operation before the creation of those who use speech, just as agriculture did not exist before those who cultivate the fields, nor navigation before those who sail, nor any other thing among those performed in life before the human life itself was established. Why, then, does he fight against us, not even knowing the consistency of his own arguments?
"God," he says, "was what He is before man was made." We do not deny this either. For whatever is conceived concerning God, that existed before the foundation of the world. But we say that this began to be named after the one who names Him began to be. For if we use names for this reason, that instruction about things might be gained by us therefrom—and only that which is ignorant stands in need of a teacher, whereas the divine nature, because it embraces all knowledge, is superior to all instruction—then it is demonstrated by these facts that names were devised not for God's sake, but for our sake, for the declaration of the Being. For it was not so that He might learn about Himself that He applied the name of ingenerateness to His nature. For He who knows all things, and Himself before all things, has no need of syllables and words to learn what His nature and dignity are. B But in order that we might have some comprehension of those things which are piously conceived concerning Him, we have impressed the differences of our notions with certain words and syllables, as if they were certain seals and marks C engraved by the formations of speech upon the movements of the mind, so that the declaration of the movements which arise in the soul might be made clear and unconfused through the sounds applied to the notions.
Why, then, does he refute our statement, by which we say that the name of "ingenerateness" was devised for the indication that God exists without beginning, by saying that God, both before those who speak, and those who are silent, and those who think, and before the very conception of things that have come to be, was and is ingenerate? For if there were someone constructing the argument that He was not ingenerate before the name was found by us, he would be worthy of pardon for writing those things against such an absurdity. But if the existence of Him before both speech and thought is confessed by all, and the placing of the name by which the mind is declared is said to have been found by us through conception; and yet the goal of his battle against us is to demonstrate that the name was not devised by men, but was something existing before our constitution, D I know not by whom said: what has that in common with his proposed study, namely, to say that before the things that are, God subsists in an ingenerate manner, and to confirm with great effort that the conception is later, and to affirm what he has said? For it is the mark of those who are insane
or demented to declare that God is a A conception. But if this argument neither exists nor has existed—for who would be driven to such a pitch of stupor and folly as to assert that He who truly is, and who brought all other things that are into existence, does not exist in His own peculiar subsistence, but is to be pronounced a conception of the name?—why does he contend in vain with an illusory struggle against things which no one asserts? Is it not the manifest cause of this insane contention that, being ashamed because those who were deceived by the captious argument of this name have been refuted—since it has been proven that the name is separated by a wide interval from the meaning of 'essence'—he willfully creates confusion in the things being said, transferring the conflict from the name to the realities? He does this so that the unwary may be easily deluded by such confusion, thinking either that God has been called a conception by us, or that He is later than the invention of human names; and for this reason, having left our unassailable argument B untouched, he shifts the battle elsewhere. For our position was, as has been said, that the name of 'ingeneracy' does not demonstrate the nature, but corresponds to the nature by way of a conception, through which it is signified that He subsists without a cause; whereas the doctrine being built up by them was that the word is indicative of the essence itself. Where, then, was it established that the power of the name is such? But these things are certainly reserved for other discourses. All his effort is occupied in demonstrating that God subsists ingenerately, just as if someone were clearly to ask him about these matters, what sort of understanding he has concerning the name of 'ingeneracy': whether he considers it to be conceived for the purpose of demonstrating that the First Cause lacks beginning and origin, or as declaring the essence itself. And he, with great gravity and haughtiness, would reply that he does not doubt that God is the Creator of heaven and earth. C Just as, therefore, this discourse is dissonant from the subject proposed and does not follow in a connected series, in the same way you would find that the battle he has beautifully described against us is also disconnected from the point. Let us consider it in this way.
They say that God is ingenerate: to this we also assent; but that 'ingeneracy' is an essence, to this occurs our contradiction. For we say that this name is demonstrative of God subsisting ingenerately, not that 'ingeneracy' is God; he promises to refute this discourse of ours. What, then, is the refutation? That He was ingenerate before the constitution of men, he says. What is this to the matter being sought, which he professes he will demonstrate, D that the name is the same as the underlying subject? For he defines 'ingeneracy' as being an essence. What, then, is the demonstration of his promises? To show, namely, that God existed before those who use the word. O marvelous demonstration, and one to which it is impossible to contradict! This is from the art of dialectic
logical workmanship of art? Towards which of those uninitiated into the secret teaching would anyone look? But he A gravely mocks for us the very name of "notion" [ἐπνοία] in the distinctions regarding the notion. For of those things, he says, that are called by notion, some have their existence only in pronunciation, as those that signify nothing; others [exist] according to individual thought. And of these, some are by way of amplification, as in the case of colossi; others by way of diminution, as in the case of pygmies; others by way of addition, as in the case of many-headed creatures; or by way of composition, as in the case of half-beast beings. You see to what point the wise man, having fragmented the notion for us, did not deign to let its power proceed further. He says the notion is insignificant, irrational, [and] sophistically contriving things contrary to nature, or mutilating, or overstretching the defined measures of nature, or composing from heterogeneous things, or producing wonders B by strange additions. Having mocked the name of "notion" in these things, he demonstrates that it is utterly useless and unprofitable to life. Whence, then, [come] the higher disciplines? Whence [come] geometry, and the philosophy of arithmetic, and the teaching of logical and physical theorems, and the inventions of machines? And the wonders done by bronze and water in horoscopes? And this philosophy concerning being, and the contemplation of intelligible things, and to speak collectively, all the occupation of the soul with great and high things? And what of agriculture? What of the skill of navigation? What of the rest of the management [of life] throughout our life? Whence is the sea made passable to man? How has that which is in the air been enslaved to that which is on the land? How is the untamed tamed? How is that which is most fearful subdued? How does that which is more powerful C not refuse the bridle? Was it not through notion that all these things were invented for human life? For, according to my account, a notion is a faculty discovering things unknown, finding what is next by means of the things concerning the first thought of what is being studied. For having understood something concerning the object of inquiry at the beginning of what has been grasped, by assembling the consequent through the discovered thoughts, we lead the endeavor unto the conclusion of the things being studied.
And what need is there for me to recount the greater and higher benefits of the act of notion? For it is permitted to one who is not contentious toward the truth to perceive that all other things, as many as are life-benefiting and useful to the life of men, that time has discovered, were discovered—not otherwise—but through notion. And it seems to me that [of] all the goods performed in us throughout this life, which are inherent in our souls from divine Providence, one who judges the power of notion to be the more precious D and more honorable would not stray far from a fitting and correct judgment. I say these things having been taught by Job, in which God spoke to the servant through whirlwinds and clouds, uttering both other things that it behooved God to say, and [declaring] that He Himself is the one who instructed man in the arts, and bestowed [wisdom] upon women.
A For that He did not instruct us in such arts by any literal activity, Himself presiding over the work, as one may see in the case of those who are taught bodily, no one, unless he be carnal and beast-like, would ever contradict. But it has been stated that the instruction in such arts was given to us by Him; therefore, He who gave to nature the power of thinking and discovering things sought after, Himself led us to the arts. And by the reason of the cause, everything that is discovered and perfected by thought B is referred back to the originator of this power. Thus also life discovered medicine; yet one would not be wrong to call medicine a gift of God. And everything that has been discovered in human life, both in peace and in war, being suitable for any useful purpose, did not have its source from elsewhere, but it is the mind that thinks out and discovers each thing for us, as it is appropriate to our nature. But the mind is the work of God; therefore, all that has been provided for us through the mind is from God. And I myself do not contradict the statement made by our opponents that the fabulous figments and monstrous falsehoods are fashioned and written by this power of thought; for even their argument contributes to our purpose. For we also say that the science of contraries is the same, both of beneficial things and of those that are otherwise, such as medicine, the art of piloting, and whatever else is of such a kind. For he who knows how to bring aid to the sick by means of drugs would know, if he should wish to misuse the art for destruction, how to apply poison even to the healthy. And he who directs a ship to harbor with a rudder could, if it were his pleasure to destroy the voyagers treacherously, steer it onto reefs or crags. And the painter, by the same art, has shown the most beautiful form upon a tablet, and has, in turn, clearly imitated the most hideous. C Thus, the trainer restores a limb that is dislocated or moved from its place by the skill of anointing, and if he wishes, by that same art, he can dislocate it.
What need is there, by recounting things one by one, to bring a great crowd into the argument? As, therefore, no one would contradict what has been said, that one who has learned any art is able to use that same art to effect things that are not proper, D so we say that the power of thought was indeed implanted by God in human nature for the good; but when some have misused this inventive faculty, it has often become a minister and creator of useless inventions. Therefore, not because the faculty of thought can plausibly fashion false and non-existent things, should it be thought that it cannot search out things that truly exist and have real subsistence; but this very aptitude and ability which it has for such things is a testimony to the well-disposed concerning that power of theirs. For that which is set forth to cause fear to those who see it, or to produce some amusement, does not lack the power of thought in order to accomplish what is being worked out; but to represent men having many hands and many heads, or breathing fire, or coiled with the sinuous bodies of serpents, or to exalt to a greater...
stature, or to clip the ways of nature to the ridiculous, or to narrate that men have been transformed into fountains, and trees, and birds—through which those who are delighted by such things may find some solace and enticement of soul—I say that this is the most evident proof that one can also, through the inventive faculty, conceive of things which are greater and more excellent in the sciences. For the mind has not been implanted in us by Him who gave it solely for the forming of things that do not exist; nor has it been allotted no faculty resourceful for things useful for the discovery of things beneficial to the soul. But just as the impulsive and elective faculty of our soul is by nature adapted and constructed primarily B for the desire of what is honorable and good, yet one might also use such an impulse for things that are not fitting; and one would not say that the faculty of choice has no inclination toward any good, merely because it occasionally has an inclination toward base things: so also the movement of the mind concerning vain and useless things is not an accusation of an inability in regard to what is useful, but becomes a proof that it is not ineffectual regarding things beneficial to the soul. For just as it has discovered there things for pleasure or astonishment, so too here it will not err in its approaches toward the truth.
One of the things being investigated was whether the first cause, which is God, is without beginning, or has its being dependent upon some principle. And having grasped with our intellect that what is conceived from another cannot be the first cause, we have devised a name expressive of such a conception, and we say that He who exists without a supereminent cause exists without origin and without beginning, or in an unbegotten manner. But we have named Him who is thus, that is, unbegotten and beginningless: indicating by this name not what He is, but what He is not. And that the name may become most clear, I shall attempt to demonstrate it through a more vivid example. Let the inquiry be about some tree, whether it is cultivated or has grown spontaneously. C If therefore it be from cultivation, we shall certainly call the tree "cultivated"; if spontaneously, "non-cultivated." Such a name does not deviate from the truth; for in any case, it will be the tree one way or the other, and it does not indicate the particular nature of the plant. For we have learned through the word "non-cultivated" that it is of spontaneous growth; yet if it is a plane tree, or a vine, or any other such plant that is being indicated, we have not learned it through such a name.
If now the example is understood, it would be time to transfer the discourse to the object of which it is an example. We have grasped that the first cause has its being from no supereminent cause. Therefore, bringing this notion into the form of a name for God, who exists in an unbegotten manner, we have named Him "unbegotten." That He is not by way of generation, we have declared through the significance of the name; but what the essence itself—which is unbegotten—is, according to its own nature, we have been guided to perceive nothing D of it from this appellation. For not even...
A is it reasonable that the conception of our reason should be so powerful as to lift us above the measures of nature, and to make us ascend to things that cannot be comprehended, and to enable us to encompass with our own knowledge those things to which there is no access for our understanding. But he disturbs our teacher, and he pulls apart and lacerates the discourse which the latter has regarding conceptualization; he insults the statements, once again reveling in his customary sound and applause of little phrases, and luxuriating in words. He says, "The testimony of those things whose interpretation he claims for himself, he shrinks from out of shame." For when he had enunciated some part of those things which are considered by our teacher concerning conceptualization—in which he said that the use of conceptualization is not only effective in vain things, but also has some strength toward greater matters, by means of the theory concerning wheat and seed and food—he brings in accusations against him, claiming that the things said by him are consequences of external or profane philosophy and that he circumcises the care or providence of God, because he does not confess that the names were imposed upon things by Him; and furthermore, that he brings aid to atheists, or those who deny God, and bears arms against Divine Providence, and admires their opinion more than divine laws, and attributes to them a greater praise of wisdom, as one who did not considerately weigh the first sayings of Scripture, because the appellation of fruit and seed was named by Scripture before men were brought forth to generation. These are his accusations against us—the thoughts are not written here in his own words, but the phrasing has been changed by us only as much as is sufficient B to correct the harshness and dissonance of the syntax of the things said. What then? What do we answer to the guardian of divine providence?
He claims we do a wrong because we do not deny that man was made by God to be a participant in reason, but we refer the inventions of words back to the reasoning faculty implanted by God in the nature of humans. And this is the most bitter of the accusations, by which the teacher of piety is accused of deserting to the opinion of the atheists, and is named an heir and patron of an illicit custom, and is called all the most terrible things. Let the corrector of our lapses, therefore, speak: "God imposed the appellations upon created things"—for this is what the new explainer of mystical doctrines says—"because God named the sprout, and the herb, and the hay, and the seed, and the wood, and things of this sort before the formation of man, when He brought those things that were made into creation by His command." If, therefore, he remains in the literal letter and in this part C judaizes—that is, clings to the opinion of the Jews—and has not yet learned that a Christian is not a disciple of the letter, but of the spirit (for "the letter," says the Apostle, "kills, but the spirit gives life"), he offers to us the bare reading of the letters according to the word, as if God were expounding these things. And he has believed this, that God did nothing else than, D according to the likeness of men, use spoken language
and voice, and sound to express his thoughts. If, therefore, he holds this, he certainly will not deny the things that follow from it. For our discourse is produced by the organs of speech—the windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, the mouth—assisted in the articulation by the drawing of air and the interior spirit. For the windpipe, inserted into the throat from below like a pipe, serves us; while the palate, through the empty space above that reaches to the nostrils, expands the sound at the top A like the sounding board of a lyre. Furthermore, the cheeks assist the discourse by being hollowed out and widened according to the various configurations of the articulations; and again, by pushing the sound through a narrow passage according to the manifold turnings of the tongue, which makes these turnings at one part or another of itself, either by the teeth or the palate, in a way roughening or compressing the spirit passing through it. The service of the lips also contributes something, as they touch the sound in different ways of movement and compose the form of the words. If, therefore, God imposes names upon things, as this new expounder of divine history has explained, naming the sprout, and the herb, and the wood, and the fruit: it is absolutely necessary that he said each of these things in no other way than, as it is said, according to the complexions of syllables, of which some are fashioned by the lips, some by the tongue, and some by both. If, therefore, the name could not be pronounced otherwise than by the parts of speech producing the syllables and the discourse through such a movement, it is certain that he also attributes these things to B God, and because of the necessity for discourse, he will also give the Divine a shape. For the specific formation of the parts that fulfill the speech is certainly a figure; and a figure is the boundary of a body; and it does not escape notice that every body is composite. But where composition is perceived, there too the dissolution of the composite is certainly understood. And dissolution, according to the concept, is the same as corruption. Therefore, this is the end of the victory of the writer against us: to demonstrate his own God, whom he fashioned through the name of "unbegotten," speaking indeed, so that he might not lack the discovery of names; but fashioned with vocal members, so that he might speak; and not devoid of a corporeal nature, because of the necessity of figures. For no figure could be viewed in itself unless it were shaped completely in a body; but by progressing little by little to the natural affections of the body, through composition indeed to dissolution, and through this to the end, C ending in the destruction of the body. Such, therefore, is the nature of the "new" God that has appeared through the sequence of the things said by this new creator of a god. But he defends what is written and asserts that Moses openly cries out: "And God said," and he adds the words: "Let there be light, and let there be a firmament, and let the waters be gathered together, and let the dry land appear, and let the earth bring forth," and all the things that are written thereafter. Therefore, through the sequence of the words D
let us examine the intent of what has been said. Who, even among the most simple, does not know that hearing and speech have a natural relationship one to another, and that just as hearing cannot function with no one speaking, so neither can speech be effective if it is not directed toward hearing? If, then, he asserts that God spoke, let him show us also the hearing to which He spoke; or will he reply that He said these things to Himself? A If so, He commands Himself by giving these orders. And who would accept that God sits directing Himself in what must be done, and using Himself as the minister and executor of His own commands? But even if anyone were to concede that it is pious to say this, what human being would need words and speech within himself? For the agitation of the mind is sufficient for each person to excite the impulse of his own choice. But he will surely say that He was conversing with the Son. B And what need was there of a voice for this? It is a property of corporeal nature to declare the thoughts of the heart through words; whence also writing has been discovered, equivalent in use to the voice. For we declare what is conceived in the mind equally by speaking and by writing; but we reach the hearing of those who are not very far away with our voice, while we declare our opinion to those who are far absent by means of letters. And for those who are present, according to the measure of the distance, we either heighten or lower the tone of the voice. Sometimes we even signify what must be done to those who are near by a mere nod of the head, revealing the counsel that is in our mind; and the eye, affected in such a way, indicates it, and a certain movement of the hand has shown whether a thing being done is to be approved or disapproved. If, therefore, those who are enclosed in bodies often make known the hidden movements of their mind to those who are near, without voice or word or conversation involved in letters, and silence has brought no detriment to the matter being performed, C then was there a need for words on the part of the immaterial and intangible—and as Eunomius says, the supreme and primary—essence, to declare the thought of the Father and make the will known to the Only-Begotten? Words, I say, which, as Eunomius himself admits, are accustomed to dissipate along with the voice—I do not know if anyone in his right mind would accept these things as true, especially since every sound is entirely poured out into the air. For neither can a voice exist except in the air. Therefore, it is entirely necessary to predicate some medium for them, between the speaker and the one to whom the speech is directed; for if there is no medium interposed, how will the voice pass from the speaker to the listener? What, then, will they call the medium by which they separate the Son from the Father? For in the case of bodies, the place in the air is made the medium, being something other, according to its own nature, than the substance of human bodies. But as for God, who is without touch, without form, and pure and immune from all composition, along with the Only-Begotten God—similarly, or rather in the same way, being a participant and consort of His own counsels in an immaterial and incorporeal manner: if He were to have communion through a voice, what medium would He have through which the word, moving and shifting, would flow into the ears of the Only-Begotten and be admitted? If indeed this is to be overlooked as unworthy of consideration, D that the...
A divine nature should be divided by cognitive operations, as among us each of the senses is distributed to its own proper object—the sight for what is visible, the sense of hearing for what is audible; and neither does the touch taste, nor the hearing perceive vapors or flavors, but each remains in the one operation to which it was ordered by nature, in a certain way remaining insensitive to that for which it is not naturally adapted, and having no taste for the enjoyment which the neighboring sense reaps B —that is not the case there, but God is whole throughout, wholly sight, and hearing, and knowledge. For it is not permitted to attribute more animal senses to the immortal nature, unless it is necessary to suppose something humble, and bring down the divine to low-lying opinions. Therefore, if we were to imagine the Father pouring forth words through a mouth, and the hearing of the Son performing the task of listening, what medium would we suppose, which leads the paternal voice to the Son's hearing? This must be either created or uncreated; but it is not possible to say it is created, for before the creation existed, the Word was. And there is nothing uncreated except the divine nature. If therefore the creature did not exist, yet the word mentioned in the creation of the world was, it was older than the creature. Therefore, if anyone says that words and the sound of a voice are signified by the Word, what medium will he place between the Son and the Father, by which the voice and the words were formed? For if there is a medium, it is undoubtedly in a peculiar and separate nature, so that it happens that it is neither the same with the Father nor with the Son according to nature, but some altogether different thing which distinguishes the Father and the Son from one another, being inserted between the two. What then will this be? It is not created; for the creature is younger than the Word; we have been taught that the Only-Begotten is begotten, but there is nothing unbegotten except the Father. Therefore the word of truth compels us to conceive that there is of necessity no medium between the Father and the Son. But where no distance is conceived, a compact and connected unity is absolutely C conceded; and that which is compact through everything does not use a medium of voice and word. And by compact I mean that which is inseparable in all things; for the term of the compact does not indicate any bodily structure in the intelligible nature, but the union and mixture of the intelligible with the intelligible through the identity of wills.
D Wherefore there is also no difference between the Son and the Father in will; but according to the archetype of the beauty of goodness, the image is also one of goodness. And just as if someone were to look at himself in a mirror (for nothing prevents representing the concept by bodily examples), the image will be formed in all things toward the archetype, so that the cause of the form in the mirror is the form that is looking into it; and the image neither moves nor inclines of itself, unless the archetype has initiated the inclination or the motion. But if that which precedes is moved, that which is shown in the mirror must also move at the same time. Thus we say that the image of the invisible God, the Lord, toward every will—
A of the Father is disposed immediately and without interval. The Father willed something, and the Son, who is in the Father, perceived the will of the Father; or rather, He Himself became the Father’s will. For, having all things of the Father within Himself, there is nothing of the Father’s which He does not possess. And if He possesses in Himself all things that are the Father’s—or rather, if He possesses the Father Himself entirely with the Father and those things which are of the Father—He possesses the whole paternal will within Himself. He does not, therefore, need to learn the Father’s will through a word, since He Himself is the Father’s Word in the higher signification of the word. Who, then, is that word which comes to Him who truly is the Word? And how does He who truly is the Word need yet another word for instruction? As He is in God, as the Apostle says, and explores all things, even the depths of God. B If, therefore, God speaks by a word, and every word is effective upon the hearing, let those who assert that God produces things through discursive words make known to us the auditory of those divine words. He has no need to speak to Himself, nor was the Son in need of that doctrine which consists of words: "The Spirit," He says, "explores all things, even the depths of God." The creature did not yet exist. To whom was the word spoken? "But," he says, "the Scripture of Moses does not lie, through which we have heard God say something." Nor is the great David one of those who lie; for he says clearly, word for word, that "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of His hands. Day unto day pours forth a word, and night unto night indicates knowledge." And when he says that the heavens and the firmament, and from the day and from the night, knowledge and words are announced, he adds again to these statements that these are not speeches nor discourses, nor are their voices heard. C How, then, are narrations, announcements, and words not speeches, nor a voice occurring through the sense of hearing? Does the Prophet contradict himself? Does he explain something of which there is no occurrence, teaching of a word devoid of sound, and a narration without speech, and an announcement without a voice? Or is the prophecy rather entirely true, which instructs us through what has been said, that the celestial narration, and the word which is cried out by the day, is not indeed an articulate voice, nor speech through the mouth, but a doctrine of divine power which occurs to those who know how to hear with a silent voice? D What, then, have we surmised concerning these things? (For perhaps if we understand this, we shall also understand those things which were written by Moses.) Often Scripture, for the sake of a clear understanding of the thing being declared, provides the contemplation of those things grasped by the intelligence in a more corporeal fashion, just as this decree is, which it seems to me David is setting forth. With this he teaches, through what he has said, that nothing of those things which exist has its subsistence from any fortuitous chance, just as some have opined that fortuitous and irrational entanglements of the first elements produced the whole world and the things within it, with no providence attending the things that are.
A And there is a cause of the constitution and administration of the universe, upon which the whole of nature depends, and from which it derives its principles and causes, and toward which it inclines and turns, and in which it remains. And since, as the Apostle says, his everlasting power and divinity are clearly seen, being understood from the creation of the world, for this reason every creature, and before all else, as the word says, the arrangement in the heavens, indicates the wisdom of the one who made it through the art which is apparent in the things that have come to pass. And this seems to me to be what he wishes to demonstrate, by offering testimony from the things which are apparent, that things that exist have been constructed wisely and skillfully, and remain forever in the power of the one who helms the whole. He says that the heavens themselves, through which they show the wisdom of the one who made them, are as if emitting a voice, crying out and proclaiming the wisdom of the creator without a voice. B For one may hear these things teaching as if by speech, that, look toward us, O men, and at the beauty and size that is in us, and at this perpetual movement in a circle, and at the well-ordered and harmonious motion which is always and in the same way, and perceive the one who stands over our constitution, and through the beauty that is apparent, reason toward the prototype and invisible beauty. For there is nothing among us that is masterless, or self-moving, or automated; but everything that is seen and understood concerning us depends upon the high and ineffable power. These things are not articulate speech, but through the things that are seen, they instill into souls the knowledge of the divine power, more than if speech were proclaiming it through a voice. C Just as, therefore, the heaven declares, and does not speak, and the firmament announces the work of God, and does not need a voice, and the day does not put forth a word, and there is no speech, and no one would say that the prophecy is at fault; in the same way, since the teacher for both Moses and David was one (the Holy Spirit, I say), who speaks of the command having been given to creation, he does not suggest to us a God who is a creator of words, but of things which are made known through the meaning of words. For so that we might not conceive of creation as something masterless and self-produced, and that it had come to pass through a sequence, it is to be understood that those things said by Moses in the character of history regarding the creation of the world were spoken dogmatically. For otherwise, through each of the things written, the erroneous and vain [opinion] of those who hold the contrary would have been more clearly refuted. But it is permitted to whoever wishes, by looking into the things we have labored upon regarding Genesis, to test which reasoning is more consistent, our dogmas or those of our adversaries. But we must return speech to the study we proposed. D That the expression "He said" does not at all indicate a voice and a word in God, but by revealing the power that accompanies the will of God, it indicates to us the intelligible contemplation more accomodated to the senses. Since, therefore, all things consist by the will of God, and it is habitual for men to indicate their will first by speech,
A and thus to bring the work into conformity with the will, the Scripture concerning the creation of the world is, in a way, introductory for those who are beginning to know God; it represents the strength and power of the divine nature through things that are more readily understood. And the apprehension of things through the senses is more readily available for the knowledge of things intellectual. For this reason, Moses, by saying that God commanded this or that to be made, represents the impelled authority of the will; and by adding, "And it was so," he indicates that there is no difference between will and energy in the divine nature, but he teaches that in God, the intellect precedes the energy, yet the energy does not follow the act of intellection as if coming later, but the two are together, and are observed at the same time: both the elective motion of the mind and the power that brings the thing to completion. For reason provides no gap B between the election and the action; but just as with the ignition of a flame, the radiance also shines forth, existing from it and shining together with it, in the same manner, the substance of things that have come to be is the work of the divine will, yet it does not follow the will in order or sequence. For it is not, as in other things in which some active power exists by nature—where one is observed in potentiality and the other in the fulfillment of the act—as, for example, we say that a shipbuilder is always a shipbuilder in potentiality, possessing the art of ship construction, but that he works only when he demonstrates his knowledge in his work. It is not so in the blessed life; but everything that is understood in it is efficacious and is action, as the will passes without an intermediary to the end it has proposed to itself. As, therefore, the adornment in the heavens testifies to the glory of the Creator and acknowledges Him who made it, and yet does not need a voice, so, conversely, let one who has taken a passage from the Scripture of Moses consider with me that God, who by His command produced all things into the nature of existence, calls the world His own creature, nor does He need words to declare this knowledge. As, therefore, he who has heard that the heavens declare, did not seek an explanatory discourse—for the world speaks to the one who possesses a mind through the things that happen, allowing the declaration that is made by words to be of no account—so also if anyone hears Moses saying that God is mandating and commanding by name concerning each of the parts of the world, let him neither suspect the prophet of lying, C nor let him degrade the high contemplation with meager and base notions, as if transferring the Divinity to the level of man by such things, and supposing Him to recount commands and orders after our own custom. But let the command explain the will, and let the names of the created things signify the very substance of the things that have come to be, so that one may learn two things through what is said: both that God brought all things to completion by willing them, and that without effort and labor the divine will became nature. But if anyone interprets the phrase, "God said," D more carnally and crudely, as if by this an articulate word
A of the divine mind were being fashioned, the same person will certainly suspect that the phrase, "God saw," is also to be understood according to our own sensory perception through the activity of the eyes. And the passage, "The Lord heard and had mercy on me," and, "He smelled the sweet savor," and everything that Scripture relates more corporeally concerning the divine head, or foot, or hand, or eyelids, or fingers, or sandal, he will interpret according to the ready meaning, and will portray the Divine to us as being in human form, according to the likeness of those things which appear in us. But if anyone, hearing of the "works of fingers" as the heavens, and a "strong hand," and a "high arm," and an "eye," and "eyelids," and a "foot," and "sandals," considers through each of these things mentioned ideas worthy of God, and does not defile the discourse concerning the pure nature by polluting it with corporeal opinions, it would be logical to hold that the utterances of words are indeed signs of the divine will, but not to suppose them to be articulate voices; rather, one should consider that the Creator of rational nature has bestowed upon us speech, proportioned to the measure of our nature, so that we might be able to express the movements of the soul through it. B Now, as much as one nature is distant from another—I mean the divine from our own—by the same measure of existence all things that are around it differ from those things observed in us, in being more magnificent and more worthy of God. And just as our power, when compared with the power of God, is nothing, and life compared with Life, and all other things of ours compared with those things judged to be in Him are as nothing before Him, just as the prophecy says; so also our word, when compared with the Word who truly is, is nothing. For this word of ours was not C in the beginning, but was constructed together with our nature; nor is it viewed as having an independent existence, but, as the master says somewhere, it vanishes with the noise of the tongue; nor is it possible to understand any work of this word, but it has its existence only in voice and letter. But the Word who is from God is God, the Word who was in the beginning and remains forever, through whom all things both are and consist, and who presides over the whole, and has all authority over those things in heaven and on earth, being Life, and Truth, and Justice, and Light, and every good, and holding together all things in nature that they may exist. Such, therefore, and so great being the Word understood to be in God, this person—not knowing that just as He who bestowed the D active power upon our nature is not said to create the works of each one of us, but He indeed gave the power to our nature, while the house, and the stool, and the sword, and the plow, and whatever else life may happen to need, are brought to effect by us—though each of these things is indeed our work, they have their reference to our own author, who created our nature capable of all knowledge; so also the power of speech is indeed the work of Him who has made our nature such, but the [things of each]
has been devised by us ourselves. A This is clearly apparent from the fact that very many things which are said are considered to be base and altogether unbecoming, of which no one possessed of a mind would suspect God to be the inventor. Wherefore, even if some words familiar and accustomed to us are spoken by the holy Scripture from the person of God, it must be known that the Holy Spirit discourses with us from our own resources: just as we learned in the history of the Acts, that every one received the teaching in his own tongue wherein he was born, perceiving the power of the words through terms known to him.
And that these things are true, one might learn more diligently and accurately by examining B the Levitical legislation. For there it makes mention of the "frying-pan," and "laganon" or "placenta," and "semidalis," and similar names in the mystical sacrifices, indicating thereby, symbolically and through enigmas, certain dogmas profitable to the soul. It also names certain measures according to the custom of that time, speaking of a "hyphi," and a "nebel," and an "in," and many of the like sort. Did He impose these appellations and names, and from the beginning so prescribe that they should be done and said, so that He should call this kind of seed "wheat," but the marrow of it "semidalis"; and should call the things that appear on the surface, which are membranous and float above the pastry, "lagana"; and should command that the vessel of this kind in which the moist dough is baked and dried be named a "frying-pan"; and C that so great a quantity of moisture should be called by the name of "nebel" or "in" and that more arid fruits should be measured by the measure called "gomor"? These are trifles and Jewish vanities, which fall far short of the sublime nature and excellence of Christians; to suppose, namely, that the great and most high God, who is above every name and thought of the mind, and who alone by the power of His will creates the universe and brings it to generation and preserves it in being, sits like some grammarian—that is, a schoolmaster—vainly busying Himself with the impositions of such names. But just as when we signify by signs and gestures to the deaf what they ought to do, we do so not because D we ourselves do not have a voice when we are doing this, but because a narrative by words is altogether useless to those who do not hear: so also, since human nature is as it were deaf and does not hear anything high and sublime, we say that the grace of God, speaking in many ways and in various manners in the prophets, conforms the tongues of the holy prophets to that which is easily understood and familiar to us, leading us through these as if by the hand to the understanding of high things, not making the teaching according to Its own greatness and sublimity: for how could that which is great be contained in that which is small? But because the divine power descends to our littleness. And just as when God gave the motive faculty to the animal, He no longer creates the individual
A gressus efficit, once the nature that has received the beginning moves and leads itself, accomplishing motion according to whatever its will may be (unless perhaps the steps of a man are said to be directed by the Lord), so also, when it has received from God the ability to speak and utter, and to declare its will through the voice, nature proceeds on its way, imprinting upon the things certain signs by means of a specific difference in sounds. And these are the words and names spoken by us, by which we signify the power of things.
Even if it is said by Moses before the generation of fruits that the fruit exists, and before the rise of seeds that the seeds exist, this does not refute our argument, nor does the mind of the lawgiver conflict with those things said concerning the faculty of conception. For what we call the end of past agriculture, saying "fruit," and what we designate the beginning of the future, calling it "seed," this very thing which underlies the names—whether wheat or any other of those things that multiply through sowing—it teaches that they are not generated spontaneously, but that they grow up according to the will of the Creator with this power, so that the same fruit comes into existence and itself in turn creates seed when it becomes seed, and nourishes man with that which remains over; yet the thing itself grows according to the divine will, not the name.
So then, the thing which exists in substance is the work of the power of the Creator, but the vocal signs of existing things, through which the intellect marks off each individual thing for the sake of an accurate and unconfused teaching, these are the works and inventions of the rational faculty; but this very rational faculty and nature itself is the work of God. And since the rational faculty is in all men, necessarily, according to the differences of the nations, the differences of names are observed. But if anyone were to assert that light, or heaven, or earth, or seeds were called by God in accordance with human usage, he will surely construct his argument on the basis of some one property of language. Let him show, then, what this is. For it is not at all out of probability that the one who knows that also does not ignore this.
For indeed, both in the Jordan after the power of the Spirit, and again in the hearing of the Jews, and at the Transfiguration, a voice came from above teaching men, and so that they might not think that what appeared was only a figure, but also might believe that the beloved Son of God is true. Such a voice was modeled by God in the airy body for the perception of the hearers, C coming to pass according to the prevailing habit of those who speak. Thus, God, who desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, having articulated the word in the air for the goal of the salvation of those hearing—just as the Lord says to the Jews who thought that it had been thunder, because the sound had occurred in the air, that "This voice did not come for my sake, but for yours."
But before the constitution of the universe, when there was nothing to receive the word, nor any bodily element capable of forming articulate voice, he who says that God used words, how will he provide what is likely for his argument? He himself is incorporeal, the creation D
A was not; reason permits us to understand nothing material concerning Him, and as yet there were none to be aided by hearing, and since men did not exist, no mode of speaking had been set forth in any way according to the property of any nation. He, therefore, who looks to the bare letter, by what reasonings does he support this, as if God were speaking these words and these thoughts?
Furthermore, one may recognize from this the vanity of those who speak such things. For just as the natures of the elements, which are work of His who made them, appear the same to all, and there is no difference in the perception of men in the participation of fire, or air, or water, but the nature is one and B immovable in all, operating in the same way and in nothing changed on account of the differences of those who participate in them: so too the placing of names, if indeed it had been applied to things by God, would have been the same for all. But now, while the nature of things, inasmuch as it is fixed by God, remains immovable, the voices signifying these have been divided into so many differences of languages that it is not even easy to count their multitude. But if anyone brings forward the confusion which happened in the construction of the tower as being contrary to what has been said, not even there is God said to make the languages of men, but to confuse the one that was, so that all might not understand one another. For as long as life was the same for all according to Him, and they had not yet been divided into many differences of nations, the fullness of all mankind lived together using one voice and the same speech; but after it was necessary by the divine will that the entire earth be inhabited by men, then, being separated according to the communion of voice, they were scattered here and there, and they were joined and accommodated to this or that character of words and voice, having obtained a certain consonance of speech that conciliates mutual concord, not differing in the knowledge of things, but differing in the form of names. For a stone or wood does not seem something else among some than among others, but the names of the matter differ among each. Wherefore, the argument remains fixed for us, which defines human voices as being the inventions of our mind or intelligence. For neither have we learned from Scripture that any doctrine of God's words was made for men from the beginning, as long as the whole human race was consonant with itself; nor D did divine law prescribe how each should speak after men were divided into various differences of languages, but God, wishing men to use different languages, permitted nature to proceed on its way, according to His will, to articulate the sound among each for the explanation of matters among men. Therefore Moses, born many centuries after the building of the tower, used one of the later languages, explaining to us historically the creation of the world, and He attributes some voices to God, relating these things in His own language in which He had been instructed and accustomed, and not changing the
A voice of God into some other strange and foreign character of speech, so that through the strangeness of the custom and the alteration of the names he might build up the idea that the voices were God’s own; rather, using the familiar language, he recounts both his own affairs and those of God. Some, however, who have followed the Scriptures more carefully, assert that the Hebrew language does not go back as far as the others, but that along with the other miracles, this too happened miraculously for the Israelites, namely that this language was suddenly fashioned for the nation after the exodus from Egypt. And who is the Prophet whose word confirms such a thing? For he says, "When he went out from the land of Egypt, then he heard a language which he did not know." If, therefore, Moses was a Hebrew, but the language of the Hebrews is posterior to the others—being a man born long after the foundation of the world—and yet he relates the utterances of God in his own language, does he not clearly teach us B not to ascribe to God such speech framed according to a human mode, but to say these things because it is impossible for what is thought to be expressed otherwise than by human voices, whereas through the things said of God, he signifies a certain decorous and more magnificent understanding? For to think that God used the Hebrew language when there was no one who could hear such a voice, I do not know how anyone who has used right reason would agree to this. In the Acts of the Apostles we have learned that for this reason the divine power was divided into many languages, so that none of those who spoke different tongues would be deprived of the benefit. But God, before the creation, discoursed in the human manner; whom was He intending to benefit by such a voice? For to say that the word is adjusted to the capacity of the hearers toward the end of their benefit—no one would suspect this to be unworthy of the divine benevolence toward the human race, since even Paul, the imitator of the Lord, knows how to adapt the word to the dispositions of the hearers, becoming C milk to the little ones, and solid food to the perfect. But if there is no end being achieved by such a use of language, and then to build up that God weaves together such words in Himself, when there is no one who needs the signification that occurs through such voices, I do not know how it is not possible to consider such an idea ridiculous and blasphemous at the same time. Neither, then, is the voice of God Hebrew, nor is it pronounced according to any one of the patterns customary among the nations; but whatever words of God were recorded by Moses or the prophets, they are indications of the divine will, shining forth in different ways according to the capacity of those who become partakers of the grace, to the pure intellect of the saints which holds the ruling power. Therefore, Moses spoke as he was born and educated; but he attributed these voices to God, as has been said often, because of the childish weakness of those who were being D brought to the knowledge of God, and for the evident and clear expression of the divine will, and so that he might make the hearers more obedient, being moved by the authority of the speaker.
A But Eunomius—who brings such insults against us, he who is the heir and advocate of illicit and impious custom—denies this; for having turned the insult into his own disgrace, I shall receive him with his own words. But he asserts that Moses himself supports him with his own testimony, namely, that by God who fashioned nature, both the use of things named and of the names themselves was given to men, and that the naming of the things given is superior to the generation of those who use them; thus he has said everything word for word. If, therefore, he possesses some Moses of his own from whom he learns these wise things, and, empowered from that source, is confident in such speeches—that God, as he himself says, legislates the utterances of men, and thus commands some words to be applied to things and forbids others—let him use this hidden Moses as an ally for his discourse to suit the nonsense he favors. But if Moses is the only one whose Scripture is the common lesson for those instructed in the divine word, we shall accept the condemnation if we are refuted by the laws of Moses. Where, then, did he find the law concerning words and names? In his writings, the creation of the world is set forth, and then the genealogy of the generations of men, and the history of certain events, and the varied legislation, and the matters pertaining to the true worship of God, and the observances regarding the way of life; these are the principal chapters of the Scripture of Moses. But if this man claims that there is some legislation of words, let him show the law, and I shall be silent. But he could not say it; for he would not, leaving aside clearer proofs, pursue those things by which he would seem ridiculous rather than persuasive to those who are endowed with a mind and are wise. For to think that this is the main point of piety—namely, to attribute the invention of words to God, for whom the whole world and the miracles in it are small for His celebration—how is this not of the utmost folly, to pass over the great things and to magnify the divine from human things? The command preceded the creation, spoken indeed by Moses in the human manner, but accomplished in a way becoming to God. Therefore, the will that is productive of those things which exist by divine power—this the accurate and diligent student of the Scriptures declares to be the teaching of words. And just as if God had said, "Let a word be," or "Let a discourse be established," or "Let this have such and such a naming," thus he brings forward to support his own nonsense that motion which is in the divine will, the creator of things, not knowing even this, through his much attention to and experience with the Scriptures, that constant impulse of the intellect is often called "voice" by the holy Scripture. And Moses himself is a witness to this, whom he, dragging him about everywhere, has ignored in this regard. For who, even slightly versed in the reading of his books, is ignorant that the Israelite people, who had lately fled from Egypt, vehemently feared the attack of the Egyptians all at once in the desert? But when heavy dangers were being presented to them from all sides, with the sea blocking the passage on one side and the enemies from the rear preventing flight, standing before the prophet [the] D
Those standing by blamed him for that difficulty and A lack of resolve. But he, while comforting those who were stunned and struck with fear, and urging them toward alacrity of mind and confidence, a voice came from God calling the prophet by name: "Why do you cry to me?" And yet, before the things mentioned, the Scripture text had made no mention of any voice that Moses had uttered, but the thought which the prophet had raised to God was called a voice, crying in the silence as a thought in the hidden chambers of the heart. If, then, Moses cries out without speaking, with Him as his witness who hears "inexpressible groanings," what is new if the prophet also, when he had known the divine will—as much as it was right for him to speak and for us to hear—made it manifest through words known and familiar to us, describing the dialogue with God more corporally, not happening in words, but proclaimed through the works themselves? "In the beginning," it says, "God made," not the name of heaven and earth, but heaven and earth. And He said, "Let there be light," not an appellation of light. And, "separating the light from the darkness," God "called," it says, "the light day, and the darkness he called night."
