Against Apollinaris

OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, ANTIRRHETICUS AGAINST THE THINGS OF APOLLINARIS

1. ^A A suitable and appropriate introduction to our discourse will be the voice of the Lord, which commands us to beware of false prophets, who come, He says, to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves; by their fruits you shall know them. If, therefore, the fruit distinguishes both the true sheep and the destroyer of the sheep—the one who, under the guise of gentleness, steals unnoticed into the assembly of the flock, and who brings into the light the mouth that is in truth an enemy hidden beneath a gentle appearance—it is fitting to seek out the fruits, both the good ones and the worse ones, by which the form of the deceit is uncovered; for He says, [B ] *by their fruits you shall know them.* Thus, of every teaching, the good fruit, in my judgment, is the addition of those who are saved within the Church; but the destructive and poisonous fruit is the dissolution of those who are already established. If, therefore, anyone might increase the flock by his words, and by the vine extend to all sides of the house,

^A transmuting the branches of the wild olive into the new shoots of the olive tree, and finally casting the mystical rods into the sweet and potable stream of his teaching, through which the flocks are made prolific, so that the possession of Laban is diminished, while the portion of Jacob abounds, and is multiplied by the noted offspring;—if anyone should show such fruit of his teaching (for the fruit, as was said, is the increase of truth), he is truly a prophet, prophesying according to the divine purpose in the Spirit.

But if anyone should cut off the shoots of the vine, and make the divine table desolate, uprooting the plantation, and laying snares against the spiritual watering-trough, so ^B that no longer do the sheep conceive before the rods of the patriarch, nor multiply the flock by the noted offspring, but are driven away from the nourishing pasture, that is, from the traditions of the fathers, and lodge outside the fold, and are scattered to strange pastures: whenever such a fruit of teaching is produced, then surely the wolfish form, lurking under the sheep’s skin, will be manifested.

II. Let us therefore inquire what the teaching of Apollinaris the Syrian has produced for us: an increase of the flocks or a diminution, a gathering of the dispersed or a dissolution of those already gathered, a defense of the ancestral dogmas or their subversion. If, therefore, the zeal of the aforementioned person looks toward what is better, he is surely a sheep, and not a wolf; but if the contrary: ^C *Beware of false prophets*, says the Lord; let not that mouth escape [notice], which is sharpened by the acute teeth of novelty for the harm and destruction of the body that approaches it, and which lacerates the healthy body of the Church of God.

But lest what we say seem to be mere railing, we shall add one of the treatises of his that circulates, the inscription of which is this: *A Demonstration*, he says, *concerning the divine incarnation in the likeness of man*. And perhaps, if the sense of the inscription were accurately laid bare, there would be no need for anyone further to labor in refuting the absurdity of the dogma through the individual parts of the treatise itself. *A Demonstration*, he says, *concerning the divine incarnation in the likeness of man*. But it would be better to set forth the divine voices for the refutation of this new word-coining. *The Word*, he says, *became flesh*, and, *Glory inhabited our land*, and, *God was manifested in the flesh*, so that from each ^D of these sayings we may learn the divinity, which is always in substance

^A immutable, having assumed a nature subject to change, so that by its own immutability it might heal our transformation into evil. But this man asserts that God was not manifested in the flesh—which is the same as saying that the Word did not become flesh, who in the form and likeness of man, by the servile habit, conversed with humans—but he ascribes a certain divine incarnation to the Word; and he does so in such ambiguous language that it is unclear to me whether he understands a transformation of the divinity from its simple and compositionless nature into a fleshly solidity, or rather, while the divine substance remains in itself, he says that another, certain divine incarnation has appeared, placed on the boundary of human and divine nature, which would be neither God nor man, but would in some way partake of both; and as it is an incarnation, it would be akin and related to humanity, but as it is divine, it would by far exceed the measure of human nature. But in very truth, a substance of this kind cannot be God. For the divinity is a thing by its own nature simple and entirely foreign to composition; and from that which lacks simplicity, it is absolutely necessary that the divinity also be absent. Conversely, it cannot be man ^B either. For he is called a man who is composed of a body and an intellectual soul; but to that in which these two are not understood to be joined together, how will the name of man be appropriate? For we call it a body of a man, and a soul of a man, so long as each of these is considered in itself. But the concurrence of these two is what both is, and is called, man.

III. What, therefore, is this divine incarnation, which is neither man nor God, which the author conjures up in the title of his treatise? It is not possible for us to discover it through what we have accurately investigated thus far. The demonstration, he says, of the divine incarnation is *to the likeness of man*. Again, what does that mean: *to the likeness of man*? Namely, that the divine incarnation consists in a similar manner to the human. And when did this happen? In the last days? And where is the mystery of the virginity? For the Lord was not incarnated to the likeness of man, as our writer says, but by divine power and the Holy Spirit, as is stated in the Gospel ^C. Or perhaps before the ages? And how is that which exists assimilated to that which does not exist? For man is the last of all things according to the order of creation, but the Lord is King before the ages. To the likeness, therefore, of which man was that divine incarnation made, if it preceded all ages? Perhaps Adam’s? But he had not yet come into being. Or according to some other man? And who is this man thought of before Adam, so that the incarnation of God might be made like the proposed pattern? ^D since, while calling others logographers and sophists, and trying to insult them, he himself will be refuted, being guilty of these things.

^A For what is similar must necessarily be so to something that exists, not to something that does not exist. Thus, according to him, two absurdities appear in the argument: for either the creature is found to be older than the Creator, or the divine [nature] becoming incarnate is made similar to that which does not exist; for in the beginning the divinity existed, but Adam did not exist. Therefore, if the divine nature assumed flesh according to the likeness of man, the divine incarnation is made similar to that which does not exist; but that which is compared to what does not exist, it is necessary that it also itself in no way exists. But he says that that incarnation occurred in some other way than the human. And what similarity is there between things of different natures? ^B If, therefore, it is not possible for the divine incarnation to have happened according to the likeness of man before the ages, nor in the fullness of time, when by the benevolent dispensation of God toward men the Word appeared clothed in flesh, in no way was the divine incarnation made according to the likeness of man (for the mystery of the virgin birth does not admit such a concept), then he would have made this title for his treatise in vain according to both meanings. That the title is therefore unexamined and based on no consistent concept, I think has been sufficiently shown by what has been said to those who listen with attention.

The time would now be at hand for me also to subject to examination the treatise whose argument is designated by such a title. I shall first write down in my own words, running through the sense in a few points, those things contained in the work itself, where there is no danger ^C that we should leave anything unexamined. "It is proper," he says, "to consider only pious faith to be a good thing, for unexamined faith did not even help Eve; wherefore it is necessary that the faith of Christians also be examined, lest it happen to fall in with the opinions of the Greeks or of the Jews." After having prefaced these things at some length, he introduces his argument by saying that among the unbelievers and the heresies it has long been rumored that it is not possible for God to become man and to have dealings with passions; and this is introduced among the heresies under the guise of faith, by calling Christ a divine man on account of the birth from a woman ^D and on account of the passions. Which heresies he knows that call Christ a divine man, he himself may know, and anyone who has been instructed in his teachings; but we, having traveled to many places, and having studiously conversed both with those who share our opinion and with those who dissent from us regarding the questions usually debated about the Word, have not yet heard anyone uttering such a voice regarding the mystery, that man

^A was a god-bearing man. Therefore, it was proper for one intending to correct the erroneous opinions concerning the dogma and to introduce more pious ones in their place, not to fashion for himself things that do not exist and to fight against non-existent entities, but to arm himself against the things actually stated by the opposing side. For not even experienced physicians apply their art to diseases that have never existed, but they stand against a disease that has already broken out through their knowledge. Let him, therefore, show someone who has said that God has not appeared in the flesh, but that Christ is a god-bearing man, and then we shall admit that his treatise was not written in vain; but as long as such a disease is not found, everyone will agree that it is foolish to struggle with things that do not exist.

V. But in truth, Apollinaris did not rashly invent such a necessity for writing; rather, in order to construct his own dogma, he made a kind of step and approach for himself, supposing as said what was never said by anyone, so that while he appeared to be contending against this imaginary heresy, by a simulated contradiction he might establish that the divine could die. For his entire writing aims at this, to assert that the divinity of the only-begotten Son is mortal, and that he did not undergo the passion in his humanity, but that his impassible and immutable nature was changed to participate in passion. Therefore, those who are skilled in knowing his mysteries will be able to see to what utility the discourse of Apollinaris looks; but the consequences that follow from his words, even infants know, are such as not even the most irreligious of the Gentiles would have spoken. For if the very divinity of the Only-Begotten died, necessarily along with it died also life, and truth, and justice, and goodness, and light, and power; for according to diverse notions, the only-begotten God both is and is called all these things. But being simple and devoid of division and composition, whatever of these things is said of him, he is that in his entirety, and not this in one part and another thing in another part; so that if one of these things exists, all are understood to exist in him; but if one does not exist, all are extinguished at once. If, therefore, the divinity of Christ perished through death, through that same death all things which are understood to be conjoined with his divinity also perished. And yet Christ is not simply power, but the power of God and the wisdom of God. Therefore, when these things were extinguished together with the divinity of Christ through death, there was no longer with the Father the wisdom of God, nor power, nor life, nor anything else of those things which are called by the name of good. For all these things are believed to be the things of the Father in him, things which, when the Son exists, exist; but when he does not exist, they certainly do not exist, because all

^A things that are of the Father are confessed to be in the Son. If, then, the power was extinguished by death, and Christ is the power of God, what power was again recalled from non-existence, since the one that existed was obliterated by death, and no other was left remaining? For even those who fight against us confess that the power of the Father is in the Son. If, therefore, the power is one, and this—having been mastered by death—departed into annihilation at the time of the economy of the Passion, what other power is fashioned besides him which recalls this power from death? For if they were to say that the one died, but the other remained immortal, they would no longer confess that the power of the Father is in the Son, and thus, as a consequence, they set aside the very words of the Lord, as not holding the truth, which bear witness that all things that are the Father’s are the Son’s. For he who has all things of the Father also possesses in himself, by all means, the immortality of the Father; immortality, however, as long as it is what it is said to be, has no communion or mixture with death. If, therefore, they say that the divinity of the Son is mortal, they establish that it does not have within itself the immortality of the Father. But he who says that he has the whole Father in himself tells the truth; he, therefore, who tries to establish as mortal him in whom the whole eternity of the Father is observed, is lying. Since, therefore, according to the opinion of those who believe piously, there is one power of the Father and the Son—for we see the Son in the Father, and in the Son the Father is clearly demonstrated—that which could by its own nature suffer admitted death, while that which was not liable to passion rendered impassibility ^B in that which was liable to passion.

VI. But let us proceed to what follows in the reasoning. I will speak again in his own voice, having summarized the thought in brief. For he says that to name Christ a divine man is contrary to the apostolic teachings, and alien to the synods, and that Paul [of Samosata], and Photinus, and Marcellus were the authors of such a perversion. Then, after the manner of fierce athletes, as if entangled with the one discussing, and having found the author of the saying, he says this: How will you say that he is a man from the earth, whom Scripture bears witness to have descended from heaven, and who is proclaimed the Son of Man? Again, in these things, the confirmation of the preceding argument is the beginning of another absurdity. For in order to show that God has died, he allows nothing at all of the earthly nature to be regarded in him. For since entirely

to the earth, he says: "The man who descended from heaven is not a man from the earth." Yet he is a man, even if he has descended from heaven; for the Lord does not reject this designation in the Gospels. How then does he maintain consistency in what he says? If the man is not from the earth, but descends to us from heaven, how is he called the Son of man who descends from heaven? For he will certainly admit, just as on earth we conceive of fathers before their sons, so also in the case of the man who comes to him from heaven, since he is called the Son of man, that he is not named from a father at random; but that he has, according to the human manner, another man as father in heaven, perceived to be prior to the Son. For if he relies on these words, "No one has ascended into heaven, but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man," and therefore separates him from kin with the earthly man, and says that the Son of man came to us from heaven, he will necessarily grant some other man in heaven as the father of that man who descended to us, so that we must suppose that in the heavenly life there are also nations of men, and peoples, and everything that exists in this life. If, therefore, he who comes from heaven is the Son of man, but he who was born of Mary from the seed of David according to the flesh, even if he came from heaven, is called the Son of man, then according to them he is falsely called the Son of God, since that Son has nothing in common with divinity, neither as earthly nor as heavenly. But as if gathering together the things said by him, he puts an end to his discourse with these words: "But if he is both the Son of man from heaven ^C and the Son of God from a woman, how is he not considered the same God and man?" I truly say that to believe the same one to be God and man is fitting for all defenders of the right faith, but not according to the opinion of Apollinaris; for neither does the divinity become an earthly thing, nor does the humanity become something heavenly, as he thinks; but the power of the Most High from heaven overshadowed human nature through the Holy Spirit—that is, it was formed in it—and from the immaculate Virgin a portion of flesh was united with it; and in this way, that which was born in it was called the Son of the Most High, the divine power reconciling an affinity with the Most High to human nature, while the flesh reconciled a kinship with man to God.

VII. "But he is God," says Apollinaris, "through the incarnation of the spirit, and man through the flesh assumed by God." What again is the incarnation of the spirit, other than the union entered into with our flesh? And from whence was man assumed, if not from the first man ^D whose first generation we have learned from Moses, who describes his genealogy, was made from the earth, not from heaven? For God, having taken dust from the earth, fashioned man; but he did not tell us of any other...

construction from heaven—no one has ever taught us that. Then Apollinaris ^A subjoins to these statements, "The mystery was manifested in the flesh"; he states this rightly, for we too say the same thing, and he adds that the Word was made flesh according to the union—these are indeed words of sound speech. For he who says that the Word has been united to the flesh, affirms nothing other than the concurrence of two things.

"But the flesh," he says, "is not without a soul; for it is said to 'war against the spirit' and to 'rebel against the law of the law'." Oh, the height of his folly! He does not fashion for God a fleshless/inanimate body. Let us therefore ask whether an ensouled flesh was assumed by God the Word, as our writer says; but we say that the bodies of irrational animals are also possessed of a soul. However, he who attributes human flesh—and that ensouled—to the Word unites nothing else than a whole human being to the Word; for there is nothing so proper to the human soul as a nature endowed with intellect, because in all other things we have communion with the brutes. ^B Concupiscence, anger, desire for food, satiety, sleep, digestion, change, the evacuation of excrement—all these things are dispensed equally in us and in irrational animals by a certain faculty of the soul. He, therefore, who says that the one who was assumed is a man, and concedes that this one is endowed with a soul, testifies to nothing other than that he possesses the faculty of understanding, which is proper only to the human soul, as appears from the very words of the Apostle which he has set before us.

For when he says that "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. viii, 7), he expresses the manifest properties of the power that chooses and thinks; for to be obedient or to struggle against the law is proper to a choosing will, and the very name of "mind" (phronēma) no one could separate ^C from the activity of thinking. And that "to think" (phronein) is the same as "to understand" (noein), not even one of those who are utterly babes would deny. And he who struggles against and leads into captivity—how could he lack the activity of understanding? For the fact that the choosing will is moved toward evil things in the wicked is no proof that there is no mind in them, but rather that they are excluded from good reasoning, yet they do think nonetheless. For even that serpent, whom the Scripture teaches us was the leader and inventor of wickedness, the God-inspired word does not say was lacking in mind, but testifies that he was more prudent than all other living creatures (Gen. iii, 1).

^D VIII. Therefore, the words brought forward by us, by which he thinks his own opinion is confirmed, clearly refute the impiety of the dogma preached by him. For not in these words alone does the Apostle oppose the flesh to the spirit—that is, an evil choice to a righteous purpose.

^A Indeed, at that time when the discourse was directed to them, were those men, according to the tripartite division of humanity devised by Apollinaris, lacking the operation of the mind? Or were they called "carnal" by Paul entirely because of their immoderate inclination toward the works of the flesh, receiving the appellation from that which abounded in them? The context of the written passage shows that such an argument is true: "For where there is among you," he says, "envy and strife, are you not carnal?" For to be envious and to contend pertains to the operations of the mind. ^B Furthermore, the things that follow in the wordy writing of Apollinaris demonstrate this one thing through many testimonies: that man consists of three things, namely, flesh, soul, and mind—which, indeed, are not far from our own opinion. For to say that man is composed of body and an intellective soul is the same thing as dividing into three parts the considerations regarding man by separately enumerating the mind by itself. Although this way of speaking provides many opportunities for heretics to err. For if one were to enumerate the rational part by itself, another could assert that the irascible part is separated from the rest, and again another part for the concupiscible, and perhaps someone else, counting the remaining motions of the soul by reason, would show man to be composed not of three, but in a certain way of far many more parts, and dissected into many parts as well.

IX. ^C But let us put these things aside, lest by dwelling on each particular point we extend our refutation longer than is necessary; let us proceed to the subsequent parts of the discourse. For while he labors to establish the composition of man as tripartite—or threefold, or by whatever other name one might wish to call it—by many arguments, he makes mention of certain synodal definitions, namely, those of the synods which were collected against Paul of Samosata, in one of which it is said that Christ was made God from heaven; andlikewise of another definition of faith promulgated at Nicaea, whose dictum he alleges in these express words: "Who descended from heaven, and was incarnate, and was made man." And when he has said these things, as though he had already established what he was about to say next, he reveals the meaning of his intention in this manner, and as if the matters were already demonstrated, he adapts the consequences to them, and says word for word: ^D "The Spirit, that is, the mind, having God, Christ, together with soul and body, is rightly called a man from heaven." What common ground do the things said have with what precedes them? Where

did the synod gathered against Samosatenus define this? But let us omit what is older concerning our dogma. What do those words, *He who descended from heaven and was incarnate*, in the dogmas of the Nicene Council suggest to the faith, except that we should understand that the flesh did not exist before the descent of the Son, but that it was subsequent to that very descent? This is preached by all in the Churches, that Christ was indeed incarnate and made man; and this is our discourse, or rather, the discourse of the Church. Where then in the stated dogmas of the Nicene Council is it found that Christ, ^B having God—that is, the Spirit, or mind—along with soul and body, is called a man from heaven? For whether you examine the discourse based on the bare wording, or based on the meaning of what was said, the claim will be found in neither. For the wording is as far removed from the claim as, to speak in the manner of the Psalms, the east is from the west; and as for the meaning of what was said, what common ground does it show with what is signified by that phrase? This man says that Christ, when incarnate in human flesh, has in Himself God, the Spirit—that is, the mind; and he says this, the very person who commands us not to call Christ a man having God within Himself, as if one in another, while he himself is the first of all to construct this very thing. But the voice of the synod says, *He who descended from heaven*. Let the multitude and the simple-minded person understand the descent from the heavens to us; for we shall not differ regarding such an assumption, even if the mind should imagine a higher meaning, ^C not saying that the Divine descends locally, being everywhere and encompassing all things, but declaring the condescension toward the humility of our nature. But however it may be pleasing to him who wishes to accept the descent, the discourse of the synod says again, *who was incarnate*, and it says this rightly; for how could one have interpreted the birth from a woman more appropriately? For it is not, as He is God, that He Himself was born of a woman by Himself; for He who existed before the creation of things does not admit of being born through flesh as His very being; but by having prepared, through the Holy Spirit, the entrance of His own power, and by having need of no material pretext for the construction of His own tabernacle, according to what is said concerning Wisdom, *He built for Himself a house*, having made, from the Virgin’s earth, a human being, through whom He was commingled ^D with the human.