Likely, it is on these things that our adversaries rely. For I will agree to the discourse on their behalf, and after the points put forward by them have been examined, I will subjoin my own, so that the dogma might be confirmed for us more strongly, with no objection left unexamined. "God called," it says, "the firmament heaven, and the dry land he called earth; and the light day, and the darkness he called night." How then will they say, C if Scripture confesses that these names were imposed upon these things by God, that you say these names are but human invention? What, then, do we say to these things? Again, we take refuge in our simple discourse, and say that He who brought the whole of creation out of nothing into being is the artificer and creator of the things that are perceived in substance, not of names which cannot subsist, and which consist only in the sound of a voice and the clamor of the tongue; but things, according to the nature and power inherent in each, are named by some significant voice, in accordance with the usage prevailing in each nation, the appellation being accommodated to the things themselves. But since many of the things that are perceived in creation do not have a simple nature, so that the subject can be comprehended by one word—as, for example, in the case of fire, the subject thing in its nature is one thing, D and the name signifying the thing is another; for the one is shining, burning, dry, heating, and consuming the matter it might seize, whereas the name is a certain brief voice, uttered by a single syllable; for this reason, the dividing discourse names each of the powers and qualities perceived in the fire properly, as we have said before, nor would anyone say that only one name has been imposed upon fire when someone names it either "shining," or "consuming," or any other of the things perceived in it; for such voices are significant of the powers that are naturally inherent in it. In the same way also in the case of heaven, and in the firmament,
A although one nature is signified by both names, yet the difference of the names expresses something proper to those things which exist in this creature. Wherefore, looking to this, we learn one thing by the appellation of heaven, and another by that of the firmament. For when the discourse describes the limit of the sensible creature, after which the intelligible and transmundane creature succeeds, by comparison with that which is intangible and incorporeal and lacks form, it is called the firmament, the beginning and the end of all material substance. But when we examine the circuit of the lower bodies, by which all material nature is contained, we call this heaven, which becomes the limit of all visible things.
In the same way also in the case of the dry earth, since heavy and downward-tending nature is divided into these two elements, I mean the earth and the waters, the appellation of "dry" distinguishes it in a certain way from the quality that corresponds to it from the opposite; for it is named dry by opposition to that which is humid, when, after laying aside at the divine command the water that flowed around it, it appeared in its own quality. But the name "earth" no longer demonstrates the significance of one of any of the qualities that are in it, but through the significant force that is in this word, it embraces everything that is understood in this element, such as that which is hard, that which is dense, that which is heavy, that which is resistant, and that which is fit for the nutrition of all fruits and animals. Therefore, the dry was not renamed by the word, so that this should be the last name given to it. For it did not lay aside through the second name the state and name of being dry, but, with both this and that appellation remaining, a certain proper significance belongs to each of the names: the one, which divides and distinguishes it from a nature and property of a different kind; the other, which embraces all the power observed in it.
B Just so, and in the case of light and day, and again in the case of night and darkness, we find that these are not sounds of syllables produced by the Creator of all, but that we come to know the substance of the things which we recognize through these appellations. By the will of God, the darkness which prevailed through the first creation is dissolved by the entrance of light. But since the earth is contained in the midst, and the circuit of the diverse elements sustains it from all sides, as Job says: *Who hangs the earth upon nothing* (Job xxvi, 7), it was necessary, when the light passed through one part and the earth obstructed the opposite part with its own mass, that some portion of darkness should be left behind by the shadowing. Since, however, the pole by perpetual motion revolves around itself that gloom which arrives from the shadowing, it was necessary for God to have ordered this circular circuit, so that it might become a measure of temporal extension. Now this measure is day and night. Therefore, for his own wisdom, Moses, declaring such doctrines to us in a more historical manner, named this gloom which comes on by obstruction, apart from light and darkness, and that which is made continuously around the terrestrial place, the measured succession of light to darkness, day
and night He called. Why, then, is that which had already been called light not termed day, but—just as light was made, and that not as a mere naming of light—was the measure of time also made? To this measure, the name followed, not brought about by the sound of words from the Creator, but because the nature of the thing itself drew to itself the signification that exists in the voice. And just as if this had been clearly stated by the Lawgiver—that everything that appears and is named is not self-originated nor unmade, but has its subsistence from God—we could have easily composed for ourselves that God made the whole world and the parts within it, and the order perceived therein, and the power that distinguishes the things that are: so also, by what He said, He leads our understanding to believe that nothing of the things that exist is without a beginning. And looking to this, He describes in a way and order the things that follow, enumerating the sequence of things produced. These things, however, could not have been set forth in speech in any other way than by signifying them through the names that indicate the thing.
Since, therefore, it is written that *God called the light Day*, it must be understood that God made day out of light, as something else according to its own definition; for you would not assign the same definition to light and to day, but light is that which is understood as set in opposition to darkness, whereas day is the measure of such a space of time as is in the light. In like manner, you shall also understand night and darkness by the same division of definition, defining darkness as that which is understood as set in opposition to light, but calling night the such-and-such circumscription of darkness. C Therefore, our argument is strengthened through all points, even if it is not artistically constructed according to the figures of logic, demonstrating that God is the Creator of things, not of mere words; for not for His sake, but for our sake, are names imposed upon things.
For because it is not always possible for us to have all things that exist before our eyes, we know some of the things that are always present, while others we autograph in our memory. Otherwise, the memory could not be preserved unconfused for us if the signification of names did not distinguish from one another the things stored in the mind. To God, however, all things are present, and there is no need of memory for Him, as all things are encompassed and surveyed by His far-seeing power. What, then, is the use of a word or name in His case, when the very wisdom and power that is within Him contains the nature of the things that are, unconfused and distinguished? Wherefore, from God are all things that exist and subsist, but for the sake of our own guidance, names that are significative of these things are imposed upon what exists. D If, however, anyone says that these things happen according to what pleases human usage and custom, he will not err regarding the account of providence. For we maintain that not the nature of things that exist, but the names, are made by us. Otherwise, the Hebrew names the heaven, and the Canaanite otherwise; yet each understands in the same way, in nothing being deceived in the understanding of the underlying reality by the difference of the sounds.
But the overly cautious and timid superstition of these wise men, by which it asserts that if it were granted that names were imposed by men upon things, men would be superior to God, is proved to be vain and incapable of subsisting, even by the example of Moses himself which is commemorated for us in Scripture. For who imposed the name upon Moses himself? Was it not the daughter of Pharaoh, who named him from the event? For in the Egyptian language, Moses is called "water." Since, therefore, at the command of the tyrant, his parents had placed the infant in a chest or basket and committed him to the streams (for so some of the historians have narrated concerning him), and this chest, by divine will, floating on the vortex of the waves, was brought to the bank and found by the king’s daughter, who was then bathing her body in that water, and because the boy was obtained by her from the water, it is said that she imposed the name on the boy as a monument of the fortuitous event. B And God Himself did not disdain to use this for His servant, nor did He judge it unworthy to let the barbarian name remain valid upon the prophet. Thus also, before him, Jacob, having grasped his brother’s heel, was named "supplanter" from the figure in which he was brought into the light. For those who understand such things teach that the interpretation of the name Jacob leads to this when translated into the Greek tongue; and the midwife, in turn, named Phares from the event that happened at the birth. And no one, according to Eunomius, ambitiously sought to arrogate to himself an authority superior to the power of God. But also, mothers impose names on the patriarchs—Ruben, Simeon, Levi, and similarly for all the rest in succession. And according to this trifler, there appeared no solicitous guardian of divine providence in those times who might forbid women from becoming superior to God through this imposition of names. For who could recount the particulars that can be drawn from holy C Scripture: the water of contradiction, and the place of weeping, and the hill of foreskins, and the valley of the cluster, and the field of blood, and all names of this kind, which were indeed imposed by men, but are often even commemorated as coming from the person of God? Through which it is possible to learn that the designation of things through words is neither above human dignity, nor does the power of the divine nature have more authority by means of them.
But other trifles, which the delirious man has babbled against the truth, since they have no strength against the dogmas, I will pass over in silence, judging it useless to dwell any longer on vain things. For who is so mad and empty of better cares that he would wish to waste his effort and study on senseless and insane speeches, and to argue against those who assert that we maintain that human care is superior to the solicitude and care of God, and has more D authority, and that we transfer to His providence the negligence that disturbs the more dissolute minds? This is the word-for-word utterance of the one who slanders us. I, however, consider it equal to indulge in such things as to believe in the dreams of old women.
A For to think that by the form of certain sounds one preserves the dignity of the beginning and lordship for the divine nature, and to demonstrate the great power of God in this, while on the other hand neglecting God and disregarding the providence proper to Him, and slandering us—that because humans have received the rational faculty from God, they have subsequently used words at their own discretion for the declaration of things—what is this other than an old woman’s fable or the dream of those suffering from a hangover? For the true power and authority of God, and His beginning and lordship, according to our account, does not have its being in syllables (otherwise anyone at all who became an inventor of terms would come to an equal honor with God), but infinite ages, the beauties of the world, the rays of the luminaries, B the wonders on land and sea, the hosts of angels, and the super-mundane powers, and whatever else we hear of in the higher region through riddles in the Scripture—these are the things that bear witness to the power of God, which is above all things. He who attributes the sound of a voice to those who naturally speak will say nothing impious against the One who gave the voice; for we do not consider it some great thing to invent sounds expressive of things. For the Scripture, in accordance with the historical creation of the world, gave the name of "man" to the formation of us, and Job calls this mortal C (βροτόν), and some of those outside call them "lights" (φῶτα), and others "articulate" (μέροπα—to omit the differences of this name according to each nation). Do we, therefore, draw the honors of those into equality with God because they, too, found certain sounds of equal power to the designation "man," by which the subject is similarly indicated? But this vain talk must be left aside by us, as I said before, and the subsequent insults must be set at naught, in which he alleges that we lie against the divine oracles and slander everything else, including God Himself, with complete audacity. Let us move on in our discourse to what remains.
Proposes again the words of the teacher, which are as follows: D "In a similar way and in a way no different, we have been taught the use of mental conception from the divine word. Our Lord Jesus Christ, declaring the nature of the deity to humans, designates this by certain properties that are peculiarly observed in Him, calling Himself the door, and bread, and the way, and the vine, and the shepherd, and the light." Those things, therefore, that were spoken as an insult against us by him regarding these things (for thus his dialectic has taught him to contend against those who contradict him), I think we should despise and not be at all disturbed by these juvenile insanities. But let us examine this sharp and unavoidable word which he puts forward for the subversion of our argument. "Who," he says, "of the saints is there who bears witness that these names are attributed to the Lord by mental conception?" But who prevents, I would say by heaven,
A that one should judge it to be blasphemous to consider the use of names in terms of mental conception? For if he asserts that the fact that a thing has not been said is proof that it is forbidden, he will undoubtedly concede that the fact that it is not forbidden is a sign that it is permitted. The Lord is called by these names; or does Eunomius become a denier of these as well? But if he denies that these expressions are used of Christ, we have conquered without a fight. For what victory could be more illustrious than to show clearly that the adversary rebels against God B because he invalidates and perverts the divine expressions of the Gospel? But if he truly confesses that Christ is called by these names, let him state the manner in which these names are piously applied to the Only-Begotten God. Does he define the stone as an indicator of His nature? Did he understand His essence by the axe or the adze? Is the property of the divinity of the Only-Begotten signified by the door, or by each of the others (so that we may not bring a great crowd upon our discourse by recounting all the names)? Is every one of these names either the nature of the Only-Begotten, or His divinity, or a property of His essence? But yet He is called C by these names, and the appellation possesses authority. For there is nothing idle or insignificant in the divine expressions that is holy to consider. Therefore, if he rejects the term "mental conception," let him provide the rationale as to how these names are adapted to Christ. For our part, we say that since the Lord multifariously provides for human life, each species of benefit is appropriately recognized through each of these types of names, with the providence and operation seen in Him passing into the form of a name. A name of this kind is what we call being named by "mental conception." But if this is not pleasing to the adversaries, let it be as each may think best. But he who is uninstructed in the names found in the Scriptures D opposes what is said. For if he had been taught the divine expressions, he would certainly have known that the Lord is also called by Scripture, according to diverse mental conceptions, a curse, and sin, and a heifer goaded by a gadfly, and a lion’s cub, and a confused bear, and a leopard, and things of such a kind, through which names holy and excellent men clearly explain the aim of the thought, toward which they were looking directly, aiming straight with these names. And if these names seem to some to be somehow disparaged by their superficial indication—names which, if one were not to grant that each is piously attributed to God according to some mental conception, the word would not be free from impious suspicion—it would be a long task to represent and lay bare or reveal the sense of all of them, how these have also been used by the commonality according to a vulgar understanding based on their superficial meaning, since the rationale of mental conception reconciles the names to the piety regarding God. But let us proceed to what follows next. Again, having resumed the discourse, such names are said of the Lord, and no one who has been versed in the divinely inspired Scriptures will deny that these things are said. What then; do they define expressions signifying His very nature? Therefore, he says, some multifarious,
A nature, indicating that it is varied according to the differences of what is signified in those names. For the meaning of "bread" and "lion" is not the same, nor that of "door" and "calf," nor "axe" and "water," but for each of the names it is necessary to provide a proper definition, which in no way communicates with the others. Therefore, they do not signify the nature; yet one would not dare to say that the imposition of the names is invalid and meaningless. If, then, they are said, but not according to nature, and every word spoken by Scripture is entirely authoritative and is spoken appropriately, what other reason remains for why such expressions have been set down as befitting the Only-begotten God, except for the mode of "mental conception"? For it is evident that the Divine is named according to the variety of the operations, along with different meanings, so that we might understand Him as being named in this way. What harm, then, does the operation of our mind toward the understanding of the things that occur, which we call "mental conception"—what harm does it do to the more pious ones? If anyone should wish to call it something else, we shall not differ. But he does not relax, just like the strong among the wrestlers, his inescapable hold on us, and he says thus, word for word: B that "these are names from human mental conception, and they are said according to the mental conception of certain things which none of the apostles or evangelists taught." And after this irresistible attack, he brings in that sacred voice, spitting out the foul-smelling insult against us again with an educated voice. For, he says, to bring forward into the midst homonymy from some analogy to establish this human mental conception is the work of an intellect stripped of a strong mind in judgment, but which is weak in understanding and which examines the Lord's words by a certain discovered habit. C Papae! What sort of dialectical demonstration is this? Is it thus artfully concluded for him that the argument hits its mark? Who would want to prove the argument of mental conception any further, with such a heavy odor flowing from his mouth onto those who set out to say something? Indeed, we ourselves, for that reason, should abstain from examining and discussing his argument when setting out to say something, lest he set in motion against us the sewer of his insult, or lest one appear to be faint-hearted in being irritated against childish delusions. Therefore, the abusive slanderer must be conceded to use his own way according to his own whim. But his argument must be resumed, so that from it, too, help may be brought to the truth. D He mentioned analogy, and from it he recognized homonymy, or the communion of names. Whence did he learn these, and from whom did he get these words? Moses did not say them; he did not hear the prophets and apostles using these expressions; the evangelists shroud such voices in silence; nor is it possible to learn these from any Scripture that teaches them. Whence, then, does it come to him to speak thus? Is such a discourse not the invention of the intelligence of him who uttered it, he who calls a certain meaning of a notion "analogy"? How, then, does he not perceive that he is using as allies for the war those whom he opposes? For he himself is fighting against the discourse of mental conception, since
A he attempts to establish that one ought not to say anything by mental conception. "But no one," he says, "of the saints has taught this." But to whom among the ancients are you able to refer the term "unbegotten," and the fact that the name of God is predicated of His essence, or rather, that the essence itself is "unbegotten"? Is it permitted to you, in cases where one intends to conclude something impious, to innovate and devise pleasing terms? But if something were said by another for the subversion of impiety, to strip the one contradicting you of authority—would you be caught guilty of cruel tyranny if you claim this power for yourself, so that what you forbid in others, you consider to be permitted to you alone, and what you yourself dare to do by license, you restrain others from doing?
As if by an edict, you abolish these names that are spoken of Christ by mental conception, because no saint has declared that it should be said in such a way. How, then, do you promulgate laws concerning the correctness of words by means of the term "unbegotten," so that only those things should be uttered which the God-inspired speech of Scripture has suggested? The name "unbegotten" should be erased from your writings, since no saint has legislated this term; but you accept the word because of the intellect that underlies this vocabulary. We, in the same way, because of the meaning enclosed in it, have admitted the term of mental conception. B Therefore, we shall either remove both from usage, or neither; but in whichever way it happens, through both we shall win. For if the term "unbegotten" were suppressed altogether, every argument of the adversaries against the truth would be extinguished, and the glory befitting the Only-Begotten God would shine forth from all people, since there would be no name from an opposite counter-distinction to diminish the majesty of the Lord. But if both remain, even so the truth will prevail with us, once the name of "unbegotten" has been transferred from the essence to mental conception.
But as long as he does not remove the term "unbegotten" from his own writings, the Pharisee who provokes us should admonish himself, not to look first to the splinter in our eye before he casts out the beam that is weighing upon and distressing his own eyes. "But God," he says, "has distributed the most precious names even to the C weakest things that exist on earth, without having distributed the equality of honors, and to the most principal things the vilest, though not from human beings, through a natural vileness." These things are said word for word, as they have been written down by us just as they were by them. If it holds some meaning hidden in the depths that escapes us, let those who have grasped things that are further removed from our sight—those initiated and taught in this intimate and ineffable initiation—say what it is. But if they offer no interpretation beyond what is understood at hand, I do not know which to deem more pitiable than the others: those who say such things, or those who lend their ears to such people. "To the weakest," he says, "of earthly things, He has granted the most precious names, not having at the same time granted equality of honors."
And this he says is the work of God: to misrepresent the inferior nature with a more precious title, and conversely, he says that God assigns less honorable terms to those who are superior by nature, while the nature itself is not in the least changed by the title.
But that what is said may become as clear as possible to us, the absurdity will be demonstrated by the things themselves. If anyone were to call a person commended for every virtue "intemperate," or on the contrary, were to call one condemned for equal wickedness "good and orderly," would anyone in his right mind consider such a man to be in his senses, or to have any concern for the truth, in that he exchanges the designations for their opposites while the significance of the names does not correspond to the nature? I, for one, B do not think so. Yet this man says that such things happen with regard to God, things which accord neither with common insights nor with the testimonies of Scripture. For in the custom of our life, it is only the case with those who are deranged by drunkenness or frenzy to go astray regarding names, and not to use words according to what is signified in things, but rather, if it should so happen, to call a man a dog, and conversely to apply the designation of human to a dog.
But the divine Scripture is so far from agreeing with this confusion that it is even possible to hear the prophet clearly lamenting over such things. "Woe," he says, "to those who call darkness light and light darkness, who call bitter sweet and sweet bitter." [Isa. V, 20]. What then, looking at this, does he think he is seeing, that he considers it necessary to attribute such great absurdity to his own God? Let those who have been initiated by him into his mysteries say what they judge to be the C weakest thing on earth that is ennobled by God with the most precious appellations. The weakest of existing things are those animals whose generation consists in the putrefaction of damp substances. But the most precious of existing things are virtue and holiness, and whatever is dear to God. Are then flies, and gnats, and frogs, and those things whose generation is from dung, honored with the appellation of the holy and of virtue, so that they might be illustrated by honorable names, yet not participate in the equality of dignities, as Eunomius says?
But we have not yet heard of such a thing, that those things which are weak have been called by more magnificent designations, or that something great and honorable by nature has been affected by the insulting appellation of one of these. "Just was Noah," says Scripture, "faithful Abraham, and meek Moses, and wise Daniel, and temperate Joseph, and blameless Job, and David, who fulfilled D all the parts of equanimity or meekness." Let them say, therefore, if anywhere any one of these has received titles from their opposites, or if even those whose wickedness Scripture testifies to—such as Nabal the Carmelite, and Pharaoh the Egyptian, and Abimelech the foreigner, and all who are mentioned for their wickedness—let me ask, have they been honored by the divine voice with more favorable and kindly names? These things are not so; but as nature and truth are, so...
are the things judged and spoken of by God; they are not named in a way contrary to what they are, but in a way that makes the things signified most manifest when proclaimed by their own proper designations. B
He who is endowed with a firm mind—he who stands as an accuser of common usage and railing against those stripped of their reasoning in judgment—supposes that we should know these things about the divine nature, and sets forth these opinions about God, as if He were mocking the objects themselves with misnomers, bestowing the most honorable appellations upon the weakest things, and shaming what is honorable by the homonymy with things that are base. And while a certain man who looks toward virtue, being led outside the truth, is often involuntarily swept away and overwhelmed by shame, he thinks it fitting for God that the honor of the things should appear to be falsified by their appellations. Yet the oracles do not attribute these things to the divine nature. "Long-suffering and very merciful and true is God," says David. How, then, is He true if He falsifies things and alters the truth by the signification of names? Again, the Lord God is called "upright" by the same. Is it, therefore, a mark of uprightness to honor base things with the most honorable of names, and to grant an insignificant naming while begrudging the dignity that appears in the word to the one who received the appellation? Such is the testimony of these theologians concerning their new god; this is the end of their widely bruited dialectical acumen: to show that their god delights in deceptions and is not free from the vice of envy. For it is deception not to name the weak things of the world according to what their nature and dignity actually are, but to bestow upon them, to no purpose, appellations taken from what is preeminent, without conferring with the name the power of the things that are named. And it is envy, when one is able to gratify things with a more honorable name according to that which is most excellent in those named, to be loath to grant the favor, as if he judged the good fortune of the weak to be his own loss. But I would advise those who possess understanding—even if the god of these gnostics is forced by the violence of such arguments to be of this sort—not to think that the true God, the Only-Begotten God, is like this, but to look to the truth of the underlying realities, to bear witness to each according to its merit, and to name them from the things themselves. "Come," He says, "you blessed," and "Go, you cursed," neither honoring him who is worthy of a curse with the name of a blessing, nor, conversely, casting out him who has stored up for himself a blessing along with those who are most unholy. D
But what, then, is the intention of the writer in these words? And toward what goal does his discourse aim? Let no one suspect that, laboring under a poverty of words, he extended his speech with meaningless babble so that it might appear as broad as possible. Rather, even the seemingly senseless parts of what has been said contain something...
A that reeks of madness and is suspect of heresy. For to claim that the most honorable names are applied to the weakest things, even if they do not possess an equal nature according to dignity, is a certain construction that covertly prepares the way for blasphemy, so that those who learn his dogmas might learn from him that even if the Only-Begotten is named God, and Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and Truth, and Judge, and King, and God over all, and Great God, and Prince of Peace, and Father of the age to come, and all such things, the honor toward him exists only in name. For he does not participate in the dignity which the force of the names indicates. And what wise Daniel did for the Babylonians, correcting their error regarding idols so that they would not worship the bronze or the dragon—reverencing the name of God which was invoked over them by those vain men, and clearly showing through what he did that the high name of divinity does not fall upon a crawling beast or the shape into which the bronze was molded—this same thing the B enemy of God strives greatly to construct against the Only-Begotten God through his dogmas, shouting through this proposition set before him: "Do not look to the names of the Lord, of which he is a participant, as if it were possible to grasp his ineffable and exalted essence in thought from them." For many other very weak things have been honored with superlative appellations, the appellation of which indeed contains sublimity within itself, but the nature is not changed into the dignity of the appellation. Therefore he says that the participation of honor is granted by God to creatures inferior [to him], even though equality of dignity does not follow the naming. So that, regarding the Son, even though we have learned all that is of exalted significance, we must believe that the honor comprised in the words is assigned to him only in name, and that he is devoid of equality according to dignity, according to the artifice that appears in their sayings.
But C indeed, by lingering on things that are senseless, I seem to be granting something covertly to my adversaries. For by opposing truth to the vanity of what has been said, I seem to myself to be inflicting tediousness upon those who are present at this disputation, before we arrive at the battle of stronger arguments. But however these things may be, they must be left to the more capable auditors; for us, our speech must be transferred to the matters proposed. And let that which is proposed next, in connection with what has already been examined, be passed over in silence—that these things are ordered in this way, so that we might not say that the human conceptualization (epinoia) has obtained the power of names. For who says this, that what is not considered in its own substance has the power over something? For it belongs only to those who are governed by a certain choice and will of their own to do something by authority. But the conceptualization (epinoia) D of our mind is an activity, and is dependent upon the choice of those who speak, not existing by itself, but having its subsistence in the impulse of the words uttered. But, he says, it is they who have created all these things. Conceptualization
of God, and of relation A and operation, and analogy, and for the laws by which he appropriately adapts the appellations to each of the things named. But these things either have no sense at all, or they stand in opposition to what was set forth before. For if he acknowledges now that God appropriately fits names to the things that underlie them, how does he in the preceding passages claim that God bestows the more sublime names upon base things, without making them partakers of the dignity declared in the meaning of the names, and on the other hand, disgraces those that are great by nature with base terms, though nature is not changed by the vileness of the words? But perhaps we do an injustice to his madness by harassing this structure of words with such accusations. For all these things are remote from any sense, not only, I say, from correct piety toward God, but they are found by those who know how to examine them strictly not to partake of any reason whatsoever. Since, therefore, they appear to have a certain swelling, just like sea-lungs—and a swelling is phlegm or a certain foamy humor, abominable to behold, but more abominable if taken into the hands—for this reason, judging a most becoming silence toward these vanities, I shall pass over what has been said in silence. For by what law are these names put forward by him—operation, proportion, and relation—governed? And who is it who imposes upon God the laws and modes of proportion and relation?
It would be better to leave these things unexamined than through zeal for them to cause nausea in the hearers and to divert the discourse from matters more worthy of study. But I fear lest all the things proposed to us from the writing of Eunomius be essentially certain phlegms and sea-lungs. Wherefore, it is necessary for our disputation to end at what has been said, finding no material in the writings to work upon. For just as smoke or mist makes the air thick and turbid—in which, if it settles, it even hinders the natural faculty of sight—yet it is not in itself so dense that one who wishes might grasp it and hold it in his palms, or that it might resist the one striking it, so too, if anyone were to say such a thing about this grave writing, he would not wander from a true conjecture. There are many absurdities elaborated in this tumid and boiling discourse, and to one who is not of a very sharp mind, it seems, just like mist to one looking from afar, to have a certain consistency and appearance. But if anyone were to become master of himself and by diligent inquiry and intelligence should reach what has been said, the notions flee from one's grasp like smoke and are dissipated into nothing; nor do they receive the striking speech with any solidity or resistance. What, therefore, is to be done? It is doubtful and uncertain. For the choice is exposed to calumny from the querulous on both sides; for whether, as if leaping across a valley, we direct our speech toward the free and level plain, taking a stand B against those things that seem to have some force against the truth by way of contradiction, or whether we contend in the battle against vain and futile things with all manner of prattle—in this way, indeed, both C D
A laborious and useless will be the effort for those who shrink from toil, [1025/1026] as it stretches out through many thousands of verses to no useful end. But if we were to seize only those points which are thought by some to have force against the truth, we shall provide an opportunity for accusation to our adversaries, as having passed over certain matters of theirs which do not admit of contradiction. Since, therefore, two courses are set before us—both that our argument should traverse all things, and that it should run only through the more necessary ones—the former is burdensome to the hearers, while the latter is suspicious to those who cast aspersions; I say it is well to have taken a middle path, so as to escape, as far as possible, that which is subject to blame from either side. What, then, will be the method? We shall cut away from all that has been laboriously and vainly composed by him, as much as possible, the filth of his dross, and we shall run through his notions and opinions in a few words and in summary fashion, so that we may neither linger recklessly among those who lack understanding, nor appear to have entirely neglected any of the things said without examination. B All of his argument, then, is occupied with this endeavor: to demonstrate, with human contentiousness, that the Divine speaks in a human manner, and that He who is the Maker and Author of things applies to existing things the voices that are significant of things. And for this reason, fighting against the one who said that the nature, which we have received from God, is rational, he says that he misses the mark of the truth, and does not hold his own thesis; and having brought this rebuke against him, he has used such lines of reasoning for the proof, and he does not hold his own foundation; and he has used such reasonings in his demonstration:
Basil says, he remarks, that after the first notion that arises in us concerning a thing, the more subtle and accurate investigation of the thing understood is called "conception." And with such a construction he refutes the argument, as Eunomius thinks, that in cases where there is not a first and second notion, nor one more subtle and accurate than another, the term "conception" would have no place; but then it will be detected by those who are not lacking in hearing that he has deceitfully snatched even this away. For our teacher has not made this the definition of every conception, but rather, by having made a certain special subdivision of those things that are viewed by way of conception—so that he might not introduce a large crowd into the argument—having clarified this part, he left those who have understanding to infer the whole from the part. And just as if one were to say that "animal" is predicated of many things that differ in species, he would not be convicted of having missed the truth if he brought forward man as an example in particular; nor would anyone call him to account as having deviated from the truth, unless he rendered the same definition of the animal as he had set forth for man, applied specifically to a bird, a quadruped, and a sea creature. Thus, since "conception" is viewed multi-formly and in various ways, it would not be a refutation to say that this is not strictly a conception, because one can also say it is something else. So that even if some other species of conception were to be discerned, that which was previously rendered is not false. C If, therefore, he says, any of the apostles or the prophets were shown to have used these names in reference to Christ, the falsehood would have its consolation. How great is the painstaking study of the divine Scriptures of God to which the things said by this writer of arguments bear witness! No one of the pro-
Aphets or apostles has called the Lord bread, or a stone, or a fountain, or an axe, or light, or a shepherd. What then does David say, and concerning whom, when he says: *The Lord is my shepherd* and, *Thou who feedest Israel, attend*? Consider what difference there is between saying "a shepherd" and "thou who feedest." And: *With thee is the fountain of life.* Therefore, he admits that the Lord is spoken of as a fountain. And: *The stone which the builders rejected.* Does not Matthew, by signifying the Lord's power to prune away vices with the name of an axe, where he says: *Behold, the axe is laid at the root of the trees*, seem to be a trustworthy and faithful witness of the things stated? Does not Moses, seeing God in the light, and John, naming Him the true light—and Paul, being surrounded by light in his first appearance of God, and afterwards hearing the voice of the light saying: *I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest*—provide sufficient testimony? But regarding the bread, let the Gospel be read: for the food which was provided to the Israelites from heaven by Moses was transferred by the Lord Himself into a figure of the Lord. For *Moses did not give you the bread; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven*, speaking of Himself, *which cometh down from heaven and giveth life to the world.* But the genuine listener of the law says that none of the prophets or of the apostles applied these names to Christ. What then follows? If the Lord Himself called Himself by these names, since among the names of the Savior there is not one that is first and another that is second, nor is one subtler or more exquisite than another, but He knows all things simultaneously and with equal subtlety: no definition that has been rendered by His own commentary can be applied to any of these names.
I have exhausted many trifles from his discourse; but I pray the readers to grant me pardon if we do not leave even the things that are openly vain unexamined—not that we may appear to be exulting in the disgrace and impudence of this writer (for what profit does it bring us to have the folly of adversaries exposed?), but so that the truth may proceed on its way, confirming itself through all things. C Since, he says, the Lord attributed these appellations to Himself, neither intending anything as primary, nor second, nor subtler, nor more exact, it is not permitted to assert that these names arise from mere mental conception. How does he remember his own aim? How does he know the arguments by which he joined battle? Our teacher had made mention of some of those things which fall into common usage for the interpretation of "conception," and by explaining his mind in the later examples, he thus promotes the contemplation of the discourse to higher things. For he said that this name *sitos* (wheat) appears by itself as one thing according to substance, but according to the various properties which are considered in it, it changes its appellations, being called as many things as it becomes: seed, and fruit, and food, and whatsoever else it becomes. Similarly,
A the Lord also—who in Himself is whatever He is according to nature—when He is named according to the differences of His operations, does not retain one appellation for all things, but according to each notion that is generated in us from an operation, He assumes the name.
In what, then, is our argument refuted by what has been said? He who said that it is possible for many appellations to be applied according to the differences of the operations, and the relation to the things operated, to the One who exists according to the subject, the Son of God—just as grain, too, being one of the diverse notions regarding it, is divided into different names—how does he who says that Christ calls these names of Himself overturn what has been said? For the question at issue was not who it was that named Him, but the inquiry turned upon the notion of the names: whether they indicate nature, or whether He is named conceptually from the operations. But this man, so sharp and sagacious in his understanding, in overturning the definition of "conception" which had been given—the one that stated it was possible to devise many appellations for one subject according to the significations of the operations—has used the battle against us forcefully, saying that such terms were not imposed upon the Lord by some other.
What, then, has this to do with the study at hand? Because these names are not spoken by the Lord, will he therefore not grant that they are names, or appellations, or words signifying notions? For if he does not admit that these are names, by the removal of the appellations, the "conception" is also simultaneously removed. But if he does not contradict that these words are names, in what way is the argument concerning "conception" harmed by the fact that he demonstrates that such nomenclatures were not imposed by some other, but by the Lord Himself? For the point that was being made was this: that using the example of the grain, the Lord, being one according to the subject, possesses names appropriate to His operations. And since it is admitted that the grain possesses its names according to the conception of the properties observed in it, it was simultaneously established that these terms in the case of the Lord are not significant of His nature, but consist in the account of the "conception" in the things understood concerning Him.
But the one who contradicts, in his great attentiveness, does not make his fight against what was proposed. Instead, he says that He is called by these names by Himself, similar to if one seeking the interpretation of the name of Isaac—whether it is interpreted as laughter, as some say, or if the name signifies something else—some one of those standing on the side of Eunomius should insistently reply that this name was imposed upon the boy by his mother. But, one might say, that was not the question at issue—by whom the appellation was provided—but what the notion of the name signifies when translated into our language. Since, then, the inquiry here consists in whether the things that are variously said of the Lord are said according to a "conception" and do not possess the indication of His nature, he who brings forward such a proof—the fact that these are spoken by the Lord Himself—as a way of saying that the appellations are not viewed by way of a "conception," [how is it that with these... D]
A should be numbered among the sober, who makes war upon the truth and uses such alliances for the war, by which he shows the one being warred against to be stronger?
Then, proceeding as if the argument had reached its goal for him, he grabs at other charges against us, harder, as he says, than those mentioned. And having lamented much and reviled the discourse, and having severely agitated the listener regarding the things about to be said, in which he accuses us of constructing some more impious things, as though we not only attribute to our own "conceptions" the appellations assigned by God—without having said what the assignment of the appellations is, and when and how it happened,—but also that we confound all things and lead the essence and operation of the Only-Begotten to the same thing. Having said nothing about this very matter, nor having demonstrated how the operation is constructed by us to be the same as the essence, he finally brings in the same climax of the charges, speaking thus in his speech: "Now, indeed," he says, "passing from these, he wraps the God over all in the ultimate blasphemies; and our arguments are torn apart by his words, and he turns away our examples, not at all needing to learn these things, but rather to show the trashy and B rash nature of the writer’s words, by which he makes a display of old wives’ tales among men, and by the pomposity of his little words in the ears of those who admire these things, he adorns himself, not realizing that for the educated he is proposing a monument against himself."
But this is nothing to our purpose. For would that the charges against him reached only this far, and that, committing no sin regarding the faith, he were thought to offend only in the delivery of his speech! As it would be for nothing, for praise or for blame, whether the wording were one way or another. The logical sequence and series of the things said against us by him, however, also proposes this.
"In the matter of grain," he says, "and of the Lord, having trained his 'conceptions' in various ways, he says that the most holy essence of God C admits of different 'conceptions' in a similar way." This is the bitterest of the charges, and because of it he tragicaly exaggerated those heavy things against us beforehand, calling us impious and absurd and applying all such things to what was said. What then is the proof of the impiety? Eunomius said things regarding grain—those common things and those known to all at first hand—discriminating how it comes to be, and how, once matured, it nourishes through its fruit, being born and increasing and being governed by certain natural powers? And having said these things, he says that it is not at all strange for the Only-Begotten God D to receive different "conceptions" because of the [meanings],
and through the diversities of the actions, and certain proportions and relationships. For he keeps harping on these terms ad nauseam regarding Him. But, he says, how is it not absurd, or rather, not blasphemous, to compare the Unbegotten to these? To which ones? To grain, he says, and to the Only-Begotten God. You see his carefulness: he insists that the base grain and the Only-Begotten God A are equally far removed from the dignity of the Unbegotten God. And so that we do not misrepresent his argument, it is possible to learn his line of thought from his very own writings. "For how," he says, "is it not absurd, or rather, blasphemous, to compare the Unbegotten to these?" And having said this, he adds to his discourse on the grain and the Lord the matter of equality in honor, judging it an equal absurdity to compare God to either one of them. Moreover, it is entirely manifest to everyone that things which are distant from any one thing by an equal measure also B possess an equal measure one towards the other. Thus, according to this "wise theologian," the Creator of the ages and He who has encompassed the entire nature of existing things has been shown as equal in status to the most insignificant seed, if both he himself and the grain are equally excluded from comparison with God. But such is the impiety of his argument.
It would now be time to examine the structure of his blasphemy, and in what way it is connected to his argument by logical consequence. For having said that it is absurd to compare God to grain and to Christ, concerning the grain he says, "that God is not of the nature to be subject to mutation C as these are," but concerning the Only-Begotten he kept silent about His not being subject to mutation; and by this he has clearly indicated the lowliness of His dignity, in that it would not be fitting to compare Him to God, just as one does not with grain; he left the argument suspended, without establishing by any other reasoning in this part of his discourse the disparity of the Son with the Father, as if what is observed in the grain were sufficient to demonstrate the difference of the Son from the Father in "lower" terms.
But he discourses concerning the incorruptibility of the Father, as though it does not exist for Him by virtue of an act. As for me, if indeed D a "true and essential life" is an act, effecting itself, and if to "always live" and to "never be dissolved into corruption" are the same thing in meaning, I do not yet concede to his argument, but I shall reserve this for its proper place. That there is, however, one notion of incorruptibility, understood in the same way for both the Father and the Son, and that the incorruptibility of the Father in no way differs from the incorruptibility of the Son—neither by any slackening nor by any intensification, nor by any other mode of corruption being found in the variance of incorruptibility—this I say even now is opportune to assert, and always: so that his argument may have no room through this premise of his to proclaim that the Son has no communion of essence with the Father. For just as incorruptibility is grasped in the Father, so it is not doubted to be in the Only-Begotten. For that which is incapable of corruption, which is what incorruptibility effectively is and is called, has an equal—or rather, the same—account in whichever one it is predicated. What, then, having learned...
why does he attribute it only to the unbegotten God, A that it is not from [the] operation that His incorruptibility exists, as if thereby demonstrating the difference of the Father from the Only-begotten? For if he assumes his own creature to be a corruptible God, he well demonstrates the difference according to nature by the difference between the corruptible and the incorruptible. But if both are alike incapable of corruption, and neither more nor less is comprehended in the incorruptibility which is according to nature, how does he demonstrate the incomparability of the Father to the only-begotten Son? Or what is intended by the fact that it is not from operation that incorruptibility is attributed to the Father? But he reveals his purpose in the subsequent discourse: it is not from operations, he says, that He is incorruptible and unbegotten, but as Father and Creator. B
To this I especially ask the hearer to attend. How does he think the meaning of these two names is the same, I mean of creation and of fatherhood? For he defines each of these as equally an operation, clearly proclaiming thus in his discourse, that He is not incorruptible by operation, but is named both Father and Creator from operations. If, therefore, it is the same thing for Him to be called both Father and Creator, because operation is the cause of both names for Him, it is absolutely necessary that the effects of the operations also have a common character with each other, from the very fact that they are similarly from operation. But to what point of blasphemy this is carried by logical consequence is clear to anyone who knows how to discern what follows from what. C But whatever I conclude regarding these things by reason, I wish to add to the examination of these arguments. It is impossible for an operation that is productive of any thing to subsist by itself, if there is not something underlying to receive the motion of the operation; for example, we say that he who works the bronze is operating, but that the matter subjected to the art is being operated upon. Therefore, these have a certain necessary relation to each other, the effective or active power and the passive; if one of these were separated from the other by logic, the remaining one could not subsist by itself in itself. For if that which suffers were not, that which acts would not be. What, then, is constructed from this, if an operation productive of any thing does not consist by itself, if there is not present a subject that suffers? But the D Father, as these men say, is nothing other than operation: therefore, by these [principles], the only-begotten Son is demonstrated to be passive, being formed according to the motion of the operation that causes Him to subsist. For just as we say that the Creator of the universe subjected some passive and easily yielding matter, and thus made [His] efficient essence the worker of itself: in the case of sensible things, ingeniously inserting into the subject various and multiform qualities for the making of each of the things that come into being; but in the case of intelligible things, in another way, not by qualities, but by volitional impulses, shaping the subject. Thus, of necessity, if anyone were to define fatherhood as an operation, he will not demonstrate the subsistence of the Son in any other way, except through some passive matter altogether [un]absolute. For if it were thought impassible, a resisting...
operation would not exist at all to that which is brought about. Thus, of the two alternatives, they will either make the essence of the Only-begotten something passive through these things, so that it may receive the operation, or, fearing this because of the evident impiety, they will conclude that it does not exist at all. For that which is by nature incapable of suffering does not in any way admit the productive operation into itself. Therefore, he who defines the Son as the result of some operation defines Him as one of those things which are born to suffer, all of which have their procession through an operation; or if he denies the passion, he will also deny His subsistence together with the passion. But since B impiety is present according to either side of the dilemma—both the saying that He does not exist and the thinking that He is something passive—the truth is evident, shining forth through the removal of the absurdities. For if He exists truly, and is not passive, it is clear that He is not from an operation, but, as is consistent, is truly God from the true God, the Father, impassibly shining forth and radiating from eternity. But, he says, God is incorruptible according to His essence. What else of those things which are understood as befitting God do not pertain to the very essence of the Son? The just, the good, the eternal, the capacity for no evil at all, the infinite in everything that is understood according to the good. For who is there who says that any of the things which are beautiful is C adventitious to the divine nature, and that not everything which is beautiful proceeds from thence and is contemplated in it—as the prophet says, that if anything is beautiful, it is His, and if anything is good, it is from Him? He connects with this that He is also unbegotten according to essence. For my part, if he says this understanding it in this way, that the essence of the Father is unbegotten, I agree with what is said, and I do not oppose the dogma. For no one at all of those who live piously posits that the Father of the Only-begotten is begotten. But if this is indicated according to the figure of speech, but he asserts that the essence itself is the unbegotten D [nature], I say that this must not be passed over unexamined, so that it might not escape notice while he is suborning those who are easily deceived into assenting to his blasphemy. That, therefore, the unbegotten is something other than the unbegotten state, being unmixed and pure from all otherness and difference. Regarding God he says these things, whose essence he asserts to be both incorruptibility and the unbegotten state. He stated, therefore, three names for God: the essence, the incorruptible, the unbegotten. If the notion of these three names in God is one and the same, the deity is absolutely these three. Just as if one were to say, wishing to characterize a man, that he is rational, risible, and flat-nailed. In which, because there is no difference according to nature in each, we say the names have equal force with one another, and these three are one in the subject, namely the humanity described by the names. If, therefore, this is the deity, namely the unbegotten state and the incorruptibility and the essence, by every necessity, with the removal of one of these, the deity is also removed at the same time. For just as if
A one were to say that which is not rational is not even fit by nature for laughter, nor would he assert it to be a man; so too in the case of these three names, that is to say, the unbegotten, the incorruptible, and the essence, if the deity is characterized by these, when any one of the three is absent, the definition of the deity is altogether effaced by the one that is missing. Therefore, let him answer what opinion he holds concerning the only-begotten God: does he think him to be begotten or unbegotten? He will certainly say begotten, if he does not contradict his own assertions. If, then, the essence and the incorruptible, by which the deity is known, are the same as the unbegotten, then to whom the unbegotten does not belong, the essence and the incorruptible are also removed from him at the same time, and since these are not present, the deity will also necessarily be taken away by every necessity. Thus the argument has arrived at a twofold result according to the blasphemous conclusion of these men. For if essence and incorruptibility and the unbegotten are spoken of regarding the same meaning in God, this new fashioner of a god is clearly shown to acknowledge the Son—who was created by him—as corruptible, because he does not acknowledge him to be unbegotten; and not only this, but also as utterly non-subsistent, because he cannot perceive him in the deity, in whom the unbegotten is not discerned, since he thinks the unbegotten and the incorruptible to be the same as the essence. Since, however, the ruin in these statements is manifest, may someone advise these wretched men to turn to the remaining path of the argument, and not to engage in strife against the truth when it is evident; but rather to agree that the meaning of each of these names is distinct, which one might understand better through the opposites. For we find the unbegotten through its opposition to the begotten, and the incorruptible is known by comparison with the corruptible, and the essence is viewed by its distinction from that which does not subsist. For B just as that which has not been begotten is called unbegotten, and that which is not corrupted is incorruptible, so too we name as essence that which is not non-existent. And conversely, as we do not call the begotten unbegotten, so we do not name that which is corruptible as incorruptible. Therefore, essence is understood in the fact that something exists; but "good" or "corruptible" indicates what kind of thing it is. Thus, the definition of essence is one thing, and that which declares the "how" or the "what kind" per se is another. C And it seems to me that it is well for me, once I have overcome the intermediate nausea (for so I think one ought to term his senseless attacks against the discourse), to tarry on the theme set before us. For whatever has been vomited forth by this writer as a kind of phlegmatic humor, for the subversion of those things on the subject of conception which were examined by the teacher, is of such a nature as to offer no danger to its readers, even if someone should be quite dull-witted and easily deceived. For who is so bereft of mind and so senseless as to believe, when Eunomius weakly applies to the discourses concerning the essence of the God of all those things which were set forth by the teacher by way of example concerning grain—by which he suggested to the listener a kind of method and approach to the contemplation of sublime things—that he is saying something, and that he is plotting against the truth with some measure of cleverness
A For to claim that the most fitting cause for God to have begotten the Son is His sovereign liberty and supreme power—a claim that could be made not only with respect to the world and the elements contained within it, but also with respect to reptiles and wild beasts—and to present this as a fitting account for a grave and venerable theologian to give regarding the conception of the only-begotten God; or to claim that even before the generation of names, God was called "Unbegotten," or "Father," or the other names, as if He feared that if the name were silent among those not yet in existence, He might become ignorant of Himself, or fall into self-oblivion, not knowing what He is through the silence of the name—this is indeed a mocking pursuit of our words. Yet, for all the sharpness and cunning it possesses, whereby he constructs the absurdity that the Father, who existed before all ages and times and every sensible and intelligible nature, waits for men so that by their mental invention He might be named—not being named, as he says, either by the Son or by any of the intelligible substances made through Him? B For I do not think anyone is so filled with deep stupidity that they do not know that the only-begotten God, who is in the Father and who beholds the Father within Himself, stands in no need of a name or word for the knowledge of the divine subject, nor does the Holy Spirit, who searches the depths of God, require a nominative appellation for the knowledge of what is sought. Nor does the incorporeal nature of the supermundane powers name the Divine by voice and tongue; for in an immaterial and intelligent nature, the act that takes place according to the mind is a word/reason (*logos*), employing no material ministry of instruments. Indeed, even in human nature, we would have no need for the use of words and names if it were possible to show the movements of the mind directly to one another. But as it is, since the notions generated within us cannot be made manifest because our nature is hampered by its carnal covering, we necessarily impose names as signs and markers for things, and through these we make the movements of the mind known to each other. C If it were somehow possible to lay bare the movements of the thoughts in another way, leaving behind the periodic service of names, we would converse with one another more brilliantly and more purely, uncovering the very nature of things, upon which the mind is occupied, by the impulses of our thoughts. But as it is, for this reason we have assigned a name to each of the things that exist: to one, "heaven"; to another, "earth"; and to another, something else. And because one thing has a relation to another, or acts or undergoes something, we signify all these things with peculiar sounds, so that the movement of the mind might not remain unshared and unknown within us. But that supermundane and immaterial nature, which is free and released from all bodily concretion, stands in no need of names or words, neither for itself nor for the nature that transcends it; but if anywhere in the holy Books a word is recorded as having been spoken by an intelligent nature, it is said for our sake, who hear it, who in no other way
A are able to learn what is signified—that which is not declared through sounds and words. And even if David in the Spirit speaks of something being said to the Lord by the Lord, it is David who is speaking, who is unable to impart to us the doctrine of what has been understood in any other way than by interpreting, through sounds and words, the understanding of the mysteries that had been generated in him from God.