Where then in these things does the discourse say that which seems to Apollinaris: that Christ, having God, that is, the mind, together with soul and body, is rightly from X. Where then in these words of the synod does the discourse assert what Apollinaris thinks, namely that the spirit—that is, the mind—God, along with soul and body, is rightly

^A held to be called a heavenly man? For if it is permitted to him, according to his own will, to drag the divine oracles to whatever interpretation he fancies, and, after the manner of interpreters of dreams, to apply the sense to the letter, just as he pleases, he may ascribe these and other similar notions to the divine utterances. But if the Apostle says that old wives' tales and profane novelties of words must be rejected in every way, it is by no means to be permitted to him to join together things that are at variance, and to combine things that cannot have communion with one another. Yet the very arguments by which he tries to confirm his own statements provide us with assistance and aid—even for the subversion of his own doctrine. For he says that Paul also calls the first man, Adam, a living soul ^B even though he was endowed with a body, asserting this, indeed, beautifully and very truly. Was therefore the first man, who is remembered by Paul as a living soul, possessed of an irrational soul, like the beasts? And yet the history of Scripture testifies that no common power and faculty of understanding was bestowed upon him; for God brought all the animals to him, but he, according to the nature of each, conceiving in his mind what was fit and appropriate, had the authority to impose a name upon each. But furthermore, his disobedience, and his inclination toward things that ought not to be done, and the shame felt for wicked deeds, and the excuse for transgressions so readily invented—all these things demonstrate the faculty of the mind ^C sufficiently and more than enough. Why, then, did Paul pass over the power of understanding in Adam in silence? Or is it perhaps that he expresses the whole by the naming of one part, as in the passage, "To thee shall all flesh come," where through "flesh" David signifies the whole human race; and Jacob, when he was received as a guest by the Egyptians with seventy-five souls, is not exhibited in Holy Scripture as being at that time devoid of mind or flesh?

XI. But Apollinaris says: "The second man is called spiritual from heaven," which signifies that the man who was commingled with God lacks a mind. But from the words which he immediately adds, the refutation of this absurdity is easily derived. For the one who says, "As is the heavenly one, such also are the heavenly ones," removes us far from such an opinion. For if those who believe in Him who came from the heavens ^D are themselves also called heavenly by Paul—inasmuch as they have translated their citizenship to the heavens, as he says elsewhere—and if the Apostle says that as that heavenly one is, such also are these heavenly ones; and since no one among those who have embraced the faith is devoid of a mind, it is therefore necessarily demonstrated from this comparison that Christ was made in the likeness of men, and consequently that a mind was also in Him. For "As is the heavenly one," he says, "such also are the heavenly ones": so that one must necessarily admit that either all are endowed with a mind, or none at all. For just as the properties of the earthly man [are found in those who have been begotten from him...]

are seen, so also according to the Apostle's saying, who was tempted in all things as we are, yet without sin (and the mind is not sin), it is altogether necessary that he should preserve an agreement and conjunction with all the properties of nature. For in this way the Apostle's statement is shown to be true, that we are like him, if we acknowledge that he also was made like us, so that by the fact that he was made such as we are, he might make us such as he himself is.

XII. But let us again recall the words of Apollinaris: Just as Paul calls the first Adam a soul possessed of a body, and not one lacking a body, yet granting the name to the whole, even though this by itself, insofar as it contains the spirit, may be called soul. He who says these things admits ^B that three things are designated by the single name of soul through this composition, as if it involved simultaneously the signification of both body and spirit. But, he says, Paul calls the last Adam a "life-giving spirit." That which he therefore showed in him [to hold] by way of the prevailing element—having secured the appellation over the other signified things—this surely also has its equivalent in his case. For if Adam, because he sinned, is called "soul," the man joined to God, because he did not commit sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth, is called "spirit" absolutely. But he does not accept this interpretation; for he says that the former is called "earthly from the earth" because the body, formed from the clay, received a soul. But was not the mind, which he calls spirit, joined to the body of Adam at his formation? In what, ^C therefore, does his likeness to God consist? What is the outflow from the divine inbreathing, if the mind is not believed to be this very thing? Further, he says that the second Adam is called "heavenly" for this reason, because the heavenly Spirit was incarnate. In what passage of holy Scripture is this said? To which of the holy ones does he attribute the word that the Spirit was incarnate? We have not heard this from the Gospels; we have not been taught this by the great voice of the Apostle. Rather, the preaching declares that the "Word became flesh," and the evangelical history relates that the Spirit descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove. But no one of those who have perceived the mysteries through the Spirit has spoken of the incarnation of the Spirit. "The glory dwelt in our land," and "Truth has sprung from the earth," and "God was manifested in the flesh," and "Righteousness looked down from heaven," and many other things of this kind we read; ^D but the God-inspired Scripture knows nothing of a Spirit being incarnate. And further, he says that the man Christ pre-exists, not as if the Spirit, that is, God, were a different being apart from him, but as the divine Spirit being in the nature of God-man. These things

^A are his words verbatim. But since, due to a certain sluggishness of interpretative power, what he implies in these words is not entirely clear through their clarity, I shall first strip away the darkness of the wording from the underlying thought, and then, in this manner, add the discourse to the examination.

XIII. "The man Christ," he says, "pre-exists." He understands these two items as being joined together—the Word who was in the beginning, and the man who appeared in time—as if he had pre-existed before his manifestation, and he elaborates on the meaning through what follows. For he says that the Spirit is not something different from him, constructing through this the argument that the very divinity of the Son is man from the beginning, which is shown more clearly through the subsequent discourse; for he says that the Lord ^B in the nature of God-man was divine Spirit. He has unified the nature of God and of man, and he has termed the fusion of the two "man." The sense of his words, therefore, is this: that he who emerged through the Virgin in the flesh is to be understood as being prior to all created things, not only according to the eternity of his divinity, as we all believe, but also according to the flesh itself. For he proceeds to add, for the testimony of such a supposition, the Lord’s word: "Before Abraham was, I am"; and the voice of John, "He was before me"; and that of the Apostle, "And one Lord through whom are all things"; and, "He is before all things"; and ^C certain other words of the prophet Zechariah, which, as they have been dragged by force towards this goal of his, we shall omit. For my part, if the proof of this absurd opinion were covered by some wrapping of thoughts, I would rightly labor on the refutation of things that were hidden; but since it openly bellows its impiety, I do not see what more could be accomplished by our words. If the flesh is pre-eternal, if what was born of the Virgin already existed before Abraham was born, then the Virgin is older in age than Nahor; then Mary even precedes Adam. And yet, why do I say this? She herself, as it seems, will be older than the creation of all things and more ancient than the ages themselves. For if he was incarnate in the Virgin, and the flesh is called Jesus, and the Apostle affirms that Jesus is before all things, then, as it seems, ^D this fine writer—if I am not mistaken—brings it about by his own arguments that we must understand Mary as co-eternal with the Father. But I pass over in silence the extremely incredible and utterly absurd things to which the perversity of this coinage of words leads in the progress of the work; for it will be easy for sagacious men to discern these absurdities from the consequences that follow, even if we do not lay out their ugliness in our own words. [alt-version omitted]

^A XIV. But let us pass by the stench of such notions, noting only this in passing: if the flesh existed before the ages, the divinity was not emptied, the Son was not in the form of God, and He did not put on the form of a servant; but what He was by nature, that He was revealed to be now, and was not humbled. May the Word be gracious to my words; but I pass over the rest in silence. If the flesh existed before the creation of all things, then all things were created through weakness, not through power; for "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Matt. xxvi, 41). Therefore, his absurdity extends even to this. And who would not discern what is connected to these things from the consequences that follow from them? For one must necessarily conceive of all that is proper to the flesh as existing at the same time in Him who had the flesh before the ages: labor, sorrow, tears, thirst, sleep, the need of hunger, and whatever is even more absurd than these.

Since, however, "a child is born to us" (Isa. ix, 6), as the divine voice says, and the Lord was "seen by the shepherds in swaddling clothes," as Luke says (Luc. ii, 12, 16), and "Jesus increased in stature, and in wisdom, and in grace" (Luc. ii, 52), and then ^B he advanced to the measure of manhood, walking through the path of nature, what will they say who see the flesh in Christ before the ages? In what state of body was He before the ages? For while He lived among humans, He passed through all the ages of human life. Was that man, who is older than the creation of all things, a boy, or a little infant, or a youth, or was He at once endowed with a perfect body? But if they say He was a boy, they must certainly also add the reason why, after the passing of so many and such great ages, He did not reach the perfect age. But if they say He was a perfect man, we demand that they teach us how, while He is born of the Virgin, He is contracted into the smallness of an infant? Where did He leave the remaining part of the body? How was the bulk of the same body so diminished ^C as to be circumscribed by such narrow limits? Then, how does He again restore the bulk of the body to its own measure? Whether by taking back what He had from the beginning through gradual growth, or by adding another part to Himself through nourishment? If they say the old, they will surely show the nourishment to have been superfluous; but if they do not deny that the Lord partook of food, what will they say concerning the flesh left behind in heaven? For they will say He left behind a great part, as is reasonable, and that He reserved for Himself only as much as the womb of the Virgin could contain. They will certainly babble something monstrous about this too, and by these assertions they will, even against their will, construct for themselves a path toward fabricating other dogmas which necessarily follow from the vanity ^D of such fables.

XV. But let us pass over these things as well. ^A Yet one might not unreasonably inquire of those who dogmatize that this divine incarnation existed before the ages. For if they think that the flesh always existed with Him, they are saying that God is flesh; but all flesh is resistant to touch, and that which is resistant to touch consists of matter and is composite; and that which is composite admits of dissolution. It is therefore absolutely necessary for them to confirm that He Himself consists of matter, is composed of diverse things, and by nature awaits dissolution. For we are not ignorant of what things the body of Christ consisted when He lived among men after the human manner; for we clearly gather that that body too was fashioned after the likeness of other men from flesh, bones, and blood, from the marks of the nails, and from the blood poured forth through the wound of the lance; and especially because, to those who did not believe when He appeared after the resurrection, the Lord said, *Handle me, and see, for a spirit has not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having* (Luc. xxiv, 39). If, therefore, the divine incarnation, as Apollinaris says, did not have its beginning from the Virgin, but existed even before ^B Abraham and before the creation of all things, it must surely have been such as it was seen by the disciples: solid, indeed, and resistant to touch, and consisting of flesh and bones. Consequently, these things always existed, and there was no descent on His part to our humility, but that which was hidden, being divine by nature, was manifested at the time of the incarnation. What did Arius, or what did Eunomius, who is even worse than he, ever devise for the destruction of the glory of the Only-Begotten that is like what Apollinaris attempts to establish for us in this treatise of his? A certain God, existing before the ages consisting of flesh and bones, possessed of hair, and fashioned from skin, sinews, flesh, and fat, composed of diverse things, and lacking simplicity, is said to be that Word which *was in the beginning, and was with God, and the Word was God* (Joan. 1, 1); who in the ^C last days, having entered into communion with the humility of our nature, became flesh out of the love by which He embraces the human race, and for that reason was tempered with humanity, taking upon Himself our entire nature, so that humanity might be seen in Him with the mixture of divinity, and through those first fruits the whole mass of our nature might be sanctified.

XVI. But I think I should pass over the things which Apollinaris brings forward from individual passages of Holy Scripture, misunderstood for the confirmation of his own dogmas; for as for those things which offer themselves of their own accord to be discussed and refuted, it would be ^D superfluous to examine them one by one.

^A For to testify that He was always in flesh and blood, he puts forward the apostolic phrase which says that through Him we have received redemption, through His blood, the remission of sins, through His flesh. That this looks to another meaning, I imagine no one of sound mind would doubt. For who does not know the divine mystery, that the Prince and Author of our salvation goes after the erring sheep? Now we men are that sheep—we who went astray through sin from that hundred-fold flock of rational creatures, by which the whole human race is signified. He takes the whole sheep upon His own shoulders; for the error was not in some part of the sheep, but since it went astray in its entirety, it is brought back in its entirety; the fleece is not carried by the shepherd while the internal organs are left behind, as Apollinaris would have it. This, being accomplished on the shoulders of the Shepherd—that is, in the Godhead of the Lord—becomes one with Him through the assumption; for this reason He desires to seek out and save that which was lost. ^B Since He found what He was looking for, He took upon Himself that which was found; for the sheep was not moving on its own feet, which had once gone astray, but was carried by the Godhead. For this reason, that which was visible was a sheep—that is, a man. But His footsteps, according to what is written, were not known. For no trace of sin or error was marked upon the human life of Him who bore the sheep upon Himself; but such traces as it was proper for God to leave in the course of life, such were manifested in the reality itself—namely, saving doctrines, healings of diseases, the raising of the dead to life, and other miracles. Having, therefore, taken this sheep upon Himself, the Shepherd became one with it; for this reason He speaks to the flocks with the voice of the sheep. ^C For how would human weakness have endured the impact of a divine voice? But humanly, or as one might say, sheep-like, He discourses with us, saying: "My sheep hear my voice." The shepherd, therefore, who took the sheep upon Himself and speaks to us through it, is both sheep and shepherd: in the one who is assumed, sheep; in the one who has assumed, shepherd.

XVII. Since it was necessary for the good shepherd to lay down His soul for the sheep, in order that by dying He might abolish death, therefore the Author of our salvation, in human nature, became both simultaneously: priest, that is, and lamb, imparting to that which was capable of passion the power and efficacy of death. For since death is nothing other than the dissolution of soul and body, by uniting Himself with both—I mean with soul and body—Christ is separated from neither of them; for "the gifts of God," as the Apostle says, "are without repentance."

^A For He imparts Himself to both the body and the soul; through the soul He opens Paradise to the robber, and through the body He arrests the power of corruption. This is the dissolution of death—to render the corruption, having been extinguished in the life-giving nature, ^B ineffectual. For that which occurred in these things becomes a common benefit and grace of our nature, and thus He joins together all things that were separated through the resurrection—He who is in both, who by His own authority commits the body to the heart of the earth, as it is written (10), yet lays down His soul by His own power: as He says to the Father, "Into Thy hands I commend My spirit," and as He says to the robber, "In Paradise," speaking the truth in both instances. For one must not believe that divine dwelling—since it is called Paradise—to be anywhere else than in the most spacious hand of the Father, as the prophet also says, speaking the word to the Jerusalem above from the person of the Lord: "I have inscribed thy walls upon My hands, and thou art before Mine eyes continually" (12). Thus, then, He also undergoes death, and is not mastered by death. For that which is composite is divided, ^C but that which is incomposite does not admit of dissolution; but the incomposite nature remains intact in the division of the composite, and though the soul departs from the body, it is separated from neither the one nor the other. The proof and argument for this is that power and efficacy which works incorruption in the body and the life of Paradise in the soul. Yet He who is simple and alien to all composition is in no way diffused along with the separation of these; on the contrary, He works the opposite, for He brings that which is divided into union with what is in itself indivisible, and He demonstrates this by saying (15), "God raised Him from the dead." For it is not as with Lazarus or any other of those who were restored to life, who are brought back to life by another’s power—it is not piously thought that the resurrection of the Lord is thus—but the Only-begotten God Himself raised up the man who was commingled with Him, and by separating the soul from the body and again uniting both, in this way the common salvation of nature is accomplished; ^D whence He is also called the Author of life. For in Him who died and rose again for us, the Only-begotten God reconciled the world to Himself, as it were redeeming us, who are all partakers of His flesh and blood, like captives, by His own blood—which is of the same nature as our own. To this it seems the Apostle looks when he says that through Him we have received redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins through His flesh. This is our view, which we have understood from the cited words of the Apostle (15), and not as that Apollinaris did (16). Let him test it who has set his mind to judge.

^A Let him judge also, regarding these two opinions, which is more pious: whether, as we say, the divine glory dwells in our land in an economical way, or whether, as he thinks, the flesh is not something added to the godhead for the sake of doing good to men, but is consubstantial and connatural with it.

^B XVIII. But as for the question of whether the prophet Zechariah inclines toward the other of these two opinions in his obscure words, I think it superfluous for us to inquire, whether his words look toward the Lord Himself or toward some other person. For he says: "Sword, awake against my shepherd, and against the man of my fellowship." We, for our part, think that the word aims this sword threateningly against those who act unjustly toward their fellow kinsmen; Apollinaris, on the other hand, says that the sword is raised against the Lord because of the title of "shepherd," not knowing that in many places of Scripture the Word designates those who are set in the rank of princes as "pastors" and "shepherds."

Furthermore, what he draws by force from the Epistle to the Hebrews to prove this contains an absurdity so manifest in the arguments derived therefrom that it is easy for anyone, even one with a little wisdom, to detect it. ^C For since it is written: "In these last days God has spoken to us in a Son, who long ago spoke to our fathers through the prophets in many parts and in many ways," he says that this is a proof that the humanity of the God who appeared to us existed before the ages. For he says as follows, in his interpretation of the Apostle: "It is manifest in these words that the very man who speaks the things of the Father to us is God, the creator of the ages, the radiance of his glory, and the figure of his substance, inasmuch as he is God by his own Spirit and does not have a God within himself other than himself; and he himself through himself—that is, through the flesh—purged the world of sins." These things Apollinaris says verbatim, and nothing has been altered by us in his stated words.

If, therefore, the man who speaks is the creator of the ages, as this writer thinks, and the flesh is the radiance of the paternal glory, and the form of a servant ^D represents the substance of God, it no longer seems to me right to fight against these statements of his, but I think it better to weep for the stupidity of those who allow themselves to be led away by such novel utterances. Is this man, who speaks with us in the human manner and with our own voice, who spat with his mouth and made clay with his hand, who put his fingers into the ears of the deaf and touched the sick and the dead, who rested from labor with sleep and sitting, who wept and was afflicted with sorrow and sadness, who suffered hunger and desired food and asked for water—is this man, as far as that flesh and humanity are concerned, to be understood as being prior to the creation of all things, and is the composite and solid nature of the flesh to be called God? Let every pious person stop...

^A their ears, and let not the divine and incorrupt dogmas be defiled by those who, petulantly puffed up, disgrace the Godhead with the attributes of carnal affections. For who is ignorant that God, who was manifested to us in the flesh, is according to the principle of pious tradition, incorporeal, invisible, simple, infinite, and without limit, and has always been and is, and exists everywhere, and pervades all created things, while according to that which appeared, he was seen encompassed by a human boundary? For it is absolutely necessary that every body be contained by some surface. And this surface of the body is the limit of that which is contained within it; and whatever is limited by anything is circumscribed by a definite quantity: but that which is defined cannot be infinite. And yet the Prophet says, *Of his greatness there is no end* (Ps. 144:3). If, therefore, the divine nature, as our author says, is flesh; and this is necessarily terminated by the limit of a surface, how does the greatness of God, as the Prophet says, proceed to infinity? Or how is that which is infinite known from that which is finite, and the immense understood from that which has a limit? Or rather, as we have already said above, how can strength arise from death? For if, as he says, the man himself who has spoken is the creator of the aeons, and he is the same one who through himself, that is, through the flesh, as Apollinaris interprets, created all things; and yet flesh in the divine oracle is called weak and feeble: then Apollinaris supposes nothing other than that power, strength, virtue, and all lofty and God-befitting conceptions that can be conceived by the mind, derive their origin from weakness and infirmity.

XIX. And this, indeed, is not so impious, but the discourse, progressing to further matters, in the discussion that follows, attacks the Father himself with blasphemies. ^C For he says that the man is the radiance of God’s glory, and that in the carnal God, whom he has thrust upon us like an idol fashioned by the vain contrivances of his own reasonings, the substance of God is represented. Just as, therefore, a ray has a kinship with the sun, and the light that shines from a lamp is related to the lamp, and as the image of a man indicates his human substance, so absolutely, if that which appeared to us shone forth from the glory of the Father, and its image of substance is flesh, it follows effectively that by consequence the nature of the Father is also carnal. For it cannot be said that the incorporeal ^D [is known] from the body.

^A nor that the unseen is made to shine forth in the visible. But such as is the glory, such obviously is its radiance, and such as is the figure, such essentially is the substance; so that if the latter is body, one must not think that the former is in any way incorporeal. He also makes mention of the faith written at Nicaea, in which the common assembly of the Fathers proclaimed the *homousion* with a great voice. Now no one would call that which is of a different kind *homousion* and consubstantial; but for those to whom there is one and the same definition of substance, for these the name consubstantial is entirely appropriate. If, therefore, the Son is God having flesh, and that very thing exists by his own proper nature, inasmuch as he was flesh according to the name that is eternally appropriate to him—and that he is consubstantial with the Father is not doubted even by the writer himself—then those things are consubstantial with one another which are defined by the same definition of substance. Therefore, Apollinaris assumes a certain human and carnal nature for the Father as well, so that he may preserve the name of *homousion* in both, that is, in the Father and the Son, as one or the other of the two; either by calling the Father incorporeal, he will join the divinity of the Son ^B to a different substance; or by confessing the commonality of the divinity and the substance to be the same in the Father and in the Son, he will make the nature of the divinity in the Father also to be flesh. But, as if correcting this absurdity, in what precedes he says, interpreting the utterance of Zacharias as he saw fit, that it was said from the person of the Father concerning the Son, that it was *symphylon*, which is the same as connatural and consubstantial. Whether he opined this rightly or not is a matter for another investigation; but what he attempts to prove is this: He shows, he says, by these words that the prophetic discourse means that the Son is consubstantial with God not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit which was united to the flesh. How then is his carnal God united to flesh before the foundation of the world? For when ^C the ages were not, nor was there any other thing of created realities, the flesh is the very last and smallest of those things which have come to be in creation. To what flesh, then, was the divinity united, when human nature had not yet been brought forth into existence? But Apollinaris knows of some other flesh besides that of man. And how, he says, is this the very man who spoke to us the things of the Father, the same who is God, the Creator of the ages? Who will interpret for us the absurdity of these new riddles? A man before becoming man, and flesh more ancient than its own creation, and that which came to be at the end of times ^D being pre-eternal.

and all other such things which he confuses in his treatise. ^B But let the writer, as it seems good to him, wander at his own discretion through the rugged paths of his reasonings; we, however, having brought forward the apostolic doctrine, which he himself also mentions, to confute his impious opinions, shall hasten to other parts of his treatise. "Who, being in the form of God," he says. He did not say, "having a form similar to God," which is said of him who was made according to the likeness of God, but "being in the very form of God"; for all things that are the Father’s are found in the Son. Therefore, [He is] also eternal, without quantity, immaterial, and bodiless, so that the form of the paternal character is preserved in the Son through all things. And when he says, "being equal to God," what difference or discrepancy does this equality allow us to understand between the Father and the Son? By what reasoning could equality apply to things that differ from one another by nature? For if one is fleshly by nature, and the other is devoid of flesh, how could anyone make that which is of such a kind equal to that which is not of such a kind? "He emptied Himself," he says, "taking the form of a servant." What is the form of a servant? The body, certainly; for we have heard from the Fathers that it is nothing else but this. Therefore, he who says that the Son took the form of a servant, which form is flesh itself, ^C he indeed also asserts that He, being one thing according to the divine form, assumed a servile form, which likewise by nature is something else than the form of God. But even the term "emptied" clearly shows that He was not always that which appeared to us, but was indeed in the fullness of the divinity equal to God, inaccessible and unapproachable to every creature, and much less contained by the short and narrow compass of human nature; but that He was then circumscribed by the transient and fragile nature of the flesh, when, as the Apostle says, He emptied His ineffable glory of divinity and diminished it to the measure of our nature, so that what He was in Himself was great and perfect and incomprehensible, but what He assumed did not exceed the measure of our nature. For He says, "in the likeness and habit of man," being made such, as one who did not have from the beginning in Himself the likeness of such a nature, nor was He configured to any bodily form. For how could a shape of form be imprinted upon something incorporeal? But He becomes in a shape then, when being shaped, He puts it around Himself. And this is the nature of the body. ^D Being found, therefore, as a man; for He was indeed a man, even if not a man in all respects, yet as a man, because of the mystery of the maternal virginity; so that it might be manifest from this that He did not serve in all things the laws of human nature, but entering into life in a way that was becoming to God, and not needing...

^A a constitution of marriage by any work, He is found to be not a common man in every respect, because He was fashioned by a different workmanship from the rest of men, but yet as man. And in this way He humbled Himself, becoming man without change. For if He had existed as such from the beginning, in what respect would the humiliation have taken place? But now, the Most High humbled Himself through the union with the lowness of our nature. For having been united to the form of a servant, which He received, and having become one with it, He makes the sufferings of the servant His own; and just as occurs in us through the natural connection of the limbs, if anything happens to the tip of the nail, the whole body is affected together with the injured part, the sensation extending through the whole frame; so He who was united to our nature makes our sufferings His own, as Isaiah says, that He Himself took our infirmities and bore our diseases, enduring for us the wound, that by His stripes we might be healed; not that the divinity was wounded, but the man ^B who was joined through the union to the divinity, whose nature is capable of receiving stripes. And these things come to pass, in order that the path of wickedness might again be undone through the same paths. For since through the disobedience of man 45, death 46 entered in, for this reason it is banished through the obedience of the second man. For this cause He becomes obedient even unto death, that by obedience He might heal the transgression caused by disobedience, and through the resurrection from the dead might cause the death that had entered in with the disobedience to vanish. For the resurrection of the man from death 48 is the disappearance of death. Therefore, he says, God also highly exalted Him. This is, as it were, a seal of the preceding thought. For it is clear that the Most High does not stand in need of exaltation, but that ^C which is low is raised to height, becoming now what it was not before. For the human nature, having been united to the Lord, is exalted together with the divinity, and that which is exalted is that which is lifted up from the low state; but the low state is the form of a servant, which, through the exaltation, becomes Christ and Lord. And since the man according to Christ was called by a name appropriate to the human path of succession, through the mystery announced at the Virgin by Gabriel, and the human element, as it has been said, was named Jesus; but the divine nature is not to be circumscribed by a name; and the two things ^D have become one through the commixture: for this reason God also is named from the human. For at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, and the man becomes above every name, which is proper to the divinity, which cannot be enslaved by any verbal designation.

For just as by means of the man the divinity is named, so does that which was raised up from the lowly state to the divinity become above a name; and just as the ignominy of the form of a servant has its reference to God, who was mingled with the servant, so also does the adoration of the divinity, which is offered by every created being, occur to Him who is united with the divinity. And thus in the name of Jesus Christ every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. Amen.

XXII. But just as if blushing for himself, and affected with shame by the ineptitude of his own words, Apollinaris ^B seems, in a way, to subvert what he had established by various arguments, nor does he seem to wish to admit any other similitude of men in the Son than an adventitious one. For he says: "Behold the equality of the same Jesus Christ with the Father existing beforehand, and the similitude with men coming upon Him afterward." He appears to repent of the things he said before, and would that this were the case, provided he would put this absurd opinion out of his mind and we might desist from refuting him. But it is apparent from what he does that, by the good intention he here puts forward, he is preparing steps for another absurdity. For he says ^C literally: "And what is more manifest than these things to show that one was not united with the other, that is, perfect God with perfect man?" Now that this statement has no connection with what preceded it will certainly be clear to all those who know how to follow the intent of writers. For how does the equality with the Father existing beforehand, and the similitude with men coming upon Him—as he loves to say—show that He is not a perfect man, through whom perfect God became man? For it is just as if one, saying that the heaven is distant from the earth, were then to assert that from this it is made manifest that lead is heavier than tin in an equal ^D measure, and should think that gravity is the same thing as the distance of heaven from the earth: so no one would ever say that it is demonstrated from the fact that the Son’s similitude with men is granted to have been added to Him anew, that the humanity through which God becomes a participant in our nature is imperfect. But I shall postpone for a little while the demonstration of the impiety and foolishness of such an opinion. Now, however, following word for word what has been written by him hereafter, I shall attempt to refute his treatise, where it is nevertheless ready at hand to be refuted. For he says there is no perfect God with a perfect man. For the time being, whether he named the subjects of what was said as imperfect here, he has left it ambiguous, and to the

ambiguity of what is signified the mind looks equally to both, nor is it possible to learn from what we have heard whether he deems one of them to be imperfect, whether God or man, or whether he supposes that this is said equally of both. He says that he is indeed God in spirit, possessing the glory of God; but in body ^A a man, bearing the ignoble form of men. He called him God, he called him man; but it is known to all that the signification of these names is not the same, but the divinity is explained by some words, and the humanity by others. For God is the cause of all good things, always one and the same, and like to Himself, who never was not, and never will not be: but man, on the one hand, is disposed similarly to the nature of irrational creatures, being governed like them through flesh and sense; yet by the addition of the intellect he is separated from the irrational creatures, and in this he possesses the proper quality of his nature. For no one, in defining man, would define him by flesh and bones and sensory organs; nor, by mentioning the nutritional and transformative ^B power, would anyone have displayed the property of human nature; but by the intellectual and rational, he has pointed out the man. It is therefore all the same whether one explains the nature through the name, or through what is uniquely concomitant to the nature. For he who says "man" has indicated the "rational," and he who has named the "rational" has proved the "man" by this verbal expression. Therefore, even Apollinaris, in naming God and man, if he embraced with this word the meanings visible in the divinity, he would not have harmed the signification of "man" through his interpretation. But if he is called man, the calling is surely true, and not falsely named; and the truth of the name is demonstrated in his being a rational animal, ^C he who is so named. But reason is entirely from the intellect, so that if there is a man, he is of necessity said to be endowed with intellect; but if he lacks intellect, he cannot even be a man.

XXIII. But man, he says, he was in the body, bearing the ignoble form of men.

is acknowledged to be the virtue of men, then baseness is altogether its vice ^A. But Apollinaris says that God assumed the base form of men. If, therefore, baseness is in vice, and vice is the turpitude of the choosing will—yet it is the faculty of thought that chooses, and thought is a certain movement of the mind 70—then he who perceives human baseness in relation to God does not strip of the mind the man through whom God associated with human life. And this, indeed, concurs with the divine Scriptures, namely, that He was made sin for us 68, that is, that He joined to Himself the sinful soul of man. The Lord, he says, appeared in the form of a servant; was this servant, whose form the Lord put on, whole, or was he maimed? For that which is lacking and mutilated in the completion of a living being, one might reasonably call a deformity. Not a man, he says, but as a man, because he was not consubstantial 72 with man according to that which is most important. If he is not consubstantial, he is by all means of a different substance; and in those things in which the account of substance is different, there is neither the same nature nor the same name. The substance of fire is one thing, and that of water is another, and the names of the two are also different. But Peter and Paul, because they are of one nature, therefore have a common name of substance; for each of them is a man. If, therefore, He was some other thing according to substance, and not a man, but was patterned to look like a man until 73 the appearance, but in truth differed in nature; let him say that all things are a sort of illusion and a deceptive phantasy: that according to him the eating was false, the sleep was false, all the miracles wrought in the healing of diseases were non-existent, the crucifixion did not take place, nor the laying in the tomb, nor the resurrection from the passion; but all things seemed to be so, while in reality, according to this writer, there was nothing at all of the things that were seen. For if He was not man, how ^C did the things recounted about Him come to pass? And by what reason could anyone say He was a man, who is foreign to human substance? For, he says 74, He was not consubstantial with man according to the most important part; but he who removes the most important part from man, which is the mind, has shown the remainder to be a beast; and a beast is not a man. Then he says, Having humbled Himself in the flesh 75, but having been superexalted by God with the divine exaltation. This, again, is more foolish than the former assertions, and more impious. He says one thing was humbled, and another was superexalted. The flesh, he says, was humbled, although it stands in no need of being humbled, as it possesses humility by nature; but he says the divinity was superexalted, and yet the Most High is not subject to exaltation. Where, then, was the divinity superexalted, which is above all things and stands higher than all exaltation? But that which is by nature humble is exalted, even if the writer should not wish it, just as the argument concerning these things has been set forth briefly a little before.

^A XXIV. Again, like those who speak perversely in their sleep, leaving aside the logical consequence of the case, he makes use of our own arguments and intermingles with his own words whatever one might say who thinks soundly concerning the doctrine. For he distinguishes that which is glorified from Him who possesses the glory. For he says that He is glorified as man, but that He has glory before the world, as God existing before the ages. Thus far he is well-minded; but if his words had stopped within these limits, perhaps someone might have thought that, led by repentance, he had approached more closely to sound sentiments. But now, like those who walk along winding and self-returning paths, he embraces this sound and correct sentiment with a twist of his words, and soon runs back to the same stadium of error, and having used many insults against us, and having equated our faith with the errors of the Jews and Greeks, he again resumes in his discourse ^B the vomit which he had already spewed out in his previous writings, attributing to Christ, through the vanity of his words, a pre-mundane flesh, and saying that the Son was born of a woman as an incarnate mind; not that He became flesh in the Virgin, but that He passed through her as if through a channel, and that then, at that time, that which was manifested—being a fleshy God, or as he himself names it, an "incarnate mind"—was revealed just as He was before the ages. Therefore he says that He is called the Lord of glory who was crucified, and is called the Lord of hosts by the prophecy, and that He makes use of those authoritative and lordly utterances: "I say to you," and, "I command you," and, "I work," and whatever else carries a sense of higher dignity. What then will this noble fellow say? Where will he place the breast, the swaddling clothes, the fleeting and flowing life, the ^C gradual growth of the body, the sleep, the labor, the obedience to his parents, the distress, the sorrow, the desire for the Passover, the request for water, the partaking of food, the bonds, the slaps, the wounds from the scourges, the carrying of thorns upon the head, the wearing of purple, the insult by the reed, the lance, the vinegar, the nails, the gall, the shroud, the burial, the monument, the stone? How will he attach these to God? For if his incarnate God, that which appeared through Mary, was always this, and what was seen was divinity, then the divinity suffers all these things: it is nursed, it is swaddled, it is fed, it grows, it is filled, it is emptied, it sleeps, it is grieved, it is distressed, ^D it moans, it thirsts

it runs to the fig tree, it ignores the fruit of that tree and the time for it, it knows not the day or the hour, it is beaten, it is bound, it is buffeted, it receives nails through itself, it bleeds, it becomes dead, it is buried, it is laid in a new tomb. Does he concede that all these things are proper and connatural to the divinity that existed before the ages, and that it would not have grown, had it not been nursed, and that it could not have lived at all, had it not repaired its collapsed strength by the consumption of food? How, then, does his fleshly God ignore that day and hour? How does he not know the season of figs, that at the time of Passover fruit suitable for eating would not be found on that tree? Let him say, who ^B is the one who is ignorant? Who is the one who is grieved? Who is the one who is constrained by helplessness? Who is the one who cried out that he had been forsaken by God? If the divinity of the Father and the Son is one, and from whom does the forsaking come, which he proclaimed upon the cross? For if it is the divinity that is suffering, and the orthodox confess that the Son has one divinity with the Father—yet the one suffering says, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"—how is the one essence of the divinity divided in passion, so that one part forsakes and another is forsaken; one part becomes dead, while the other remains in life; one is killed, while the other raises that which was dead? For either he will refuse to confess that the divinity of the Father and the Son is one, and by this means will be caught agreeing with Arius; or if, opposing Arius, he says that the divinity of both is one and the same, he will be in complete disagreement with himself, since he cannot by any means establish the fable he has fabricated from falling apart on all sides. Rather, he will by necessity attribute these lowly and humble voices and states of mind to the human, and will confess that the divine nature has remained immune to all perturbation and affection, and subject to no change, even in its communion with human sufferings. And of this fact, he who spoke concerning him is himself a witness: "He is glorified as a man, rising from ignobility, yet he possesses glory before the creation of the world, as God existing before all things." For ignobility is in every way the passible nature of the flesh; but glory is, therefore, the eternal, impassible, and immortal power.

XXV. But lest anyone think to slander us in what we have said, I shall bring forward the very words of Apollinaris, into whose meaning we have just inquired. "For the Greeks," he says, "and the Jews are clearly ^D unbelievers, inasmuch as they refuse even to hear that God was born of a woman." Why then, when speaking of this birth, does he pass over the flesh in silence, even though that which was born of the flesh was in every way flesh?