All the arguments, then, which he has philosophized against [epinoia] (conception), I think it is well to pass over, even if he imputes madness to those who think that the name of the Godhead is spoken by men through [epinoia] to declare the transcendent power. For what he has in mind when he thinks he must disparage [epinoia] is available for those who wish to learn from his own words. But what we suppose regarding the use of names we have stated in the preceding. That the rational power implanted in our nature by God has discovered the sounds that interpret existing things, as they are by nature—if anyone refers the cause to the One who gave the power, neither do we dissent, just as we say that moving, seeing, and performing the rest through the senses come from Him from whom we acquired such power. Thus, therefore, the cause of naming the One who is God according to His nature, insofar as this is in accord with common reason, must be referred to Him Himself; but the authority to name all that has been understood in this way or that lies in our nature; and whether one wishes to call this [epinoia] or something else, we do not contend. We offer as the surest proof of this argument the fact that the Divine is not named identically by all, but is interpreted according to what seems right to each who has understood It. Therefore, passing over in silence all his swarming chatter about [epinoia], we shall hold to our dogmas, noting only from certain of the things he has interspersed in the midst of his vanity—where he thinks that God, like some pedagogue or schoolmaster sitting before the first-formed parents, D imparted a teaching of words and names: in which he says that the first ones formed by God, or those who sprung immediately from them, if they had not been taught how each of the things is spoken of and named, would have lived in speechlessness and irrationality, and he says they could have accomplished nothing useful for human life, since the intention of everything would have been unknown due to the lack of significant terms, namely, words and names. Such is the madness of this writer, that it is not enough for him to imagine a faculty implanted in nature by God for every method of rational operation, but that unless one had learned each thing individually, just as one is taught the language of the Hebrews or the Romans word for word, one would be ignorant of what the things themselves are—not knowing fire, not water, not air, nor the rest of the existing things—unless one had acquired knowledge of them through the names imposed upon them. But we say that He who did all things in wisdom, and this rational
creature, by the mere fact that reason exists in its nature, has endowed it with every rational faculty. And just as in our instruments of sensation, having from Him who fashioned the eye and planted the ear that faculty which naturally resides within them, we use each of the sense organs for that purpose for which it was naturally intended—and we have no need of a person to name the colors, of which sight has the perception (for the eye suffices to be its own teacher in such matters)—nor, for those things which we perceive through hearing, taste, or touch, do we stand in need of outside teachers for their knowledge, since we possess from within ourselves the instrument of judgment for each of the things produced in us by sensation; so we say A that the intellectual faculty of the soul, having been made in such a way by God, is henceforth moved by itself and looks toward objects; and so that knowledge might suffer no confusion, it imprints upon each thing stamps, as it were—the marks that are produced by words. This doctrine B is also confirmed by the great Moses, when he said that the names of the brute animals were imposed by Adam, writing in the text thus: "And God further fashioned from the earth all the beasts of the field, and all the birds of the sky, and He brought them to Adam to see what he would call them. And every living soul that Adam called, that was its name. And Adam called the names for all the beasts of the earth and the cattle and all the beasts of the field." But it seems that that nonsense, compounded by him against our conception like some viscid and sticky mud, detains C us and does not permit us to grasp what is more useful. For how could one pass by that excellent and thoughtful philosophy, where he says that the magnificence of God is displayed not only in His works, but also that the wisdom of God is demonstrated even in the names, because He fitted the appellations appropriately and naturally to each of the things created by Him? Perhaps, having encountered these things in Plato's dialogue *Cratylus*, or having heard them from someone who had encountered the work, because of the great poverty of his own ideas he stitches those trifles found there onto his own nonsense, acting similarly to those who collect their food by begging. D For just as they, receiving a small amount from each of those who offer, patch together their food for themselves from various and diverse sources, so the discourse of Eunomius, because of its poverty of true bread, collects from every side the crumbs of words and notions through its own labor; and for this reason, struck by the elegance of the Platonic diction, he thinks it fitting to make that philosophy the doctrine of the Church. For tell me, by how many voices, according to the differences of the nations, is the nature of the firmament named? We refer to it as *ouranos* (heaven), the Hebrew as *Samaim*, the Roman as *caelum*, and the Syrian, the Mede, the Cappadocian, the Maurusian, the Scythian, the Thracian, and the Egyptian name it otherwise; and one could neither
A easily enumerate the differences in names that exist according to each nation regarding the heaven and the rest of the objects. What, then, tell me, is the proper and genuine name of these, by which the magnificent wisdom of God is demonstrated? If you prefer the Greek to the rest, the Egyptian will perhaps resist you, putting forward his own. And if you grant the primacy to the Hebrew, the Syrian will oppose his own tongue, nor will the Roman yield the primacy to these; and the Mede will not admit that his own do not hold the first place; and each of the other nations will claim the primacy for its own. What then shall the dogma not suffer, being torn apart by those in conflict to such a degree by the differences of tongues? But from these, he says, as if by laws clearly set forth, it is declared that God makes the appellations B fitting to the natures among themselves. O the magnificence of the dignity, what opinions the theologian grants to the divine doctrines, which men do not even envy the bath-attendants! For we concede to them the power to coin names for the activities in which they happen to be laboring, and no one has honored them with honors equal to God, when foot-basins, or rinsing-vessels, and depilatories, or hair-removing ointments, and towels, and many such things are named by them, which fittingly declare the object by the expressiveness of the words.
But I will pass over these things, and their Epicurean natural philosophy set forth thereafter, which he says is of equal value to the *epinoia* [conceptual thought], since he asserts that the void, the indivisible corpuscle, and the fortuitous generation of things have a certain kinship with that which is declared by the *epinoia*. Lo, how he understands Epicurus, we are refuted by those who say so! Let his patron and ally in dogmas, Aristotle, also be silent, whose opinion he says is next added to the discourses of the *epinoia*. C For he says that it is his dogma that Providence does not penetrate through all things that exist, nor extend to earthly matters. Which this man, indeed, asserts is consistent with those things scrutinized by the *epinoia*; thus is one to judge the dogmas with careful precision. But proceeding further, he says that one must either not concede the origin of things that are to God, or if we grant this, not take away the institution of names. And further, concerning irrational and reasonless creatures, as we have said before, we are taught the contrary by Scripture, that neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them; but the origin is from God, while the naming of the things that have been made is from man, as has been recorded by Moses. Then he pursues an encomium of words in his own discourse, as if someone were dishonoring the power and faculty of speech, D and he says that after that foolish and empty and insolent structure of words, one must by the law and measure of Providence perfectly join the tradition of names with the knowledge and use of necessary things; and having raved about many such things in a deep sleep, he proceeds in his discourse to an unassailable and unavoidable necessity. I shall state, however, not word for word, but explaining only the meaning of his discourse: It is not to the poets, he says, that the discovery of words is to be attributed, to those who have been deceived in the
A opinions about God. What kind of things does this noble fellow attribute to God, adapting the inventions of the poetic faculty to God? So that by this means God may seem to men more august and exalted, when the disciples of Eunomius imagine that these words—*Licriphis*, and *Karchaire*, and *Eurax*, and *Kechære*, and *Phocheiri*, and *Size*, and *Doupese*, and *Kanachize*, and *Intonuere poli*, and *Crebris micat ignibus æther*, and *Linxe*, and *Ische*, and other figments of the poets of this kind—are not pursued by the poets through some license according to their own judgment, but that, being mystically instructed by God Himself, they insert these words into their verses. But let these things also be passed over, as well as that learned and unassailable epicheirema of theirs, that we are unable to demonstrate from written history that holy men devised new terms. For if human nature was imperfect up to the manifestation of those men, and had not yet been completed by rational grace, it would have been highly appropriate to require of them the filling up of what was lacking. But if nature subsisted from the very beginning as not indigent, but perfect according to its ratiocinative and excogitative operation, how could anyone easily inquire further regarding the constitution of speech according to commentary, so as to claim that the saints were the first authors of voices or words? Or if we cannot demonstrate this, they judge it to be a sufficient demonstration for themselves that God has ordained such syllables and words for us.
B But since, he says, God does not disdain conversation with His own servants, it is consequent to think that He gave from the beginning the names that were suitable to the things. What then shall we reply to this? We define the cause of God’s coming into Congress and conversation with man as being His benevolence toward the human race. But since what is small by nature cannot be lifted above its own modes and reach the supereminent nature of the Most High, for this reason He Himself, bringing His benevolent power down to our weakness, distributes His grace and utility to us just as we are able C to receive it. For just as according to the divine providence the sun, by tempering the intensity and purity of its rays with the intervening air, sends down a moderate splendor and heat to those who receive it, although in itself it is inaccessible to the weakness of our nature: so too the divine power, by the likeness of the example mentioned by us, infinitely surpassing our nature and being inaccessible to participation, as a mother—benign and merciful—together lisping to the inarticulate whimpers of infants, bestows upon human nature what it is able to receive; and for this reason, in the various D appearances of God to men, He is both fashioned according to man, and speaks humanly, and puts on such affectations as anger and mercy and the like, so that through all things that are congruous to our nature our infantile life might be led, as if by the hand, touching the divine nature through the discourses of Providence. For since [He is subject to] no passion of those that happen for the sake of pleasure, or mercy, or anger...
it is A a holy thing to believe that the Divine is not subject to them, a truth which no one who has even moderately examined the truth of things would contradict. Yet, nevertheless, the Lord is said to delight in His servants, and to be angered with wrath against a people that has stumbled, and to pity again him whom He was to pity, and to show mercy in like manner; for every one, I suppose, of such expressions is instructing us in the reasoned word, that through our own idioms the Providence of God is tempered to our infirmity. This is so that those who are inclined toward sin may abstain from evils through fear of punishment, and those who have been caught in sins before may not despair of a return through repentance, looking toward His mercy; and that those who direct their lives according to an exact standard and conform them rightly, may delight more in the virtues, as those who by their own life bring joy to Him who is the inspector of goods.
Just as it is not permitted to call him a mute who converses with a deaf person by signs and gestures, insofar as he is able to hear: so neither should we consider human speech [when applied] to God as literal, since He made use of it toward men by way of dispensation. For we, too, have been accustomed to guide irrational animals with clucking, kissing sounds, and hissing. B Yet this is not "discourse" as far as we are concerned—that with which we reach the hearing of the irrational—but we use our natural speech among ourselves; whereas for irrational animals, a suitable noise and whatever sound or gesture [is adequate] has sufficed for necessary use.
But this pious person does not want God to have made use of our own [forms of speech] because of our propensity toward vice, this best of friends being ignorant that for our sake He even refused not to become a curse and sin; so great is His benevolence and love toward men, that he willingly came to the experience not only of our goods, but also of our evils. And if He accepted the communion of our evils, how would He have been unwilling to participate in the most beautiful of our goods (I mean, the Word)?
But [our opponent] puts forward David for his defense, and says that he claims that names were imposed by God upon things, because it is written in this manner: "He who numbers the multitude of the stars, and gives names to all of them." But I think it is manifest to anyone possessed of a mind that the discourse concerning these matters has no communion with the subject at hand. Since, however, it is probable that some might heed this argument without consideration, we shall discuss a few things regarding these matters. C Divine Scripture often knows how to attribute to God such expressions as seem in no way discordant with our own; for example: "The Lord was angered with wrath"; and, "He repented regarding their wickedness"; and, "It repented Him that He had anointed Saul as king"; and, "The Lord was awakened as one sleeping." And in addition to these, it sets forth a throne, and standing, and movement, and many such things; which by nature do not pertain to God, but for the sake of the dispensation of those being instructed, they are not without their use. For it [the Scripture] D understands how to restrain the more slack in spirit through the fear of the expression of anger, and to benefit those who are in need of the...
pharmaceutical of repentance, it says that the Lord has a change of heart regarding the wickedness; and to those who, on the other hand, are carried away to arrogance by certain successes, it demonstrates through the repentance concerning Saul that prosperity does not remain for them, even if it seems to be from God. And to those who are not submerged in the deep fall of sin, but rise up as if from a certain sleep of a vain life, it says that God rises and awakens together with them; to those who have firmly ascended to the good, it says He stands; and to those who are settled in the good, it says He sits; and again, it says He is moved and walks in those who have been shifted from the stability that is in the good. A As the history narrates in the case of Adam, describing God walking in the paradise at the time of the cool of the day, indicating by the cool of the day the descent to the darkness of the first-formed man, and by the movement, the instability and changeableness of man regarding the good.
But these things perhaps will seem to many to be drawn out further than the contemplation proposed to us requires. That, however, no one would say is at variance with the matter proposed: that many think that what is incomprehensible to themselves is also not comprehensible to God, and they think that whatever escapes their own understanding is also above the divine power. Since, therefore, we have made number the measure of quantity—and number is nothing else than a composition of units, B in various ways as the unit increases into a multitude; for the unit and the decade are accomplished toward this according to the composition of units, and again the century is a unit composed of decades. In like manner also the thousand is another unit, and the myriads likewise, proportionally by multiplication, the one being headed up toward this from the thousands, and the other collected from the centuries—we make all these, limiting the things subjected to us, signs of the quantity of the things being numbered.
As then we might be instructed by the divine Scripture that nothing is unknown to God, it speaks of the multitude of the stars being numbered by God himself, not that the numbering happens in this way. For who is so foolish C as to think that God comprehends existing things by odd and even numbers, and completes his numbering of the aggregated quantity through the composition of units? But because with us the exact knowledge of quantity is derived from number, in order that we might be instructed concerning God, that all things are encompassed by the knowledge of His wisdom and nothing escapes His accurate understanding, for this reason He ordained that God numbers the stars, counseling us by the things which He says to understand this: not to suppose that God reaches the things that are with a measure of our own knowledge, but that all things which are incomprehensible and inconceivable to us D are encompassed by the knowledge of the divine wisdom. For since the stars, on account of their multitude, escape numbering as far as human conception is concerned, from the part...
A of these things being numbered by God, the discourse testifies that nothing of those things which are unknown to us escapes the knowledge of God. Therefore it says, *He who numbers the multitudes of the stars*, not, of course, being ignorant of the quantity of the stars before he numbered them. For how is it likely that He should be ignorant of what He made? For He who is the overseer of the universe would not be ignorant of what is encompassed by the power that contains all things. Why, then, does He number that which He knows? For it is a characteristic of those who are ignorant to measure quantity by number; but He who knows all things before their creation has no need of a teacher of number for the knowledge of the things that exist. But yet, it is said by David that He numbers, clearly for the sake of our instruction, as the discourse descends B to our capacity for the sake of clarity; David demonstrated that those things which are unknown to us are known accurately through the significance of the number. Just as, therefore, He is said to number—needing no arithmetical process for the knowledge of created things—so the prophecy says that He calls them all by name, not meaning, I think, this naming which is done by voice. For if the discourse proceeded to that sense, it would end in something absurd and unworthy of the conception held about God, if it says that these names used in our custom were imposed upon the stars by God. For if anyone were to grant that these were called by God, it would necessarily follow that one must think the appellation of the Greek idols was derived thence for the stars, and to deem true whatever names from mythical history are attributed to the celestial figures, as if God were ratifying such words for them. Thus the heptad of stars C contained in the pole, being distributed among the Greek idols, would show those who have wandered in these matters to be free from blame, if it were believed and persuaded that this had been ordained by God. And so the myth concerning Orion and Scorpio is brought to belief, and what is told about Argo, and Cygnus, and the Eagle, and the Dog, and the fable about Ariadne’s Crown. Furthermore, it would lead one to suspect that God is the inventor of those names which have been devised in the zodiac for the appearances on account of a certain similarity of figure, if Eunomius rightly thinks that David is saying that God imposes these names upon them. Since, therefore, it is absurd to think God is the inventor of such names, lest the names of the idols seem D to have attained their origin from Him, it will be best not to accept what is said without inquiry, but to perceive the meaning of this statement just as we understood those things which were said about number. For since among us a testimony of accurate knowledge is that what is known to us is called by its own name, through these things He teaches us that of those things which cannot be comprehended by us, He who contains the universe not only comprehends in summary the fullness of the quantity gathered together, but also knows each single thing exactly and perfectly. For this reason, the discourse says not only that the multitudes of the stars are numbered, but also that each one is called by name, which indeed
A signifies his A accurate diligence, reaching even into the more subtle and tenuous parts, and thus to know the singular things exactly, just as a man calls by name one who is known to him and familiar. But if anyone should say that other names were placed upon the stars by God, of which he imagines human nature to be ignorant, and concerning which he supposes David to have spoken, such a one wanders far from the truth. For if there were other names given to the stars, the divine Scripture would not have made mention of these names, which are in the abuse of Greek custom, for Isaiah says: *He who makes the Pleiades, and Vesper, and Arcturus, and the storehouses of the South*; and Job naming Orion and Asaroth; so that from this it is manifest that in things worn smooth by life, divine Scripture has used names for our instruction. Thus, we have B heard of the horn of B Amalthea in Job; and among Isaiah, the Sirens: the former, indeed—namely, Job—designating the total abundance of goods according to Greek opinion; while Isaiah declares the pleasure perceived from hearing by the name of the Sirens. Just as, therefore, the divinely inspired discourse used there the names from fabulous narrations, looking to the utility of the hearers, so also here the discourse has spoken of the appellations placed upon the stars by human commentary, teaching that every thing which is named by humans has its existence from God—the thing, that is, not the name. For he does not say "who names," but *He who makes the Pleiad, and Vesper, and Arcturus.* Wherefore I think it to be demonstrated abundantly by what has been said that David favors our opinion, teaching through the prophecy that God does not name the stars, but knows them exactly according to the custom of men, who know these C most fully and perfectly, C whom they can also call by name on account of frequent acquaintance.
But if it is necessary to explain also the opinion handed down by many concerning these sayings of this psalm, the vanity of the opinion which Eunomius has concerning them will be refuted much more. For those who have more diligently searched out the mind of the divinely inspired Scripture say that not all things that exist are worthy of divine numbering; for in the evangelical feedings that took place in the desert, neither the puerile age, nor the female sex, were considered worthy of number; and in the exodus of the Israelite people, only those who were already able to bear arms against enemies and fight most bravely were counted. For neither are the names of all things such that they are brought forth through the divine mouth, but if anything is beautiful and celestial it is numbered; that which, because of the height of its condition or governance, remains pure and unmixed from all fellowship of darkness and obscurity, is called a star; and if anything is found by the same reason worthy of being written in the divine Books, it is named. For concerning the adversaries he says that, *I will not be mindful of their names through my lips.* But names, such as befit such stars,
A the Lord imposes, we have clearly learned from the prophecy of Isaiah, which says: *I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine.* So that if anyone makes himself the possession of God, the work becomes a name for him. But let these things be as they may seem to be to those who encounter them. As for what he adds to the statements, namely that the beginnings of the creation of the world attest that the sounds were imposed by God upon things—a matter the investigation of which I judge to be already sufficiently redundant in what has preceded—and the voice of Adam, which the Apostle says was made prophetically regarding Christ and the Church, let him interpret it at his own discretion as he wishes. For no one is so foolish and dull-witted that, when Paul has revealed to us the mysteries hidden in the power of the Spirit, he would make Eunomius a more trustworthy interpreter of divine things—a man who overtly fights against the words of the divinely inspired testimony and, through his explanation of this saying, forces the conclusion that the species of animals were not named by Adam. Let his stinging words also be passed over, and that graceless boorishness, and his dung-scented and sewer-filled speech, which proceeds with his customary elegance against our teacher, calling him a sower of tares, and a rot of fruit, and the ruin of Valentinus, and the fruit from him which he asserts to be piled up in the soul of the author; and let the rest of the unpleasantness of his remarks be wrapped in silence, just as bodies liquifying with rotten corruption are buried in the earth, so that the stench may not become an annoyance to many throughout the crowd. B
But the discourse must be transferred to the matters stated by him thereafter. For again he sets forth a certain diction of the teacher, which is as follows: *For we call God, the Lord of all, incorruptible and unbegotten, using these names according to different concepts of the mind. For when we look back at the past ages, and find the life of God to be beyond every limitation and every beginning, we call Him unbegotten; but when we direct the mind to the succeeding ages, we have addressed as incorruptible Him who is infinite and interminable and comprehensible by no end. As therefore that which has no end to its life is incorruptible, so that which lacks a beginning is named unbegotten, while we contemplate these things through our conceptualization.* C Accordingly, the insult which he has made the prologue to the contemplation of the statements, I shall again pass over—the change of some seed, and the instructor of sowing, and that charge of reprehension which is concluded by no reasoning, and whatever other things his insatiable tongue pursues while walking through empty and void concepts. But to that which he attempts to attack by slandering the discourse, to this we shall now turn. He promises to refute us for saying that the Divine is not incorruptible by nature; but we consider alien to that nature only those things which are adventitious to some and which can be lost; but that without which the underlying nature cannot be conceived, how could one be in a position, as if separating it from itself
A from its own nature, to blame anyone? If, therefore, our discourse were to claim that incorruptibility is ingrained and adventitious to God, as though it had not always been in Him, or as though it would not always be, it would have occasion to speak against us in calumny. But if our discourse defines that the Divine always has the same state, and that it always exists as what it is now, and that nothing accrues to Him by way of any augmentation and addition of things that are not present in Him, but that He always is in everything that is understood and spoken of as good—how are we maligned for not attesting to incorruptibility as B belonging to His nature? But from the passage previously read to the master, he feigns that he has taken the grounds for such calumny of our discourse, as if we attribute incorruptibility to God from the comparison of the ages. If our statement were brought forth by us, perhaps the discourse would be suspect as an apology, as if we were correcting what had not been rightly said and were making the words liable to censure into blameless ones by changing them. But since our words are brought forth by the adversary, what stronger demonstration of the truth could there be than the testimony of those who contend against us? How, then, does our discourse, which Eunomius brings forward in calumny against us, run? “When,” he says, “we turn our mind to the supereminent ages, that which is indeterminate and infinite, and comprised by no end, we have called incorruptible.” Does Eunomius think that attributing and calling are the same thing? C And who is so far gone from right reason as to be ignorant of the distinct significations of these words? For he who acquires what is not present to him attributes it, but he who names appropriately that which exists calls it. How, then, is this “illuminator of truth” not ashamed to conclude his calumny with such manifest slander? And just as those who, because of some disease, do not see, behave unseemly in the eyes of those who see, thinking that what is not seen by them is also unknown to those who are healthy, such a thing has happened to this “acute and quick-witted” man, who, being blind to the truth, thinks that this same defect exists in the hearers. And who is so foolish as not to place the slandered words alongside the calumny, and from the reading of both D detect the malice of the writer? Our discourse calls God incorruptible; he accuses the one who “bestows” incorruptibility. What do these have in common? It is just that each should be held accountable for his own words, and not be subject to blame for the words of others. But now he accuses us, and his bitterness is directed at us, yet according to true reason he condemns no one but himself. For if bestowing incorruptibility upon God is a crime, and this is said by no one else but him alone—then the slanderer becomes his own accuser, slandering what is his own, not what is ours. And concerning the name regarding “unbegottenness,” we say that, just as that which has no end to its life is incorruptible, so too that which has no beginning to its existence was named unbegotten; but this man says that we cause the firstfruits of this to be bestowed upon Him by the ages in relation to all begotten things.
I pass over in silence the blasphemy, that the Only-begotten God is made common with everything that is begotten, and, by comprehending Him in the same term, produces the same opinion as regarding the rest, bringing the Son of God down to everything that exists by way of generation. But I will add to my discourse, for the sake of more intelligent hearers, the senseless malice of this man. Basil, he says, procures for God the privileges of preeminence over all begotten things from the ages. What is this senseless and empty babble? Does man become a broker for God, and through the ages procure for Him rights of primogeniture? What sort of vain and empty boasting is this, consisting of words that cannot stand? If the teacher has said that what rises above the vast extension of the ages is revealed by certain significant terms regarding that Being who, as the Apostle says, has neither beginning of days nor end of life, so that the distinction of opinion may be signified by different words—and for this reason that which is older than every beginning is called "without beginning" and "unbegotten," while that which is circumscribed by no end is called "immortal" and "incorruptible"—he is not ashamed to write these things as an attribution, a procurement, and suchlike ravings. B Furthermore, he says that the ages are divided in two by us, as if he had not read what he himself set down, or as if he had a discourse suited to those who are forgetful of what he has said. What does the teacher say? "If we conceive of things before creation and, by reasoning beyond the ages, grasp the uncircumscribed life of eternal existence, we signify such a notion by the title of 'unbegotten'; and if we turn our thought to what follows, and apprehend the life of God as more abundant than the ages, we interpret this thought by the term 'infinite' and 'incorruptible'." Where does the discourse in these words divide the ages, if we are declaring with words and names, according to our ability, the eternity of God, which is equally apparent to every conception of the mind, and exists in the same way from every quarter, and is measured by no interval? For since human life, moving by intervals, progresses from some beginning to some end, and the life here is distributed into what is past and what is expected, so that the latter falls into hope and the former into memory; for this reason, C as our condition allows, we understand both what is past and what is expected by way of extended intervals. So also, in regard to the supereminent nature, we speak by catachresis—not as though God, through His own life, leaves behind some interval at His back, and proceeds again by living into what lies ahead, but as our understanding, which conceives things according to our own nature, measures eternity by past and future: when it neither cuts off the notion that progresses into the infinity of the indefinite on the side of what is behind, nor promises some position and limit for the infinite life on the side of what is before. If we both think and speak these things, how is it that for us the... D
[Beginning of translation: ...of life to be announced. If we conceive of these things and affirm them with our mind, how does Eunomius assert that we propagate a common dissection of the ages? Unless he would say that holy Scripture also divides the ages—Scripture which, with the same understanding, signifies the infinity of the divine life, since David commemorated the kingdom that was before the ages, and Moses showed the kingdom of God extending above the ages, so that we may be taught by both that everything which is conceived in the mind as distinct by intervals is contained within the divine nature, terminated on every side by the infinity of Him who contains the universe? For Moses, looking to what follows thereafter, says that He reigns for the age and for the age and beyond. B But the great David, bringing his thought to that which is before, said: *God is our King before the ages*; and again: *God, who is before the ages, shall hear*. But the wise Eunomius, telling such great teachers to fare well, says that we proclaim one life as lacking a beginning, and another as lacking an end; and again, certain varieties and differences of the ages, which by their diversity also divide the conception of God. But lest our battle against the things said be drawn out too long, we will add Eunomius's effort—not yet agitated or examined—which is sufficiently suitable, through the things in which he is studiously occupied in falsehood, to make the truth more illustrious to the wise.
C For as he proceeds with his argument, he asks us what we think the ages are. And yet, it would have been more just for such questions to be proposed by us to him. For he is the one who claims to have known the essence of God, and who determines that things inaccessible to us are comprehended by his own intellect. Therefore, let him, who boasts of having comprehended the things above, explain to us the essence of the ages. And let him not terrify us, ignorant as we are, by brandishing this steep and dilemmatic-like answering so fearfully, as if by thinking the ages were one thing, this absurdity would arise, and if the other, that. For if, he says, you call them eternal, you will be Greeks and Valentinians and barbarians; but if you call them begotten, no longer, he says, will you confess that which is unbegotten in God. O this unassailable and irrebuttable argument! If something begotten were to be conceded, Eunomius, the confession of the Unbegotten will be abolished. And where have those reasonings of yours about the begotten in relation to the unbegotten flowed away—those by which you construct the dissimilarity of the essence of the Son to Him who begat Him? D For it seems, from what we are now being taught, that the Father, when considered in regard to the begotten, does not have his essence in a dissimilar way, but is altogether dissolved into non-being by the confession of the Unbegotten: if, indeed, by calling the ages begotten, we are driven to no longer confess the Unbegotten. But let us see the necessity by which he forces us into the assent of this absurdity. For he says that those things by whose juxtaposition that which is without beginning comes to be for God—if these did not exist, that which is added would not exist. O this strong and inescapable grip, as if he were wrestling us, bound in knots that cannot be loosened, from the midst...]
A of the ages, says that the Ingenitum accrues to God. From whom does it accrue? Who says this, that for Him who is without beginning, something comes to be as an Ingenitum through acquisition by the transposition of certain things? Neither the word nor the thought of this absurdity is detected in our writings. Indeed, the word will be its own advocate, having nothing of the kind that has been alleged against us; and as for the meaning of what has been said, who would be thought a more trustworthy interpreter than the authors themselves of the discourse? Therefore, we are more just in saying what we perceive. When we define the life of God to be beyond the ages, we say these things which have been said in what preceded. But, he says, if there is no transposition of ages, it is impossible that that which is added to God from this can exist. And he says that Ingenitum is added. Let him also say from whom such a thing is added to God. If, therefore, from himself, he would be ridiculous to blame his own folly on our discourses; but if from us, let him recite the word, and we shall receive the accusation.
But I think these things and whatever follows from them should be passed over. For they are like children’s toys, building certain structures of edifices in the sand directly from the arena. For having composed a certain periodic clause, and with difficulty having arrived at the end, he demonstrates that the same life is both without beginning and without end, fulfilling our own prayer in such a study. B For nothing else is said by us than that this divine life is one and continuous with itself, infinite and everlasting, never hindered by any limit toward the infinite. Up to this point the writer bestows his labors and sweats upon the truth that is according to us, demonstrating that the life itself is not limited on either side, neither if one examines that which is before the ages, nor if one reasons about that which will be after. But in what follows he turns back again to his own confusion. For when he had said that the same life is lacking beginning and end, having omitted the discourse about life, and having reduced the notions that are considered in the divine life into one single concept, he made all things one. For if life, he says, is without beginning and without end and incorruptible and ingenitum, the notion of incorruptibility would be the same as that of the ingenitum, and that which is without beginning would be the same as that which has no end. And to these he adds assistance from ratiocination. For it is not possible, he says, that the life should be one, while the definition of the incorruptible is not the same as the definition of the ingenitum: C excellently here the noble fellow adds. He thinks, however, that neither should the definition of justice be different from these things that have been said, nor that of wisdom, and power, and goodness, and of each of the names that fit God decorously. And let there be no ratio that is understood peculiarly and separately, but let one signified thing be subjected under every review of names; and let one ratio of description fulfill the definition of each of the things that are spoken. And if you were asked what the signification of "judge" is, reply with the interpretation of "ingeneracy." And if you must give the definition of justice
which is incorporeal, have it ready for your response. And what "incorruptibility" signifies, which you would surely say is what the signification of "mercy" or "judgment" represents: thus let all things one by one proceed mutually, with no distinctive impression separating the one from the other. A And if Eunomius ordains these things, why do the Scriptures vainly call upon the Divine nature with many names, naming it God, judge, just, strong, long-suffering, true, merciful, and many other such things? For if none of these names is grasped by any distinctive conception, but all are churned together through the confusion of what is signified, it would be vain to use many appellations for the same thing, with no difference in what is signified distinguishing the names from one another. Who is so stupid and astonished as to be ignorant that, while the Divine nature—whatever it may be in its essence—is one, simple, uniform, and incomposite, and in no way viewed in any varied composition; the human soul, on the other hand, lying on the ground, and buried in this earthly life, because it cannot clearly and lucidly gaze upon what is sought, reaches out to the ineffable nature with many conceptions in many ways and in many parts, not hunting for the hidden truth through any one single thought. For if one path were granted to us to Divine knowledge, the apprehension would be easy. But now, through the wisdom that appears in the whole universe, we have understood that the One who presides over all is wise. And through the magnificent display of miracles, we have received an impression of power. B And to believe that the whole universe depends upon Him becomes a proof that there is no cause of His existence.
Again, having understood the abomination of evil, we grasp its unchangeability and its freedom from mixture with evil; and having thought that the corruption of death is the extreme of evils, we have named Him immortal and incorruptible, and foreign to every such notion—not dividing the subject by these conceptions, but, believing that what He is in essence is one, we have conceived that what is understood by the mind stands in a proper relation to all such notions. For the names do not conflict with one another according to the nature of opposites, as if, when one is present, it is impossible for the other to be thought of in the same subject—just as it is impossible for life and death to be thought of together in the same being—but the impression of each of those things said about the Divine nature is such that, even if it is separate in its signification, it nevertheless has no opposition C to what is named along with it. For what does "just" oppose to "incorporeal," even if the words do not accord with each other in their conception? And what battle does "goodness" have with "invisible"? Thus, neither is the eternity of Divine life, though it is known by twofold names and notions—that which has no end and that which lacks a beginning—divided by the difference of the names; nor is the one the same as the other in regard to the signification of the names. For one indicates the exclusion of a beginning, the other the exclusion of an end; nor does it imply a division.
of the subject itself of the names which are considered in it, or any difference A in the things remarked upon in relation to it.
These are the things said by us; but those said by our adversary, according to the very phrasing of the expression, are such that they have no support from reasoning, while meanwhile he himself prodigiously spews forth such arrogant voices, devoid of all sense, in the figure of clauses and periods, rashly and at random. The goal of his discourse, however, is this: that there is no difference in the diverse names according to their meanings, lest we seem to attribute to it something of those things which do not belong to it. For, he says, since true discourses take their judgment from the subjects and the things signified, and some things are suitable for some, just as the same things are for the same, there must of necessity be one of two things: either the thing which is declared is absolutely different, or the discourse which declares the thing is not different either. B He pursues these and many other things to this end, in order to prove his proposed aim, after he has brought forward in the middle certain relations of speech, and appositions, and species, and measure, and part, and time, and place, so that through the subtractions or exceptions of these, ungenerateness might become an indicator of essence. C But the construction of this has this manner; I shall express the meaning in my own wording. There is no other thing, he says, than life, which is essence, so that no composition might be understood in the simple nature, divided by the notion into that which participates and that which is participated. But the same thing, he says, that is life, is also essence, teaching this excellent philosophy. For no one of those who are possessed of their wits would contradict that these things are not so. But how did he conclude his argument toward his goal? If, he says, by signifying that which D is without a beginning, we signify life, and the discourse of truth compels us to call this life essence, then, he says, the unbegotten is the signifier of the divine essence itself. But we too assent to the fact that the divine life was not begotten by another (which is what the notion of that which is without a beginning signifies). But to think that the very thing which is signified by the word "unbegotten" is essence, we believe is a trait only of those who are carried away by madness. For who is so deranged and wandering from reason as to proclaim unbegottenness as the definition of essence? For just as generation has a kinship with that which is begotten, so likewise generation does not agree with the unbegotten. Since, therefore, ungenerateness demonstrates that which is not in the Father, how shall we confess that we make a demonstration of that which does not exist in relation to the essence? But when he granted to himself—which is not granted to him either by us or by the consequence of the things set forth—namely, that ungenerateness is the signifier of the divine life of God, he drew his conclusion. But that his drivel in this place may become perfectly clear, let us consider the discourse thus: for let us examine the arguments by which he led the essence in the Father to ungenerateness, to see if we might likewise lead the essence of the Son to ungenerateness by the same arguments.
BOOK XII
A It is necessary, he says, that of the same life, and one which is simply one, there should be one and the selfsame definition, even if in names and in manner and in order it appears different. For since true definitions take their judgment from the underlying subjects and the realities that are declared, and since others correspond to other realities, just as the same realities correspond to the same definitions, it is necessary that one of two things must be the case: either the reality declared is entirely different, or else the definition that declares it is not different; but there is no underlying reality other than the Son’s life on which one could fix one’s thought or cast another definition. Is there any incongruity in these statements, such that it is not permitted to say or write such things concerning the Only-Begotten? Is not the Son himself also life in a sincerely one way? Is it not also fitting for him that there should be one and the selfsame definition, even if in names or in manner and in order it appears different? In his case too, will not one of the two things necessarily be established: either the reality declared is entirely different, or else the definition that declares it is not different—there being no underlying reality other than his life on which one could fix one’s thought or cast another definition? Nothing from us has been mixed in with what has been said by Eunomius regarding the Father. But we have arrived at the same confession and consequence, only interposing the name of the Son.
B If, therefore, he too is one life, sincere, separated from every composition and entanglement, and no reality is set apart from the Son's life—for how could a mixture of an alien reality be suspected in that which is simple? For that would no longer be considered simple which is conceived with something else; yet the life and the essence of the Father are simple C —and since of simple life, according to the same reasoning of life and simplicity, there is no difference, nor any intensification or remission, nor any variation making for a difference in quantity or quality, it is absolutely necessary that those things which agree in the same concepts should also be named by the same appellations. If, therefore, the same reality is understood regarding the simplicity of life in the Father and in the Son, since the defining account of the simplicity, as has been said, receives no difference, it is absolutely necessary that the name applied to the one should also befittingly apply to the other; so that if the simplicity of the Father’s life is signified by the name of ungenerateness, the word is not D improper for, nor does it fail to agree with, the Son’s simplicity. For just as the rational and mortal, and that which is capable of mind and knowledge, is named "man," similarly both in the case of Adam and of Abel—and nothing has changed the designation of nature, neither that which in the case of Abel came to life through generation, nor in the case of Adam without generation—so too, if the simple and incomposite life of the Father has the name of ungenerateness, in the same manner the same concept must necessarily be applied to the Son’s life by the same word; if indeed, as Eunomius says, one of two things must be the case, that either the reality declared is entirely different, or else the definition that declares it is not different.