^A But because he wishes the flesh that was born to be divinity, and intends to argue that God did not appear in the flesh, he says: "But God, existing as God before the ages, was later born through a woman, and came into the world for the experience of sufferings and to undergo the other necessities of human nature." By saying these things, he does not grant Him to be even a man; but he subjects Him to sufferings as a man, while he does not impart to Him a human nature. For how could that be a man which is said not to be from the earth? For Scripture says of the human race that it came to be from Adam, and that the first man was brought forth from the earth by divine power. This is why Luke, too, when drawing up the genealogy of Him who was thought to be the son of Joseph, says, "Who was of Adam," ^B tracing back the origin of His generation in an ordered series through each of the fathers. Therefore, he who did not come to be from the race of men is something else entirely, and not a man. So, if He is neither a man, having nothing of the human race, nor God, since He is not incorporeal, let his disciples and advocates of this deceit say what this "fleshy" god of the writer might be. ^C "But," he says, "Greeks and Jews would have accepted it, if we said that He who was born was a divine man, like Elijah." And which of the Greeks accepted the miracles concerning Elijah as true—that fire, shaped in two forms, one in the likeness of a chariot and the other in the form of horses, moved in a direction contrary to its own nature, being carried from above to below, and that Elijah, raised on high on the fiery chariot, driving the fire, was preserved unharmed in the flame, the fire drawing the fire—that which was in the horses, the fire that was in the chariot? For if someone were to receive these things in the manner required, by these very things the argument for the reception of the mystery would be clearly shown ^D as he sees in the narrative a certain typical prophecy regarding the Lord’s incarnation, prefigured through the events that occurred. For just as fire, while light by nature, is brought down to earth by divine power, and Elijah, surrounded by the heavenly fire, is lifted up along with it as it returns to its natural motion—so too, a certain immaterial and invisible essence, the power of the Most High, having taken on the servile form, the substance which He had from the Virgin, brought it up to His own height, transforming it into a divine and incorruptible nature; so that he who is begrudging toward this would not even subscribe to the wonder-working concerning Elijah; but he who has learned beforehand in him the truth sketched out would not be much opposed to the truth itself.

Then he turns his railings against us, who do not accept the myth he has fabricated, and

XXVI. Then he turns his invective against us who reject the story cooked up by him, using these...

words: ^A *“But those who in the guise of faith are faithless toward God born of a woman and crucified by the Jews, are ashamed in the same way as they are* (and he himself will be ashamed of them).” Now, who does not know that to use curses against adversaries is the prerogative of those who are weak in the matters they are striving for? We, for our part, say only this: that between the two chasms of error set before us—on one side the fall into the error of Apollinaris, and on the other the fall into that of Arius—the destruction is equal for those who fall into either; except that, in the selection of evils, the fracture caused by the Arian error seems the lighter of the two. For both drag the incorrupt nature of the Only-Begotten down to something lower. But Arius assimilates the Lord of the angels to the incorporeal nature of the angels, declaring that both He and they exist by creation and are equally inferior to the uncreated nature. This man, ^B however, pushes the absurdity so far that he judges Christ to be of no greater dignity than a man who is inferior to the angels, and defines His nature as being carnal. Now, by as much as an incorporeal nature is superior to bodies, by so much is the impiety of Arius more preferable than the error of Apollinaris. Who, therefore, is the one who, while expounding the mystery of the Incarnation from the Virgin, appears faithless in the guise of faith? I shall place before the public gaze both our faith, which is mocked by this writer of myths, and his own opinion. For we say that God, being by essence immaterial, invisible, and incorporeal, through a certain benevolent dispensation toward the end of the completion of all things—when wickedness had already reached its ^C highest point—was then, for the abolition of sin, mingled with human nature, just like a sun being introduced into a dark cave, dissipating the darkness by the presence of its light. For by taking our filth upon Himself, He is not Himself defiled by the impurity, but within Himself He purifies the filth; for *“the light,”* he says, *“shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it.”* This is what also happens in the art of medicine; for when the cure is applied to the disease, the sickness disappears, it is not transferred into the medical art. This is our view. But he says that God was incarnate from the beginning, and so that visible and palpable body, which in the last days was born of a woman and gradually grew through the additions of human nourishment, ^D that very thing is what existed before all created things, what created both men and all other things, both visible and invisible, what also feels fatigue and receives the experience of death in the sorrow of its soul. I do not know how this "wise man," when it comes to the heavens, the earth, and all the other marvels that were established in the creation of the universe, testifies that their Creator underwent no labor, but when it comes to the Jew...

in Galilee, he says that he was in labor; and that he turned the rock into pools of water for the Israelites, but that he himself asked for a drink of water from a Samaritan woman; and that for forty years he did not grow weary while pouring out heavenly food for so many myriads of Jews, but that he himself ran to the fig tree in hope of food which was not there. Since such is the opinion held by both parties regarding the faith, let the prudent and wise listener judge for himself who is the one who is faithless under the guise of faith. ^B

XXVII. But he says that we claim that the one who was crucified had nothing divine in his own nature, not even that which is most important, namely, the spirit. But a defense against this calumny is readily available from the negation. For if Apollinaris thinks that the spirit is the mind, no Christian says that the man united with God is a man only halfway, but rather that the entire man was united to the divine power. Whatever names, therefore, one may wish to use to designate the parts of man—whether mind, or spirit, or heart; for these three are said by Scripture to refer to the governing part of man: “Create a clean heart in me, O God” (Ps. 1, 12); and, “The discerning man will acquire ^C governance” (Prov. 1, 5); and, “No one knows the things of a man, except the spirit that is in him” (1 Cor. 11, 11);—so, then, we do not say that Christ was without breath, without mind, or without heart through the overshadowing of the power of the Most High and the coming of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this reproach would not look toward us, as if we said that that man was born without having the spirit within himself, which is the mind; but it looks toward that very author of the reproach, who attacks us with the insults ^D with which he himself deserved to be struck. For he who calls the mind "spirit," yet says that the man according to Christ does not have a mind, is the very one who establishes that the Lord does not have a spirit. But what is the further charge he makes against us? He says that we act unjustly by claiming that the man possessed something else greater than his own nature, namely, the divinity dwelling within him. But if this is set down as a crime, we do not shun the accusation, being rejected together with the Apostle. For having learned such things from him, we believe that Christ, being in the form of God according to that which is perceived by the mind, was made in the form of a servant according to that which appeared outwardly. But if the divine form is more excellent than the servile person, certainly that which appeared outwardly was by no means of equal dignity with that which lay hidden within. Therefore, that which was visible according to the flesh, and which associated with men, had in itself something more precious than itself, which our writer feigns to be a crime against the faith. Yet the Apostle also says that in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily (Col. 2, 9); and when he says "in him," he did not signify half of the one being referred to, but included the whole subject in the meaning. If, then, it was a human body in which the divinity dwelt, and the body is not soul-less; and it is peculiar to the human soul...

^A to possess an intellectual and rational part—for if this is separated from the human being, as we have often said, what remains is that of the brute beasts—then it is not us that this outstanding man has been attacking with insults, but rather the Apostle, or indeed, the great voice of John himself, who says, "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." For he did not speak of a part of us, but by the plural form, he signified everything that is understood in the human nature, first distinguishing the Word from the flesh, and then, in this way, leading them into union. For the Word was by Himself, and He was with God; and what God was, [the Word was also—for He was God]. But when He came to His own, and shone in the darkness, then the Word became flesh, having been made flesh in the Virgin by His own power. Let him, therefore, refrain from his insults against us, so that he may not involve the saints in the same reproaches.

^B XXVIII. Furthermore, passing over those things which have been interposed here by Apollinaris, by which he thinks that those who do not hold the same views as he does are denying the mystery of the Incarnation, I shall mention only one of those things which, in the heat of accusation, he brings forward to stir up calumny against us. For he says that unless we approve his words, it is necessary for us to say that Christ did not exist before His earthly birth, nor before all creation, and that He is not of the same genus as God. Yet we do confess that Christ existed already before He was born on earth, if indeed it is not doubted that His flesh is of earthly nature and constitution. But as for saying that He is of the same genus as God, God forbid! No Christian would fashion words so lowly and so foreign to the divine majesty as to proclaim that He who is truly God is of the same genus as God, or kin to God, and not truly God. ^C Nor would Eunomius himself shrink from using this expression of yours regarding the Lord; for he, too, denying the true divinity in Christ, might say that He is kin to God in that way, just as those who embrace His faith become "concorporeal" and co-participants with Christ—not being the same thing as the Lord is, but communicating in Him, and obtaining one and the same name with Him of whom they are participants. Thus, while he turns it into a crime against us that we do not say those things which are confessed among all followers of the true faith, by that very fact he confirms that our position is pious and subject to no reproach.

Then, to prove that the flesh is divinity, he adds to what was said ^D above: "For who," he says, "is the holy one from the womb?" as if he had not read the Scripture according to Jeremiah, concerning whom it says, "Before I formed you in the womb, I sanctified you." For not only from the womb, but even before existence, he is testified by Scripture to be holy. But also from the womb...

He who leaped in the womb of his mother; he who received the voice of the mother of the Lord with exultation—he too may be from the womb a saint, just as the voice of the angel concerning him declares, when it says, *And he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb*. ^A But he also adds this to what has been said: "Who is the wise man who is not taught?" But we say that the wisdom from God, which is Christ, is not taught, but is a teacher; yet we do not doubt that that portion of our flesh which has been united to divine Wisdom has, by participation, received the good of wisdom, being persuaded by the Gospel, which thus narrates: *And Jesus increased in age, and wisdom, and grace*. ^B Just as in the body the gradual increase, by the cooperation of food, advances toward the perfection of nature, so also in the soul the progress toward the perfection of wisdom is added through training to those who seek it. "Who," he says, "works the things of God by his own authority? How does he diminish the ineffable greatness of the Lord with childish arguments?" For to perform the works of God by one's own authority also belongs to those men who have been deemed worthy of divine power, such as was Elijah, who by his own authority caused rain to fall and to cease for men, who called down fire upon his enemies, who multiplied the flour in the jar by a wondrous cultivation, who caused the oil to flow in the cruse, and who, by breathing, granted life to the dead, and whatever other things the story records about him. ^C So there is nothing beyond man in performing some of the miracles by divine power through the authority of God; but what is truly beyond man is that he himself is the surpassing power. This, indeed, is believed by us and by all who have received the Word in truth.

As for the distinction he has added to what was said, being incomprehensible, since it is not fitting for us to refute it in a hurried manner, we shall leave it for the judgment of learned men to examine. For what does he mean by, "Distinguishing the operation according to the flesh, but equalizing it according to the spirit"? This he added to the word of the Gospel which says, *My Father worketh until now, and I work*. ^D If anyone has the power for an apology for the foolish, let him stand by his argument and say what he means when he again adds to the things said similar things, which run thus: "He possesses," he says, "again the equality in power, and the distinction of the operation according to the flesh, by which," he says, "he did not make all alive, but some, whom he willed." For we, having grasped the simple and unadorned meaning of the divine Scripture, thus concerning the matters mentioned— XXIX. Furthermore, since the obscure and incomprehensible distinction which he adds does not befit us to refute more accurately, we shall leave it to be examined by the judgment of the learned. For what does it mean: "Distinguishing indeed the operation according to the flesh; but equalizing it according to the spirit"? Which he added to these words of the Gospel, *My Father worketh until now, and I work*. If any of the foolish are able to offer a defense for his thoughts, let him support this statement and say in what sense he again adds similar things to the words just cited, which are as follows: "Who indeed," he says, "possesses equality in power, and the distinction of the operation according to the flesh, by which," he says, "he did not vivify all, but some, whom he willed." For we, having grasped the simple and obvious meaning from the divine Scripture...

^A regarding the matters mentioned, we determine that when we hear the Lord saying, "The Father raises the dead and gives them life, and the Son gives life to whom he wills," we should not understand this as though some were rejected by the life-giving will, but since we have both heard and believe that all things of the Father are also the Son's, we clearly perceive the will of the Father, as [the will] of all things, in the Son. If, therefore, the paternal will is in the Son—yet the Father, as the Apostle says, "wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"—then surely He who possesses all that is the Father's, and has the whole Father in Himself, altogether has in Himself, along with the rest of the Father's good things, also His saving will. If, therefore, He does not lack this perfect will, it is absolutely clear that those whom the Father wills to be vivified, He also vivifies Himself, not being found inferior in the philanthropic will, as Apollinaris claims when he says that He willed that some, not all, should be vivified. For it is not on account of the divine will that some are saved ^B and others perish—or in that case, the cause of those perishing would revert to that [will]—but it happens that some are saved or perish according to the disposition of those who receive the Word. But he adds to his arguments that "no one died or rose again by his own authority." And having said this, he brings forward the voice of the Gospel: "No one takes my soul from me; I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it again." What kind of soul, rational or irrational? I would ask those who associate an irrational soul with God. If they say it is irrational, they would call Christ a beast, and not a man; but if they say it is rational, what else do they suppose the intellect to be besides reason? For the Word is not an articulate sound, but a movement of thought, and it becomes the beginning and basis of reason. Therefore, he who speaks of a rational soul has also confessed it to be intellectual; ^C and the intellect is a movement and activity of the mind. How could the mind act if it were not present, if they mark the Lord's soul as void of mind? So if the Lord has a soul which He takes and lays down by His own authority—and it is not a bestial or irrational soul, but one of the human composition—it is confessed that He has indeed assumed a human and intellectual soul. Consequently, it necessarily follows that the human soul assumed by Christ existed as endowed with mind.

^A Since I have already spoken of the grain which dies and so sprouts with many grains, and since these things are on our side and confirm our own argument, I shall willingly pass over them. For what is the grain that dies, and by its own ear of resurrection gathers a heap of grains within itself? I do not imagine anyone is so ignorant of divine dogmas as not to see that the mystery of the passion was fulfilled in His humanity. The proof of this argument is found in the fact that we also die with Him, are buried with Him, and rise again with Him. For it is easy for those who wish to imitate beings of the same kind; but it is impossible for those of an inferior nature to be likened to things that far transcend them. Wherefore, if it is flesh that endured death, it would certainly be easier for us who live in the flesh to imitate death through death. But if the Godhead has died, how shall we who are in the flesh die together with the Godhead? Flesh dies together with flesh, and rises again with flesh. But if the Godhead has suffered this, as Apollinaris wishes, one must seek other godheads who will die and rise again together with the Godhead; ^B for just as Christ died and rose, so too shall we, says the Apostle. What are we according to our own nature? Is it divine power, or blood and flesh, as the Scripture says? For this reason, He who became like us for our sake has communicated with us in flesh and blood. Therefore, what we are in essence, the One who died for us also was, and the imitation of Him is set before those who are of the same kind as He. The impiety of the view that declares the Godhead to be mortal is clearly demonstrated by what happens to us human beings ourselves. For in the common death of men, what is it that dies and undergoes corruption? Is it not the case that the flesh is resolved into the earth, while the mind remains with the soul, and is not harmed in its essence by the dissolution of the body? A proof of this is that the rich man remembers those who were still on earth, and entreats Abraham on behalf of those kin to him. No one would attribute to madness the fact that one has some concern for kin and loved ones after he has known that his own affairs are concluded. If, therefore, our mind remains even after death without any loss or change, ^C how is it logical that that tripartite God of Apollinaris should have undergone a carnal death? In what way did He die, or how did He suffer the dissolution of death? For it is hidden from no one at all that death is the mutual separation of soul and body; but as for the soul and the mind itself, how is it divided from itself so as to receive death? If, then, our soul is incapable of receiving death, how does it receive death—let those who fragment Christ into parts tell us! ^D

^A XXXI. But they are troubled, he says, by the disturbance of the infidels. He uses contumely against us, calling those who accept those evangelical words without examination "troubled infidels"—words which say, "If it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will, but thine, be done." To these he adds his own words, which are as follows: "And they do not remember," he says, "that this will was designated not as that of a man from the earth, as they themselves think, but of God who came down from heaven." Who has ever produced such a fabrication? I do not say among those condemned for heresy, but I do not believe even the father of falsehood and lying himself could invent anything that would carry a more atrocious blasphemy than these things that Apollinaris has uttered. Do you think that our writer understands what he is saying? God, who descended from heaven, circumscribes the proper will of His divinity, and does not wish what it wishes to come to pass. ^B Therefore, the wills of the Father and the Son are divided. And how then could the will be common to both? And in what way could the identity of the nature be demonstrated through the diversity of wills? For it is absolutely necessary that the volition should be in accord with the nature, just as the Lord says somewhere: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Now the fruit of the nature is the resolve of the will, so that if the nature is good, the fruit is good; if evil, it is evil. If, therefore, the fruit of the will is different in the Father and the Son, they necessarily confess the nature of both to be different. Why, then, is Arius attacked? Why do they not desert to Eunomius, who, dividing the nature of the Father and the Son, also divides the volition along with the nature, and from this fact most especially constructs the diversity of their substance, because while he separates the inferior and subordinate one, namely the Son, from the superior and universally excellent One, that is, the Father, he at the same time tears apart the very logic of the divinity?

XXXII. But let us again repeat what was said by him. "They do not remember," he says, "that this will was designated not as that of a man from the earth, as they themselves think, but of God who came down from heaven." Of what will does our writer speak? Of that, indeed, which the Lord does not wish to come to pass, while He says to the Father, "Not my will, but thine be done." Does he understand into what a contradiction his own discourse falls? The passion draws near, and the traitor with a multitude of armed men is practically upon Him, and then this kind of prayer is made. He who thus prays, is he man or God?

^A If he thinks that he who prays is God, he perceives in Him an imbecility equal to that in men. How then is He God, who has no good from Himself, but is in need of supernal assistance? Furthermore, how does the Godhead condemn its own will? Was that which He willed good or evil? For if it were good, why is that which He willed not carried through to completion? But if it were evil, what fellowship does the Godhead have with evil? But, as I said, the author does not perceive that he is perversely turning his argument in the opposite direction. For if it is the voice of the only-begotten Son of God that says: *Not my will be done, but thine*, then the statement itself is always turning back upon itself through a certain contradiction, and nowhere finds a firm standing. For he who does not wish ^B his own will to be done, absolutely wills this very thing—that it should not be done. How then will the prayer reach its completion, if one says: "I will this, in order that what I will may not happen"? The prayer will necessarily turn to the opposite of what is intended, and he who hears such a prayer will be at a loss on either side. For whatever he may do, the event will always be contrary to the will of him who prays. Will he perform the will of the one praying? But this man is praying that what he wills may not happen at all. Will he not perform what he wills? But he who prays wishes for that to be done to him which he does not will; so that, in whatever way and in whatever sense it is taken, its meaning will never stand, since it contradicts itself and is destroyed by itself. Yet, the true confession of the mystery can alone explain the perplexity of such a statement, namely, that to fear the passion ^C is of human infirmity, just as the Lord also says, calling the spirit willing but the flesh weak; yet to endure that same passion by dispensation is of divine counsel and power. Since, therefore, the human will is one thing and the divine is another, He who made our infirmities His own speaks indeed as a man of things that are congruent with infirmity; but He adds the subsequent words by which He desires a will that is sublime and worthy of God to be established, rather than the human one, for the sake of the salvation of men. For when He said, *Not mine*, He signified the human will by these words; but when He sub-

subjoined, *thine*, He showed the connection of His own divinity with the Father, of which there is no difference of will on account of the communion of nature; for by saying the will of the Father, He also indicated that of the Son. And this is that He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth; which could not happen in any other way unless death, which hindered the path to life, were swallowed up. The Lord assumes unto Himself the lowly words and affections of human fear, to show that He truly had our will in Himself, confirming that the human nature in Him was real through the communion of affections. ^A

XXXIII. But, says Apollinaris, it was not the work of a terrestrial man, as they themselves think, that which had been assumed into His union, but of God who came down from heaven. In these words, however, the deficiency and obscurity of the locution causes the one who attends only to the bare words not to attain the author’s meaning, except that by the confusion of speech, his sense is not entirely hidden. These are not, he says, the voices of a terrestrial man that express human passions, but of God who came down from heaven. From these things which we have said thus far, it is manifest that Apollinaris intends this one thing: namely, ^B to demonstrate that the divinity is passible. Presently he confuses the senses of his own mind by the absurdity of his locution; for after he said, *Of God who came down from heaven*, he immediately adds, *What had been assumed into His union*. Which words someone rendering with a clearer sense might say: It was not a man who was speaking, but God who was speaking through a man, who had assumed into His own union that which appeared. Whence therefore was that man assumed? From the earth? He denies it. But if he existed in the heavens, he is not from men. It remains, therefore, that he must say he arrived from no place; with which assertion it is simultaneously ^C implied that what appeared existed only in opinion, and not in truth: for that which is from no place does not exist at all. Yet from the words he subjoins, he says that that man descended from heaven. And indeed Mary existed on earth, and the cave existed on earth, and the manger was terrestrial. How then does this man bring a man down from heaven to earth? For when all Scripture confesses the Virgin, the birth, the flesh, the swaddling clothes, the breasts, the manger, and every human apparatus; this man, having rejected all these, fashions for us another man devoid of any origin and ^D joined by no affinity to our nature.

XXXIV. Furthermore, those insults which he inserts into his discourses, thinking he will fortify the absurdity of his dogma...

by which he might more vehemently assail us with his blasphemies—I consider should be ignored by anyone who is of sound mind, and that the judgment should be left to the readers as to whom in truth the adulterators of the apostolic faith are: whether it is we, who according to the words of St. Paul ^A *know Christ according to the flesh, but now know him so no longer*, or whether it is he, who always, both before and after the economy of the human incarnation, carries about in his discourse a God of his own making, endowed with flesh. He adds, moreover, to what he has just said, the blasphemy uttered by the Jews against Christ, by which they called him a glutton and a wine-drinker, and he says that these things necessarily must be said of the man. Who, then, is this man who is reproached by the Jews for his eating and drinking? Is he one who partook of these things, or one who did not? But if he did not partake, it was a mere appearance; if, however, he did partake, then that which was partaken of was earthly; but what is heavenly is not nourished by earthly things. O the contradiction of absurdities! How he falls into opposite errors regarding one and the same subject! At one moment he asserts that he who appeared endowed with a body was superior to human nature, ^B and the next moment he shows the same to be inferior to men, mutilated in his better part. For among the things that are in us, the mind is preeminent in dignity, of which he says the flesh—in which God was manifested—is destitute; and he clearly constructs this through his subsequent arguments, which, lest anyone should think it unnecessary to carefully examine such foolish and inept things, we shall briefly run through. For again, having filled his writing with a multitude of insults, he puts forward against us an argument of this sort, saying that those who claim that the union of the flesh and the assumption of the man are one and the same thing are acting unjustly. But I, even if I may seem to speak somewhat crudely, will not hide the truth: that neither of the terms just mentioned is exactly and accurately defined by our common usage. For what the difference is between "union of the flesh" ^C and "assumption of the man" is not so easy to explain in words, since union is considered in many ways and in various matters: namely, in number, in species, in nature, in customs, in doctrines, and in the properties of wickedness or virtue, and in mutual affections. We therefore have need of the explanation of interpreters, so that we may understand what this "union of the flesh" is—whether it is joined with itself or with another. Also, how the "assumption of the man" takes place, from what, and whence, and how, and by whom, and in what manner he was assumed—this is likewise unknown to us, just as the preceding points are. For until one brings forth the discourse regarding the mystery seasoned with the divine salt of Scripture, we shall leave the salt of secular wisdom, which has lost its savor, to be trodden underfoot by the faithful. Which of the evangelists narrated a "union of the flesh"? Or which of the apostolic accounts ^D of the assumption of the man...

instructed us in these terms that he himself uses? What law, what prophets, what divinely inspired Scripture, what synodical sanction entrusted such a thing to us to be kept? Moreover, from these two expressions, namely the "union of the flesh" and the "assumption of the man," he attributes one to us and declares the other to be his own; but which of these he claims for himself, we are still in doubt. For we either use neither of these expressions, or we use both, because in no respect is one found to differ from the other. For a union is formed with something, and an assumption is necessarily nothing else than the assumption of some thing; and both denote a relation to another; for he who assumes is united with that which is assumed, and that which is united is surely coupled through the assumption.

^B XXXV. But he asserts that we say there are two persons, God and the man assumed by God; while he claims that he himself does not think so at all, but rather says that Christ was incarnate, and is not different from the incorporeal one, but is the same one, after the likeness of our life which we live in the flesh. Further, he discourses to us his trifles through things that cannot stand. His fleshy God cannot be simple in nature; for no one could see simplicity in flesh; and what is not simple cannot be devoid of composition. But this man says that he is one, in the very same way that each one of us is one, who, he says, consist of spirit, soul, and body. Now for the first time we learn a new kind of number, having been taught that things divided into three different kinds are a monad. But let the discourse concerning the spirit which Apollinaris constructs be deferred to another time. As for us, instructed by the crasser division of man which most people use, we confess that man is constituted of an intelligent soul and a body. ^C How therefore shall we say that two are one, when the Apostle clearly observes two men in each of us, while he says, "Though our outer man is perishing," meaning the body, "yet the inner one is being renewed day by day," hinting at the soul by these words. And yet, if there were three men according to Apollinaris, the Apostle would have surely posited two invisible ones and one visible; so that even if he were to use the example of human nature according to our division to strengthen his own argument, by calling the two one, he would nevertheless be refuted by Paul, who divides man into two parts. Since, therefore, he establishes the account of his own dogma through the human example, once this is overturned, that which he believes concerning Christ is also utterly refuted. But what he says is of this sort, that, "As man ^D is one, composed of spirit and soul and body." I for my part, I wanted at first to establish of what kind of body, and from where it was taken, and when it was fashioned, and of what kind of soul—whether rational, or irrational, that is, whether he thinks that man is of a beastly nature...

and then to inject into this the intellectual faculty, which he says is something other than the spirit, calling it "mind" in us, but "God" in him? For if a creation of a heavenly man, fashioned after the likeness of the earthly one, had been shown by him beforehand, we would have been led on by the consistency of the myth, having learned ^B from this new wisdom that the earthly race of men consists of a rational soul and a body, but that there is a genus of heavenly men, to whom belongs an irrational soul and a human body, and God—instead of a mind—is mingled into the structure of the body and the soul; from which Apollinaris thinks the one who appeared on earth is derived. But since that is neither demonstrated nor exists, and the one born through the Virgin is discarded by him as though he did not even share our nature, I consider it alien and inconsistent to call that a "body" which is not a body, and that a "human soul" which is not a soul. For if one were not to admit that it is rational, he would not even concede that it is a human soul at all. But if these things do not exist, what occasion is there for that tripartite division ^C of man, of which two parts are man, and the third part is God? "For," he says, "he would not have come to be in the likeness of man, unless he were, just like a man, a mind clothed in flesh." Now, as to whether that man, in whom God reconciled the world to Himself, was mindless, I cannot say; but that the one who writes these things was out of his mind at the time he wrote them, even if I should not say it, the written words cry out. How does one become "in the likeness of man" who is something other than man and is entirely foreign to our nature? ^D For if the human composite is a rational soul and a body—and neither this body nor that soul is present in the one refashioned by him—how does that which is alien to our nature receive the likeness of man? But he says he is not a man, but only "like a man," being mindless and clothed in flesh. These are the things that convince me that the writer is not of sound mind. How is that which does not partake of a nature assimilated to that nature? And what is that "mind clothed in flesh" which is connate with the flesh and inseparable, being always such? Is it also derived from another thing entirely like itself? For indeed, flesh cannot be brought forth unless it is from flesh, just as the Lord says somewhere, that "that which is born of the flesh is flesh." But it comes to be later. What flesh, then, has he put on to become "clothed in flesh"? Is it existing flesh? But it is from the same. Is it non-existing flesh? Then he is not called "clothed in flesh," for he would not be named by that which does not exist.

^B XXXVI. But let us see the unavoidable force of his arguments, by which he compels us to concede that the Only-Begotten God is a mind clothed in flesh. If, he says, the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh, he must be wisdom. O invincible proposition! He considers that the Lord must absolutely be one of two things, either a mind clothed in flesh or wisdom. Therefore, he says, it is necessary that he be that; unless it is the case that, since a mind is not clothed in flesh, it is undoubtedly wisdom—whatever is not a mind of this kind. What then of a stone? What of a beetle? What finally of all the other things that fall under our eyes? For indeed, he will concede that of these two, one or the other must be true: either they are a mind clothed in flesh or they are wisdom. But clearly, they are neither mind nor wisdom. Therefore, the writer’s proposition has collapsed, and his whole scheme has melted away, the entire argument falling down along with the subversion of its principle. For it has not been shown that these two differ from each other in such a way that if one of them exists, the other cannot exist, or conversely, if one does not exist, the other must necessarily exist. But nothing prevents both from being in the same thing, or neither.

But let us also see how infirm this proposition is from the other one that answers to it from the contrary side. For if this is asserted as true, that if he is not a mind clothed in flesh, he will be wisdom; then that which is said the other way around will also be true, namely, that if he is wisdom, he is not a mind clothed in flesh. But indeed, whoever has embraced the faith readily concedes that Christ is wisdom; therefore, according to the assertion of this "wise man," we shall confess that this same Christ is not a mind clothed in flesh. Thus, by both sets of reasons—those which he brought forward in the first and second place, and the others which he adds to confirm his opinion in the present case—the writer himself demonstrates that the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh. Such is the proposition, and such is the assumption. What, then, does the conclusion of both include? That Christ’s approach to us was not the advent of God, but the birth of a man. Let those who are accustomed to proudly despise the views of others laugh at these words; but we, judging it more fitting to weep over their deceit and foolishness, refrain from a more lengthy refutation of them, lest we seem to be scoffers ourselves. For who would not reasonably laugh at the incoherent weaving of a syllogism? ^C But I will set forth the statement itself, as it follows in sequence: "If the Lord is not a mind clothed in flesh, he would be wisdom, illuminating the mind of man; and this is in all men. But if these things are so, Christ’s coming was not the advent of God, but the birth of a man." Now, that the Lord is wisdom

surpassing every mind, no one of the pious would deny, being guided to these things by the voices of the holy Fathers and Apostles. For indeed, that Wisdom was made for us by God, Paul explicitly cries out; and, that "the saving grace has appeared to us, instructing us that, denying ungodliness, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, looking for the blessed hope" (Tit. II, 11). And we have heard the Apostle discoursing on these things; but that the Only-begotten God—He who is over all, and through all, and in all—is an "ensouled mind," we have neither heard from any of the saints, nor do we admit this strange new coinage into the divine utterances, ^B and this especially when we look to the goal of this novel word-monger, who wishes, through this cold fabrication of his sophistry, to oust from the Lord the confession of Wisdom, through which we have believed every mind to be enlightened; and to introduce in its place this irrational new coinage, so that the Only-begotten may be called "an ensouled mind" and not "Wisdom." For if, he says, the Lord is believed to be Wisdom—that is, the Wisdom which is evidently in all who receive grace—we shall no longer confess the presence of Christ to be the advent of God, as if it were something foreign to the Wisdom of God. Who would not pity this man for this madness of his? If, he says, we believe Him to be Wisdom, Christ’s coming to us, "Who was made for us wisdom from God" (1 Cor. I, 30), will not be the advent of God, but the birth of a man. If it is Wisdom? Have you not heard the prophet ^C crying out, that "a virgin shall conceive in the womb, and shall bear a son" (Isa. VII, 14)? And, that "a Child has been born to us" (Isa. IX, 6)? And that "the Son has the rule upon his shoulder," as strong and mighty, and is Father not only of the past, but also of the future age? But let us leave this dream-like nonsense, whereby he determined that He must be called "an ensouled mind," neither Wisdom that illuminates, nor the passage of our life through birth. Another argument: "If," he says, "the Word did not become an ensouled mind, but Wisdom." In which, what cause is there again that this "wise man" distinguishes the Mind from Wisdom, just as is accustomed to be done in the case of opposites? Those who accurately divide existing things say that those things which are distinguished by way of opposition are of such a nature that the one yields to the presence of the other, just as ^D life to death, and in turn death to life, and vice-versa, wickedness to virtue, and that to this, and whatever else is spoken of in the same way. How, then, does he, in an equal manner

to that of opposites, distinguish the mind from wisdom, as if it were impossible for those two things to exist simultaneously in one and the same thing and concerning one and the same thing? For he says, ^A If the mind were not endowed with flesh, it would be wisdom, just as if someone were to say that where health is not, disease must be. What, then, is this argument? If, he says, wisdom were in the mind, the Lord would not have descended, nor would he have emptied himself. O what an unavoidable force of argument! How does he attempt to prove that the Lord did not descend from the fact that it is shown he was wisdom? Therefore, if from the fact that the Lord is wisdom, his descent is rejected, it necessarily follows that he who confesses the descent of the Lord to us must also affirm that this same Lord is not wisdom. But Apollinaris confesses that the Lord descended. Therefore, let him also confess that he who descended is not wisdom. Such are the fine arguments of this outstanding man against the truth. Then, through an incoherent consequence, he adds to this proposition another deduction sought from non-granted premises, which goes like this: Therefore he was also man; for man, according to Paul, is a mind placed in flesh. I beseech my readers not to think that we have invented such things for the sake of a joke to provoke laughter, as if from the persona of Apollinaris; for it is possible to learn from his own writings that the sentiment just mentioned was set forth by him word for word. According to which Paul, then, is a mind endowed with flesh called a man? Let him say if he has some other hidden Paul! For the servant of Jesus Christ, the called Apostle, in all the Epistles written by him, affirmed no such thing. If, therefore, neither the series of the discourse nor any testimony supports his assertions, whence can this absurd fabrication of a dogma have credence? But again, having reviewed the arguments, he adds another thought: Since, he says, this earthly man was a man, and indeed heavenly. I say again that this man has forgotten about Mary, to whom Gabriel brings the news, upon whom it is believed the Holy Spirit came, whom the power of the Most High overshadows, who brings forth Jesus, who has the government upon his shoulders, that is to say, who bears the government in himself. The Beginning ^B of all things is God the Word, who was also in the beginning and was the beginning, just as the word of Scripture says somewhere, namely, *I am the beginning. Either, therefore, let him show that the Virgin did not exist on earth, or let him cease to invent a heavenly man; nor let him frighten the more ignorant, as if they were sinning against the divine by admitting the human, lest they fail to acknowledge the divine. For the birth from a woman indeed involves the human, but the virginity which served the birth revealed what is above man. So that what was born was man, but the power towards the birth was not from men, but through the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High. Therefore, according to the true word, * Apoc. 1, 8.

both man and God exist: man in that which is seen, God in that which is conceived by the mind. But he does not say this in his conclusion, defining divinity by that which is seen, not by that which is contemplated by the mind.

^B XXXVIII. But let our discourse proceed to the argument which follows. If with God, he says, who is mind, a human mind also existed in Christ. This is the first proposition. But we in turn oppose this assertion: Who among the saints ever decreed that the mind is divinity? What Scriptures taught us that God and mind are one and the same, so that we might concede what is said, that the man who was Christ was devoid of a mind, but God became mind for him who was destitute of a mind? It would, indeed, be appropriate to describe this contumelious argument in its entirety; but I fear lest we be seen as mockers by our readers, as if we were exposing the deformity of our writer to the laughter of all. Nevertheless, lest that proposition remain imperfect, I think it best to bring forward only the conclusion, omitting the trifles which the author has interjected. If with God, he says, acting in the place of a mind, a human mind also existed in Christ, then the work of the incarnation is not accomplished in him. But if the work of the incarnation is not accomplished in the mind which is moved by its own impulse and is compelled by no one, certainly the same work of incarnation—which is the abolition of sin—is accomplished in the flesh, which is moved by another and is acted upon by the divine mind; and our mind, which is moved by its own impulse, becomes a participant in this abolition, in so far as it is joined to Christ. Do you see how akin the conclusions are to the first proposition? Perhaps there will be need of some enchanter or some *gazarus* to explain to us the enigmas of such dreams, and to set forth to us what the novelty of these words signifies: A mind which is moved by itself; a mind which is driven by external impulse; flesh which accomplishes the work of abolition. But let these things be left to the petulance of the young to be derided; we, however, shall proceed to discuss the things which follow in his treatise. If, he says, one acquires something more than another, this happens through exercise; but there is no exercise in Christ; therefore, a human mind does not exist in Christ. ^D Is this how he remembers the divinely inspired Scriptures? What kind of exercise taught Bezaleel the arts? Whence did Solomon obtain the knowledge of so many and such great things? And Amos, who was piercing sycamore figs, how did he obtain such power in prophecy from being a herdsman? And yet, none of those mentioned descended from heaven, nor were they in the beginning, nor were they equal to God.