But why do we linger in vain, rashly and to no purpose? It were better to produce Eunomius’s book before more diligent men for the refutation of his insanity, and without A needing correction or rebuttal, to demonstrate from it to those who have understanding not only the blasphemy of his dogma, but also the flaccidity and torpor of his habit. For in many ways, by perversely interpreting the name "conception" not according to our understanding, but according to what seems good to him, he is like someone in a night battle, where no one distinguishes friend from foe, blindly striking at his own dogma by the very things through which he thinks he is waging war upon us, without realizing it. For what he thinks he must most of all use to alienate himself from the Church of the pious, is this: the assertion that God at some time became Father, and that the name of Fatherhood is more recent than the other names B spoken of Him. For he asserts that He was called Father from that time from which He proposed to become Father, and did become so.
Since, therefore, he constructs in this discourse that all the appellations applied to the divine nature are in agreement with one another according to their meaning, and that there is no difference among them; and one of the names spoken of Him is "Father"—for just as He is incorrupt and eternal, so is He also named "Father"—either he will confirm the opinion concerning the other names in this title as well, and destroy his initial premise, if the notion of Fatherhood happens to be contained within all the appellations. For it is clear that if the meaning of "incorrupt" and "Father" is the same, then as He is always incorrupt, so He will also be confessed to be always Father, since, as he says, the meaning is one and the same for all the names. Or, if he fears to attribute Fatherhood to God from all eternity, he will of necessity dissolve his own argument, by confessing that each of the names possesses a unique and peculiar meaning; and thus his elaborate babbling about the names C will vanish like a bubble that has burst.
But if he should reply that the meanings of these words are actually opposites, because only the appellation of Father and that of Creator come to God in a generative manner—since, as he himself says, both words are predicated of God from "operation"—he will spare us from lingering much on this subject, by confessing these things which would have required much labor for us to refute. For if the meaning of the word "Creator" and the word "Father" is one and the same (since both are from "operation"), then it is certain that what is signified by the words is also fully equivalent; for things that have the same significance cannot possibly differ in their underlying subject. If, therefore, both "Father" and "Creator" D are named from "operation," it is surely permissible for one who wishes to make an interchange to use the names in reverse and say that God is both Creator of the Son and Father of a stone, if the appellation of Father signifies no relation of nature. But the absurdity brought about by this, for those endowed with mind and intelligence, is no longer in doubt; for just as it is absurd to think God a stone, or any other of those things that have come into existence through creation, so
A it will be confessed, nor is there need to ascribe divinity to the Only-begotten God, since it is one and the same signification according to operation that attributes both appellations to God, according to which, as Eunomius thinks, He is named both Father and Creator. But let us hold to the things proposed.
For slandering our argument, which says that the knowledge of God is gathered in us according to different applications, he says that it is no longer represented by us as simple, since it partakes of the meanings signified by each name, and through the participation of them, completes for itself its perfection according to being. these things I have set down in my own words, cutting short his long babbling. B But towards this vain and languid redundancy, I do not believe that any person of sound mind would make any refutation that would be outside the category of foolishness. For if there were such a thing in what has been said by us, we would necessarily have to either recant what was falsely spoken, or bring the ambiguity of thought to the standard of an unexceptionable interpretation. But since no such thing has been said by us, nor does the sequence of what has been said force the mind to such a necessity, why is it necessary to weary those who encounter it by lingering on what is agreed upon with a prolix argument? For who is so far out of his mind, that upon hearing that pious conceptions for God are gathered through many notions, he should think the Divine to be composite from different things, or that it gathers for itself its perfection from the participation of certain things? Suppose someone to have discovered geometry; let this same person be thought also to be the inventor of astronomy, and again of medicine and grammar, and agriculture, and other such crafts of this kind. Because many C and different names of crafts are considered in relation to the one soul, will the soul be thought for this reason to be composite? And yet the meaning according to medicine differs greatly from the science of astronomy, and grammar has no communion with geometry according to the meaning; nor again navigation and agriculture. But yet, concerning the soul, the account of each of these can be gathered, and not for this reason does the soul become multicomposite, nor are all the names of the crafts mixed together into one meaning. If, therefore, the human mind, through so many things being said about it, is in nothing harmed in its simplicity, how could one think that God, if He be called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the names that are appropriate to God—unless one meaning were to be brought to all the names—should become multipartite, or gather for Himself the perfection of His nature D from the participation of these things?
But let us examine his more vehement accusation against us, which runs as follows: "But if," he says, "it is necessary to proceed to a more severe argument, it does not even preserve the essence itself unmixed and pure from things worse and contrary." The accusation, then, is this much. But what is the proof of the charges?
A I see this violent and rhetorical assault of his against us. "If," he says, "it is incorruptible only according to that which is without end in life, and unbegotten only according to that which is without beginning, then whereby it is not incorruptible, it will be corruptible, and whereby it is not unbegotten, it will be begotten." And taking up the same point again, he says: "It will be, therefore, according to the 'without beginning,' both unbegotten and corruptible, and according to the 'without end,' both incorruptible and begotten." This, then, is his more severe argument, which he threatened to bring against us, to refute and convict us of saying that the essence of God is mixed with things contrary and worse. I, however, consider it clear and manifest to those who possess within themselves a firm and valid criterion of truth, that our teacher has given no handle to this slanderer in what was said, but that the latter has distorted the statements according to his own whim and has concluded this childish game of sophistry or cavil. Nevertheless, so that this may be clearer to all who read it, I will again recount that passage word for word, and will place alongside these the words of Eunomius. "We call the God of the universe incorruptible," says the doctor, "and unbegotten, using these names according to different applications of the intellect and concepts. For when we look back toward the past ages, finding the life of God exceeding all circumscription, we call him unbegotten. But when we apply our mind to the coming ages, we designate that which is indeterminate, infinite, and comprehended by no limit as incorruptible. As, therefore, that which has no end of life is called incorruptible, so that which lacks a beginning of life is named unbegotten by our reflection, as we contemplate these things." This is the discourse of our teacher, teaching us through what has been said that the divine life, being by nature one and continuous with itself, neither begins from any beginning nor is circumscribed by any limit. And that it is possible to make clear through certain names the concepts that are contemplated in this divine life. For we declare that which is not from any cause by the word "without beginning" and "unbegotten," and that which can be circumscribed by no limit nor dissolved into destruction, the expression "incorruptible" and "having no end" signifies. And he defines that it is necessary in the divine life to express by the name "unbegotten" that which has no beginning, and to name that which lacks an end "incorruptible." Since whatever has ceased to be falls entirely into disappearance; and when we hear of the disappearance of that which is, we understand the destruction of that which has subsisted. He says, therefore, that he who never ceases to be, and is alien to every dissolution that occurs through corruption, is called incorruptible. What then does Eunomius say to these things? "If," he says, "it is incorruptible only according to that which is without end in life, and unbegotten only according to that which is without beginning, then whereby it is not unbegotten, it will be begotten." Who gave this to you, Eunomius, not
A to be considered B in all the life of God C is the incorruptibility? Who, having divided the divine life into two [parts] with terms signifying them separately, names each of the halves in such a way that, as if this name belonged to one segment, he says that it does not belong to the other? This is the acuteness of your dialectic: to say that the life which is without beginning is corruptible, and that with the incorruptible, that which is without beginning is not considered. It is similar to if someone were to say that man is a being endowed with reason, mind, and knowledge, applying each of these names to the subject according to a different way of regarding it and conception, and then were mocked by some such person expounding these and similar things. For if man, as he is capable of mind and knowledge, cannot be rational corresponding to this, but will be this alone insofar as he is capable of knowledge, and his nature will not contain the other [attribute]; and again, if you define man as rational, you will no longer grant him to be capable of mind; for insofar as he is rational, he will be shown to be lacking intelligence. Now if the ridiculous and foolish nature of this is clear to everyone in these examples, it will not be in the least ambiguous in that [theological] case either. For if you read the teacher's statement, you will find the play of the sophism to be a mere shadow. For neither in the example of man is the capacity for knowledge excluded by reason, or reason by the capacity for intelligence; nor does the eternity of the divine life, or its incorruptibility, fail to exist if it is without beginning, or if someone attributes incorruptibility to it, will it be stripped of being without beginning by nature. But while, by the art of dialectical subtlety, he searches for the truth, by interpolating what he wished into our discourse from his own [mind], he fights with himself and overturns himself, not touching our position at all. For what we were asserting was nothing other than that the life which is without beginning is named "unbegotten" by a conception—not that it comes to be through [the process of] begetting—and that which proceeds into the infinite is signified by the title of "incorruptible"—not that it is made incorruptible, but that it is signified to be such; so that the infinite nature in both directions is the divine life, which is the property of the subject, while the notions viewed in the subject "in this way or that way" consist only in the word which indicates the notion being signified. One notion concerning the divine life is that it is not from a cause; the term "unbegotten" demonstrates this. Another notion concerning the same life is that it is infinite and without end; the title of "incorruptible" represents this, so that the subject [itself] is without beginning and without end, which is above every name and notion; D but that it is neither from a cause, nor will it ever move toward that which is non-existent, these things are signified through the conception of these names. What, then, from our own [arguments] moved him to this senseless and foolish play, so that, taking it up again, he says the same thing in these terms: "For it is, according to that which is without beginning, unbegotten at once and incorruptible; but according to that which has no end, it is incorruptible at once and begotten"? Now this, even if it had not been judged by our own discourse, is clear to everyone who possesses even the slightest share of mind, how it is ridiculous and foolish.
B Indeed, it is rather impious and worthy of condemnation. For by the same argument that he constructs a conjugation of "without beginning" with "incorruptible," he makes a mockery of every name that is pious and becoming to God. For not only are these two things contemplated concerning the divine life—that it is without beginning and that it does not admit of destruction—but it is also called immaterial and without wrath, unchangeable and incorporeal, invisible and without form, truthful and just, and there are countless other notions concerning the divine life, each of which is expressed by significant words according to its own peculiar and distinct conception. Therefore, with any name whatsoever that signifies a pious and fitting opinion of God, one may connect the conjugation devised by Eunomius—that prodigious thought—according to the same unnatural logic. For example, "immaterial" and "without wrath" are both spoken of concerning the divine life, but not each according to the same conception. For we have understood the fact that the Godhead is pure from material admixture through the notion of "immaterial." In "without wrath," however, the alienation from the passion of anger is signified. Eunomius, then, will likely run through these too, and dance the same dance as in the points mentioned. For he will say, connecting his absurdity in the same sequence: "If it is, precisely because it is separated from material admixture, called 'immaterial,' it will not on this account be 'without wrath,' and if it is 'without wrath' by not admitting wrath, it is no longer possible for 'immaterial' to be admitted concerning it; but by every necessity, since it is pure from matter, it will be shown to be simultaneously 'immaterial' and 'wrathful,' and since it does not admit of wrath, it will be found to be simultaneously 'without wrath' and material." You will find the same thing in all the rest. And if you wish, let us propose another such conjugation of names: I mean "unchangeable" and "incorporeal." For since both of these two names are spoken of concerning the divine life according to their own proper and distinct signification, the wisdom of Eunomius will similarly construct an absurdity for them as well. For if that which is always the same is signified by the voice of "unchangeable," and the designation of "incorporeal" represents the intellectual nature of the substance, Eunomius will surely say of these too that they are incomparable and alien, and have no communion or fellowship with one another, the notions contemplated in these names. For in that which always holds itself in the same way, the Divine will be only "unchangeable" and not "incorporeal"; but in the intellectual and formless nature, it has the "incorporeal," but it is separated from the "unchangeable." So it happens that when the "unchangeable" is contemplated in the divine life, it is constructed to be a body along with the unchangeable; but when the intellectual is examined, it is defined as being simultaneously "incorporeal" and "changeable." C These are the wise findings of Eunomius against the truth. For what is the need to extend the discourse in idle D garrulity by following up on everything, since it is possible to observe this same madness and defect of reason being constructed in all things? For, indeed, both "truthful" and "just" will similarly be at war with one another according to the aforementioned entanglement.
For there is one meaning for "truth," and another for "just," so that one might say, as a consequence, concerning these also about Eunomius, that truth does not attend upon the just, and that justice is absent from the truth. A And it happens that whenever someone considers that which is alien to injustice in God, he declares God to be at the same time both just and deceitful. But if we consider His alienation from the lie, we establish God as being at once true and unjust. Thus it is for the "invisible," and thus it is for the "unfashioned." For it will be permitted through these things, according to the same manner of wisdom as was previously set forth, to say that we should not speak of the invisible being present in the unfashioned, nor of the unfashioned in the visible. But he will attach "form" to the invisible, and through reversal B he will construct the "unfashioned" as being visible.
Having said these things also concerning these matters, upon which he speculated regarding the "incorruptible" and the "unoriginate," that "When we consider the incomposite nature of the divine life, we confess it to be unfashioned, but not yet invisible. And when we consider that it is not possible to see God with bodily eyes, having conceded the 'invisible' to Him, we shall not agree that He is 'outside of form'." C But if these things seem to everyone equally ridiculous and senseless, one who possesses understanding will judge the absurdity of those who thought up these ideas to be much greater, from whence the argument, being prompted, brought forth the absurdity on these points by consequence. But he snatches at the voice of the teacher, as though he did not duly look upon the incorruptible in the endless, and in the incorruptible did not perceive the endless. Therefore, let us also deride the near-equivalent to the cleverness of Eunomius. For let us examine such a judgment of his concerning these names, whatever it D may be.
"For he says that there is some other meaning to 'endless' than to 'incorruptible,' or else he will compound the two. But if indeed he says that both are one, he will agree with our argument. But if he says that the meaning of 'incorruptible' is one thing, and the meaning of 'endless' another, it is entirely necessary, in the case of things that are alien to one another, that the one is not the same in power as the other. Therefore, if the conception of the 'incorruptible' is one, and that of the 'endless' is again another, and each of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant the 'incorruptible' to be 'endless,' nor the 'endless' to be 'incorruptible'; but the 'endless' will be corruptible, and the 'incorruptible' will be end-having. But I beg those who encounter this not to turn against us the condemnation of ridicule. For we have played for the sake of the jester under necessity, so that by a similar game, we might dissolve the puerile entanglement of his sophism. But if it does not seem heavy and tiresome to those who encounter it, it would not be untimely to set forth again the words of Eunomius to the letter. 'If,' he says, 'insofar as it is endless, the life is only incorruptible, and insofar as it is unoriginate, it is only ingenerate; insofar as it is not incorruptible, it will be corruptible; and insofar as it is not ingenerate, it will be generate.' And having resumed the same thing again, he says: 'It will be, therefore, insofar as it is principi
without beginning, ingenerate at once and corruptible; and insofar as it is without end, corruptible at once and generate.' For I pass over the untimely and superfluous insertions in the middle, as they contribute nothing further to the construction of the discourse. But I think it is easy for anyone to understand the intent of our arguments, from which this man himself quoted, that they have no communion with the accusation that has been constructed by him against us. For we speak of the God of all as incorruptible and ingenerate, says the teacher, using these names according to different conceptions of the mind. For toward that which, he says, surpasses every circumscription of the ages according to every distance of temporal extension, whether we reason concerning that which is from the beginning or that which follows, in accordance with both modes of eternal life, that which is infinite and uncircumscribed, we signify the one part by the name of incorruptibility, and the other by that of ingeneracy. But this man says that we teach that that which lacks a beginning is an B essence, and that which has no end is again an essence, as though two segments of essences stated by us in opposition were being brought together. And thus he constructs the absurdity: placing his own things, and becoming entangled with his own things, and driving toward the absurd the thoughts composed by himself, he touches nothing of ours. For what he says—that God is incorruptible according to that alone by which He has no end—is his own, not ours. In the same way, that the incorruptible is not without a beginning is also an invention of the same cleverness, which reduces what does not belong to the definition of essence. For we do not define anything that does not belong as being an essence. But it does not belong to God that His life should end in corruption, nor that it should begin from generation, which is represented through these two names, of incorruptibility, that is, and of ingeneracy. But he, having noised his own trifles abroad with our decrees, is unaware that he is defaming himself C through the accusation instituted against us. For whoever defines ingeneracy as being an essence will proceed, according to the consequence, to as much absurdity as he attributes to our decrees. For since the name of the beginning and the name of the end are, according to the discriminating understanding of things, different, if anyone were to grant that the privation of one of these is an essence, he would suppose the life existing from half of itself to be subsisting only in that which lacks a beginning, but not extending itself any further through nature to that which has no end, if ingeneracy were to be considered as essence. But if anyone were to force both to be essences, it would be absolutely necessary, according to the argument given by Eunomius, that each of the names, according to the meaning imposed, should also have its being in the definition of essence, existing only D to as great an extent as the meaning of the title indicates. And thus the argument of Eunomius will become strong: that neither does that which is without a beginning have that which lacks an end, nor does that which has no end contain that which is without a beginning. Since, according to his argument, both of the things said are an essence, and the two are unmixed with each other in their conceptions, and neither does the beginning have the same relation as the end, nor are the names that negate these consistent with each other in their meanings.
A But in order that he himself may recognize his own nonsense, the refutation will be from the things said by him. For he says, contending against our positions, that God is ingenerate also according to that which is endless, and endless according to that which is ingenerate, as if there were one significance for both names. If, therefore, he is ingenerate also according to that which is endless, and the meaning of “endless” and “ingenerate” is the same, and he concedes that the Son is also endless, he will necessarily have to concede, by this logical consequence, that the Son is also ingenerate, if indeed “being endless” is the same as “being without beginning,” as he has said. For just as he sees the “endless” in the “ingenerate,” so he confesses he has understood the “without beginning” in the “endless.” For he would not have made the interchange of terms in a parallel case. But he says that God is ingenerate by nature, and not by the juxtaposition of the aeons. And who is the one contending about these matters, that God is not by nature whatever he is also called? For we do not say that God is just, and powerful, and Father, and incorruptible by the juxtaposition with the aeons, nor by reference to anything else of the things that exist, but we contemplate all pious conjecture B regarding the subject itself, whatever it is by nature; so that if by hypothesis neither an aeon, nor anything else of the things understood according to creation had been brought into being, God would nonetheless be what he is now believed to be, not needing any of the aeons for his being what he is. But he says he does not have a life that is superadded, nor composite, nor different. For he is himself the eternal life, immortal according to that very life, incorruptible according to that very immortality. These things we have also learned concerning the Only-Begotten, and there is no one to gainsay it, unless someone were to openly fight against the words of John. For the life was not added to the Son. For, "I," he says, "am the life." (John xi, 25). Nor is his life composite, nor different; but it is according to this life that he is immortal. For in what other thing would one contemplate that which is immortal, except in life? And according to that very immortality, he is incorruptible. For that which is superior to death and decay is certainly incapable of receiving them. Up to this point our argument follows what has been said.
C But let those who have been exercised in Prunicus’s wisdom interpret the enigma written in addition to what has been said; for it seems to me that he has brought forward the things said from that school. For what does he say? "Being without beginning, he is without beginning; he is ingenerate, ingenerately; he is endless, endlessly; he is spoken of neither according to another, nor through another, nor toward another." For he who has a purified ear and a discerning mind knows, even before my words, that except for the clatter of the names—which he has rattled off by their strange combination—not a trace of scientific intelligence is to be found in the things said. But if, by chance, some shadow of a concept should be found in the noise of the words, either the unholy D
A or the ridiculous will surely be found. For what are you thinking when you say this? Tell me. That it is without origin, B endlessly, and without end, unoriginately? Do you think that the beginning is the same thing as the end? And that these two terms refer to one and the same concept, just as the titles "Peter" and "Simon" denote one single subject—and for this reason, just as you think the beginning and the end are the same, you have linked the two terms, which signify the destruction of either—I mean the end and the beginning—into a single meaning, and by inversely understanding the "without end" to be the same as the "without origin," you have confused the two terms into one. And this is what your mixing of terms aims at, when you say that the unbegotten is "without end," and that that which is without end is "unbegotten." And how did you not see the impiety in what is said, as well as the ridicule? For if, through this new mixing of terms, this reversal of names occurs—so that the unbegotten is "without end" unbegotten, and the "without end" is "without end" unoriginately—it is absolutely necessary that everything without end should be nothing else but unoriginate. And thus you find, my dear friend, your much-touted "unbegottenness," which, in your judgment alone, marks and expresses the essence of the Father, made common to everything that is devoid of death, and makes all things consubstantial with the Father, because it appears in the same way in all those to whom, through immortality, life proceeds to infinity: archangels, angels, human souls; and perhaps even to that apostate power itself, the devil and the demons. For if the "without end" and incorruptible is, according to your word, entirely unoriginate, then the "unbegotten" must C necessarily be considered as existing in every "without end" and incorruptible being.
These absurdities befall those who, before learning what they ought to learn, publish their own ignorance through the things they attempt to teach. For if he had any discerning knowledge, he would not have been ignorant of the meaning uniquely present in both the "without origin" and the "without end." And [he would know] that the "without end" is common to all things that are believed to endure in life unto infinity, while the "without origin" belongs only to that which is without cause. How, then, is it possible to deem that which is common to all equal to that which is believed—by all, in a pre-eminent way—to belong only to God? Otherwise, by this [logic], one would either make the "unbegotten" common to all who partake of immortality, or concede that nothing is immortal, if it is only of the unbegotten to be "without end," and conversely, if it is only of the "without end" to be "unbegotten." For thus all "without end" beings would be thought of as unbegotten. But let these things be passed over, and let his customary abuse, which he poured into his words, be shrouded in silence along with them. Let us proceed to the next part of the reading.
Perhaps it seems to me to be well-ordered to let most of the things that follow pass by unexamined. For in all things he is the same, not D engaging with things from us, but
A giving to himself, as if from our argument, occasions for opposition, which anyone who has considered judging will say is vain and superfluous for those to pursue with precision, since every one of those who has read his writing with understanding perceives the slander from his very words. He says that the dignity of God is of a more ancient concept than that of our teacher. Nor do we contradict this; for the dignity of God, which one must indeed consider to be even this, is not only prior to our generation, but it stands above all creation and the very ages. What, then, comes of this for the argument, if it is acknowledged that the dignity of God is superior and more ancient not only to Basil’s, but to all things that exist? "Yes," he says, "but the name is 'dignity'." And who has demonstrated that the appellation is the same thing as the dignity, so that we too might consent to what is said? "The law of our nature," he says, "teaches that in the things being named, the dignity of the names does not lie in the power of those who name." What is this law of nature? And how is it not ratified against all? For if nature legislated such a thing, it ought to have power over all who share in that nature, just as B all other things peculiar to nature do. If, then, the law of nature made appellations arise for us from the things themselves, just as blossoms do from seeds or roots, and did not entrust the significant designations of the underlying subjects to the choice of those revealing the things, we would all be humans of one and the same language toward one another. For if the names imposed upon things were not divergent, we would not disagree with one another in the form of our speech. He says it is "holy," and most agreeable to the law of providence, for names to be imposed on things from above. How then did the prophets fail to know what is holy, and how were they not taught the law of providence—those who, according to your argument, in no way deified the unbegotten? And how does God himself fail to know such a form of holiness, he who does not impose appellations from above upon the animals created by him, but grants to Adam the power of name-making? For if, as Eunomius says, for names to be imposed on things from above is agreeable to the law of providence and is holy, then it is altogether unholy and incongruous for appellations to be applied to existing things by those below.
But the caretaker of all, he says, saw fit to implant them in our souls by a law of creation. And if these things were sown into the souls of humans, how is it that from Adam until your transgression the fruit of this vanity did not sprout, though it was, as you say, implanted in the souls of humans, so that unbegottenness C was called the name of the Father's essence? For Adam would have said this, and all who came after him from that time, if indeed such a thing had been sown into nature by God. For just as things that sprout from the earth at the present time remain always from the first creation by seminal succession, and no seed is innovated by nature in the present, so also this word
if it were, as you say, sown by God into nature—would have sprouted with the first utterance of the first-formed humans and would have continued along with the succession of those who were born later. But since this was not the case from the beginning—for none of the first humans up to those of the present time have ever spoken in such a way—it is clear that something bastard and surreptitiously introduced has sprouted from the weedy seed, and not from those beautiful seeds which, to speak in the language of the Gospel A, God cast into the field of nature. For whatever belongs to common nature does not take its beginning now, but appeared together with nature from the first constitution; just as the activity of the sense organs, and the instinct in humans toward something out of desire or aversion, and whatever else is acknowledged to be common to nature—none of which life has innovated in those who came later, but from the first ones down to the last, the human condition is preserved through everything, with nature neither casting off things that belong to it from the beginning, nor taking on things that do not.
Just as everyone acknowledges that the act of seeing is a gift of nature, while seeing in a technical or expert way comes to those who have devoted effort to the sciences and disciplines through study. For knowledge of how to use a diopter, or the demonstrative contemplation of geometric lines, or anything else of that sort, is not something that everyone possesses—not the act of seeing itself, but the use of seeing for some specific purpose, which has been devised by art. In this way, one might say that the use of reason is common and proper to human nature, implanted from above along with nature and substance. But that it is for humans—who possess the faculty of reasoning from God within themselves—to invent significant voices and names for things, always devising, as it pleases them, certain words as indices and marks of the things themselves for the sake of clarifying what is being declared.
But if these things hold sway, he says that one of two things must be established: either that the invention is older than those who invent it, or that the names which are naturally appropriate to God are pre-existent to all things and later than the generation of humans. Therefore, one must resist and stand against such claims, and engage with such troublesome madness through reason. Who is so simple as to think and believe that they are harmed by such things, if words are believed to be of the faculty of reason, and therefore to confess that the vocal expressions of words are older than those who speak, or to think that one sins against God if humans, after they are born, name God according to their own capacity? For it has already been said that the transcendent nature is not in need of words which are expressed by voice and tongue, and it would be superfluous to insert such trouble and weariness into the discourse. For that which is in nature's view is not unworthy of any thing, and is perfect, neither excessive nor lacking anything necessary, nor does it possess anything that is not necessary. Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated from the preceding discourses that there is no need for it to be called by a name, and it is agreed from the common consent of those who possess understanding,
no one would gainsay that it is the height of impiety to attribute to God that which is not becoming. A But I do not think one ought to spend time on these and similar matters, nor to refute in detail what has been said next. For the discourse, elaborated by the adversary, will sufficiently manifest itself to the more attentive as a patron of impious dogmas. For he asserts that the essence itself is incorruptibility and immortality likewise. But I, for my part, whether these things inhere in the divine nature, or whether they are in their signification the essence itself, do not think it necessary to contend with him; for whichever of the things stated wins the day, it will in any case confirm our own argument. For if decay being absent should belong to the essence, then not being from generation will also necessarily belong to it. And thus the argument of unbegottenness will be cast out from the B signification that is according to essence. But if, because God is not corrupted, someone says that the essence is incorruptibility, and because He is stronger than death, he defines the very nature as immortality, and the Son is incorruptible and immortal, then the essence of the Only-Begotten will also be incorruptibility and immortality. If, therefore, the Father is incorruptibility, and the Son is incorruptibility, and both are essence, and no difference is conceived regarding the notion of incorruptibility, then the essence will in no respect differ from essence, since the nature is equally alienated in both. Even if, resuming the same points again, he entangles us in what he deems to be the inescapable necessities of dilemmas, saying: "If that which is in the being were to be distinguished by us, we would be establishing that the Divine is composite; but if there is simplicity, it admits that incorruptibility is significant of the essence, and that unbegottenness will necessarily be manifested." We shall again demonstrate him to be an aider of our own arguments. For if he makes the divine essence composite by saying that something inheres in it, he will certainly not reject fatherhood as being outside the essence, but will confess Him Father by nature as incorruptible and immortal; and thus, even against his will, he will admit the Son into the affinity of his nature; for it will not be possible, if He is Father by nature, for the Son to be separated from the natural relation with Him. But if he says it belongs to the Father outside of his nature, so that His simplicity is not at all harmed C if that which is according to unbegottenness be signified outside the essence; and if he says that the incorruptible and the unbegotten are significant of the very essence, and insists that each of these names equates to the other, so that there is no difference between them, because the same thing is implied in both, and he speaks of one notion for the incorruptible and for the unbegotten—the one who is the one of these is, in any case, the other as well. But indeed, that the Son is incorruptible is not doubted even by them. Therefore, according to the argument of Eunomius, He is also unbegotten, if "incorruptible" signifies the same as "unbegotten," so that one of two things must be agreed upon: either that the unbegotten signifies something else besides incorruptibility, or that, persisting in the things he has decreed, he will blaspheme in many ways regarding the Only-begotten God, either by making Him corruptible so as not to D be unbegotten
or by asserting that He is unbegotten so as not to demonstrate that He is corruptible.
But I know not what I ought to do: whether to follow through in order everything that has been set forth by him with my pen, or to be content with these things and terminate the fight against these vanities. For just as with those who sell lethal poisons, a small experimental sample A readily attests to the strength and power of the entire medicine to bring about destruction and death; nor is there anyone who, once he has learned through experience from a single part of the harm inflicted, doubts that the whole of what is sold is a lethal and deadly drug: so I think it fitting that this deadly poison of his discourse, having been demonstrated through the matters examined above, should no longer be doubtful to those who are of sound mind, but that it is in every respect such as has been revealed by the preceding arguments. For this reason, I consider it more desirable not to prolong my discourse by dwelling any longer upon these vanities. But since the ringleaders of error conjure up for themselves from many quarters what might persuade them, and there is a fear lest, because something of what they have elaborated has been held in contempt, a specious occasion for slandering us be afforded, as if we had abandoned what is stronger and more potent: for this reason, I would wish those who are engaged with us in this study, leaving no piece of prattle unexamined, to follow the discourse with a ready mind, wherever it necessarily turns itself against the aggressions of the lie.
Since, then, he has at last with difficulty ceased from the dreaming of his fiction in a deep sleep, and, arming himself with those absurd and insane arguments, transfers his discourse to another dream, much more absurd and senseless than the previous vision; the vanity and absurdity of his labor may be discerned by one who has recognized his captious discourse regarding privation. But to be entwined and involved in all this prattle and trifling would be characteristic of Eunomius and his followers, who apply no care or effort to matters that are most serious and most worthy of study. We, however, shall run through what has been said concisely and summarily, so that neither may any of the accusations be left behind, nor may the discourse bring forth anything empty and vain to useless prolixity.
For indeed, being about to set forth C this brilliantly woven discourse regarding those names that signify privation, he professed that he would demonstrate the absurdity of our decrees, as he puts it, an incurable one, and a certain feigned and reprehensible religion. This, therefore, is the promise. But what is the demonstration of these charges? "When some have said," he says, "that God is unbegotten by the privation of generation, we have said, in refutation of these, that this term—and indeed this concept—does not in any way befit God." Let him demonstrate the prime author of this discourse, if any one of those who have been born, from the time that humans came into existence until now, whether among the barbarians or among the Greeks, is shown to have uttered such a thing, and we shall be silent; but no man, in all of human memory, will be found to have said such a thing, unless one were insane. For who is this drunkard, who is so far driven from his seat of reason by madness, or D phrenitis, or delirium, as to say...
A that for the unbegotten God, generation is natural, but having been deprived of what is natural from the "begotten" which was prior, He later became unbegotten? But these are the artifices of rhetoric, namely, in those things where they are caught, to evade the shame of the reproaches by certain summoned pretexts of persons; and so he has also defended himself concerning that excuse, assigning the blame and cause of the indictment to judges and accusers, while being unable to show accusers, or a trial, or a judicial forum. And now, as if correcting another's folly, he says that he has come into the necessity of speaking thus. This is his reproach of our incurable absurdity and our feigned and reprehensible piety. But he says that we, being at a loss, do not have anything to use in the present situation and are turning ourselves about, and even that we are hiding our poverty; and that as to him, he is slandering us on account of worldly wisdom, while they themselves claim the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as their own. B This is another dream: to think that so much of the external wisdom belongs to oneself that Basil would appear terrible to him on account of it. Thus, some have often imagined themselves to be sitting on the same throne with kings and to be of higher dignity, with the beguiling vision of dreams planting this opinion about themselves from the desire they have while awake. He says Basil, having nothing to answer to what has been said, slanders him on account of worldly wisdom. Yet he made such a great deal of this accusation, as if he imagined that he was a person terrible to Basil and to any of his disciples for the abundance of his words, if indeed anyone at all is considered by him to be such, or ever was. But as for the intermediate speech—if indeed his servile abuse and unlearned and inept jests, through which he thinks to assault our affairs, can be called speech—I will pass over everything, deeming it execrable and abominable that our discourse should be filled with so many pollutions, C just as those who loathe the swollen and stinking ulcers [of others], and who find it difficult to bear the sight of those things which, through the repletion of some grievous humor, have changed the surface of the skin through warts and callouses. But having set forth his mind in a few words, I shall pass over the great stench of what has been said.
I shall expose their sense, however, in a few points, and I shall pass over the great stench of their words. D My speech will proceed for a while with freedom, not turning at all to tearing apart any of the things that are being said in a calumnious way. Every speech that is truly speech is a voice signifying the impulses that occur in the mind. Every function and movement of a healthy mind looks toward the knowledge and contemplation of things, to the extent that it is possible. The nature of things is bipartite: the one part is discerned by the mind, the other is perceived by the senses. But as for that which is open to the senses, because it is in the senses and is easily known, common knowledge is set before all, for the judgment of the senses causes no ambiguity concerning the subject; for we judge the differences of colors and the varieties of the remaining qualities by sight, and hearing, or smell, or the sense of touch, or taste; and all those who partake of the same nature know and name them with unanimous consent. And all the remaining things which comprehension...
A appears to have more superficially regarding the things that circulate in our life, which pertain to the civil life and to the moral end of life. But in the contemplation of the intelligent nature—which is perceptible by the mind alone, because it is situated above the comprehension of the senses—the intelligence, grasping conjecturally at the things which escape the senses, moves us differently toward what is sought. And according to the understanding produced in each of us concerning the subject, we declare, as far as possible, the thing understood, approaching as closely as we can with the power of the things understood through the significance of words.
In these matters, it is often possible for what is sought to be obtained through both, when the intelligence does not stray from the thing sought, and the voice directly declares the concept of the mind through a natural interpretation. B Sometimes, perhaps, it happens that one errs in both or in one of these, when either the comprehensive intelligence or the interpretive faculty is carried transversely and wrongly from what is fitting. Since, therefore, there are two things by which all speech is directed—namely, the certain confirmation or security that occurs in the mind and intelligence, and the utterance that is in words—it will always be more excellent that which is proven by both. But it is no less good not to stray from a correct opinion, even if the speech is inferior to the intelligence.
When, therefore, the intelligence applies its effort and work to things that are elevated and invisible—things which sense cannot reach, I speak of the divine and ineffable nature, in which it would be a bold act to grasp anything promptly and quickly with the intelligence, and even bolder to entrust the interpretation of the opinion generated in us to any words whatsoever—then we bid the sound which is in the words to be silent, whether declared this way or that way by the powers of those speaking; and we examine solely the intelligence that is apparent in the words, whether it is sound or otherwise, leaving these verbal or nominal subtilties to the arts of grammarians. C Since, therefore, we signify only those things which are known through nominal appellation, and it is not right to embrace with certain known appellations those things which surpass knowledge. For how could that which is ignored be signified? For this reason, since no natural appellation is found in them which plainly expresses the subject, we are forced to reveal the opinion born in us concerning the Divinity with many and diverse names, as far as is possible.
Nevertheless, those things which fall under our comprehension are such that they are either considered in some interval of distinct extension, or provide a notion of local capacity, in which individual things are understood to exist; or they come into our sight by the description of beginning and end, beginning from that which is not and ending in that which is not, equally according to both terms; or—which is the ultimate of all—we comprehend the phenomenon through the composition of bodily qualities, to which destruction, and suffering, and conversion, and D change, and things of this kind are conjoined. Wherefore, in order that it may have no kinship with these lowest things
A we have made use of notions and terms in speaking of the divine nature that set it apart from such things. We state that what is above the eras is "eternal," and what is above a beginning is "without beginning," and what is not finished by any end is "endless," and that which has its subsistence without a body is "incorporeal," and that which does not undergo destruction is "incorruptible," and that which is not receptive to conversion, or passion, or alteration is "impassible," "unalterable," and "invariable." As for such names, those who wish to do so may invent them with skillful artifice as it pleases them, and attach other names to these, such as those that imply stripping away or taking away, or whatever names they please.
B But let us, conceding this freedom to those who are very eager to teach or learn such things, look only to the mind to see if it contains within itself an opinion that is pious and worthy of God, or the contrary. If, therefore, God were either not before, or will not be at some time, he would not properly be called "endless" or "without beginning." In the same way, neither would he be "unalterable," nor "incorporeal," nor "incorruptible," if indeed one were to think about him as having body, or destruction, or mutation, or anything of that sort. But if it is holy to think nothing of this kind about him, it would be thoroughly impious to use against him words that imply opposition and abhorrence, and to say these things which we have often said before—"incorruptible," and "endless" or "infinite," and "unbegotten," and all that is of such a character—since the meaning assigned to each of these names teaches only the separation from things that are ready at hand for our perception, C not interpreting the nature itself that is separated from non-fitting things. For when the meaning of these names points out what God is not, what he is according to nature—that which these things are not—remains in obscurity. But the remaining names, whose meaning is indicative of some position and existence, do not signify the divine nature itself, but rather the showing forth of those things that are piously discerned in it. For, considering that nothing of the things that are, both those that are seen and those that are understood, has a fortuitous and random existence, but that whatever is comprehended in the nature of things depends upon the nature that is supereminent over all things that are, and thence has the cause of its existence; and noting the beauty and greatness of the wonders that are in creation, we take other notions about the Divine from all such things, and interpret each of the notions that arise in us with D particular names, following the counsel of Wisdom, which says that from the greatness and beauty of created things, the Creator of all things must be contemplated by analogy. We call the maker of mortal beings a "Creator," and we call Him a "Powerful One" who controls such a creation, whose power was sufficient to bring the substance
A of it into existence; and just as we are taught by the divine Scripture concerning the incorruptible and perfect judgment to come, we address Him as "Judge" and "Just" by these very names. And to sum everything up, we translate all the notions that arise in our minds regarding the divine nature into the form of names, such that no appellation is used of the divine nature without some specific concept.
Furthermore, we comprehend that the word "God" [Θεός] has prevailed because of a scrutinizing operation or an act of contemplation. For, being persuaded that the Divine is present to all, sees all, and penetrates all, we signify such a thought by this name, being guided to this by the holy voice. For the One who said, "My God, attend to me" [Ps. LIII, 3], and "God saw" [Gen. I, 4], and "God knows the secrets of the heart" [Ps. VII, 10], clearly interprets the meaning inherent B in this word, that it is named "God" [Θεός] from "looking" [θεᾶσθαι]. For it makes no difference to say "attend," or "see," or "behold" [θέασαι]. Since, therefore, the one who looks also sees the object that is to be looked at, the One who looks is fittingly called God [Θεός] in relation to what is seen. Thus, even through this word, although we have learned of a certain partial operation of the divine nature, we have not gained insight into His essence; yet, we do not suppose that the Divine suffers any detriment to its glory because we labor under a penury of fitting names. For the incapacity of expressing the ineffable, while indicting our nature’s innate poverty, possesses a proof greater than that of the glory of God, teaching us, as the Apostle says, that the only name fitting for God C is to believe that He is "above every name" [Phil. II, 9]. For that He surpasses every movement of thought and is found to be outside of nominal comprehension constitutes an most certain argument of His ineffable majesty for men.
These things we know concerning the names that are uttered in any form regarding God, the exposition of which we have set before more benign listeners in a rough and simple manner, judging it shameful and indecorous for us ourselves to resist vigorously and vehemently against the feeble battles of Eunomius regarding these things. For what could one say to him who claims that we fashion the form of names to be greater and more powerful than the dignity of the things that are named, thereby granting a prerogative to names against the things themselves, and assigning equal honor to unequal things? These things were said thus by his voice. Let him who is able to judge with consideration decide if the vehement accusation D of the calumniator against us has any weight, for which it would even be worth defending [the idea] that we grant a privilege to names against the things themselves, when it is manifest to all that no name has an essential subsistence by itself, but every name becomes a certain mark or sign of some essence and thought, which does not exist or even exist in the understanding of itself.
A But to that which does not subsist by itself, how is it possible to distribute gifts? Let the teacher of deceit, who claims to use names and words aptly, explain this. Indeed, I would not have mentioned these things at all, if it were not necessary through them to demonstrate the weakness of the scribe, both in his mind and in his diction. And whatever he drags in from the divinely-inspired Scripture inappropriately and not according to its purpose, discussing the difference in the immortality of angels and men—I know not to what end he looks, nor what he is contriving by this—these things also I shall pass over.
For the immortal, so long as it is immortal, does not admit of "more" or "less" by way of comparison. For if one of the things being compared had some subjection B or portion in the account of immortality by way of comparison, it would be absolutely necessary that such a thing not even be named immortal. For how could that still be properly called immortal, whose mortality the comparative opposition has convicted? And that subtle precision of his, which forbids calling "incorruptible" a notion intermediate to privation, but says that the separation of the superior should be called "privation," whereas the removal of the inferior should not be signified by this name—if these things should prevail, then according to him the apostolic utterance would no longer be true, which says that He alone has immortality and grants it to others. For what link C the introduced passage has to the preceding argument, it is not possible for us, nor for any others who possess understanding, to perceive. And because we have not been able to see these wise and subtle points, he calls us ignorant and unlearned in the judgment of matters and the use of names, thus writing in his words; and I shall pass over all such things, as having no force against the truth, without examining them, including his censuring of the understanding of "incorruptible" and "incorporeal" which we set forth, as meaning with each of these appellations—the one, that which has no dimension, in which D the tripartite distance of bodies is not contemplated; the other, that it is not capable of destruction. And his saying in these terms that we do not rightly accept the form of names, to fall into inappropriate notions, and that we suppose each of these to be a sign not of them existing or being present, but of existence itself—judging these also to be worthy of silence and deep forgetfulness, I will leave it to those who encounter them to detect for themselves the impiety mixed with folly.
As for his claim that one should not contrast the corruptible with the incorruptible, nor signify by the privative meaning a removal of the inferior, but that existence itself is signified by the subject: if, therefore, the signification of "incorruptible" is not considered privative of corruption by the one who idly makes these technical distinctions, then such a form of the name will, by every necessity, demonstrate the contrary. For if incorruptibility is not a removal of corruption, then it will be an assent to that which is [alt-version omitted] incongruous; for indeed the nature of opposites, as...
A even if we let pass that bitter construction that God by nature is capable of death, as if someone held the contrary opinion regarding these things, remains. For we consider that in opposites there is no difference between saying that a thing is, or that its contrary is not; just as in the present argument, having stated that God is life, we prohibit by the very power of this confession the thought of death being in Him, even if we do not declare it with our voice. And when we have confessed Him to be incapable of death, by that same logic we have established that He is life.
“But I do not see,” he says, “how God excels His own creatures on account of those things which are not in Him.” And with this scholarly argument, or effort, he calls the great Basil both impious and stupid for having dared to use such B words—against whom I would say that he has not been overly profuse in using insults against those who say these things, lest imprudently he should afflict himself with the same reproaches. For perhaps not even he himself would deny that the majesty of the divine nature is recognized in this, that it has no communion with those things of which the nature of the lowest is shown to be a partaker. For if He were any one of these things, He would not have any advantage, but would be altogether the same as each one of those which have a communion of property. But if He is above these things, it is clearly because He does not possess them, and thus He excels those that do possess them; just as we say that one who is without sin is more excellent than those who are contaminated by sins. For to be separated from evil is a proof of being rich in the best things. But let this abusive reviler use his own nature; we, however, having briefly indicated the things said in this part, will return our discourse to the matters proposed.
Similarly, he says, He excels things that are mortal as immortal, and things that are corruptible as incorruptible, and excels those things that are generated as ungenerated. Is the assertion of this impiety against God not clear to all, or is it fitting to reveal this wickedness through argument? Who is ignorant that things which are excelled by the same measure are altogether equal to one another? If, therefore, that which is corruptible and that which is generated are similarly excelled by God, and the Lord is also generated, let Eunomius C conclude the sin that arises D from the things set forth. For it is clear that he considers generation to be the same as destruction and death, just as in the arguments slightly before this he proclaimed that the ungenerated is the same as the incorruptible. If, therefore, he views destruction and generation with the same eye, and similarly asserts that God is far removed from both, and the Lord is generated, let no one require of us to set forth what follows from this argument, but let him gather the conclusion for himself, if indeed the nature of God stands at an equal distance and by the same logic from the generated as from the corruptible. “But it is not permitted,” he says, “to speak of Him as incorruptible and immortal by the absence of death and destruction.” Let those who are led by the nose, and who are turned about to whatever happens to seem right to each, have faith in his words, and let them say that death and destruction are present to God so that
A he might be called immortal and incorruptible. For if, as Eunomius says, the privative appellations of these things do not signify the absence of death and destruction, then surely the presence of their opposites and what is alien to Him is established by this artifice. For each of the things that are understood either is entirely absent from something, or it is not absent, for example, light, darkness, life, death, health, sickness, and all such things. In cases where one says that one of the things that are understood is absent, he will necessarily establish the presence of the other. If, therefore, he says that God is not called immortal by the absence of death, he would clearly be establishing the presence of death in Him, and through this, denying immortality to the God of all. For how could He still be truly immortal and incorruptible, if he says that corruption and death are not absent from Him? But perhaps someone will say that we are adhering too captiously to his argument; for no one would be so insane as to seek to establish that God is not immortal, but that of the things which are understood by some in secret, no human has knowledge, since it is through what is said that the conjecture of what is hidden in us comes to be. Let us then resume what was said.
Not by the absence of death, he says, is God called immortal. B How are we to take what is said? That death is not absent from God, even if He is called immortal? Therefore, if he bids us understand this, the God of Eunomius will be entirely mortal, and subject to corruption. For He to whom death is not absent does not have the nature of being immortal. But if neither the absence of death nor of corruption is what these appellations signify, they are either used in vain concerning the God of all, or they contain some other meaning within them. Who, then, is this interpreter, this master of technical language? But we, as Eunomius says, being unskilled in the judgment of reality and the usage of names, have learned to call a person "healthy," not by looking at where he derives his strength, but where the disease has been removed; and "unimpaired," not the one who is outside of banquets, but the one who has no impairment in himself; and all other things likewise, whether we name them from what is present or from what is absent—brave, cowardly, sleepy, sleepless, and whatever belongs to this usage. But I do not know what gain there is in deigning to examine these trifles; C for to a man living in gray hairs, and looking towards the truth, it is no small cause for condemnation to carry upon one's lips the ridiculous and implacable disputes of the adversary's contentiousness. Therefore, I will pass over those things, as well as what follows them. These are: "No truth," he says, "testifying to any natural conjunction with God." For if this had not been said, who would be the one saying that God is double-formed, except you, who cause every concept of a name to coalesce with the essence of the Father, and say that nothing exists outside, but bring each of the divine names into the essence of God as if into a center? "Then," he says, "nor truly, D while registering such a concept with the laws of piety, is it something fabricated from the outside and by us." But I will refrain again from what has been said, as not being mere clowning to those who encounter it.
A For I have set forth these laughable utterances not in order to provoke laughter in the readers, but so that I might persuade the listener from what sort of equipment of arguments that man, who washes away our simplicity, proceeds, and then brazenly launches an assault upon the truth. Who is he, according to the argument, and what sort of things does he utter—he who exults and boasts before the listeners, whose ears have been covered with elephant-hide, as if they were a delight, and who, stringing together these arrogant, dry-mouthed utterances of his with a poor composition, proclaim him as if he were the victor in the power of words over all others? But he says that the essence itself is immortality. What then of the essence of the Only-Begotten? What are you saying? I would say to him: is it immortality, or not? Since, even in this case, simplicity admits no connection, as you yourself say. If, therefore, he denies that the essence of the Son is immortality, it is clear to what he is looking. For that which is set in opposition to the immortal is not a matter for a very subtle mind to grasp. For just as the consequence of the opposite division demonstrates that what is not incorruptible is corruptible, and that which is not immutable is subject to change, so also is that which is by all means mortal, that which is not immortal. What, then, does the interpreter of these new dogmas say? What will he define for us concerning the essence of the Only-Begotten by its proper name? For I will bring the same question forward to the writer again. Will he grant that this also is immortality, or will he not consent? If, therefore, he does not accept that the essence of the Son is immortality, he will necessarily consent to the contrary, constructing it to be death by means of the destruction of the superior. But if, fleeing from that absurdity, he should name the essence of the Only-Begotten as immortality, he will confess that there is of necessity no difference between them according to essence. For if the nature of both the Father and the Son is equally immortality, and yet immortality is not divided in itself by any reason of difference, is it not therefore granted even by the enemies themselves that no ground for a difference is to be found in the Father and the Son according to essence? B C But it would be time to set forth his bitter accusation against us, which he made at the end of his discourse, saying that we declare the Father to be from completely nothing; having stolen some word from the context, and having dragged it out, bare and disorganized, from the rest of the body of the text, he attempts to irritate it, tearing at it with insane teeth, or rather, spitting it out (that is, as if spitting out the argument like saliva). I will first state the meaning of those things which were clearly distinguished by the teacher in this discourse, and then I will set forth the discourse itself word for word, so that it may be manifest to all how, to the detriment of truth, it creeps perniciously into the studies of the pious. For our teacher, leading us to the meaning of "unbegotten" through his own arguments, proposed to us such an approach for the knowledge of that which is sought, demonstrating that the meaning of "unbegotten" is far from the notion which pertains to the essence. For the evangelist, he says, having made the beginning of the genealogy of the Lord according to the flesh from Joseph, then always proceeding to one who is older according to time, and defining the end of the genealogy in Adam, D
A and because there was no bodily Father superior to the first-formed man, he called Him the Father of God. He says it is easy for everyone's mind to grasp this about God: that God, from whom Adam is, does not himself have his substance from another, not after the likeness of those whose genealogy is described in human fashion; for since we, by passing through all things, grasp God in our mind B after all things, we have understood the principle of all things. Now every principle, if it happens to be dependent on something else, is not a principle. Therefore, God is the principle of the universe; nor is there anything that can be established above the principle of all things. This is the teacher's exposition concerning the meaning of the ingenerate. And that nothing outside the truth has been attributed to him by us, I shall set forth the utterance itself regarding this, word for word. "Luke the evangelist," he says, "in setting forth the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Savior Jesus Christ, and retracing his steps from the last to the first, began from Joseph: but having said that this one was of Heli, and he of Mattath, and thus leading the narrative by an ascent to Adam, then when he had come to the highest, and had said that Seth was of Adam, and Adam himself of God, he made an end of the ascent here. C Just as, therefore, he said that Adam is of God, we shall ask him: And God is of whom? Is it not easy for everyone's mind that it is from nothing? That which is from nothing is, clearly, without a beginning; and that which is without a beginning is the ingenerate. As, then, in the case of men, essence is 'that which is from something,' so it is not possible to call the ingenerate essence even in the case of the God of all." With what eyes do you still look toward your leader? I speak to you, the flock of those who are perishing. How is it that you incline your ears to him who has erected such a monument to his own impudence through these words? Are you not ashamed, even now, if not before, to use such a guide to the truth? Will you not use this as a sign of the madness in his dogmas, that he thus impudently opposes himself to the truth of the Scriptures? D Is this how he interprets the divine voices for us? Is this how he stands as a defender and champion of the truth of the dogmas? So as to refute Basil, who traces the genealogy of the God who is in all things from that which does not exist at all? I will state their own wording, I will expose the words of their impudence; I pass over the insults, I do not accuse the abuse and reproaches, I do not blame him whose mouth reeks, because it reeks, nor him who is deformed in body, because he is deformed. For such things are misfortunes of nature, which escape the censure of those who have sense. Therefore, the zeal for insulting is a disease of the reasoning faculties and an infirmity of a soul whose healthy reason has been maimed. I have therefore no concern for his abuses, but that vehement and impregnable knot of his syllogism, through which he brought the accusation against us to his own goal, I will write out clearly in his very words. "For in order," he says, "that it might not be forbidden to call the Son 'from participation' of the One who is, it has escaped his notice that he has said of the God who is over all things that he is from that which does not exist at all. For if nothing is the same as that which does not exist at all,
...according to their meaning; but there is free substitution for those that are equivalent, and this is not forbidden: he who says that God exists "out of nothing" says that God exists "out of that which is absolutely not." Let us direct our eyes to some of the things that were said before.
C That he thinks the Son exists by participation in God, he sprinkles even on those who do not accept this the foul odor of his own mouth, or the base, dream-like, and turbulent structure of his sophism, which we shall examine. But that to attribute sons to the divine nature by participation is the work of poets and myth-makers alone, no one who has even a little prudence and sense is ignorant. For thus do those who weave fables into poems fashion certain Dionysuses, and Heracleses, and Minoes from the union of demons with human bodies, and celebrate such beings in their verse as superior to the rest of mankind, as having something more through participation in a more excellent nature. Therefore, it is fitting to wrap this argument in silence, as one containing a rebuke of madness and impiety.
But it is better to add that irrefutable syllogism, so that our simple and untutored people may learn what kind of loss and damage they have suffered from those who have not learned the technical methods of argument. For if, he says, "nothing" is the same in meaning as "that which is absolutely not," and the substitution of equivalent terms is not forbidden, then he who says God is "out of nothing" says God is "out of that which is absolutely not." Who gave him who brandishes an Aristotelian spear against us the right to say that saying someone has no father is the same as his having been generated from that which is absolutely nothing? For he who has numbered in order those who are enumerated in the genealogy by sacred Scripture, understands that there is always a father superior to the one mentioned. For what was Heli to Joseph, what was Mattathas to Heli, what was Adam to Seth? Is it not manifest and known even to very small children that the list of these names mentioned is an enumeration of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, the father of him who was born from him is undoubtedly Adam. Thus, tell me, who is the father of the God over all? Tell the one asking, raise your voice, answer, stir up all your logical art for this question. Will you find any argument that escapes the snare of your sophism? Who is the father of the Unbegotten? D Can you say who? Therefore, he is not unbegotten. But you will say, crushed—which is also necessary—that there is no father. What then, my friend? Is this weak entanglement of your sophism now unraveled for you? Have you not understood that you have spit into your own bosom, as the great Basil says, because the Unbegotten is not from any father? For from the fathers who were previously set forth in the genealogical description, the sequence, by what is passed over in silence, allows the addition of "father" to be accepted as confessed. You made "nothing" out of "not from a father." And again, by seizing upon "nothing" as "that which is absolutely not," you have concluded that now-dissolved syllogism of yours. Therefore, these wise arts of technical cleverness will be turned back upon you. Who is the father of the Unbegotten, I ask? None, you will say by every necessity. For the Unbegotten certainly has no father. If, therefore, there is no one [for] the Unbegotten...
and you have transferred this "no one" to "nothing," and if, according to your argument, "nothing" is identical in meaning to that which in every way does not exist, and since an interchange of equivalent terms, as you say, is permitted; then he who said that there is no father of the Unbegotten is claiming that God, who is over all, is from that which in every way does not exist.
Such, Eunomius, is the evil—for I will use your own words—not to appear wise before actually being honored as such. This, perhaps, is a small misfortune; but to be ignorant of oneself, and not to know how great is the difference between the high-flying Basil and a land-bound beast, is something else. For if that keen and divine eye were to survey our life—if it were to hover over human existence with the wing of wisdom—it would have swooped down upon you with a rush of words, [revealing you] as one who has grown attached to the shell of folly, and would have shown against whom you have, through deceit, raised yourself up, pursuing a reputation for being someone among old women and eunuchs by means of insults and slanders against him. A Yet there is no reason to despair of you reaching his claws. For as far as we are concerned, compared to him, even if our portion were judged to be but a claw, it would be much. With you, however, it is at least enough to be able to tear open the covering of your deceit and to expose the shamelessness hidden within the shell. B
OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, ANTIRRHETICUS AGAINST THE THINGS OF APOLLINARIS
1. A A suitable and appropriate introduction to our discourse will be the voice of the Lord, which commands us to beware of false prophets, who come, He says, to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves; by their fruits you shall know them. If, therefore, the fruit distinguishes both the true sheep and the destroyer of the sheep—the one who, under the guise of gentleness, steals unnoticed into the assembly of the flock, and who brings into the light the mouth that is in truth an enemy hidden beneath a gentle appearance—it is fitting to seek out the fruits, both the good ones and the worse ones, by which the form of the deceit is uncovered; for He says, [B ] *by their fruits you shall know them.* Thus, of every teaching, the good fruit, in my judgment, is the addition of those who are saved within the Church; but the destructive and poisonous fruit is the dissolution of those who are already established. If, therefore, anyone might increase the flock by his words, and by the vine extend to all sides of the house,
A transmuting the branches of the wild olive into the new shoots of the olive tree, and finally casting the mystical rods into the sweet and potable stream of his teaching, through which the flocks are made prolific, so that the possession of Laban is diminished, while the portion of Jacob abounds, and is multiplied by the noted offspring;—if anyone should show such fruit of his teaching (for the fruit, as was said, is the increase of truth), he is truly a prophet, prophesying according to the divine purpose in the Spirit.
But if anyone should cut off the shoots of the vine, and make the divine table desolate, uprooting the plantation, and laying snares against the spiritual watering-trough, so B that no longer do the sheep conceive before the rods of the patriarch, nor multiply the flock by the noted offspring, but are driven away from the nourishing pasture, that is, from the traditions of the fathers, and lodge outside the fold, and are scattered to strange pastures: whenever such a fruit of teaching is produced, then surely the wolfish form, lurking under the sheep’s skin, will be manifested.
II. Let us therefore inquire what the teaching of Apollinaris the Syrian has produced for us: an increase of the flocks or a diminution, a gathering of the dispersed or a dissolution of those already gathered, a defense of the ancestral dogmas or their subversion. If, therefore, the zeal of the aforementioned person looks toward what is better, he is surely a sheep, and not a wolf; but if the contrary: C *Beware of false prophets*, says the Lord; let not that mouth escape [notice], which is sharpened by the acute teeth of novelty for the harm and destruction of the body that approaches it, and which lacerates the healthy body of the Church of God.
But lest what we say seem to be mere railing, we shall add one of the treatises of his that circulates, the inscription of which is this: *A Demonstration*, he says, *concerning the divine incarnation in the likeness of man*. And perhaps, if the sense of the inscription were accurately laid bare, there would be no need for anyone further to labor in refuting the absurdity of the dogma through the individual parts of the treatise itself. *A Demonstration*, he says, *concerning the divine incarnation in the likeness of man*. But it would be better to set forth the divine voices for the refutation of this new word-coining. *The Word*, he says, *became flesh*, and, *Glory inhabited our land*, and, *God was manifested in the flesh*, so that from each D of these sayings we may learn the divinity, which is always in substance
A immutable, having assumed a nature subject to change, so that by its own immutability it might heal our transformation into evil. But this man asserts that God was not manifested in the flesh—which is the same as saying that the Word did not become flesh, who in the form and likeness of man, by the servile habit, conversed with humans—but he ascribes a certain divine incarnation to the Word; and he does so in such ambiguous language that it is unclear to me whether he understands a transformation of the divinity from its simple and compositionless nature into a fleshly solidity, or rather, while the divine substance remains in itself, he says that another, certain divine incarnation has appeared, placed on the boundary of human and divine nature, which would be neither God nor man, but would in some way partake of both; and as it is an incarnation, it would be akin and related to humanity, but as it is divine, it would by far exceed the measure of human nature. But in very truth, a substance of this kind cannot be God. For the divinity is a thing by its own nature simple and entirely foreign to composition; and from that which lacks simplicity, it is absolutely necessary that the divinity also be absent. Conversely, it cannot be man B either. For he is called a man who is composed of a body and an intellectual soul; but to that in which these two are not understood to be joined together, how will the name of man be appropriate? For we call it a body of a man, and a soul of a man, so long as each of these is considered in itself. But the concurrence of these two is what both is, and is called, man.
III. What, therefore, is this divine incarnation, which is neither man nor God, which the author conjures up in the title of his treatise? It is not possible for us to discover it through what we have accurately investigated thus far. The demonstration, he says, of the divine incarnation is *to the likeness of man*. Again, what does that mean: *to the likeness of man*? Namely, that the divine incarnation consists in a similar manner to the human. And when did this happen? In the last days? And where is the mystery of the virginity? For the Lord was not incarnated to the likeness of man, as our writer says, but by divine power and the Holy Spirit, as is stated in the Gospel C. Or perhaps before the ages? And how is that which exists assimilated to that which does not exist? For man is the last of all things according to the order of creation, but the Lord is King before the ages. To the likeness, therefore, of which man was that divine incarnation made, if it preceded all ages? Perhaps Adam’s? But he had not yet come into being. Or according to some other man? And who is this man thought of before Adam, so that the incarnation of God might be made like the proposed pattern? D since, while calling others logographers and sophists, and trying to insult them, he himself will be refuted, being guilty of these things.
A For what is similar must necessarily be so to something that exists, not to something that does not exist. Thus, according to him, two absurdities appear in the argument: for either the creature is found to be older than the Creator, or the divine [nature] becoming incarnate is made similar to that which does not exist; for in the beginning the divinity existed, but Adam did not exist. Therefore, if the divine nature assumed flesh according to the likeness of man, the divine incarnation is made similar to that which does not exist; but that which is compared to what does not exist, it is necessary that it also itself in no way exists. But he says that that incarnation occurred in some other way than the human. And what similarity is there between things of different natures? B If, therefore, it is not possible for the divine incarnation to have happened according to the likeness of man before the ages, nor in the fullness of time, when by the benevolent dispensation of God toward men the Word appeared clothed in flesh, in no way was the divine incarnation made according to the likeness of man (for the mystery of the virgin birth does not admit such a concept), then he would have made this title for his treatise in vain according to both meanings. That the title is therefore unexamined and based on no consistent concept, I think has been sufficiently shown by what has been said to those who listen with attention.
The time would now be at hand for me also to subject to examination the treatise whose argument is designated by such a title. I shall first write down in my own words, running through the sense in a few points, those things contained in the work itself, where there is no danger C that we should leave anything unexamined. "It is proper," he says, "to consider only pious faith to be a good thing, for unexamined faith did not even help Eve; wherefore it is necessary that the faith of Christians also be examined, lest it happen to fall in with the opinions of the Greeks or of the Jews." After having prefaced these things at some length, he introduces his argument by saying that among the unbelievers and the heresies it has long been rumored that it is not possible for God to become man and to have dealings with passions; and this is introduced among the heresies under the guise of faith, by calling Christ a divine man on account of the birth from a woman D and on account of the passions. Which heresies he knows that call Christ a divine man, he himself may know, and anyone who has been instructed in his teachings; but we, having traveled to many places, and having studiously conversed both with those who share our opinion and with those who dissent from us regarding the questions usually debated about the Word, have not yet heard anyone uttering such a voice regarding the mystery, that man
A was a god-bearing man. Therefore, it was proper for one intending to correct the erroneous opinions concerning the dogma and to introduce more pious ones in their place, not to fashion for himself things that do not exist and to fight against non-existent entities, but to arm himself against the things actually stated by the opposing side. For not even experienced physicians apply their art to diseases that have never existed, but they stand against a disease that has already broken out through their knowledge. Let him, therefore, show someone who has said that God has not appeared in the flesh, but that Christ is a god-bearing man, and then we shall admit that his treatise was not written in vain; but as long as such a disease is not found, everyone will agree that it is foolish to struggle with things that do not exist.
V. But in truth, Apollinaris did not rashly invent such a necessity for writing; rather, in order to construct his own dogma, he made a kind of step and approach for himself, supposing as said what was never said by anyone, so that while he appeared to be contending against this imaginary heresy, by a simulated contradiction he might establish that the divine could die. For his entire writing aims at this, to assert that the divinity of the only-begotten Son is mortal, and that he did not undergo the passion in his humanity, but that his impassible and immutable nature was changed to participate in passion. Therefore, those who are skilled in knowing his mysteries will be able to see to what utility the discourse of Apollinaris looks; but the consequences that follow from his words, even infants know, are such as not even the most irreligious of the Gentiles would have spoken. For if the very divinity of the Only-Begotten died, necessarily along with it died also life, and truth, and justice, and goodness, and light, and power; for according to diverse notions, the only-begotten God both is and is called all these things. But being simple and devoid of division and composition, whatever of these things is said of him, he is that in his entirety, and not this in one part and another thing in another part; so that if one of these things exists, all are understood to exist in him; but if one does not exist, all are extinguished at once. If, therefore, the divinity of Christ perished through death, through that same death all things which are understood to be conjoined with his divinity also perished. And yet Christ is not simply power, but the power of God and the wisdom of God. Therefore, when these things were extinguished together with the divinity of Christ through death, there was no longer with the Father the wisdom of God, nor power, nor life, nor anything else of those things which are called by the name of good. For all these things are believed to be the things of the Father in him, things which, when the Son exists, exist; but when he does not exist, they certainly do not exist, because all
A things that are of the Father are confessed to be in the Son. If, then, the power was extinguished by death, and Christ is the power of God, what power was again recalled from non-existence, since the one that existed was obliterated by death, and no other was left remaining? For even those who fight against us confess that the power of the Father is in the Son. If, therefore, the power is one, and this—having been mastered by death—departed into annihilation at the time of the economy of the Passion, what other power is fashioned besides him which recalls this power from death? For if they were to say that the one died, but the other remained immortal, they would no longer confess that the power of the Father is in the Son, and thus, as a consequence, they set aside the very words of the Lord, as not holding the truth, which bear witness that all things that are the Father’s are the Son’s. For he who has all things of the Father also possesses in himself, by all means, the immortality of the Father; immortality, however, as long as it is what it is said to be, has no communion or mixture with death. If, therefore, they say that the divinity of the Son is mortal, they establish that it does not have within itself the immortality of the Father. But he who says that he has the whole Father in himself tells the truth; he, therefore, who tries to establish as mortal him in whom the whole eternity of the Father is observed, is lying. Since, therefore, according to the opinion of those who believe piously, there is one power of the Father and the Son—for we see the Son in the Father, and in the Son the Father is clearly demonstrated—that which could by its own nature suffer admitted death, while that which was not liable to passion rendered impassibility B in that which was liable to passion.
VI. But let us proceed to what follows in the reasoning. I will speak again in his own voice, having summarized the thought in brief. For he says that to name Christ a divine man is contrary to the apostolic teachings, and alien to the synods, and that Paul [of Samosata], and Photinus, and Marcellus were the authors of such a perversion. Then, after the manner of fierce athletes, as if entangled with the one discussing, and having found the author of the saying, he says this: How will you say that he is a man from the earth, whom Scripture bears witness to have descended from heaven, and who is proclaimed the Son of Man? Again, in these things, the confirmation of the preceding argument is the beginning of another absurdity. For in order to show that God has died, he allows nothing at all of the earthly nature to be regarded in him. For since entirely
to the earth, he says: "The man who descended from heaven is not a man from the earth." Yet he is a man, even if he has descended from heaven; for the Lord does not reject this designation in the Gospels. How then does he maintain consistency in what he says? If the man is not from the earth, but descends to us from heaven, how is he called the Son of man who descends from heaven? For he will certainly admit, just as on earth we conceive of fathers before their sons, so also in the case of the man who comes to him from heaven, since he is called the Son of man, that he is not named from a father at random; but that he has, according to the human manner, another man as father in heaven, perceived to be prior to the Son. For if he relies on these words, "No one has ascended into heaven, but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man," and therefore separates him from kin with the earthly man, and says that the Son of man came to us from heaven, he will necessarily grant some other man in heaven as the father of that man who descended to us, so that we must suppose that in the heavenly life there are also nations of men, and peoples, and everything that exists in this life. If, therefore, he who comes from heaven is the Son of man, but he who was born of Mary from the seed of David according to the flesh, even if he came from heaven, is called the Son of man, then according to them he is falsely called the Son of God, since that Son has nothing in common with divinity, neither as earthly nor as heavenly. But as if gathering together the things said by him, he puts an end to his discourse with these words: "But if he is both the Son of man from heaven C and the Son of God from a woman, how is he not considered the same God and man?" I truly say that to believe the same one to be God and man is fitting for all defenders of the right faith, but not according to the opinion of Apollinaris; for neither does the divinity become an earthly thing, nor does the humanity become something heavenly, as he thinks; but the power of the Most High from heaven overshadowed human nature through the Holy Spirit—that is, it was formed in it—and from the immaculate Virgin a portion of flesh was united with it; and in this way, that which was born in it was called the Son of the Most High, the divine power reconciling an affinity with the Most High to human nature, while the flesh reconciled a kinship with man to God.
VII. "But he is God," says Apollinaris, "through the incarnation of the spirit, and man through the flesh assumed by God." What again is the incarnation of the spirit, other than the union entered into with our flesh? And from whence was man assumed, if not from the first man D whose first generation we have learned from Moses, who describes his genealogy, was made from the earth, not from heaven? For God, having taken dust from the earth, fashioned man; but he did not tell us of any other...
construction from heaven—no one has ever taught us that. Then Apollinaris A subjoins to these statements, "The mystery was manifested in the flesh"; he states this rightly, for we too say the same thing, and he adds that the Word was made flesh according to the union—these are indeed words of sound speech. For he who says that the Word has been united to the flesh, affirms nothing other than the concurrence of two things.
"But the flesh," he says, "is not without a soul; for it is said to 'war against the spirit' and to 'rebel against the law of the law'." Oh, the height of his folly! He does not fashion for God a fleshless/inanimate body. Let us therefore ask whether an ensouled flesh was assumed by God the Word, as our writer says; but we say that the bodies of irrational animals are also possessed of a soul. However, he who attributes human flesh—and that ensouled—to the Word unites nothing else than a whole human being to the Word; for there is nothing so proper to the human soul as a nature endowed with intellect, because in all other things we have communion with the brutes. B Concupiscence, anger, desire for food, satiety, sleep, digestion, change, the evacuation of excrement—all these things are dispensed equally in us and in irrational animals by a certain faculty of the soul. He, therefore, who says that the one who was assumed is a man, and concedes that this one is endowed with a soul, testifies to nothing other than that he possesses the faculty of understanding, which is proper only to the human soul, as appears from the very words of the Apostle which he has set before us.
For when he says that "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. viii, 7), he expresses the manifest properties of the power that chooses and thinks; for to be obedient or to struggle against the law is proper to a choosing will, and the very name of "mind" (phronēma) no one could separate C from the activity of thinking. And that "to think" (phronein) is the same as "to understand" (noein), not even one of those who are utterly babes would deny. And he who struggles against and leads into captivity—how could he lack the activity of understanding? For the fact that the choosing will is moved toward evil things in the wicked is no proof that there is no mind in them, but rather that they are excluded from good reasoning, yet they do think nonetheless. For even that serpent, whom the Scripture teaches us was the leader and inventor of wickedness, the God-inspired word does not say was lacking in mind, but testifies that he was more prudent than all other living creatures (Gen. iii, 1).
D VIII. Therefore, the words brought forward by us, by which he thinks his own opinion is confirmed, clearly refute the impiety of the dogma preached by him. For not in these words alone does the Apostle oppose the flesh to the spirit—that is, an evil choice to a righteous purpose.
A Indeed, at that time when the discourse was directed to them, were those men, according to the tripartite division of humanity devised by Apollinaris, lacking the operation of the mind? Or were they called "carnal" by Paul entirely because of their immoderate inclination toward the works of the flesh, receiving the appellation from that which abounded in them? The context of the written passage shows that such an argument is true: "For where there is among you," he says, "envy and strife, are you not carnal?" For to be envious and to contend pertains to the operations of the mind. B Furthermore, the things that follow in the wordy writing of Apollinaris demonstrate this one thing through many testimonies: that man consists of three things, namely, flesh, soul, and mind—which, indeed, are not far from our own opinion. For to say that man is composed of body and an intellective soul is the same thing as dividing into three parts the considerations regarding man by separately enumerating the mind by itself. Although this way of speaking provides many opportunities for heretics to err. For if one were to enumerate the rational part by itself, another could assert that the irascible part is separated from the rest, and again another part for the concupiscible, and perhaps someone else, counting the remaining motions of the soul by reason, would show man to be composed not of three, but in a certain way of far many more parts, and dissected into many parts as well.
IX. C But let us put these things aside, lest by dwelling on each particular point we extend our refutation longer than is necessary; let us proceed to the subsequent parts of the discourse. For while he labors to establish the composition of man as tripartite—or threefold, or by whatever other name one might wish to call it—by many arguments, he makes mention of certain synodal definitions, namely, those of the synods which were collected against Paul of Samosata, in one of which it is said that Christ was made God from heaven; andlikewise of another definition of faith promulgated at Nicaea, whose dictum he alleges in these express words: "Who descended from heaven, and was incarnate, and was made man." And when he has said these things, as though he had already established what he was about to say next, he reveals the meaning of his intention in this manner, and as if the matters were already demonstrated, he adapts the consequences to them, and says word for word: D "The Spirit, that is, the mind, having God, Christ, together with soul and body, is rightly called a man from heaven." What common ground do the things said have with what precedes them? Where
did the synod gathered against Samosatenus define this? But let us omit what is older concerning our dogma. What do those words, *He who descended from heaven and was incarnate*, in the dogmas of the Nicene Council suggest to the faith, except that we should understand that the flesh did not exist before the descent of the Son, but that it was subsequent to that very descent? This is preached by all in the Churches, that Christ was indeed incarnate and made man; and this is our discourse, or rather, the discourse of the Church. Where then in the stated dogmas of the Nicene Council is it found that Christ, B having God—that is, the Spirit, or mind—along with soul and body, is called a man from heaven? For whether you examine the discourse based on the bare wording, or based on the meaning of what was said, the claim will be found in neither. For the wording is as far removed from the claim as, to speak in the manner of the Psalms, the east is from the west; and as for the meaning of what was said, what common ground does it show with what is signified by that phrase? This man says that Christ, when incarnate in human flesh, has in Himself God, the Spirit—that is, the mind; and he says this, the very person who commands us not to call Christ a man having God within Himself, as if one in another, while he himself is the first of all to construct this very thing. But the voice of the synod says, *He who descended from heaven*. Let the multitude and the simple-minded person understand the descent from the heavens to us; for we shall not differ regarding such an assumption, even if the mind should imagine a higher meaning, C not saying that the Divine descends locally, being everywhere and encompassing all things, but declaring the condescension toward the humility of our nature. But however it may be pleasing to him who wishes to accept the descent, the discourse of the synod says again, *who was incarnate*, and it says this rightly; for how could one have interpreted the birth from a woman more appropriately? For it is not, as He is God, that He Himself was born of a woman by Himself; for He who existed before the creation of things does not admit of being born through flesh as His very being; but by having prepared, through the Holy Spirit, the entrance of His own power, and by having need of no material pretext for the construction of His own tabernacle, according to what is said concerning Wisdom, *He built for Himself a house*, having made, from the Virgin’s earth, a human being, through whom He was commingled D with the human.
Where then in these things does the discourse say that which seems to Apollinaris: that Christ, having God, that is, the mind, together with soul and body, is rightly from X. Where then in these words of the synod does the discourse assert what Apollinaris thinks, namely that the spirit—that is, the mind—God, along with soul and body, is rightly
A held to be called a heavenly man? For if it is permitted to him, according to his own will, to drag the divine oracles to whatever interpretation he fancies, and, after the manner of interpreters of dreams, to apply the sense to the letter, just as he pleases, he may ascribe these and other similar notions to the divine utterances. But if the Apostle says that old wives' tales and profane novelties of words must be rejected in every way, it is by no means to be permitted to him to join together things that are at variance, and to combine things that cannot have communion with one another. Yet the very arguments by which he tries to confirm his own statements provide us with assistance and aid—even for the subversion of his own doctrine. For he says that Paul also calls the first man, Adam, a living soul B even though he was endowed with a body, asserting this, indeed, beautifully and very truly. Was therefore the first man, who is remembered by Paul as a living soul, possessed of an irrational soul, like the beasts? And yet the history of Scripture testifies that no common power and faculty of understanding was bestowed upon him; for God brought all the animals to him, but he, according to the nature of each, conceiving in his mind what was fit and appropriate, had the authority to impose a name upon each. But furthermore, his disobedience, and his inclination toward things that ought not to be done, and the shame felt for wicked deeds, and the excuse for transgressions so readily invented—all these things demonstrate the faculty of the mind C sufficiently and more than enough. Why, then, did Paul pass over the power of understanding in Adam in silence? Or is it perhaps that he expresses the whole by the naming of one part, as in the passage, "To thee shall all flesh come," where through "flesh" David signifies the whole human race; and Jacob, when he was received as a guest by the Egyptians with seventy-five souls, is not exhibited in Holy Scripture as being at that time devoid of mind or flesh?
XI. But Apollinaris says: "The second man is called spiritual from heaven," which signifies that the man who was commingled with God lacks a mind. But from the words which he immediately adds, the refutation of this absurdity is easily derived. For the one who says, "As is the heavenly one, such also are the heavenly ones," removes us far from such an opinion. For if those who believe in Him who came from the heavens D are themselves also called heavenly by Paul—inasmuch as they have translated their citizenship to the heavens, as he says elsewhere—and if the Apostle says that as that heavenly one is, such also are these heavenly ones; and since no one among those who have embraced the faith is devoid of a mind, it is therefore necessarily demonstrated from this comparison that Christ was made in the likeness of men, and consequently that a mind was also in Him. For "As is the heavenly one," he says, "such also are the heavenly ones": so that one must necessarily admit that either all are endowed with a mind, or none at all. For just as the properties of the earthly man [are found in those who have been begotten from him...]
are seen, so also according to the Apostle's saying, who was tempted in all things as we are, yet without sin (and the mind is not sin), it is altogether necessary that he should preserve an agreement and conjunction with all the properties of nature. For in this way the Apostle's statement is shown to be true, that we are like him, if we acknowledge that he also was made like us, so that by the fact that he was made such as we are, he might make us such as he himself is.
XII. But let us again recall the words of Apollinaris: Just as Paul calls the first Adam a soul possessed of a body, and not one lacking a body, yet granting the name to the whole, even though this by itself, insofar as it contains the spirit, may be called soul. He who says these things admits B that three things are designated by the single name of soul through this composition, as if it involved simultaneously the signification of both body and spirit. But, he says, Paul calls the last Adam a "life-giving spirit." That which he therefore showed in him [to hold] by way of the prevailing element—having secured the appellation over the other signified things—this surely also has its equivalent in his case. For if Adam, because he sinned, is called "soul," the man joined to God, because he did not commit sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth, is called "spirit" absolutely. But he does not accept this interpretation; for he says that the former is called "earthly from the earth" because the body, formed from the clay, received a soul. But was not the mind, which he calls spirit, joined to the body of Adam at his formation? In what, C therefore, does his likeness to God consist? What is the outflow from the divine inbreathing, if the mind is not believed to be this very thing? Further, he says that the second Adam is called "heavenly" for this reason, because the heavenly Spirit was incarnate. In what passage of holy Scripture is this said? To which of the holy ones does he attribute the word that the Spirit was incarnate? We have not heard this from the Gospels; we have not been taught this by the great voice of the Apostle. Rather, the preaching declares that the "Word became flesh," and the evangelical history relates that the Spirit descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove. But no one of those who have perceived the mysteries through the Spirit has spoken of the incarnation of the Spirit. "The glory dwelt in our land," and "Truth has sprung from the earth," and "God was manifested in the flesh," and "Righteousness looked down from heaven," and many other things of this kind we read; D but the God-inspired Scripture knows nothing of a Spirit being incarnate. And further, he says that the man Christ pre-exists, not as if the Spirit, that is, God, were a different being apart from him, but as the divine Spirit being in the nature of God-man. These things
A are his words verbatim. But since, due to a certain sluggishness of interpretative power, what he implies in these words is not entirely clear through their clarity, I shall first strip away the darkness of the wording from the underlying thought, and then, in this manner, add the discourse to the examination.
XIII. "The man Christ," he says, "pre-exists." He understands these two items as being joined together—the Word who was in the beginning, and the man who appeared in time—as if he had pre-existed before his manifestation, and he elaborates on the meaning through what follows. For he says that the Spirit is not something different from him, constructing through this the argument that the very divinity of the Son is man from the beginning, which is shown more clearly through the subsequent discourse; for he says that the Lord B in the nature of God-man was divine Spirit. He has unified the nature of God and of man, and he has termed the fusion of the two "man." The sense of his words, therefore, is this: that he who emerged through the Virgin in the flesh is to be understood as being prior to all created things, not only according to the eternity of his divinity, as we all believe, but also according to the flesh itself. For he proceeds to add, for the testimony of such a supposition, the Lord’s word: "Before Abraham was, I am"; and the voice of John, "He was before me"; and that of the Apostle, "And one Lord through whom are all things"; and, "He is before all things"; and C certain other words of the prophet Zechariah, which, as they have been dragged by force towards this goal of his, we shall omit. For my part, if the proof of this absurd opinion were covered by some wrapping of thoughts, I would rightly labor on the refutation of things that were hidden; but since it openly bellows its impiety, I do not see what more could be accomplished by our words. If the flesh is pre-eternal, if what was born of the Virgin already existed before Abraham was born, then the Virgin is older in age than Nahor; then Mary even precedes Adam. And yet, why do I say this? She herself, as it seems, will be older than the creation of all things and more ancient than the ages themselves. For if he was incarnate in the Virgin, and the flesh is called Jesus, and the Apostle affirms that Jesus is before all things, then, as it seems, D this fine writer—if I am not mistaken—brings it about by his own arguments that we must understand Mary as co-eternal with the Father. But I pass over in silence the extremely incredible and utterly absurd things to which the perversity of this coinage of words leads in the progress of the work; for it will be easy for sagacious men to discern these absurdities from the consequences that follow, even if we do not lay out their ugliness in our own words. [alt-version omitted]
A XIV. But let us pass by the stench of such notions, noting only this in passing: if the flesh existed before the ages, the divinity was not emptied, the Son was not in the form of God, and He did not put on the form of a servant; but what He was by nature, that He was revealed to be now, and was not humbled. May the Word be gracious to my words; but I pass over the rest in silence. If the flesh existed before the creation of all things, then all things were created through weakness, not through power; for "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Matt. xxvi, 41). Therefore, his absurdity extends even to this. And who would not discern what is connected to these things from the consequences that follow from them? For one must necessarily conceive of all that is proper to the flesh as existing at the same time in Him who had the flesh before the ages: labor, sorrow, tears, thirst, sleep, the need of hunger, and whatever is even more absurd than these.
Since, however, "a child is born to us" (Isa. ix, 6), as the divine voice says, and the Lord was "seen by the shepherds in swaddling clothes," as Luke says (Luc. ii, 12, 16), and "Jesus increased in stature, and in wisdom, and in grace" (Luc. ii, 52), and then B he advanced to the measure of manhood, walking through the path of nature, what will they say who see the flesh in Christ before the ages? In what state of body was He before the ages? For while He lived among humans, He passed through all the ages of human life. Was that man, who is older than the creation of all things, a boy, or a little infant, or a youth, or was He at once endowed with a perfect body? But if they say He was a boy, they must certainly also add the reason why, after the passing of so many and such great ages, He did not reach the perfect age. But if they say He was a perfect man, we demand that they teach us how, while He is born of the Virgin, He is contracted into the smallness of an infant? Where did He leave the remaining part of the body? How was the bulk of the same body so diminished C as to be circumscribed by such narrow limits? Then, how does He again restore the bulk of the body to its own measure? Whether by taking back what He had from the beginning through gradual growth, or by adding another part to Himself through nourishment? If they say the old, they will surely show the nourishment to have been superfluous; but if they do not deny that the Lord partook of food, what will they say concerning the flesh left behind in heaven? For they will say He left behind a great part, as is reasonable, and that He reserved for Himself only as much as the womb of the Virgin could contain. They will certainly babble something monstrous about this too, and by these assertions they will, even against their will, construct for themselves a path toward fabricating other dogmas which necessarily follow from the vanity D of such fables.
XV. But let us pass over these things as well. A Yet one might not unreasonably inquire of those who dogmatize that this divine incarnation existed before the ages. For if they think that the flesh always existed with Him, they are saying that God is flesh; but all flesh is resistant to touch, and that which is resistant to touch consists of matter and is composite; and that which is composite admits of dissolution. It is therefore absolutely necessary for them to confirm that He Himself consists of matter, is composed of diverse things, and by nature awaits dissolution. For we are not ignorant of what things the body of Christ consisted when He lived among men after the human manner; for we clearly gather that that body too was fashioned after the likeness of other men from flesh, bones, and blood, from the marks of the nails, and from the blood poured forth through the wound of the lance; and especially because, to those who did not believe when He appeared after the resurrection, the Lord said, *Handle me, and see, for a spirit has not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having* (Luc. xxiv, 39). If, therefore, the divine incarnation, as Apollinaris says, did not have its beginning from the Virgin, but existed even before B Abraham and before the creation of all things, it must surely have been such as it was seen by the disciples: solid, indeed, and resistant to touch, and consisting of flesh and bones. Consequently, these things always existed, and there was no descent on His part to our humility, but that which was hidden, being divine by nature, was manifested at the time of the incarnation. What did Arius, or what did Eunomius, who is even worse than he, ever devise for the destruction of the glory of the Only-Begotten that is like what Apollinaris attempts to establish for us in this treatise of his? A certain God, existing before the ages consisting of flesh and bones, possessed of hair, and fashioned from skin, sinews, flesh, and fat, composed of diverse things, and lacking simplicity, is said to be that Word which *was in the beginning, and was with God, and the Word was God* (Joan. 1, 1); who in the C last days, having entered into communion with the humility of our nature, became flesh out of the love by which He embraces the human race, and for that reason was tempered with humanity, taking upon Himself our entire nature, so that humanity might be seen in Him with the mixture of divinity, and through those first fruits the whole mass of our nature might be sanctified.