^A XXXIX. But let us also leave this argument in silence, most of all because it is akin to the conclusion that precedes it, the words of which are as follows: “Therefore the human race is not saved by the taking up of the mind and the whole man, but by the receiving of flesh.” This is indeed the conclusion of the argument; but as for the difference between “taking up” (assumption) and “receiving” (susception), let those who apply themselves to grammatical trivialities explain it, so that they may discourse to children according to the art of those parts of speech which are called prepositions, concerning the discrepancy they locate in such a small matter; for we, for our part, do not doubt that what is received is taken up, and what is taken up is likewise received, since Scripture teaches us such a use of these terms. “With glory you have received me,” says David; and again in another place, “He chose David His servant, and took him from the flocks of his father.” Therefore, he who was received with glory was also taken up, and he who was taken up from the flocks was also received. For it says both things about the same person, so that what the speaker means—who claims that the mystery of the incarnation was administered by the Only-Begotten not by assumption but by susception—is something he himself perhaps could not explain. But I, refusing to immerse my discourse in the mire of his absurd words, willingly omit the greater part of his trifles, thinking that from the very reading of the book the ineptitude of his statements is sufficiently and more than sufficiently refuted, so that anyone who wishes to inveigh sharply against this heresy can prove its fatuity not so much by arguments devised by himself as by the very words of the adversary; for by the same reasons by which he attempts to build up his lie, he makes the impiety of his own dogma manifest by his weak and feeble defense. ^C For if, he says, a perfect God is joined to a perfect man, they would be two, not one. But, according to him, the imperfect joined to the perfect is not regarded as a duality. Has this eminent man never seen children counting the fingers on their hands, who count the small one along with the large one, naming one the lesser and the other the greater? Yet he says they are two if he counts both together. For every number is an aggregation of units, denoting in sum what is collected from them. And if that which can be numbered, whatever it may be, when joined to another that is numbered with it, exceeds in quantity that which is less, nevertheless it will be the count of the lesser, even if the magnitude is lacking. When, therefore, we distinguish two that are equal in number, we call them two perfect things; but when we count the remainder alongside the perfect, we call them two, and indeed a smaller amount.

^B But this person, so excellent in the science of arithmetic, says that if each is perfect according to its own nature, they are called two things; but if one should be lacking and the other perfect, so that they both become one 44, I do not know how, by merging the imperfect with the superabundant and conceiving of a union through opposites for things that are incompatible 45. For the perfect is more fittingly joined with the perfect, and the imperfect with the imperfect, by reason of their similarity. But as for the union of the opposite with the opposite—I mean the imperfect with the perfect—let the lawgiver of this new arithmetic explain the method of it.

^B XL. But he thinks it does not befit the human mind to acknowledge it in the only-begotten God, and he gives as a reason that the human mind is mutable. Well then, by the same argument, let him not grant to God the flesh either; for that it is mutable, not even this writer would deny, since it, like a garment, puts on different ages from youth unto the perfect growth of a man. Or how was He not mutable, who was first carried in His mother's arms, then became an infant, then a young boy 48, and thus little by little advanced to the perfect, so as to come to the measure of human age? If, therefore, the mind is rejected because of its mutability, for the same reason the flesh also must not be admitted by him in Christ; and in this way the whole Gospel would be shown 51 to be false according to him, his preaching empty, and his faith vain. If, however, it is not disbelieved that He was manifested in the flesh, and that this was mutable, then for the same reason 52 the mind is not to be considered inadmissible 53; but just as by becoming flesh He was not defiled, so too by receiving the mind, He was not changed into mutability. ^C Again I will take up the same subject, having set forth his expression verbatim. The human race, he says, is not saved through the assumption of the mind, and of the whole man, but through the assumption of flesh, to which it is natural to be governed; and the flesh had need of an immutable mind, which would not follow it in its deficiency of knowledge, but would bring it into conformity with itself without any compulsion. Who does not know that that which is in need of the help of another is altogether different in nature from that which has need of nothing; and that he whose nature is so constituted that he is governed by another is altogether different from that which is born to govern? In the same way, in respect to essence, it is distinguished just as the nature of irrational creatures is so constructed as to be subject to that of humans, ^D and man does not possess the authority over irrational creatures as an acquired trait, but as his own 56. If, therefore, it is natural for the flesh to be changed

to be ruled, as Apollinaris says, but the Divine is naturally sovereign, how can he who grants these things determine that both are one in nature from the beginning, when it is manifest to all that the reason for the subject [being ruled] ^A is one, and that of the sovereign is another, and that the nature which is naturally led is one thing, and that which is by nature sovereign is another? If, therefore, the nature of one of these, I mean of the flesh and of the Divinity, is observed to have contrary properties, how are two natures one? And how does he fashion a certain divine and heavenly flesh for the Word? Or rather, he claims that the Word himself, before He was truly incarnate, was made flesh, as if He did not, in the last days through the dispensation, put on our form, but has always been this and always remained in the same state. For he who says that the flesh has need of immutability and also of a guide, ^B is speaking directly of our flesh, which slips into sin because of the mutability of its nature. But if a heavenly and divine body, as he says, is observed to be around the Word, it does not at all consistently ascribe to it mutability or the need for a director, nor the need for one who corrects. And yet this is not our word, but the word of the Divine mouth that said, "They that are whole need not a physician; but they that are sick" (Matt. IX, 12). For in heaven, the disease that comes from sin is not found; rather, we are those who have been sick with the disease of of sins; we are those who have become weak through the reception of evil. It is we who, because we have turned toward evil, have stood in need of the Immutable; we who have wandered away from the path of salvation have come to have need of a guide toward the good. So that if this writer truly attributes these things to the Lord's flesh in his testimony—that ^C it is naturally prone to be ruled, and has need of an immutable guide—he interprets nothing other than our own composition. But if he defines the Divinity within the flesh, yet the Divine, as long as it is what it is said to be, has no need of another to lead and rule it, since it does not admit of conversion and mutation for the worse; then this writer has stitched together in vain what was just said about the flesh; for if this was some divine flesh, it is clearly also immutable; but if it is mutable, it is absolutely not divine.

^A XLI. Who, then, could ever recount this confused and inconsistent fable of doctrines, which wavers on every side and, like images seen in dreams, appears now in one way and now in another? For at one moment he asserts that the flesh of the Word is divine and coeternal with Him; at another, that it is acquired and assumed from elsewhere; then, that it is alien to our nature, which is subject to passions, fleeting, and fragile. At another moment, he says it stands in need of a guide, and is subject to the affliction of change and alteration, and for this reason he renders it devoid of mind, so that it might be healed by the divinity, considering the mind to be, as it were, an obstacle to the divine providence toward humanity, and that which is mindless is more pleasing to God. Therefore, he thinks it is more blessed not to have a mind, if, as he says, that which is mindless is assumed by God. ^B Why, then, does he not correct Solomon, who says: "But the understanding [man] shall possess governance"? For I do not think that any other governance is meant here by the proverbial riddle than our own nature, which, having been tossed about in the storm of sin and suffered shipwreck, is guided by the oversight of the true Pilot toward the harbor of the divine will. If, therefore, man is saved in senselessness, how shall the understanding one possess governance? To what, in nature, would the divine be more akin? To what does reason suggest that the divine nature is more suitable? The flesh is something thick and resistant, and has a kinship with the earthen nature; but the intellect is something intellectual, invisible, and unshaped. ^C What, then, of these could be found more suitable to be joined to God: that which is thick and earthen, or that which is intangible and unshaped? And how is it that the flesh is joined to God, as he says, without impediment, by partaking of pure virtue? For who does not know that virtue is a success of the faculty of choice? But the flesh is an instrument of the faculty of choice, lying at the disposal of the impulse of the intellect, and is moved toward whatever the mover directs it. And the faculty of choice is nothing other than a certain intellect and a disposition toward something. If, therefore, he says that a man in whom there is no intellect partakes of pure virtue, what could be the thing that voluntarily receives virtue? Unless, perhaps, the writer understands that which is forced to be un-forced. ^D For when, without the intellect applying itself to the preferred inclination, the body happens to be outside of actions related to vice, that which is accomplished will be an act of necessity, not of the faculty of choice; but he who chooses the good through the judgment of his reason is superior to all necessity and force, having the inclination toward the better from within himself. How, then, does the writer testify that the one without a faculty of choice is unforced, since no personal reason has led it toward the good? For that which is not...

without a faculty of choice is neither blameless, nor is it praiseworthy; or in this way we should also praise those who are hindered from wickedness by bonds—those whom the bond keeps away from the operation of evils, not their own resolve. But, he says, the divinity brings the flesh to itself ^A *unforced*. By "unforced," he clearly means "voluntarily." How, then, could anyone be brought to virtue voluntarily, if he does not possess a personal will? For to choose, and to will, and the selection of what is beneficial, and the turning away from what is harmful, these are all things of the mind; but to think is not among those things that are senseless. If, then, the flesh is joined to God *unforced*, it is testified by these people through the writer that the flesh is not *without a faculty of choice*—nor did it take in what is advantageous rashly and without consideration—and one could not call such a thing a lack of reason. For how could reason exist in the irrational? So that it is not only in the human that the mind exists, through which he says it is composed, but that it is also above others. For the voluntary and unforced impulse toward the good becomes a testimony of the mind’s perfection; and that it is of the mind to make an appropriation toward the better is shown most clearly by what is said next, as the wording has it: "For as He imparts pure virtue to every mind subject to Him." ^B If, therefore, he observes the purity of virtue in the mind, how does he alienate the mind from that flesh in which he recognizes this purity? For it is necessary that one of two things be false: either that the mind is able to be a participant of virtue, or that the flesh which freely acquires virtue for itself lacks a mind.

XLII.

then the incomplete man, insofar as he is man, will certainly be called a semi-adopted son, since he obtains the title of adopted only in part; so that, if we wish to speak more aptly, the former is indeed a perfect adopted man, but this latter is a semi-adopted one, inasmuch as he is deficient by a third part according to the opinion of those who divide man into minute parts with such cuts. But if it is unbefitting for God to have an adopted son, for the exact same reason the same thing would be said of the perfect as of the imperfect. Indeed, ^A it is discovered to be even more absurd in the mutilated one; for if the whole and perfect nature of man is deemed alien from the opinion we ought to hold concerning God when viewed in relation to the Divine, it would be far more shameful to see a maimed and ruined nature in Him. For it is not because there is no mind that the flesh has an affinity with the nature of the Father; rather, both the whole man and his parts are separated from the substance of the Father according to the definition of nature, and neither of the things that are within us—neither the mind nor the body—is made akin to the superior nature by the definition of substance. Even if this myth should fashion some heavenly kind of flesh around the divine, a sound judge will not for that reason agree that that flesh is consubstantial with God and the Father. But if the flesh is alien to the Father’s substance, how could that which is alien be a Son? For it is ^B absolutely necessary that that which truly is from something must be in its substance what that which begat it is; but the Father is not flesh. Therefore, that which is from Him cannot be flesh at all; for that which is born of the Spirit is said to be spirit, and not flesh. If, then, the flesh is not from the Father, it is not a Son. What then shall it be called? For whatever name they devise for that heavenly flesh, which has been fabulously invented by those word-mongers, that same name we will congruently apply to the flesh assumed from among men, and by whatever name they call ours, by that same name that other will also be called. The earthly thing is not a Son, and neither is that other, by all means. The earthly thing is an adopted son, and so therefore is that other. There is a duality of sons here; as there is certainly there. In the heavenly one, there is one Son, flesh and divinity; this is so in that case, and here as well. For since all creation is equally distant from the divine substance, being outside the nature of the Father, it is equally admitted that it is ^C both earthly and heavenly. It remains to think more reasonably concerning God regarding whatever happens to be in accordance with the intent of His love for mankind. It is proper to find no name for Him, but to name Him by that which abounds and prevails. As happens in the case of the sea; for if someone casts a drop of vinegar into the sea, the drop is also called sea, ^D

^A having been transmuted into the quality of the sea; thus, the true Son and only-begotten God, the unapproachable light, and the self-existent wisdom and sanctification and power, and every high name and thought, these are what He who was manifested to men through the flesh truly is. But as for the flesh, being flesh by its own nature, yet having been transmuted into the ocean of incorruptibility, just as the Apostle says, that "mortality was swallowed up by life," so too, all things that appeared in the flesh at that time were changed into the divine and incorruptible nature; no weight, no form, no color, no resistance, no softness, no circumscription of corporeal quantity, nor any other of the things that were then seen in Him remained, the humility of the fleshly nature having, by the commixture which occurred with the Divinity, assumed the communion of divine properties. ^B Therefore, there is no danger for us that the mystery of the Trinity should be extended to a quaternity, as Apollinaris says, nor do we reduce the angels to servitude to a man, as his fable against us asserts. For those who bow themselves before the Lord do not serve a man, nor are they ashamed to worship Him who, having assumed flesh, dwelled in this world. For when He brings the firstborn into the world, He says, "And let all His angels worship Him." There is, however, but one entrance into the world—that which is through birth—and it is not possible to be within the life of men without having used this entrance. Therefore, the Word calls His birth through the flesh an "entrance into the world." If, then, when He entered into the world, all the angels worship Him, and the entrance is the birth through the flesh, it is not that we are subjecting that which is already the Lord's to the Lord; rather, the very nature of the angels does not ignore its own subjection to the Lord. Therefore, let him who ^C rashly and emptily asserts that we turn things above into things below be silent, while we bind the God-bearing angels to the God-bearing man.

XLIII

^A to Himself, the great Paul is a sufficient and wealthy witness. But if the script-writer thinks that a multitude of gods is being introduced by us into the proclamation because we confess that in Christ God was reconciling the world to Himself, ^B as if God were coming to be among many men, we offer this defense: If there were many mothers who were virgins, and if the secret message of Gabriel was to many, and if to each one the descent of the Holy Spirit and the presence of the power of the Most High occurred; and if the prophets preach the grace in regard to many, so as to speak in the plural, "Children were born to us" (and "sons were given to us"), and "Virgins shall conceive in the womb," and for all those born the name is Emmanuel; if all walk on foot upon the waves, and by an ineffable power feed so many ^C thousands in the desert, increasing with the basket the bread that is cultivated in the hands of the disciples; if all raise to life those who have been dead four days from the earth; if all become lambs of God and are sacrificed as our Passover, and nail sin to the cross, and destroy the power of death, and ascend into heaven before the eyes of the disciples, and sit at the right hand of the Father; if all are to come to judge the inhabited world in justice, and at the name of all, the tongues of those in heaven, ^D and on earth, and under the earth confess Him—then we would grant that there are many gods, if those many were recognized by these marks. But if Jesus is one Lord, through whom are all things, and from whom, and through whom, and in whom are all things, and if this enumeration of divine attributes pertains only to Him, what danger is there that many gods will be dreamed up when we say that God was manifested through an ensouled flesh? For who is so ignorant of the evangelical teachings as not to know what was said by the Savior Himself to the Jews: "But now you seek to kill me, a man, who has spoken to you the truth"? Do you see in what is said what it is that is being killed, as He clearly indicated by saying, "You seek to kill me," not the truth, but the man through whom the truth was speaking? For it was not a man who was speaking the truth; but clearly, He who spoke was God, while the man was mediating to men the message being spoken in his own voice. Wherefore he also became a mediator of God and men, since the human nature was not able to approach the pure communion of God, and for this reason needed a voice kindred to it and natural, by which it is likely that the power from above could be received. This also must be left behind, and the discourse must be turned to what follows. Nothing, he says,

is as equally conjoined to God as that flesh which He assumed. O, the discerning judgment of the man! Nothing is so tightly conjoined to God as the flesh; not goodness, not eternity, not incorruption, not omnipotence, nor any other of those notions which most befit God, but all these things are secondary to the flesh, when compared with God and with the union of God to this, and to the flesh that was acquired. The writer ^A himself confesses this very thing: for by saying that it was assumed, he declared its adventitious nature.

XLIV. But, leaving these aside, we also wrap those things which follow in silence, inasmuch as they can in no way harm the readers, and contain within themselves the refutation of the fiction of a fable that is nowhere consistent with itself. For when he had first posited that no other of those things which are affirmed of God is as equally conjoined to the Lord as that flesh which He assumed, he straightway adds in conclusion that those things which are not conjoined in such a manner are not to be adored in the same manner, and he even adds this further climax: "But nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh of Christ." Since these things appear absurd even to children themselves, we shall deliberately be silent about them; for the very children who sit in the market and play would reason thus: "If nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh, then the flesh of Christ is more to be venerated than the majesty of the Father Himself, and His omnipotence, and His supreme rule over all things, and whatever else our nature is able to utter concerning the divine power; so that, omitting the adoration of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we ought to venerate and adore only the flesh preferred by this man to all else, and ascribe omnipotence to it."

The argument that follows is similar to the preceding ones: "The flesh of the Lord," he says, "is adored, inasmuch as it is one person and one animal with Him." Making mention of two things, namely, the Lord and the flesh of the Lord, he makes one animal out of these two ^B. Now it is clear what he signifies in the title of the treatise, while he promises to teach us concerning the divine incarnation, made after the likeness of men; for since human life consists of the convergence of soul and body, out of the coupling and mixing of these heterogeneous things, and since one could not define our constitution otherwise than by the union of body and soul, the writer, having imagined this same thing also ^C concerning the divine nature, ^D

^A promises immediately, even in the very title of this treatise, that he will demonstrate that the conjunction of divinity with flesh is to be viewed according to the likeness of man. And now, in this part of the same treatise, he manifestly strives to establish that the flesh and the Lord are one person and one animal, as if he were to say that in Paul, because of the conjunction of body and soul, that which is hidden is the same as that which is seen by the eyes of all. Why, then, is it fitting to refute with accurate disquisition those things which we have just mentioned? And who would not deservedly accuse us of foolishness for spending our time refuting these wrongly devised arguments? Therefore, let us ponder what follows. If, he says, no created thing is to be adored equally with the Lord as his flesh. Who will preside over the contest and award the prizes to Apollinaris and Eunomius as they compete with each other for the primacy of impiety? Which of them will be deemed worthy of the rewards for their labors against the truth? Perhaps, because of the equal ardor of those struggling to assert impiety, the victory will be uncertain and inclined to neither side. For the one, while asserting that the Only-Begotten God is a creature, does not deny that he is endowed with mind and is alien to corporeal nature; but the other, imagining that he was from the beginning composed of things of a different nature, establishes ^B that the same being is one animal, fashioned from flesh and divinity, after the likeness of human nature. For the adoration of the creature is equal in both cases; but the former says that the intellectual and incorporeal nature was created; while the latter adds also that the nature around the creature is fleshly, and that this is to be adored more than other creatures, as if adoration were extended to other creatures as well, which even those who respect the dogmas of Eunomius admit to be impious. Therefore, let him carry off the victory prizes against Eunomius, and let him exult, adorned with the crowns of impiety; for by as much as the body is inferior to the soul in human nature, by so much is he who ordains that the flesh be adored far more inept in his impiety than those who adore the intellectual creature among those who adore created things, especially if he himself says that not one, but many creatures are to be adored, compared to which the flesh deserves to obtain greater adoration. For no created thing, he says, is to be adored ^C equally with the flesh of the Lord. For all things that are numbered among created things, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, are equally beneath the divine power; yet, nevertheless, created things, if compared among themselves, have some more or less dignity than others, since the incorporeal nature is ^D possessed of it...

whereas the one that prefers the flesh to the intellectual nature surpasses the other in impiety. Let the disciples of this error hear with whom, and concerning what matters, the contention with their teacher is.