XVI. But I think I should pass over the things which Apollinaris brings forward from individual passages of Holy Scripture, misunderstood for the confirmation of his own dogmas; for as for those things which offer themselves of their own accord to be discussed and refuted, it would be D superfluous to examine them one by one.
A For to testify that He was always in flesh and blood, he puts forward the apostolic phrase which says that through Him we have received redemption, through His blood, the remission of sins, through His flesh. That this looks to another meaning, I imagine no one of sound mind would doubt. For who does not know the divine mystery, that the Prince and Author of our salvation goes after the erring sheep? Now we men are that sheep—we who went astray through sin from that hundred-fold flock of rational creatures, by which the whole human race is signified. He takes the whole sheep upon His own shoulders; for the error was not in some part of the sheep, but since it went astray in its entirety, it is brought back in its entirety; the fleece is not carried by the shepherd while the internal organs are left behind, as Apollinaris would have it. This, being accomplished on the shoulders of the Shepherd—that is, in the Godhead of the Lord—becomes one with Him through the assumption; for this reason He desires to seek out and save that which was lost. B Since He found what He was looking for, He took upon Himself that which was found; for the sheep was not moving on its own feet, which had once gone astray, but was carried by the Godhead. For this reason, that which was visible was a sheep—that is, a man. But His footsteps, according to what is written, were not known. For no trace of sin or error was marked upon the human life of Him who bore the sheep upon Himself; but such traces as it was proper for God to leave in the course of life, such were manifested in the reality itself—namely, saving doctrines, healings of diseases, the raising of the dead to life, and other miracles. Having, therefore, taken this sheep upon Himself, the Shepherd became one with it; for this reason He speaks to the flocks with the voice of the sheep. C For how would human weakness have endured the impact of a divine voice? But humanly, or as one might say, sheep-like, He discourses with us, saying: "My sheep hear my voice." The shepherd, therefore, who took the sheep upon Himself and speaks to us through it, is both sheep and shepherd: in the one who is assumed, sheep; in the one who has assumed, shepherd.
XVII. Since it was necessary for the good shepherd to lay down His soul for the sheep, in order that by dying He might abolish death, therefore the Author of our salvation, in human nature, became both simultaneously: priest, that is, and lamb, imparting to that which was capable of passion the power and efficacy of death. For since death is nothing other than the dissolution of soul and body, by uniting Himself with both—I mean with soul and body—Christ is separated from neither of them; for "the gifts of God," as the Apostle says, "are without repentance."
A For He imparts Himself to both the body and the soul; through the soul He opens Paradise to the robber, and through the body He arrests the power of corruption. This is the dissolution of death—to render the corruption, having been extinguished in the life-giving nature, B ineffectual. For that which occurred in these things becomes a common benefit and grace of our nature, and thus He joins together all things that were separated through the resurrection—He who is in both, who by His own authority commits the body to the heart of the earth, as it is written (10), yet lays down His soul by His own power: as He says to the Father, "Into Thy hands I commend My spirit," and as He says to the robber, "In Paradise," speaking the truth in both instances. For one must not believe that divine dwelling—since it is called Paradise—to be anywhere else than in the most spacious hand of the Father, as the prophet also says, speaking the word to the Jerusalem above from the person of the Lord: "I have inscribed thy walls upon My hands, and thou art before Mine eyes continually" (12). Thus, then, He also undergoes death, and is not mastered by death. For that which is composite is divided, C but that which is incomposite does not admit of dissolution; but the incomposite nature remains intact in the division of the composite, and though the soul departs from the body, it is separated from neither the one nor the other. The proof and argument for this is that power and efficacy which works incorruption in the body and the life of Paradise in the soul. Yet He who is simple and alien to all composition is in no way diffused along with the separation of these; on the contrary, He works the opposite, for He brings that which is divided into union with what is in itself indivisible, and He demonstrates this by saying (15), "God raised Him from the dead." For it is not as with Lazarus or any other of those who were restored to life, who are brought back to life by another’s power—it is not piously thought that the resurrection of the Lord is thus—but the Only-begotten God Himself raised up the man who was commingled with Him, and by separating the soul from the body and again uniting both, in this way the common salvation of nature is accomplished; D whence He is also called the Author of life. For in Him who died and rose again for us, the Only-begotten God reconciled the world to Himself, as it were redeeming us, who are all partakers of His flesh and blood, like captives, by His own blood—which is of the same nature as our own. To this it seems the Apostle looks when he says that through Him we have received redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins through His flesh. This is our view, which we have understood from the cited words of the Apostle (15), and not as that Apollinaris did (16). Let him test it who has set his mind to judge.
A Let him judge also, regarding these two opinions, which is more pious: whether, as we say, the divine glory dwells in our land in an economical way, or whether, as he thinks, the flesh is not something added to the godhead for the sake of doing good to men, but is consubstantial and connatural with it.
B XVIII. But as for the question of whether the prophet Zechariah inclines toward the other of these two opinions in his obscure words, I think it superfluous for us to inquire, whether his words look toward the Lord Himself or toward some other person. For he says: "Sword, awake against my shepherd, and against the man of my fellowship." We, for our part, think that the word aims this sword threateningly against those who act unjustly toward their fellow kinsmen; Apollinaris, on the other hand, says that the sword is raised against the Lord because of the title of "shepherd," not knowing that in many places of Scripture the Word designates those who are set in the rank of princes as "pastors" and "shepherds."
Furthermore, what he draws by force from the Epistle to the Hebrews to prove this contains an absurdity so manifest in the arguments derived therefrom that it is easy for anyone, even one with a little wisdom, to detect it. C For since it is written: "In these last days God has spoken to us in a Son, who long ago spoke to our fathers through the prophets in many parts and in many ways," he says that this is a proof that the humanity of the God who appeared to us existed before the ages. For he says as follows, in his interpretation of the Apostle: "It is manifest in these words that the very man who speaks the things of the Father to us is God, the creator of the ages, the radiance of his glory, and the figure of his substance, inasmuch as he is God by his own Spirit and does not have a God within himself other than himself; and he himself through himself—that is, through the flesh—purged the world of sins." These things Apollinaris says verbatim, and nothing has been altered by us in his stated words.
If, therefore, the man who speaks is the creator of the ages, as this writer thinks, and the flesh is the radiance of the paternal glory, and the form of a servant D represents the substance of God, it no longer seems to me right to fight against these statements of his, but I think it better to weep for the stupidity of those who allow themselves to be led away by such novel utterances. Is this man, who speaks with us in the human manner and with our own voice, who spat with his mouth and made clay with his hand, who put his fingers into the ears of the deaf and touched the sick and the dead, who rested from labor with sleep and sitting, who wept and was afflicted with sorrow and sadness, who suffered hunger and desired food and asked for water—is this man, as far as that flesh and humanity are concerned, to be understood as being prior to the creation of all things, and is the composite and solid nature of the flesh to be called God? Let every pious person stop...
A their ears, and let not the divine and incorrupt dogmas be defiled by those who, petulantly puffed up, disgrace the Godhead with the attributes of carnal affections. For who is ignorant that God, who was manifested to us in the flesh, is according to the principle of pious tradition, incorporeal, invisible, simple, infinite, and without limit, and has always been and is, and exists everywhere, and pervades all created things, while according to that which appeared, he was seen encompassed by a human boundary? For it is absolutely necessary that every body be contained by some surface. And this surface of the body is the limit of that which is contained within it; and whatever is limited by anything is circumscribed by a definite quantity: but that which is defined cannot be infinite. And yet the Prophet says, *Of his greatness there is no end* (Ps. 144:3). If, therefore, the divine nature, as our author says, is flesh; and this is necessarily terminated by the limit of a surface, how does the greatness of God, as the Prophet says, proceed to infinity? Or how is that which is infinite known from that which is finite, and the immense understood from that which has a limit? Or rather, as we have already said above, how can strength arise from death? For if, as he says, the man himself who has spoken is the creator of the aeons, and he is the same one who through himself, that is, through the flesh, as Apollinaris interprets, created all things; and yet flesh in the divine oracle is called weak and feeble: then Apollinaris supposes nothing other than that power, strength, virtue, and all lofty and God-befitting conceptions that can be conceived by the mind, derive their origin from weakness and infirmity.
XIX. And this, indeed, is not so impious, but the discourse, progressing to further matters, in the discussion that follows, attacks the Father himself with blasphemies. C For he says that the man is the radiance of God’s glory, and that in the carnal God, whom he has thrust upon us like an idol fashioned by the vain contrivances of his own reasonings, the substance of God is represented. Just as, therefore, a ray has a kinship with the sun, and the light that shines from a lamp is related to the lamp, and as the image of a man indicates his human substance, so absolutely, if that which appeared to us shone forth from the glory of the Father, and its image of substance is flesh, it follows effectively that by consequence the nature of the Father is also carnal. For it cannot be said that the incorporeal D [is known] from the body.
A nor that the unseen is made to shine forth in the visible. But such as is the glory, such obviously is its radiance, and such as is the figure, such essentially is the substance; so that if the latter is body, one must not think that the former is in any way incorporeal. He also makes mention of the faith written at Nicaea, in which the common assembly of the Fathers proclaimed the *homousion* with a great voice. Now no one would call that which is of a different kind *homousion* and consubstantial; but for those to whom there is one and the same definition of substance, for these the name consubstantial is entirely appropriate. If, therefore, the Son is God having flesh, and that very thing exists by his own proper nature, inasmuch as he was flesh according to the name that is eternally appropriate to him—and that he is consubstantial with the Father is not doubted even by the writer himself—then those things are consubstantial with one another which are defined by the same definition of substance. Therefore, Apollinaris assumes a certain human and carnal nature for the Father as well, so that he may preserve the name of *homousion* in both, that is, in the Father and the Son, as one or the other of the two; either by calling the Father incorporeal, he will join the divinity of the Son B to a different substance; or by confessing the commonality of the divinity and the substance to be the same in the Father and in the Son, he will make the nature of the divinity in the Father also to be flesh. But, as if correcting this absurdity, in what precedes he says, interpreting the utterance of Zacharias as he saw fit, that it was said from the person of the Father concerning the Son, that it was *symphylon*, which is the same as connatural and consubstantial. Whether he opined this rightly or not is a matter for another investigation; but what he attempts to prove is this: He shows, he says, by these words that the prophetic discourse means that the Son is consubstantial with God not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit which was united to the flesh. How then is his carnal God united to flesh before the foundation of the world? For when C the ages were not, nor was there any other thing of created realities, the flesh is the very last and smallest of those things which have come to be in creation. To what flesh, then, was the divinity united, when human nature had not yet been brought forth into existence? But Apollinaris knows of some other flesh besides that of man. And how, he says, is this the very man who spoke to us the things of the Father, the same who is God, the Creator of the ages? Who will interpret for us the absurdity of these new riddles? A man before becoming man, and flesh more ancient than its own creation, and that which came to be at the end of times D being pre-eternal.
and all other such things which he confuses in his treatise. B But let the writer, as it seems good to him, wander at his own discretion through the rugged paths of his reasonings; we, however, having brought forward the apostolic doctrine, which he himself also mentions, to confute his impious opinions, shall hasten to other parts of his treatise. "Who, being in the form of God," he says. He did not say, "having a form similar to God," which is said of him who was made according to the likeness of God, but "being in the very form of God"; for all things that are the Father’s are found in the Son. Therefore, [He is] also eternal, without quantity, immaterial, and bodiless, so that the form of the paternal character is preserved in the Son through all things. And when he says, "being equal to God," what difference or discrepancy does this equality allow us to understand between the Father and the Son? By what reasoning could equality apply to things that differ from one another by nature? For if one is fleshly by nature, and the other is devoid of flesh, how could anyone make that which is of such a kind equal to that which is not of such a kind? "He emptied Himself," he says, "taking the form of a servant." What is the form of a servant? The body, certainly; for we have heard from the Fathers that it is nothing else but this. Therefore, he who says that the Son took the form of a servant, which form is flesh itself, C he indeed also asserts that He, being one thing according to the divine form, assumed a servile form, which likewise by nature is something else than the form of God. But even the term "emptied" clearly shows that He was not always that which appeared to us, but was indeed in the fullness of the divinity equal to God, inaccessible and unapproachable to every creature, and much less contained by the short and narrow compass of human nature; but that He was then circumscribed by the transient and fragile nature of the flesh, when, as the Apostle says, He emptied His ineffable glory of divinity and diminished it to the measure of our nature, so that what He was in Himself was great and perfect and incomprehensible, but what He assumed did not exceed the measure of our nature. For He says, "in the likeness and habit of man," being made such, as one who did not have from the beginning in Himself the likeness of such a nature, nor was He configured to any bodily form. For how could a shape of form be imprinted upon something incorporeal? But He becomes in a shape then, when being shaped, He puts it around Himself. And this is the nature of the body. D Being found, therefore, as a man; for He was indeed a man, even if not a man in all respects, yet as a man, because of the mystery of the maternal virginity; so that it might be manifest from this that He did not serve in all things the laws of human nature, but entering into life in a way that was becoming to God, and not needing...
A a constitution of marriage by any work, He is found to be not a common man in every respect, because He was fashioned by a different workmanship from the rest of men, but yet as man. And in this way He humbled Himself, becoming man without change. For if He had existed as such from the beginning, in what respect would the humiliation have taken place? But now, the Most High humbled Himself through the union with the lowness of our nature. For having been united to the form of a servant, which He received, and having become one with it, He makes the sufferings of the servant His own; and just as occurs in us through the natural connection of the limbs, if anything happens to the tip of the nail, the whole body is affected together with the injured part, the sensation extending through the whole frame; so He who was united to our nature makes our sufferings His own, as Isaiah says, that He Himself took our infirmities and bore our diseases, enduring for us the wound, that by His stripes we might be healed; not that the divinity was wounded, but the man B who was joined through the union to the divinity, whose nature is capable of receiving stripes. And these things come to pass, in order that the path of wickedness might again be undone through the same paths. For since through the disobedience of man 45, death 46 entered in, for this reason it is banished through the obedience of the second man. For this cause He becomes obedient even unto death, that by obedience He might heal the transgression caused by disobedience, and through the resurrection from the dead might cause the death that had entered in with the disobedience to vanish. For the resurrection of the man from death 48 is the disappearance of death. Therefore, he says, God also highly exalted Him. This is, as it were, a seal of the preceding thought. For it is clear that the Most High does not stand in need of exaltation, but that C which is low is raised to height, becoming now what it was not before. For the human nature, having been united to the Lord, is exalted together with the divinity, and that which is exalted is that which is lifted up from the low state; but the low state is the form of a servant, which, through the exaltation, becomes Christ and Lord. And since the man according to Christ was called by a name appropriate to the human path of succession, through the mystery announced at the Virgin by Gabriel, and the human element, as it has been said, was named Jesus; but the divine nature is not to be circumscribed by a name; and the two things D have become one through the commixture: for this reason God also is named from the human. For at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, and the man becomes above every name, which is proper to the divinity, which cannot be enslaved by any verbal designation.
For just as by means of the man the divinity is named, so does that which was raised up from the lowly state to the divinity become above a name; and just as the ignominy of the form of a servant has its reference to God, who was mingled with the servant, so also does the adoration of the divinity, which is offered by every created being, occur to Him who is united with the divinity. And thus in the name of Jesus Christ every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. Amen.
XXII. But just as if blushing for himself, and affected with shame by the ineptitude of his own words, Apollinaris B seems, in a way, to subvert what he had established by various arguments, nor does he seem to wish to admit any other similitude of men in the Son than an adventitious one. For he says: "Behold the equality of the same Jesus Christ with the Father existing beforehand, and the similitude with men coming upon Him afterward." He appears to repent of the things he said before, and would that this were the case, provided he would put this absurd opinion out of his mind and we might desist from refuting him. But it is apparent from what he does that, by the good intention he here puts forward, he is preparing steps for another absurdity. For he says C literally: "And what is more manifest than these things to show that one was not united with the other, that is, perfect God with perfect man?" Now that this statement has no connection with what preceded it will certainly be clear to all those who know how to follow the intent of writers. For how does the equality with the Father existing beforehand, and the similitude with men coming upon Him—as he loves to say—show that He is not a perfect man, through whom perfect God became man? For it is just as if one, saying that the heaven is distant from the earth, were then to assert that from this it is made manifest that lead is heavier than tin in an equal D measure, and should think that gravity is the same thing as the distance of heaven from the earth: so no one would ever say that it is demonstrated from the fact that the Son’s similitude with men is granted to have been added to Him anew, that the humanity through which God becomes a participant in our nature is imperfect. But I shall postpone for a little while the demonstration of the impiety and foolishness of such an opinion. Now, however, following word for word what has been written by him hereafter, I shall attempt to refute his treatise, where it is nevertheless ready at hand to be refuted. For he says there is no perfect God with a perfect man. For the time being, whether he named the subjects of what was said as imperfect here, he has left it ambiguous, and to the
ambiguity of what is signified the mind looks equally to both, nor is it possible to learn from what we have heard whether he deems one of them to be imperfect, whether God or man, or whether he supposes that this is said equally of both. He says that he is indeed God in spirit, possessing the glory of God; but in body A a man, bearing the ignoble form of men. He called him God, he called him man; but it is known to all that the signification of these names is not the same, but the divinity is explained by some words, and the humanity by others. For God is the cause of all good things, always one and the same, and like to Himself, who never was not, and never will not be: but man, on the one hand, is disposed similarly to the nature of irrational creatures, being governed like them through flesh and sense; yet by the addition of the intellect he is separated from the irrational creatures, and in this he possesses the proper quality of his nature. For no one, in defining man, would define him by flesh and bones and sensory organs; nor, by mentioning the nutritional and transformative B power, would anyone have displayed the property of human nature; but by the intellectual and rational, he has pointed out the man. It is therefore all the same whether one explains the nature through the name, or through what is uniquely concomitant to the nature. For he who says "man" has indicated the "rational," and he who has named the "rational" has proved the "man" by this verbal expression. Therefore, even Apollinaris, in naming God and man, if he embraced with this word the meanings visible in the divinity, he would not have harmed the signification of "man" through his interpretation. But if he is called man, the calling is surely true, and not falsely named; and the truth of the name is demonstrated in his being a rational animal, C he who is so named. But reason is entirely from the intellect, so that if there is a man, he is of necessity said to be endowed with intellect; but if he lacks intellect, he cannot even be a man.
XXIII. But man, he says, he was in the body, bearing the ignoble form of men.
These things he foists upon us from his own mind, not from the teaching of Holy Scripture. But that we may invert these pronouncements of Apollinaris to the contrary of what he himself intends, we shall so institute the discourse. "He bore," he says, "the ignoble form of men." Let us first consider what is the glory of man, and in this way we shall consequently understand what is their ignobility. D For the true glory of man is life instituted according to the norm of virtue. For it would be the mark of effeminate men to measure the glory or ignobility of men by a certain beauty of complexion, or by the bloom of the flesh, or conversely by the deformity of the body. If therefore glory, in no sense, as it seems to me, for no glory can arise from death in man...is acknowledged to be the virtue of men, then baseness is altogether its vice A. But Apollinaris says that God assumed the base form of men. If, therefore, baseness is in vice, and vice is the turpitude of the choosing will—yet it is the faculty of thought that chooses, and thought is a certain movement of the mind 70—then he who perceives human baseness in relation to God does not strip of the mind the man through whom God associated with human life. And this, indeed, concurs with the divine Scriptures, namely, that He was made sin for us 68, that is, that He joined to Himself the sinful soul of man. The Lord, he says, appeared in the form of a servant; was this servant, whose form the Lord put on, whole, or was he maimed? For that which is lacking and mutilated in the completion of a living being, one might reasonably call a deformity. Not a man, he says, but as a man, because he was not consubstantial 72 with man according to that which is most important. If he is not consubstantial, he is by all means of a different substance; and in those things in which the account of substance is different, there is neither the same nature nor the same name. The substance of fire is one thing, and that of water is another, and the names of the two are also different. But Peter and Paul, because they are of one nature, therefore have a common name of substance; for each of them is a man. If, therefore, He was some other thing according to substance, and not a man, but was patterned to look like a man until 73 the appearance, but in truth differed in nature; let him say that all things are a sort of illusion and a deceptive phantasy: that according to him the eating was false, the sleep was false, all the miracles wrought in the healing of diseases were non-existent, the crucifixion did not take place, nor the laying in the tomb, nor the resurrection from the passion; but all things seemed to be so, while in reality, according to this writer, there was nothing at all of the things that were seen. For if He was not man, how C did the things recounted about Him come to pass? And by what reason could anyone say He was a man, who is foreign to human substance? For, he says 74, He was not consubstantial with man according to the most important part; but he who removes the most important part from man, which is the mind, has shown the remainder to be a beast; and a beast is not a man. Then he says, Having humbled Himself in the flesh 75, but having been superexalted by God with the divine exaltation. This, again, is more foolish than the former assertions, and more impious. He says one thing was humbled, and another was superexalted. The flesh, he says, was humbled, although it stands in no need of being humbled, as it possesses humility by nature; but he says the divinity was superexalted, and yet the Most High is not subject to exaltation. Where, then, was the divinity superexalted, which is above all things and stands higher than all exaltation? But that which is by nature humble is exalted, even if the writer should not wish it, just as the argument concerning these things has been set forth briefly a little before.
A XXIV. Again, like those who speak perversely in their sleep, leaving aside the logical consequence of the case, he makes use of our own arguments and intermingles with his own words whatever one might say who thinks soundly concerning the doctrine. For he distinguishes that which is glorified from Him who possesses the glory. For he says that He is glorified as man, but that He has glory before the world, as God existing before the ages. Thus far he is well-minded; but if his words had stopped within these limits, perhaps someone might have thought that, led by repentance, he had approached more closely to sound sentiments. But now, like those who walk along winding and self-returning paths, he embraces this sound and correct sentiment with a twist of his words, and soon runs back to the same stadium of error, and having used many insults against us, and having equated our faith with the errors of the Jews and Greeks, he again resumes in his discourse B the vomit which he had already spewed out in his previous writings, attributing to Christ, through the vanity of his words, a pre-mundane flesh, and saying that the Son was born of a woman as an incarnate mind; not that He became flesh in the Virgin, but that He passed through her as if through a channel, and that then, at that time, that which was manifested—being a fleshy God, or as he himself names it, an "incarnate mind"—was revealed just as He was before the ages. Therefore he says that He is called the Lord of glory who was crucified, and is called the Lord of hosts by the prophecy, and that He makes use of those authoritative and lordly utterances: "I say to you," and, "I command you," and, "I work," and whatever else carries a sense of higher dignity. What then will this noble fellow say? Where will he place the breast, the swaddling clothes, the fleeting and flowing life, the C gradual growth of the body, the sleep, the labor, the obedience to his parents, the distress, the sorrow, the desire for the Passover, the request for water, the partaking of food, the bonds, the slaps, the wounds from the scourges, the carrying of thorns upon the head, the wearing of purple, the insult by the reed, the lance, the vinegar, the nails, the gall, the shroud, the burial, the monument, the stone? How will he attach these to God? For if his incarnate God, that which appeared through Mary, was always this, and what was seen was divinity, then the divinity suffers all these things: it is nursed, it is swaddled, it is fed, it grows, it is filled, it is emptied, it sleeps, it is grieved, it is distressed, D it moans, it thirsts
it runs to the fig tree, it ignores the fruit of that tree and the time for it, it knows not the day or the hour, it is beaten, it is bound, it is buffeted, it receives nails through itself, it bleeds, it becomes dead, it is buried, it is laid in a new tomb. Does he concede that all these things are proper and connatural to the divinity that existed before the ages, and that it would not have grown, had it not been nursed, and that it could not have lived at all, had it not repaired its collapsed strength by the consumption of food? How, then, does his fleshly God ignore that day and hour? How does he not know the season of figs, that at the time of Passover fruit suitable for eating would not be found on that tree? Let him say, who B is the one who is ignorant? Who is the one who is grieved? Who is the one who is constrained by helplessness? Who is the one who cried out that he had been forsaken by God? If the divinity of the Father and the Son is one, and from whom does the forsaking come, which he proclaimed upon the cross? For if it is the divinity that is suffering, and the orthodox confess that the Son has one divinity with the Father—yet the one suffering says, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"—how is the one essence of the divinity divided in passion, so that one part forsakes and another is forsaken; one part becomes dead, while the other remains in life; one is killed, while the other raises that which was dead? For either he will refuse to confess that the divinity of the Father and the Son is one, and by this means will be caught agreeing with Arius; or if, opposing Arius, he says that the divinity of both is one and the same, he will be in complete disagreement with himself, since he cannot by any means establish the fable he has fabricated from falling apart on all sides. Rather, he will by necessity attribute these lowly and humble voices and states of mind to the human, and will confess that the divine nature has remained immune to all perturbation and affection, and subject to no change, even in its communion with human sufferings. And of this fact, he who spoke concerning him is himself a witness: "He is glorified as a man, rising from ignobility, yet he possesses glory before the creation of the world, as God existing before all things." For ignobility is in every way the passible nature of the flesh; but glory is, therefore, the eternal, impassible, and immortal power.
XXV. But lest anyone think to slander us in what we have said, I shall bring forward the very words of Apollinaris, into whose meaning we have just inquired. "For the Greeks," he says, "and the Jews are clearly D unbelievers, inasmuch as they refuse even to hear that God was born of a woman." Why then, when speaking of this birth, does he pass over the flesh in silence, even though that which was born of the flesh was in every way flesh?
A But because he wishes the flesh that was born to be divinity, and intends to argue that God did not appear in the flesh, he says: "But God, existing as God before the ages, was later born through a woman, and came into the world for the experience of sufferings and to undergo the other necessities of human nature." By saying these things, he does not grant Him to be even a man; but he subjects Him to sufferings as a man, while he does not impart to Him a human nature. For how could that be a man which is said not to be from the earth? For Scripture says of the human race that it came to be from Adam, and that the first man was brought forth from the earth by divine power. This is why Luke, too, when drawing up the genealogy of Him who was thought to be the son of Joseph, says, "Who was of Adam," B tracing back the origin of His generation in an ordered series through each of the fathers. Therefore, he who did not come to be from the race of men is something else entirely, and not a man. So, if He is neither a man, having nothing of the human race, nor God, since He is not incorporeal, let his disciples and advocates of this deceit say what this "fleshy" god of the writer might be. C "But," he says, "Greeks and Jews would have accepted it, if we said that He who was born was a divine man, like Elijah." And which of the Greeks accepted the miracles concerning Elijah as true—that fire, shaped in two forms, one in the likeness of a chariot and the other in the form of horses, moved in a direction contrary to its own nature, being carried from above to below, and that Elijah, raised on high on the fiery chariot, driving the fire, was preserved unharmed in the flame, the fire drawing the fire—that which was in the horses, the fire that was in the chariot? For if someone were to receive these things in the manner required, by these very things the argument for the reception of the mystery would be clearly shown D as he sees in the narrative a certain typical prophecy regarding the Lord’s incarnation, prefigured through the events that occurred. For just as fire, while light by nature, is brought down to earth by divine power, and Elijah, surrounded by the heavenly fire, is lifted up along with it as it returns to its natural motion—so too, a certain immaterial and invisible essence, the power of the Most High, having taken on the servile form, the substance which He had from the Virgin, brought it up to His own height, transforming it into a divine and incorruptible nature; so that he who is begrudging toward this would not even subscribe to the wonder-working concerning Elijah; but he who has learned beforehand in him the truth sketched out would not be much opposed to the truth itself.
Then he turns his railings against us, who do not accept the myth he has fabricated, and
XXVI. Then he turns his invective against us who reject the story cooked up by him, using these...
words: A *“But those who in the guise of faith are faithless toward God born of a woman and crucified by the Jews, are ashamed in the same way as they are* (and he himself will be ashamed of them).” Now, who does not know that to use curses against adversaries is the prerogative of those who are weak in the matters they are striving for? We, for our part, say only this: that between the two chasms of error set before us—on one side the fall into the error of Apollinaris, and on the other the fall into that of Arius—the destruction is equal for those who fall into either; except that, in the selection of evils, the fracture caused by the Arian error seems the lighter of the two. For both drag the incorrupt nature of the Only-Begotten down to something lower. But Arius assimilates the Lord of the angels to the incorporeal nature of the angels, declaring that both He and they exist by creation and are equally inferior to the uncreated nature. This man, B however, pushes the absurdity so far that he judges Christ to be of no greater dignity than a man who is inferior to the angels, and defines His nature as being carnal. Now, by as much as an incorporeal nature is superior to bodies, by so much is the impiety of Arius more preferable than the error of Apollinaris. Who, therefore, is the one who, while expounding the mystery of the Incarnation from the Virgin, appears faithless in the guise of faith? I shall place before the public gaze both our faith, which is mocked by this writer of myths, and his own opinion. For we say that God, being by essence immaterial, invisible, and incorporeal, through a certain benevolent dispensation toward the end of the completion of all things—when wickedness had already reached its C highest point—was then, for the abolition of sin, mingled with human nature, just like a sun being introduced into a dark cave, dissipating the darkness by the presence of its light. For by taking our filth upon Himself, He is not Himself defiled by the impurity, but within Himself He purifies the filth; for *“the light,”* he says, *“shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it.”* This is what also happens in the art of medicine; for when the cure is applied to the disease, the sickness disappears, it is not transferred into the medical art. This is our view. But he says that God was incarnate from the beginning, and so that visible and palpable body, which in the last days was born of a woman and gradually grew through the additions of human nourishment, D that very thing is what existed before all created things, what created both men and all other things, both visible and invisible, what also feels fatigue and receives the experience of death in the sorrow of its soul. I do not know how this "wise man," when it comes to the heavens, the earth, and all the other marvels that were established in the creation of the universe, testifies that their Creator underwent no labor, but when it comes to the Jew...
in Galilee, he says that he was in labor; and that he turned the rock into pools of water for the Israelites, but that he himself asked for a drink of water from a Samaritan woman; and that for forty years he did not grow weary while pouring out heavenly food for so many myriads of Jews, but that he himself ran to the fig tree in hope of food which was not there. Since such is the opinion held by both parties regarding the faith, let the prudent and wise listener judge for himself who is the one who is faithless under the guise of faith. B
XXVII. But he says that we claim that the one who was crucified had nothing divine in his own nature, not even that which is most important, namely, the spirit. But a defense against this calumny is readily available from the negation. For if Apollinaris thinks that the spirit is the mind, no Christian says that the man united with God is a man only halfway, but rather that the entire man was united to the divine power. Whatever names, therefore, one may wish to use to designate the parts of man—whether mind, or spirit, or heart; for these three are said by Scripture to refer to the governing part of man: “Create a clean heart in me, O God” (Ps. 1, 12); and, “The discerning man will acquire C governance” (Prov. 1, 5); and, “No one knows the things of a man, except the spirit that is in him” (1 Cor. 11, 11);—so, then, we do not say that Christ was without breath, without mind, or without heart through the overshadowing of the power of the Most High and the coming of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this reproach would not look toward us, as if we said that that man was born without having the spirit within himself, which is the mind; but it looks toward that very author of the reproach, who attacks us with the insults D with which he himself deserved to be struck. For he who calls the mind "spirit," yet says that the man according to Christ does not have a mind, is the very one who establishes that the Lord does not have a spirit. But what is the further charge he makes against us? He says that we act unjustly by claiming that the man possessed something else greater than his own nature, namely, the divinity dwelling within him. But if this is set down as a crime, we do not shun the accusation, being rejected together with the Apostle. For having learned such things from him, we believe that Christ, being in the form of God according to that which is perceived by the mind, was made in the form of a servant according to that which appeared outwardly. But if the divine form is more excellent than the servile person, certainly that which appeared outwardly was by no means of equal dignity with that which lay hidden within. Therefore, that which was visible according to the flesh, and which associated with men, had in itself something more precious than itself, which our writer feigns to be a crime against the faith. Yet the Apostle also says that in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily (Col. 2, 9); and when he says "in him," he did not signify half of the one being referred to, but included the whole subject in the meaning. If, then, it was a human body in which the divinity dwelt, and the body is not soul-less; and it is peculiar to the human soul...
A to possess an intellectual and rational part—for if this is separated from the human being, as we have often said, what remains is that of the brute beasts—then it is not us that this outstanding man has been attacking with insults, but rather the Apostle, or indeed, the great voice of John himself, who says, "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." For he did not speak of a part of us, but by the plural form, he signified everything that is understood in the human nature, first distinguishing the Word from the flesh, and then, in this way, leading them into union. For the Word was by Himself, and He was with God; and what God was, [the Word was also—for He was God]. But when He came to His own, and shone in the darkness, then the Word became flesh, having been made flesh in the Virgin by His own power. Let him, therefore, refrain from his insults against us, so that he may not involve the saints in the same reproaches.
B XXVIII. Furthermore, passing over those things which have been interposed here by Apollinaris, by which he thinks that those who do not hold the same views as he does are denying the mystery of the Incarnation, I shall mention only one of those things which, in the heat of accusation, he brings forward to stir up calumny against us. For he says that unless we approve his words, it is necessary for us to say that Christ did not exist before His earthly birth, nor before all creation, and that He is not of the same genus as God. Yet we do confess that Christ existed already before He was born on earth, if indeed it is not doubted that His flesh is of earthly nature and constitution. But as for saying that He is of the same genus as God, God forbid! No Christian would fashion words so lowly and so foreign to the divine majesty as to proclaim that He who is truly God is of the same genus as God, or kin to God, and not truly God. C Nor would Eunomius himself shrink from using this expression of yours regarding the Lord; for he, too, denying the true divinity in Christ, might say that He is kin to God in that way, just as those who embrace His faith become "concorporeal" and co-participants with Christ—not being the same thing as the Lord is, but communicating in Him, and obtaining one and the same name with Him of whom they are participants. Thus, while he turns it into a crime against us that we do not say those things which are confessed among all followers of the true faith, by that very fact he confirms that our position is pious and subject to no reproach.
Then, to prove that the flesh is divinity, he adds to what was said D above: "For who," he says, "is the holy one from the womb?" as if he had not read the Scripture according to Jeremiah, concerning whom it says, "Before I formed you in the womb, I sanctified you." For not only from the womb, but even before existence, he is testified by Scripture to be holy. But also from the womb...
He who leaped in the womb of his mother; he who received the voice of the mother of the Lord with exultation—he too may be from the womb a saint, just as the voice of the angel concerning him declares, when it says, *And he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb*. A But he also adds this to what has been said: "Who is the wise man who is not taught?" But we say that the wisdom from God, which is Christ, is not taught, but is a teacher; yet we do not doubt that that portion of our flesh which has been united to divine Wisdom has, by participation, received the good of wisdom, being persuaded by the Gospel, which thus narrates: *And Jesus increased in age, and wisdom, and grace*. B Just as in the body the gradual increase, by the cooperation of food, advances toward the perfection of nature, so also in the soul the progress toward the perfection of wisdom is added through training to those who seek it. "Who," he says, "works the things of God by his own authority? How does he diminish the ineffable greatness of the Lord with childish arguments?" For to perform the works of God by one's own authority also belongs to those men who have been deemed worthy of divine power, such as was Elijah, who by his own authority caused rain to fall and to cease for men, who called down fire upon his enemies, who multiplied the flour in the jar by a wondrous cultivation, who caused the oil to flow in the cruse, and who, by breathing, granted life to the dead, and whatever other things the story records about him. C So there is nothing beyond man in performing some of the miracles by divine power through the authority of God; but what is truly beyond man is that he himself is the surpassing power. This, indeed, is believed by us and by all who have received the Word in truth.
As for the distinction he has added to what was said, being incomprehensible, since it is not fitting for us to refute it in a hurried manner, we shall leave it for the judgment of learned men to examine. For what does he mean by, "Distinguishing the operation according to the flesh, but equalizing it according to the spirit"? This he added to the word of the Gospel which says, *My Father worketh until now, and I work*. D If anyone has the power for an apology for the foolish, let him stand by his argument and say what he means when he again adds to the things said similar things, which run thus: "He possesses," he says, "again the equality in power, and the distinction of the operation according to the flesh, by which," he says, "he did not make all alive, but some, whom he willed." For we, having grasped the simple and unadorned meaning of the divine Scripture, thus concerning the matters mentioned— XXIX. Furthermore, since the obscure and incomprehensible distinction which he adds does not befit us to refute more accurately, we shall leave it to be examined by the judgment of the learned. For what does it mean: "Distinguishing indeed the operation according to the flesh; but equalizing it according to the spirit"? Which he added to these words of the Gospel, *My Father worketh until now, and I work*. If any of the foolish are able to offer a defense for his thoughts, let him support this statement and say in what sense he again adds similar things to the words just cited, which are as follows: "Who indeed," he says, "possesses equality in power, and the distinction of the operation according to the flesh, by which," he says, "he did not vivify all, but some, whom he willed." For we, having grasped the simple and obvious meaning from the divine Scripture...
A regarding the matters mentioned, we determine that when we hear the Lord saying, "The Father raises the dead and gives them life, and the Son gives life to whom he wills," we should not understand this as though some were rejected by the life-giving will, but since we have both heard and believe that all things of the Father are also the Son's, we clearly perceive the will of the Father, as [the will] of all things, in the Son. If, therefore, the paternal will is in the Son—yet the Father, as the Apostle says, "wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"—then surely He who possesses all that is the Father's, and has the whole Father in Himself, altogether has in Himself, along with the rest of the Father's good things, also His saving will. If, therefore, He does not lack this perfect will, it is absolutely clear that those whom the Father wills to be vivified, He also vivifies Himself, not being found inferior in the philanthropic will, as Apollinaris claims when he says that He willed that some, not all, should be vivified. For it is not on account of the divine will that some are saved B and others perish—or in that case, the cause of those perishing would revert to that [will]—but it happens that some are saved or perish according to the disposition of those who receive the Word. But he adds to his arguments that "no one died or rose again by his own authority." And having said this, he brings forward the voice of the Gospel: "No one takes my soul from me; I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it again." What kind of soul, rational or irrational? I would ask those who associate an irrational soul with God. If they say it is irrational, they would call Christ a beast, and not a man; but if they say it is rational, what else do they suppose the intellect to be besides reason? For the Word is not an articulate sound, but a movement of thought, and it becomes the beginning and basis of reason. Therefore, he who speaks of a rational soul has also confessed it to be intellectual; C and the intellect is a movement and activity of the mind. How could the mind act if it were not present, if they mark the Lord's soul as void of mind? So if the Lord has a soul which He takes and lays down by His own authority—and it is not a bestial or irrational soul, but one of the human composition—it is confessed that He has indeed assumed a human and intellectual soul. Consequently, it necessarily follows that the human soul assumed by Christ existed as endowed with mind.
A Since I have already spoken of the grain which dies and so sprouts with many grains, and since these things are on our side and confirm our own argument, I shall willingly pass over them. For what is the grain that dies, and by its own ear of resurrection gathers a heap of grains within itself? I do not imagine anyone is so ignorant of divine dogmas as not to see that the mystery of the passion was fulfilled in His humanity. The proof of this argument is found in the fact that we also die with Him, are buried with Him, and rise again with Him. For it is easy for those who wish to imitate beings of the same kind; but it is impossible for those of an inferior nature to be likened to things that far transcend them. Wherefore, if it is flesh that endured death, it would certainly be easier for us who live in the flesh to imitate death through death. But if the Godhead has died, how shall we who are in the flesh die together with the Godhead? Flesh dies together with flesh, and rises again with flesh. But if the Godhead has suffered this, as Apollinaris wishes, one must seek other godheads who will die and rise again together with the Godhead; B for just as Christ died and rose, so too shall we, says the Apostle. What are we according to our own nature? Is it divine power, or blood and flesh, as the Scripture says? For this reason, He who became like us for our sake has communicated with us in flesh and blood. Therefore, what we are in essence, the One who died for us also was, and the imitation of Him is set before those who are of the same kind as He. The impiety of the view that declares the Godhead to be mortal is clearly demonstrated by what happens to us human beings ourselves. For in the common death of men, what is it that dies and undergoes corruption? Is it not the case that the flesh is resolved into the earth, while the mind remains with the soul, and is not harmed in its essence by the dissolution of the body? A proof of this is that the rich man remembers those who were still on earth, and entreats Abraham on behalf of those kin to him. No one would attribute to madness the fact that one has some concern for kin and loved ones after he has known that his own affairs are concluded. If, therefore, our mind remains even after death without any loss or change, C how is it logical that that tripartite God of Apollinaris should have undergone a carnal death? In what way did He die, or how did He suffer the dissolution of death? For it is hidden from no one at all that death is the mutual separation of soul and body; but as for the soul and the mind itself, how is it divided from itself so as to receive death? If, then, our soul is incapable of receiving death, how does it receive death—let those who fragment Christ into parts tell us! D
A XXXI. But they are troubled, he says, by the disturbance of the infidels. He uses contumely against us, calling those who accept those evangelical words without examination "troubled infidels"—words which say, "If it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will, but thine, be done." To these he adds his own words, which are as follows: "And they do not remember," he says, "that this will was designated not as that of a man from the earth, as they themselves think, but of God who came down from heaven." Who has ever produced such a fabrication? I do not say among those condemned for heresy, but I do not believe even the father of falsehood and lying himself could invent anything that would carry a more atrocious blasphemy than these things that Apollinaris has uttered. Do you think that our writer understands what he is saying? God, who descended from heaven, circumscribes the proper will of His divinity, and does not wish what it wishes to come to pass. B Therefore, the wills of the Father and the Son are divided. And how then could the will be common to both? And in what way could the identity of the nature be demonstrated through the diversity of wills? For it is absolutely necessary that the volition should be in accord with the nature, just as the Lord says somewhere: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Now the fruit of the nature is the resolve of the will, so that if the nature is good, the fruit is good; if evil, it is evil. If, therefore, the fruit of the will is different in the Father and the Son, they necessarily confess the nature of both to be different. Why, then, is Arius attacked? Why do they not desert to Eunomius, who, dividing the nature of the Father and the Son, also divides the volition along with the nature, and from this fact most especially constructs the diversity of their substance, because while he separates the inferior and subordinate one, namely the Son, from the superior and universally excellent One, that is, the Father, he at the same time tears apart the very logic of the divinity?
XXXII. But let us again repeat what was said by him. "They do not remember," he says, "that this will was designated not as that of a man from the earth, as they themselves think, but of God who came down from heaven." Of what will does our writer speak? Of that, indeed, which the Lord does not wish to come to pass, while He says to the Father, "Not my will, but thine be done." Does he understand into what a contradiction his own discourse falls? The passion draws near, and the traitor with a multitude of armed men is practically upon Him, and then this kind of prayer is made. He who thus prays, is he man or God?
A If he thinks that he who prays is God, he perceives in Him an imbecility equal to that in men. How then is He God, who has no good from Himself, but is in need of supernal assistance? Furthermore, how does the Godhead condemn its own will? Was that which He willed good or evil? For if it were good, why is that which He willed not carried through to completion? But if it were evil, what fellowship does the Godhead have with evil? But, as I said, the author does not perceive that he is perversely turning his argument in the opposite direction. For if it is the voice of the only-begotten Son of God that says: *Not my will be done, but thine*, then the statement itself is always turning back upon itself through a certain contradiction, and nowhere finds a firm standing. For he who does not wish B his own will to be done, absolutely wills this very thing—that it should not be done. How then will the prayer reach its completion, if one says: "I will this, in order that what I will may not happen"? The prayer will necessarily turn to the opposite of what is intended, and he who hears such a prayer will be at a loss on either side. For whatever he may do, the event will always be contrary to the will of him who prays. Will he perform the will of the one praying? But this man is praying that what he wills may not happen at all. Will he not perform what he wills? But he who prays wishes for that to be done to him which he does not will; so that, in whatever way and in whatever sense it is taken, its meaning will never stand, since it contradicts itself and is destroyed by itself. Yet, the true confession of the mystery can alone explain the perplexity of such a statement, namely, that to fear the passion C is of human infirmity, just as the Lord also says, calling the spirit willing but the flesh weak; yet to endure that same passion by dispensation is of divine counsel and power. Since, therefore, the human will is one thing and the divine is another, He who made our infirmities His own speaks indeed as a man of things that are congruent with infirmity; but He adds the subsequent words by which He desires a will that is sublime and worthy of God to be established, rather than the human one, for the sake of the salvation of men. For when He said, *Not mine*, He signified the human will by these words; but when He sub-
subjoined, *thine*, He showed the connection of His own divinity with the Father, of which there is no difference of will on account of the communion of nature; for by saying the will of the Father, He also indicated that of the Son. And this is that He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth; which could not happen in any other way unless death, which hindered the path to life, were swallowed up. The Lord assumes unto Himself the lowly words and affections of human fear, to show that He truly had our will in Himself, confirming that the human nature in Him was real through the communion of affections. A
XXXIII. But, says Apollinaris, it was not the work of a terrestrial man, as they themselves think, that which had been assumed into His union, but of God who came down from heaven. In these words, however, the deficiency and obscurity of the locution causes the one who attends only to the bare words not to attain the author’s meaning, except that by the confusion of speech, his sense is not entirely hidden. These are not, he says, the voices of a terrestrial man that express human passions, but of God who came down from heaven. From these things which we have said thus far, it is manifest that Apollinaris intends this one thing: namely, B to demonstrate that the divinity is passible. Presently he confuses the senses of his own mind by the absurdity of his locution; for after he said, *Of God who came down from heaven*, he immediately adds, *What had been assumed into His union*. Which words someone rendering with a clearer sense might say: It was not a man who was speaking, but God who was speaking through a man, who had assumed into His own union that which appeared. Whence therefore was that man assumed? From the earth? He denies it. But if he existed in the heavens, he is not from men. It remains, therefore, that he must say he arrived from no place; with which assertion it is simultaneously C implied that what appeared existed only in opinion, and not in truth: for that which is from no place does not exist at all. Yet from the words he subjoins, he says that that man descended from heaven. And indeed Mary existed on earth, and the cave existed on earth, and the manger was terrestrial. How then does this man bring a man down from heaven to earth? For when all Scripture confesses the Virgin, the birth, the flesh, the swaddling clothes, the breasts, the manger, and every human apparatus; this man, having rejected all these, fashions for us another man devoid of any origin and D joined by no affinity to our nature.
XXXIV. Furthermore, those insults which he inserts into his discourses, thinking he will fortify the absurdity of his dogma...
by which he might more vehemently assail us with his blasphemies—I consider should be ignored by anyone who is of sound mind, and that the judgment should be left to the readers as to whom in truth the adulterators of the apostolic faith are: whether it is we, who according to the words of St. Paul A *know Christ according to the flesh, but now know him so no longer*, or whether it is he, who always, both before and after the economy of the human incarnation, carries about in his discourse a God of his own making, endowed with flesh. He adds, moreover, to what he has just said, the blasphemy uttered by the Jews against Christ, by which they called him a glutton and a wine-drinker, and he says that these things necessarily must be said of the man. Who, then, is this man who is reproached by the Jews for his eating and drinking? Is he one who partook of these things, or one who did not? But if he did not partake, it was a mere appearance; if, however, he did partake, then that which was partaken of was earthly; but what is heavenly is not nourished by earthly things. O the contradiction of absurdities! How he falls into opposite errors regarding one and the same subject! At one moment he asserts that he who appeared endowed with a body was superior to human nature, B and the next moment he shows the same to be inferior to men, mutilated in his better part. For among the things that are in us, the mind is preeminent in dignity, of which he says the flesh—in which God was manifested—is destitute; and he clearly constructs this through his subsequent arguments, which, lest anyone should think it unnecessary to carefully examine such foolish and inept things, we shall briefly run through. For again, having filled his writing with a multitude of insults, he puts forward against us an argument of this sort, saying that those who claim that the union of the flesh and the assumption of the man are one and the same thing are acting unjustly. But I, even if I may seem to speak somewhat crudely, will not hide the truth: that neither of the terms just mentioned is exactly and accurately defined by our common usage. For what the difference is between "union of the flesh" C and "assumption of the man" is not so easy to explain in words, since union is considered in many ways and in various matters: namely, in number, in species, in nature, in customs, in doctrines, and in the properties of wickedness or virtue, and in mutual affections. We therefore have need of the explanation of interpreters, so that we may understand what this "union of the flesh" is—whether it is joined with itself or with another. Also, how the "assumption of the man" takes place, from what, and whence, and how, and by whom, and in what manner he was assumed—this is likewise unknown to us, just as the preceding points are. For until one brings forth the discourse regarding the mystery seasoned with the divine salt of Scripture, we shall leave the salt of secular wisdom, which has lost its savor, to be trodden underfoot by the faithful. Which of the evangelists narrated a "union of the flesh"? Or which of the apostolic accounts D of the assumption of the man...
instructed us in these terms that he himself uses? What law, what prophets, what divinely inspired Scripture, what synodical sanction entrusted such a thing to us to be kept? Moreover, from these two expressions, namely the "union of the flesh" and the "assumption of the man," he attributes one to us and declares the other to be his own; but which of these he claims for himself, we are still in doubt. For we either use neither of these expressions, or we use both, because in no respect is one found to differ from the other. For a union is formed with something, and an assumption is necessarily nothing else than the assumption of some thing; and both denote a relation to another; for he who assumes is united with that which is assumed, and that which is united is surely coupled through the assumption.
B XXXV. But he asserts that we say there are two persons, God and the man assumed by God; while he claims that he himself does not think so at all, but rather says that Christ was incarnate, and is not different from the incorporeal one, but is the same one, after the likeness of our life which we live in the flesh. Further, he discourses to us his trifles through things that cannot stand. His fleshy God cannot be simple in nature; for no one could see simplicity in flesh; and what is not simple cannot be devoid of composition. But this man says that he is one, in the very same way that each one of us is one, who, he says, consist of spirit, soul, and body. Now for the first time we learn a new kind of number, having been taught that things divided into three different kinds are a monad. But let the discourse concerning the spirit which Apollinaris constructs be deferred to another time. As for us, instructed by the crasser division of man which most people use, we confess that man is constituted of an intelligent soul and a body. C How therefore shall we say that two are one, when the Apostle clearly observes two men in each of us, while he says, "Though our outer man is perishing," meaning the body, "yet the inner one is being renewed day by day," hinting at the soul by these words. And yet, if there were three men according to Apollinaris, the Apostle would have surely posited two invisible ones and one visible; so that even if he were to use the example of human nature according to our division to strengthen his own argument, by calling the two one, he would nevertheless be refuted by Paul, who divides man into two parts. Since, therefore, he establishes the account of his own dogma through the human example, once this is overturned, that which he believes concerning Christ is also utterly refuted. But what he says is of this sort, that, "As man D is one, composed of spirit and soul and body." I for my part, I wanted at first to establish of what kind of body, and from where it was taken, and when it was fashioned, and of what kind of soul—whether rational, or irrational, that is, whether he thinks that man is of a beastly nature...
and then to inject into this the intellectual faculty, which he says is something other than the spirit, calling it "mind" in us, but "God" in him? For if a creation of a heavenly man, fashioned after the likeness of the earthly one, had been shown by him beforehand, we would have been led on by the consistency of the myth, having learned B from this new wisdom that the earthly race of men consists of a rational soul and a body, but that there is a genus of heavenly men, to whom belongs an irrational soul and a human body, and God—instead of a mind—is mingled into the structure of the body and the soul; from which Apollinaris thinks the one who appeared on earth is derived. But since that is neither demonstrated nor exists, and the one born through the Virgin is discarded by him as though he did not even share our nature, I consider it alien and inconsistent to call that a "body" which is not a body, and that a "human soul" which is not a soul. For if one were not to admit that it is rational, he would not even concede that it is a human soul at all. But if these things do not exist, what occasion is there for that tripartite division C of man, of which two parts are man, and the third part is God? "For," he says, "he would not have come to be in the likeness of man, unless he were, just like a man, a mind clothed in flesh." Now, as to whether that man, in whom God reconciled the world to Himself, was mindless, I cannot say; but that the one who writes these things was out of his mind at the time he wrote them, even if I should not say it, the written words cry out. How does one become "in the likeness of man" who is something other than man and is entirely foreign to our nature? D For if the human composite is a rational soul and a body—and neither this body nor that soul is present in the one refashioned by him—how does that which is alien to our nature receive the likeness of man? But he says he is not a man, but only "like a man," being mindless and clothed in flesh. These are the things that convince me that the writer is not of sound mind. How is that which does not partake of a nature assimilated to that nature? And what is that "mind clothed in flesh" which is connate with the flesh and inseparable, being always such? Is it also derived from another thing entirely like itself? For indeed, flesh cannot be brought forth unless it is from flesh, just as the Lord says somewhere, that "that which is born of the flesh is flesh." But it comes to be later. What flesh, then, has he put on to become "clothed in flesh"? Is it existing flesh? But it is from the same. Is it non-existing flesh? Then he is not called "clothed in flesh," for he would not be named by that which does not exist.
B XXXVI. But let us see the unavoidable force of his arguments, by which he compels us to concede that the Only-Begotten God is a mind clothed in flesh. If, he says, the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh, he must be wisdom. O invincible proposition! He considers that the Lord must absolutely be one of two things, either a mind clothed in flesh or wisdom. Therefore, he says, it is necessary that he be that; unless it is the case that, since a mind is not clothed in flesh, it is undoubtedly wisdom—whatever is not a mind of this kind. What then of a stone? What of a beetle? What finally of all the other things that fall under our eyes? For indeed, he will concede that of these two, one or the other must be true: either they are a mind clothed in flesh or they are wisdom. But clearly, they are neither mind nor wisdom. Therefore, the writer’s proposition has collapsed, and his whole scheme has melted away, the entire argument falling down along with the subversion of its principle. For it has not been shown that these two differ from each other in such a way that if one of them exists, the other cannot exist, or conversely, if one does not exist, the other must necessarily exist. But nothing prevents both from being in the same thing, or neither.
But let us also see how infirm this proposition is from the other one that answers to it from the contrary side. For if this is asserted as true, that if he is not a mind clothed in flesh, he will be wisdom; then that which is said the other way around will also be true, namely, that if he is wisdom, he is not a mind clothed in flesh. But indeed, whoever has embraced the faith readily concedes that Christ is wisdom; therefore, according to the assertion of this "wise man," we shall confess that this same Christ is not a mind clothed in flesh. Thus, by both sets of reasons—those which he brought forward in the first and second place, and the others which he adds to confirm his opinion in the present case—the writer himself demonstrates that the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh. Such is the proposition, and such is the assumption. What, then, does the conclusion of both include? That Christ’s approach to us was not the advent of God, but the birth of a man. Let those who are accustomed to proudly despise the views of others laugh at these words; but we, judging it more fitting to weep over their deceit and foolishness, refrain from a more lengthy refutation of them, lest we seem to be scoffers ourselves. For who would not reasonably laugh at the incoherent weaving of a syllogism? C But I will set forth the statement itself, as it follows in sequence: "If the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh, he would be wisdom, illuminating the mind of man; and this is in all men. But if these things are so, Christ’s coming was not the advent of God, but the birth of a man." Now, that the Lord is wisdom
surpassing every mind, no one of the pious would deny, being guided to these things by the voices of the holy Fathers and Apostles. For indeed, that Wisdom was made for us by God, Paul explicitly cries out; and, that "the saving grace has appeared to us, instructing us that, denying ungodliness, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, looking for the blessed hope" (Tit. II, 11). And we have heard the Apostle discoursing on these things; but that the Only-begotten God—He who is over all, and through all, and in all—is an "ensouled mind," we have neither heard from any of the saints, nor do we admit this strange new coinage into the divine utterances, B and this especially when we look to the goal of this novel word-monger, who wishes, through this cold fabrication of his sophistry, to oust from the Lord the confession of Wisdom, through which we have believed every mind to be enlightened; and to introduce in its place this irrational new coinage, so that the Only-begotten may be called "an ensouled mind" and not "Wisdom." For if, he says, the Lord is believed to be Wisdom—that is, the Wisdom which is evidently in all who receive grace—we shall no longer confess the presence of Christ to be the advent of God, as if it were something foreign to the Wisdom of God. Who would not pity this man for this madness of his? If, he says, we believe Him to be Wisdom, Christ’s coming to us, "Who was made for us wisdom from God" (1 Cor. I, 30), will not be the advent of God, but the birth of a man. If it is Wisdom? Have you not heard the prophet C crying out, that "a virgin shall conceive in the womb, and shall bear a son" (Isa. VII, 14)? And, that "a Child has been born to us" (Isa. IX, 6)? And that "the Son has the rule upon his shoulder," as strong and mighty, and is Father not only of the past, but also of the future age? But let us leave this dream-like nonsense, whereby he determined that He must be called "an ensouled mind," neither Wisdom that illuminates, nor the passage of our life through birth. Another argument: "If," he says, "the Word did not become an ensouled mind, but Wisdom." In which, what cause is there again that this "wise man" distinguishes the Mind from Wisdom, just as is accustomed to be done in the case of opposites? Those who accurately divide existing things say that those things which are distinguished by way of opposition are of such a nature that the one yields to the presence of the other, just as D life to death, and in turn death to life, and vice-versa, wickedness to virtue, and that to this, and whatever else is spoken of in the same way. How, then, does he, in an equal manner
to that of opposites, distinguish the mind from wisdom, as if it were impossible for those two things to exist simultaneously in one and the same thing and concerning one and the same thing? For he says, A If the mind were not endowed with flesh, it would be wisdom, just as if someone were to say that where health is not, disease must be. What, then, is this argument? If, he says, wisdom were in the mind, the Lord would not have descended, nor would he have emptied himself. O what an unavoidable force of argument! How does he attempt to prove that the Lord did not descend from the fact that it is shown he was wisdom? Therefore, if from the fact that the Lord is wisdom, his descent is rejected, it necessarily follows that he who confesses the descent of the Lord to us must also affirm that this same Lord is not wisdom. But Apollinaris confesses that the Lord descended. Therefore, let him also confess that he who descended is not wisdom. Such are the fine arguments of this outstanding man against the truth. Then, through an incoherent consequence, he adds to this proposition another deduction sought from non-granted premises, which goes like this: Therefore he was also man; for man, according to Paul, is a mind placed in flesh. I beseech my readers not to think that we have invented such things for the sake of a joke to provoke laughter, as if from the persona of Apollinaris; for it is possible to learn from his own writings that the sentiment just mentioned was set forth by him word for word. According to which Paul, then, is a mind endowed with flesh called a man? Let him say if he has some other hidden Paul! For the servant of Jesus Christ, the called Apostle, in all the Epistles written by him, affirmed no such thing. If, therefore, neither the series of the discourse nor any testimony supports his assertions, whence can this absurd fabrication of a dogma have credence? But again, having reviewed the arguments, he adds another thought: Since, he says, this earthly man was a man, and indeed heavenly. I say again that this man has forgotten about Mary, to whom Gabriel brings the news, upon whom it is believed the Holy Spirit came, whom the power of the Most High overshadows, who brings forth Jesus, who has the government upon his shoulders, that is to say, who bears the government in himself. The Beginning B of all things is God the Word, who was also in the beginning and was the beginning, just as the word of Scripture says somewhere, namely, *I am the beginning. Either, therefore, let him show that the Virgin did not exist on earth, or let him cease to invent a heavenly man; nor let him frighten the more ignorant, as if they were sinning against the divine by admitting the human, lest they fail to acknowledge the divine. For the birth from a woman indeed involves the human, but the virginity which served the birth revealed what is above man. So that what was born was man, but the power towards the birth was not from men, but through the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High. Therefore, according to the true word, * Apoc. 1, 8.
both man and God exist: man in that which is seen, God in that which is conceived by the mind. But he does not say this in his conclusion, defining divinity by that which is seen, not by that which is contemplated by the mind.
B XXXVIII. But let our discourse proceed to the argument which follows. If with God, he says, who is mind, a human mind also existed in Christ. This is the first proposition. But we in turn oppose this assertion: Who among the saints ever decreed that the mind is divinity? What Scriptures taught us that God and mind are one and the same, so that we might concede what is said, that the man who was Christ was devoid of a mind, but God became mind for him who was destitute of a mind? It would, indeed, be appropriate to describe this contumelious argument in its entirety; but I fear lest we be seen as mockers by our readers, as if we were exposing the deformity of our writer to the laughter of all. Nevertheless, lest that proposition remain imperfect, I think it best to bring forward only the conclusion, omitting the trifles which the author has interjected. If with God, he says, acting in the place of a mind, a human mind also existed in Christ, then the work of the incarnation is not accomplished in him. But if the work of the incarnation is not accomplished in the mind which is moved by its own impulse and is compelled by no one, certainly the same work of incarnation—which is the abolition of sin—is accomplished in the flesh, which is moved by another and is acted upon by the divine mind; and our mind, which is moved by its own impulse, becomes a participant in this abolition, in so far as it is joined to Christ. Do you see how akin the conclusions are to the first proposition? Perhaps there will be need of some enchanter or some *gazarus* to explain to us the enigmas of such dreams, and to set forth to us what the novelty of these words signifies: A mind which is moved by itself; a mind which is driven by external impulse; flesh which accomplishes the work of abolition. But let these things be left to the petulance of the young to be derided; we, however, shall proceed to discuss the things which follow in his treatise. If, he says, one acquires something more than another, this happens through exercise; but there is no exercise in Christ; therefore, a human mind does not exist in Christ. D Is this how he remembers the divinely inspired Scriptures? What kind of exercise taught Bezaleel the arts? Whence did Solomon obtain the knowledge of so many and such great things? And Amos, who was piercing sycamore figs, how did he obtain such power in prophecy from being a herdsman? And yet, none of those mentioned descended from heaven, nor were they in the beginning, nor were they equal to God.
A XXXIX. But let us also leave this argument in silence, most of all because it is akin to the conclusion that precedes it, the words of which are as follows: “Therefore the human race is not saved by the taking up of the mind and the whole man, but by the receiving of flesh.” This is indeed the conclusion of the argument; but as for the difference between “taking up” (assumption) and “receiving” (susception), let those who apply themselves to grammatical trivialities explain it, so that they may discourse to children according to the art of those parts of speech which are called prepositions, concerning the discrepancy they locate in such a small matter; for we, for our part, do not doubt that what is received is taken up, and what is taken up is likewise received, since Scripture teaches us such a use of these terms. “With glory you have received me,” says David; and again in another place, “He chose David His servant, and took him from the flocks of his father.” Therefore, he who was received with glory was also taken up, and he who was taken up from the flocks was also received. For it says both things about the same person, so that what the speaker means—who claims that the mystery of the incarnation was administered by the Only-Begotten not by assumption but by susception—is something he himself perhaps could not explain. But I, refusing to immerse my discourse in the mire of his absurd words, willingly omit the greater part of his trifles, thinking that from the very reading of the book the ineptitude of his statements is sufficiently and more than sufficiently refuted, so that anyone who wishes to inveigh sharply against this heresy can prove its fatuity not so much by arguments devised by himself as by the very words of the adversary; for by the same reasons by which he attempts to build up his lie, he makes the impiety of his own dogma manifest by his weak and feeble defense. C For if, he says, a perfect God is joined to a perfect man, they would be two, not one. But, according to him, the imperfect joined to the perfect is not regarded as a duality. Has this eminent man never seen children counting the fingers on their hands, who count the small one along with the large one, naming one the lesser and the other the greater? Yet he says they are two if he counts both together. For every number is an aggregation of units, denoting in sum what is collected from them. And if that which can be numbered, whatever it may be, when joined to another that is numbered with it, exceeds in quantity that which is less, nevertheless it will be the count of the lesser, even if the magnitude is lacking. When, therefore, we distinguish two that are equal in number, we call them two perfect things; but when we count the remainder alongside the perfect, we call them two, and indeed a smaller amount.
B But this person, so excellent in the science of arithmetic, says that if each is perfect according to its own nature, they are called two things; but if one should be lacking and the other perfect, so that they both become one 44, I do not know how, by merging the imperfect with the superabundant and conceiving of a union through opposites for things that are incompatible 45. For the perfect is more fittingly joined with the perfect, and the imperfect with the imperfect, by reason of their similarity. But as for the union of the opposite with the opposite—I mean the imperfect with the perfect—let the lawgiver of this new arithmetic explain the method of it.
B XL. But he thinks it does not befit the human mind to acknowledge it in the only-begotten God, and he gives as a reason that the human mind is mutable. Well then, by the same argument, let him not grant to God the flesh either; for that it is mutable, not even this writer would deny, since it, like a garment, puts on different ages from youth unto the perfect growth of a man. Or how was He not mutable, who was first carried in His mother's arms, then became an infant, then a young boy 48, and thus little by little advanced to the perfect, so as to come to the measure of human age? If, therefore, the mind is rejected because of its mutability, for the same reason the flesh also must not be admitted by him in Christ; and in this way the whole Gospel would be shown 51 to be false according to him, his preaching empty, and his faith vain. If, however, it is not disbelieved that He was manifested in the flesh, and that this was mutable, then for the same reason 52 the mind is not to be considered inadmissible 53; but just as by becoming flesh He was not defiled, so too by receiving the mind, He was not changed into mutability. C Again I will take up the same subject, having set forth his expression verbatim. The human race, he says, is not saved through the assumption of the mind, and of the whole man, but through the assumption of flesh, to which it is natural to be governed; and the flesh had need of an immutable mind, which would not follow it in its deficiency of knowledge, but would bring it into conformity with itself without any compulsion. Who does not know that that which is in need of the help of another is altogether different in nature from that which has need of nothing; and that he whose nature is so constituted that he is governed by another is altogether different from that which is born to govern? In the same way, in respect to essence, it is distinguished just as the nature of irrational creatures is so constructed as to be subject to that of humans, D and man does not possess the authority over irrational creatures as an acquired trait, but as his own 56. If, therefore, it is natural for the flesh to be changed
to be ruled, as Apollinaris says, but the Divine is naturally sovereign, how can he who grants these things determine that both are one in nature from the beginning, when it is manifest to all that the reason for the subject [being ruled] A is one, and that of the sovereign is another, and that the nature which is naturally led is one thing, and that which is by nature sovereign is another? If, therefore, the nature of one of these, I mean of the flesh and of the Divinity, is observed to have contrary properties, how are two natures one? And how does he fashion a certain divine and heavenly flesh for the Word? Or rather, he claims that the Word himself, before He was truly incarnate, was made flesh, as if He did not, in the last days through the dispensation, put on our form, but has always been this and always remained in the same state. For he who says that the flesh has need of immutability and also of a guide, B is speaking directly of our flesh, which slips into sin because of the mutability of its nature. But if a heavenly and divine body, as he says, is observed to be around the Word, it does not at all consistently ascribe to it mutability or the need for a director, nor the need for one who corrects. And yet this is not our word, but the word of the Divine mouth that said, "They that are whole need not a physician; but they that are sick" (Matt. IX, 12). For in heaven, the disease that comes from sin is not found; rather, we are those who have been sick with the disease of of sins; we are those who have become weak through the reception of evil. It is we who, because we have turned toward evil, have stood in need of the Immutable; we who have wandered away from the path of salvation have come to have need of a guide toward the good. So that if this writer truly attributes these things to the Lord's flesh in his testimony—that C it is naturally prone to be ruled, and has need of an immutable guide—he interprets nothing other than our own composition. But if he defines the Divinity within the flesh, yet the Divine, as long as it is what it is said to be, has no need of another to lead and rule it, since it does not admit of conversion and mutation for the worse; then this writer has stitched together in vain what was just said about the flesh; for if this was some divine flesh, it is clearly also immutable; but if it is mutable, it is absolutely not divine.
A XLI. Who, then, could ever recount this confused and inconsistent fable of doctrines, which wavers on every side and, like images seen in dreams, appears now in one way and now in another? For at one moment he asserts that the flesh of the Word is divine and coeternal with Him; at another, that it is acquired and assumed from elsewhere; then, that it is alien to our nature, which is subject to passions, fleeting, and fragile. At another moment, he says it stands in need of a guide, and is subject to the affliction of change and alteration, and for this reason he renders it devoid of mind, so that it might be healed by the divinity, considering the mind to be, as it were, an obstacle to the divine providence toward humanity, and that which is mindless is more pleasing to God. Therefore, he thinks it is more blessed not to have a mind, if, as he says, that which is mindless is assumed by God. B Why, then, does he not correct Solomon, who says: "But the understanding [man] shall possess governance"? For I do not think that any other governance is meant here by the proverbial riddle than our own nature, which, having been tossed about in the storm of sin and suffered shipwreck, is guided by the oversight of the true Pilot toward the harbor of the divine will. If, therefore, man is saved in senselessness, how shall the understanding one possess governance? To what, in nature, would the divine be more akin? To what does reason suggest that the divine nature is more suitable? The flesh is something thick and resistant, and has a kinship with the earthen nature; but the intellect is something intellectual, invisible, and unshaped. C What, then, of these could be found more suitable to be joined to God: that which is thick and earthen, or that which is intangible and unshaped? And how is it that the flesh is joined to God, as he says, without impediment, by partaking of pure virtue? For who does not know that virtue is a success of the faculty of choice? But the flesh is an instrument of the faculty of choice, lying at the disposal of the impulse of the intellect, and is moved toward whatever the mover directs it. And the faculty of choice is nothing other than a certain intellect and a disposition toward something. If, therefore, he says that a man in whom there is no intellect partakes of pure virtue, what could be the thing that voluntarily receives virtue? Unless, perhaps, the writer understands that which is forced to be un-forced. D For when, without the intellect applying itself to the preferred inclination, the body happens to be outside of actions related to vice, that which is accomplished will be an act of necessity, not of the faculty of choice; but he who chooses the good through the judgment of his reason is superior to all necessity and force, having the inclination toward the better from within himself. How, then, does the writer testify that the one without a faculty of choice is unforced, since no personal reason has led it toward the good? For that which is not...
without a faculty of choice is neither blameless, nor is it praiseworthy; or in this way we should also praise those who are hindered from wickedness by bonds—those whom the bond keeps away from the operation of evils, not their own resolve. But, he says, the divinity brings the flesh to itself A *unforced*. By "unforced," he clearly means "voluntarily." How, then, could anyone be brought to virtue voluntarily, if he does not possess a personal will? For to choose, and to will, and the selection of what is beneficial, and the turning away from what is harmful, these are all things of the mind; but to think is not among those things that are senseless. If, then, the flesh is joined to God *unforced*, it is testified by these people through the writer that the flesh is not *without a faculty of choice*—nor did it take in what is advantageous rashly and without consideration—and one could not call such a thing a lack of reason. For how could reason exist in the irrational? So that it is not only in the human that the mind exists, through which he says it is composed, but that it is also above others. For the voluntary and unforced impulse toward the good becomes a testimony of the mind’s perfection; and that it is of the mind to make an appropriation toward the better is shown most clearly by what is said next, as the wording has it: "For as He imparts pure virtue to every mind subject to Him." B If, therefore, he observes the purity of virtue in the mind, how does he alienate the mind from that flesh in which he recognizes this purity? For it is necessary that one of two things be false: either that the mind is able to be a participant of virtue, or that the flesh which freely acquires virtue for itself lacks a mind.
XLII.
Furthermore, what he adds C as regards it being *unobstructed* and inconsistent, I think it superfluous to examine, being in this manner: "And to all," he says, "who are intellectually made similar to Christ, and are not carnally made dissimilar." What this nausea of words means, let the admirers of this deceit explain; as for us, we proceed to examine what follows next. "And if," says he, "God were joined to a human—a perfect one with a perfect one—there would be two, one by nature being Son of God, and the other by adoption." I would gladly learn from those who are learned in such things: if they call the man endowed with mind and perfect an "adopted son," what will they call the "senseless man"—for thus, in any case, they term the one who does not have a mind? D For the only-begotten God, being in Himself lacking nothing and perfect, possesses the appellation of true Son, the nature itself demonstrating that it is the true name; but what name does the addition of the "incomplete man" have? For if the perfect man is called an adopted son according to Apollinarius,then the incomplete man, insofar as he is man, will certainly be called a semi-adopted son, since he obtains the title of adopted only in part; so that, if we wish to speak more aptly, the former is indeed a perfect adopted man, but this latter is a semi-adopted one, inasmuch as he is deficient by a third part according to the opinion of those who divide man into minute parts with such cuts. But if it is unbefitting for God to have an adopted son, for the exact same reason the same thing would be said of the perfect as of the imperfect. Indeed, A it is discovered to be even more absurd in the mutilated one; for if the whole and perfect nature of man is deemed alien from the opinion we ought to hold concerning God when viewed in relation to the Divine, it would be far more shameful to see a maimed and ruined nature in Him. For it is not because there is no mind that the flesh has an affinity with the nature of the Father; rather, both the whole man and his parts are separated from the substance of the Father according to the definition of nature, and neither of the things that are within us—neither the mind nor the body—is made akin to the superior nature by the definition of substance. Even if this myth should fashion some heavenly kind of flesh around the divine, a sound judge will not for that reason agree that that flesh is consubstantial with God and the Father. But if the flesh is alien to the Father’s substance, how could that which is alien be a Son? For it is B absolutely necessary that that which truly is from something must be in its substance what that which begat it is; but the Father is not flesh. Therefore, that which is from Him cannot be flesh at all; for that which is born of the Spirit is said to be spirit, and not flesh. If, then, the flesh is not from the Father, it is not a Son. What then shall it be called? For whatever name they devise for that heavenly flesh, which has been fabulously invented by those word-mongers, that same name we will congruently apply to the flesh assumed from among men, and by whatever name they call ours, by that same name that other will also be called. The earthly thing is not a Son, and neither is that other, by all means. The earthly thing is an adopted son, and so therefore is that other. There is a duality of sons here; as there is certainly there. In the heavenly one, there is one Son, flesh and divinity; this is so in that case, and here as well. For since all creation is equally distant from the divine substance, being outside the nature of the Father, it is equally admitted that it is C both earthly and heavenly. It remains to think more reasonably concerning God regarding whatever happens to be in accordance with the intent of His love for mankind. It is proper to find no name for Him, but to name Him by that which abounds and prevails. As happens in the case of the sea; for if someone casts a drop of vinegar into the sea, the drop is also called sea, D
A having been transmuted into the quality of the sea; thus, the true Son and only-begotten God, the unapproachable light, and the self-existent wisdom and sanctification and power, and every high name and thought, these are what He who was manifested to men through the flesh truly is. But as for the flesh, being flesh by its own nature, yet having been transmuted into the ocean of incorruptibility, just as the Apostle says, that "mortality was swallowed up by life," so too, all things that appeared in the flesh at that time were changed into the divine and incorruptible nature; no weight, no form, no color, no resistance, no softness, no circumscription of corporeal quantity, nor any other of the things that were then seen in Him remained, the humility of the fleshly nature having, by the commixture which occurred with the Divinity, assumed the communion of divine properties. B Therefore, there is no danger for us that the mystery of the Trinity should be extended to a quaternity, as Apollinaris says, nor do we reduce the angels to servitude to a man, as his fable against us asserts. For those who bow themselves before the Lord do not serve a man, nor are they ashamed to worship Him who, having assumed flesh, dwelled in this world. For when He brings the firstborn into the world, He says, "And let all His angels worship Him." There is, however, but one entrance into the world—that which is through birth—and it is not possible to be within the life of men without having used this entrance. Therefore, the Word calls His birth through the flesh an "entrance into the world." If, then, when He entered into the world, all the angels worship Him, and the entrance is the birth through the flesh, it is not that we are subjecting that which is already the Lord's to the Lord; rather, the very nature of the angels does not ignore its own subjection to the Lord. Therefore, let him who C rashly and emptily asserts that we turn things above into things below be silent, while we bind the God-bearing angels to the God-bearing man.
XLIII
To these things the writer also adds: "If he who receives God is true God, many would surely be gods, since many receive God." What then do we say to this? That God was indeed in Christ, reconciling the world DA to Himself, the great Paul is a sufficient and wealthy witness. But if the script-writer thinks that a multitude of gods is being introduced by us into the proclamation because we confess that in Christ God was reconciling the world to Himself, B as if God were coming to be among many men, we offer this defense: If there were many mothers who were virgins, and if the secret message of Gabriel was to many, and if to each one the descent of the Holy Spirit and the presence of the power of the Most High occurred; and if the prophets preach the grace in regard to many, so as to speak in the plural, "Children were born to us" (and "sons were given to us"), and "Virgins shall conceive in the womb," and for all those born the name is Emmanuel; if all walk on foot upon the waves, and by an ineffable power feed so many C thousands in the desert, increasing with the basket the bread that is cultivated in the hands of the disciples; if all raise to life those who have been dead four days from the earth; if all become lambs of God and are sacrificed as our Passover, and nail sin to the cross, and destroy the power of death, and ascend into heaven before the eyes of the disciples, and sit at the right hand of the Father; if all are to come to judge the inhabited world in justice, and at the name of all, the tongues of those in heaven, D and on earth, and under the earth confess Him—then we would grant that there are many gods, if those many were recognized by these marks. But if Jesus is one Lord, through whom are all things, and from whom, and through whom, and in whom are all things, and if this enumeration of divine attributes pertains only to Him, what danger is there that many gods will be dreamed up when we say that God was manifested through an ensouled flesh? For who is so ignorant of the evangelical teachings as not to know what was said by the Savior Himself to the Jews: "But now you seek to kill me, a man, who has spoken to you the truth"? Do you see in what is said what it is that is being killed, as He clearly indicated by saying, "You seek to kill me," not the truth, but the man through whom the truth was speaking? For it was not a man who was speaking the truth; but clearly, He who spoke was God, while the man was mediating to men the message being spoken in his own voice. Wherefore he also became a mediator of God and men, since the human nature was not able to approach the pure communion of God, and for this reason needed a voice kindred to it and natural, by which it is likely that the power from above could be received. This also must be left behind, and the discourse must be turned to what follows. Nothing, he says,
is as equally conjoined to God as that flesh which He assumed. O, the discerning judgment of the man! Nothing is so tightly conjoined to God as the flesh; not goodness, not eternity, not incorruption, not omnipotence, nor any other of those notions which most befit God, but all these things are secondary to the flesh, when compared with God and with the union of God to this, and to the flesh that was acquired. The writer A himself confesses this very thing: for by saying that it was assumed, he declared its adventitious nature.
XLIV. But, leaving these aside, we also wrap those things which follow in silence, inasmuch as they can in no way harm the readers, and contain within themselves the refutation of the fiction of a fable that is nowhere consistent with itself. For when he had first posited that no other of those things which are affirmed of God is as equally conjoined to the Lord as that flesh which He assumed, he straightway adds in conclusion that those things which are not conjoined in such a manner are not to be adored in the same manner, and he even adds this further climax: "But nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh of Christ." Since these things appear absurd even to children themselves, we shall deliberately be silent about them; for the very children who sit in the market and play would reason thus: "If nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh, then the flesh of Christ is more to be venerated than the majesty of the Father Himself, and His omnipotence, and His supreme rule over all things, and whatever else our nature is able to utter concerning the divine power; so that, omitting the adoration of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we ought to venerate and adore only the flesh preferred by this man to all else, and ascribe omnipotence to it."
The argument that follows is similar to the preceding ones: "The flesh of the Lord," he says, "is adored, inasmuch as it is one person and one animal with Him." Making mention of two things, namely, the Lord and the flesh of the Lord, he makes one animal out of these two B. Now it is clear what he signifies in the title of the treatise, while he promises to teach us concerning the divine incarnation, made after the likeness of men; for since human life consists of the convergence of soul and body, out of the coupling and mixing of these heterogeneous things, and since one could not define our constitution otherwise than by the union of body and soul, the writer, having imagined this same thing also C concerning the divine nature, D
A promises immediately, even in the very title of this treatise, that he will demonstrate that the conjunction of divinity with flesh is to be viewed according to the likeness of man. And now, in this part of the same treatise, he manifestly strives to establish that the flesh and the Lord are one person and one animal, as if he were to say that in Paul, because of the conjunction of body and soul, that which is hidden is the same as that which is seen by the eyes of all. Why, then, is it fitting to refute with accurate disquisition those things which we have just mentioned? And who would not deservedly accuse us of foolishness for spending our time refuting these wrongly devised arguments? Therefore, let us ponder what follows. If, he says, no created thing is to be adored equally with the Lord as his flesh. Who will preside over the contest and award the prizes to Apollinaris and Eunomius as they compete with each other for the primacy of impiety? Which of them will be deemed worthy of the rewards for their labors against the truth? Perhaps, because of the equal ardor of those struggling to assert impiety, the victory will be uncertain and inclined to neither side. For the one, while asserting that the Only-Begotten God is a creature, does not deny that he is endowed with mind and is alien to corporeal nature; but the other, imagining that he was from the beginning composed of things of a different nature, establishes B that the same being is one animal, fashioned from flesh and divinity, after the likeness of human nature. For the adoration of the creature is equal in both cases; but the former says that the intellectual and incorporeal nature was created; while the latter adds also that the nature around the creature is fleshly, and that this is to be adored more than other creatures, as if adoration were extended to other creatures as well, which even those who respect the dogmas of Eunomius admit to be impious. Therefore, let him carry off the victory prizes against Eunomius, and let him exult, adorned with the crowns of impiety; for by as much as the body is inferior to the soul in human nature, by so much is he who ordains that the flesh be adored far more inept in his impiety than those who adore the intellectual creature among those who adore created things, especially if he himself says that not one, but many creatures are to be adored, compared to which the flesh deserves to obtain greater adoration. For no created thing, he says, is to be adored C equally with the flesh of the Lord. For all things that are numbered among created things, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, are equally beneath the divine power; yet, nevertheless, created things, if compared among themselves, have some more or less dignity than others, since the incorporeal nature is D possessed of it...
whereas the one that prefers the flesh to the intellectual nature surpasses the other in impiety. Let the disciples of this error hear with whom, and concerning what matters, the contention with their teacher is.
A XLV. Let us now examine those shackles—to speak in the manner of Apollinaris’ master—rendered fast by the indissoluble chains of syllogisms, with which he strives to bind his readers. If anyone, he says, thinks that man is more joined to God than other men and angels. It would be worth the effort to examine the meaning of these words as well, but to extract any sense—if not a good and refined one, then at least one somewhat conducive to the confirmation of his impious dogma—from the stated words would be just like looking for a soul in stones, or intelligence in wood. Further, from the things he adds in the same tenor and with the same intent, it can be confirmed how incomprehensible his words are. Angels, he says, and humans will be despoiled of their freedom of choice, just as the flesh is deprived of freedom. But the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is the loss of being in control of oneself and one’s own power; yet nature is not corrupted by its Creator: therefore, man is not at all joined to God. O the power of such arguments! How indissoluble are these snares of syllogisms! He takes away from man and the angels that free choice which exists in the union with divinity, and the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination; and if these things be accepted, it is proven that man is not joined to God. What such things do those ventriloquists utter? What similar things do those who speak from the earth and have been trained in internal divinations babble forth in comparison to these? The self-determination of men and angels is taken away, if the human B is united to God. Was He not a man, He who said, "But now you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth?" Was not He, who demonstrated all divine power within Himself, acting by His own authority as He willed, mingled with the divine nature? If, then, this did not take place in Him, the evangelical testimony must be set aside; and Paul, and the prophets, and all who foretold the miracles concerning the Lord, and those who related what happened afterward, will altogether be convicted of falsehood. But if this did truly happen, and God was manifested in the flesh, and the flesh, being mingled with the divine nature, became one with it, then, according to the poetic myth, self-determination has perished for the human nature, and angels have been enslaved, since this has come to pass, having been deprived of the grace of self-determination. O the absurdity of this strange speech! Of what sort also is the inference to say, "The corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination." C D
Does he then remove from the list of living things those who are servants, because A they are not governed by free choice, but are enslaved to the prevailing power? For the writer defines the creature as being in a state of free choice. But he legislates that one in whom the sovereign motion of the will is not present is not even to be considered a living creature. Therefore, that Canaan was dead when he was enslaved to his brothers because of his disorder; the servant of Abraham was dead; Giezi, the boy of Elisha, was dead; and in later times Onesimus was dead; all the centurions working as servants were dead. And why do I say these things? All who are subjected to the authorities of those who rule over them, in whom the free-choosing will is obstructed, are dead. But even those to whom Paul gives instruction to submit to the higher authorities are altogether dead, even if they possess souls, corrupted by the absence of their free choice, and no longer able to be living creatures. B For this is what the fable of Apollinaris directs, so that he may unite that soul-less flesh to the God who is above all, whether it be soul-less or mind-less, for the fable looks equally to both. But the soul-less is a corpse. That which has a soul but is devoid of intellect is a beast, which not even he himself avoids as an absurdity, stripping that flesh of free choice; for it is the property of irrational creatures not to be their own masters, but to be subject to the authority of man. But let these things be passed over, and let us move on to the next parts of the discourse; I will relate the opponent’s opinion in my own words for the sake of brevity. C He says that man consists of three things: spirit, and soul, and body, as the Apostle also defines this in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, and he adds this part of the canticle of the three children: "Bless, O spirits and souls of the righteous"; then also, "In spirit," he says, "it is necessary to worship the Lord"; and he brings forward the word of the Gospel, by which we are taught that those who worship God must worship in spirit. Having gone through these, he adds that there is something besides this, the flesh which is at war with the spirit; and he says that this is not soul-less, in order to show by this means that the spirit is a third thing, distinct from the soul and the body. If, therefore, he says, man consists of three things, and the Lord is a man, D then the Lord also consists altogether of three things: spirit, and soul, and body. In order, therefore, that his error in the apprehension of the divine Scriptures may become manifest, we shall briefly deal with each of the things he has mentioned. And first of all let us examine the apostolic saying. For it is not
A into those three parts into which we divide it that Paul divides the human being, when he writes to the Thessalonians and prays to the Lord that they may be sanctified in their entirety, in body, soul, and spirit. But there is a certain way of philosophizing about the resolution of our life which is much loftier, not only here, but also where he speaks to the Corinthians. For he knows there a certain "carnal" human being, and again another "spiritual" one, and between these two a "soulish" (animal) human being: calling him "carnal" who is subject to perturbations and clings to earthly things; calling him "spiritual" who is not burdened by the weight of the body but has his mind set on things above; and finally calling him "soulish" who is strictly neither of these, yet has communion with both.