^A XLV. Let us now examine those shackles—to speak in the manner of Apollinaris’ master—rendered fast by the indissoluble chains of syllogisms, with which he strives to bind his readers. If anyone, he says, thinks that man is more joined to God than other men and angels. It would be worth the effort to examine the meaning of these words as well, but to extract any sense—if not a good and refined one, then at least one somewhat conducive to the confirmation of his impious dogma—from the stated words would be just like looking for a soul in stones, or intelligence in wood. Further, from the things he adds in the same tenor and with the same intent, it can be confirmed how incomprehensible his words are. Angels, he says, and humans will be despoiled of their freedom of choice, just as the flesh is deprived of freedom. But the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is the loss of being in control of oneself and one’s own power; yet nature is not corrupted by its Creator: therefore, man is not at all joined to God. O the power of such arguments! How indissoluble are these snares of syllogisms! He takes away from man and the angels that free choice which exists in the union with divinity, and the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination; and if these things be accepted, it is proven that man is not joined to God. What such things do those ventriloquists utter? What similar things do those who speak from the earth and have been trained in internal divinations babble forth in comparison to these? The self-determination of men and angels is taken away, if the human ^B is united to God. Was He not a man, He who said, "But now you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth?" Was not He, who demonstrated all divine power within Himself, acting by His own authority as He willed, mingled with the divine nature? If, then, this did not take place in Him, the evangelical testimony must be set aside; and Paul, and the prophets, and all who foretold the miracles concerning the Lord, and those who related what happened afterward, will altogether be convicted of falsehood. But if this did truly happen, and God was manifested in the flesh, and the flesh, being mingled with the divine nature, became one with it, then, according to the poetic myth, self-determination has perished for the human nature, and angels have been enslaved, since this has come to pass, having been deprived of the grace of self-determination. O the absurdity of this strange speech! Of what sort also is the inference to say, "The corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination." ^{C D}

Does he then remove from the list of living things those who are servants, because ^A they are not governed by free choice, but are enslaved to the prevailing power? For the writer defines the creature as being in a state of free choice. But he legislates that one in whom the sovereign motion of the will is not present is not even to be considered a living creature. Therefore, that Canaan was dead when he was enslaved to his brothers because of his disorder; the servant of Abraham was dead; Giezi, the boy of Elisha, was dead; and in later times Onesimus was dead; all the centurions working as servants were dead. And why do I say these things? All who are subjected to the authorities of those who rule over them, in whom the free-choosing will is obstructed, are dead. But even those to whom Paul gives instruction to submit to the higher authorities are altogether dead, even if they possess souls, corrupted by the absence of their free choice, and no longer able to be living creatures. ^B For this is what the fable of Apollinaris directs, so that he may unite that soul-less flesh to the God who is above all, whether it be soul-less or mind-less, for the fable looks equally to both. But the soul-less is a corpse. That which has a soul but is devoid of intellect is a beast, which not even he himself avoids as an absurdity, stripping that flesh of free choice; for it is the property of irrational creatures not to be their own masters, but to be subject to the authority of man. But let these things be passed over, and let us move on to the next parts of the discourse; I will relate the opponent’s opinion in my own words for the sake of brevity. ^C He says that man consists of three things: spirit, and soul, and body, as the Apostle also defines this in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, and he adds this part of the canticle of the three children: "Bless, O spirits and souls of the righteous"; then also, "In spirit," he says, "it is necessary to worship the Lord"; and he brings forward the word of the Gospel, by which we are taught that those who worship God must worship in spirit. Having gone through these, he adds that there is something besides this, the flesh which is at war with the spirit; and he says that this is not soul-less, in order to show by this means that the spirit is a third thing, distinct from the soul and the body. If, therefore, he says, man consists of three things, and the Lord is a man, ^D then the Lord also consists altogether of three things: spirit, and soul, and body. In order, therefore, that his error in the apprehension of the divine Scriptures may become manifest, we shall briefly deal with each of the things he has mentioned. And first of all let us examine the apostolic saying. For it is not

^A into those three parts into which we divide it that Paul divides the human being, when he writes to the Thessalonians and prays to the Lord that they may be sanctified in their entirety, in body, soul, and spirit. But there is a certain way of philosophizing about the resolution of our life which is much loftier, not only here, but also where he speaks to the Corinthians. For he knows there a certain "carnal" human being, and again another "spiritual" one, and between these two a "soulish" (animal) human being: calling him "carnal" who is subject to perturbations and clings to earthly things; calling him "spiritual" who is not burdened by the weight of the body but has his mind set on things above; and finally calling him "soulish" who is strictly neither of these, yet has communion with both.

In asserting these things, however, he does not say that the carnal man is destitute of the activities of mind or soul, nor does he show the spiritual man to be alien from the conjunction with soul and body, nor does he maintain that the soulish man is lacking in either mind or flesh; but he imposes the name on each of them from that which is most prominent in his way of life. For, he who "judges all things and is judged by no one" is both possessed of flesh and endowed with a soul, yet is called spiritual; and he who ^B raged with the passion of the flesh against his father’s bed was not without a soul, nor was he deprived of intellect. Likewise, he who stands in the middle between the praiseworthy and the condemned is in both, having mind within himself and being clothed in the nature of flesh. But, as has been said, because the appellation is properly applied according to the visible signs of one's life, those who are self-indulgent and pleasure-loving, and who are eager for contentious disputes, are called "carnal." Those who judge all things but afford those who wish to examine them no handle for judgment, on account of the loftiness of their conduct, are named "spiritual." And he calls "soulish" the one who stands between them, who has fallen as far below the latter as he has risen above the former.

Since, therefore, he wishes the person who is perfected through virtue not only to be testified to for a lofty life, but also, when he is compelled to serve the necessities of the body, to look toward God, and, if he does anything else that pertains to the faculties of soul or body, not even then to be forgetful of God—"For whether you eat," he says, "or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God"—so that even while occupied with the necessities of the body they might always be intent upon glorifying God. ^C For this reason, to the Thessalonians, who were already believed to be striving toward what is better in all respects, he grants full sanctification through this blessing, saying, "And may God sanctify you entirely, and may your whole body, and soul, and spirit," that is, every bodily, soulish, and spiritual pursuit, "be kept for sanctification." This is our account. But if the Apo- ^D

Apollinaris says that the mind is ^A thereby blessed separately, and that to distinguish the body and the soul again, he separates the power of the blessing in each individual case, how is the whole body kept—that which falls away entirely and in every respect in death? How is that whole which is pressed down and shriveled by abstinence, and made frail by harsher subjugation? How could anyone say that the poor Lazarus did not miss out on this blessing, teeming as he was with such sores, and being consumed by his own discharge? But, even if it seems strange to say, the blessing of Paul achieved its full effect in that body which was running with sores; for his body was kept whole by his soul through the discipline of the spiritual life, since he was not led by the violence of the flesh from a higher hope to think anything unseemly; for the flesh did not provide distraction for the soul, nor was his mind agitated by bodily passions.

^B XLVII. The hymn of the three children, too, which invites the spirits and souls of the just to the communion of glorification together, does not command the souls to praise God separately, and the spirits separately from the souls, as Apollinaris thinks. For what sort of praise of the soul could there be, if it were not fulfilled through the mind? For a soul separated from the mind, as has already been said often, is a beast devoid of rational and intellectual activity. If, therefore, he separates the mind from our soul, as he says, let it be granted that it is possible for praise to be rendered to God by the spirits, since he himself understands the mind under the name of "spirits." But if he thinks that the soul is something else, distinct from the mind, how will the mindless one praise God? What hymn of praise from foolishness will be pleasing to God? And what further need would there be for the soul to have a mind, if, in the matter of divine glorification, it were sufficient ^C on its own, singing the hymn by itself and having no need of the assistance of the mind to perform it? But we have not learned such things from those who have interpreted for us. But since souls are equal to the angels, having been loosed from bodily bonds, as the Lord says, for this reason the discourse indicates the equality of souls with the angels through the union with the spirits; for the angels are spirits, according to the Prophet who says, "Who makes his angels spirits," with whom the three children also invite the souls of the just to sing. But the Savior, in saying that one must worship God in spirit, does not mean the mind by the name of spirit, but that one must not ^D occupy oneself with bodily things.

For since the Samaritan woman says to the Lord that one ^A must worship God on the mountain, as if he were circumscribed by place, which is not outside of bodily conception, for this reason the Word says to the one who had wandered away from the truth, that God is spirit, that is to say, incorporeal; and that those who worship Him cannot draw near to the incorporeal in a bodily way, but must fulfill their worship in spirit and truth. For He distinguishes the corrective words according to the double ignorance: truth from figure, and spirit as opposed to bodily suppositions. For this reason Paul also says he serves the Lord neither in figure nor in body, but in spirit, following the truth. But to say that the flesh is not subject to the law of God provides from itself the refutation of the deceit contained in their dogma; for to fight against, to take captive, and not to be subject, and all such things, are acts of the power of choice. But if there were no mind, there would not be a power of choice. Therefore, the flesh that Apollinarius calls ensouled and having a power of choice, he himself acknowledges is not separated from the mind either. But even if flesh alone is spoken of, it contains within itself the formula of humanity, so that if one of the things that complete the nature is missing, it cannot be called a person. ^B

XLVIII. "But," he says, "man consists of three things." Let this be granted, even if that argument does not necessarily draw us to assent. "But," he says, "the Lord, when He is called man, also consists of three things: spirit, soul, and body." We would not strongly oppose this opinion either; for if someone were to say that all things which complete our nature existed in that Man, he would not err from the truth. "But He is also the heavenly Man" (he says this of Christ) "and a life-giving spirit." And we approve of these things as well; for this is our own opinion, if, however, the understanding is taken from Him and directed toward the One toward whom it ought to be directed. For he who is commingled with the heavenly, and through this commingling with the more excellent thing transforms what is earthly into something better, would rightly and deservedly be called not earthly, but heavenly. The same must be said of the life-giving Spirit; yet He who works good acts in us is Himself also a life-giving spirit. But let us see to what end the writer uses the arguments brought forward in this way. "If," he says, "the heavenly Man consists of all things equal to us, the earthly, (so that He also possesses a spirit equal to the earthly ones), ^C he is not heavenly but of the heavenly God..." ^D

^B There is much obscurity in the things said, and it is difficult to discern, on account of the feebleness of the interpretation; but it is easy to uncover his intention. For he says, if that man is deficient in mind, he is heavenly; but if he is complete, he is no longer heavenly, but becomes a receptacle of the heavenly God. In these things, which of the points made should one abhor more? The belief that completeness is a hindrance to the Godhead, as if the flesh, destitute of mind, were more suitable and convenient for receiving the Godhead; or the belief that God is heavenly, yet he who receives the heavenly God within himself is not where God is believed to be, but is somewhere else than in heaven and is named by another title? For if, says Apollinaris, man is a receptacle of the heavenly God, and God is above in heaven, as the Ecclesiastes says: therefore ^C he who has contained God within himself is with Him who was contained, and is rightly called heavenly instead of earthly. As is also evident through what the writer says; if he understood what logically follows from his own arguments, the dogma of the truth is clearly established, being strengthened by the wisdom of its enemies.

XLIX. But let us examine what follows.

^A For whatever you may say of the two, you will not remove from the Word the composition of the two natures. For the one who said that the flesh was from above does not set it up as not being flesh; but the flesh, being governed by a soul-endowed nature and having within itself a vital power, as Apollinaris himself wishes, properly possesses the appellation of man; but He who took it and through it manifested Himself is, in nature, entirely different from it; for the very name of "assumption" indicates the difference in nature of the one who is assumed from the one who assumes. ^B What, then, will prevent, even if these things be the case, God who appeared in the flesh from being insulted by that absurd invention of a name, so that He who is constituted in this way should, according to the rash language of Apollinaris, be called "Man-God"? For the fable did not impose such a name on the goat-stag ^C because the goat portion was attached in part to the whole stag, or conversely in the mixing of those animals such that the stag-part was attached to the entire goat; but the composition of the names explains that it in some way partakes of each nature. So, according to the writer, if the same one is both man and God, having the union in some way, whether because the whole of the nature has come together or because it is in a deficient state, he will not escape that absurd synthesis of the name. And if the Greeks, having learned such things from him, should mock our mystery, the one who provided the occasion for the blasphemy will certainly fall under the prophetic curse, as he says, "Woe to those through whom my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles!"

^D Let us also consider what he adds again to the preceding arguments. "If," he says, "it consists of two perfect things, neither is he who is God also man, nor is he who is man also God." But if, according to his argument, the conjunction were conceded to be of a perfect and an imperfect thing, would it not be said in the same way by those who dare to utter such things, that the man is not in that in which God is, and God is not in that in which the man is? For the principle of the divinity is in every way different from that of the humanity, and no one would ever have thought that the divine nature could be defined by the mutilation of human nature; for the principle of divinity does not consist in the fact that it is not human nature or that human nature is imperfect, but each thing, if grasped separately by the mind, is understood by its own proper concept. For he who hears the "God," receives together with this appellation everything that it is appropriate to conceive regarding God, and he who accepts the appellation of a man, [is understood to have ...]

^A understands his entire nature, and the signification of those terms suffers no confusion, so that in the one appellation the other is understood. For neither is that signified by this name, nor this by that, but each of the names retains the meaning appropriate to its nature, and in no way can their implications be interchanged. But "imperfect" and "perfect" imprint altogether different notions upon the minds of the hearers; for we call that "perfect" which, according to the definition of its own nature, is complete and absolute, while the "imperfect" is that which is contrary to this. Neither of these, however, when spoken of in isolation, signifies man or God, but to whatever thing or name it is attached, it makes us understand that which is expressed by those utterances to be either complete or maimed. How, then, if a man were imperfect, does Apollinaris deduce that God is present in that which is imperfect, as if the mutilation of our nature were more ^B becoming to divinity?

LI. Proceeding next to what follows, he says: "Man cannot save the world, being a man and subject to the common corruption of men." I also say this: for if human nature were sufficient to provide the good for itself, the mystery would be superfluous. But since it was impossible to exist apart from death without God providing the salvation, therefore the light shines in the darkness through the flesh, that through the flesh it might banish the destruction born of darkness. "But neither are we saved," he says, "by God, if he were not mixed with us." In these words, the writer seems to think rightly and to turn his mind toward wiser reflections; for he who speaks of a mixture of things that are naturally distinct signifies union. "He is mixed with us," he says, "when he became flesh," that is, when he became man, just as the Gospel says: when he became flesh, then he tabernacled in us. ^C Nor do these things disagree with sound doctrine, unless something of the darnel-like seed is immediately sowed among them by him thereafter. For this discourse of ours—or rather, of the truth itself—is that he tabernacled in us then, when he became flesh, and conversely, he became flesh when he tabernacled in us. If, therefore, the flesh existed from the time when the indwelling began in us, then before Gabriel proclaimed it to the Virgin, the Word was not yet flesh; and he is a liar who says that the human element descended to us from above—and that before the created human nature, that human element already existed—through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, for he who says that the humanity of the ^D Word descended to us from heaven (and that already before the human nature was created, it already existed as a man), through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, gives the lie to the truth.

dax est. Sed neque, ait, peccata hominum delet, ^A τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θανάτου βασιλείαν καταλύει, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπέθανε, καὶ ἀνέστη. Εἴθε μέχρι τέλους ἦν εὐγνώμων, τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας φθεγγόμενος! Πάλιν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανέρχεται καί φησι, τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν αἰτιώμενος λόγον, ὅτι περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωροῦμεν τὸ πάθος, καὶ ἐπάγει τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἡμῶν, ἔχοντα οὕτως· Ἀνθρώπου δέ, φησί, θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον. Τί κατασκευάζων ταῦτά φησιν; Ὅτι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἡ θεότης, αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν σταυρὸν πάθει ἀπενεκρώθη, ὥστε κατὰ τὴν τριήμερον ἐκείνην τοῦ χρόνου περιγραφήν, μὴ ζωὴν εἶναι, μὴ δύναμιν, μὴ δικαιοσύνην, μὴ φῶς, μὴ ἀλήθειαν, μὴ αὐτὴν τὴν θεότητα. Οὐ γὰρ μιᾶς ^B ἀποθανούσης θεότητος, ἑτέραν ὑπολελείφθαι λέγει, διότι πολλαχοῦ δείκνυται Ἀρείῳ περὶ τούτου μαχόμενος, καὶ μίαν εἶναι κατασκευάζων τῆς Τριάδος θεότητα, ἧς ἐν τούτῳ νεκρωθείσης, καθὼς συγκατασκευάζει τῷ λόγῳ, πάντως ἑτέρα οὐκ ἦν. Καὶ πῶς ἄν τις ὑπονοήσειεν αὐτὸν μὴ θνητὴν ποιεῖν τὴν θεότητα, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, εἰ μὴ τοῦ συνθέτου διάλυσις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται λυομένου, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ συνδιαπίπτει τῇ διαλύσει τοῦ σώματος· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σύνθετον διαλύεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνθετον ἀδιάλυτον μένει. Εἰ οὖν ψυχῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται θάνατος, πῶς ἡ θεότης ἀπονεκροῦται, λεγέτωσαν οἱ μὴ εἰδότες ἃ λέγουσι.