In asserting these things, however, he does not say that the carnal man is destitute of the activities of mind or soul, nor does he show the spiritual man to be alien from the conjunction with soul and body, nor does he maintain that the soulish man is lacking in either mind or flesh; but he imposes the name on each of them from that which is most prominent in his way of life. For, he who "judges all things and is judged by no one" is both possessed of flesh and endowed with a soul, yet is called spiritual; and he who B raged with the passion of the flesh against his father’s bed was not without a soul, nor was he deprived of intellect. Likewise, he who stands in the middle between the praiseworthy and the condemned is in both, having mind within himself and being clothed in the nature of flesh. But, as has been said, because the appellation is properly applied according to the visible signs of one's life, those who are self-indulgent and pleasure-loving, and who are eager for contentious disputes, are called "carnal." Those who judge all things but afford those who wish to examine them no handle for judgment, on account of the loftiness of their conduct, are named "spiritual." And he calls "soulish" the one who stands between them, who has fallen as far below the latter as he has risen above the former.
Since, therefore, he wishes the person who is perfected through virtue not only to be testified to for a lofty life, but also, when he is compelled to serve the necessities of the body, to look toward God, and, if he does anything else that pertains to the faculties of soul or body, not even then to be forgetful of God—"For whether you eat," he says, "or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God"—so that even while occupied with the necessities of the body they might always be intent upon glorifying God. C For this reason, to the Thessalonians, who were already believed to be striving toward what is better in all respects, he grants full sanctification through this blessing, saying, "And may God sanctify you entirely, and may your whole body, and soul, and spirit," that is, every bodily, soulish, and spiritual pursuit, "be kept for sanctification." This is our account. But if the Apo- D
Apollinaris says that the mind is A thereby blessed separately, and that to distinguish the body and the soul again, he separates the power of the blessing in each individual case, how is the whole body kept—that which falls away entirely and in every respect in death? How is that whole which is pressed down and shriveled by abstinence, and made frail by harsher subjugation? How could anyone say that the poor Lazarus did not miss out on this blessing, teeming as he was with such sores, and being consumed by his own discharge? But, even if it seems strange to say, the blessing of Paul achieved its full effect in that body which was running with sores; for his body was kept whole by his soul through the discipline of the spiritual life, since he was not led by the violence of the flesh from a higher hope to think anything unseemly; for the flesh did not provide distraction for the soul, nor was his mind agitated by bodily passions.
B XLVII. The hymn of the three children, too, which invites the spirits and souls of the just to the communion of glorification together, does not command the souls to praise God separately, and the spirits separately from the souls, as Apollinaris thinks. For what sort of praise of the soul could there be, if it were not fulfilled through the mind? For a soul separated from the mind, as has already been said often, is a beast devoid of rational and intellectual activity. If, therefore, he separates the mind from our soul, as he says, let it be granted that it is possible for praise to be rendered to God by the spirits, since he himself understands the mind under the name of "spirits." But if he thinks that the soul is something else, distinct from the mind, how will the mindless one praise God? What hymn of praise from foolishness will be pleasing to God? And what further need would there be for the soul to have a mind, if, in the matter of divine glorification, it were sufficient C on its own, singing the hymn by itself and having no need of the assistance of the mind to perform it? But we have not learned such things from those who have interpreted for us. But since souls are equal to the angels, having been loosed from bodily bonds, as the Lord says, for this reason the discourse indicates the equality of souls with the angels through the union with the spirits; for the angels are spirits, according to the Prophet who says, "Who makes his angels spirits," with whom the three children also invite the souls of the just to sing. But the Savior, in saying that one must worship God in spirit, does not mean the mind by the name of spirit, but that one must not D occupy oneself with bodily things.
For since the Samaritan woman says to the Lord that one A must worship God on the mountain, as if he were circumscribed by place, which is not outside of bodily conception, for this reason the Word says to the one who had wandered away from the truth, that God is spirit, that is to say, incorporeal; and that those who worship Him cannot draw near to the incorporeal in a bodily way, but must fulfill their worship in spirit and truth. For He distinguishes the corrective words according to the double ignorance: truth from figure, and spirit as opposed to bodily suppositions. For this reason Paul also says he serves the Lord neither in figure nor in body, but in spirit, following the truth. But to say that the flesh is not subject to the law of God provides from itself the refutation of the deceit contained in their dogma; for to fight against, to take captive, and not to be subject, and all such things, are acts of the power of choice. But if there were no mind, there would not be a power of choice. Therefore, the flesh that Apollinarius calls ensouled and having a power of choice, he himself acknowledges is not separated from the mind either. But even if flesh alone is spoken of, it contains within itself the formula of humanity, so that if one of the things that complete the nature is missing, it cannot be called a person. B
XLVIII. "But," he says, "man consists of three things." Let this be granted, even if that argument does not necessarily draw us to assent. "But," he says, "the Lord, when He is called man, also consists of three things: spirit, soul, and body." We would not strongly oppose this opinion either; for if someone were to say that all things which complete our nature existed in that Man, he would not err from the truth. "But He is also the heavenly Man" (he says this of Christ) "and a life-giving spirit." And we approve of these things as well; for this is our own opinion, if, however, the understanding is taken from Him and directed toward the One toward whom it ought to be directed. For he who is commingled with the heavenly, and through this commingling with the more excellent thing transforms what is earthly into something better, would rightly and deservedly be called not earthly, but heavenly. The same must be said of the life-giving Spirit; yet He who works good acts in us is Himself also a life-giving spirit. But let us see to what end the writer uses the arguments brought forward in this way. "If," he says, "the heavenly Man consists of all things equal to us, the earthly, (so that He also possesses a spirit equal to the earthly ones), C he is not heavenly but of the heavenly God..." D
B There is much obscurity in the things said, and it is difficult to discern, on account of the feebleness of the interpretation; but it is easy to uncover his intention. For he says, if that man is deficient in mind, he is heavenly; but if he is complete, he is no longer heavenly, but becomes a receptacle of the heavenly God. In these things, which of the points made should one abhor more? The belief that completeness is a hindrance to the Godhead, as if the flesh, destitute of mind, were more suitable and convenient for receiving the Godhead; or the belief that God is heavenly, yet he who receives the heavenly God within himself is not where God is believed to be, but is somewhere else than in heaven and is named by another title? For if, says Apollinaris, man is a receptacle of the heavenly God, and God is above in heaven, as the Ecclesiastes says: therefore C he who has contained God within himself is with Him who was contained, and is rightly called heavenly instead of earthly. As is also evident through what the writer says; if he understood what logically follows from his own arguments, the dogma of the truth is clearly established, being strengthened by the wisdom of its enemies.
XLIX. But let us examine what follows.
If we, he says, consist of three, but He of four, He is not a man, but a God-man. Let not the reader of this discourse laugh at the foolish and senseless nature of the term; but let him rather groan at the willful blindness of those who are enslaved to such irrationality. If the whole of human nature is saved by the indwelling of the divine power, the Word of God shall be called a God-man; and just as myths, by weaving together different natures, produce monstrous animals, and shapes, and names—fashioning and naming centaurs D and goat-stags and such like—so also this new myth-maker, following his masters in this kind of composition, mocks the divine mystery. Though the Apostle expressly cries out that "through man came the resurrection of the dead," not through half a man, nor one possessing little more than half, but by the absolute force of the word he indicated the nature meant in its entirety, unimpaired; this man, through this shameful making of names, produces a minotaur for us, behaving like a monster regarding the mystery, offering many handles to those who are alien to the faith, through what he has said, to mock the word of the faith; for it is not possible for one who wishes to draw the dogmas into ridicule to turn aside the logic of this absurd composition.A For whatever you may say of the two, you will not remove from the Word the composition of the two natures. For the one who said that the flesh was from above does not set it up as not being flesh; but the flesh, being governed by a soul-endowed nature and having within itself a vital power, as Apollinaris himself wishes, properly possesses the appellation of man; but He who took it and through it manifested Himself is, in nature, entirely different from it; for the very name of "assumption" indicates the difference in nature of the one who is assumed from the one who assumes. B What, then, will prevent, even if these things be the case, God who appeared in the flesh from being insulted by that absurd invention of a name, so that He who is constituted in this way should, according to the rash language of Apollinaris, be called "Man-God"? For the fable did not impose such a name on the goat-stag C because the goat portion was attached in part to the whole stag, or conversely in the mixing of those animals such that the stag-part was attached to the entire goat; but the composition of the names explains that it in some way partakes of each nature. So, according to the writer, if the same one is both man and God, having the union in some way, whether because the whole of the nature has come together or because it is in a deficient state, he will not escape that absurd synthesis of the name. And if the Greeks, having learned such things from him, should mock our mystery, the one who provided the occasion for the blasphemy will certainly fall under the prophetic curse, as he says, "Woe to those through whom my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles!"
D Let us also consider what he adds again to the preceding arguments. "If," he says, "it consists of two perfect things, neither is he who is God also man, nor is he who is man also God." But if, according to his argument, the conjunction were conceded to be of a perfect and an imperfect thing, would it not be said in the same way by those who dare to utter such things, that the man is not in that in which God is, and God is not in that in which the man is? For the principle of the divinity is in every way different from that of the humanity, and no one would ever have thought that the divine nature could be defined by the mutilation of human nature; for the principle of divinity does not consist in the fact that it is not human nature or that human nature is imperfect, but each thing, if grasped separately by the mind, is understood by its own proper concept. For he who hears the "God," receives together with this appellation everything that it is appropriate to conceive regarding God, and he who accepts the appellation of a man, [is understood to have ...]
A understands his entire nature, and the signification of those terms suffers no confusion, so that in the one appellation the other is understood. For neither is that signified by this name, nor this by that, but each of the names retains the meaning appropriate to its nature, and in no way can their implications be interchanged. But "imperfect" and "perfect" imprint altogether different notions upon the minds of the hearers; for we call that "perfect" which, according to the definition of its own nature, is complete and absolute, while the "imperfect" is that which is contrary to this. Neither of these, however, when spoken of in isolation, signifies man or God, but to whatever thing or name it is attached, it makes us understand that which is expressed by those utterances to be either complete or maimed. How, then, if a man were imperfect, does Apollinaris deduce that God is present in that which is imperfect, as if the mutilation of our nature were more B becoming to divinity?
LI. Proceeding next to what follows, he says: "Man cannot save the world, being a man and subject to the common corruption of men." I also say this: for if human nature were sufficient to provide the good for itself, the mystery would be superfluous. But since it was impossible to exist apart from death without God providing the salvation, therefore the light shines in the darkness through the flesh, that through the flesh it might banish the destruction born of darkness. "But neither are we saved," he says, "by God, if he were not mixed with us." In these words, the writer seems to think rightly and to turn his mind toward wiser reflections; for he who speaks of a mixture of things that are naturally distinct signifies union. "He is mixed with us," he says, "when he became flesh," that is, when he became man, just as the Gospel says: when he became flesh, then he tabernacled in us. C Nor do these things disagree with sound doctrine, unless something of the darnel-like seed is immediately sowed among them by him thereafter. For this discourse of ours—or rather, of the truth itself—is that he tabernacled in us then, when he became flesh, and conversely, he became flesh when he tabernacled in us. If, therefore, the flesh existed from the time when the indwelling began in us, then before Gabriel proclaimed it to the Virgin, the Word was not yet flesh; and he is a liar who says that the human element descended to us from above—and that before the created human nature, that human element already existed—through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, for he who says that the humanity of the D Word descended to us from heaven (and that already before the human nature was created, it already existed as a man), through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, gives the lie to the truth.
dax est. Sed neque, ait, peccata hominum delet, A τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θανάτου βασιλείαν καταλύει, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπέθανε, καὶ ἀνέστη. Εἴθε μέχρι τέλους ἦν εὐγνώμων, τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας φθεγγόμενος! Πάλιν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανέρχεται καί φησι, τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν αἰτιώμενος λόγον, ὅτι περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωροῦμεν τὸ πάθος, καὶ ἐπάγει τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἡμῶν, ἔχοντα οὕτως· Ἀνθρώπου δέ, φησί, θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον. Τί κατασκευάζων ταῦτά φησιν; Ὅτι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἡ θεότης, αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν σταυρὸν πάθει ἀπενεκρώθη, ὥστε κατὰ τὴν τριήμερον ἐκείνην τοῦ χρόνου περιγραφήν, μὴ ζωὴν εἶναι, μὴ δύναμιν, μὴ δικαιοσύνην, μὴ φῶς, μὴ ἀλήθειαν, μὴ αὐτὴν τὴν θεότητα. Οὐ γὰρ μιᾶς B ἀποθανούσης θεότητος, ἑτέραν ὑπολελείφθαι λέγει, διότι πολλαχοῦ δείκνυται Ἀρείῳ περὶ τούτου μαχόμενος, καὶ μίαν εἶναι κατασκευάζων τῆς Τριάδος θεότητα, ἧς ἐν τούτῳ νεκρωθείσης, καθὼς συγκατασκευάζει τῷ λόγῳ, πάντως ἑτέρα οὐκ ἦν. Καὶ πῶς ἄν τις ὑπονοήσειεν αὐτὸν μὴ θνητὴν ποιεῖν τὴν θεότητα, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, εἰ μὴ τοῦ συνθέτου διάλυσις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται λυομένου, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ συνδιαπίπτει τῇ διαλύσει τοῦ σώματος· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σύνθετον διαλύεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνθετον ἀδιάλυτον μένει. Εἰ οὖν ψυχῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται θάνατος, πῶς ἡ θεότης ἀπονεκροῦται, λεγέτωσαν οἱ μὴ εἰδότες ἃ λέγουσι.
LII. Τὰ δὲ ἐχόμενα τούτων, ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι κατασκευῆς, ὑπερβήσομαι. Φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς, κατασκευάζων τὸ αὐτὴν τεθνάναι τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν θεότητα, ὅτι Ἀνθρώπου θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον, οὐδὲ ἀνίσταται ὁ μὴ ἀποθανών· ἐξ ὧν, φησίν, ἁπάντων δῆλον, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἀπέθανε, καθό, φησίν, οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν κρατεῖσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου. Ἅπερ ὡς πρόδηλον ἔχοντα τὴν ἀτοπίαν, παραδραμεῖν οἶμαι δεῖν ἀνεξέταστα, παντὸς τοῦ γε νοῦν ἔχοντος καθ' ἑαυτὸν συνιδεῖν C δυναμένου τὸ ἀσεβές τε καὶ ἄτοπον τοῦ διαφορήδην ἀποφαινομένου αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν τεθνάναι, τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὑποστάντα τὸν θάνατον. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον εὔλογον ἴσως ἐστὶ παρασημήνασθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ ἡμετέρου προσώπου λέγει, καθαρεύει τοῦ ψεύδους, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἃ συκοφαντικῶς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ συμπέπλασται τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου. Λέγει γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν παρ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι, ὥστε τὸν Λόγον εἶναι Θεόν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων ἡμερῶν διὰ σαρκὸς πεφανερώσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ τὴν ζωὴν, ἅπερ πάντα ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα· τὸ δὲ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί ποτε ταῦτα, τὸν
τὸν A διὰ τούτων δηλούμενόν τε καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον, Κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν, οὐδὲν ἀνεκτότερον εἰς ἀσέβειαν τῆς παντελοῦς ἀρνήσεως τοῦ ὀνόματος κρίνομεν. Ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγων εἶναι Χριστὸν (Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ δύναμις, καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν ὑψηλόν τε καὶ θεοπρεπές ἐστιν ὄνομα), οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλο τι λέγοι εἶναι, ὃ διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου τούτου νοεῖται ὀνόματος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσηγορίᾳ τὸ λογικόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο γνωριστικὸν τῆς φύσεως ἰδίωμα λέγεται· εἰ δέ τις μὴ εἶναι λέγοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, συνανῄρηται πάντως τῇ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀθετήσει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς φύσεως ἰδιώματα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις, ἡ σοφία, ὁ χαρακτήρ, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα· ὁ ἐκεῖνον ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ εἶναι λέγων, ἀθετήσει πάντως καὶ τὰ μετ' ἐκείνου νοούμενα. Διό φαμεν διὰ τῶν ἁγίων B Γραφῶν ὁδηγούμενοι, ἀεὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀϊδιότητι συνθεωρούμενον. Ὡς γὰρ πάντοτε Θεὸς ὁ μονογενής Θεὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ μετουσίας γίνεται, οὐδὲ διά τινος προκοπῆς ἀπὸ ταπεινοτέρας καταστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν θεότητα μέτεισιν· οὕτως καὶ ἡ δύναμις, καὶ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν θεοπρεπές ὄνομα, συναϊδιόν ἐστι τῇ θεότητι, ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιγίνεσθαι κατὰ προσθήκην εἰς δόξαν τῆς φύσεως, ὃ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν. Τὸ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὄνομα, διαφερόντως φαμὲν ἐξ ἀϊδίου περὶ τὸν Μονογενῆ θεωρεῖσθαι, ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφάσεως πρὸς τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην χειραγωγούμενοι. Τῆς γὰρ ἁγίας Τριάδος διδασκαλίαν περιέχει ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου ὁμολογία, ἑκάστου τῶν πεπιστευμένων προσώπων ἐμφαινομένου τῇ προσηγορίᾳ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ πρόσφορον. Καὶ ὡς ἂν μὴ παρ' ἑαυτῶν λέγειν τι δοκοίημεν, τὰ τῆς προφητείας παραθησόμεθα ῥήματα. Ὁ θρόνος σου, φησὶν, ὁ Θεὸς, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος, ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου. Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ Θεός σου, ἔλαιον ἀγαλλιάσεως παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου. Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ διὰ μὲν τοῦ θρόνου τὴν ἐπὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν διασημαίνει ὁ λόγος. Ἡ δὲ ῥάβδος τῆς εὐθύτητος τὸ ἀδέκαστον ἑρμηνεύει τῆς κρίσεως. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀγαλλιάσεως ἔλαιον, τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος παρίστησι δύναμιν, ᾧ χρίεται παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Θεὸς, τουτέστι, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Μονογενής, ἐπειδὴ ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. C Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν φίλος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἐχθρὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας, ἀκόλουθον ἦν τὸ μηδὲ κεχρίσθαι ποτὲ λέγειν, τὸν διὰ τοῦτο κεχρίσθαι λεγόμενον, ὅτι ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. Εἰ δὲ πάντοτε φίλος δικαιοσύνης, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἑαυτὸν μισήσειε, δικαιοσύνη ὢν, πάντοτε δηλονότι καὶ ἐν τῷ χρίσματι θεωρεῖται. Ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄδικος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἄχριστος ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ὁ χριστός· ὁ δὲ μηδέποτε ἄχριστος, ἀεὶ πάντως χριστός. Ὅτι τοίνυν ὁ ἄδικος; D
ἄδικος A has iniquity. But if he always loved justice—nor indeed could it ever happen that he should at any time hate himself, since justice itself always existed—then he was surely not anointed from the beginning, but from all time; that is, he is understood to be Christ. And just as the just man is in no wise unjust, so too he could never be Christ without unction, nor can he be. Wherefore, no one will deny that He who anoints is the Father, and that the unction is the Holy Spirit, unless he has his heart covered by the Jewish veil.
LIII. How, then, does he say that we do not claim Christ to have been from the beginning?
But seeing that we confess Christ to be from eternity, we do not on that account imagine that he was at no time without that flesh which Apollinaris fabricates; but we know the same Christ and Lord to be from eternity, and after the Passion we confess him to be that same [Lord and Christ] again, just as Peter says to the Jews: “That God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified.” We say this, however, not as if we saw two Christs and Lords in one person of Christ, but because the Only-begotten God, being by nature God and Lord of all, and king of every creature, and creator of things that are, and fixer of those things which have fallen, B brought [it to pass] in great long-suffering that he did not spurn our nature, which had fallen from sin, from communion with him, but on the contrary deigned out of his supreme kindness to receive it back into life.He himself is life; and therefore, at the end of the human life, when our wickedness had already increased to its utmost point, so that nothing of our malice might remain unhealed, he then receives the commingling with our lowly nature, and taking man into himself, and himself coming to be in man—as he says to the disciples: “I in you, and you in me”—he made that which had been commingled with him [to be] what he himself was. But he himself was always the Most High; therefore, he also exalted that which was lowly, for the One who is above all need not be exalted. The Word, however, was Christ and Lord, and that same [Word] also becomes the One who was assumed and commingled with the divinity; for he who is Lord is not re-appointed to lordship, but the form of the servant is raised to the same dignity of the Lord. Wherefore, “One Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things,” is likewise called Christ—the One who before the ages put on the glory of the Spirit (for this is what the anointing signifies through symbols), and after the Passion, adorning the man united to him with that same unction, makes [him] Christ; for, “Glorify me,” he says, C as if to say, “Anoint me,” with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. But the glory which is seen before the world and the creation of all things, and before all ages, with which the Only-begotten God is glorified, could not, in our opinion, be any other D than the glory of the Father; for only [the] progenitor who...
A prior is what the true faith teaches us. He who is before the ages, says the prophet, is of the Father, and concerning the Only-begotten Son, "Through him," says the Apostle, "the ages were made"; and the glory which is understood to exist before the ages in the Only-begotten God, is indeed the Holy Spirit. Therefore, what was proper to Christ while he was with the Father, before the world was, this also becomes proper to Him who was united to Christ at the end of the ages. For Jesus, he says, the one from Nazareth, whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit—so let no one slander our discourse, as if we said that Christ the Only-begotten God is not always; but rather, Christ is always, both regarding the dispensation and after this. But the man was neither before this, nor after these things, but only in the time of the dispensation. For neither was the man before the Virgin, nor after the ascent into the heavens is the flesh B still in its own properties. For if we have known Christ according to the flesh, he says, yet now we know him no longer. For because God was manifested in the flesh, the flesh did not remain; but because the human is mutable, while the Divine is immutable, the Godhead is immovable towards every change, neither being altered toward the worse (for it does not admit the worse, and the better it does not have). But human nature in Christ C uses the change towards the better, having been altered from the corruptible to the incorruptible, from the ephemeral to the inviolable, from the short-lived to the eternal, from the corporeal and configured to the incorporeal and unconfigured.
LIV. Concerning the fact that they assert that we say that the man suffered, and not God, let them hear this from us: that we confess the Godhead to be in him who suffered, but not that the impassible nature has become passible. And that what is said may become clearer, having this... D
A our opinion: Human nature, endowed with an intellectual soul, has its subsistence joined to a body. And this conjunction of both takes place through a certain material substance, which is placed as a foundation before its constitution. That matter, having been formed into a living being by divine power, becomes a man; so that if one were to grant, by way of hypothesis, that the creative power of God does not intervene in forming the living being, the matter would remain entirely idle and unmoved, not being brought to life by the productive energy. As, therefore, we understand a certain life-giving power to supervene upon matter in us, by which man, consisting of soul and body, is formed: so it happened in the Virgin Mary that the power of the Most High, immaterially insinuated into the immaculate body through the life-giving Spirit, and assuming the incorrupt purity of the Virgin into the material of the flesh, received that part contributed from the virginal body for the forming of the fetus. And in that way a new man was truly fashioned, who alone and for the first time demonstrated in himself such a mode of subsistence, having been formed in a divine and not human fashion—the divine power flowing through the entire nature of that composition B in such a way that neither part was devoid of the Godhead, but the Godhead coalesced and harmonized with both, I mean soul and body, suitably and fittingly according to the measure of each. As, therefore, at the birth of man, the Godhead had no need to be born—being before all ages and remaining for eternity—but once having become united in the constitution of the man, it appears along with him at his very birth; so neither does It need to rise again, being eternally living; but It rises again in the one who is brought back to life by the divine power, not Itself being raised (for It has not fallen), but in Itself raising up the one who had fallen. If, therefore, the Divine C generally has no need of birth or resurrection, it is evident that the Passion also is accomplished, not as the Godhead suffering, but as Existing in the one who was suffering, and, through the union entered upon with him, rendering his suffering proper to Itself. For the divine nature, as has been said, having been suitably insinuated into both soul and body, and having become one with each—since, it says, "The gifts of God are without repentance"—does not withdraw from either of these, but remains perpetually. For there is nothing that separates any man from union with God, except sin; but whose life is immune from every stain of sin, his union with God can in no way be severed. D LV. Since, therefore, sin had no place in either, that is, in soul or body, in both accordingly it was…
A present after the manner of either nature. But when death brought about the separation of the soul from the body, that which was composite was indeed dissolved, but that which is incomposite was not divided; rather, it existed in each part indivisibly. A proof that God was in the body is that the flesh was preserved in incorruption after death—for incorruption is entirely proper to God—and a proof that he did not depart from the soul is that through it the way into paradise was opened to the thief.
Since, therefore, the mystery was fulfilled, the divine power having entered into the twofold human nature, and having deposited the life-giving energy in each B related part—through the flesh in the body, and through the soul in the soul (I mean the intellectual soul, not the irrational one, for that which is mindless is beastly and not human)—then the divinity, which from the beginning was mingled with the body and the soul and had remained throughout, is raised in the resurrection of him who had died. And so Christ is said to have risen from the dead—the same being both Christ and having become so: being Christ according to his pre-eternal kingdom, but having become so when the angels announced to the shepherds the great joy which was to be for all the people at the birth of the Savior, who is, he says, Christ the Lord, appropriately named according to the word of Gabriel, who said that the Holy Spirit would come upon the Virgin and the power of the Most High would overshadow her.
He who was thus born is therefore rightly called both Christ and Lord: Lord on account of the power of the Most High, and Christ on account of the Spirit of unction. For he who is eternal is not then anointed, but rather he of whom he says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. II, 7). For "today" is the middle between the two parts of time, the past and the future. But how can the creator of the ages be born and anointed in a part of time? So the divinity C has neither died nor been raised: it has not died, because that which is uncompounded is not dissolved; but it is raised, because, being in that which was dissolved, it caused that which had fallen according to the law of human nature to rise again together with itself, so that by being present in each part, offering what is proper to it, it might heal the nature of bodies through the body, and that of souls through the soul; and again, by uniting through itself that which had been separated, it rises in the one who is raised.
And just as there is nothing to prevent the mystery of the dispensation concerning the resurrection from being indicated corporeally: just as if, therefore, a reed were split in two, and one were to unite the tips of the pieces of the reed at one end, the whole piece of the reed would of necessity be fitted to the other, by being joined to the opposite end through the meeting and fastening at the first end; so too the D presence of the soul to the body in him...
A by means of the resurrection, brings the entire human nature—which had been cloven in two by death and divided into soul and body—into a synthesis, having harmonized in the hope of the resurrection the gathering together of those things that had been separated. And this is that which is spoken by Paul: that Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep, and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. For according to the example of the reed, on the one hand, from the side that takes its beginning from Adam, our nature was cloven through sin, with the soul being divided from the body by death. But from the side that pertains to Christ, nature again takes itself back, the division in its entirety being grown together again in the resurrection of the man who is in Christ. For this reason, therefore, we die together with Him who died for us—I do not mean this necessary and common death of our nature, for this happens even to those who do not wish it—but since it is fitting that we should die willingly and gladly with Him who died B voluntarily, it follows that we must discern a death that is in our own power, for it is not possible for that which happens by necessity to be an imitation of that which is voluntary. Since, then, the death that is imposed by nature upon each one happens to everyone and in every way, both to those who wish it and those who do not, and no one would ever call that which happens of necessity voluntary, for this reason we die together with Him who died voluntarily in another way, being buried by the mystical water through baptism. For, We were buried with Him, he says, through baptism into death, that the imitation of the resurrection might follow upon the imitation of the death.
LVI. But let us proceed to the next part of the discourse.
How, he says, does God become man, without ceasing to be God, if a mind is not posited in the man? Does he understand C what he is saying? He calls the Divinity immutable, and he says this rightly; for that which is always one and the same and like to itself cannot by its own nature become something other than what it is; yet it can be in something else, but it cannot become something different. What, then, was that mind, as Apollinarius says, which was in the man? Did it retain the majesty of its immutable nature, or did it make a transition from that sublime state to the lowly one, having so enclosed itself within the straits of human nature that, as great as this is, so great D also did it become; and, being equal to the lesser, was it changedA Therefore, the human mind is equal to the divinity, if, as Apollinaris says, the divine nature became the mind of man. For if the human nature receives in like manner either our mind, or God in the place of the mind, these would be equal to each other in magnitude and on an equal footing, if indeed the divinity is also contained in that in which the mind is contained. Just as if one were to measure out grain, or any other of the seeds, into some empty vessel, no one would say that what is measured by the same measure differs from the other in quantity; for the grain of oats is equal to the wheat, when the bushel is emptied of those seeds and applied to a different task. Therefore, if the divinity occupies the place of the mind, no one would say that the divinity is more excellent than the mind, since the human nature receives it just as it receives the latter. Either, then, the mind is equal to the divinity, as Apollinaris wishes, and in passing from its own state into that one it was not changed; or the mind is inferior to the Divine, and this, having been made from the former, was changed into the baser state. But who does not know that everything conceived within creation has fallen far short of the inaccessible and unapproachable nature, so that if anyone were to say the B Divine has been changed, even into a creature or a mind, the change would be equal? So if Apollinaris does not think that becoming a mind constitutes a change, nor that being mixed with man without a faculty of understanding implies change, he bears witness to that which was commingled as being immutable. But if it was not changed when it became flesh, much more did it remain in the immutable state while making the commingling with the mind. But if he accuses the change by the fact of it becoming a mind, then the appropriation to the flesh does not entirely escape the accusation of alteration.
He says further (for I omit the things in between): If after the resurrection He became God and is no longer man, how will the Son C of man send forth His angels? And how shall we see the Son of man coming upon the clouds of heaven? How also, even before He was united and deified, does He say: "I and the Father are one"? He discusses these things, establishing through the aforementioned points that the nature of the body was transformed in no way toward the more divine, but that the hairs, the nails, the form, the D figure, the description of the mass, and—
A the interior and exterior parts of the same body remain in Christ unchanged. I, however, consider it superfluous to prove at length that one ought not to have such base and groveling thoughts about God, since the very discourse of the adversaries reveals how absurd this opinion is. But lest they think that the divine oracles contribute anything to the fabrication of this myth, I will briefly run through each of their sayings. Since, he says, the one who sends the angels at the consummation of the universe is called the Son of Man, he thinks for that reason that one must believe he will remain forever in those things that are proper to the human body. He does not remember the word of the Gospel, where in many places the Lord by his own words called God, who is over all, a man. “A man was a householder,” who let out his vineyard to tenants; and after the slaughter of his servants, he sent his only-begotten Son, whom the same tenants, casting him out of the vineyard, killed. Who was that man who sent his only-begotten Son? And who was the son who was killed outside the vineyard? And in that parable of the one who made a marriage feast for his son, does not the Scripture describe this very one as a man? What if we were to say that Christ, intending to provide for the infirmity of those who, because they despised in him a nature similar to their own, could not be brought to believe in his divinity, therefore said that the Son of Man would send angels in the last judgment, so that he might strengthen their weak and infirm minds, seized by fear, in the faith, and by the expectation of terrible things might heal their unbelief regarding those things which they saw with their own eyes? “But you will see,” he says, “the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with much power and majesty.” This surely agrees perfectly with what we previously taught, whether concerning that man who planted the vineyard and made a marriage for his son, C or according to the previously given meaning. And that the discourse is entirely removed from the base supposition of Apollinaris, and that such a discourse suggests that one should conceive of nothing bodily concerning him, is a clear proof from the fact that it is added to the word which signifies his appearance at the end of the ages, that then all will see the Lord in the glory of his Father—so that it must necessarily be concluded from what is said either that the Father is also endowed with a human form, so that the Son, who is to be seen in human form, may appear in the glory of the Father; or, if the majesty of the paternal glory lacks any form or visible appearance, one must acknowledge D the rest—namely, all that is both visible and whatever else is invisible—and also think that the Father is formed in a human way, so that the Son who appears according to the human shape may appear in the glory of the Father. But if the majesty of the paternal glory is pure from every form viewed in an outward appearance, then one must not think that he himself is fashioned in a human way, he who is promised to be seen in the glory of the Father. For the glory of a man is one thing, and the glory of the God who is over all is another. But, he says, through
speaking of the flesh to men, that "I and the Father are one." O the folly of imagining a proof that His manifestation in human form would occur after this, because the Lord said, while speaking through the flesh, that He is one with the Father! A Does he not then, by this statement, absolutely establish that the Father also lives precisely in the flesh? For if he who said that he is one with the Father intends for the unity to be understood not in a spiritual sense, but in a human one, as Apollinaris thinks, then the Father is that same thing which the Son was then seen to be according to man. But since the Divine is outside of all bodily concepts, the union of the Son with the Father was not, therefore, according to a human form, but according to the communion of the divine nature and power. And that these things are in this state is most clearly shown from those words which He says to Philip: "He who has seen me has seen the Father." For the precise understanding of the Son's majesty prepares one to see the archetype B as in an image.
As for the things that follow, because of their incoherence and unintelligibility, I shall pass over them, so that I may not spend my time in vain on foolish things; for through them he does not even make clear what he wishes to say to those who carefully follow his writing. For I cannot see what it contributes to his argument for him to say that no one snatches the sheep given to Him by the Father out of His hand, and that by the Father’s divinity He draws the sheep to Himself, and, "If Christ," he says, "is united with the Father C before the resurrection, how is He not united with the God who is in Him?" For this, as if he intentionally wanted to refute his own fabulations, he inserts into his own arguments, through which the separation and union of the human with the Divine is demonstrated. For he who says, "If Christ is united with the Father, how is He not united with the God in Him?"—thus also the man in Christ, being another, is united with the God in Him. These things, therefore, as they refute the error and instability of his doctrine by their very reading, I shall pass over in my discourse; but I will mention only this one thing. D "The Savior," he says, "suffered hunger, and thirst, and fatigue, and anguish, and sorrow." Who is this Savior? He is God, he says in the previous parts, not two Persons, as if one Person were God and another were man. Therefore, God has suffered those things which he said He suffered; and He suffers what is in no way capable of suffering, not by the necessity of a nature that is forced—as is the case with man—but by the consistency of His nature. Indeed, who will be sufficient to refute such vain notions? In what does he see a difference between the necessity of nature and the consistency of nature? For truth sees the same meaning in each; for example, what I am saying,
that it follows that one who is not healthy in his eyes should have weak vision. And again I say the same thing, that it is necessary, if one is not healthy in his eyes, that he should have weak vision. Is the sense of both statements not the same? For he who speaks of necessity indicates what happens as a consequence; and he who mentions what follows indicates what is necessary. Why, then, does the wisdom of our writer wish to attribute the passions of our nature to the Savior, B not by the necessity of nature, but by the consistency and accompaniment of nature? "It was necessary," he says, "that the passions be stirred according to the likeness of men." He who said "it was necessary," has he not clearly pronounced that it is a necessity? Is this not the usage of Scripture? Indeed, from the Gospels themselves it is easy to take proofs of this locution: "It is necessary that scandals come," for "these things must also happen." Is the meaning of both expressions not one and the same? For he who said that it is necessary that scandals come, indicated by those words that it must be that scandals come; and he who said, "These things must happen," indicated what necessarily must be brought to effect.
LIX.
But I will once again pass over the trifles, confused and rashly heaped up in his foolish reasonings, which he proceeds to bring forward. Towards the end of the discourse, however, he says thus: "Even with the body being in the heavens, He is with us until the consummation of the age." The writer does not know who that is who is with us, clearly separating what cannot be separated. For if he places the body in heaven, but says that the Lord is with us, he openly introduces a certain disjunction and separation by this distinction of his. For he does not say that His body both remains in heaven and is with us, but C that "with the body existing in the heavens," [but with us not being in the heavens]. Therefore, since we are not in the heavens, he has believed that something else—other than the body that is in the heavens, and different from the body—is with us who dwell on the earth. These are the sublime doctrines of Apollinaris. But we say that Christ, after He had said these things, was taken up into the heavens, and that He who was taken up is with us, and no division is to be found in Him; but just as He is in us, being present to each one and remaining in our midst, so also He extends through D all the bounds of created things, appearing equally to all parts of the world. If He is present to us who are bodily in an incorporeal way, surely He will not be present to the celestial beings in a bodily way. But now he says that the Lord is thus divided, in the things subject to Him, without any congruence and in an order entirely contrary: to the corporeal as incorporeal, and to the incorporeal in a body. For having established the flesh in heaven, spirituallyit mingles itself with men. But as for the things which he breathes out like souls at the end of his treatise, as if they were certain mere gasps, he entangles them with bodiless concepts, which I think should be passed by without examination; for where he is pressed, he calls upon the Greeks to defend his own fables. And regarding all other things similar to these, whoever loves to discern the weakness of this heresy throughout its entire length should proceed to the things written. We, however, do not have so much leisure as to delve into such words, which of themselves manifestly carry the evidence of their own absurdity, and possess the refutation of their strangeness even before they are examined; whoever desires to have the futility of this heresy thoroughly recognized and perceived, let him run through his writings; for we do not have enough leisure to be able to spend much time discussing discourses of this kind, which obviously carry in themselves the cause from which one may, without any examination, refute their ineptitudes and errors. A
OF THE SAME GREGORY AGAINST APOLLINARIUS TO THEOPHILUS BISHOP OF ALEXANDRIA
The great city of the Alexandrians is prolific not only in secular wisdom, but the fountains of true and genuine wisdom have flowed from the beginning among you. For this reason it seems right to me, as it appears to my judgment, that if to those who have the greater power for the promotion of what is right, more support should be contributed to them for the defense of the mystery of the truth; for as the sublime Gospel says somewhere, "To whom much is given, from him the more shall be required." B Therefore you would be just, if you were to oppose with all the power that is in you—by divine grace and in your Church—the falsely named knowledge of those who are always inventing something new against the truth, by which the harmony according to God is severed, the great and venerable name of the Christians is shrouded in silence, and the Church is divided into human appellations; and what is most terrible of all, that men rejoice to be named after those who lead them into error. If, indeed, it were possible for the prophetic prayer to come to its fulfillment at all, and for sinners and the lawless to vanish from the earth, so that C
they no longer existed, that would be a thing to be preferred above all else. But since the words of the wicked prevail, strengthened by the cooperation of the adversary to gain power against the truth, it ought to be welcomed if we can at least diminish and hinder these evils, lest the augmentation of worse things, which is produced day by day, be carried too far.
What, however, do these words imply? A For those who favor the dogmas of Apollinaris, because of the censures prepared against us, attempt to establish their own cause by making the Word a creature of flesh, the maker of the ages the Son of man, and the divinity of the Son mortal. For they pretend, as if there were some in the Catholic Church who worship two sons in their creed—one, indeed, according to nature, and another subsequently acquired according to adoption. I know not from whom they have heard such things, nor against what person they are contending; for I have yet to meet one who has uttered such things.
Nevertheless, since they set forth this charge against us, and by seeming to impugn such an impiety they corroborate their own opinions, it is well that your perfection in Christ, as the Holy Spirit may put it into your mind, should cut off the pretexts of those who seek pretexts against us, and persuade those who calumniously attribute these things to the Church of God that no such dogma exists among Christians, nor is it preached. For it is not because the Maker of the ages was seen on earth in the last days, and conversed with men, that therefore two sons are numbered in the Church: the one the Maker of the ages, B and the other he who appeared in the flesh to the human race at the consummation of the ages.
For if anyone, from the appearance of the only-begotten Son of God in the flesh, which was effected for the sake of the dispensation, concludes that another son has been produced, he must, if he also counts up all the theophanies that were offered to holy men before the manifestation of the only-begotten Son of God in the flesh, and those which were offered to the saints again after that, set down a multitude of sons in proportion to the number of the divine manifestation. And there will be for him one son, he who conversed with Abraham; another, the one who appeared to Isaac; another, he who wrestled with Jacob; another, different still, who showed himself to Moses in various apparitions—in the light, in the darkness, in the pillar of cloud, in the vision face to face, and in the hindermost parts; another son, again, who stood in the battle line with the successor of Moses; and another who spoke to Job through the whirlwind; and he who appeared to Isaiah on a high throne, and he who was described by Ezekiel in human form by his narrative; and he who later flashed around Paul in the light; and before that, he who appeared to those with Peter upon the mountain in higher glory.
C D If then it is absurd and utterly impious to divide the various theophanies of the only-begotten Son of God into a number of sons, it involves an equal absurdity to consider the appearance through the flesh as a pretext for