LII. Τὰ δὲ ἐχόμενα τούτων, ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι κατασκευῆς, ὑπερβήσομαι. Φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς, κατασκευάζων τὸ αὐτὴν τεθνάναι τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν θεότητα, ὅτι Ἀνθρώπου θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον, οὐδὲ ἀνίσταται ὁ μὴ ἀποθανών· ἐξ ὧν, φησίν, ἁπάντων δῆλον, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἀπέθανε, καθό, φησίν, οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν κρατεῖσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου. Ἅπερ ὡς πρόδηλον ἔχοντα τὴν ἀτοπίαν, παραδραμεῖν οἶμαι δεῖν ἀνεξέταστα, παντὸς τοῦ γε νοῦν ἔχοντος καθ' ἑαυτὸν συνιδεῖν ^C δυναμένου τὸ ἀσεβές τε καὶ ἄτοπον τοῦ διαφορήδην ἀποφαινομένου αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν τεθνάναι, τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὑποστάντα τὸν θάνατον. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον εὔλογον ἴσως ἐστὶ παρασημήνασθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ ἡμετέρου προσώπου λέγει, καθαρεύει τοῦ ψεύδους, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἃ συκοφαντικῶς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ συμπέπλασται τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου. Λέγει γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν παρ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι, ὥστε τὸν Λόγον εἶναι Θεόν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων ἡμερῶν διὰ σαρκὸς πεφανερώσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ τὴν ζωὴν, ἅπερ πάντα ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα· τὸ δὲ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί ποτε ταῦτα, τὸν

τὸν ^A διὰ τούτων δηλούμενόν τε καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον, Κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν, οὐδὲν ἀνεκτότερον εἰς ἀσέβειαν τῆς παντελοῦς ἀρνήσεως τοῦ ὀνόματος κρίνομεν. Ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγων εἶναι Χριστὸν (Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ δύναμις, καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν ὑψηλόν τε καὶ θεοπρεπές ἐστιν ὄνομα), οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλο τι λέγοι εἶναι, ὃ διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου τούτου νοεῖται ὀνόματος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσηγορίᾳ τὸ λογικόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο γνωριστικὸν τῆς φύσεως ἰδίωμα λέγεται· εἰ δέ τις μὴ εἶναι λέγοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, συνανῄρηται πάντως τῇ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀθετήσει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς φύσεως ἰδιώματα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις, ἡ σοφία, ὁ χαρακτήρ, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα· ὁ ἐκεῖνον ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ εἶναι λέγων, ἀθετήσει πάντως καὶ τὰ μετ' ἐκείνου νοούμενα. Διό φαμεν διὰ τῶν ἁγίων ^B Γραφῶν ὁδηγούμενοι, ἀεὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀϊδιότητι συνθεωρούμενον. Ὡς γὰρ πάντοτε Θεὸς ὁ μονογενής Θεὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ μετουσίας γίνεται, οὐδὲ διά τινος προκοπῆς ἀπὸ ταπεινοτέρας καταστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν θεότητα μέτεισιν· οὕτως καὶ ἡ δύναμις, καὶ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν θεοπρεπές ὄνομα, συναϊδιόν ἐστι τῇ θεότητι, ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιγίνεσθαι κατὰ προσθήκην εἰς δόξαν τῆς φύσεως, ὃ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν. Τὸ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὄνομα, διαφερόντως φαμὲν ἐξ ἀϊδίου περὶ τὸν Μονογενῆ θεωρεῖσθαι, ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφάσεως πρὸς τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην χειραγωγούμενοι. Τῆς γὰρ ἁγίας Τριάδος διδασκαλίαν περιέχει ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου ὁμολογία, ἑκάστου τῶν πεπιστευμένων προσώπων ἐμφαινομένου τῇ προσηγορίᾳ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ πρόσφορον. Καὶ ὡς ἂν μὴ παρ' ἑαυτῶν λέγειν τι δοκοίημεν, τὰ τῆς προφητείας παραθησόμεθα ῥήματα. Ὁ θρόνος σου, φησὶν, ὁ Θεὸς, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος, ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου. Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ Θεός σου, ἔλαιον ἀγαλλιάσεως παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου. Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ διὰ μὲν τοῦ θρόνου τὴν ἐπὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν διασημαίνει ὁ λόγος. Ἡ δὲ ῥάβδος τῆς εὐθύτητος τὸ ἀδέκαστον ἑρμηνεύει τῆς κρίσεως. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀγαλλιάσεως ἔλαιον, τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος παρίστησι δύναμιν, ᾧ χρίεται παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Θεὸς, τουτέστι, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Μονογενής, ἐπειδὴ ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. ^C Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν φίλος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἐχθρὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας, ἀκόλουθον ἦν τὸ μηδὲ κεχρίσθαι ποτὲ λέγειν, τὸν διὰ τοῦτο κεχρίσθαι λεγόμενον, ὅτι ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. Εἰ δὲ πάντοτε φίλος δικαιοσύνης, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἑαυτὸν μισήσειε, δικαιοσύνη ὢν, πάντοτε δηλονότι καὶ ἐν τῷ χρίσματι θεωρεῖται. Ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄδικος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἄχριστος ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ὁ χριστός· ὁ δὲ μηδέποτε ἄχριστος, ἀεὶ πάντως χριστός. Ὅτι τοίνυν ὁ ἄδικος; ^D

ἄδικος ^A has iniquity. But if he always loved justice—nor indeed could it ever happen that he should at any time hate himself, since justice itself always existed—then he was surely not anointed from the beginning, but from all time; that is, he is understood to be Christ. And just as the just man is in no wise unjust, so too he could never be Christ without unction, nor can he be. Wherefore, no one will deny that He who anoints is the Father, and that the unction is the Holy Spirit, unless he has his heart covered by the Jewish veil.

LIII. How, then, does he say that we do not claim Christ to have been from the beginning?

He himself is life; and therefore, at the end of the human life, when our wickedness had already increased to its utmost point, so that nothing of our malice might remain unhealed, he then receives the commingling with our lowly nature, and taking man into himself, and himself coming to be in man—as he says to the disciples: “I in you, and you in me”—he made that which had been commingled with him [to be] what he himself was. But he himself was always the Most High; therefore, he also exalted that which was lowly, for the One who is above all need not be exalted. The Word, however, was Christ and Lord, and that same [Word] also becomes the One who was assumed and commingled with the divinity; for he who is Lord is not re-appointed to lordship, but the form of the servant is raised to the same dignity of the Lord. Wherefore, “One Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things,” is likewise called Christ—the One who before the ages put on the glory of the Spirit (for this is what the anointing signifies through symbols), and after the Passion, adorning the man united to him with that same unction, makes [him] Christ; for, “Glorify me,” he says, ^C as if to say, “Anoint me,” with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. But the glory which is seen before the world and the creation of all things, and before all ages, with which the Only-begotten God is glorified, could not, in our opinion, be any other ^D than the glory of the Father; for only [the] progenitor who...

^A prior is what the true faith teaches us. He who is before the ages, says the prophet, is of the Father, and concerning the Only-begotten Son, "Through him," says the Apostle, "the ages were made"; and the glory which is understood to exist before the ages in the Only-begotten God, is indeed the Holy Spirit. Therefore, what was proper to Christ while he was with the Father, before the world was, this also becomes proper to Him who was united to Christ at the end of the ages. For Jesus, he says, the one from Nazareth, whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit—so let no one slander our discourse, as if we said that Christ the Only-begotten God is not always; but rather, Christ is always, both regarding the dispensation and after this. But the man was neither before this, nor after these things, but only in the time of the dispensation. For neither was the man before the Virgin, nor after the ascent into the heavens is the flesh ^B still in its own properties. For if we have known Christ according to the flesh, he says, yet now we know him no longer. For because God was manifested in the flesh, the flesh did not remain; but because the human is mutable, while the Divine is immutable, the Godhead is immovable towards every change, neither being altered toward the worse (for it does not admit the worse, and the better it does not have). But human nature in Christ ^C uses the change towards the better, having been altered from the corruptible to the incorruptible, from the ephemeral to the inviolable, from the short-lived to the eternal, from the corporeal and configured to the incorporeal and unconfigured.

LIV. Concerning the fact that they assert that we say that the man suffered, and not God, let them hear this from us: that we confess the Godhead to be in him who suffered, but not that the impassible nature has become passible. And that what is said may become clearer, having this... ^D

^A our opinion: Human nature, endowed with an intellectual soul, has its subsistence joined to a body. And this conjunction of both takes place through a certain material substance, which is placed as a foundation before its constitution. That matter, having been formed into a living being by divine power, becomes a man; so that if one were to grant, by way of hypothesis, that the creative power of God does not intervene in forming the living being, the matter would remain entirely idle and unmoved, not being brought to life by the productive energy. As, therefore, we understand a certain life-giving power to supervene upon matter in us, by which man, consisting of soul and body, is formed: so it happened in the Virgin Mary that the power of the Most High, immaterially insinuated into the immaculate body through the life-giving Spirit, and assuming the incorrupt purity of the Virgin into the material of the flesh, received that part contributed from the virginal body for the forming of the fetus. And in that way a new man was truly fashioned, who alone and for the first time demonstrated in himself such a mode of subsistence, having been formed in a divine and not human fashion—the divine power flowing through the entire nature of that composition ^B in such a way that neither part was devoid of the Godhead, but the Godhead coalesced and harmonized with both, I mean soul and body, suitably and fittingly according to the measure of each. As, therefore, at the birth of man, the Godhead had no need to be born—being before all ages and remaining for eternity—but once having become united in the constitution of the man, it appears along with him at his very birth; so neither does It need to rise again, being eternally living; but It rises again in the one who is brought back to life by the divine power, not Itself being raised (for It has not fallen), but in Itself raising up the one who had fallen. If, therefore, the Divine ^C generally has no need of birth or resurrection, it is evident that the Passion also is accomplished, not as the Godhead suffering, but as Existing in the one who was suffering, and, through the union entered upon with him, rendering his suffering proper to Itself. For the divine nature, as has been said, having been suitably insinuated into both soul and body, and having become one with each—since, it says, "The gifts of God are without repentance"—does not withdraw from either of these, but remains perpetually. For there is nothing that separates any man from union with God, except sin; but whose life is immune from every stain of sin, his union with God can in no way be severed. ^D LV. Since, therefore, sin had no place in either, that is, in soul or body, in both accordingly it was…

^A present after the manner of either nature. But when death brought about the separation of the soul from the body, that which was composite was indeed dissolved, but that which is incomposite was not divided; rather, it existed in each part indivisibly. A proof that God was in the body is that the flesh was preserved in incorruption after death—for incorruption is entirely proper to God—and a proof that he did not depart from the soul is that through it the way into paradise was opened to the thief.

Since, therefore, the mystery was fulfilled, the divine power having entered into the twofold human nature, and having deposited the life-giving energy in each ^B related part—through the flesh in the body, and through the soul in the soul (I mean the intellectual soul, not the irrational one, for that which is mindless is beastly and not human)—then the divinity, which from the beginning was mingled with the body and the soul and had remained throughout, is raised in the resurrection of him who had died. And so Christ is said to have risen from the dead—the same being both Christ and having become so: being Christ according to his pre-eternal kingdom, but having become so when the angels announced to the shepherds the great joy which was to be for all the people at the birth of the Savior, who is, he says, Christ the Lord, appropriately named according to the word of Gabriel, who said that the Holy Spirit would come upon the Virgin and the power of the Most High would overshadow her.

He who was thus born is therefore rightly called both Christ and Lord: Lord on account of the power of the Most High, and Christ on account of the Spirit of unction. For he who is eternal is not then anointed, but rather he of whom he says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. II, 7). For "today" is the middle between the two parts of time, the past and the future. But how can the creator of the ages be born and anointed in a part of time? So the divinity ^C has neither died nor been raised: it has not died, because that which is uncompounded is not dissolved; but it is raised, because, being in that which was dissolved, it caused that which had fallen according to the law of human nature to rise again together with itself, so that by being present in each part, offering what is proper to it, it might heal the nature of bodies through the body, and that of souls through the soul; and again, by uniting through itself that which had been separated, it rises in the one who is raised.

And just as there is nothing to prevent the mystery of the dispensation concerning the resurrection from being indicated corporeally: just as if, therefore, a reed were split in two, and one were to unite the tips of the pieces of the reed at one end, the whole piece of the reed would of necessity be fitted to the other, by being joined to the opposite end through the meeting and fastening at the first end; so too the ^D presence of the soul to the body in him...

^A by means of the resurrection, brings the entire human nature—which had been cloven in two by death and divided into soul and body—into a synthesis, having harmonized in the hope of the resurrection the gathering together of those things that had been separated. And this is that which is spoken by Paul: that Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep, and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. For according to the example of the reed, on the one hand, from the side that takes its beginning from Adam, our nature was cloven through sin, with the soul being divided from the body by death. But from the side that pertains to Christ, nature again takes itself back, the division in its entirety being grown together again in the resurrection of the man who is in Christ. For this reason, therefore, we die together with Him who died for us—I do not mean this necessary and common death of our nature, for this happens even to those who do not wish it—but since it is fitting that we should die willingly and gladly with Him who died ^B voluntarily, it follows that we must discern a death that is in our own power, for it is not possible for that which happens by necessity to be an imitation of that which is voluntary. Since, then, the death that is imposed by nature upon each one happens to everyone and in every way, both to those who wish it and those who do not, and no one would ever call that which happens of necessity voluntary, for this reason we die together with Him who died voluntarily in another way, being buried by the mystical water through baptism. For, We were buried with Him, he says, through baptism into death, that the imitation of the resurrection might follow upon the imitation of the death.

LVI. But let us proceed to the next part of the discourse.

^A Therefore, the human mind is equal to the divinity, if, as Apollinaris says, the divine nature became the mind of man. For if the human nature receives in like manner either our mind, or God in the place of the mind, these would be equal to each other in magnitude and on an equal footing, if indeed the divinity is also contained in that in which the mind is contained. Just as if one were to measure out grain, or any other of the seeds, into some empty vessel, no one would say that what is measured by the same measure differs from the other in quantity; for the grain of oats is equal to the wheat, when the bushel is emptied of those seeds and applied to a different task. Therefore, if the divinity occupies the place of the mind, no one would say that the divinity is more excellent than the mind, since the human nature receives it just as it receives the latter. Either, then, the mind is equal to the divinity, as Apollinaris wishes, and in passing from its own state into that one it was not changed; or the mind is inferior to the Divine, and this, having been made from the former, was changed into the baser state. But who does not know that everything conceived within creation has fallen far short of the inaccessible and unapproachable nature, so that if anyone were to say the ^B Divine has been changed, even into a creature or a mind, the change would be equal? So if Apollinaris does not think that becoming a mind constitutes a change, nor that being mixed with man without a faculty of understanding implies change, he bears witness to that which was commingled as being immutable. But if it was not changed when it became flesh, much more did it remain in the immutable state while making the commingling with the mind. But if he accuses the change by the fact of it becoming a mind, then the appropriation to the flesh does not entirely escape the accusation of alteration.

He says further (for I omit the things in between): If after the resurrection He became God and is no longer man, how will the Son ^C of man send forth His angels? And how shall we see the Son of man coming upon the clouds of heaven? How also, even before He was united and deified, does He say: "I and the Father are one"? He discusses these things, establishing through the aforementioned points that the nature of the body was transformed in no way toward the more divine, but that the hairs, the nails, the form, the ^D figure, the description of the mass, and—

^A the interior and exterior parts of the same body remain in Christ unchanged. I, however, consider it superfluous to prove at length that one ought not to have such base and groveling thoughts about God, since the very discourse of the adversaries reveals how absurd this opinion is. But lest they think that the divine oracles contribute anything to the fabrication of this myth, I will briefly run through each of their sayings. Since, he says, the one who sends the angels at the consummation of the universe is called the Son of Man, he thinks for that reason that one must believe he will remain forever in those things that are proper to the human body. He does not remember the word of the Gospel, where in many places the Lord by his own words called God, who is over all, a man. “A man was a householder,” who let out his vineyard to tenants; and after the slaughter of his servants, he sent his only-begotten Son, whom the same tenants, casting him out of the vineyard, killed. Who was that man who sent his only-begotten Son? And who was the son who was killed outside the vineyard? And in that parable of the one who made a marriage feast for his son, does not the Scripture describe this very one as a man? What if we were to say that Christ, intending to provide for the infirmity of those who, because they despised in him a nature similar to their own, could not be brought to believe in his divinity, therefore said that the Son of Man would send angels in the last judgment, so that he might strengthen their weak and infirm minds, seized by fear, in the faith, and by the expectation of terrible things might heal their unbelief regarding those things which they saw with their own eyes? “But you will see,” he says, “the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with much power and majesty.” This surely agrees perfectly with what we previously taught, whether concerning that man who planted the vineyard and made a marriage for his son, ^C or according to the previously given meaning. And that the discourse is entirely removed from the base supposition of Apollinaris, and that such a discourse suggests that one should conceive of nothing bodily concerning him, is a clear proof from the fact that it is added to the word which signifies his appearance at the end of the ages, that then all will see the Lord in the glory of his Father—so that it must necessarily be concluded from what is said either that the Father is also endowed with a human form, so that the Son, who is to be seen in human form, may appear in the glory of the Father; or, if the majesty of the paternal glory lacks any form or visible appearance, one must acknowledge ^D the rest—namely, all that is both visible and whatever else is invisible—and also think that the Father is formed in a human way, so that the Son who appears according to the human shape may appear in the glory of the Father. But if the majesty of the paternal glory is pure from every form viewed in an outward appearance, then one must not think that he himself is fashioned in a human way, he who is promised to be seen in the glory of the Father. For the glory of a man is one thing, and the glory of the God who is over all is another. But, he says, through

speaking of the flesh to men, that "I and the Father are one." O the folly of imagining a proof that His manifestation in human form would occur after this, because the Lord said, while speaking through the flesh, that He is one with the Father! ^A Does he not then, by this statement, absolutely establish that the Father also lives precisely in the flesh? For if he who said that he is one with the Father intends for the unity to be understood not in a spiritual sense, but in a human one, as Apollinaris thinks, then the Father is that same thing which the Son was then seen to be according to man. But since the Divine is outside of all bodily concepts, the union of the Son with the Father was not, therefore, according to a human form, but according to the communion of the divine nature and power. And that these things are in this state is most clearly shown from those words which He says to Philip: "He who has seen me has seen the Father." For the precise understanding of the Son's majesty prepares one to see the archetype ^B as in an image.

As for the things that follow, because of their incoherence and unintelligibility, I shall pass over them, so that I may not spend my time in vain on foolish things; for through them he does not even make clear what he wishes to say to those who carefully follow his writing. For I cannot see what it contributes to his argument for him to say that no one snatches the sheep given to Him by the Father out of His hand, and that by the Father’s divinity He draws the sheep to Himself, and, "If Christ," he says, "is united with the Father ^C before the resurrection, how is He not united with the God who is in Him?" For this, as if he intentionally wanted to refute his own fabulations, he inserts into his own arguments, through which the separation and union of the human with the Divine is demonstrated. For he who says, "If Christ is united with the Father, how is He not united with the God in Him?"—thus also the man in Christ, being another, is united with the God in Him. These things, therefore, as they refute the error and instability of his doctrine by their very reading, I shall pass over in my discourse; but I will mention only this one thing. ^D "The Savior," he says, "suffered hunger, and thirst, and fatigue, and anguish, and sorrow." Who is this Savior? He is God, he says in the previous parts, not two Persons, as if one Person were God and another were man. Therefore, God has suffered those things which he said He suffered; and He suffers what is in no way capable of suffering, not by the necessity of a nature that is forced—as is the case with man—but by the consistency of His nature. Indeed, who will be sufficient to refute such vain notions? In what does he see a difference between the necessity of nature and the consistency of nature? For truth sees the same meaning in each; for example, what I am saying,